Afficher l’image

1This volume is the first book-scale study of verbal hypocrisy from a pragmatic perspective. It also attempts to provide a theoretical model of it. Despite a long tradition of politeness and face theory in pragmatics, hypocrisy has been largely ignored in linguistics and a number of other disciplines, including sociology. Yet hypocrisy is practised every day, even though it is valued negatively—and sometimes by the very same people who condemn it. The reason, the editors argue convincingly, is that part of it is necessary to communication (ch.2). Humans, they claim, sometimes set standards that are too high to reach: denouncing hypocrisy in politics, for instance, is itself hypocritical because it is a necessity there. Acknowledging the centrality of hypocrisy has far-reaching consequences for a theory of communication, which typically takes truth and sincerity as the basis for interaction (see for instance the Gricean maxims).

2Verbal hypocrisy involves a misalignment between pretended and genuine values, desires or other sets. The editors give the following definition (38): “a pragmatic phenomenon of pretence that aims at concealing self-serving motivations by enhancing the hypocrite’s face as well as other faces, and/or by avoiding mutual face damage.” It differs from behavioural hypocrisy – a misalignment between words and deeds. Verbal hypocrisy might be malign or more benign, but always involves an endeavour to project a more favourable image of oneself.

3The volume is divided into six parts, with a total of eleven chapters. Part I, written by the editors, proposes “the first pragmatic model of verbal hypocrisy.” Part II contains two metapragmatic studies, to establish when and how people talk about hypocrisy. The focus is respectively on British newspaper discourse and discussion forum interaction. Part III addresses hypocrisy and authenticity in political and public discourse. Part IV moves on to benign hypocrisy, in face-to-face everyday interaction and online. Part V focuses on the ubiquity of hypocrisy, showing its brighter sides—its role in face saving, for example, such as when someone pretends to recognize an addressee who obviously recognizes them. The last part is a form of concluding commentary and outlook for future research.

4This review cannot do justice to the wealth of case studies and more theoretical contributions in the volume, which is definitely a must-read and will be of interest not only to linguists interested in pragmatics, or to sociologists, but to anyone who wants to understand why hypocrisy is pervasive and sometimes necessary, and to identify clues to detect it. Below are some elements that the present reviewer found particularly valuable.

5Sandrine Sorlin and Tuija Virtanen (ch.2), also Sandrine Sorlin (ch.10), show that hypocrisy can be a protective shield, either for the less powerful or merely for people who want to keep their thoughts private. They also explore the relationship between hypocrisy and neighbouring concepts: “face, tact, flattery, politeness, irony, deception, and lying” (ch.2, 21). They show that hypocrisy involves lying, but not all types of lying. Face lies at the core of hypocrisy, but unlike tact or flattery, hypocrisy is at least mainly self-oriented. Flattery can be a powerful tool for the hypocrite if it helps make the addressee well-disposed towards them. Politeness, too, is typically addressee-oriented, but may become hypocrisy when the tools of politeness are used in a non-genuine way. It is then negatively valuated if detected.

6Hypocrites, Sandrine Sorlin and Tuija Virtanen argue, are of four types: the “simulator” (deceiving and manipulating), the “dissimulator” (who practises self-censorship, refraining from any form of outspokenness, in order to avoid confrontation), the “chameleon” (adapting to please an audience, a common feature of polite communication), and the playful exposer of his/her own act (“the virtual hypocrite,” (34)). These types correlate with types of exposure, social action and language game. As pointed out by the editors, this model is a starting point for future research. Later in the volume (ch.10), Sandrine Sorlin investigates degrees in hypocrisy, including for instance self-deceptive hypocrisy, when the speaker believes his/her own lies. She also proposes a Principle of Hypocrisy, with maxims of flattery, concealment and simulation of sincerity. The editors also point out that their model is based on Western cultures and call for cross-cultural comparisons: conceptions of how to mark respect vary greatly, as Jonathan Culpeper reminds readers with the example of Israeli dugri speech (ch.11).

7The volume also raises the complex issue of the relationship between hypocrisy, insincerity and politeness. For Helena Halmari (ch.6), insincerity does not necessarily involve hypocrisy: situations such as paying a fake compliment to a friend to avoid offending them are one example. Sandrine Sorlin (ch.10) similarly considers that a fake compliment is hypocritical only if the aim is to further the speaker’s own interest, rather than just protect the faces of the interactants. But the notion of “civil hypocrisy” has also been coined (ch.2). Michael Haugh (ch.7) proposes the notion of “sincere hypocrisy” when, for instance, speakers make ostensible offers that are mutually recognized as insincere, but are sincere in their wish to show consideration for the addressee’s feelings. To him, hypocrisy etymologically denotes feigning, pretending to be something one is not, and whether politeness is perceived as being sincere or hypocritical depends on whether the speaker is being true to him/herself. Sincere hypocrisy is partly addressee-oriented, since the hypocrite is sincere in his/her consideration for the recipient’s feelings. As for Jim O’Driscoll (ch.9), he challenges the appearances/reality dichotomy. He relates verbal politeness and face saving to choices regarding how one looks: they are what people assess you by, how they make provisional assumptions about you.

8Among other particularly interesting ideas, Mathew Gillins (ch.3) stresses that hypocrisy is partly a matter of perception: “hypocrisy need not be deliberate; only perceived as such” (52). In his media corpus, people always use the words “hypocrite” or “hypocrisy” negatively, and metaphor is common in collocations, as in reek of hypocrisy. Martin Gill provides further examples based on political scandals (ch.5). Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen adds that people tend to evaluate their own transgressions, or those of their in-group, differently from those of others (ch.4). She shows that in the forum The Student Room, self-directed claims of hypocrisy are either disclaimers or balanced with indications of satisfaction. They are typically accepted by other interactants. Conversely, other-directed claims are negative, and may trigger reactions of denial or negotiation, sometimes eventual acceptance of the claim. The many examples in context are extremely valuable in understanding the process. Helena Halmari (ch.6) looks for linguistic clues that can identify insincere apologies, based on two high-profile case studies (public apologies by Bill Clinton and Donald Trump). Focusing on reception, she highlights the importance of motivation in identifying insincere apologies (accusation, self-promotion) and the need to distinguish between apologies and the mere expression of regret, and also proposes a set of Felicity conditions and a typical “move structure” (discourse stages) for genuine apologies. She shows that the two politicians’ apologies include all the required elements, but also add moves whose purpose is other than apologizing, such as attempts to establish their own ethos.

9Tuija Virtanen (ch.8) shows that in online discourse, autohypocrisy – when technology users produce something hypocritical and denounce it simultaneously, possibly playfully, as in “*pretends to be shocked” – can actually be a means of self-promotion: the user comes across as a sincere and likeable person. Based on a wealth of examples, she shows how online discourse shows a constant tension between conventionalization of such practises and creativity.

10As exemplified by these few paragraphs, the volume is extremely stimulating and thought-provoking, both for research and for one’s own communication choices. It will certainly encourage further research on communication, politeness and face and also, perhaps, on the exact boundary between hypocrisy and “mere” insincerity, as well as on the relationship between hypocrisy and accommodation theory.