Aghion P., Dewatripont M., and Rey P. (1994), “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information,” Econometrica, vol. LXII, 257-82.
Aghion P. and Hermalin B. (1990), “Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, vol. VI, pp. 381-409.
Allen F. and Gale D. (1992), “Measurement Distorsion and Missing Contingencies in Optimal Contracts,” Economic Theory, vol. II, pp. 1-26.
Anderlini L. and Felli L. (1994), “Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 109, pp. 1085-1124.
Arrow K. J. [1953] (1971), “The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing”, reprinted in Arrow K. J., Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, Markam, Chicago.
Arrow K. J. (1959), “Toward a theory of price adjustment,” in Abramowitz M. (ed.), The Allocation of Economic Resources, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
Arrow K. J. (1965), Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing, Yrjo Johansson Foundation, Helsinki.
Arrow K. J. (1985), “The Economics of Agency,” in Pratt J. and Zeckhauser (eds.), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, pp. 37-51.
Arrow K. J. and Hahn F. H. (1971), General Competitive Analysis, Holden-Day, San Francisco.
Ayers I. and Gertner R. (1992), “Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 101, no. 4, pp. 729-73.
Azariadis C. (1993), Intertemporal Macroeconomics, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass.
Barro R. J. (1981), “The Equilibrium Approach to Business Cycles,” in Barro R. J. (ed.), Money Expectations and Business Cycles, Academic Press, New York.
Barzel Y. (1982), “Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 25, pp. 27-48.
Barzel Y. (1989), Economic Analysis of Property Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Benassy J. P. (1982), The Economics of Market Disequilibrium, Academic Press, New York.
Benassy J. P. (1986), Macroeconomics: An Introduction to the Non-Walrasian Approach, Academic Press, New York.
Bernheim B. D. and Whinston M. D. (1998), “Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity,” The American Economic Review, vol. 88, no. 4, pp. 902-932.
Bolton P. and Whinston M. (1993), “Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 60, pp. 121-148.
Busch L. A. and Horstmann I. (1992), “Endogenous Incomplete Contracts,” Mimeo, University of Waterloo and University of Western Ontario.
Boycko M., Shleifer A. and Vishny R. (1996), “A Theory of Privatisation,” The Economic Journal, vol. 106, no. 435.
Caldwell B. (1997), “Hayek and Socialism,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXXV, pp. 1556-1915.
Cass D. and Shell K. (1983), “Do Sunspots Matter?” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91, no. 2, pp. 193-227.
Chaigneau N. (1997), “Contrat et utilité : origines et fondements de la théorie de l’échange de Francis Y. Edgeworth,” Thèse pour le Doctorat en Science Economique, Université de Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne.
Cheung T. Y. (1991), “Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 1031-42.
Coase R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 3, pp. 1-44.
Dahlman. C. (1979), "The problem of externality," Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22.
Davis L., North D. (1971), Institutional change and American economic growth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Day R. D. (1964), “Review of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm by Cyert and March,” Econometrica, vol. 32, pp. 461-65.
De Alessi L. (1983), “Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory,” The American Economic Review, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 64-81.
Debreu G. (1959), Theory of Value, Wiley, New York.
Demsetz H. (1997), “The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution,” The American Economic Review, vol. 87, no. 2, pp. 426-430.
Dewatripont M. (1989), “Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 104, no. 3, pp. 589-619.
Donzelli F. (1989), “The Concept of Equilibrium in Neoclassical Economic Theory. An Enquiry into the Evolution of General Competitive Analysis from Walras to the “Neo-Walrasian Research Programme,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cambridge.
Dye R.A. (1985), “Costly Contracts Contingencies,” International Economic Review, vol. XXVI, pp. 233-50.
Edgeworth F. Y. [1881] (1967), Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, Kegan and Paul & Co. , London, reprinted A. M. Kelly, New York.
Edlin A. and Reichelstein S. (1996), “Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment,” The American Economic Review, vol. 86, no. 3, pp. 478-501.
Evans G. and Honkapohja S. (1992), “Adaptive Learning and Expectational Stability: An Introduction,” Mimeo, London School of Economics.
Furubotn E. and Richter R. (1997), Institutions and Economic Theory, The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor.
Garvey G. (1991), “Encouraging Specific Investments in a One Shot and Repeated Partnership: Some Comparisons,” Mimeo, Australian Graduate School of Management.
Goldberg V. and Erickson J. (1982), “Long-Term Contracts for Petroleum Coke,” Department of Economics Working Paper Series No. 206, University of California-Davis.
Grandmont J. M. (ed.) (1987), Temporary Equilibrium: Selected Readings, Academic Press, New York.
Green J. R. (1973), “Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model with Spot and Future Transactions,” Econometrica, vol. 41, pp. 1103-23.
Grossman S. (1977), “The Existence of Futures Markets, Noisy Rational Expectations and Informational Externalities,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 431-49.
Grossman S. (1981), “An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations under Asymmetrical Information,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 68, pp. 541-59.
Grossman S. (1989), The Informational Role of Prices, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Grossman S. and Hart O. (1980), “Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation,” Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11, pp. 42-64.
Grossman S. and Hart O. (1986), “The Costs and Benfits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 4, pp. 691-719.
Grout P. (1984), “Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach,” Econometrica, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 449-60.
Guesnerie R. and Woodford M. (1991), “Endogenous Fluctuations,” Mimeo, DELTA.
Hahn F. (1968), “On Warranted Growth Paths,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 35, pp. 175-84.
Halonen M. (1994), “Reputation and Allocation of Ownership,” Mimeo, Helsinki School of Economics.
Hart O. (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. IV, no. 1, pp. 119-139.
Hart O. (1989), “An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm,” Columbia Law Review, vol. 89, pp. 1749-1757.
Hart O. (1990), “Is “Bounded Rationality” an Important Element of a Theory of Institutions?”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 146, pp. 696-702.
Hart O. (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hart O. (2001), “Financial Contracting,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXXIX, no. 4, pp. 1079-1100.
Hart O. and Holmstrom B. (1987), “The Theory of Contracts,” in Bewley T.F. (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 71-155.
Hart O. and Moore J. (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” Econometrica, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 755-785.
Hart O. and Moore J. (1990), “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, pp. 1119-58.
Hart O. and Moore J. (1999), “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, 1999, pp. 115-138.
Hashimoto M. (1981), “Firm-Specific Human Capital as a Shared Investment,” The American Economic Review, vol. 71, no. 3, pp. 475-482.
Hausman D. M. and Mcpherson M. S. (1993), “Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXXI, pp. 671-731.
Hayek F. [1937] (1948), “Economics and Knowledge,” reprinted in Hayek F. (ed.), Individualism and Economic Order, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 33-56.
Hayek F. [1945] (1948), “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, reprinted in Hayek F. (ed.), 1948, pp. 71-91.
Hayek F. [1946] (1948), “The Meaning of Competition,” reprinted in Hayek F. (ed.), 1948, pp. 92-106.
Hayek F. [1968] (1978), “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” in Hayek F. (ed.), New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 179 -90.
Hermalin B. (1988), “Adverse Selection and Contract Length,” in Three Essays on the Theory of Contracts, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ph.D. thesis.
Hicks J. (1939), Value and Capital, Clarendon, Oxford.
Holmstrom B. and Tirole J. (1989), “The Theory of Firm,” in Schmalensee R. and Willig R.D. (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1, Handbook in Economics, no. 10, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 61-133.
Hurwicz L. (1973), “The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation,” The American Economic Review, vol. 63, pp. 1-30.
Jensen M. (1986), “Agency costs and free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers,” The American Economic Review, Papers and proceedings, vol. 76, pp. 323-29.
Jensen M. and Meckling W. (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, pp. 305-60.
Joskow P.A. (1985), “Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating Plants,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 33-80.
Kirzner I. (1994), “On the economics of time and ignorance,” in Boettke P. and Prychitko D. (1994), The Market Process, Essays in Contemporary Austrian Economics, Edward Elgar, Hants.
Klein B., Crawford R.and Alchian A. (1978), "Vertical integration, appropriate rents, and the competitive contracting process", Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 21.
Kreps D. (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Kreps D. (1999), “Markets and Hierarchies and (Mathematical) Economic Theory,” in G. Carroll and Teece D. (eds.), Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies, Oxford University Press, N.Y., pp. 121-55.
Lachmann L. (1994), “On the economics of time and ignorance,” in Boettke P. and Prychitko D. (1994), The Market Process, Essays in Contemporary Austrian Economics, Edward Elgar, Hants.
Leibenstein H. (1966), “Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X-Efficiency’,” The American Economic Review, vol. 56, pp. 392-415.
Lipman B. (1993), “Limited Rationality and Endogenously Incomplete Contracts,” Mimeo, Queen’s University.
Lipman B. (1995), “Information Processing and Bounded Rationality: A Survey,” Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 28, pp. 42-67.
Lucas R. E. (1972), “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 4, pp. 103-124.
Lucas R. E. (1980), “Methods and Problems in Business Cycle Theory,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 12, pp. 696-715.
Macleod W.B. (1996), “Decision, Contract, and Emotion: Some Economics for a Complex and Confusing World,” Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 788-810.
Malcomson J. (1997), “Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXXV, pp. 1916-1957.
Maskin E. and Tirole J. (1999), “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, pp. 83-114.
Masten S.C. (1998), “Contractual Choice,” in Boukaert B. and De Geest G. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Law & Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing and the University of Ghent (forthcoming).
Modigliani F. and Miller M. (1958), “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment,” The American Economic Review, vol. 48, pp. 261-97.
Mukerji S. (1998), “Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness of Contractual Form,” The American Economic Review, vol. 88, no. 5, pp. 1207-1232.
Nöldke G. and Schmidt K. (1995), “Option Contracts and Renegotiation,” Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 163-79.
Negishi T. (1972), General Equilibrium Theory and International Theory, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Negishi T. (1989), “Tâtonnement and Recontracting,” in Eatwell J., Milgate M. and Newman P. (eds.), The New Palgrave, General Equilibrium, Norton, London, pp. 281-296.
Nelson R. and Winter S. (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
North N. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, Norton, New York.
North N. (1984), “Government and the Cost of Exchange,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 44, pp. 255-264.
North N. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
North N. (1993), “Institutions and Credible Commitment,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 149, no. 1, pp. 11-23.
Polanyi M. (1967), The Tacit Dimension, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Radner R. (1980), “Equilibrium under Uncertainty,” in Arrow K. J. and Intriligator M. D. (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, chapter 20, vol. II, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 33-52.
Rogerson W. (1984), “Efficient Reliance and Damage Measure for Breach of Contract,” Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 39-53.
Rogerson W. (1992), “Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 777-93.
Rosen S. (1985), “Implicit Contracts: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 1144-75.
Rubinstein A. (1998), Modeling Bounded Rationality, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Sappington D. E. M. (1991), “Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 45-66.
Schelling T. (1963), The Strategy of Conflict, A Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press, New York.
Scitovsky T. (1943), “A Note on Profit Maximization and its Implications,” Review of Economic Studies, no. 1, vol. 11, pp. 57-60.
Segal I. (1999), “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts,” The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, pp. 57-82.
Shavell S. (1980), “Damage Measures for Breach of Contract,” Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 11, pp. 466-90.
Shell K. (1989), “Sunspot Equilibrium”, in Eatwell J., Milgate M. and Newman P. (eds.), The New Palgrave, General Equilibrium, Norton, London, pp. 274-280.
Shiller R. (1978), “Rational Expectations and the Dynamic Structure of Macroeconomic Models: A Critical Review,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 4, pp. 1-44.
Simon H. A. (1951), “A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship,” Econometrica, vol. 19, pp. 293-305.
Simon H. A. (1959), “Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral Science,” The American Economic Review, vol. 49, pp. 253-83.
Simon H. A. (1962), “New Developments in the Theory of the Firm,” The American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 52, pp. 1-15.
Simon H. (1997), An Empirically Based Microeconomics, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
Spear S. (1985), “Rational Expectations in the Overlapping Generations Model,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 35, pp. 251-275.
Spence M. (1977), “Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure, and Producer Liability,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 44.
Spier K. (1992), “Incomplete Contracts and Signalling,” Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 23, pp. 432-43.
Tirole J. (1986), “Procurement and Renegotiation,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, no. 2, pp. 235-59.
Tirole J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Mass., Cambridge.
Tirole J. (1994), “Incomplete Contracts: Where do we stand?” , Walras-Bowley lecture, delivered at the North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, Quebec City, Mimeo, IDEI, 53 pages, publié dans Econometrica, vol. 67, no. 4, 1999, pp. 741-781.
Vahabi M. (1995), “The Austro-Hungarian Convergence through the Writings of J. Kornai”, Economie Appliquée, vol. XLVIII, no. 2, pp. 77-103.
Vahabi M. (1997), “A Critical Survey of K.J. Arrow’s Theory of Knowledge”, Cahiers d’économie politique, no. 29, pp. 35-65.
Vahabi M. (1998), “The Relevance of the Marshallian Concept of Normality in Interior and in Inertial Dynamics as Revisited by G. Shackle and J. Kornai”, The Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol. 22, no 5, pp. 547-572.
Walker D. A. (1973), “Edgeworth’s theory of recontract,” Economic Journal, vol. 83, pp. 138-149.
Walras L. [1874] (1954), Eléments d’économie politique pure ou théorie de la richesse sociale, trans. by Jaffé W. as Elements of Pure Economics, George Allen and Unwin, London.
Weitzman M. (1981), “Toward a Theory of Contract Types,” Mimeo, MIT.
Whinston M. (2001), “Assessing the Property Rights and Transaction-Cost Theories of Firm Scope,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 91, no. 2, pp. 184-188.
Williamson O. (1975), Market and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications, Free Press, New-York.
Williamson O. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, The Free Press, New-York.
Williamson O. (1988), “Corporate finance and corporate governance,” Journal of Finance, vol. 43, pp. 576-91.
Williamson O. (1989), “The firm as a nexus of treaties: An Introduction” , in Aoki M, Gustafsson B., and Williamson O. (eds.), The firm as a nexus of treaties, SCASS, Sage Publications, London.
Williamson O. (1992), "Markets, hierarchies, and the modern corporation. An unfolding perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 17.
Williamson O. (1996), The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Williamson O. (2000), “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXXVIII, pp. 595-613.