Concurrence et antisélection en assurance maladie : l’expérience des Pays-Bas
Abstracts
Which are the benefits but also the pitfalls to be expected from strengthening competition in the health insurance markets ? Is State intervention still legitimate ? Which are the optimal forms it should take ? These are some of the questions addressed in this paper whixh confronts the theorical predictions from insurance economics with the practical experience of the Dutch health care system.
Index terms
Keywords :
assurance maladie complémentaire, économie de la santé, économie de l’assurance, écrémage des risques, sélection adverseKeywords:
adverse selection, cream skimming, health economics, insurance economics, private health insuranceJEL Codes:
D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis, D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information, G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies, G28 - Government Policy and Regulation, I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health, I19 - OtherReferences
Electronic reference
Agnès Couffinhal and Lise Rochaix, “Concurrence et antisélection en assurance maladie : l’expérience des Pays-Bas”, Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 02 | 1998/2, Online since 13 February 2007, connection on 10 October 2024. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/1868; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.1868
Top of pageCopyright
The text and other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.
Top of page
RSS feed
