Navegação – Mapa do site

InícioNúmeros35ArtigosDiverting Welfare Paths: Ethnicis...

Artigos

Diverting Welfare Paths: Ethnicisation of Unemployment and Public Work in Hungary*

Caminhos divergentes de bem-estar: etnicização do desemprego e do trabalho público na Hungria
Sára Hungler e Ágnes Kende

Resumos

Uma nova visão de “democracia iliberal” foi introduzida pelo governo do partido Fidesz, liderado por Viktor Orbán, na década de 2010, marcando o fim do Estado-providência e voltando a ter como elemento central do discurso político a criação de uma sociedade laboral. A nova tendência workfarist no emprego indicou um novo rumo na política ativa do mercado de trabalho, favorecendo os regimes de trabalho público. No entanto, os regulamentos do trabalho público colocam um fardo desproporcional nos desempregados da comunidade cigana, ao mesmo tempo que ignoram os fatores que contribuem para a sua privação material. Este artigo examina o novo rumo das medidas de emprego e de desemprego, um terreno político onde o regime de workfare pode ser melhor detetado. Colocámos ênfase especial na minoria cigana e na forma como a sua situação de emprego é influenciada pelo ponto de viragem antissocial.

Topo da página

Notas da redacção

Edited by Scott M. Culp

Received on 23.01.2021
Accepted for publication on 03.09.2021

Texto integral

Introduction

  • * This article is based on the authors’ research findings during the European Commission Horizon 2020 (...)

1Historically, social policy has centred around anti-poverty measures, and poverty prevention has remained one of the main objectives in European social policy. However, European welfare states follow different strategies to secure citizen’s wellbeing and challenge income inequality. Esping-Andersen divided welfare states into three groups: the liberal regime, the conservative regime, and the social democratic regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990). His cluster theory triggered a wide debate over the various paths countries follow in their social policies. The most influential line of literature in institutional comparison has been the school of varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001). However, it was difficult to categorise newly emerging capitalist states according to the models tailored for traditional western archetypes.

2Although post-socialist countries’ social policy tends to follow the historical path and put more emphasis on the state’s responsibility in securing citizens’ wellbeing, these Central-Eastern European (CEE) countries differ in many aspects from each other, and therefore form different clusters within the region (McMenamin, 2004; Bohle and Greskovits, 2012) However, there are also commonalities which distinguish them from the other types of capitalism in the European Union (EU), and the low or relatively high level of social protection and the suppression of welfare redistribution correlate well among the CEE member states with the relative strength or weakness of civil society and the depth of the roots and traditions of the institutions of social protection (Farkas, 2016).

  • 1 Act CXXII of 1999, amending Act IV of 1991 on unemployment benefit.

3Due to the frequently changing social policy approaches, incorporating Hungary to the CEE welfare typology is increasingly challenging. The creation of a democratic political system, the shift to a market-based economy, the reorganized system of governance, and the changing social structure have created a distinctive context, as in most of the former state-socialist countries. The transformation of the political system, the development of democratic institutions, and the independence of social policy represented a very important stage in creating a welfare state. However, making cuts in social expenditure was a much needed step in order to mitigate a budgetary crisis, but in the meanwhile high unemployment contributed to the rising levels of poverty and social inequality (Tausz, 2009: 245). Already in the mid-1990s, the coalition of Socialists and Free Democrats explicitly focused their social policy on strengthening the middle classes, and the government differentiated between the deserving and the undeserving poor, introducing measures (such as subsidised house loans) which benefited the middle class. As a result of the neo-liberal economic policy trends, social benefits gradually eroded, and stricter measures were introduced to link welfare with work.1 The need to switch to a “workfare” model has become an increasingly dominant aspect of political ideology in which social assistance benefits and compulsory public work programmes started to play an increasingly important role (ibidem: 246).

  • 2 Orbán uses the term “illegal democracy” with a specific meaning, different from the one established (...)
  • 3 Some examples are the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on (...)
  • 4 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article XII paragraphs (1) and (2).

4A new vision of “illiberal democracy” was introduced by the Orbán-led Fidesz government in the 2010s, which marked the end of the welfare state, and the central element of the political discourse once again became the creation of a labour-based society.2 Their landslide victory allowed the Fidesz-KDNP coalition to re-codify major policy areas with no opposition, while attracting substantial attention from national and European institutions due to the removal of democratic guarantees from political processes.3 Major legislative bills were adopted in the social and labour fields, providing more flexibility while removing substantial elements of security. The new workfarist direction in employment and social policy was anchored in the Fundamental Law of Hungary, stating that “everyone shall be obliged to contribute to the enrichment of the community through his or her work, in accordance with his or her abilities and potential. Hungary shall strive to create the conditions that ensure that everyone able and willing to work has the opportunity to do so”.4 The Labour Code adopted in 2012 further paved the way for the workfare regime and brought in a wide range of deregulations. It increased labour market flexibility while severely curtailing collective labour rights (Kollonay-Lehoczky, 2013) yet destroyed social dialogue on a national level (Gyulavári and Kártyás, 2016).

5Even though Hungary’s economic performance has been quite strong in the past few years and robust economic growth has been witnessed with one of the highest GDP growth rates in the EU, the newly introduced social reforms dismantled the welfare state and started to build a new regime (Jakab et al., 2017) characterized by social disinvestment, which is rooted in the neoliberal scheme (Abrahamson, 2010). Radical austerity measures were introduced to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis; however, these appeared in the political discourse as necessary steps to cut back overly generous social benefits which discourage people from entering the labour market (Horváth et al., 2020). Meant to act as a disincentive, unemployment benefits were minimized, and compulsory public works programmes were introduced (Hungler and Kende, 2019). Self-responsibility became the guiding principle in social policy as well, replacing collective protection by individualistic and often punitive schemes.

6The image of a “hard-working people” whose wellbeing is jeopardized by lazy welfare recipients rose to mainstream status in public media. Populist rhetoric would often blame the Roma for all the hardships experienced in the social services. The Roma constitute one of the largest and poorest ethnic minorities in Europe, with nearly 80% of Roma living in Central and Eastern Europe. The employment rate of the estimated 600,000 to 800,000 thousand Hungarian Roma, who make up 6-8% of the population, was 23.9 percentage points lower in 2017 compared to non-Roma in the 15-64 age group (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2018). The Roma people are often depicted in official statements as lazy and purportedly living on benefit. The explanatory theory behind the prejudiced image of the Roma is anti-Gypsyism.

The core assumption of anti-Gypsyism is the inferiority and deviance of Roma. Anti-Gypsyism is about the way the majority and institutions view and treat those portrayed in the public imaginary as “Gypsy”. Unlike Romaphobia, which suggests an unreasonable fear of Roma, the term “anti-Gypsyism” encompasses direct actions against Roma and emphasises its systemic feature by bringing into discussion the role of the state in producing and reproducing this illogical racially biased fear and hostility. Anti-Gypsyism is therefore deeply embedded in social structures, especially in state institutions like the police, the military or the education system, and is constantly reproduced. (Rostas, 2017: 761)

7Public work regulations put a disproportionate burden on the Roma unemployed, interfering with their private sphere, such as the maintenance of their homes, while disregarding the contributing factors leading to their material deprivation, such as segregation and a high ratio of drop-outs in schools.

8This paper examines the new direction in employment and unemployment policy measures, a policy terrain where the workfare regime can be best detected. We put a special emphasis on the Roma minority and how their employment situation is effected by the anti-welfare turn.

1. Methodology

  • 5 Hungary has a relatively low level of union density. Union relationships with government changed af (...)

9The paper uses a mixed methodology, combining legal analysis of the relevant Hungarian regulations and policy measures and empirical research on public employment of Roma people based on a range of Hungarian and international academic and policy sources in tandem with purposely designed interviews. Four semi-structured individual interviews and two group interviews were conducted in March 2017. Two were conducted with local mayors, one of whom was the mayor of a small city in western Hungary, a person of Roma origin and a member of one of the opposition parties. The other mayor hailed from a very small, deprived village in north-eastern Hungary. Further individual interviews were conducted with the leader of a local Roma non-governmental organization (NGO) organizing public work for the people in a small village in north-eastern Hungary and a lawyer for the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights and his office. Group interviews were first carried out with two people from a public work trade union5 in Budapest and then with Roma women (six participants) working in a public work scheme in a small, deprived village in north-eastern Hungary. Requests for interviews to add to the scope of this research were sent to state officials, such as the Secretary of State for Employment in the Ministry of National Economy, but no one responded to our invitations to participate.

10In terms of age, interviewees ranged from 20 to 60 years of age. Seven interviewees were female, and five were male, eight were Roma, while four of them were non-Roma. The duration of the interviews was between one and one and a half hours. We described the topic and aim of the research and all other important information about the research (e.g. voluntary participation, anonymity) before the interviews. The language of the interviews was Hungarian, and all interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.

2. The “Workfarist” Turn in Hungary

  • 6 Mandiner.hu (2011), “Orbán: Élet-halál kérdés a munkanélküliség csökkentése”, 8 June. Accessed on 2 (...)
  • 7 Hungarian News Agency (2012), “Orbán: nem jóléti állam épül”, 18 October. Accessed on 21.10.2021, a (...)

11Before the outbreak of the global financial crisis in September 2008, Hungary managed to achieve substantial fiscal consolidation gains and the general government deficit shrank from 9.4% in 2006 to 3.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008. However, following the outbreak of the crisis Hungary faced one of the most severe recessions among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries –and among other transition countries – with a steep fall in the real gross domestic product in 2009, which was double the OECD average (OECD, 2010). Hungary received financial assistance from international organisations, but the recession left deep marks. A crisis intensified the effects of the collapse in trade on investor-confidence in forint-denominated assets. To ease the devaluation pressure, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the World Bank authorized a combined credit package of EUR 20 billion in November 2008. The arguments concerning the much-needed reforms were centred on the need for a major social and economic transformation. As the Prime Minister stated in a conference speech in the 2011 World Economic Forum, “reducing unemployment is a matter of life or death for Hungary […] to achieve our goals we need a complete reform of the labour market and the restructuring of the economy”.6 This argument was complemented later with the rejection of the welfare society. Orbán stated many times that Hungary was deconstructing the welfare state, which lacked competitiveness, and instead it was building a work-based society in which no one would deserve any support from the state unless he or she contributed to the economy.7

  • 8 Explanatory memorandum attached to Act No I of 2012 (Labour Code).
  • 9 You can find a detailed analysis of the issue by Bíró Nagy et al. (2012), “Munkahelyteremtés Magyar (...)

12Against this background, a new Hungarian Labour Code came into effect in 2012, with the main objective of increasing the employment rate by promoting employers’ competitiveness.8 The crucial question concerning the success of the new employment policy was whether these new flexible rules would serve the work-based economy as envisaged by the Fundamental Law and create “one million new jobs within 10 years” as promised to people in the 2010 Fidesz electoral campaign.9

2.1. Public Work Programmes as an Activation Measure for Roma

13In certain cases, subsidized employment could serve as an effective tool for expanding job opportunities, especially if certain vulnerable groups – most importantly people with disabilities – are concerned (Messing, 2013). However, the least successful programme type in subsidized employment is the public sector (public work programmes) (Kluve and Schmidt, 2002; Kluve, 2010). Countries with considerable Roma populations – Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Spain – represent a wide range of how labour market policies are designed and implemented. Data shows that direct job creation (public works schemes) plays a marginal role in most countries examined, except Hungary, where these schemes form the central element of active labour market policies (ALMP) (Figure 1). Regarding Roma participation, with the only exception being Spain, large scale state-run active labour market programmes are typically implemented by public institutions without partnership with Roma organisations or communities (Messing, 2013). Organisations representing Roma communities are also excluded from the phase of policy design or ex-ante impact assessment, and the lack of cooperation has negative consequences in relation to both matters of equality and policy efficiency. A further direct consequence is that only the least beneficial ALMP, public employment, reaches out to Roma communities sufficiently; thus, these programmes rarely enhance Roma inclusion (Messing, 2015).

Figure 1 – Public Expenditure in Direct Job Creation (% of GDP)

Figure 1 – Public Expenditure in Direct Job Creation (% of GDP)

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Eurostat data.

2.2. Social Reforms Supporting the Workfare Model

14Welfare policy has been increasingly subordinated to the political struggle between the Left and the Right. The Conservative FIDESZ-KDNP government after 2010 promoted a workfare agenda. Building a workfare regime meant that the government had curbed access to disability benefits and early pensions, abolished vocational early pensions, reduced the amount and duration of unemployment benefits, and tightened behavioural conditions both by introducing unprecedentedly harsh sanctions and by extending the public works programme. According to Scharle and Szikra (2015) the growing political demand for regulating the unemployed may have originated from various sources. The possible factors may include government failure in tackling “long-term unemployment, public opinion maintaining the work ethic of the Socialist era, local tensions arising from long-term unemployment and the lack of capacity in local municipalities to tackle it, and last but not least, the revival of the Conservative political tradition of workfare” (ibidem: 223). The government introduced measures that were “overtly of punitive nature. The most serious of these measures was the radical reduction of the level of – the already conditional – social benefits for those who were not participating in public work” (Vidra, 2018: 74).

15The social welfare subsidy system was subject to major changes in 2015, and regular social aid was abolished. Instead, benefits for poor health and childcare benefit were introduced, but the conditions for eligibility remained similar. Two additional benefits were terminated: the housing benefit and debt settlement support. Since these passive measures are intended to provide support for jobseekers and their families as a last resort, only those who are below the poverty threshold are eligible for these allowances.

  • 10 It is presumed that a person’s subsistence is provided if 90% of the minimum old age pension, which (...)
  • 11 Section 33 paragraph (6) of Act III of 1993.

16Eligibility criteria for the unemployment allowance (álláskeresési járadék) was tightened, meaning that the allowance would be granted to those who paid a labour market contribution (which is 1.5% of the gross wage) for at least 360 days within a period of three years prior to losing a job. Further requirements were that a person should be actively seeking employment and that the employment agency could not offer a suitable job. The duration of eligibility would depend on the contribution: ten days of contribution equals one day of eligibility to unemployment allowance, but the maximum duration is 90 days, which is the lowest in OECD countries (Figure 2). After the job seekers allowance expired, a person would become eligible for job substitute allowance (foglalkoztatást helyettesítő támogatás, FHT) if his/her subsistence could not otherwise be provided10 and the person had no other income, was registered as jobseeker and chose to cooperate with the employment office. Also eligible were those whose unemployment allowance had expired and met the above criteria. It is important to note that the FHT is not a per capita benefit but is provided for the household as only one person is eligible for the FHT in the household, unless another person is receiving health-detriment allowance or childcare benefit.11

Figure 2 – Maximum Duration of Unemployment Benefits in OECD Countries

Figure 2 – Maximum Duration of Unemployment Benefits in OECD Countries

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on OECD TaxBenefit Models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives).

  • 12 Section 42/E of Act LXXXIII of 1997; Section 23 of Act No LXXXIV of 1998.
  • 13 Section 34 paragraph (4) of Act III of 1993.
  • 14 Section 34 paragraph (3) of Act III of 1993.
  • 15 Act CVI of 2011, Section 1 paragraphs (4a)-(4b).

17This scheme is particularly disadvantageous for low-income families or those with small children. Those who are receiving any form of maternity and child care benefits are not eligible,12 as well as those who are incarcerated or sentenced to imprisonment. The FHT is suspended during public work. Statutory law also provides for further sanctions. The payment of the FHT is suspended for one month for those who are convicted for being engaged in informal work.13 The payment is suspended for 36 months for those who are not cooperating with the employment office or for those who have violated the public work programme as specified above.14 Jobseekers’ eligibility for the FHT is strictly linked to the participation in public work programmes and statutory law has many disciplinary elements as well. Individuals whose public work is suspended are not eligible for any benefits for that period.15 Due to the employment market’s characteristics, unemployed Roma are more often subject to punitive measures and loss of eligibility, as they are more likely to be engaged in informal work.

3. Public Work Programme

18The practice of tying the provision of benefits to useful work for the general public and society and its enforcement via the application of financial sanctions, the so-called workfare (work and welfare) system, can be said to originate in the United States. The use of these programmes only spread in the developed and developing world since the 1990s. “The introduction of this system spurred heated social debates, as did the phenomenon of welfare dependency, which is often mentioned to justify the system” (Kálmán, 2015: 45).

19In times of economic crises, the state (mediating between economic processes and prevailing ideologies of the political elites) may consider direct job-creation as an effective means of tackling the devastating effects of joblessness. “Following Polanyi’s idea of the ‘double movement’, in times when the self-regulating market fails (such as recently, during and after the 2008 crisis), social dislocations ‘naturally’ lead to social protectionism and different forms of political intervention” (Czirfusz, 2015: 129). The linkage between welfare provisions and public works (workfare) can be understood in the context of activation interventions directed at the unemployed and the fight against poverty. Activation measures try to facilitate the return of the long-term unemployed and other disadvantaged groups to the labour market (Kálmán, 2015).

3.1. The History of Public Work Programme in Hungary

  • 16 Labour Ministry Decree 6/1996 (VII. 6.).
  • 17 The amount of the minimum old age pension, which serves as a calculation basis for social benefits, (...)
  • 18 A special edition was dedicated to this issue, at Fazekas and Molnár (2010).

20During the post-WWII period in which the communist regime was in power, work (possibly within the collective property) was a legal duty, and non-compliance was punished by criminal and administrative sanctions. Unemployment started to become a problem with the emergence of the market economy in the late 1980s. Reintegrating into the labour market those who lost their job due to factors that could not be attributed to the applicants required the government to launch a programme called Work Programme for Public Benefit in 1987. The first public work programme in its contemporary meaning began in 1996, intended to tackle long-term unemployment.16 This programme underwent major reforms in 2000, when the regular social benefits first became conditional to participation in the public work scheme. In 2006 the programme was renamed the Integration Programme; the change in the name was triggered by the new conditions related to the desire to have participants cooperate more intensively. In 2009 a new programme, Road to Work was launched, targeting low-educated persons suffering from long-term unemployment. Substantial increase of the budget available for public work programmes was made available to finance the programme; the funds were managed by local governments. Individuals who drew regular social benefits but were nevertheless capable of working were redirected to the new scheme, and when no suitable public work was available for them, they were entitled to a so-called availability allowance, equal to the minimum amount of old-age pension (HUF 28,500 or EUR 97 per month).17 Anyone who was unwilling to take up the work offered was excluded from the social benefit scheme. Criticism of the scheme arose because public workers receiving less than the minimum wage could not break out from their unemployed status (Szikra, 2013, 2014). Without training and mentoring, the programme did not increase participants’ possibility to return to the labour market (Csoba, 2010). Research showed the low efficacy of the programme, due to lack of structural changes.18

3.2. The Current Hungarian Workfare Model

21With the deepening of the economic crisis, the unemployment rate shot up (Figure 3). Due to the lack of structural employment policy reform, the missing jobs were largely created through extensive public work schemes. The peak of the public work scheme was in 2014, when the estimated number of workers engaged in the public works programme was around 300,000, which was 14.4% of the total workforce at that time. An extremely high budget of HUF 340 billion (EUR 1094 million) was allocated for this active labour market programme in 2014. Even though this radical workfare regime affected hundreds of thousands of vulnerable workers, public works schemes were removed from the protection of labour law measures, and the newly adopted regulations intensified the obligation and local dependency criteria of participants.

Figure 3 – Unemployment Rates as a Percentage of the Labour Force

Figure 3 – Unemployment Rates as a Percentage of the Labour Force

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Eurostat data.

22Surveys confirm that those in the periphery of the labour market work to a significant extent in both registered and unregistered employment (Farkas et al., 2014; Koltai, 2013); moreover, public works do not act as a deterrent, but instead are perceived in some regions as an opportunity (Kálmán, 2015). In the words of a Roma public worker, “we won’t be able to find employment anywhere. Neither part-time nor full-time. For me there’s only public work as an opportunity. Because I am Roma” (Koltai, 2015: 109).

  • 19 Constitutional Court Decision 30/2017. (XI. 14.) ABH.

23From a social law point of view, public work in Hungary has a rather mixed nature: on the one hand, public workers are not counted in official unemployment statistics; thus from this perspective it is treated as an active labour market policy measure. On the other hand, public work wages and job seekers allowances are treated as social allowances, which links public work to passive labour market measures. Public work indeed enjoys many attributes of employment: the work is performed under the supervision of the (public) employer, based on its instructions and for remuneration. A recent decision of the Constitutional Court to some extent supports the former argument.19 The Constitutional Court indeed reinforces the argument that public work is a part of the social benefit scheme which does not justify the severely detrimental working conditions attached to it. Public workers, many of whom are Roma, are discriminated against as compared to regular employees, without any constitutionally acceptable reasons.

  • 20 While wages in the public sector have been growing, wages in the public works scheme have decreased (...)

24The public works programme became the central element of the ruling government's fight against unemployment. While other active labour market policy measures are underfinanced (European Commission, 2020), the expensive yet inefficient public works schemes have been reduced, but are still maintained (direct job creation in Figure 4).20 It is also visible that job seekers’ allowances and other direct cash transfers to the unemployed have been drastically cut. One of the public work trade union leaders says that he understands if the government introduces public employment – temporarily – for the low educated people in times of crisis, when these people do not have any possibility to enter the labour market. The problem, he says, is that “this public work scheme stayed here in a prosperous economy, and it distorts the labour market”.

Figure 4 – Public Spending on Labour Markets in Hungary, Out-of-Work Income Maintenance and Support, % of GDP, 2000-2018

Figure 4 – Public Spending on Labour Markets in Hungary, Out-of-Work Income Maintenance and Support, % of GDP, 2000-2018

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on OECD database (https://data.oecd.org/​socialexp/​public-spending-on-labour-markets.htm).

  • 21 According to the Labour Code, typical employment contracts are open-ended. Section 45 paragraph (2) (...)

25The explicit aim of public works is to replace benefits. This approach removes public works from the circle of labour market measures and places public works among social provisions intensifying the obligation and local dependency criteria making people living in poverty more and more vulnerable (Koltai, 2015). However, from a labour law point of view, public work is an atypical form of work which is based on a fixed term contract concluded between the public worker and the public employer,21 the public work scheme has been used as a quasi-punishment since its introduction in 2008. The organisers of public works themselves think that these types of works do not develop skills and competencies that might open the door to jobs in the open labour market. The mayor of a very small, deprived village in north-eastern Hungary where all the public workers are Roma said that “if the public work wage was not subsidized by the state, then it would be nothing at all, it would be a loss”.

4. Employment Situation of Roma

  • 22 Although the Roma are the largest ethnic minority in Europe, there is no systematic data collection (...)
  • 23 According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the AROP (People who are “at-risk-of poverty (...)
  • 24 67.8% in 2015 (Hungarian Central Statistical Office). According to the Hungarian research institute (...)

26The Roma constitute one of the largest and poorest ethnic minorities in Europe. Nearly 80% of Roma live in Central and Eastern Europe. The size of the Roma population is hard to assess because ethnic data are not collected in accurate and systematic ways.22 The percentage of Roma as part of Hungary’s total population is 6-8%. Little representative evidence exists on the wellbeing of the Roma, but all available data indicate widespread poverty, low formal employment, low education, poor health and social exclusion in all countries (Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011). The at-risk-of-poverty rate for Roma is almost five times higher than for non-Roma,23 and two thirds of Roma suffer from severe material deprivation.24

27The employment rate of Roma in Hungary is one of the highest in the EU (36%) (FRA, 2016), but a significant proportion (41.6%) are employed in the public works scheme. Their integration in the open labour market is thus very limited (Figure 5). Public works play a significant role in social policy, particularly in disadvantaged areas of the country, but it also creates the risk of becoming dependent on benefits and constitutes a trap of inactivity for individuals relying on social assistance benefits in those periods between living on benefits and participating in public works.

Figure 5 – Activity Rate (%) Roma and Non-Roma Population (Ages 15-64) in 2015

Figure 5 – Activity Rate (%) Roma and Non-Roma Population (Ages 15-64) in 2015

Source: Roma Integration (2015).

28The labour market disadvantage is primarily a result of the dramatically low level of education of Roma when compared to the rest of the population forming a majority in Hungary, and regular public work programmes are unable to address these disadvantages. Regarding education, 16% of Roma people between 15 and 64 years of age have not completed primary education and 63% have only primary education. 15% of Roma people completed vocational school or training. Concerning housing and living conditions, the proportion of Roma people who live in small villages or hamlets is significantly higher than that of non-Roma people, which poses a huge obstacle to entering the primary labour market. As one of our interviewee, a Roma NGO leader stated:

  • 25 Interview conducted by the authors on March 23, 2018.

20-year-old Roma young people do not know how to read and write. The school is totally segregated in the village, only Roma children attend the school, and it does not teach them anything. Even if they finish the vocational schools – but in most cases, they drop out of school – they come back here to the village and they start working in public work. The education of Roma children is screwed up. (Roma NGO leader)25

29Discrimination, combined with high costs of employment and the fact that the recession hit the classic employment sectors of Roma disproportionately hard (e.g. manufacturing industry), results in the extensive exclusion of Roma from official employment, pushing them towards informal segments of the labour market. Köllő and Scharle emphasised that employment of Roma deviates considerably from typical employment in that: 1) it is usually irregular (casual); 2) it includes activities that are not considered as employment (collecting and trading with goods, waste recycling); 3) it is unstable; and 4) it is outside the scope of the formal and sometimes even the legal labour market (Köllő and Scharle, 2012). There is significant informal, unreported and sometimes unpaid work hidden behind the recorded low employment rates (Messing, 2015). A significant number of Roma work outside the official, declared labour market and perform temporary jobs in the grey and black job markets which are the lowest paid and the most vulnerable sectors. There is a wide range of unofficial work including collecting used or discarded goods and performing other undeclared commercial activities, such as selling products at local agricultural markets (Bodrogi and Kádár, 2013).

30Employment programmes for the Roma population entails considerable political risk in Hungary, where prejudice and negative attitudes towards Roma are widespread, not only within the population but also among politicians and employees of public institutions. Governments are therefore reluctant to explicitly target Roma (Messing, 2015). Targeted ALMP programmes have been more successful in labour market integration of Roma unemployed. One of the supported programmes of the European Commission, “Kiútprogram Self-employment and Microcredit Programme” helped to increase participants’ inclusion in decision-making at a local level and presenting them as examples for their peer group. Participants were also assisted in liberating themselves from the debt trap, by gaining social respect through entering the legal labour market and becoming contributing members of society.

31There are measurable differences in those factors that influence the employment opportunities for Roma people as compared to non-Roma people. Education and housing conditions of Roma people are below the average of the non-Roma population. The proportion of young people however is much higher, and the ratio of elderly is significantly lower, this latter figure explainable by the bad health condition of elderly Roma people, which affects their labour market activity. On average Roma people tend to raise more children than non-Roma families, which may explain the below-average employment ratio of Roma women, which is less than 30%.

5. Ethnicisation of Public Work Programmes

32Since the Roma minority is strongly affected by long-term unemployment in Hungary, the public work scheme has also shaped ethnic distinctions in play and contributed to the ethnicisation of poverty. The Roma’s disadvantaged situation appears as something that also derives from the character of their ethnicity. Therefore, in many cases, workfare policies implicitly contribute to the ethnicisation of poverty. Most critics of the public work scheme have pointed out that it has strengthened the ethnic division between the Roma and non-Roma and as local governments became employers, it has put extensive powers into their hands and rendered the subsistence of the public workers highly dependent on the decision of the local authorities. “Consequently, the Public Work Scheme has considerably strengthened hierarchical, paternalistic relationships between the local authorities (mayors) and the poor” (Kovai, 2019: 148).

5.1. Mainstreaming Racial Discrimination

  • 26 Index (2020), Orbán szerint a gyöngyöspatai cigány diákok szegregációs kárpótlása mindenféle munka (...)

33EU’s regulatory framework for social policy – outlined mostly in soft law measures – was costly (especially its active labour market policies) and has been politically contested all over Central-East Europe (Lendvai-Bainton, 2019). Even though Hungary used to have generous cash transfers, particular forms of social polarisations, especially ethnic and regional disparities have remained strong, making the whole welfare regime fragile (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). The Roma have been described as the undeserving poor and mainstreamed in everyday politics and practice (Škobla and Filčák, 2019). The Hungarian Minister of Trade and Foreign Affairs once stated that Hungarian society “is burdened enough by the unemployment of the Roma community”, and even the Prime Minister claimed that “one cannot live from crime, nor welfare” (Juhász, 2017). After the Curia (Hungarian Appeals Court) ruled that, altogether, 100 million Hungarian forints must be paid as compensation to those Roma students whose education had suffered due to racial segregation, the leader of Fidesz claimed that the decision was a selfish, self-centred “fundraising mission” put in place by George Soros. Orbán in his radio speech on the State-owned nationwide channel stressed that the decision hurts society’s “sense of justice” since the people of this town will see that the town’s Roma community receives a “significant sum without having to work for it in any way” and he would wonder why the “members of an ethnically dominant group living with me in one community, in one village, receive a large amount [of money] without working for it”.26

  • 27 Before the 2015 amendment, local authorities had the right to decide on individual eligibility.

34The ethnicization of social policy is visible through the allocation of resources, as well. Eligibility for social benefits is now at the discretion of district governmental offices.27 These offices, per their own decrees, can set eligibility criteria for social benefits with a broad margin of appreciation, especially concerning merit-based allowances. This enhances local hierarchies and increases the powerlessness of participants, especially since public employment is tied to social allowances.

5.2. Roma on Public Work

35Empirical evidence suggests that beneficiaries of direct job creation programmes, such as public work programmes, are most often unemployed Roma. The Ombudsman reported that the public work programmes create “discriminatory settings” for Roma, who face discrimination in some municipalities when applying for and taking part in public work programmes. Similarly, the Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities (NEKI, in the original acronym) expressed the opinion that the public work system makes it possible for local councils, the most common public employers, to abuse their powers and take discriminatory actions in connection with Roma public workers (Meneses et al., 2018).

36The proportion of Roma among public workers cannot be defined exactly, as official data disaggregated by ethnicity is not collected in this regard (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2015). The employment of the Roma population within the total employment is only 2%, while their rate of the total population is around 8% and their proportion in public employment is around 20% (Figure 6).

Figure 6 – Number of total and Roma population in employment and in public employment

Figure 6 – Number of total and Roma population in employment and in public employment

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Hungarian Central Statistical Office. Hungarian Labour Force Survey 2014-2018 (https://www.ksh.hu/​docs/​hun/​xftp/​idoszaki/​munkerohelyz/​munkerohelyz17.pdf).

37Considering that a large proportion of public workers are Roma, the Hungarian public work programme may constitute indirect discrimination based on ethnic origin prohibited by the EU Race Directive. Article 3 (1) of the Race Directive stipulates that indirect discrimination is prohibited in relation to employment and working conditions, including dismissals. Detrimental conditions of public work especially related to holidays, suspension and dismissal are arguably not justified objectively by a legitimate aim. Even if we consider the policy aims of public work as legitimate, e.g. to exclude the “idle poor from social rights”, the means of achieving this aim are not appropriate and necessary. It might be argued that the Hungarian public work programme undermines the achievement of the objectives of the attainment of a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity by indirectly discriminating against unemployed Roma people.

38Roma public worker mentioned that non-Roma public workers are placed in “invisible” places as in the schools, in kindergartens, in social institutions or in the office of the local government while Roma public workers are placed in the “visible places” of the village, as in the streets to do cleaning and similar works that would make them feel very humiliated. As the Roma NGO leader says, “the non-Roma public workers are hidden in the office of the local government, they do not go into the streets”.

39In the smaller settlements, e.g., in villages, the mayors organize the public work, deciding on which participants will perform which type of work. The majority of public workers, especially Roma people, live in the most deprived regions in Hungary. These vulnerable people’s lives strongly depend on the mayor’s personality, as stressed by the Ombudsman’s Reports. Humaneness, flexibility, racist or anti-racist attitudes strongly influence how Roma public workers can work and live in these villages. Almost all the interviewees assume political reasons behind the public work scheme. According to one of our interviewees, a Roma NGO leader,

  • 28 Interview conducted by the authors on March 23, 2018.

there is no professionalism behind the public employment, only political calculation: the government strengthens the mayors giving them the power to organize public work, so if the mayor wants to stay in power for the next cycle, he threatens the public workers that if they do not vote for the ruling party in the national election, or for the prevailing mayor at the local elections, they will lose their job. (Roma NGO leader)28

40The trade union leader puts the same idea in even harsher terms: “feudalism is being strengthened in these villages, as these people are totally vulnerable to the local power”. The Roma NGO leader says: “these people are afraid of speaking up in their own interest because they are afraid they will not be allowed to work” (and thus receive benefits).

41NEKI received more than a hundred complaints regarding the implementation of the public work system. The complaints are connected to the following issues: insufficient working conditions (employers are failing to comply with safety regulations, lack of proper tools, access to a WC on site); the requirement of a 30-day employment is practically impossible to meet in many cases where there is simply not enough public work positions offered; public-work-related trainings are not organized; wages are not paid on time; public employers (mostly local councils) are often using their powers to intimidate or pressure Roma by threatening them with excluding them from public work positions or dismissing them from public work. In both instances the affected persons are losing their right to public benefits for a given time. The experience of NEKI shows that institutions whose duty it is to investigate complaints regarding the compliance with work safety regulations and the rules relating to working conditions rarely carry out thorough and proper investigations.

42The Roma mayor of a city in western Hungary says that “these people are low educated and vulnerable. It is hard to imagine that they come to the mayor’s office and turn the tables on the mayor saying we want our rights. They are afraid of the local power; they are afraid of being fired or they will not be offered public work next time”.

43As local governments are not obliged to organize public work for all the unemployed in their area, many people fail to meet the requirement of 30-days attendance in such programmes, leading to their exclusion from social assistance. “This loophole is blatantly misused by some racist mayors who have mainly excluded the Roma from this program” (Scharle and Szikra, 2015: 254). In many cases, the Roma are not given enough information about public work programmes and are often put in extremely humiliating conditions if they are included. Unemployed households are increasingly isolated, especially in small villages. No less than 90% of Hungarian Roma live in severely deprived circumstances, including no possibility of eating meat every second day or affording proper heating during the winter (Szívós and Tóth, 2013).

5.3. Evaluation of the Hungarian Employment Policy

44Public work programmes had been financed from the large-scale restructuring of active labour market policies; however, there was no comprehensive evidence-based evaluation of running active labour market policies that would back the need for expanding the scale of public work programmes. At the same time, trainings were cut back, despite the growing need for skilled workers (European Commission, 2012). The lack of mobility has been one of the major obstacles for unemployed to find paid employment in the primary labour market (European Commission, 2012; OECD, 2012). Concerns were raised about the double purpose of public works schemes in targeting social inclusion and activation at the same time, as the latter element was rather subtle. Moreover, there is a risk that the drastic cut in unemployment benefit, together with the reduced capacities of the Public Employment Service, would result in channelling and locking people into public works.

45This threat is definitely more viable for the Roma unemployed. Arguably, public work schemes seldom give access to the primary labour market, as they do not encourage job searching in more employment-rich regions and have a low training content (OECD, 2021: 59). Although the schemes pay wages that are above social transfer, no progress has been made in improving the adequacy of social assistance and unemployment benefits (European Commission, 2020). These programmes are rather unsuccessful as active labour market measures, as until recently only 10%-12% of enrolees have subsequently found employment in the primary labour market (OECD, 2020). Moreover, these schemes have even more limited success in integrating vulnerable groups, especially Roma, into the labour market (European Commission, 2020: 26). While decreasing in size, the public works scheme continues to be the main active labour market policy, both in terms of spending and the number of participants, employing over 2% of the workforce (European Commission, 2020). To provide adequate support for those who lost their jobs, phasing out the public works schemes and rebalancing active labour market policy spending towards job assistance would be more desired (OECD, 2019: 98), while the extension of the duration of unemployment benefits would be necessary to provide sufficient income support during employment transitions (OECD, 2020).

Conclusion

46Roma employment deviates significantly from typical employment in a way that is dominantly irregular, includes activities which are usually not considered as employment (like waste recycling, trading goods), is unstable, and is outside the scope of the formal or even legal labour market. There are few employment policies in place, some of them are targeting specifically marginalised Roma communities, some of them targeting groups according to vulnerability traits, such as low education level. The most important element of active labour market policy in Hungary is public work. Empirical evidence proved that the beneficiaries of direct job creation programmes, such as public work programmes, are most often unemployed Roma.

47The most important finding is that Roma beneficiaries are trapped in the circle of welfare subsidies and public work, where participants can recurrently become beneficiaries, and no additional support is provided for them to return to the primary labour market, partially because activities offered in the frame of public work (such as sweeping streets back and forth or collecting sand in buckets) do not develop new skills. These activities do not have any added value; therefore, it enhances local hierarchies and increases the powerlessness of Roma participants, especially since public employment is tied to social allowances.

48The social welfare system and the ratio of means-tested and merit-based measures was significantly modified in 2015. Under the current system both unemployment measures and family allowance are merit-based, with people being entitled to benefits if they cooperate with the employment office and participate in public work programmes. Moreover, due to the low level of social welfare subsidies and public work wages, beneficiaries cannot maintain dignified living conditions for themselves and their families, which further increase marginalisation and social exclusion.

  • 29 Unemployment has drastically increased since the outbreak of the COVID-19; in August 2020 368 500 j (...)

49Arguably, the government has no other solution to tackle unemployment than public work, and once a large number of people hit the job market, the only labour market policy measure has to be reserved for the meritorious.29 Thus, due to limited resources, the idle poor will more likely be excluded disproportionately from these programmes, which are, for their part, one of the most important sources of income for many families, and the re-introduced restriction will likely contribute further to the ethnicisation of public employment.

Topo da página

Bibliografia

Abrahamson, Peter (2010), “European Welfare States Beyond Neoliberalism: Toward the Social Investment State”, Development and Society, 39(1), 61-95.

Bíró Nagy, András; Kadlót, Tibor; Varga, Áron (2012), “Munkahelyteremtés Magyarországon”. Budapest: Policy Solutions/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Bodrogi, Bea; Kádár, András (2013), Racism and Related Discriminatory Practices in Employment in Hungary. ENAR Shadow Report 2012-2013. Iceland: European Network Against Racism.

Bohle, Dorothee; Greskovits, Béla (2012), Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2015), Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 – Hungary. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State.

Csoba, Judit (2010), “Job Instead of Income Support: Forms and Specifics of Public Employment”, Review of Sociology of the Hungarian Sociological Association, 2(6), 46-69.

Czirfusz, Márton (2015), “Spatial Inequalities of Public Works Employment”, in Károly Fazekas; Júlia Varga (eds.), The Hungarian Labour Market 2015. Budapest: Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 128-143.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.

European Commission (2012), Country Report Hungary 2012, SWD(2012) 317 final. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2017), Country Report Hungary 2017, SWD(2017) 82 final/2. Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2020), Country Report Hungary 2020, SWD(2020) 516 final. Brussels: European Commission.

Farkas, Beáta (2016), Models of Capitalism in the European Union. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Farkas, Zsombor; Molnár, György; Molnár, Zsuzsanna (2014), A közfoglalkoztatási csapda (The public work trap). Budapest: Magyar Szegénységellenes Hálózat.

Fazekas, Károly; Molnár, György (eds.) (2010), “Közelkép: a válság munkapiaci hatásai (Close-up: the impact of the crisis on the labour market). Munkaerőpiaci Tükör. Budapest: MTA KTI.

FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2016), Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey.

Gyulavári, Tamás; Kártyás, Gábor (2016), “Effects of the New Hungarian Labour Code on Termination: Has It Become Cheaper to Fire Employees?”, Monitor Prawa Pracy, 342-351.

Hall, Peter A.; Soskice, David (2001), “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism”, in Peter A. Hall; David Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-68.

Horváth, István; Hungler, Sára; Petrovics, Zoltán; Rácz Réka (2020), “Dialogo sociale e crisi economica globale in alcuni Paesi dell’Europa centrale e orientale”, Diritti Lavori Mercati, 1, 183-194.

Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2018), Munkaerőpiaci Helyzetkép. Budapest: Hungarian Central Statistical Office.

Hungler, Sára; Kende, Ágnes (2019), “Nők a család- és foglalkoztatáspolitika keresztútján”, Pro Futuro, 9(2), 100-117.

Jakab, Nóra; Hoffmann, István; Könczei György (2017), “Rehabilitation of People with Disabilities in Hungary: Questions and Results in Labour Law and Social Law”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Arbeits- und Sozialrecht Jahresabonnement Inland, 31, 23-44.

Juhász, Attila (ed.) (2017), Az átrendeződés éve. A populista jobb és a szélsőjobb a mai Magyarországon. Budapest: Political Capital & Social Development Institut.

Kálmán, Judit (2015), “The Background and International Experiences of Public Works Programmes”, in Károly Fazekas; Júlia Varga (eds.), The Hungarian Labour Market 2015. Budapest: Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 42-58.

Kertesi, Gábor; Kézdi, Gábor (2011), “Roma Employment in Hungary after the PostCommunist Transition”, Economics of Transition, 19(3), 563-610.

Kluve, Jochen (2010), “The Effectiveness of European Labour Market Programs”, Labour Economics, 17(6), 904-918.

Kluve, Jochen; Schmidt, Christoph (2002), “Can Training and Employment Subsidies Combat European Unemployment?”, Economic Policy, 35, 409-488.

Kollonay-Lehoczky, Csilla (2013), Génmanipulált újszülött – Új munkatörvény az autoriter és a neoliberálsi munkajogi rendszerek határán. Budapest: Károli Gáspár Református Egyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kara.

Koltai, Luca (2013), “A közfoglalkoztatás szerepe válság idején az európai országokban”, Munkaügyi Szemle, 1, 27-38.

Koltai, Luca (2015), “The Values of Public Work Organisers and Public Workers”, in Károly Fazekas; Júlia Varga (eds.), The Hungarian Labour Market 2015. Budapest: Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 101-111.

Kovai, Cecília (2019), “Permanent Wage Labour as a Norm. Workfare Policy and Everyday Experiences of Precariousness in a Small Hungarian Former Industrial Town”, in Péter Csizmadia; Dorottya Szikra (eds.), Social Science Review. Labour Relations and Employment Policies in Times of Volatility, 7, 143-161.

Köllő, János; Scharle, Ágota (2012), “The Impact of the Expansion of Public Works Programs on Long-Term Unemployment”, in Károly Fazekas; Gábor Kézdi (eds.), The Hungarian Labour Market 2012. Budapest: Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 123-137.

Lendvai-Bainton, Noémi (2019), “Welfare Trajectories in Central and Eastern Europe”, in Sofiya An; Tatiana Chubarova; Bob Deacon (eds.), Social Policy, Poverty, and Inequality in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Stuttgart: Agency and Institutions in Flux, 263-283.

McMenamin, Iain (2004), “Varieties of Capitalist Democracy: What Difference Does East-Central Europe Make?”, Journal of Public Policy, 24(3), 259-274.

Meneses, Maria Paula; Araújo, Sara; Ferreira, Sílvia; Safradin, Barbara (2018), Comparative Report on the Types Of Distributive Claims, Interests and Capabilities of Various Groups of the Population Evoked in The Political and Economic Debates at the EU and at The Nation State Level. Coimbra: ETHOS Consortium.

Messing, Vera (2013), Active Labour Market Policies With An Impact Potential On Roma Employment in Five Countries of the EU. Brussels: Neujobs FP7 Project.

Messing, Vera (2015), “Policy Puzzles with the Employment of Roma”, in Miroslav Beblavy; Maselli Ilaria; Marcela Veselkova (eds.), Green, Pink or Silver: The Future of Labor in Europe. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 174-196.

OECD (2010), Economiy Surveys: Hungary. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD (2012), Reducing Income Inequality While Boosing Economic Growth: Can It Be Done?. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD (2019), OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD (2020), OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD (2021), OECD Economic Surveys: Hungary. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Roma Integration (2015), “Roma Inclusion Index 2015”. Budapest: Decade of Roma Inclusion Secretariat Foundation. Accessed on 31.10.2021, at https://www.rcc.int/romaintegration2020/files/user/docs/Roma%20Inclusion%20Index%202015.pdf.

Rostas, Iulius (2017), “Antigypsyism, Education and the Media: Ways Forward”, Global Studies in Culture and Power, 24, 760-768.

Scharle, Ágota; Szikra, Dorottya (2015), “Recent Changes Moving Hungary away from the European Social Model”, in Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead (ed.), The European Social Model in Crisis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 229-261.

Škobla, Daniel; Filčák, Richard (2019), “Mundane Populism: Politics, Practices and Discourses of Roma Oppression in Rural Slovakia”, Sociologia Ruralis, 60(4), 773-789.

Szikra, Dorottya (2013), “Dismantling Democracy and Welfare. The Social Policy of the Orbán-Government in Hungary since 2010”. Paper presented in the 2013 Annual Conference of Research Committee Poverty, Social Welfare and Social Policy International Sociological Association, Budapest, Hungary.

Szikra, Dorottya (2014), “Democracy and Welfare in Hard Times: The Social Policy of the Orbán Government in Hungary between 2010 and 2014”, Journal of European Social Policy, 24(5), 486-500.

Szívós, Péter; Tóth, István György (2013), “Egyenlőtlenség és polarizálódás a magyar társadalomban”, TÁRKI Monitoring Jelentések 2012. Budapest: TÁRKI.

Tausz, Katalin (2009), “From State Socialism to a Hybrid Welfare State: Hungary”, in Klaus Schubert; Simon Hegelich; Ursula Bazant (eds.), The Handbook of European Welfare Systems. London: Routledge, 249-259.

Vidra, Zsuzsanna (2018), “Hungary’s Punitive Turn: The Shift From Welfare to Workfare”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 51(1), 73-80.

Zakaria, Fareed (1997), “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 22-43.

Topo da página

Anexo

Hungarian Legislation

Act No I of 2012 (Labour Code); effective of 1 June 2012.

Act No III of 1993 on social security and social benefits; effective of 27 April 1993.

Act No IV of 1991 on unemployment benefit; effective of 1 February, 2000.

Act No LXXXIII of 1997 on compulsory health insurance, effective of 25 June 1997.

Act No LXXXIV of 1998 on family benefits, effective of 1 January 1999.

Act No CVI of 2011 on public work, effective of 1 September 2011.

Constitutional Court Decision 30/2017. (XI. 14.) ABH.

Fundamental Law of Hungary; effective of 1 January 2012.

Labour Ministry Decree No. 6/1996. (VII. 6.), effective of 6 June 1996.

Topo da página

Notas

* This article is based on the authors’ research findings during the European Commission Horizon 2020 research project entitled ETHOS – Towards a European THeory Of juStice and fairness (Project No 727112: https://ethos-europe.eu) and NKFIH-134962 “Legal approaches to operationalize nationality and ethnicity (LA-ONE)”.

1 Act CXXII of 1999, amending Act IV of 1991 on unemployment benefit.

2 Orbán uses the term “illegal democracy” with a specific meaning, different from the one established in political sciences – like the definition of Zakaria (1997) –, in his interpretation it means that “elections are not won by liberalist”. For more information see HVG – Hungarian News Agency (2017), “Az illiberális demokrácia az, amikor nem a liberálisok nyernek”, HVG, 16 April. Accessed on 21.10.2021, at https://hvg.hu/itthon/20170426_orban_viktor_brusszel_europai_parlament/2/pp/64089 (in Hungarian).

3 Some examples are the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on three legal questions arising in the process of drafting the new constitution of Hungary (No 614/2011, 28 March 2011) (Venice Commission Op 614/2011); Opinion on the new Constitution of Hungary, (No. 618/2011, Venice, 17-18 June 2011) (Venice Commission Op 618/2011); European Parliament resolution on the Revised Hungarian Constitution [2011].

4 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article XII paragraphs (1) and (2).

5 Hungary has a relatively low level of union density. Union relationships with government changed after the election of 2010, which produced a landslide win for the FIDESZ-KDNP coalition. The trade unions are largely ignored and the official tripartite structures have been dismantled (see https://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Hungary/Trade-Unions [accessed on 21.10.2021]). In this situation, the public work trade union is one of the least influential trade unions today. The public work trade union became widely known when they organized a so called “Work, Bread” march in 2013. They said that that it was the inflexibility and inhumanity of this country's government which moved them to launch their protest.

6 Mandiner.hu (2011), “Orbán: Élet-halál kérdés a munkanélküliség csökkentése”, 8 June. Accessed on 23.10.2021, at https://mandiner.hu/cikk/nyomtatas/20110608_orban_elet_halal_kerdes_a_munkanelkuliseg_csokkentese.

7 Hungarian News Agency (2012), “Orbán: nem jóléti állam épül”, 18 October. Accessed on 21.10.2021, at https://www.napi.hu/magyar_gazdasag/orban_nem_joleti_allam_epul.534599.html. Another example is this speech at the GLOBSEC 2015 conference, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aVBARcSli3Q&feature=youtu.be&t=3653 (last accessed on 21.10.2021). This speech is also memorable for two additional reasons: the Prime Minister announced that Hungary does not welcome migrant workers and wants to solve its labour shortage “on a biological basis”, projecting a new demographic policy; and he compared the Hungarian economic model to a pornographic movie by saying that nobody is able to define it, but immediately recognizes it once they see it. We use citations from press releases because there are no comprehensive economic or social policy documents published; thus, the government’s policy can only be known through the Prime Minister’s regular speeches and interviews in public media.

8 Explanatory memorandum attached to Act No I of 2012 (Labour Code).

9 You can find a detailed analysis of the issue by Bíró Nagy et al. (2012), “Munkahelyteremtés Magyarországon” [“Job creation in Hungary”].

10 It is presumed that a person’s subsistence is provided if 90% of the minimum old age pension, which is equal to HUF 25,650, is attained for each unit of the family. A unit is a ratio of consumption within a family, calculated as follows: one adult counts as 1 unit, every other adult counts as 0.9, the first two children count as 0.8 and every other child counts as 0.7. Calculation is somewhat different in case of children with disability. Section 33 paragraph (2) of Act III of 1993.

11 Section 33 paragraph (6) of Act III of 1993.

12 Section 42/E of Act LXXXIII of 1997; Section 23 of Act No LXXXIV of 1998.

13 Section 34 paragraph (4) of Act III of 1993.

14 Section 34 paragraph (3) of Act III of 1993.

15 Act CVI of 2011, Section 1 paragraphs (4a)-(4b).

16 Labour Ministry Decree 6/1996 (VII. 6.).

17 The amount of the minimum old age pension, which serves as a calculation basis for social benefits, has remained unchanged up till now.

18 A special edition was dedicated to this issue, at Fazekas and Molnár (2010).

19 Constitutional Court Decision 30/2017. (XI. 14.) ABH.

20 While wages in the public sector have been growing, wages in the public works scheme have decreased relative to the minimum wage, from 77%in 2013 to 55% in 2019.

21 According to the Labour Code, typical employment contracts are open-ended. Section 45 paragraph (2) of Act I of 2012.

22 Although the Roma are the largest ethnic minority in Europe, there is no systematic data collection on Roma in the EU Member States. Therefore, the Europe 2020 statistical indicators for employment, poverty and education cannot be disaggregated for Roma. With very few exceptions, the EU-wide large-scale surveys – such as the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) – currently do not collect information on ethnicity and do not sufficiently cover ethnic minorities, including Roma.

23 According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, the AROP (People who are “at-risk-of poverty”) rate was 63.1% for Roma and 13.7% for non-Roma in 2015. Based on the 2016 survey of the Fundamental Rights Agency, 75% of Roma are at risk of poverty (FRA, 2016).

24 67.8% in 2015 (Hungarian Central Statistical Office). According to the Hungarian research institute TARKI it was 87% in 2014 (European Commission, 2017).

25 Interview conducted by the authors on March 23, 2018.

26 Index (2020), Orbán szerint a gyöngyöspatai cigány diákok szegregációs kárpótlása mindenféle munka nélkül kapott pénz”, 9 January. Access on 23.10.2021, at https://index.hu/belfold/2020/01/09/orbaninfo_gyongyospata_gyori_gyerekgyilkos_birosagi_iteletek_biralat/

27 Before the 2015 amendment, local authorities had the right to decide on individual eligibility.

28 Interview conducted by the authors on March 23, 2018.

29 Unemployment has drastically increased since the outbreak of the COVID-19; in August 2020 368 500 jobseekers were registered, which is 118 thousand more people than a year before. The number of public workers has also gradually been growing; in June and July of 2020, 93,600 public workers were registered, and the government increased the budget by HUF 5 billion during the summer (see https://www.vg.hu/kozelet/kozeleti-hirek/nott-a-kozmunkasok-szama-2-3068798/, accessed on 23.10.2021).

Topo da página

Índice das ilustrações

Título Figure 1 – Public Expenditure in Direct Job Creation (% of GDP)
Créditos Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Eurostat data.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/eces/docannexe/image/6299/img-1.png
Ficheiro image/png, 37k
Título Figure 2 – Maximum Duration of Unemployment Benefits in OECD Countries
Créditos Source: Elaborated by the authors based on OECD Tax‑Benefit Models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives).
URL http://journals.openedition.org/eces/docannexe/image/6299/img-2.png
Ficheiro image/png, 34k
Título Figure 3 – Unemployment Rates as a Percentage of the Labour Force
Créditos Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Eurostat data.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/eces/docannexe/image/6299/img-3.png
Ficheiro image/png, 26k
Título Figure 4 – Public Spending on Labour Markets in Hungary, Out-of-Work Income Maintenance and Support, % of GDP, 2000-2018
Créditos Source: Elaborated by the authors based on OECD database (https://data.oecd.org/​socialexp/​public-spending-on-labour-markets.htm).
URL http://journals.openedition.org/eces/docannexe/image/6299/img-4.png
Ficheiro image/png, 30k
Título Figure 5 – Activity Rate (%) Roma and Non-Roma Population (Ages 15-64) in 2015
Créditos Source: Roma Integration (2015).
URL http://journals.openedition.org/eces/docannexe/image/6299/img-5.png
Ficheiro image/png, 30k
Título Figure 6 – Number of total and Roma population in employment and in public employment
Créditos Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Hungarian Central Statistical Office. Hungarian Labour Force Survey 2014-2018 (https://www.ksh.hu/​docs/​hun/​xftp/​idoszaki/​munkerohelyz/​munkerohelyz17.pdf).
URL http://journals.openedition.org/eces/docannexe/image/6299/img-6.png
Ficheiro image/png, 31k
Topo da página

Para citar este artigo

Referência eletrónica

Sára Hungler e Ágnes Kende, «Diverting Welfare Paths: Ethnicisation of Unemployment and Public Work in Hungary»e-cadernos CES [Online], 35 | 2021, posto online no dia 10 dezembro 2021, consultado o 21 abril 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/eces/6299; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/eces.6299

Topo da página

Autores

Sára Hungler

ELTE Faculty of Law | Center of Social Sciences, Institute for Legal Studies
Egyetem tér 1-3, 1053 Budapest, Hungary
hungler@ajk.elte.hu
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5002-1641

Ágnes Kende

Central European University, Democracy Institute
Nador u. 13, 1051 Budapest, Hungary
kendea@ceu.edu
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0948-4780

Topo da página

Direitos de autor

CC-BY-4.0

Apenas o texto pode ser utilizado sob licença CC BY 4.0. Outros elementos (ilustrações, anexos importados) são "Todos os direitos reservados", à exceção de indicação em contrário.

Topo da página
Pesquisar OpenEdition Search

Você sera redirecionado para OpenEdition Search