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Abstracts

The design of reimbursement schemes of health care providers is a main issue in most reforms. We show in this paper why it is so difficult for a government (which is also the insurer) to implement an optimal mechanism. The representative consumer can incur two types of illness (serious or benign). If the quality of the diagnosis is  depending on an effort of the physician, it is no longer possible for the government to implement a system which, at the same time, favours the quality and prevents the increasing in health expenses (induced demand).

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References

Electronic reference

Carine Franc, “Mécanismes de rémunération et incitations des médecins”Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 09 | 2001/3, Online since 07 December 2005, connection on 16 April 2024. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/553; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.553

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About the author

Carine Franc

CREGAS-INSERM-CNRS

By this author

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The text and other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

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