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Chapelle J., 1987, Souvenirs du Sahel, Paris, L’Harmattan.
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Iocchi A., 2015, “The Boko Haram Franchise and the War on Terror in Nigeria”, in Diritto e Questioni Pubbliche 15 (2), pp. 202-214.
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Njeuma M., 1971, “Adamawa and Mahdism: The Career of Hayatu Ibn Sa'id in Adamawa, 1878-1898”, in The Journal of African History, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 61-77.
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Saibou I., 2010, Les “coupeurs de route”. Histoire du banditisme rural et transfrontalier dans le bassin du lac Tchad, Paris, Karthala.
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UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994.
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Notes
Jamā’at Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da‘wa wa’ l-Jihād is the name of the historical core organization founded by the late Muhammad Yusuf (d. 2009), which came to be popularly known as “Boko Haram”. In its relatively brief history (2009-2017), the Jamā’at has faced a number of leadership conflicts, and has split into several inter-connected, yet divergent, branches. Among the most important branches are those led by the infamous Abubakar Shekau and Mamman Nur, the founder of and catalyst for Jamāʿatu Anṣāril Muslimīna fī Bilādis Sūdān, commonly known as Ansaru, and the splinter association of Boko Haram. Another important division occurred in March 2015 after components of the group pledged allegiance to al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya (The Islamic State Organization), thus becoming al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya Wīlāyat al-Gharb al-Ifrīqiyya (The Islamic State Organization’s West Africa Province) : this branch is apparently led by Yusuf's youngest surviving son, Abu Musab al-Barnawi.
“Khalid al-Barnawi : Nigeria Islamist group head 'arrested'”, BBC Africa, 3 April 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35956301 (consulted 7/3/2017) ; “Tchad : un chef de Boko Haram arrêté”, BBC Africa, 29 June 2015, http://www.bbc.com/afrique/region/2015/06/150629_tchad_arrests_boko_leader (consulted 7/3/2017).
The reference is to the motto assigned as a title of the Dabiq issue published in November 2014. “Remaining and expanding”, Dabiq, issue no. 5, November 2014.
“Nigeria Boko Haram : Militants 'technically defeated' – Buhari”, BBC Africa, 24 December 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618; “Boko Haram technically defeated, Buhari insists”, Punch, 6 February 2016, http://punchng.com/boko-haram-technically-defeated-buhari-insists/ (both consulted 7/3/2017).
This is supported both by evidences drawn from the chronicles of attacks, suicide-bombings, massive kidnappings, ambushes and clashes reported by international and local medias in the last six months on the Nigeria-Cameroon border and neighboring areas (October 2016- April 2017) and by information collected by the author through several interviews in the concerned area during the same period.
The data for this analysis are the result of field research begun in October 2014 and still ongoing in April 2016 in various local areas in the wider Lake Chad Basin, mainly in Nigeria and Chad. More than 50 semi-structured in-depth interviews, discussions, and dialogues have been conducted in Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, N’Djamena, Bol, and Baga Sola. We have chosen not to mention the identity of the interviewees in this paper for security reasons.
In 1998, after many years of neglect, the four coastal states (on the initiative of Nigeria, which created the first outpost in Baga in 1994) abandoned the idea of intervening politically and resorted to military force in an early attempt to place the area under their control and halt smuggling and trafficking activities, to “checkmate banditry”. When attacks by Boko Haram began in 2012, the mandate of the so-called Multinational Joint Task Force was expanded to include counter-terrorism activities. See “BAGA : Multinational Joint Task Forces, BHTs And Host Community”, Lt. Col. Sagir Musa, Sahara Reporters, 7 May 2013, http://saharareporters.com/2013/05/07/baga-multinational-joint-task-forces-bhts-and-host-community-lt-col-sagir-musa (consulted 10/5/2017).
The maze-like geography of the lake and, broadly speaking, its population, has been interestingly highlighted since the earliest attempts by colonial administrators to administer it and exercise some kind of sovereignty over it, as has been stated in a number of official reports: see, for instance “Reconnaissance effectuée dans les îles du lac Tchad (Fort Lamy, 10 juin 1902)”, “Rapport Politique (Goulfei, 1 mars 1902) sur la Région Militaire du Tchad: Région de Bas-Chari, Îles du Tchad, Région Dagana-Kanem”, ANOM AEF GI D/4(4)/1-2, Archives nationales d’outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence. Likewise, there is an interesting account of the relationship between the colonial administration and the lake’s inhabitants, the so-called “nomades du lac”, by the late Colonel Jean Chapelle (1905-1986). See J. Chapelle (1987).
These processes and the attribution of lands in general are administered by three key figures: the “chef de canton” (District Officer), the “chef de village, île ou polder” (village, island or polder chief), and the “diguedji”. The first of these, or Mai, who is a religious figure, has a mandate to settle conflicts between the inhabitants and provide security for the community. The second is in charge of the assignment of plots of land to family members according to the number of workers present. The third has a dual responsibility : as master of ceremonies and to decide on boundaries for plots of land.
As elsewhere, the native-settler dichotomy is one of the most sensitive issues, especially as it relates to rights to economic exploitation. On the Nigerien and Nigerian sides of the lake, Kanuri elders tend to ascribe a presumed “Chadian” origin, to Buduma fishermen, drawing their conclusion from the fact that there are no Buduma toponyms on their side of the lake. On the conflicts relating to the fisheries sector, see Hadiza Kiari Fougou 2014, Impacts des variations du niveau du lac Tchad sur les activités socio-économiques des pêcheurs de la partie nigérienne, PhD thesis, Université Abdou Moumouni, Niamey (Niger).
These are collectively known in north-eastern Nigeria as “Dane guns”. Despite its name, the rifle is manufactured locally, and is widespread throughout West Africa. It derives its name from early trading relationships that the Kingdom of Denmark maintained in the Gulf of Guinea for almost two centuries (1658-1850) thanks to the Gold Coast colonies (in present-day Ghana).
Allegedly from Sudan and Libya.
Interview, Bol (Chad), December 2016.
In many cases, it has been observed that the funds and goods collected by means of violent dispossession by criminal gangs operating under the Boko Haram banner are seldom employed to finance legal businesses (such as the cattle, keke NAPEP (motorized rickshaw), or market business), thereby creating a continuous flow between the illegal and legal realms. See A. Iocchi 2016, “Boko Haram : Trans-National Flows and the Quest for an Economic Space”, in Annual Review of Islam in Africa, no. 12\13, pp. 97-105.
Interviews of many unemployed young people in Bol and Baga Sola, December 2016.
Interview, Baga Sola (Chad), December 2016.
Although the lake’s geography kept the islanders in relative isolation until recent years (the process of “apprivoisement” was still under way in late colonial times, between 1950 and 1960), the Buduma islanders live in the heart of one of the oldest Islamic regions in Africa. Apart from the continuous commercial traffic that links all the communities in and around the lake in spite of the different political regimes, one needs to take account of the great cultural proximity and the shared history and religion. Echoes of Uthman dan Fodio's jihād in 1804 and the undisputed prestige of the al-Kanemi dynasty of the Kanem-Bornu Empire have contributed towards shape the cultural and religious identity of many Muslims in the Lake Chad Basin : Bornu is traditionally regarded as an indisputable abode of Islamic knowledge, and many of the lake’s children and teenagers are sent there to study and learn the Quran (thus becoming gardanci). Another important religious aspect that must be mentioned is the significance of the Mahdist memory of the Adamaoua and Gombe Emirates (the Sokoto Caliphate, which is now split between Nigeria and Cameroon), which is identified through different figures : Attahiru I, a Sarkin Musulmi (Commander of the Believers) who rejected British occupation in 1903 and started his hijira eastward, dying in Gombe ; the Sudanese warlord turned Mahdi Rabih az-Zubayr ibn Fadlallah, who died in present-day Kousseri in 1900 ; Hayatu bin Said, a Fulani cleric from northern Adamaoua (Cameroon), who was imprisoned by British officers in 1923 ; Jibril Gaini, a follower of Hayatu bin Said and the creator of a Mahdi state on the Sokoto-Bornu border in present-day Gombe (Nigeria). See R. A. Adeleye 1970, “Rabih b. Fadlallah and the diplomacy of European imperial invasion in the Central Sudan, 1893-1902”, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 399-418 ; M. Njeuma 1971, “Adamawa and Mahdism : The Career of Hayatu Ibn Sa'id in Adamawa, 1878-1898”, The Journal of African History vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 61-77 ; and J. E. Lavers 1967, “Jibril Gaini : a preliminary account of the career of a Mahdist leader in North-Eastern Nigeria”, Research Bulletin, Centre of Arabic Documentation, Ibadan, iii, I6-38.
“Tchad : nombreuses redditions d’éléments de Boko Haram en provenance du Nigeria”, RFI, 13 November 2016, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161113-boko-haram-tchad-nigeria-redditions-reportage-bagassola (checked 7/3/2017) ; though the episode mentioned only seems to be the first : “Niger : reddition de combattants Boko Haram”, BBC Africa, 6 January 2017, http://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-38527190 (checked 7/3/2017).
All data are updated to October 2016.
Communication with the Sultan, Bol, December 2016.
Once a neglected peripheral region, in the aftermath of the Boko Haram crisis the world (and, therefore, local governments) have suddenly taken an interest in the Lake Chad area, and have therefore begun to funnel an impressive amount of financial aid for humanitarian purposes. In January 2017, the European Commission released € 40 million “in additional humanitarian aid to support the populations in the Lake Chad region”, bringing the EU’s overall funding for the region since 2016 to over € 116 million. Nigeria will receive the largest slice (€ 22 million), followed by Cameroon (€ 7 million), Niger (€ 6 million), and Chad (€ 5 million). During the United Nations-supported humanitarian conference on “Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region” held in Oslo on 24 February 2017, many donors pledged to donate $ 458 million in relief and an additional $ 218 in the coming years.
UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994.
In this respect, see R. Marchal 2015, “CAR and the regional (dis)order”, in T. Carayannis, L. Lombard (eds.), Making sense of the Central African Republic, London, Zed Books, pp. 166-193 ; “Mali : quelle enquête après une possible bavure des militaires tchadiens ?”, RFI, 27 May 2016, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160527-mali-soupcons-bavure-militaires-tchadiens-minusma-enquete-interne-casques-bleus (checked 7/3/2017).
Between 2009 and 2013, the United States allocated a total of $ 13 million to Chad in the context of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) : it is therefore no accident that between 2006 and 2010 Chad became one of the top three weapons importers in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Testimonies collected at the IDP site in Kindjiria, Mamdi Department (Chad), December 2016.
Interviews at the Yakoua, Melea, Darkani, and Kindjiria IDP sites, Mamdi Department (Chad), December 2016.
Interview collected at the IDP site in Dabantchali, Mamdi Department (Chad), December 2016. Besides the Multinational Joint Task Force that has been deployed to fight Boko Haram, routine operations in the region by the French Army within the framework of Operation Barkhane and by the United States African Command (AFRICOM) in the context of the broader ‘war on terror’ have been recorded.
Interview, Kindjiria IDP site, Mamdi Department (Chad), December 2016.
Interview, Melea IDP site, Mamdi Department (Chad), December 2016. In fact, many NGOs operators seem to turn a blind eye to people who apparently leave the IDP site and return to their herding activities on kirtas, while they are still recipients of vouchers and aid. The same attitude is shown by police and military officers, who turn a blind eye in exchange for informations and tips on people's movements across the wider archipelago.
According to information gathered during a conversation with two young female refugees who had recently fled from a madrasa camp on the north-west side of the Lake (in N’Guigmi Department, Niger), this area was apparently under the command of Mamman Nur. Bol, December 2016.
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