Du choix social à la taxation optimale : les dépenses de santé
Abstracts
The theory of social choice and the theory of optimal taxation can be linked together by applying the former’s tools to economic models pertaining to the latter, and not only to the traditional abstract social choice setting, and also by using sufficient information about individual preferences in the comparison of alternative social states, contrary to a regrettable tradition initiated by Arrow’s theorem. This paper first discusses the general methodological issues, and illustrates the new approach proposed here with an example dealing with health policy.
Index terms
JEL Codes:
D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations, H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation, H51 - Government Expenditures and Health, I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health, I31 - General Welfare; Basic Needs; Living Standards; Quality of Life; HappinessReferences
Electronic reference
Marc Fleurbaey, “Du choix social à la taxation optimale : les dépenses de santé”, Économie publique/Public economics [Online], 09 | 2001/3, Online since 07 December 2005, connection on 19 April 2024. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/economiepublique/599; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/economiepublique.599
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