- 1 The niqab is a garment of clothing that covers the face and which is worn by a small minority of M (...)
1Before starting to write this article, I was thinking to write a profile of three Sudanese women wearing a full veil (niqab) for the Strategic Initiative for Women in The Horn of Africa (SIHA) Journal “Women in Islam”. But from the first interview I did, I realized how the issue of niqab1 needed a scientific research paper (not a profile) on this remarkable phenomenon of recent Salafi wave in Sudan. From this perspective, this article could be considered as a preliminary paper based on a qualitative research that could be possibly complemented with an extensive quantitative survey in the future.
2This paper addresses the growing phenomenon of niqab in this particular historical moment in Sudan. The paper aims to understand the historical, socio-economic and cultural reasons behind the spread of niqab in a society deeply immersed in Sufi religious culture.
3The religious map of Sudan shows that 60% of the Sudanese population is made of devotees of Sufi orders, while the Muslim Brothers and Ansar al Sunna represent only 10% (al-Sarief 2014). Among Sufi orders, hijab is not a condition for membership, while niqab is completely rejected. So, this new phenomenon of wearing niqab in Sudan is striking.
4Since the late 1970s, Sudan witnessed a gradual and quiet radicalization. By radicalization I mean “a process of being more literal in Islamic text interpretation”, leading individuals to adopt more strict puritanical understanding of religion with more devotion to the Islamic texts (The Qur’an and the Prophetic Tradition). While radicalization does not necessarily means committing violence, religious violence is based on radicalization (radical interpretations of religion) and the development of these interpretations founded the base of violent Salafi movements (Salafi-Jihadists).
5This radicalization is a result of a number of global-regional and local developments. Notably, the impact of globalization and social media (where Salafis are particularly active in the absence of the representatives of other Islamic factions) appears crucial to understand the spread of the phenomenon of niqab (2003, 2013-present). Among the regional developments, the Arab Spring played a pivotal role during which Salafism has significantly expanded at the expense of secular and left forces. An important local reason is the return of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese expatriates from the Gulf countries where they had migrated due to the Sudanese economic crisis under May regime. On their return, many expatriates had brought new Salafi doctrines to Sudan (Bernal 1999). Wearing niqab is one of the signs of the society’s evolution towards a stricter understanding of religion.
6This article suggests that, while the radical understanding of religion had been silently and gradually spreading since the late 1970s in Sudan, it accelerated under the Ingazh regime due to its adoption of militant Islamic policies. This article contends that the spread of niqab is a by-product of the politics of the Ingazh regime in addition to the regional rise of Salafism.
7This article follows a qualitative approach to research and is based on the interviews of ten randomly chosen niqabi women in Omdurman and Khartoum North between September and October 2017. Ten semi-structured interviews were used for comparison between cases.
- 2 When I tried to write this section on Ansar al-Sunna in Kassala and Gedaref States in 1997, I foun (...)
8The phenomenon of niqab in Sudan is relatively new and there is little academic research on the topic. The notable exceptions are Tønnessen (2016), and Abdel Munim on Salafi groups (2019). One could mention the work by Mohamed El Obeid which was mainly focusing on Ansar al Sunna Jama‘a in Kassala and Gedaref States,2 in her paper, “Sufi Brotherhoods in Kassala and Gedaref State” (1997).
9The process of societal radicalization was accelerated during the Ingazh regime (June 1989-April 2019) with its militant version of the National Islamic Front and with making Sudan a host country for the Salafi radicals of the Islamic world such as Osama Bin Laden since 1990 (Burr, Collins 2003). The Salafi Ansar al-Sunna made use of the policies of the Ingazh regime that continued for thirty years. It seems that the regime's civilizational project of islamizing the State/society is imposing hijab in order to express the new Islamic orientation of the State and applying the uni-policy of arabization and islamization. In December 1991, hijab became the official dress code for women, by Presidential decree (Tønnessen, Granås Kjøstvedt 2010). At that time the female members of the Salafi Ansar al-Sunna used to wear hijab.
10Before the Ingazh regime, there was always mutual interest between the Muslim Brothers and the Salafi Ansar al-Sunna (Mohamed El Obeid 1989). One of the best example of this rising influence is the Salafis’ support to the application of Shari‘a Law represented by the Islamic Penal codes adopted in 1991.
- 3 Interview with Khartoum State official, Omdurman, September 2017.
- 4 In fact, the female members of the Salafi Ansar al-Sunna did not use to wear niqab or hijab before (...)
- 5 In the period (1990-1996) Salafi networks entered Sudan but no appearance of niqab. In 2003 there (...)
- 6 Interview by phone with Musa Hamid, a former member of the Jama’a of Ansar al-Sunna, 24 March 2020 (...)
11The Salafis found important support from the state during this period. Hosting Osama Bin Laden and his Salafi-Jihadist movement, for example, participated to the rise of a Salafi wave in Sudan. The backing of the Ingazh government to Salafis has also been demonstrated by giving them access to the media and facilitations. For that reason, the Ingazh regime did not reject the spread of niqab. Lately, through an undeclared policy, it supported Salafi Qur’anic centres of niqabi women.3 In the beginning of the Salafi Jama‘a’s appearance as a remarkable entity in the late 1970s, they did not impose the specific dress code (niqab) for members. They used to wear hijab which did not cover their faces.4 So, their female members were identified by wearing hijab. However, with the rise of the Salafi movements in Sudan (1990, 2003, 2013-present),5 women started to adopt niqab.6 This is in addition to the impact of the Salafis on the social media after 2013.
- 7 See the definition of radicalization mentioned above. Also see Salma Mohamed Abdel Munim Abdalla ( (...)
12The ongoing radicalization7 of society was accelerated during the Ingazh regime after the invitation of Bin Laden to Sudan and the appearance of the Takfiri groups in Sudan (Abdel Munim 2019). Having access to the media (Sudanese TV and radio programs), they indoctrinated youths through Salafism and women were encouraged to wear niqab.
13After the oil boom in Sudan in 1999-2011, the NCP was turned into an entrepreneurial and corrupt political organization whereas the mosques, preaching to the family (women) and the village was left to Salafi of Ansar al-Sunna and to Salafi-Jihadism. Abdel Munim mentioned different radical Salafi groups functioning in Sudan. They are: al-Qaeda, The Takfir wa Hijra, the Takfiri Group, Ansar al-Tawhid, Du‘at al Shari‘a group (Abdel Munim 2019). All of them commit their members to wearing niqab and they are finding new ground in Sudan.
14This period after 2003 witnessed the slight appearance of niqab among Salafi members and Takfiri groups, but after 2013, with the impact of the Salafis in Sudanese media, Friday prayers and social networks, niqab in Sudan spread rapidly in an escalating phenomenon.
15Those Salafis dominated the media, preaching for Friday prayers and dominated Qur’anic centres in all Khartoum cities. Niqab is widely seen in these Qur’anic centres as associated with the Salafis (Mohamed El Obeid 2005).
16In Sudan, the first appearance of a Salafi movement is linked to Jama‘at Ansar al-Sunna. The Jama‘a was established in Khartoum in the 1930s by a group of people such as Muhammad Hashim Al-Hadiyya, Mustafa Naqi and Shaykh Abu Zaid Muhammad Hamza (Mohamed El Obeid 2005).
- 8 Personal interview with the General Secretary of Ansar al-Sunna in Kassala, Kassala, 1997.
17In the 1980s, the Salafi Ansar al-Sunna started to appear as a quasi-state organization providing social services to the population and filling the gap left by the increasing incapacity of the state to ensure its presence on the social and economic fronts. During the 1990s, with the increased withdrawal of the state from the services of education and health, the role of the Jama‘a strengthened in society. Members of the Jama‘a had built camps for refugees in Eastern Sudan and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) after the 1983 famine in the fringes of Khartoum. It succeeded in providing clean water and in addressing basic needs in different areas of Sudan.8 The Jama‘a is strongly supported by individuals – powerful benefactors – from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries who are known to be associated to the circles of Wahabism (Mohamed El Obeid 2005: 136). Beginning from the late 1970s, the Saudi regime came to see the spread of Sunni-Wahabi fundamentalism as the best ideological antidote to Iran's revolutionary Islam (Bernal 1999).
- 9 In fact, this point needs further research beyond the scope of this article.
18The Wahabi incursion that would later lead to the spread of niqab had been growing since the late 1970s, following the shift of focus of moral authority. The normative understanding of Islam had been increasingly aligned with the Wahabi Islam spreading from Saudi Arabia and against which local behavior was increasingly measured (Bernal 1999). The spread of the Wahabi interpretation of Islam is taking place in the urban centres of the Sudanese cities (Khartoum, Medani, Kosti, Kassala, etc.) as well as in Sudanese villages.9 It could be considered as a quiet radicalization/Salafization of Sudanese society.
- 10 I started to conduct a solid research on this issue (Evaluation of Salafism in Sudan under the Ing (...)
19Women wearing niqab in Sudan are considered members of Jama‘a Ansar al-Sunna. While not every woman wearing niqab is a member of this Jama‘a, most of them are influenced by its doctrines. Ansar al-Sunna’s main focus is da‘wa, Islamic missionary and preaching activities (Tønnessen 2016: 92). They call for re-Islamization in order to purify and standardize Islam (Tønnessen 2016: 93).10
20One of the major consequences of the spread of the Wahabi interpretation of the Qur’an had been the Salafization of Sufi centers in Sudanese cities and villages.
21Khalwa is the Sudanese title for Sufi religious schools, where Qu’ran and Sufi studies such as those of Ibn ‘Arabi and other Sufi scholars are taught. The Khalwa play important roles in society among which mediation in conflicts and supporting the needy, providing medical care for the ill based on popular and Prophetic medicine, and initiating disciples into the Sufi path. The Sufi khalwa is dominated by the popular religion (that includes African traditions such as African witchcraft and the use of drums during rituals, alongside Sufi and Islamic traditions). As one informant explained, the Sufi khalwas were gradually turning into Qur’anic centers with Salafi ideation under the supervision of Salafi Ansar al-Sunna. Taking place during the third decade of the Ingazh regime, this change had increased the interest of the youth in religious learning, expecting that it would provide them access to job market in Saudi Arabia.
- 11 Interview with Israa Al Nur, Official in Khartoum State, 18/09/2017.
22The Qur’anic centers for women have strong access to public schools, especially secondary schools and training courses for civil servants. They are more attractive than the Sufi centres. Through charity associations and Qur’anic centres, the unemployed youth have a chance to be provided with certificates, facilitating the access of students to Saudi Arabia’s two-year training courses and job market.11
- 12 The relation of Ministry of Interior and Qur’anic Studies Association is based on Interview with a (...)
- 13 These Qur’anic studies centres are linked to Saudi Salafi Ansar Al-Sunna. This fact shows the quic (...)
23What I did not expect to find in these interviews is that the Ministry of Interior supported centers of women wearing niqab.12 It seems that these Qur’anic studies associations (centres) exist in every housing quarter in Khartoum city, and they teach Qur’anic studies where women were encouraged to wear niqab whereas13 most khalwas in the White Nile State (Kosti) used to be Sufi.
- 14 Concentration on tahwid is very essential in Ibn Taymiyya’s ideation. This reflects transformation (...)
- 15 Interview with an Official in Khartoum State, Omdurman, 18/09/2017.
24Niqabi women attend tawhid14 class in khalwas. In some of these centres they attend Shari‘a sciences for two years after which they are given the chance to go to Saudi Arabia in order to continue their studies in Shari‘a sciences.15 I arrived at the conclusion that Salafization takes place according to a three-step process:
- Addressing the family (women), through the Qur’anic studies centres that spread all over Khartoum and in other Sudanese cities. The Salafi Ansar al-Sunna are very active in incorporating women into these Qur’anic studies, and therefore influence women who adopt Salafi doctrine (instead of Sufi). Women go to the Qur’anic khalwas in order to study Qur’an. There, they study Shari‘a sciences and their perception of religion differs as they adopt the Wahabi version of Islam instead of the Sufi. I observed that during Ramadan, it is a custom that women attend Ramadan prayers (al-tarawih) in the mosques. From there they got the knowledge of Qur’anic centers and tawhid schools, which is the basis of Salafi doctrine.
- Targeting the Mosque institution. The Salafi Ansar al-Sunna are infiltrating every mosque by teaching Qur’anic studies and radicalize/Salafize visitors and students with Sunni and Salafi doctrine and preaching.
- Transforming the nature of Sudanese villages through mosques and disseminating new Salafi/Wahabi ideation instead of the Sufi at the village level (Mohamed El Obeid 2008: 168).
- 16 The Sammaniya Sufi Order was founded by Abdelkrim Summany.
25Each Qur’anic centre in Khartoum is located near a Sufi centre with the aim of mitigating their influence. For example, the Salafi Qur’anic centre of Ansar al-Sunna in Omdurman is located near the Mosque of Sheikh Al Burai of the Sammaniyya tariqa,16 and the Salafi Qur’anic centre of Ansar al-Sunna in Khartoum North is located near the mosque of Samanniyya centre of Shaikh Wad Al Bashir in Shambat (Khartoum North), etc.
26According to Liv Tønnessen, although Ansar al-Sunna is not directly questioning women’s right to participate in society and politics, it is calling for a more conservative dress code (face veil, niqab) and greater segregation between women and men at universities and workplaces in order to avoid fitna, which is a word used to describe the sexual chaos, a lack of segregation between the sexes will ultimately result in (Tønnessen, Granås Kjøstvedt 2010: 20).
27When wearing niqab, women are seeking a new identity (pious muslim) in addition to an economic empowerment (niqab gives access to Saudi charity organizations). Niqab identifies the doctrine of the Salafi. Whenever one sees a niqabi woman, it means she adopts Salafi doctrine (for example rejecting shakings hands with men), however niqabi women are not politically oriented. This dress in Sudan is mostly worn by women belonging to Salafi Ansar al-Sunna’s organization who used to be apolitical.
- 17 I noticed that due to expensive prices of the Sudanese garment tube, young girls started to wear t (...)
28My fieldwork confirmed that most of the niqabi interviewees are young students (20-30 years old) in secondary schools and universities. While Sudanese women from an older generation usually wear the Sudanese garment, tube. Wearing niqab and hiding a woman’s face is mostly widespread among the youths.17 All of my interviewees participate in Qur’anic centers and Qur’anic associations where they form support networks of niqabi women.
29As I mentioned before, niqab is an urban phenomenon, present in the fringes of the cities, either in Khartoum or the fringes of cities in other states. In public spaces and public transport connecting Khartoum city (mainly Omdurman and Khartoum North), the phenomenon of niqabi women is spreading on a daily basis.
30Moreover, the centers of niqabi women benefited from the government support during the Ingazh regime probably after the crackdown of relations between Sudan and Iran in 2015.
- 18 “Why has Sudan ditched Iran in favour of Saudi Arabia”, published on 12 January 2016, URL: https:/ (...)
31The Ingazh regime in 2016 decided to ally with Saudi Arabia for economic reasons.18 According to that alliance, some of the women were active participants in Saudi charity organizations, have trade relationships with Saudi Arabia, or family members who work as guides for the pilgrimage (hajj). Thus, all niqabi interviewees uncover their identity for making ID photos and, in the case of University students, for entering exam halls.
- 19 Interview with Iman B., student at Omdurman Ahliyya University, 3rd Class, 18/09/2017.
32Niqabi women have no awareness of gender issues, but they have the feeling to empower themselves by wearing niqab even if they convey very conservative opinions. For example, one of the interviewees stated that “there is no equity between men and women, because the Qur’an said that”. Some of them “accept the fact that men could beat women (in specific cases)”. They do not listen to music, nor do they read newspapers. Some of them watch TV (mainly Islamic channels) but most prefer not watching TV.19 Some of those niqabi women do not reject being working women, even being medical doctors. In a way, they show some hostility to Western culture and everything associated to it (secularism, etc.).
33Most of the interviewees wear niqab since 2013. This is the year when Salafism and Salafi Jihadism were very active regionally and inside Sudan and in social media. Most of them assert the fact that in the University where they study, there is an increase in the number of students who wear niqab in the classes that came after them. But I found that most interviewees showed they are willing to be working women. They do not see any contradictions between wearing niqab and being working women.
- 20 Social empowerment as well as economic empowerment, with niqabi women’s links to Saudi charities.
34Niqab in Sudan is considered as a factor of gender empowerment.20 From my observation, niqab dress in Sudan is voluntary, that is, not imposed by force, either by the State or the family. The decision to wear niqab is taken on individual basis. Yet, in the last decade, the State facilitated its spread by providing support to niqabi centres.
35Some scholars such as Liv Tønnessen (2010) focusing on the process of coming of age in Islamic communities have argued that wearing a headscarf should not be directly taken as a lack of free will, as is usually done by Western discourses that portray Muslim women as passive and oppressed.
- 21 “The Hopes and Fears of Female Street Cleaners in Mogadishu”, Women in Islam, SIHA Journal, no. 3, (...)
36Generally, women wear niqab for religious reasons, but it is sometimes used to acquire a new identity (pious and economically empowered woman, and sometimes for hiding her identity). One Somali woman said: “I wear the niqab so that nobody including my own family members can identify me”.21
- 22 I do believe that gender issues are cross-class phenomenon. However, class could give part of the (...)
37Though wearing niqab is widespread across social strata,22 my observations conducted in the public transport in Omdurman suggest that many niqabi women come from a relatively poor social class.
38For the women I interviewed, this Salafi wave will hinder any developments, and will lead to a setback in all the achievements and rights Sudanese women achieved since the 1950s and 1960s. It is interesting from the fieldwork to learn that those niqabi women are unaware of women achievements in Sudan.
39While niqab appeared after 2003, it witnessed a significant growth after 2013. The spread of niqab in Sudanese society is caused by multiple regional and local factors, such as the usage by Salafi activists of the social media, the rise of Salafism/Salafi Jihadism after the Gulf wars, and the policies of the Ingazh regime that has facilitated the proliferation of Qur’anic centers at the expense of Sufi centers.
- 23 Spaulding J., 1985, The Heroic Age in Sinnar, African Studies Centre, Michigan State University Pr (...)
- 24 Already accusations of being heretic were raised to Sadiq Al Mahdi (head of the Umma Party), Moham (...)
40This article shows that the niqab phenomenon is a reflection of a wider transformation in the Islamic world towards radicalization / salafization at the grassroots of society, and religious intolerance. Sudan is a multi-cultural (African, Arab and Nubian cultures),23 multi-ethnic society with more than 150 ethnic groups (Khalid 1990). The spread of Salafism and niqab in such a society conveys the risk to destabilize Sudanese religious tolerance, as it will gradually insert a new religious agenda in Sudanese politics. This fact resulted in the growing extremism of Sudanese society, which used to enjoy religious tolerance based on Sufi institutions.24
- 25 Ahmad Osman Omer, A Contribution in the Text of Getting Out Crisis (in Arabic), no publisher, no d (...)
41Another aspect to be considered in further researches is the relation between economic crisis and growing social inequalities. Skyrocketing poverty among the whole population and political repression led to the retreat and weakening of the Left and of enlightening thought and efforts to make a civilian state.25
42The findings of this paper reinforce the need for further wide quantitative research on the topic.