A Bargaining Model of Monetary Nonneutrality
Abstracts
Models of bargaining in which prices are negotiated in nominal terms, and one party has superior information about real terms, have equilibrium outcomes insensitive to this information. These models illustrate that if negotiations are conducted in nominal terms then information transmission can be sticky in the sense used in macroeconomic theories of sticky prices.
Index terms
JEL Codes:
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles, E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and CreditReferences
Electronic reference
Robert Wilson, “A Bargaining Model of Monetary Nonneutrality”, Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 17 | 2005/2, Online since 11 May 2007, connection on 18 May 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/2529; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.2529
Top of pageCopyright
The text and other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.
Top of page