11. Anna Boncompagni has written a thorough, lucid and persuasive account of Wittgenstein’s use of the expression “form of life,” of its historical background and of the debate surrounding the concept. I am very largely in agreement with her argument, in particular I think her central contention that the concept of a form of life has a methodological rather than a substantive role in Wittgenstein’s thinking is insightful and important. I also think she is right in the connected claim that Wittgenstein’s use of the concept is not unified but multiform (even if, she argues, a certain development in Wittgenstein’s use of the expression can be discerned). A form of life – as an aspect of human behaviour – may be local or universal, it may be specific or general. In this connection it is important to realize, as Boncompagni points out, that the expression “form of life,” in Wittgenstein’s work, is not to be thought of as a specialized term of art; in using it Wittgenstein was actually falling back on a turn of phrase which was in common use at the time (as it still is today).
2Furthermore, Boncompagni steers clear of taking sides in the debate on whether form of life is primarily to be understood as a biological or a cultural notion. Again, this point is closely connected with her claim that the concept of form of life is not substantive. In fact, it could be argued that the biology/culture issue is spurious, since biology and culture are interdependent: on the one hand, the way our natural needs and propensities will manifest themselves depends on our cultural environment – and thus will vary from one society to another – and on the other hand any human culture must accommodate our natural needs and propensities – hence there are limits to the possible variations. I would argue that the attempt to designate some feature of our life as either rooted in biology or as culturally conditioned makes sense only against the background of the other variable being held constant.
32. It may be noted that the emphasis in Wittgenstein’s discussion of forms of life is cognitive rather than evaluative. Rather than being concerned with the things people cherish or strive for, it is intended to throw light on our shared ways of describing, classifying or investigating things, as brought out in what Boncompagni calls the second and third cluster of remarks on forms of life. (This distinction, of course, is not a sharp one: we should keep in mind that our descriptions and classifications are themselves a reflection of what matters to us.)
4I would suggest that the role of the invocation of forms of life – as presented by Boncompagni – can be characterized as that of “gesturing towards the contingent.” I talk of gesturing because the appeal to forms of life is not an exhortation to delve into the details of this or that specific way of living but rather to recognize the role common ways of acting have for our shared language. Boncompagni speaks of “the fundamentality and inescapability of forms of life as the level at which philosophical analysis must stop” (Boncompagni 2022: 56).
5The concept of form of life, I would suggest, shares this character of being a gesture with the concept of language-game as employed by Wittgenstein. Apart from the builders’ game at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations, which is used as a means of introducing the notion of language-game, Wittgenstein’s references to language-games are mostly generic. Little attempt is made to characterize the specific language-games referred to, nor would it serve his purpose to do so. The reader is left to fill in the details where needed.
6The reason one might say that the gesture points toward the contingent, on the other hand, is that there are no a priori restrictions on the shape that our ways of judging and categorizing may take. This is a point on which Wittgenstein deviates strongly from traditional Western philosophy, in which a search for the a priori, for necessary truth, whether in the empiricist or the rationalist tradition, has been a pervasive theme.
7Thus (on p. 25-8), Boncompagni discusses Wittgenstein’s remark: “What has to be accepted, the given, is – one might say – forms of life” (PPF: §345). She argues that Wittgenstein is here countering the empiricist idea that the given is “specific experiences”; on that conception, what it means for speakers of a language to have a shared understanding of a word, say, a colour word, is for them to connect it with one and the same experience. However, this would presuppose that all it would take to define colour words – to delimit their area of application – would be to concentrate on specific experiences in one’s mind. But this does not make sense – for one thing, there would be no room for discussing whether two experiences were to count as the same (cp PI: §258). Wittgenstein, according to lecture notes, puts it as follows:
The specific is something that has to be shown publicly. What can be shown publicly and are specific are certain phenomena of life… Take any such phenomenon as comparing colours, measuring time, comparing lengths, playing games. These are specific. (Wittgenstein 1988, quoted by Boncompagni 2022: 27-8)
8In other words, the meanings of colour words are a matter of their role in various shared activities: apart from comparing colours for particular purposes, we try to achieve a certain hue by mixing colours, we try to judge the condition of a fruit by its colour, we recognize objects based on their colour, we judge whether two colours go well together in getting dressed or in decorating a room, etc. The way these activities will be carried out is not predetermined by the specific colour experiences individuals have, rather the activities are given their shape in the context of the form of life to which they belong. It is in that context that the question “same experience or different?” has a life.
9As Wittgenstein puts it in RPP I §630 (quoted by Boncompagni on p. 26), in a formulation presaging that of PPF §345:
Instead of the unanalysable, specific, indefinable: the fact that we act in such- and-such ways, e.g. punish certain actions, establish the state of affair thus and so, give orders, render accounts, describe colours, take an interest in others’ feelings. What has to be accepted, the given – it might be said – are facts of living.
10By adding the phrase “it might be said” [“könnte man sagen”], Wittgenstein indicates that the term “the given” is here being used in a sense that deviates from the customary one. (The person who has to do the accepting here, it should be pointed out, is the philosopher reflecting on what it means to share a language.)
11Now the notion of the contingency of forms of life is also counterpoised to the idea that our reasoning is somehow set to proceed in a preordained way. Wittgenstein challenges this idea in his discussion of rule-following, for instance when it comes to continuing a number series. The fact that “doing the same thing” in continuing the series “2, 4, 6 …” would mean writing “1002” rather than “1004” after “1000” is not based on an interpretation of the beginning of the series, since there is no single way in which that beginning is to be interpreted, except with regard to our actual practice – and this might have been different. Boncompagni quotes a Wittgenstein manuscript on this point, in a remark that presages Philosophical Investigations §241:
“How is the application of a rule fixed?” – Do you mean, “logically” fixed? Either through other rules, or nothing at all. – Or do you mean: how is it, that we all apply it in agreement [übereinstimmend] in this way and not otherwise? By training, discipline, and the forms of our life [die Formen unsres Lebens]. It is not a consent [Consens] of opinion, but of forms of life [Lebensformen]. (MS 160: 26r-26v; quoted by Boncompagni 2022: 20; translation by her)
12The fact, say, that mathematicians normally agree on how to proceed in their proofs and calculations does not mean that the correct way of proceeding is somehow laid down in the structure of human reason, but is simply a matter of the ways in which they have been taught to proceed in being introduced to “the mathematical form of life,” which includes taking up an attitude towards disagreement as something to be shunned.
13In short, in drawing attention to the contingency of forms of life, Wittgenstein is providing an antidote to the temptations both of empiricism and of rationalism.
143. There are some points of nuance or emphasis to which I should like to draw attention. Thus, consider Wittgenstein’s use of the word “agreement” as it occurs in the above quotation as well as in Philosophical Investigations §241:
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” – What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is not agreement in opinions, but rather in form of life.
15In fact, what is here called agreement in language may actually be brought out in a case in which two individuals disagree in their opinions. Two car mechanics may disagree on the reason a car will not start: one of them thinks it is a problem with the fuel supply, while the other is convinced there is something the matter with the ignition. They may still agree in language, as shown, for instance, by the fact that they agree on the method by which the matter is to be settled. Of course, they may also have some disagreement on that level, but sooner or later they must find a way of coming together on the issue, or at least agree on how the problem ought ideally to be solved. If no such level of agreement is reached, we might conclude that they do not agree in their language.
16Similarly, for two individuals to agree on the application on a set of rules may not consist in their acting in the same way. For a simple example, consider two individuals harvesting apples: one of them climbs a ladder to get at the apples, then throws them onto a sheet held by the other, while the other tries to catch them in the sheet. Their actions, we might say, though different, are in alignment with one another.
17For a more complex relation, consider the actions of the pitcher and the batsman in a baseball game. The pitcher throws the ball in the direction of the batsman, who in turn tries to swing at the ball with his bat. On the one hand, the ball must be thrown within reach of the batsman, but on the other hand the pitcher will try to thwart the batsman’s attempt to hit it by throwing it with a speed and a spin which will make it difficult to hit. If the pitcher throws the ball wide of the mark, the throw violates the rules of the game. But if he purposely makes it easy to hit the ball, he is not really playing the game.
18In order to judge whether or not people’s actions or language are in alignment it is not enough to attend to what they say or do; we have to take into account the role of their actions or words within the practice or the language-game.
19We might ask whether “agreement” is the best translation of “Übereinstimmung” here. I would not claim that the translation is wrong, but for clarity it might be better to speak of people’s actions, or their use of words, being in alignment (or: in tune?) with one another. The words “agreement” or “disagreement” only come into play when there is debate on whether or not someone has been following the rules. In this way agreement in applying rules and agreement in language differ from the “agreement in judgments” to which Wittgenstein refers in the next remark of the Philosophical Investigations. (I shall get back to that remark in a while.)
204. Next, I wish to discuss the idea that forms of life are foundational or fundamental. To get at the relevant sense of these terms, we need, first of all, to distinguish it from a use which is brought up by Boncompagni but which is not, I believe, relevant to the discussion of forms of life. This use occurs in a passage in which Boncompagni quotes Wittgenstein’s remarks on cause and effect (Wittgenstein 1993: 397):
[…] We have an idea of which ways of living [Lebensformen] are primitive, and which could only have developed out of these. We believe that the simplest plough existed before the complicated one.
The simple form (and that is the prototype [Urform]) of the cause-effect game is determining the cause, not doubting.
21She then goes on to say:
Here, Wittgenstein is concerned with the “game” of identifying the causes of phenomena, a reflection stimulated by Bertrand Russell’s paper “The Limits of Empiricism” (1935-1936). In this context, he speaks of foundations, bases, primitive forms, simple forms, and prototypes (Goethe resonates here): a way of living plays a foundational, grounding role for the development of language and of language games. (Boncompagni 2022: 17)
22We might speak of this as a “developmental use” of the concept of foundations. We can depict the evolution of a practice, a symbolism or forms of expression in terms of a succession of stages. Thus, we may think of the development of a barter economy into one where cash is used, and from there on into one where bank credit and credit cards take the place of cash transactions. Or a child’s speech may be seen as proceeding from learning the names of objects to learning to ask “What is the name of ...?” to being able to say “I know / I don’t know the name of …” (Cp OC: §535-47). Or in mathematics we can think of the adding of fractions, negative numbers, irrational numbers, imaginary numbers, etc., to the basic notion of positive integers.
23The idea here seems to be that we can give a perspicuous representation of the character of a practice (or a mode of expression, etc.) by making it apparent how a form of the practice may have evolved from an earlier one. The evolutionary process in question may but need to be thought of as extended in time; it may but need not be thought to have actually taken place. Nor will the development necessarily have a point of origin, rather our focus may be simply on the relation between two or more stages in the process.
24This is a form of thinking that greatly interests Wittgenstein but is not, I think, central to an understanding of the role of forms of life. I mention it here in order to set it aside.
25Now, the notion of the fundamental or the foundational in philosophy has been understood in two different ways: on the one hand, the fundamental may be that which has no foundation, and on the other hand, it is that which provides a foundation. I would argue that the latter is more common in the philosophical tradition; however, the former is that which is relevant in a discussion of Wittgenstein’s concept of forms of life, and it is also central to Boncompagni’s text. (However, she once hints in the direction of the latter notion – as does Wittgenstein too, as I shall argue – this, however, actually runs counter to the central idea of forms of life.)
26The relevant sense is well brought out, for instance, in the following passage:
The concern is with the depth of agreement and yet its “conventional” nature in the peculiar sense of “conventional” that Wittgenstein accustoms us to: a sense in which agreement on forms of life is not to be equated with agreement in opinion, with something that can be stipulated and withdrawn arbitrarily. The depth of human beings’ agreement has the fundamentality of language and the normativity of rules; at the same time, it is not a foundation as traditional foundationalism would have it. It is a bedrock of action and habit brought about by training and discipline, the sort of discipline with which we learn to calculate, measure, speak, draw inferences, and follow rules the way our community does. (Boncompagni 2022: 55; my italics)
27Thus, the fact that in calculating with pen and paper we trust the paper and ink not to change in uncontrollable ways is not based on any tests we have made (cp PPF: §343-5). This is simply the way we act.
28Suppose certain judgments were held to be dependent for their justification on certain facts holding. If so, that justificatory relation would itself be a feature of the form of life. Accordingly, the idea that our adhering to a form of life might be logically dependent for its justification on certain conditions external to it is incoherent. (This concerns the issue of logical dependence. A form of life may of course be contingent on external conditions in an empirical sense. Thus, to the extent that the form of life of a native American tribe was dependent on hunting for buffalo, it would have to change once it was realized that there were no longer any buffalo to hunt for.)
29In Philosophical Investigations §217 Wittgenstein writes, on this theme:
Once I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”
(The aptness of this metaphor, by the way, could be questioned. The idea of a bedrock suggests that I may be surprised by some external obstacle that hampers my attempts to proceed. But the point, rather, is that I have no thought of going on investigating, and would not even understand what it would mean do so.)
30Now, at one point Boncompagni talks about
[…] the line of reasoning that [Wittgenstein] wanted to stimulate in the reader of the Investigations: from the absence of disputes on rule following among mathematicians to the question about human agreement and the clarification of agreement in definitions and in judgments, which is more broadly a clarification of the relationship between logic and its applications. (Boncompagni 2022: 20; my italics)
31To talk about logic and its applications is to suggest that language has a hierarchical structure: as if it were constituted by a relation between logic on the one hand and its applications – our ways of arguing and judging – on the other hand. Yet surely, what is involved in the notion of a form of life is that its logic is given in the way we speak and act. Of course one may also speak about “logic” as a system of rules that may be extracted from our ways of speaking, but this system is then derived from our linguistic practices, it does not in any sense precede or regulate them.
32Similar remarks can be made about the formulation “clarification of agreement in definitions and in judgments.” It contains an allusion to Philosophical Investigations §242:
It is not only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may sound) agreement in judgements that is required for communication by means of language. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.
33It is unclear what Wittgenstein has in mind in talking about agreement in definitions. Is he thinking about explicit formulations? Here it seems as if he accepted the conventional idea that definitions is what keeps our use of words on the rails. However, when it comes to most words of our common language (rather than terms introduced for special purposes), we have hardly ever heard them defined, and we might be hard put to formulate a definition ourselves – besides, in the case of a great many words, it would probably be difficult to find any definition that would fit the variety of their actual use (apart, at best, from synonymous expressions that do not as such advance our understanding of the word). Wittgenstein might, on the other hand, be thought to be referring to an agreement in definitions as something implicit that shows itself in our actual use of words – but in that case the idea of a contrast between agreement in definitions and in judgments becomes void.
34This observation does not matter greatly in the context of Boncompagni’s argument. But it is, I think, important to recognize that the notion of language having a hierarchical structure is at odds with a conception of language as seen in the light of the concept of forms of life.
355. Boncompagni has managed to make use of the scant references to forms of life in Wittgenstein’s work as a starting point for providing a well-rounded picture of key elements of his later thought, while avoiding committing herself to any restricted conception of what the concept involves. What I have brought up here are points of nuance, in the hope that they will contribute to a deepened understanding of Wittgenstein’s remarks. My criticisms do not diminish the over-all value of Boncompagni’s study.