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Recherches

The Bayesian Average Voting Game with a Large Population

Régis Renault and Alain Trannoy

Abstracts

The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We characterize the equilibrium outcome of the bayesian game where voters have incomplete information about other voter s tastes. We show that when the population is sufficiently large, for a given distribution of voters weights, the equilibrium allocation may be approximated by a simple fixed point relation. Furthermore, if we consider a sequence of games where weights and taste parameters are randomly drawn from some population then the equilibrium allocation of the bayesian game converges almost surely to the limit of the equilibrium allocation in the complete information game.

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References

Electronic reference

Régis Renault and Alain Trannoy, “The Bayesian Average Voting Game with a Large Population”Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 17 | 2005/2, Online since 11 May 2007, connection on 24 May 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/2886; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.2886

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About the authors

Régis Renault

Université de Cergy-Pontoise, Thema

Alain Trannoy

École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Greqam-Idep

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Copyright

The text and other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

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