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Symposia
Pragmatism in China

The Difference between Peircean and Deweyan Interpretations of Inquiry

The Transition from Epistemology to Existentialism
Ming Dong and Chengbing Wang

Abstract

Both Peirce and Dewey explained the concept of inquiry. From an epistemological point of view, Peirce regarded inquiry as the process of belief changing from an uncertain state to a certain one. Dewey developed the concept of inquiry and imbued it with an existential meaning. Inquiry is a functional product generated in the process of dealing with the real world. Specifically, habits are stable patterns of temporarily fixed behaviors; impulses are the primary drive for inquiry; and intelligence is an effective way to deal with new problems and make experience more controllable.

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1. Introduction

1Peirce and Dewey, two representatives of classical pragmatism, showed great difference in their elaboration of inquiry. Peirce, working on it epistemologically, believed that inquiry was a transition of belief from an uncertain state to a certain one, while Dewey emphasized inquiry as a functional product in the process of dealing with the real world, which are supposedly characteristics of practice, operationality, and existentiality. Therefore, this paper will examine Peircean and Deweyan interpretations of inquiry respectively, and thus will reveal the insufficiency of Peirce’s theory and Dewey’s development of this concept in the dimension of existentialism.

2. Peirce’s Discourse on Inquiry

2Peirce’s interpretation of inquiry mainly shows itself as the method for both the clarification of ideas and the determination of beliefs, and is therefore a matter of epistemology. By connecting inquiry with his pragmatist thought, Peirce emphasized that human cognition is an activity of inquiry, and that its starting point “is not a purely intellectual pursuit of ‘truth’, and its final result is not the acquisition of truth or infallible knowledge, but only the acquisition of certain beliefs that convince us” (Xu 2016: 45).

3Specifically, Peirce started his work with a critique of traditional rationalistic philosophy represented by Descartes. The Cartesian method of doubting everything holds that we should eliminate all existing ideas first, find a self-evident intuition, then start our philosophical work on this basis, and finally construct a system of human ideas. Firstly, for Peirce, there is no such thing as a self-evident Cartesian intuition. It is only a kind of “pre-understanding” of human beings, which has been permeated by educational background and existing associations. Intuitions are already saturated with inferences. Secondly, in Peirce’s view, Cartesian doubt is nothing but a false and formal one, and there is no stable belief system to judge new evidence and hypotheses, as Descartes argued. For human beings doubt without some beliefs, but they must begin with some preconceptions that they already have. In short, we would know nothing if we had as high criteria for knowledge as Descartes did.

4Peirce did not agree with Kant regarding the distinction between content and form, and he argued that human cognition should not be based on the a priori form of cognition. In Peirce’s view, the groundwork of human cognition is problematic, and the innate basis of knowledge structure cannot be precisely confirmed. Therefore, he pointed out that human knowledge is composed of ideas or beliefs, and the acquisition and effectiveness of such beliefs do not presuppose any a priori basis; on the contrary, we should determine the meaning of our beliefs based on their consequences. The view that pragmatism emphasizes experiment and results is reflected in Peirce’s philosophical research. What he did was actually an experiment on ideas to find what would happen when one held a certain idea in practice and thus determine in turn the meaning of it.

5Peirce believed that the acquisition of knowledge presupposed inquiry. As Cheryl Misak (2004: 10) noted, “The notion of inquiry occupies a central place in Peirce’s thought.” By connecting inquiry with belief, Peirce emphasized that inquiry arises from doubt and that it aims at the acquisition of definite beliefs. The Peircean mode of inquiry can be summarized as: (previous) belief-doubt-inquiry-belief.

6Peirce (1986: 247) stated, “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry.” Doubt and uncertainty provide the motivation for inquiry. Doubt is not something abstract and on paper, but a state of being triggered by current actual circumstances, which begins with the conflict between a previous idea and a present situation. “Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way, when the occasion arises” (ibid.). Actions are guided by ingrained beliefs, and one hasn’t been in a state of doubt when one bears these beliefs in mind to deal with the problem of the moment successfully, for in that case the practical needs of the moment have been tackled successfully. In Peirce’s view, belief is a state of peace and contentment of which we are fond. However, things cannot go satisfactorily all the time, and one may fall into a state of instability sometimes, even with unease inside. So, a real doubt is what interferes with the smooth functioning of belief, and means not knowing how to act.

  • 1 As for the other three methods, the first is called tenacity, which means to make our belief stable (...)

7One will try his best to reconfirm his belief when any doubt arises in his mind. Peirce discussed four ways to determine beliefs, but promoted the scientific method most enthusiastically.1 In fact, he regarded only the scientific method as an approach to inquiry because he believed that the beliefs established through the scientific method “may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect” (ibid.: 253). Peirce held that there were some kinds of real things whose nature were not subject to the will of a human being, which instead “affect our senses according to regular laws” (ibid.: 254). And furthermore, he stated that “The only effect which real things have is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs” (ibid.: 271-2). The scientific method is superior to the other three ones precisely in that it presupposes a reality, which is continually open to inquiry.

8Reality, which can lead to the same conclusions among different inquirers, can only be reached by general thought. The term “general” here refers to the unified thought eventually formed by the community of scientific inquiry. “A reality as an existence independent of cognitive individuals or groups is in fact the object of the final opinion that is formed after the infinite continuation of all inquiry activities” (Cheng 2022: 174). Therefore, the scientific method also precludes the subjective effects of individual practice to determine beliefs. It enters a public arena, which is constituted by “other men and other minds and their common field of endeavor” (Murphree 1959: 668). The determination of beliefs depends on the final consensus reached within the community. Taking scientific research as an example, Peirce pointed out that believers in science are all sure that any kind of method will lead to the same result so long as the scientific activity is performed enough. Thinking activities do not lead us to where we wish to go, but to a predetermined end, as if by fate. “Whereas Peirce began by saying that truth is no part of inquiry’s aim, he ended by claiming that the scientific method is to be preferred because it promises to lead us to a truth that is independent of anyone’s opinion” (Short 2000: 3).

9First of all, Peirce’s understanding of inquiry emphasizes the subjective influence of beliefs on inquirers. The primary task of beliefs is to calm down the inner state of restlessness even if such restlessness and doubt are only a pretention and imagination. Inquiry does not have to appeal to practical activities; and although inquiry is often caused by even a momentary hesitation in real life, there is a kind of “feigned hesitancy” (Peirce 1986: 262) sometimes. For example, when we have to kill time in a train, we may watch advertisements on board, and compare the advantages and disadvantages of different train numbers and routes although we have no plan of taking any of them. We do that simply to put ourselves in a state of indecision. Although Peirce freed himself from Cartesian doubt and believed that cognition had to be based on some stereotypes, he still did not get rid of the distinction between mind and world, or subject and object.

10Secondly, the Peircean conception of reality takes the separation of inquiry from contexts as a risk. Peirce defined reality as something external and eternal, independent of the influence of thought, and believed that it could be certainly reached after constant inquiry. Things that have become obliterated in history and cannot be recovered in concrete detail, that are extremely small but may exist, and that are apart from human activities but do exist somewhere, are all what we may never discover; but does this fact indicate that they do not belong to the category of reality? With respect to this, Peirce held an optimistic attitude. He held that those things will eventually be reached by human inquiry with the development of science, technology and the expansion of the scopes of human activities, and therefore that they belong to the category of reality. For example, men did not consider the existence of electrons, atoms, quarks and other realities with the development of natural science to a certain stage, but for us modern people, they have become indisputable things. In fact, as we will see later, contextual inquiry is precisely the key to Dewey’s theory of inquiry, which really allows philosophical activities to reach the central field of practice and thereby avoid the problems that Peirce faced.

11Last but also most importantly, there is an ambiguity in the term “reality” as a criterion for evaluating the right or wrong of inquiry: is the very existence of reality or the result of our belief in the reality that influences the activity of inquiry? In fact, “We absolutely do not deny that the imagination of the consequences and effects of ideas is fallible, only that we need not, as Peirce did, presuppose either reality or truth to be acquired in the future under this fallibility. In our view, this fallibility is contrasted with the outcomes and effects that actually occur” (Ma 2018: 36).

12Peirce retained the concept of “reality,” which is characteristic of traditional philosophy, so as to provide something “regulative” for his theory of inquiry. The conduct of inquiry depends on the assumption that reality does have effects and results. But we should also note that the concept prevents Peirce’s philosophy from entering the field of practice fully, and still retains the epistemological tendency of traditional philosophy to a certain extent.

3. Inquiry. An Existential Implication

13Dewey was deeply influenced by Darwinism and recognized that inquiry was the inevitable result of organisms’ existence and various activities in their environment, which is different from Peirce who studied inquiry from the perspective of traditional epistemology. Murray G. Murphey remarked, “The proper approach to man was therefore one which viewed him in evolutionary perspective, as one type of animal among many, situated in an environment which he both depended upon for the maintenance of life and altered by his activity” (in Dewey 1983: ix). Dewey had a strong interest in understanding the significance of practical activities in human affairs, and he believed that human beings live in a world full of problematic situations, and that inquiry arises from the requirements of experience itself. In this way, he reshaped the concept of inquiry and imbued it with an existential meaning.

3.1. Habits

14Dewey studies human inquiry activities from a biological perspective. As John E. Smith (1986: 247) claimed, “not since Aristotle has any philosopher built his thought so completely on biological foundations.” According to Dewey, human beings are creatures of nature, and life is a process of self-renewal through actions upon the environment. He reminded us that “The organism is itself a part of the larger natural world and exists as organism only in active connections with its environment” (Dewey 1986b: 40). Organisms (humans) and their environments are not independent of each other ontologically, but in a symbiotic relationship as two components of the whole natural process.

15The environment is turbulent, full of problems and challenges. An organism within its environment, in order to survive, has to respond to those challenges, “must adjust itself, by accommodation and defense but also by conquest,” and “must draw upon something in its surroundings to satisfy its needs” (Dewey 1987: 19). The organism and its environment are in a dynamic equilibrium.

Indeed, living may be regarded as a continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium. The “higher” the organism, the more serious become the disturbances and the more energetic (and often prolonged) are the efforts necessary for its reestablishment. The state of disturbed equilibration constitutes need. The movement towards its restoration is search and exploration. The recovery is fulfilment or satisfaction. (Dewey 1986b: 33-4)

16An organism benefits from a continuous transaction to obtain a relatively stable mode or rhythm of getting along with its environments. In Dewey’s view, a mode as such is not imposed externally, but arises in a natural process, and meanwhile, it changes and develops.

17Fundamentally speaking, a human is always a “living creature.” All living things are born with instincts and must learn how to use them. Lower creatures are often subject to their instincts; in the case of human beings, an opportunity to constant trial and error is given due to the slow development of their instincts, which allows them to learn to react differently in accordance with different contexts, and develop various methods to adapt themselves to a variety of situations. In the process of continuous trials, human beings will cultivate a relatively stable behavioral pattern, that is, some habits.

18In Dewey’s view, habits are similar to the most ordinary physiological behaviors such as digestion and breath, “They are things done by the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions” (Dewey 1983: 15). He used the word “habit” in a broader sense and wrote:

But we need a word to express that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity. (Ibid.: 31)

In the first place, a habit is a form of executive skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an ability to use natural conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of the environment through control of the organs of action. (Dewey 1980a: 51)

19Firstly, all patterns of human activities are developed through experience, and herewith they are a component of nature. Habits can have some “a priority” insofar as a certain specific act is concerned. This suggests that the antecedent tendencies of thinking and doing formed under the influence of customs and practices of the contextual society may be the result of previous inquiry.

20Secondly, human beings are creatures of habits, and the keynote of human activities is to act in line with habits. The human self is a dynamic process made up of specific, relatively stable and persistent habits, which is the bridge between impulse and intelligence. Therefore, Dewey (1986b: 88) said, “Man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct.” “Habits are dynamic, supplying inner tension, like mainsprings, and, like flywheels, they also supply the momentum necessary for continued activity even in the absence of stimuli that call for innovative thinking” (Hickman 1990: 16). Moreover, habits are also the bridges between old and new experiences. Previous patterns of experience are fixed into some habits, which developed into new ones through inquiry activities.

21Thirdly, there is indeed something mechanic in habit, but repetition does not make any habit possible, or rather, it is habit that may bring about repetition. The intellectual component within a habit determines that human behaviors are not scattered and aimless, but always has something planned and “Where there is a habit, there is acquaintance with the materials and equipment to which action is applied” (Dewey 1980a: 53). A habit has its own clear understanding of the mode of operation within a current situation, and helps in the process of reasoning and judgement. The intellectual element of a habit ensures both its connection with other flexible applications and the possibility of the development of old habits into new ones.

22And fourthly, Dewey argued that there was a mutual adaptation between an organism and its environment, with habits not only adapting to the environment but also regulating it. In other words, the environment also needs to adapt itself to human beings, and its change needs to be in a certain direction. Habit does not mean the increased stability through repetition, but maintains the flexibility to accept further changes. So, habits “are active means, means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting” (Dewey 1986b: 22). The more complex the organism is, the more inclined it is to make the best possible use of its environment, and the more it will adopt a pattern of adjusting the environment for the benefit of life. A habit is a positive kind of transformation, a dynamic and structural process of integrating the organism-environment. A habit becomes a basis for continuity between the biological world and society.

3.2. Impulse

23Human behaviors manifest themselves as impulses at first despite the dominant position of habits in them. Although impulses are something primary and the first forces causing an organism’s transaction with its environment, they are immature, scattered, and sporadic. The instinctive impulses as such cannot become useful unless they are given initial guidance by the social environment. Impulses can absorb energy in both natural and social environments, and form one’s own habits and become stabilized.

24According to Dewey, habits are characteristic of inertia despite their intelligent nature. They are certain behavioral tendencies arising in particular situations, and the truth is that the situations that we encounter are not exactly the same, and the way we deal with a problem in the past is not guaranteed to be applicable in the future. The obstruction of an action gives rise to an impulse so as to reorganize experience.

25But the impulse itself is orderless and chaotic, and does not help solve any problem. The organism is thus faced with a crisis, an uncomfortable and unsettled state. But it is also an opportunity to develop new habits. It is necessary to emphasize that we should not focus on the negative side of impulsivity exclusively and ignore its positive role in human development. Larry A. Hickman (1990: 184-5) noted, “Some of what has been termed progress has been precipitated by chance events breaking down old habits and the consequent necessity of reconstructing them, whether or not we wish to do so.” Impulse is also the hub of reorganizing activities, giving old habits a new direction. It is a kind of power deviating from the routine. “The impulse itself opens up possibilities, but does not guarantee a steady reorganization of habits to meet elements in a new situation” (Dewey 1983: 75). Impulse holds an intermediary position in actions, and is the source of liberation of indispensable behavioral patterns.

26Dewey distinguished impulsion from impulse in his work Art as Experience. Impulse, which is specialized and particular, is more similar to instinct, therefore it is relatively discrete and belongs to a certain mechanism that is “involved in a more complete adaptation with the environment” (Dewey 1987: 64). In comparison, however, impulsion is the integral outward and forward movement of an organism, for which impulse is auxiliary. For example, an organism’s desire for things is known as impulsion, while the actions of chewing and swallowing are impulses. The impulsion with wholeness and purposefulness is what leads to “one experience.” The question arises here as to how to channel the impulses into an intelligent activity. The most desirable way is to elevate impulse and make it a factor intelligently coordinated with others in the process of continuous actions (see Dewey 1983: 108).

27Intelligence and impulse are twin brothers when a habit is impeded. Habits ensure the stability of human society, but also threaten to make it sclerotic; impulse is some flavor for habits, which are proceduralized, but may throw human society into turmoil if it is not properly treated and guided. Dewey, therefore, attached great importance to the role of intelligence in human activities, and he argued that only with intelligence can placeless impulse be calmed down, with old habits smoothly developing into new ones. The transformation of experience is inseparable from the participation of intellectual activities.

3.3. Intelligence

28Despite its intellectual component, habits have the tendency of becoming mechanic in nature. As stimuli and responses are linked in a continuous chain, an actor is forced into a predetermined sequence. Thomas M. Alexander (1987: 144-5) concluded, “While habit is thus the means toward expression and intelligent action, it is also capable of ossification into dead routine. This happens when habit loses its contact with emotion and impulse, in short, with the variety and immediacy of the situation.” Impulse would arise so long as a habit still works; without impulse, there would be no opportunity for intelligence to show up. Experience attracts attention only when it encounters an obstacle in actual process, and will be considered only when it thus arouses consideration. Habits do not lead to spontaneous cognition, nor do they call for any pauses for thinking, observation or recalling. This is because they have their own set of habitual and stable patterns of organization and operation, and thus have no need or motivation to reflect on and constantly renew themselves. And likewise, impulse is also incompetent at self-reflection or speculation because of its chaos and disorder.

29According to Dewey, the situation is not “something” in the epistemological sense, but the inevitable scene in which “life-function” plays a role, which is the transactions between organism and environment, “particularly an instance of breakdown or disturbance in organism-environment transactions” (Burke, Hester & Talisse 2002: xv). The emergence of a problem situation provides an opportunity for the occurrence of intelligence. Intelligence is supposed to resolve dissonance in existing activities, restore the continuity of the stream of experience, subdue scattered impulses, and renew old habits. It begins with the inefficacy of an old way in dealing with a problem and ends with the finding of a new line of action. Therefore, it is an experiment with different lines.

30Intelligence begins its work only when there is a conflict between habit and the release of impulse. The most direct manifestation of intelligence is deliberation, which means stopping to think and take “time to put objects in order” (Dewey 1983: 137). Deliberation requires the imaginary “dramatic rehearsals” of various competing possible line of action, and meanwhile “means precisely that activity is disintegrated, and that its various elements hold one another up” (ibid.: 133). Deliberation is performed in imagination, just as we would have rehearsed possible paths and try to imagine the consequences of each possible action before driving a rattlesnake off the road. It should be pointed out that an activity does not cease because of the stop of physical movement, it only turns from the external behavior into the thinking activity of a certain organism. Deliberation is important simply because it offers a buffer zone between problems and outcomes, “Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster” (ibid.). The occurrence of a problem does not directly bring about the effect of an action on the environment, because such a pause gives the experience more possibilities and largely prevents the organism from causing irreparable damage to the environment.

31Deliberation can also be called “reflective thinking,” which is “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends to constitute reflective thought” (Dewey 1986a: 118). It includes successive ideas and their possible consequences. Dewey did not claim that any thinking necessarily led to a satisfactory solution. In his view, we may not discover a line of action to solve a certain problem, or we may find a set of methods indeed, which do not necessarily produce practical results. This means the necessity of tests: a proposed method of action must be tested in the real world as to whether it can achieve any satisfactory result. In order to reach this end, an intellectual activity necessarily requires us to investigate, find out the grounds on which it is based, and suggest ways and means by which it may be achieved.

32A plan that cannot be performed in reality is merely speculative and cannot be viewed as effective activity in the real world no matter how perfect a plan may be in the rational argument. Columbus’s belief that the earth is spherical does not mean that the matter simply ends there; instead, he has to develop a series of thoughts around this idea and has to act accordingly, moving along a certain line by starting from the beginning and returning to the origin. When we prove a previously proposed hypothesis successfully, the problem is solved, the impulse is suppressed, and the situation becomes stable again. This means the acquisition of a new habit. But impulse will occur again when a new problem situation arises, and that requires further inquiry.

4. Inquiry. From Epistemology to Existentialism

33Peirce opposed the epistemological approach of traditional philosophy. First of all, he believed that our cognition was based on various stereotypes. Second, Peirce was a realist in a certain sense, who was convinced that there was a certain reality that provided guidance on inquiry and judgments about whether human knowledge was correct or not. Reality is at first the object of a community’s belief, and becomes increasingly secure due to the participation of inquiry. Peirce rejected the hypothesis of a reality and the once-and-for-all cognition of its eternality, attached much importance to the way of the scientific inquiry into the practical effects produced by what the idea had claimed, and emphasized constant inquiry without allowing sclerotic ideas or beliefs to block the road of inquiry. Dewey thought highly of this Peircean idea. As he said, “Do not a large part of our epistemological difficulties arise from an attempt to define the ‘real’ as something given prior to reflective inquiry instead of as that which reflective inquiry is forced to reach and to which when it is reached belief can stably cling?” (Dewey 1980b: 78). But we should also keep in mind that Peirce’s theory of inquiry can only be viewed as having half a foot in the door of practice, and as being still mixed with the remnants of traditional epistemology and dualism. In Peirce, inquiry is still a process of starting from the agent of inquiry and pointing to the external reality, with the purpose of calming down the anxiety caused by doubts and finally determining the belief. Peirce believed that there was an objective reality which can be reached through the inquiry of the scientific community. Such a presupposition creates an irreducible tension between inquiry and reality, and it is a sign of hesitancy in Peirce’s philosophy.

34Unlike Peirce, Dewey regarded human beings as fundamentally living creatures who, as long as they are still alive, have to do something and thus transact with their environments. Dewey inherited a changing worldview from Darwin, and he believed that we live in a world that manifests itself as a process, a world full of problematic situations. Dewey imbued inquiry with an existential meaning, pointing out that inquiry is life and experience, and that there is no ontological distinction between subject and object, but only a functional division of agent and object concerning inquiry in the same process of experience. As Liu Fangtong (2015: 44) remarked, “The key point here is to affirm that experience is life, which is men’s interactions with nature and social environment. Life is just practice and gets transformed in practice. It thus leads man to future experience and practice.” Practice here is synonymous with inquiry, and both science and philosophy should be viewed as a practical method. Practice needs to be guided and controlled, which requires intelligent participation. There is a fundamental connection between intelligence and the future that is still unrealized; and the reconstruction of the present situation is a better help in turning the future into reality. It is noteworthy that for Dewey, intelligence, although it is a methodical conception of possible future outcomes, does not foretell the future, for “It is to ascertain the meaning of present activities and to secure, so far as possible, a present activity with a unified meaning” (Dewey 1983: 43). Therefore, in the view of Dewey, it is unnecessary to presuppose a reality as Peirce did, or in other words, there can be such a reality, which is merely a means to help the development of inquiry, and has to be tested in practical activities in the end. So long as it can effectively help the development of inquiry, it can be accepted. So, it is not important whether there is such a reality. What is important is whether the assumption of its effect can contribute to the solution of the problem situation.

35Dewey developed Peirce’s concept of inquiry, turning the mode of inquiry from (previous) beliefs-doubt-inquiry-belief to habit-problematic situation-impulse-intelligence-new habit. Inquiry is no longer the privilege of an actor, but an objective thing. At the same time, inquiry imbues an organism with proactivity, the ability to transform the world. Dewey also combined inquiry with metaphysics to identify the “genetic traits” of the real world where we live and to use them as a means in transforming it. It is a critical topographic map, which is instrumental and testable. Experience is a core concept in Dewey’s metaphysics. It is no exaggeration to say that the process of inquiry is the rhythm of the flow of experience. If inquiry is more on the side of organisms, then experience is the overall description of the unity of organisms and their environments.

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Bibliography

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Notes

1 As for the other three methods, the first is called tenacity, which means to make our belief stable by avoiding doubt; the second is based on authority; and the third is known as the a priori method, which insists on “agreeableness to reason.”

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References

Electronic reference

Ming Dong and Chengbing Wang, “The Difference between Peircean and Deweyan Interpretations of Inquiry”European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XVII-1 | 2025, Online since 24 April 2025, connection on 22 June 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/4787; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/13t9n

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About the authors

Ming Dong

Shandong Jiaotong University, Jinan
230063[at]sdjtu.edu.cn

Chengbing Wang

Shanxi Universtiy, Taiyuan
wangchengbing1961[at]163.com

By this author

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