On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Integer Payoffs
Abstracts
Consider a symmetric two-player zero-sum game with integer payoffs. We prove that if there exists an integer such that all upper-diagonal payoffs entries have the same non-zero reminder when divided by this integer, then the game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.
References
Electronic reference
Michel Le Breton, “On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Symmetric Two-Player Zero-Sum Games with Integer Payoffs”, Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 17 | 2005/2, Online since 11 May 2007, connection on 24 May 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/2655; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.2655
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