The Bayesian Average Voting Game with a Large Population
Abstracts
The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We characterize the equilibrium outcome of the bayesian game where voters have incomplete information about other voter s tastes. We show that when the population is sufficiently large, for a given distribution of voters weights, the equilibrium allocation may be approximated by a simple fixed point relation. Furthermore, if we consider a sequence of games where weights and taste parameters are randomly drawn from some population then the equilibrium allocation of the bayesian game converges almost surely to the limit of the equilibrium allocation in the complete information game.
Index terms
JEL Codes:
D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances, H41 - Public Goods, I22 - Educational FinanceReferences
Electronic reference
Régis Renault and Alain Trannoy, “The Bayesian Average Voting Game with a Large Population”, Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 17 | 2005/2, Online since 11 May 2007, connection on 24 May 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/2886; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.2886
Top of pageCopyright
The text and other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.
Top of page