1The influence of pragmatism in 4E approaches to cognition is still undervalued. Only certain contemporary researchers from these fields venture beyond William James’s insights and pay attention to philosophers such as John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, or Charles Peirce. Although several from the embodied, embedded, extended, and enacted ranks acknowledge that these frameworks have roots in phenomenology and pragmatism, only a few actually go deep into Mead’s or Peirce’s texts looking for continuities and tensions with current 4E theories. For some researchers, pragmatism still seems to be an uncomfortable guest that you have to greet in the first paragraphs of the paper, proceed to exchange some pleasantries, and then you are good to go. And this is a pity, because the more one digs into pragmatist work, the more likely it is that one will find exciting concepts and bold theories useful to tackle some thorny issues regarding cognition, society, or the relation between action and perception. Yet, pragmatism seems to be slowly coming back into style. The present book is a timely example of this tendency while, at the same time, it is a valuable contribution in itself, with the capacity to catalyze present research and trigger new collaborations.

2In this book, the philosopher of mind Matthew Crippen and the behavioral neuroscientist Jay Schulkin collaborate in order to achieve several interconnected goals. The first one is to present some relevant pragmatist tenets to situate this philosophical tradition “in the context of the history of philosophy, psychology, and science with the ultimate aim of applying it to contemporary work” (1). Their second stated goal is to contribute to the bridging between bodily functions and perception and cognition. That is, without renouncing to the relevance of neuroscientific research, they push beyond brain-centered cognitivist theories of cognition. Their third goal, and the more ambitious one according to the authors, is “to integrate hints from classical pragmatism with contemporary cognitive science and neurobiology to demonstrate that emotional, aesthetic, and interested capacities – what we term affective or valuative life – are at the heart of action, perception, and cognition” (2). The authors do a great job interweaving and connecting these three aspects across the six chapters in which the book is structured; yet, in my opinion, their success at fulfilling each objective is somehow uneven.

3First of all, the effort by the authors to deliver an accessibly written book has to be positively valued. This is noticeable from the first chapter of the book “Life, Experimentalism, and Valuation.” In these pages, the authors provide a historical account of some pragmatist ideas related to bodily and affective dimensions of the mind. Aspects of James’s, Dewey’s, and Mead’s philosophical work are accurately presented to the reader. The discussion regarding ancient Greek influences on Dewey’s concept of experience is particularly relevant. The chapter concludes advancing an idea to which the book will keep coming back from different angles: the notion that “cognition is affective or valuative and vice versa, and that perception is cognitive and emotional and vice versa. All are embodied” (50).

4The second chapter called “Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science” marks the start of the authors’ endeavor to wed old and new visions of embodied and action-oriented research traditions. Aspects of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger’s philosophical thought are confronted with pragmatism and recent approaches, which serves nicely as a reminder of the importance of the phenomenological tradition to today’s 4E frameworks. Yet, Crippen and Schulkin keep their focus on Mead’s and, particularly, Dewey’s pragmatist accounts. They compare some key excerpts from Andy Clark’s extended mind theory and J. Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë’s enactive sensorimotor account with Dewey’s work, showing how contemporary accounts are indebted to pragmatist texts a lot more than they let on. However, it is at this point of the book when one potential problem starts to emerge. Even though the authors claim that their book “merges classical pragmatism with contemporary neurobiological and cognitive sciences” (51), I have to say that I miss references to recent influential research in cognition from both neuroscientific and philosophical perspectives. There is quite a lot of work on areas such as interoception and brain networks that might have provided a solid anchor to some of the authors’ empirical claims. On the other hand, philosophical theories, such as Giovanna Colombetti’s work on affectivity, Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo’s conceptualization of participatory sense-making, or Erik Rietveld’s research on affordances, are barely mentioned or not at all, even if they seem extremely relevant for the goals of this book.

5The third chapter, “social cohesion, experience, and aesthetics” presents one particularly insightful section dedicated to a discussion on Dewey’s aesthetic theory. These pages succeed at the difficult task of highlighting the most important aspects of Dewey’s aesthetics while, at the same time, the authors manage to show the potential that his work still retains for contemporary debates on social development and interaction. Yet, as the book progresses, the aforementioned omissions become more troublesome and hamper some of the aforementioned goals for this book. For example, the chapter on pragmatism and cognitive affection does a great job summing up pragmatist influences on recent research, but not so much opening new venues for approaches integrating philosophy and neuroscience within a fully embodied, non-representational, non-dualist framework. The authors conclude this chapter by suggesting that “cognitive activity, such as conceiving, decision making, and memory processes are grounded in appraisals – affective valuations – that permeate, chisel, and give form and meaning to our experiences” (155). One wonders, though, whether this view is not still too cognitivist for the 4E tastes. Taking into account views such as Shaun Gallagher’s interaction theory or Colombetti’s notion of enactive appraisal would have certainly offered an interesting counterpoint.

6Yet, coming back to what Mind Ecologies is and leaving aside what it might have been, it is in the final part of the book that the authors go on to focus on one extremely interesting line of research that is just starting to grow: the traditionally neglected role of visceral factors in cognition. According to Crippen and Schulkin, “researchers are recognizing that the gut and microscopic organisms in it add significantly to brain functioning and psychic life” (185). The authors present evidence that support an embodiment rooted in the interaction between gut and brain through different mechanisms. The influence on cognition of the microbiome that we carry with us or the mechanisms of communication between visceral systems and regions of the brain are introduced in a convincing way that succeeds at proving the constant and meaningful interaction between brain and viscera. Together these aspects manage to cut across internal and external divisions, expanding the concept of ecology toward a particularly strong notion of ecological embodiment. In the authors’ words: “ecologies within us are literal, and they point to synergic processes of our bodies, both neural and extraneural, that achieve coordination through engagement with the world” (193). However, bold and really exciting claims like these, are sometimes almost undercut by the same authors just a few pages later. For example, when they claim, from a very weakly embodied perspective, that “bodies are inhabited by minds, and minds need bodies. Feelings and emotions are not detached from cognitive and perceptual systems in the brain, and they are not separate from bodily conditions and actions either” (203). Speaking of synergies enacted by microbiome, body and extraneural cells is much more radical than just claiming that systems of the brain are not separated from bodily conditions.

7All things considered, Crippen and Schulkin’s book delivers what promises: advancing in the integration of cognitive research and classical pragmatism within 4E approaches to different aspects of cognition. I think that this book is particularly suited and relevant for those researchers that might feel intimidated by pragmatist philosophers. Mind Ecologies is a long due work that offers an introduction to James, Mead, Peirce, and Dewey’s ideas and also to some not well-known pragmatist theories on affective-evaluative and aesthetic dimensions of perception and cognition. On top of this, the authors’ ecological approach emphasizing the interdependence of different systems is clearly refreshing and constitutes a natural conclusion for the book’s trajectory. Overall, Mind Ecologies is a valuable and comprehensive contribution that certainly strengthens and amplifies recent efforts to show that pragmatism is an extremely useful asset that can bring different perspectives to contemporary debates on affectivity, embodiment, and the ecological relation between agents and the environment.