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Symposia
On Sami Pihlström’s Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of the Humanities

Responses to My Critics

Sami Pihlström

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1I am deeply grateful to Roberto Gronda, the organizer of this book symposium, and Nicholas Gaskill, Kathleen Wallace, and Tullio Viola – the three reviewers of my book, Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of the Humanities (Pihlström 2022) – for their highly perceptive comments, which I can only inadequately address in these responses. All three seem to generally sympathize with my project while making a number of truly important critical remarks. I will, of course, focus on the latter, trying to find out where exactly we agree and disagree.

2As I explain in the book, one reason for writing it was the fact that many of us are worried about what is happening to the humanities in our contemporary academia. This worry, however, needs to be seen in its proper context. We hardly need any “alarmist” discourse on the situation of the humanities. In many ways, the humanities are doing fine, as profound and insightful research is conducted within a variety of disciplines, both traditional and emerging. Yet, there are genuine obstacles to the development of the humanities – not only the increasing pressures of pursuing immediately useful knowledge but also the tendency (among both humanistic scholars themselves and others) to see at least some of the humanistic disciplines as inevitably grounded in ideologies, producing something quite different from the objective knowledge that the sciences are in the business of delivering.

3Some critics go as far as to claim entire research fields to be inherently ideological. For example, gender studies, feminist theory, postcolonial studies, and cultural studies have been argued to suffer from ideology-driven approaches sacrificing the objectivity of academic research. There are, indeed, good reasons to be critical of humanistic and social-scientific contributions that primarily seek to advance some political or cultural values, instead of aiming at new knowledge. However, we need to understand the essential dependence of all human inquiry – not only the humanities – on human values.

  • 1 An excitingly parallel pragmatically realist and pluralist view in the philosophy of science has re (...)

4This is why I see pragmatism as a promising basis for a philosophy of the humanities. As I try to argue, pragmatism enables us to develop a moderate (“pragmatic”) realism about the objects of inquiry in the humanities (thus recognizing that the humanities do have their “objects of inquiry,” in a way not completely different from the natural sciences), and thus to maintain that whatever the humanities are studying is in principle to be considered as real as the objects of the sciences – though, of course, quite different, even ontologically different, in the spirit of the ontological pluralism many pragmatists in a way or another subscribe to.1 This qualified realism can, and should, be combined with a due acknowledgment of the thoroughgoing value-dependence of the objects of inquiry (in the humanities but also generally), without claiming that dependence, or those values, to be “ideological” in the bad sense feared by many critics of the humanities. The integration of realism with ontologically relevant value-ladenness is a key feature of pragmatism, and we may draw from both classical pragmatists like William James and John Dewey and more recent pragmatists such as Hilary Putnam in developing this position further in the philosophy of the humanities.

5My book only offers a “prolegomenon”: it develops no fully worked-out theory in the philosophy of the humanities but proposes, in a broad outline and through case studies on specific issues (e.g., “real generals” and transcendental arguments), some avenues along which such a theory might be developed, while also providing a general philosophical articulation of a “Kantian-pragmatist” framework for doing so.

1. Gaskill

6After having described the way in which I use general pragmatist philosophy of science to support a pragmatically realist picture of the humanities, Nicholas Gaskill notes that this “reliance on the philosophy of science” is also an “obstacle” for my goals. I over-emphasize, he thinks, the similarities between the humanities and the sciences within my pragmatist articulation of realism, even “letting the project down by refusing to look into the ways that the specific practices of the humanities come to know (and co-create) their objects” (Gaskill, this issue: §6). This is fair criticism, but I should stress, again, the meta-level character of my discussion; in a “prolegomenon,” I cannot go into great detail about the various humanities’ ways of “knowing.”

7A philosophical meta-standpoint may seem overly general for humanistic practitioners, though. Gaskill, as a Professor of English, understandably does not want philosophers to tell him how his job should be done (ibid.: §7). I agree: philosophers generally ought not to tell anyone how they should do their job, or how they should live. Philosophers of science, when reflecting on realism or, say, scientific explanation or the underdetermination of theory by evidence, do not tell physicists or biologists how they should conduct their experiments or interpret their data; rather, they explore more general issues concerning, say, the ontological and epistemological significance of those experiments and interpretations. Philosophers of religion, in turn, do not tell people to be religious or non-religious but try to understand better what it is for someone to be religious or non-religious. Clearly, I have failed to sufficiently emphasize that I do not think of philosophy as a project of telling others what to do; I am certainly not trying to “police the way that scholars in the humanities operate” (ibid.: §10). Accordingly, I have tried to keep my discussion at an abstract, albeit pragmatic, transcendental level.

8Gaskill invokes “the difference between a radical empirical pragmatism and a transcendental pragmatism” (ibid.: §7). He is right to note that not all pragmatist interpreters of the humanities need to be transcendental pragmatists in my sense, and that from a slightly different standpoint it may be misleading to advance such a Kant-inspired position. I duly acknowledge that I may have focused too much on applying general transcendental-pragmatist ideas drawn from the realism discussions in the philosophy of science to the philosophy of the humanities. In comparison, I haven’t said much (in this book) about Richard Rorty, for example, and I have perhaps over-emphasized Thomas Kuhn’s Kantian tendencies. Gaskill rightly asks whether my “talk of the real-making power of practices” is “really that different from Rorty” (ibid.: §9). My problem with Rorty is that he sacrifices the normative status of philosophy by viewing our discourses and practices reductively in terms of causal clashes between vocabularies. That is something I discuss elsewhere, though I agree I should have said more in this book, too.

9Regarding pragmatist views on “reality,” Gaskill touches one of the key issues in the book by wondering whether all interpretations, including insane ones no one ever proposes, should be taken to be “real” as Peircean “real generals” (ibid.: §11). There is a danger of ontological inflation here, but the main point is that, for example, the meanings of artworks and historical events exist (as the kind of things they are) in contexts of possible interpretations. It does not follow (nor does Gaskill suggest that I claim this) that all interpretations would be equally good. I agree with him that the “deep ontological background” is quite far from the “actual methods” of particular humanistic fields like literary studies (ibid.: §12).

10A related worry concerns the concept of truth. Referring to Elisa Tamarkin’s Apropos of Something (2022), Gaskill suggests that relevance might be more significant than truth in the humanities. Thus, I have failed to appreciate “that truth may not be the best way to capture what’s important about the values driving and constituting the objects of humanistic study, or even the procedures by which the humanities operate” (Gaskill, this issue: §12). This, I believe, is precisely the reason why we need pragmatism, and a pragmatist conception of truth, according to which relevance and values are built into truth itself. We are not aiming at truth conceived abstractly as correspondence but at truth that needs to be humanly relevant and only emerges within value-laden practices. Thus, I am not necessarily in disagreement with Gaskill when he writes:

What I’m suggesting here is that pragmatism’s strengths don’t reside in the kinds of exercises in philosophical grounding performed in the appeal to real generals. I’d offer instead this tweak: rather than use real generals to “prove” that an actually existing practice of literary studies is “possible,” and rather than establish transcendental conditions of practice that tell humanists how they “ought” to work, why not offer the framework of practice-based realism as a means of awakening humanities practitioners to new modes of relevance, to the values and possibilities realizable within their practices when they think along these lines? (Ibid.: §13)

11Why not indeed? This is an excellent topic for future scholars to pursue. The relation between the philosophy of the humanities and the humanities themselves is at issue here, as Gaskill notes (ibid.), and I would encourage philosophers of the humanities to explore this relation in greater depth and breadth.

  • 2 See Pihlström (2021, chapter 6).
  • 3 Even in the sciences, research aims at informative and relevant truth, not just truth per se. For e (...)

12Regarding truth, Gaskill also wonders why we couldn’t have realism without truth, that is, why “truth-aptness” needs to be the measure of scholarly practices (ibid.: §16). In fact, I have examined what I call meta-level agnosticism about the cognitive meaningfulness and (thus) truth-aptness of discourses such as religion in some other work.2 However, I have, at least up to now, been convinced that in scholarly practices we do need the concept of truth, and with a pragmatist account of that concept there is no problem in understanding the concern with truth as, more widely, a concern with value and relevance as well.3

13The notion of truth, then, plays a transcendental role in our practices of inquiry, and therefore we need, in my view, a transcendental version of pragmatism with resources for analyzing that role. Scholars may aim at relevance, “voice,” or something similar, but they can reasonably and sincerely have such aims only in a context in which engaging in scholarly inquiry entails being committed to the value of truth. Truth is not the sole value in the humanities, or any research; it is a value that needs other values surrounding it, but those other values, when we are talking about inquiry and scholarship, can operate only in a context constitutively shaped by inquirers’ sincere commitment to the value of truth.

14The main disagreement seems to concern the significance, for us pragmatists, of the transcendental methodology that, indeed, many pragmatists from James to Rorty have preferred to avoid. I admit that my transcendental pragmatism, as any transcendental philosophy, may seem to proceed “as if philosophy determines the inescapable transcendental conditions of all practices and then passes the news along to practitioners working within specialized fields, with an implicit warning that they must get in line or else fall into contradiction” (Gaskill, this issue: §13). However, strictly speaking, this charge only applies to orthodoxly transcendental philosophies, not to my relaxed, historicized, and practice-embedded transcendental methodology. The inescapability of transcendental conditions itself needs to be historically relativized. Awareness of this historicity and practice-embeddedness might also enable the (humanist) practitioners, or all of us, to (in Gaskill’s words) “sing for ourselves” instead of being spoken “for” by philosophers of the humanities.

15Toward the end of his paper, Gaskill refers to important figures at the margins of pragmatism that are absent from my discussion, especially Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers (influenced by Alfred N. Whitehead). Everything he says here is highly significant, and I can only reply that I was unable to cover all relevant aspects of my topic in a single book. The current within pragmatism he speaks about emphasizes, in Jamesian terms, radical empiricism rather than pragmatism as such, and this reflects my choice of focus. I have no trouble with the suggestion that Latour and Stengers begin where I “leave off” (ibid.: §15), but I am not entirely convinced that “the radical empirical wing of contemporary pragmatism has already done much of the work that a transcendental account can only point towards” (ibid.). I continue to have doubts about where that work is leading. Latour has famously been criticized for antirealism, and even if that is exaggerated, there is the worry that these radical pragmatists might sacrifice the transcendental level of investigation analogously to the way Rorty stays away from anything resembling the transcendental.

16I agree with Gaskill that we need “a more dynamic back-and-forth between humanistic practice and philosophical generalization” (ibid.: §17) than I deliver. I continue to think that philosophy aims at truth, but it aims at many related things as well, including “the good” (a species of which James famously claimed truth to be). Accordingly, I see no reason to think about the humanities – or anything else – in terms of a dichotomy (here drawn from Whitehead) between “rational thought” and “modes of appreciation,” and I agree with Gaskill that the humanities and the philosophy of the humanities can equally accommodate both. Philosophy – and here I agree with Rorty, too – is (in Rorty’s words referring to Derrida) “a kind of writing,” and the pursuit of the philosophy of the humanities, and even a mere prolegomenon to that pursuit, is a writing project, thus itself part of our overall humanistic practice.

2. Wallace

17While Gaskill appears to find the analogy between pragmatist philosophy of science and pragmatist philosophy of the humanities somewhat exaggerated, Kathleen Wallace does not seem to have any major trouble with this. Instead, she perceives a “structural similarity” between the two (Wallace, this issue: §21). Wallace also comes from a somewhat different branch of pragmatism, but her approach can easily accommodate the idea of pragmatism as a general theory of inquiry.

18Citing Justus Buchler – one of the great albeit possibly somewhat neglected pragmatic naturalists in the American tradition – Wallace reminds us of what Buchler called “ontological parity,” “asserting the equal reality of whatever is.” Starting from Buchler rather than the core classical pragmatists, she agrees with my Peirce-inspired “real generals” discussion: “existence” remains “too narrow and tends to exclude the ‘reality’ of patterns of development, relations, concepts, many human artifacts, experiences, and meanings”; therefore, we need to develop “a robust set of categories for the ‘being’ of whatever is” (ibid.: §8). In this context (ibid.: n.3), she also notes that a possible slide to some form of constructivism or relativism might be a “weakness” in my version of pragmatism, however, presumably to be corrected by means of a Buchlerian naturalism. I do admit this danger and the need to constantly struggle against it, even though the form of pragmatic realism I try to formulate is, in my view, the most robust sustainable variant of realism. It would have been very interesting to hear Wallace say a bit more about this critical issue.

19She rightly points out that I am critical of an “instrumentalist” view of the humanities, which would prioritize the ameliorative character of humanistic research (e.g., our better understanding of literature yielding more empathy) at the cost of “pure” knowledge about the objects of research (whatever they are) (ibid.: §17). Here – and this is also a self-critical point – it might be asked whether the pragmatist philosopher of the humanities should rather emphasize the entanglement of the theoretical and the practical, instead of relying on any dualism between the two. What I am rejecting is excessive instrumentalism which would find no value at all in humanistic knowledge-seeking for its own sake. This does not mean that humanistic knowledge could not, or should not, be practically useful as well; no pragmatist should deny that.

20Wallace provides a nice summary of my pragmatic transcendental position by referring to the “contingently necessary” status of (pragmatic) transcendental conditions that need to be presupposed in order for inquiry to be possible (ibid.: 27). While I am not sure we agree about all of this, given Wallace’s Buchler-inspired naturalism, what we both seem to be concerned with is how exactly philosophy itself ought to be understood in this context. Wallace legitimately challenges my pragmatic transcendental conception of philosophy by referring to areas of philosophical inquiry that could be taken to reach out to reality “in itself” instead of addressing (merely) the transcendental conditions for the possibility of inquiry (or something along those lines):

Metaphysicians and ontologists regard their investigation as being about reality, rather than seeing it (only) in transcendental terms as identifying the necessary conditions for the possibility of thinking about reality at all. Pihlström may regard this as an unreconstructed realism. But if the metaphysician is claiming to study the fundamental nature of reality – not only natural, not only human, but reality – and not only conditions for thought about reality, then there is a debate here, and a question about whether this part of philosophy is among the humanities. (Ibid.: §29)

  • 4 In addition to the references she provides, see also the revised and expanded edition of The Blooms (...)

21There is, indeed, a debate here, and Wallace puts her finger on its core question. Is metaphysics part of the humanities? Or is it closer to – well, physics (or science more broadly), which in its own way explores ultimate reality? I agree that any serious pragmatist should have a well worked-out view on what exactly metaphysics, as an ineliminable area of philosophical reflection, is and how it is related to science, to the humanities, and to other fields of philosophy. In the book under review, I develop no such views, but as Wallace notes, I have done something to this effect in earlier work.4

22Another debate could arise, she argues, regarding normative ethics and virtue theory, which “aim to ‘get it right’ about how one ought to live and act. They are not aiming at necessary conditions for the possibility of ethics (transcendental), nor only at facilitating the development of virtue or practical wisdom (salutary, but instrumental, purposes), but at what really does or can constitute a good life or the correct criterion for evaluating the rightness or wrongness of an act” (Wallace, this issue: §30). This, as Wallace notes, is “tangential” in the present context, but a broader transcendental pragmatism must definitely address the status of ethical and valuational inquiry as part of philosophy, albeit entangled with empirical inquiries, including of course the kind of humanistic inquiries the philosophy of the humanities seeks to understand.

23While Gaskill (as we saw) suggests that the concept of truth plays too dominant a role in how I view pragmatist philosophy of the humanities (as well as the nature of the humanities themselves), Wallace observes that I do maintain that, “in addition to truth, inquiry has other validating factors, namely, ‘interests’ or ‘value judgments’ about what is interesting and relevant” (ibid.: §31). Truth, as I suggest above in my response to Gaskill, should (as a “species of the good” à la James) be presupposed as part of a constitutive, or at least constraining, framework of values that (also) validate and guide our research. This is not to deny the significance of other values. This entanglement of truth with other values constitutive of the very possibility of inquiry could be further illuminated by employing the conceptual tools of the “holistic pragmatism” developed by Morton White (also cited by Wallace): all our value commitments would then, in principle, be critically tested as we test our conceptions of what is true about the world.

24I can only agree with Wallace when she maintains that my investigation “does not address what philosophers who are metaphysicians, ontologists, normative ethicists, virtue theorists, and others (e.g., who deploy thought experiments, or identify as experimental philosophers) are doing or the value of their cognitive and knowledge contributions” (ibid.). Unfortunately I was unable to address the nature of such pursuits in this specific undertaking. It remains undecided, and in need of further discussion, where exactly the boundaries lie between the humanities and various other fields of (broadly philosophical) inquiry conducted by the kinds of inquirers Wallace lists.

3. Viola

25Tullio Viola – a world-leading expert on Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of history – shares with Gaskill the worry that my metaphysics of, for example, merely possible interpretations (and other ontological postulations I try to cash out in terms of Peircean real generals) might be problematically inflationary. This ontology “can easily become too comprehensive,” leading us “to ascribe reality to a potentially infinite variety of concepts, interpretations, and theoretical objects, without having stringent criteria to determine what is actually plausible and what is not” (Viola, this issue: §7). Such criteria of plausibility are certainly needed. However, I am merely trying to establish an ontologically relevant context within which it makes sense to inquire into relevant humanistic “objects” and critically discuss (among other things) the plausibility of rival interpretations. Not only plausible interpretations are “real” as humanistic objects. However, I do concede that I should have devoted more space to the concept of interpretation itself, which, as Viola correctly points out, “gets surprisingly little scrutiny” (ibid.: §10), given its central status both in humanistic scholarship and my pragmatic-transcendental articulation of the ontology of such scholarship.

26A related point concerns the relation between the philosophy and the history of the humanities (ibid.: §23). Here I can only fully agree with Viola: we need more interdisciplinary research exploring the ways in which philosophical issues arise in the framework of our understanding of various historical contexts and developments of humanistic scholarship, including specific practices of writing, reading, and archival research.

27Viola’s most elaborated criticism concerns the “unexpectedly prescriptive” stance I take especially when discussing scholarship in religious studies (ibid.: §11). I may have expressed my view too strongly, because though defending the need to understand “from within” what makes (say) a religious practice religious, or involving religious (as distinguished from some other) meanings, I am not denying that “external” (e.g., causally explanatory) perspectives may also play a very important role in our humanistic attempts to understand phenomena such as religion – or literature and history, for that matter – in their contexts. What I am arguing against – transcendentally – is a reductive externalist account, e.g., the kind of approach we (arguably) find in cognitive study of religion (if reductively interpreted). The problem there is the lack of sufficient awareness of what it is that is being studied in the first place, that is, the ability to interpret religion qua religion, insofar as it is claimed that religion “just is,” or essentially amounts to, a system of culturally invariant beliefs in supernatural agents whose emergence and spreading can be fully explained with reference to (for instance) cognitive science and evolutionary psychology.

28This said, I can only plead guilty when Viola argues that my “emphasis on the ‘internal perspective’ of humanistic disciplines risks not giving much space to another important and legitimate perspective in the humanistic study of cultural facts, namely, the necessarily interdisciplinary investigation of human beings’ capacity to handle symbols across various forms of experience” (ibid.: §16). However, it is precisely in the interest of drawing attention to the (again, transcendental) conditions for the possibility of such investigations that I am criticizing the reductively externalist views that fail to take seriously enough the “internal” meanings of whatever it is that those interdisciplinary investigations are helping us to understand. When we are engaged in a transcendental examination of this kind, there is no need to disagree with Viola’s claim that “the ‘external’ understanding of a cultural or social phenomenon should not be seen as impairing our interpretative capacity, but rather as sharpening it” (ibid.: §21).

29In this context, Viola legitimately wonders why I fail to discuss neo-Kantian philosophy of the humanities, especially Ernst Cassirer’s work (ibid.: §16). I chose to focus on pragmatism rather than, say, neo-Kantianism, hermeneutics, or other traditions that may so far have had more to offer to the philosophy of the humanities, because a pragmatist approach has been lacking in the field, while those other traditions have already developed their philosophies of the humanities to a significant degree. Not being a Cassirer scholar, it is difficult for me to comment on Viola’s observations on how exactly a transcendental pragmatist project differs from Cassirer’s transcendental philosophy, but I would certainly welcome critical comparisons between Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms and the kind of transcendental pragmatism I believe we need.

  • 5 I have explored transcendental issues in the pragmatist critique of meaning – especially regarding (...)

30It is in relation to questions concerning the “internal” perspective of the humanities and transcendental philosophy that Viola arrives at an extremely important critical comment on what I say, in my concluding chapter, about the Holocaust as a limit of comprehensibility and thus as a “metaphysical disruption” challenging our historical representations and indeed any pursuit of meaning. I agree that my formulations in the brief Holocaust paragraphs are partly misleading, as my intention certainly is no mystification of the event, as disruptive as it is for our understanding of history, the world, and ourselves. I explicitly treated the Holocaust as a “metonym” for historical atrocities generally. Certainly I would never suggest that “we should not attempt to explain the Holocaust historically the way we do with other historical facts” (ibid.: §21). What I would still suggest, however, is that we cannot simply treat the Holocaust as yet another (“mere”) historical fact along with all other facts. The way we respond to the incomprehensible suffering and moral horror it involves is constitutive of our relation to history generally, and there is a sense in which the Holocaust (as a metonym) plays a transcendental role in constraining historical representability and comprehensibility themselves.5 In brief, the Holocaust, then, has a transcendental aspect (in addition to being, of course, a historical fact), and neither as a fact (or an event) nor as a transcendentally constitutive condition of our historicity should it be mystifyingly claimed to be anything transcendent. Challenging the preconditions of ethical thought, the Holocaust demonstrates the entanglement of the transcendental and the empirical.

31This said, I fully agree with Viola’s vitally important insistence that “the greatest danger of trivializing or relativizing the Holocaust currently comes not from those who want to treat it as a historical phenomenon, but from those who cultivate skeptical or openly negationist attitudes” (Viola, this issue: §22). In my view, such attitudes are not merely historically false but transcendentally confused – not merely wrong about the historical fact of the Holocaust (though of course they are wrong about that, too) but about the world generally, and about ourselves as human beings. Holocaust denialism, then, is not just historically – factually – but also transcendentally misguided, violating the ethical boundaries enabling us to represent historical facts at all, or more fundamentally breaching the value framework within which serious inquiry becomes possible.

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Bibliography

Chang Hasok, (2022) Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatist Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Niiniluoto Ikka, (1999), Critical Scientific Realism, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Pihlström Sami, (2021), Pragmatist Truth in the Post-Truth Age: Sincerity, Normativity, and Humanism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Pihlström Sami, (2022), Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of the Humanities, Albany, State University of New York Press.

Pihlström Sami, (2023), Humanism, Antitheodicism, and the Critique of Meaning in Pragmatist Philosophy of Religion, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books.

Pihlström Sami (ed.), (2024), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Pragmatism, London, Bloomsbury.

Tamarkin Elisa, (2022), A Propos of Something: A History of Irrelevance and Relevance, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

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Notes

1 An excitingly parallel pragmatically realist and pluralist view in the philosophy of science has recently been developed by Hasok Chang in his Realism for Realistic People: A New Pragmatist Philosophy of Science (2022). Had I been familiar with his book when writing mine, I would have engaged with it in detail.

2 See Pihlström (2021, chapter 6).

3 Even in the sciences, research aims at informative and relevant truth, not just truth per se. For example, according to Ilkka Niiniluoto’s critical scientific realism, science progresses as the truthlikeness of theories increases, but truthlikeness already incorporates informativeness and thus relevance, while depending conceptually on truth. (An informative false theory can be more truthlike than a true uninformative one.) See Niiniluoto 1999.

4 In addition to the references she provides, see also the revised and expanded edition of The Bloomsbury Handbook of Pragmatism, Pihlström 2024.

5 I have explored transcendental issues in the pragmatist critique of meaning – especially regarding the ethical need to respond to suffering – in other works, including Pihlström 2023.

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References

Electronic reference

Sami Pihlström, Responses to My CriticsEuropean Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XVI-1 | 2024, Online since 17 May 2024, connection on 14 June 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/3968; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/11p53

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About the author

Sami Pihlström

University of Helsinki, Finland
sami.pihlstrom[at]helsinki.fi

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