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On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Integer Payoffs

Michel Le Breton

Abstracts

Consider a symmetric two-player zero-sum game with integer payoffs. We prove that if there exists an integer such that all upper-diagonal payoffs entries have the same non-zero reminder when divided by this integer, then the game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.

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References

Electronic reference

Michel Le Breton, “On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Integer Payoffs”Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 17 | 2005/2, Online since 11 May 2007, connection on 24 May 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/2655; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.2655

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About the author

Michel Le Breton

Université de Toulouse I, Gremaq & Idei

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