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Recherches

A Bargaining Model of Monetary Nonneutrality

Robert Wilson

Abstracts

Models of bargaining in which prices are negotiated in nominal terms, and one party has superior information about real terms, have equilibrium outcomes insensitive to this information. These models illustrate that if negotiations are conducted in nominal terms then information transmission can be sticky in the sense used in macroeconomic theories of sticky prices.

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References

Electronic reference

Robert Wilson, “A Bargaining Model of Monetary Nonneutrality”Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 17 | 2005/2, Online since 11 May 2007, connection on 18 May 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/2529; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.2529

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About the author

Robert Wilson

Stanford Business School

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Copyright

The text and other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

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