1Sudan in its modern historical era has witnessed an evolution in governance structures amidst changing colonial rulers starting with the Turkish empire, followed by British colonial rule, and continuing onto national regimes post-independence. While pre-colonial kingdoms in modern Sudan such as Darfur and Sinnar employed a decentralized governance system with centralized taxation, and land use systems such as the Hawakir in Darfur (Abdul-Jalil, 2006; Harir, 1998; Spaulding, 2007), the Turkish, Mahdist and British period witnessed a shift towards centralization in connection to resource exploitation, which simultaneously widened class disparities through taxation and forced labor (Ibrahim, 1991; Spaulding, 2007; Abu Zaid, 2023). By continuing to depend on cash crop exports, consecutive Sudanese national government policies around labor migration, and service distribution have resulted in regional disparities, and wide wealth inequalities. Policies which favored extractive sectors such as oil and agriculture have resulted in community displacement and the reshaping of local hierarchy as a reward for political alignment (Mohamed, 2006; Ille et al., 2021). Inflamed by perpetual sectarian and social divisions (Abu Shouk, 2008; Bakhit, 1968) and increased militarization, Sudan would fall into a saga of rebellions and wars beginning in 1955 with the South Sudan uprising (Mahmoud, 2005; De Waal, 2015).
- 1 The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a Sudanese paramilitary group, originally formed from the Janjaw (...)
- 2 Zakaria M., 2024 (February 24). A child dies every two hours... Displaced people in Zamzam camp in (...)
- 3 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2024, September 25). Sudan: Hi (...)
- 4 Al Jazeera. (2024, February 5). A child dies every two hours in Sudan camp for displaced people: MS (...)
- 5 Walsh D., 2024 (December 11). Sudan’s gold rush at the heart of the civil war. The New York Times [ (...)
- 6 The Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja Agreement) came after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of (...)
2In mid-April 2023, war broke out in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)1. The conflict quickly spread to most of the country's states, resulting in one of the largest humanitarian crises the world has witnessed. More than 10 million citizens were displaced, turning life into a living nightmare as the fighting continued. Large regions are suffering from famine levels not seen globally in recent history. Women and children are particularly affected by the conflict; for instance, in the Zamzam camp in North Darfur, one child dies every two hour2. This camp is just one of approximately 200 camps in Darfur alone (UNOCHA, 2024; Al Jazeera. 2024, February 5).34 Amid this conflict, numerous contributions have been made, focusing on the role of resource-related disputes in fueling the war, with particular emphasis on gold (Abdelrahman, 2023; Chevrillon et al., 2024).Gold, one of the central resource in the country and the primary source of foreign currency, has emerged as one of the key resources over which various military groups and militias compete, playing a significant role in military funding even before the outbreak of conflict in Sudan5. In its recent history, gold mining in Sudan developed dramatically, particularly after the independence of South Sudan in 2011. Currently, gold employs around 13% of Sudan’s total population and is found in most of the country's states (Salah, 2018a). Initially, the growth of mining was not based on a clear strategy by the federal or local state, the private sector, or the artisanal sector, but rather was influenced by several factors. Chief among these was the rise in global gold prices, coupled with the trade deficit caused by the loss of oil, which prior to 2011 accounted for 90% of Sudan's foreign exchange sources before South Sudan’s independence where it was located. Additionally, in 2011 Sudan witnessed military developments, such as the collapse of the Abuja Agreement6 and the resurgence of conflicts in areas like South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, and the Blue Nile region, which comprise much of the rainy savanna belt in the southern part of Sudan and its southeastern and southwestern parts. These intertwined economic and political shocks were further escalated by the lack of a clear vision to address the ongoing situation following the secession.
3At the beginning of the 21st century, particularly with the global financial crisis, gold prices saw a worldwide surge. The price of a gram of gold increased from about $8 in 2000 to $13 in 2005, $30 in 2008, and around $50-$55 in 2011. Since then, gold prices have fluctuated, reaching a recent high in April 2025, where the price per gram soared to $100, marking an increase more than 1000% since the beginning of the millennium. This global price surge initially attracted laborers to gold mining in Sudan in the period between 2007 and 2008, leading to an expansion of activities and the involvement of companies, supported by the migration of large numbers of workers (Salah & Ille, 2020 ; Chevrillon, 2016).
- 7 From 2015-2023 the researcher has covered Northern State, River Nile State, Red Sea, Blue Nile, Sin (...)
4Official policies have played a crucial role in increasing the influence of military groups in the mining sector, dating back to the era of President Omar al-Bashir (1989-2019). Thus, it was not surprising that the peaceful revolution that ousted one of the oldest military governments led by the Muslim Brotherhood would place mining reform as a central goal within the transitional government's institutional and economic reform agenda (Abdelrahman et al., à paraître). Curbing the control of violence, economy, and foreign relations by military groups was seen as essential for a successful political transition toward a democratically elected civilian government (Hoffmann & Lanfranchi, 2023). Despite these ambitions, gold not only became a source of funding for military apparatuses but also one of the underlying causes of the Sudanese conflict. This paper discusses the policies governing gold and their impact on deepening, escalating, and financing the war. Using extensive primary data collected between 2015-2025 and research on the development of gold mining in Sudan, the paper is rooted on long term fieldwork which represents the basis of the case studies and analysis discussed in the paper; covering most states7 in Sudan engaged in mining. The data includes a collection of field observations, interviews and discussions with various sources and actors in the mining industry from artisanal miners, service providers in gold markets, as well as technicians, heads of private companies, traders, and government officials. The paper also employes an extensive archive collected during this period, which includes press releases from private and government entities, company registration documents, production and taxes reports, as well as laws and policies in the sector. A particular attention has been paid to the role and development of the Sudanese Minerals Resource Company, and corporate social responsibility policies, illuminating the contradiction of attempts at centralized governance and amidst private corporate expansion.
5Theoretically the paper examines the contradictions between centralized rule and the decentralized nature of gold mining production both as a technical process, and the development of its policies in parallel with development of gold mining itself and in correspondence to political and economic changes at the national and regional level. To illustrate this tension the paper first makes the argument that the unregulated development of gold mining activities in Sudan has significantly influenced the evolution of the country's mining experience. The first section begins by describing the Sudanese gold mining model, highlighting its unique hybrid feature between artisanal mining and tailing companies. The challenges faced by the government to manage to transform a decentralized and often informal production process in a centralized wealth accumulation will be exposed. In the context of the economic, political, and military crisis, the Sudanese government continuously sought to enact political changes and improve its regional or international relations in ways that would help maintain its hold on power (Abdelrahman, 2023; Hoffmann & Lanfranchi, 2023). We end this section by tracking how the Sudanese government reshaped its political vision to maintain its grip on the power by aligning with groups such as tailing company owners.
6Finaly the second section of the paper illustrates how shifts in policies regarding land ownership, the dominance of competing civilian and military private sectors over production and trade, and redistributive policies such as corporate social responsibility have been shaped by the nature of gold mining, and the inherent contradictions between the different parties in competition over the resource weather be it communities affected by mining, or the government affiliated companies. In this analysis the paper focuses on key pillars in the mining sector–the ruling authority, land, military-linked economic actors, and affected communities–shedding light on Sudan’s experience, where gold mining reshaped governance, power distribution, and its wielded influence, including regional alliances and fragmented power centers that culminated in the April 2023 war.
7The current era of gold production in Sudan is characterized by two central themes. One, the dependance on decentralized artisanal mining as the driving force of production, and second, the political instability arising from governance policies by the federal government to maintain its political and economic hegemony. We begin by exploring the rise of the hybrid artisanal-industrial mining model dependent on artisanal mining tailing reprocessing, which effectively entails the exploitation of informal labor and the outsourcing of risks on the part of tailing and production companies. Companies are protected by sanctioned monopolization policies and established links to armed factions in the state. Following this exploration, we present the paradox of centralized control over mining against the decentralized nature of gold production resulting in a fragmented authority.
8The hybrid artisanal company model forms the backbone of gold mining in Sudan. As of 2018, about 5 million people (approximately 13% of the population) were involved in gold mining (Salah, 2018a), with 2.8 million directly working in mines and many others engaged in related occupations, processing, and trade. According to official reports, artisanal mining operations have spread to 14 of Sudan's 18 states (SMRC, 2020). Even in states where activities are not officially recorded, they are carried out beyond the reach of state regulatory bodies. As discussed above, each increase in global gold prices is mirrored in Sudan by expanding activities and increased production.
- 8 Thiourea is a chemical sometimes used as a "safer" alternative to toxic cyanide for extracting gold (...)
9The Sudanese gold mining experience has been characterized by an unprecedented boom in knowledge and technologies. Initially dependent on surface gold detection devices, the sector then transitioned to deeper wells, where modern excavators (jackhammers) were used alongside traditional tools like hammers. In processing, air mills were introduced, and mercury was used in extraction, followed by more efficient water mills, which extract over 30% more than air mills, particularly with increased use of machinery like bulldozers and loaders (Abdelrahman, 2022). Additionally, air and water sieves began to be used in water channels, as well as mechanical mixers using thiourea8 (Khalatat) leading to significant expansion at each stage as techniques and local knowledge evolved, marking this period as remarkable in Sudan's history and extractive capabilities. Despite mechanization, the demand for labor continued to grow with the expansion of mining activities.
Illustration 1 - Gold detector, Northern State, Sudan
Author: Mohamed Salah Abdelrahman, 2019.
ِIllustration 2 - Air Mill, Blue Nile State, Sudan
Author: Mohamed Salah Abdelrahman, 2021.
Illustration 3 - Water Mill, Northern State, Sudan
Author: Mohamed Salah Abdelrahman, 2018.
Illustration 4 - Thiourea Mixer, River Nile, Sudan
Author: Mohamed Salah Abdelrahman, 2022.
Illustration 5 - Mining site with heavy machinery, Northern State, Sudan
Author: Mohamed Salah Abdelrahman, 2022.
10As artisanal mining began to expand in Sudan, there were initially only a few mining companies due to limited geological exploration and insufficient infrastructure, including machinery, technology, and specialized knowledge. The expansion of mining activities was preceded by economic sanctions imposed on Sudan by the United States in 1997. These sanctions created significant challenges for international companies with substantial capabilities to engage in gold mining in Sudan on an industrial scale, as they feared potential repercussions. Sanctions also limit the flow of international investment and block Sudanese capital from accessing foreign capital. Moreover, pervasive corruption under military dictatorship, a lack of transparency, and ongoing armed conflicts in large areas of the country – eight out of eighteen states – further discouraged companies.
11Despite these challenges, and contrary to expectations, these factors did not lead to the absence of mining companies. Instead, they contributed to a substantial increase in their numbers, facilitated by the emergence of new operational methods, such as companies specializing in processing artisanal mining waste. These companies focus solely on reprocessing mercury-treated waste from artisanal mining by using cyanide and more efficient machinery, achieving up to 95% gold recovery from the ore mined by artisanal miners often retrieved for free. The discovery of this method in 2012 and the opening of official licensing in 2013 led to a gradual expansion of these processing companies. This approach provided a rapid avenue for financial accumulation unriddled by the structural challenges of the Sudanese economy as the fee for entry was relatively low, requiring neither significant financial resources nor high-level technical expertise, thus encouraging many local investors to enter the field. By 2018, there were 54 tailing companies in operation, compared to only 13 industrial mining companies with processes involving comprehensive exploration and independent extraction operations (SMRC, 2020). This development led to a significant increase in Sudanese gold production, with output rising from an average of 8 tons up to 2008 to 107 tons by 2017, and mining activities have continued to expand since despite reduction in recorded production numbers (Salah, 2018b). This discrepancy is attributed to the growing domination of military producers over the sector, and the continued weakening of policies and oversight. While field data confirms sustained or even increased production, trafficking facilitated by military actors results in undercounting in official Sudanese records. The following graph illustrates these trends.
Illustration 6 - Yearly gold production estimates in Sudan
Source: Bank of Sudan (retrieved in September 2024).
12It is clear that this increase in production was primarily driven by the expansion of artisanal mining, as indicated by both the field expansion and official figures showing the contribution of different sectors to gold production.
Illustration 7 - Percentage of mode of production against total production
Source: Abdelrahman, 2022.
- 9 The tripartite Contract, introduced in 2017 by the Sudanese Resource Mining Company.
13This development also created a deep interconnection between artisanal production and tailing company production, as companies that process mining waste rely entirely on artisanal mining. In 2017, a new policy9 was introduced allowing concession companies with mining blocks to establish a tripartite agreement between the company, the state, and the artisanal miner. Under this agreement, artisanal miners work within the companies' blocks, selling raw ore to the company after sampling the ore to determine the gold content. The artisanal miner receives approximately 30% of the value (the theoretical yield from mercury extraction), the state takes about 24% in lieu of taxes (equivalent to 18% in the case of production companies), and the remainder goes to the company.
14These changes have led to profound shifts in production methods, with all forms of production now relying on artisanal labor. This labor is less efficient in terms of extraction capacity, ore selection, and excavation methods, yet it bears the risk and burden of low or no gold yield independently. By focusing on waste treatment produced by artisanal miners, companies have outsourced costs associated with geological surveys, expensive engineering excavations, and operational capacity. Companies have also gained the advantage of acquiring ore at minimal costs, with exclusive rights to determine the share of each party involved, as they are the sole entities with ore sampling and analysis capabilities. For artisanal miners the shift in the production model towards selling tailing and ore has also changed the type of ore targeted by artisanal miners. Whereas in the past high-grade ores were preferred, now miners are more open to lower grades given they will be sold directly to tailing companies.
15In practice, production companies and tailing companies have become entities that rely entirely on laborers, assigning them the task of obtaining ore to supply companies. This arrangement which has been profitable for companies, supported by the full backing of the state and its political system, which are often closely tied to the companies' owners. While the hybrid model created an interdependent production chain, it presents an attempt by the state to economically control the decentralized artisanal mining chain. This contradiction is apparent in the following discussion of the evolution of resource governance in Sudan and the conditions which shaped gold mining governance.
16The unregulated expansion of artisanal mining has created various forms of local governance tailored to the unique social, environmental, and political contexts of each region based on state and customary laws. This legal framework was then formalized under the 2015 Mineral Resources Act, affecting by extension the centralization and decentralization of federal authority based on location. For example, in some areas of Eastern Sudan and several regions in Kordofan and Darfur, traditional local administrations have played a significant role in tax collection. In contrast, the Blue Nile region developed new community-based management structures linked specifically to gold mining activities, which emerged amid ongoing armed conflicts in the area between the government and SPLM-N. In other regions, such as the Northern State and River Nile State, local authorities have played a more substantial role in organizing artisanal mining operations. Consequently, the division of governance authority has evolved to depend on the specific local governance structures and the stage of mining development in a given region. This has resulted in different governance iterations, including local committees, community-based management bodies, and, in some areas, elected local committees responsible for overseeing mining operations and distributing revenues from these activities.
- 10 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 stands out as a significant example. It was signed (...)
17In a continuation of a long history and legacy since the colonial era (Bakhit, 1968), Sudan’s economic model has been shaped by a marriage between local capital and centralized authority economic institutions are often intertwined with those controlling the political system, including various military factions (Mahmoud, 2005). Beyond gold extraction this connection can be observed in agricultural policies which have enabled large-scale farmers, traders, and military personnel to seize hundreds of thousands of hectares taken from small farmers while still being dependent on small farmers and seasonal workers, while also receiving preferential financing by private banks (Ali, 1994; Omer, 2023). Similarly, in the early 21st century, oil extraction led to a significant shift in the nature of the power struggle (Patey, 2024; Abdelrahman, 2023). This shift moved the Sudan’s civil conflict from the peripheries to the political center of power, as oil is a capital-intensive resource requiring a certain degree of political stability and allowing for the concentration of budgets at the federal level. This dynamic was one of the reasons for ending violent conflict (Abdelrahman, 2023) (the longest-running conflict in Africa) in South Sudan and other regions, shifting the conflict to Khartoum's political center under the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 200510.
18In the gold mining sector, attempts to centralize control have focused on establishing a level of centralization that allows for political dominance through two main strategies. First, drawing on the experience of the Dams Implementation Unit, the government created a central authority composed of politically loyal individuals within Khartoum's central authority to oversee mining operations and distribute the economic returns to support the Muslim Brotherhood political project (National Congress Party) at that time (Abd Elkreem, 2018). The second strategy involved aligning the federal government's policies with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which, in 2011, 2012, and 2013, recommended increasing taxes on artisanal mining by creating a unified tax system controlled by the central authority to help reduce the trade deficit. In addition to maximizing profits for the federal state, the second rationale for this policy was to create tax equity and use it as a tool to regulate artisanal mining. Thereby limiting its role while simultaneously providing opportunities for the formal sector or gold mining companies to expand further and gain greater control over the development of gold mining in Sudan. Furthermore, this alignment was a condition for normalizing relations and facilitating access to financial aid. Thus, in order to tighten control over the mining sector, the government established the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company in 2014, modeled on the Dams Implementation Unit. In 2014, the IMF quickly evaluated and praised this approach, describing it as the beginning of a solution to the economic crisis, particularly concerning artisanal mining (IMF, 2014).
- 11 Soliman A., Baldo S., 2025 (March 26). Gold and the war in Sudan: How regional solutions can suppor (...)
19In practice, these policies faced resistance in many parts of Sudan. For example, in Eastern Sudan, collected testimonies in 2022 and 2023 show that local administrations controlling land blocked the federal government from overseeing mining activities, halting all artisanal mining operations in several areas. This impasse forced the government to negotiate independently with many Eastern Sudan leaders, allowing mining activities to continue in exchange for local administrations retaining the right to collect taxes in addition to the state, creating multiple tax-collecting authorities for the same activities. A close assessment of the progression of resistance in Northern Sudan shows that objection to these policies took the form of protests within government offices and civil objections, including petitions and protest letters (Chevrillon et al., 2020). Objection was targeted in part on the change of taxes administration between local and federal government, whereas in the past taxes in areas such as the Halfa locality would be collected through a public works scheme, where the local government would have access to all mines for three days a month. Production from these mines – employing hundreds of residents – would go to the local authority as taxes. The revenue generated from this process was approximately 5 billion Sudanese pounds monthly, managed by the local authority, which was then reinvested in direct services (Salah, 2018a). In contrast, after the implementation of central policies, taxation shifted from to direct taxes based on production volume, collected in cash and kind from miners, yielding about 1 billion Sudanese pounds per month in the same geographical area (Salah, 2018a). This meant that the federal government's treasury collected only 20% of what the local authority had previously gathered, in addition to differing tax collection methods that shifted from the local state's participation in labor, oversight, and production to mere tax collection. In Western Sudan, for instance, these policies prevented the local state from entering several areas (such as Jebel Amir and Hashaba) due to various armed groups' control over mining activities, turning these resources into tools for funding their operations (Anonymous, 2023)11.The outcome of these policies was a decline in the value of locally collected taxes and a shift of the tax burden to the federal government, separating economic activities from local authority control. In some areas, local authorities successfully established autonomous governance structures within the mining sector, independent of state control, including areas governed by traditional administrations and regions under the control of armed militias.
20This section examines the implications of centralized policies on gold mining, highlighting how land – as the fundamental physical element for accessing gold – becomes a focal point of conflict due to competing ownership claims. These tensions reveal autonomous tendencies that resist state centralization, even in regions without prior history of similar conflicts, such as areas in the River Nile State. It also explores the militarization of gold mining, as various armed groups have relied on gold revenues to sustain their operations, even using weapons to enforce control–turning gold into both a driver of conflict and a catalyst for militia formation.
21Amid these contradictions, corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies were introduced to redistribute a portion of mining revenues to local communities and production areas. However, within the multi-layered conflict dynamics of the mining sector, CSR itself became a source of dispute over land ownership – between local communities, the state, and even among communities – and was exploited to further militarization and deepen societal divisions. This fragmentation was exacerbated by the proliferation of competing political and military power centers.
- 12 Other factors also significant to the question of the paper but beyond its current scope include la (...)
22Given the paper’s focus on gold mining governance, the discussion is framed around these three key factors12.
23The control of land rights by the central authority was in response to the emergence of concession blocks for mining companies as a major concern for the government in managing the mining sector. The government's objective was to secure mining concessions for private companies through increased centralization of the land allocation authority. The challenge remained however that the allocation of land as the Sudanese state developed continued to be a source of contention and often a tool for buying political allegiance. As is the pattern in other African countries the expropriation of land in Sudan can be seen as part of wider neoliberal economic agenda necessitating a formalized, legalized and centralized control of land in accordance with the interest of private capital and militarized groups in our current period. (Engels, 2018; Luning, 2008; Sikainga, 2002)
24The implementation of new mining sector policies occurred simultaneously with Sudan's economic and political crises, particularly following the protests in September 2013 that nearly toppled the Muslim Brotherhood regime (Kadoda & Hale, 2015). The restructuring of the mining sector was intertwined with then–President Omar al–Bashir's launch of a political dialogue initiative in early 2014, focusing on four main pillars, one of which was the economy (Al-Rakoba, 2015). The restructuring of the mining sector was carried out under this political framework, culminating in significant legal changes, firstly the establishment of SMRC in late 2014 as a central body capable of translating the political project introduced at the time through its direct link to the central authority. Another significant development was the issuance of a new mineral resources law in 201513. This law granted the Ministry of Minerals the authority to allocate land rights to companies for mining operations.
25However, the new law faced numerous obstacles, especially from local and federal land laws dating back to the colonial era. These laws prohibited large-scale land acquisitions and changes in land use without consulting the local community, affected individuals, or landowners. This led to a constitutional amendment in 2015, modifying the 2005 Sudan Constitution to grant the President the authority to expropriate land for public interest. In parallel, the Mineral Resources Law stipulated that the President would also serve as the head of the Supreme Mining Council in Sudan, providing constitutional and legal legitimacy to the expanding acquisition of land by mining companies, which eventually came to control approximately 16% of Sudan's land (SMRC, 2022).
26Evidence collected shows that these policies inevitably had extensive environmental, social, and economic consequences, as large tracts of land previously used for grazing, agriculture, and even residential areas, towns, and villages were converted into mining concessions without offering any alternatives for weakened economic activity or compensation for those affected. Furthermore, the formalization of land laws and policies often did not account for the complex needs of mining companies and markets. For instance, while companies are awarded land concessions, they are often still dependent on resources beyond the concession block to operate, such as the need to access water and energy sources, roads and waste disposal areas, and the activity of artisanal miners which supply its main ore. As would have it, local resistance to mining activities intensified in various regions, including South Kordofan, Northern State, River Nile State, and the Red Sea State, often taking advantage of the needs by these companies in accessing community–controlled lands (Baldo, 2022). In the case of Sawarda in Northern State when the local communities failed through legal means to halt mining operations, the resistance groups cut off the companies access to the power grid which passed through their village, prompting the national intelligence security service (NISS) forces to resume the company activities by force, which was part of their investment portfolio (Chevrillon et al., 2020).
27These conditions and contradictions necessitated for the state to expand its military control either to strengthen new designated land owners, or to protect companies in cases where there was a question of authority over the land. All these circumstances are further exasperated as the line between the military groups and private sector blurred with military groups who were now concession holders through different government affiliated companies.
- 14 Examples include Sawa company related to one of the state’s ideological arms, the Holy Quran Associ (...)
28The connection between mining developments and the central political power perpetuates the historical link between economic influence and political authority. The allocation of mining concessions to companies involved in processing artisanal mining waste was often tied to individuals connected to the ruling party or political power in some form14. Additionally, political bribes were offered by granting certain groups licenses to operate in the gold mining sector to maintain the existing political, economic, and social order.
- 15 The Popular Defence Forces (PDF) were a paramilitary group established in Sudan’s Islamist era (198 (...)
- 16 Until 2013 the site was controlled by the Beni Husain group, from 2013 the site was controlled by M (...)
- 17 The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) was Sudan’s primary security agency from 1990 (...)
29The period of Bashir rule coincided with ongoing armed conflicts, leading the Sudanese government to establish various militias, such as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Popular Defense Forces15, to counter armed opposition groups (Salmon & Walmsley, 2007; Flint, 2009). As the economic situation of Sudan deteriorated the government would increasingly open the door for these military and political services to fund their operations through direct involvement in the mining sector. Consequently, as the involvement of military groups in the mining sector grew so did the capital of military groups linked to political power and by extension its independence. For instance, the RSF was granted control over areas rich in mineral wealth, such as Jebel Amir16 and southern Darfur, particularly the gold-rich regions, as well as the Triangle area in northern Sudan and several other concessions (Chevrillon et al., 2024). Findings also show that the Popular Defense Forces was awarded a mining company in the Triangle area of South Kordofan, while the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)17 was allocated mining concessions, including one in South Kordofan, two in Kassala State, and another in Northern State, managed by the International Group Company, a subsidiary of NISS. Similarly, the armed forces continued their investments, particularly in Blue Nile State through two companies; Advanced Mining Works (the Red Rock Previously) and Elements.
- 18 TAM (Tajammu' al-Ajsam al-Matlabiya) is a coalition of over 70 grassroots organizations, including (...)
30These military centers and government–affiliated militias evolved into independent economic entities, competing not only with each other but also with private capital, including those linked to political power. All these armed and private groups accumulated wealth primarily at the expense of the artisanal mining sector, which served as the source of gold-rich waste. Military force thus became a prerequisite for wealth accumulation through repression, giving armed groups a significant advantage in extracting maximum returns from artisanal miners and the natural environment. In many areas, private capital was compelled to form economic partnerships with military groups in exchange for protection, often formalized through profit–sharing agreements or monthly payments, effectively privatizing security services and enhancing the economic influence of military actors. Two reports by TAM18 (2020, 2023) illustrate these partnerships in the Dalgo mining company, as well as field observations of security outsourcing by mining companies to SAF in 2019 and 2020 in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states.
31The military groups were also deeply involved in both gold mining and trade, primarily with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which became the largest importer of gold from Africa in 2016, surpassing China (Reuters Investigation, 2016). In the same year, Sudan's domestic policies shifted from a system where the Central Bank worked with various traders (locally known as bank agents) to collect gold on behalf of the Central Bank, which then exported it to the UAE in exchange for an agreed profit margin.
32In 2016, a new policy was introduced, establishing the Gold Sabika Company, a subsidiary of NISS. The Gold Sabika Company was tasked with gold purchasing on behalf of the state through financial funding by the Central Bank. This policy created competition between traders and the Company for control over the gold trade. This competition, linked to speculation on the devaluing local currency, saw traders offering higher prices for gold than the company, compensating for the difference by raising the dollar exchange rate in the black market (Ibrahim, 2018). Incidentally, the first day of the Company operations saw a dramatic collapse in the national currency, with the Sudanese pound dropping from 16 pounds per dollar to 29 pounds per dollar, a nearly 100% depreciation.
- 19 24.ae., 2018. (January 24). Wazīr Sūdānī: Nuntij 250 ṭannan min al-dhahab sanawiyyan aktharuh yuhar (...)
33The speculative activities between the dollar and gold continued, a phenomenon that can be described as gold-related inflation. Traders sought alternative financing sources outside the official state channels, with numerous reports and papers documenting traders receiving direct financing from commercial centers in the UAE (Global Witness, 2019). This marked the beginning of a new phase, with foreign financial capital entering the state and the formal corporate system. This trend became a significant factor in rising inflation, the devaluation of the national currency, and the control of several economic centers over gold mining, to the point where the devaluation of the national currency became directly linked to the quantity of gold available in the market, and more importantly establishing direct relations with now independent military groups working in gold production and trade. These illicit activities can be observed in the huge discrepancy between recorded gold production, and gold export, mirrored by the discrepancy between recorded gold exported from Sudan to the UAE vs gold imported from Sudan as recorded by the UAE. For instance from 2012 until 2017 only 27.4% of the recorded production is exported, at the same time the Sudanese state does not hold gold reserves according to official statements by the minister of industry Musa Karama such as those made by the minister of industry in 2018, who clearly stated that while the recorded production for the year was 100 tons of gold, he estimates that in reality the figure is almost double at 250 tons but the state has no capacity to record19.
Illustration 8 - Yearly estimates of gold export and import between Sudan and UAE
Sources: SWISSAID, 2024; UN Comtrade HS 7108.
34The peaceful revolution that ousted Omar al-Bashir in 2019 did not bring about structural changes in the mining sector. Instead, it reinforced the power of certain military economic centers, particularly the RSF, which played a role in dismantling the NISS's military forces and taking control of its headquarters. Similarly, Al-Junaid Company for Multiple Activities, affiliated with the RSF, took control of the gold trade, becoming the primary source of Sudanese gold exports to the UAE. Numerous reports have documented the RSF receiving military vehicles and four-wheel drive vehicles in exchange for gold exports (Global Witness, 2019 and 2020).
35The ongoing economic competition became increasingly focused on the rivalry between the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the two key armed factions in the signing of the 2019 Constitutional Declaration with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), the third party in the declaration. Despite the FFC's control over the civilian government, it made no significant interventions in the mining sector, allowing the competition to persist. Economically, the RSF succeeded in enhancing its financial power and expanding its political influence, becoming a central force in the government alongside other power centers, similar to the dynamics during the 2005-2010 transitional government following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but without any framework to address the proliferation of central power as was done under the CPA (Hussein et al., 2024; Sudan Tribune, 2021).
36Building on the militarization and land appropriation, this section presents Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) the official policy for redistribution as envisioned by the state showing policies in Sudan's mining sector are fundamentally constrained and reshaped by the country's political economy. Rather than serving as neutral development mechanisms, CSR initiatives become entangled in the same power structures that govern land access and resource control in the hands of militarized groups. The implementation and manipulation of CSR reveal how both state and non-state actors instrumentalize development policies, not only reflecting existing power relations but actively reinforcing them.
37Corporate social responsibility (CSR) was introduced as a policy within Sudan's mining sector around 2012, serving as a tool for transitioning from the state's developmental role to that of companies in local development. In other words, CSR became a mechanism for creating the ethical and political legitimacy of gold mining companies' activities, aiming to reduce tensions between local communities and mining companies, particularly in the absence of globally recognized compensation models. CSR also epitomizes the state's gradual withdrawal from providing services and even development, a trend that began in 1978 with the introduction of structural adjustment policies. Effectively reducing the relationship between the state and citizens as a relationship of rights and entitlements to a relationship between citizens and private companies on the basis of donations or charity.
38Initially, CSR in Sudan took the form of voluntary contributions from private companies to local communities. In 2020, this policy evolved into a mandated a new policy by the transitional government allocating 4% of total production to benefit the development of production areas following pressure by local communities. However, the definition of these terms remained unclear, particularly in the context of companies involved in processing artisanal mining waste, which differs from companies owning production concessions. The artisanal waste processing model often involves sourcing raw materials from one area and processing them in another, potentially entirely different locality. The lack of geographic or social clarity regarding production areas or affected communities led to conflicts over the distribution of CSR funds, creating competition among communities and companies, exacerbated by the weakness of the civilian government, which failed to perform regulatory, supervisory, and oversight roles in mining operations and the distribution of mining proceeds.
39This competition drove many communities to demand the creation of independent administrative units to receive CSR funds, as occurred in the Abidiya area of Barbar locality. The people of Abidiya demanded the establishment of an independent locality to benefit directly from the mining revenues collected from gold companies operating in their area. This demand led to a decree by the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council to establish Abidiya and Al-Farouq localities at the end of 2022, as a means of addressing the objections of Abidiya residents to mining activities that had led to the closure of all mining companies in the area. The companies were allowed to resume operations after meeting several protests' demands, foremost among them the establishment of an independent locality. This development highlights how gold has played a role in reshaping official state authority and redrawing the governance map, driven by conflicts between the communities benefiting from and those harmed by mining activities.
40Essentially, the impacts of CSR policies varied between areas almost entirely managed by the state and those where local administration or armed groups wielded significant influence. In the case of the Um Badir area in North Kordofan State, communities staged large protests, demanding their share of the CSR funds, which amounted to 625 billion Sudanese pounds, equivalent to 1.4 million dollars in 2022. The CSR policy required that local development committees agree on how the funds would be spent, which did not happen, leading to the freezing of CSR budgets. Most of the residents in the Um Badir area are part of a social group called the Kawahla, which led to a representative from this group becoming the chair of the development committee managing the CSR funds. Unfortunately, the Kawahla and Kababish groups have a long-standing conflict in this area. When the CSR budget was allocated exclusively to the Kawahla, some members of the Kababish sought support from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), interpreting the state’s approval as an alignment with the Sudanese Armed Forces' authority. In response, the Kababish groups opened new markets in territories under their control and blocked the transport of waste and raw ore from Kababish areas to Kawahla areas. They also restricted access to water from wells located in Kababish territories, which companies in Kawahla areas rely on, thereby disrupting operations and reducing production.
41The case of the Kababish and the Kawahla is not an isolated case, in fact multiple conflicts over land have risen and intensified as a result of CSR funds from gold mining. In addition to igniting conflicts, the CSR operates as a legitimizing tool to be used by the state when settling land disputes or buying loyalties. As recorded in multiple instances, the government continuously employed CSR funds to legitimize the claim over the land of its political allies despite often violent circumstances. These arrangements not only affected companies but artisanal miners.
- 20 Another example of conflict between the Blue Misseriya and the Red Misseriya, who are divided betwe (...)
42These developments are continuing to flourish in the post-war period in Sudan following the conflict that erupted on April 15, 2023. The RSF, one of the warring parties, has utilized some of the mining areas they had established in the Kababish regions for landing military aircraft and obtaining supplies, with these areas being designated as military bases for the RSF. Similarly, in various regions, mining and CSR policies have influenced loyalties and alignments among different groups involved in the armed conflict in Sudan. This challenges the narratives which frames the conflict as between Arab and non-Arab groups. In the mentioned example, the conflict is between two groups both classified as Arab, with differing positions among their leaders. Additionally, the idea that the conflict is solely between pastoralist groups and farmers does not accurately reflect the reality, relying on a flawed assumption that economic and social development is homogeneous enough to categorize competing groups so clearly20.
43Similarly, groups like the Rawawga, one of the main groups under the Hawazma tribe classified as an Arab pastoralist group, have declared their support for the Sudanese Armed Forces. This is the same group that received CSR funds from gold mining activities for years in the Kadugli area, the capital of South Kordofan State. Although the commander of the RSF in all Kordofan states is from this group, this did not determine their alignment, underscoring that the connections between warring groups are not limited to supporting a leader or members of their own tribe. It also highlights how policies concerning land acquisition and the revenue generated from it influence the different groups' orientations in the ongoing war in Sudan, with access to gold revenue being one of the contributing factors (Abdelrahman, 2023).
44Gold mining has led to the reproduction of forms of centralization and structural shifts in wealth management, representing a continuation of previous policies in new forms. Due to the nature of gold, which differs from other resources, this has strengthened the multiplicity of power centers. Military centers have found advantages in the economic extraction struggle, positioning themselves as alternatives to civilian commercial investment. Furthermore, military groups have become more effective as local intermediaries, replacing traditional traders. The cohesion of central authority since colonial times was maintained by exporting conflict to various peripheries through historically creating dichotomies. However, as conflicts accumulated and the central authority's ability to maintain cohesion declined, these dichotomies were re-exported from the peripheries back to the center. This dynamic ended in the oil era with South Sudan's secession, based on the governance framework established by the 2005 agreement. In contrast, the gold mining era has played a role in enhancing the multiplicity of active authorities and in creating multiple and competing centers of power within a single authority, ultimately leading to an armed conflict that, for the first time, erupted from the divided center of power in the capital, Khartoum.
45In conclusion, the development of gold mining in Sudan reflects the adaptability, rapid expansion, and organization of artisanal mining practices. It also highlights the ability of local capital to redirect production processes to maximize profits through alliances with those in control of the government and military apparatus. The neoliberal transformations in land management and corporate social responsibility, driven by centralization, have led to military dominance over gold mining. The lack of regulation has further increased profits, creating a contradiction between the expansion of military involvement in mining and political stability.