Skip to navigation – Site map

HomeIssuesXVII-1SymposiaPragmatism in ChinaReview of Studies on Richard Rort...

Symposia
Pragmatism in China

Review of Studies on Richard Rorty’s Philosophy in China since the 21st Century

Zilong Liu

Abstract

The study of Richard Rorty’s philosophy in China since the 21st century has covered a number of aspects, which has made significant progress. Regarding Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, scholars have conducted in-depth discussions of Rorty’s anti-essentialism, his conception of truth, and the idea of a philosophy of dialogue; Regarding Rorty’s ideas of an edifying philosophy and a post-philosophical culture, scholars have sorted out the relationship between the two and carried out more targeted and in-depth interpretations and discussions. In addition, the application and revelation of Rorty’s philosophy in political science, ethics and literary aesthetics have been examined, which reveals the interdisciplinary value of his thought. Finally, scholars, by means of a comparative study, have further highlighted the uniqueness of Rorty’s philosophy and its significance in the history of philosophy.

Top of page

Full text

1. Introduction

1The study of Rorty’s philosophy in Chinese mainland has begun in the 1980s. In June 1985, Rorty was invited to visit China and gave academic lectures on Non-reductive Physicalism and Freud and Moral Reflection at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Peking University respectively. Later, the Chinese translations of Rorty’s seminal work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and the collection of essays Post-Philosophical Culture (a Chinese translation of some of Rorty’s essays) were published one after another, and then Rorty’s philosophy became widely known to Chinese scholars. Scholars were initially attracted to Rorty’s work because of its unique perspectives that challenged traditional Western philosophical thought, especially considering China’s own philosophical development and the search for diverse philosophical paradigms.

2In July 2004, Rorty was invited to visit China again, where he carried out a series of academic activities in Beijing, Tianjin, Xi’an, Hangzhou, Taiyuan, Harbin, and Shanghai, and participated in an international symposium entitled Rorty, Pragmatism, and Chinese Philosophy in Shanghai. Rorty’s visit this time was longer in duration and his lectures covered a wider range of topics. In addition, compared to his first visit to China, which solely focused on philosophical issues, Rorty’s reports during this visit were significantly more in-depth on political issues, such as the report The Philosopher’s Vision: China, America, and the World in 2050. Rorty’s visit to China once again aroused greater enthusiasm among Chinese scholars of Rorty’s philosophy, and this set off another round of “Rorty Fever.”

3Since the beginning of the 21st century, significant progress has been made in the study of Rorty’s philosophy in China’s academic community. According to the statistics from authoritative academic databases like CNKI, since 2000 more than 1200 academic texts on Rorty have been produced in Chinese mainland, including more than 120 doctoral dissertations and more than 210 master’s dissertations. At the same time, Chinese scholars have also compiled more than ten books and collections of essays on Rorty from abroad, which provides documentary support for the Chinese academic community in their effort to develop a better understanding of Rorty’s philosophy.

4Generally speaking, the study of Rorty’s philosophy in the Chinese academic community since the turn of the century can be divided into two phases. The first phase is from 2000 to 2010, which mainly represents a continuation of the study of Rorty’s philosophy at the end of the last century. Scholars have explored the core concepts and theoretical framework of Rorty’s philosophy in a more detailed way, and placed them in the context of postmodernism and pragmatism.

5Since 2010, the study of Rorty’s philosophy in China has entered a second phase. With several Chinese version of his books published one after another (two books in 2003, Truth and Progress, and Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, and three collections of essays in 2009, Scenes of Philosophy, Post-Metaphysical Hope, and Philosophy, Literature and Politics), the translation of Rorty’s original philosophical works by Chinese scholars was roughly completed. Since then, academic study of Rorty’s philosophy has been gradually extended, not only carrying out a more detailed analysis and interpretation of his basic theory, but also focusing on his ethics, aesthetics, and especially his political philosophy.

2. Studies on Rorty’s Neo-Pragmatist Philosophy

6Rorty’s neo-pragmatism is an essential part of his philosophy. In terms of time, it is one of the earliest theory of Rorty that scholars in Chinese mainland paid attention to and conducted study on. The academic community as a whole holds an affirmative stance towards Rorty’s anti-essentialism. Scholars are particularly interested in this aspect as it challenges the long-established essentialist views in Western philosophical traditions. They generally believe that Rorty’s anti-essentialism not only challenges the traditional correspondence theory of truth, but also fundamentally denies the existence of a fixed ontology or essence, thereby rejecting the existence of absolute truth that completely corresponds to objective reality. This has led Chinese scholars to reevaluate the traditional understanding of the nature of things and the pursuit of absolute knowledge. As for Rorty’s thought of anti-essentialism, Kong Wenqing points out that the focus of Rorty’s criticism is all forms of Platonism, namely, doctrines that insist on the existence of some inherent and essential nature. Rorty emphasizes that there is no independent reality beyond human cognition, nor is there any fixed and immutable essence. In the face of the possible criticism of relativism, Rorty argues that such criticism is still confined to the theoretical framework of Platonism, and the mission of pragmatists is precisely to break this framework (Kong 2013). The academic community believes that Rorty’s anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism have not only built a bridge for the dialogue between philosophy in Chinese mainland and analytic philosophy, but also promoted the integration and coexistence of scientism and humanism in the field of philosophy, revealing a new trend in the development of modern Western philosophy (Zhang 2009).

7The academic community holds the view that Rorty put forward his own view of truth on the basis of criticizing traditional philosophy. Guo Guichun and An Jun point out that Rorty’s conceptions of truth reveals a sharp contrast between the silence of the world and the linguistic behavior of human being, emphasizing that language is created by human beings for specific purposes, rather than a transparent medium between the self and reality, and that if does not possess the ability to directly represent or reproduce reality. Therefore, he proposes that “truth” is merely a property of statements which is inevitably the product of human construction. This perspective reflects Rorty’s attempt to demystify the world and build his own view of truth on this basis (Guo & An 2008). As for the origin of Rorty’s conception of truth, Liu Zhijing believes that Rorty inherits William James’s view, that is, the idea that truth is not essential but inclines more towards value judgment. Han Keyong emphasizes the key role of literature in Rorty’s conception of truth, noting that Rorty is deeply influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche’s view that truth is a set of mutable metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphic words. Zhang Wenhua believes that Rorty accepts Willard Quine’s conception of naturalistic language and further regards truth as a pure human construct. Xu Wei and Li Teng propose that Rorty develops Donald Davidson’s conception of truth, advocating that both reality and truth are constructions of thought (Xu & Li 2006).

8Despite the disputes over Rorty’s view of truth in the academic community, scholars generally agree that his subversive “non-mirror” view of truth reveals the contemporary transformation in the development of Western philosophy. Sun Bin has realized that Rorty’s thought reflects a significant shift in the pragmatist view of truth from the pure philosophical domain to the field of social science. This shift provides a new perspective to re-examine Rorty’s philosophical contributions and the mission of philosophy in current era. Rorty’s conception of truth is not only related to philosophical thinking itself, but also leads to a better future dependent on human imagination. At present, if philosophy still adheres to the traditional way to interpret the world, it will lose its reality and legitimacy. Therefore, we need a kind of philosophical thinking that can intervene in society and promote future creation, so that truth can be developed and perfected in this very process of intervention and creation (Sun 2019).

9As for the proposition of dialogue in Rorty’s pragmatism, the academic community has sorted it out and has multi-dimensionally outlined the whole picture of Rorty’s conception of dialogue from such aspects as the premise, approach, principle, and goal of dialogue. The study indicates that Rorty considers the criticism of mirror philosophy and ethnocentrism as the two cornerstones of dialogue and regards literature as the macro approach to achieving dialogue. In terms of the principle of dialogue, Rorty emphasizes the significance of persuasion and believes that weaker rationality provides philosophical support for persuasion. In Rorty’s conception, post-philosophical culture is the ultimate goal of dialogue, which aims to achieve collaboration and unity as well as construct a web of beliefs; while at the ethical level, dialogue aims to promote moral progress (Mei 2019). The academic community highly appraises Rorty’s conception of dialogue, considering that he has a keen insight into the severe challenges faced by the current times and explores theoretical paths to address these challenges. Rorty’s dialogue philosophy not only portrays a new self-image for future Western philosophy, but also indicates a new path for the development of Western culture, namely, to achieve cultural progress through dialogue and communication (Wang 2011).

3. Studies on Rorty’s Post-Philosophical Culture and Edifying Philosophy

10“Edifying philosophy” or “post-philosophical culture” is a major topic in Rorty’s philosophy, which has also drawn extensive attention from the Chinese academic community. Chinese scholars are attracted to this topic because it offers a novel perspective on the transformation of philosophy from a traditional, foundational discipline to a more fluid and practical form of cultural activity. They believe that Rorty’s edifying philosophy, which takes skeptical epistemology as its starting point, tries to free people from traditional philosophical constraints. This has encouraged Chinese scholars to explore how philosophy can better engage with contemporary social and cultural issues and adapt to the changing intellectual landscape. Chinese scholars believe that Rorty’s edifying philosophy is put forward for system philosophy and takes skeptical epistemology as its starting point, trying to free people from traditional philosophical constraints (Han 2001). In Rorty’s view, edifying philosophy is considered as a proposal for seeking a better way of communication, through which dialogue can be deepened and sustained (Gu 2011). As for the purpose of Rorty’s edifying philosophy, there are different views. Gu Linzheng believes that edification amounts to dialogue which does not pursue a common goal, but takes maintaining the continuity of the conversation as the entire purpose of philosophy. Zhang Guizhi emphasizes that the purpose of edifying philosophy is to maintain the purity and original intention of dialogue.

11The academic studies on Rorty’s post-philosophical culture primarily focus on its theoretical origins, connotation and essence, as well as theoretical features. From the perspective of theoretical origins, the academic community believes that Rorty’s post-philosophical culture is a new type of philosophical culture constructed in the context of American pragmatism, which is on the basis of criticizing traditional Western metaphysics and drawing on the postmodernist elements in the thoughts of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, and John Dewey. In terms of the connotation and essence of Rorty’s post-philosophical culture, discussions in academic community can be categorized into four viewpoints. The first is that Rorty’s post-philosophical culture actually undermines the core position of science in modern culture and emphasizes its nature of “post-scientific culture.” The second is that Rorty’s post-philosophical culture is essentially a dialogue culture beyond traditional philosophy and emphasizes the characteristics of dialogue. The third indicates that both the post-philosophical culture advocated by Rorty and postmodernist pluralistic culture are aiming at challenging authority, questioning the monopoly of truth and legitimacy of cultural dictatorship. The fourth regards Rorty’s post-philosophical culture as an activity of cultural interpretation, in which people’s modes of dialogue are constantly evolving to expand the boundaries of “we.” In terms of the features of post-philosophical culture, scholars also put forward three different perspectives. First, the distinctive feature of Rorty’s post-philosophical culture is that there is no central foundation and no hierarchical discipline of the academic disciplines, and the difference between the “center” and “periphery” within the overall cultural structure has become blurred. Second, anti-foundationalism is the major feature of Rorty’s post-philosophical culture, and anti-essentialism and limited relativism are also its main characteristics. Third, from the perspective of the relationship between the various branches of post-philosophical culture, the most basic feature of post-philosophical culture is its focus on practical political issues rather than metaphysical philosophical discussions, and it gives priority to politics over philosophy, science, literature when politics is in the conflicts with them (Mei 2018).

4. Diversified Trend of Study on Rorty’s Philosophy

12Since the 21st century, the study of Rorty’s philosophy in China’s academic community has shown a diversified perspective, manifested in the gradual extension of study into fields such as Rorty’s political philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics of literature and art.

13In the field of political philosophy, scholars first explore deeply into Rorty’s views on the relationship between politics and philosophy. They propose that Rorty advocates the separation of philosophy and politics, believing that metaphysical philosophical theory has limited guidance for concrete political practice, and advocates replacing ontology of traditional philosophy with cultural politics (Zheng 2010). This perspective has spurred Chinese scholars to discuss the role of philosophy in political life and the necessity for a more practical and contextually aware approach to political philosophy. In terms of the division between the public and private spheres, the academic community has reached a consensus on the following points. In Rorty’s view, the private sphere has nothing to do with politics, which is a space for people to freely exercise their imagination and hold personal philosophical and religious beliefs. Political activities are limited to the public sphere, and its goal is only to reduce cruelty and eliminate humiliation, without any other higher purpose (Dong 2010). However, some scholars also point out shortcomings of Rorty’s view, Luo Qian arguing that although Rorty resolves the contradiction between individual creativity and social solidarity through the division of public and private, the key to achieving social solidarity while maintaining individual freedom does not lie in the clarity of the public-private boundary, but in the ambiguity and uncertainty of such boundary. Therefore, they argue that Rorty to some extent merely avoids the core of the problem (Luo 2011).

14In exploring Rorty’s ironic liberalism, scholars summarize it as follows. A real liberal society should encourage and support individual creativity. Real liberals, on the one hand, should strive to re-describe existing things. On the other hand, they need to sympathize with and understand others’ views and strive to reduce cruelty (Chen 2009). Some studies further reveal Rorty’s dilemma. Dong Shanmin’s research points out that although ironic liberalism criticizes mainstream liberal views by rejecting foundationalism, it also exposes its own contradictions: its linguistic pragmatism makes it an incomprehensible theory, and the practice of taking actual effect as the standard may contribute to the spread of relativism. Therefore, the dilemma of Rorty’s ironic liberalism also reflects the predicament of Western liberalism, the difference being that the latter constructs an abstract notion of humanity, while the former falls into the trouble of being rootless (Dong 2019).

15Regarding Rorty’s moral ethics, scholars generally believe that Rorty places ethics at the core of philosophical reflection and holds a positive attitude towards his moral empiricism (Chen 2008). However, Chen Yajun criticizes Rorty for his inadequacy in explaining moral progress and handling the relationship between “others” and “we.” Meanwhile, some critics argue that although Rorty criticizes the practical dilemma of rational morality, he has not deeply reflected on the problems of his own moral sentiment in practice (Ai 2013). Regarding Rorty’s literary and cultural thought, some studies elaborate on its origin, establishment, and inner meaning of his literary culture, and pointed out that Rorty constructs literary culture by emphasizing the unique value of literature, which challenges the traditional status of philosophy as the cornerstone of culture and integrates philosophy into the realm of literature, so that the integration of philosophy and literature becomes the core feature of literary culture.

16Some scholars regard Rorty as one of the main representatives of ethical aestheticization thought and actively explore the aesthetic dimension of Rorty’s aesthetic thought. Zhao Yanfang holds the view that Rorty, from a cultural-political perspective, puts forward a literary way of thinking focusing on “intervention,” which emphasizes the important role of literature in stimulating individual creativity and strengthening unity of a community. Although ways of how literary intervenes in ethics put forward by Rorty are different, the ethical connotation of literature has not disappeared (Zhao 2016). Another view is that although Rorty’s ethics can be attributed to an aesthetic form of poetic culture, its corresponding concept of aesthetic life is difficult to achieveand the consideration of aesthetics in ethical issues is still a theoretical problem to be solved in the context of the increasingly severe ethical crisis in the West (Li 2013).

4. Studies on Rorty’s Philosophy from the Perspective of Comparative Philosophy

17The diverse connotation and inclusive characteristics of Rorty’s philosophy has created the possibility for cross-disciplinary and multi-dimensional philosophical dialogues. In comparative studies with other important figures in the fields of analytic philosophy and pragmatism, the academic community explores the similarities and differences between Thomas Kuhn and Richard Rorty in the aspects of explanatory rationality, epistemological rationality, commensurability, and questioning of the “common ground” of traditional epistemology from the perspective of comparison and analysis. Wang Shanbo proposes that Kuhn agrees with epistemological rationality and insists on taking paradigms as the basis for scientific interpretation, while Rorty attempts to deconstruct epistemological rationality through hermeneutical rationality. In addition, although both Rorty and Kuhn oppose the commensurability of epistemology and question the “common ground,” Rorty, based on hermeneutical rationality, pursues new commensurability in dialogue to transcend the “common ground” (Wang 2002). Other scholars realize that Rorty and Hilary Putnam hold different view on the issue of realism. Rorty believes that metaphysical realism is illusory, while Putnam insists that metaphysical realism is an intuition of the world that should be transformed rather than avoided. Some studies also reveal that there are distinctive differences between Putnam’s late anti-functionalist stance and Rorty’s although they are seemingly similar to each other, with the key point being whether culture can be regarded as software and the brain as hardware (Chen 2003).

18In comparative studies with European philosophers and postmodern philosophers, the academic community has found that Rorty’s ideas have produced interesting overlaps with the views of Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Rancière, and Slavoj Žižek. For example, Chen Sihai’s study explores Rorty’s transformation on Nietzsche’s idea of self-redemption, pointing out that Rorty’s irony and self-redescriptive concepts can be seen as a deepening and expansion of Nietzsche’s Übermensch philosophy and the motto “be yourself.” However, Rorty’s irony seems to be closer to the image of “the last man” described by Nietzsche, rather than the Übermensch that is actively transcended, which needs to be further explored by the academic community (Yang 2021). Other studies name Rancière’s and Rorty’s literary views as “radical poetics” and “practical poetics” respectively, and attempt to construct a possible dialogue between them. What the two have in common, Tang Yonghua has pointed out, is their refusal to substitute philosophical speculation for political action and their emphasis on literature and hope. But their logic is different: Rorty tends to achieve understanding by assimilating differences, whereas Rancière seeks commonalities due to the existing differences (Tang 2018). In addition, Wang Wei’s studies show that Rorty and Žižek are compatible in philosophy and politics. But Žižek sticks to a conservative stance in ontology, echoing Alain Badiou’s criticism of Rorty’s idea of “democracy preceding philosophy.” At the same time, Žižek criticizes several issues in the presuppositions of Rorty’s liberal utopia, including the legal possibility of being uncontaminated, the atomization of society, the naturalization of capitalism, and the lack of universal liberation of public space (Wang 2020).

19In the comparative study of Rorty and many thinkers in fields of ethics and political philosophy, scholars focus their attention on contemporary figures such as Jürgen Habermas, Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper, Michael Walzer, John Rawls, as well as historical figures like David Hume. With their unique perspectives and theoretical contributions, these thinkers have formed a rich dialogue and contrast with Rorty’s thought. On the one hand, scholars put the views of Habermas and Rawls on the broad stage of the debate between liberalism and communitarianism, and make a horizontal comparison with Rorty’s ironic liberal political philosophy to explore the similarities and differences and complementarities between them. This comparison not only deepens the understanding of Rorty’s philosophy, but also reveals the diversity and complexity of liberal political philosophy in contemporary era (Dong 2012). On the other hand, scholars also pay attention to the differences between Rorty and Hume in the aspects of rationality, human nature and epistemology. For example, Rorty and Hume’s different views on the origin and rationality of liberalism have led to an in-depth discussions on the role of rationality and human nature, and they believe that the problem of “we” and “others” can be effectively solved by considering scientific reason in Hume’s sense, which not only guarantees the freedom of irony of ironists, but also is more effective in preventing society from falling into irrational situations (Zhang 2004).

20On the issue of justice and value pluralism, the academic community finds that Rorty’s views have an interesting intersection and collision with the thoughts of Berlin and Walzer. Scholars agree with Rorty’s innovative approach in solving the dilemma of value pluralism, such as transforming the issue of justice into a discussion of loyalty and attaching importance to the role of “poet.” At the same time, scholars also point out that Rorty does not discuss the principle of justice deeply, and his views lack professionalism and have a tendency of cynicism, which may lead to the chaos of the real society (Zhang & Xi 2013). In addition, Wang Zhenlin analyzes the two major trends of contemporary ethical and moral philosophy: Rorty’s unprincipled ethics of “technical rationality” and Habermas’s universal ethics based on “communicative rationality.” He believes that although they are expressed in a different way, they both abandon the traditional metaphysical foundation, and both reflect on and respond to the current social situation. However, Habermas claims that the ethnocentrism advocated by Rorty is closer to solipsism, which essentially hinders the dialogue between different cultural groups, because, in Rorty’s theoretical framework, there is no “they,” but only the concept of the “we.” This evaluation rightly points out the logical problems in Rorty’s philosophy and is closely related to the feasibility of Rorty’s political philosophy (Wang 2007).

Top of page

Bibliography

Ai Kunpeng, (2013), “The Path of Moral Progress: Rorty on Contingency and Morality,” Morality and Civilization, 3, 95-101.

Chen Yajun, (2003), “The Dialogue Between Putnam and Rorty: What Can Realism Leave Us?,” World Philosophy, 1, 70-80.

Chen Yajun, (2008), “On Rorty’s New Pragmatism in Moral Philosophy,” Journal of East China Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences), 4, 55-61.

Chen Yajun, (2009), “Richard Rorty’s Theory of Irony Liberalism,” The Journal of Yunnan University Social Sciences Edition, 8(3), 24-31.

Dong Shanmin, (2010), “The Debate Between Foucault and Habermas in Rorty’s Prism,” The Journal of Humanities, 4, 5.

Dong Shanmin, (2012), A Criticism of Rorty’s Political and Moral Philosophy, Beijing, Social Sciences Academic Press.

Dong Shanmin, (2019), “Rootless Liberalism: On the Tension of Rorty’s Proposal,” Dongyue Tribune, 7, 8.

Gu Linzheng, (2011), “Pragmatism Trend: Gadamer and Rorty’s Hermeneutic Dialogue,” Journal of Shaoxing University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 31(6), 27-30.

Guo Guichun & Jun An, (2008), “Vigil for Post-Philosophy Culture: In Memory of Professor Richard Rorty,” Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology, 25(6), 1-6.

Han Yi, (2001), “Rorty’s Philosophical View,” Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute of Politics, 1, 40-3.

Kong Wenqing, (2013), “On Rorty’s Anti-Essential Ethics and the Issue of Relativism,” Journal of East China Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 45(3), 60-6.

Li Li, (2013), “‘Literary Culture’ and the Aesthetic Construction of Ethical Life,” Journal of Henan Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition), 1, 5.

Luo Qian, (2011), “‘Democracy Precedes Philosophy’: On Rorty’s Ironical Political Philosophy,” Philosophical Trends, 8, 55-60.

Mei Tao, (2018), “Review of Domestic Research Status of Rorty’s Philosophy,” Theory Horizon, 3, 45-54.

Mei Tao, (2019), “Research on Richard Rorty’s Conversation Thought,” Doctoral Dissertation, Jilin University.

Sun Bin, (2019), “Richard Rorty as a Perspective to the Turn of Theory of Truth from Philosophy to Social Science,” Journal of Southwest University (Social Sciences Edition), 45(6), 45-52.

Tang Yonghua, (2018), “Radical and Pragmatic Poetics: The Dialogue Between Rancière and Rorty,” Literature & Art Studies, 1, 5-16.

Wang Heyan, (2007), “A Review of Research on Rorty’s Philosophical Thought,” Theoretical Investigation, 1, 67-9.

Wang Heyan, (2011), “Rorty’s Post-Philosophical Cultural View and its Response to Contemporary Themes,” Theoretical Exploration, 4, 86-9.

Wang Shanbo, (2002), “Interpretation and Incommensurability,” Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 9, 23-5.

Wang Wei, (2020), “Philosophical Role, Postmodern Theory and Liberalism: On Žižek’s Criticism of Rorty,” Journal of Wuling, 45(5), 40-6.

Xu Wei & Teng Li, (2006), “A Brief Analysis of the Issues of Truth and Progress: A Study on Rorty’s View of Truth,” Journal of Southeast University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), S2, 40-2.

Yang Yuchang, (2021), “From Self-Creation to Self-Re-Description: On Rorty’s Transformation of Nietzsche’s Self-Redemption Thought,” Academic Research, 11, 51-7.

Zhang Dongfeng, (2009), “A Comparison of Rorty’s and Martin Heidegger’s Views on Truth,” Zhejiang Academic Journal, 6, 189-94.

Zhang Guoqing, (2004), “Between Virtues: A Problematic of Isaiah Berlin’s Values-Pluralism and its Criticism,” Philosophical Research, 7, 72-8.

Zhang Guoqing & Xiaodiao Xi, (2013), “Justice, Loyalty and Solidarity: On the Social Criticism Theories of Rorty and Walzer,” Zhejiang Social Sciences, 4, 111-7.

Zhao Yanfang, (2016), “The Ethics of Literature Between Individuals and Community: Starting from Richard Rorty’s Literary Thought,” Journal of School of Chinese Language and Culture Nanjing Normal University, 3, 124-8.

Zheng Weiwei, (2010), “Triple Meanings for Irony in Richard Rorty’s Political Philosophy,” Philosophical Analysis, 1(4), 14.

Top of page

References

Electronic reference

Zilong Liu, “Review of Studies on Richard Rorty’s Philosophy in China since the 21st Century”European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XVII-1 | 2025, Online since 24 April 2025, connection on 20 June 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/4839; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/13t9o

Top of page

About the author

Zilong Liu

Shanxi University, Taiyuan
965276686[at]qq.com

Top of page

Copyright

CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

The text only may be used under licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

Top of page
Search OpenEdition Search

You will be redirected to OpenEdition Search