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Special Feature

From Private Practice to State-Controlled Sector: The Transformation of Zakat in Sudan (1989-2018)

D’une pratique privée à un secteur contrôlé par l'État : la transformation de la Zakat au Soudan (1989-2018)
من عبادة شخصية إلى قطاع خاضع لسيطرة الدولة: تحوّل الزكاة في السودان (١٩٨٩-٢٠١٨)
Salma Mohamed Abdalmunim Abdalla
p. 121-138

Résumés

Entre 1989 et décembre 2018, la zakat au Soudan est passée d'une pratique privée de dons charitables à des parents et voisins moins fortunés à un instrument central de la politique sociale de l'État. Cet article explore la manière dont cette transformation a été effectuée, notamment la manière dont l'État a cherché à légitimer les changements aux yeux du public. Il étudie le labyrinthe bureaucratique qui s'est développé autour de la zakat, mettant en lumière les pratiques et les politiques qui ont facilité l'instrumentalisation de la zakat pour les projets de l'État. Ce faisant, il montre comment des aspects importants de la zakat ont été perdus, comme la solidarité, la générosité et la philanthropie parmi les musulmans. Cet article soutient que l'instrumentalisation de la zakat par l'État a servi les intérêts des politiciens au détriment des bénéficiaires. Il montre comment le développement de pratiques de recherche de rente autour de la zakat a déclenché une méfiance générale à l'égard de l'institution de la zakat, en particulier parmi ceux la payant.

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Introduction

1In the first week of nationwide anti-government demonstrations in Sudan in 2018, a video circulated widely that showed protestors from the city of Ar-Rahad in North Kordofan storming the Zakat Chamber storehouses after the governor and security apparatus had fled. The protestors took as much of the stored food as they could. The commentator on the video expressed sympathy with the protestors, saying, “People have suffered!” He also addressed then-president Omar al-Bashir: “Now do you realize what you have driven the people to?” (Mohamed 2018). The speaker thus highlighted the role of government policy in impoverishing the people of Sudan and creating hunger and desperation. In his view, the people had the right to take these commodities, which were due to them as zakat, but which had been denied to them by corrupt zakat officers (Mohamed 2018). The video communicated two important messages. First, many people saw the state-managed Zakat Chamber as a corrupt institution because it denied zakat to the poor. Second, at least initially, the people perceived the popular uprising as an opportunity to claim their right to zakat from the corrupt regime and to exercise “popular sovereignty” (El-Gizouli 2019, 2).

2Zakat is one of the pillars of Islam. It is a religious obligation for wealthy Muslims to donate a prescribed percentage of their wealth to support the poor and needy in their communities. In the 1990s, the government of Sudan took control of zakat collection and distribution, and gradually transformed it from a voluntary and private matter to an obligatory state-managed concern. Zakat was placed under the control of the Zakat Chamber (Dîwân al-Zakât), making it technically distinct from conventional taxation. However, in the name of alleviating poverty, the government established an increasingly complex bureaucratic structure around zakat. As a result, over time, zakat came to be perceived as a government tax rather than a means of social solidarity, as per its original purpose.

3Against the backdrop of the uprisings and the raiding of the storehouses, it is important to examine how and why the Zakat Chamber—which promised prosperity and the alleviation of poverty—lost all legitimacy. To this end, it is necessary to consider the transformations that occurred within the Zakat Chamber and the discourses that were employed to justify these changes. This article analyzes the destruction of the zakat system in Sudan: how zakat came to lose its positive associations and general appeal through its takeover by the state.

4As the article aims to understand the transformations within the Zakat Chamber, I do not examine links between zakat and poverty reduction. Instead, I focus on how decisions were made and how various categories of recipient were prioritized within the Chamber. This means studying the administration of zakat; the reasons behind the transformations; and the ways the authorities presented the changes to the public. I argue that the Chamber was restructured in order to increase state control over zakat and to place zakat funds at the heart of the state agenda. For example, government officials and governors leveraged zakat funds and projects to increase their political capital. During election campaigns, zakat funds were used to entice potential voters to vote for the ruling party (Abdalla, S. M. 2017). In addition to examining the administrative structure of the Zakat Chamber, this study explores the mechanisms deployed to strengthen the state’s control over zakat in society. This includes studying both the media discourse regarding the Zakat Chamber and the local zakat committees, which were responsible for collecting and distributing zakat at the local level. By examining the bureaucratization or Zakat, the study illustrates the aporia of creating an efficient form of government that adheres to what the successive Sudanese regimes deemed « Islamic ».

5The debate on the government’s role in zakat collection and distribution in Muslim communities goes back to the pre-modern era. Edmund Hayes’ study of zakat in pre-modern Shi‘i legal rulings showed that there were specific guidelines for avoiding the payment of zakat to unjust rulers and for determining the proper beneficiaries of autonomous zakat payments (Hayes 2017). In contemporary Sudan, by contrast, citizens have been obliged to pay their zakat exclusively to the state, and failure to make the required payments has had legal repercussions such as the non-renewal of business licenses. Owing to widespread mistrust in the state’s management of zakat, many pious Sudanese Muslims have practiced autonomous zakat payments to needy relatives and neighbors on top of the obligatory payments to the state. Emanuel Schaeublin’s 2020 study on zakat committees in Palestine shows that zakat collectors are under constant pressure to earn local trust and that their success is inextricable from this. The top-down approach of zakat management in Sudan has meant that individual zakat collectors have had little concern with proving their trustworthiness to the public, and have rather been preoccupied with implementing state law to satisfy their superiors. The case of the Zayd movement, which is a religious educational movement founded in Syria in the first half of the twentieth century and active in the fields of da‘wa (outreach) and charitable work, is remarkable. The movement’s successful charitable activities and extraordinary popularity have stemmed from a bottom-up approach that focuses on building a social base through da‘wa work among the grassroots (Pierret & Kjetil 2009). The Zakat Chamber in Sudan also conducted da‘wa activities, but in a way that simply emphasized the state’s top-down control of zakat.

6In Indonesia, political transformations over the years have resulted in the remolding of zakat from a religious obligation into an instrument for social justice. The discourse there centers the generosity of zakat payers and de-emphasizes the rights of those entitled to zakat (Retsikas 2014). In Sudan, the zakat discourse centers neither the payers nor the beneficiaries of zakat, instead merely emphasizing state control of zakat. In her 2013 study of Muslim almsgiving practices in Egypt, Amira Mittermaier revealed the coexistence of the concept of thawâb—divine recompense that leads to paradise—with that of baraka (“divine blessing”), which emphasizes generosity. In Sudan, on the other hand, the concepts of thawâb, baraka, and “trading with God” disappeared amid the complex administrative structure associated with state management of zakat. The analysis of direct zakat practices in Nablus—where givers and receivers face one another—has emphasized the importance of ethical considerations, such as removing the hierarchy between givers and receivers, not exposing the latter’s wants, and decent treatment of the needy (Schaeublin 2019). In Sudan, state management of zakat eliminated face-to-face interaction between givers and receivers. In this context, values such as justice, generosity, and preserving the dignity of the needy were deprioritized.

7Most scholarly literature on zakat in Sudan has focused on technical aspects, such as its role in reducing poverty (Kjellgren et al. 2014; Turkawi 2014; Machado, Bilo, and Helmy 2018). Less attention has been paid to the social processes within the Zakat Chamber and to the politicization of zakat. A World Bank assessment analyzed social safety nets in Sudan, including governmental and non-governmental interventions (Kjellgren et al. 2014). The study outlined various categories of beneficiaries of the Zakat Chamber, the objectives of the program, the sources of funding, the institutional setup at the federal and local levels, and the decision-making structure. However, it failed adequately to explore the connection between the administrative structure of the Zakat Chamber and the regime’s politics. The present study aims to fill this important knowledge gap. Kjellgren and his co-authors found that increasing the efficiency and targeting of zakat funds would strengthen social safety nets for the neediest citizens in Sudan. I would argue, however, that the zakat system has not lacked efficiency; rather, following the restructuring of zakat, there was a lack of political will to prioritize the poor in the allocation of zakat funds, which were instead appropriated to serve the government’s political projects.

8Turkawi (2014) documented social protection and safety net programs, policies, and strategies in Sudan that the national government and NGOs designed and implemented. Although the study mentions the zakat administrative structure and explains the formal process of decision-making, it still categorized zakat as an informal or semi-formal safety net. I would argue that this is inaccurate, because zakat had been formalized as a state operation since the 1990s, and by 2014 the Zakat Chamber had become one of the nation’s most sophisticated governmental institutions and was supposedly governed by formal guidelines. Even so, some informal practices did continue to exist within this formal structure, as will be revealed in later sections. Machado et al. (2018) compared the role of zakat in three different social protection systems and found that the institutional arrangements vary in different national contexts. The study focused on strategies to increase zakat collection and argued that depoliticization would increase public trust in zakat. This argument can be applied to Sudan, as the government placed zakat at the center of its socio-political agenda.

9These studies have provided rich background on the technical aspects of the Zakat Chamber’s purported role in poverty reduction. However, I would argue that it is necessary to examine the social dynamics and everyday practices of decision-making within the Zakat Chamber in order to fully understand the institution’s performance. It is necessary to study the conditions that led to the instrumentalization of zakat for political ends. These dynamics and practices have generally been neglected in the scholarly literature on zakat in Sudan. One exception is Hassanain and Saaid (2016), who examined the operational efficiency of the Zakat Chamber to assess the impact on targeted beneficiaries. They identified a lack of coordination, information sharing, and awareness on the part of state agencies as key challenges affecting the Zakat Chamber. However, since they analyzed survey data collected from beneficiaries, they were unable to illuminate the internal causes of the problems in the operations of the Chamber, hence addressed in the current study.

10This study uses a qualitative approach. The initial data were collected during field research that I conducted in Sudan between 2010 and 2014 for my doctoral studies (Abdalla, S. M. 2017). I have supplemented these with further data-gathering efforts in Sudan in 2018, 2019 and 2020. These included in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and direct observation. Interviewees included upper- and lower-level officers at the Zakat Chamber, such as advisors, a former secretary general, the head of zakat distribution at the Khartoum State Zakat Chamber, the director of the funds distribution planning department, and two professors at the Higher Institute of Zakat Science. I also collected policy reports and media reports on the development of the Zakat Chamber.

11The following section of the paper presents the historical background, outlining the trajectory of zakat and highlighting the turning points that shaped zakat practices in Sudan over the past four decades. Thereafter, I describe how zakat was modernized in Sudan and explain how the Zakat Chamber’s administrative and organizational structure strengthened state control over zakat collection and distribution. The ensuing section presents the rise of in-groups and a new elite class within the Zakat Chamber, and the final one explores the erosion of public trust in the Zakat Chamber.

Historical Background

  • 1 The Laws of September 1983, also known as the September Laws, are Islamic laws declared by former S (...)

12The 1979 Zakat Act established the Zakat Fund, a juridical entity that oversaw the collection and distribution of zakat by asking wealthy Muslims to give zakat on a voluntary basis. In March 1984, a new Zakat Act was declared following the imposition of Islamic laws in September 1983.1 Under this Act, zakat became obligatory for all Muslims for the first time, and the law gave the state complete control over the collection of zakat. However, at this point, there were no specialized personnel to manage the zakat. Consequently, the Tax Directorate expanded to perform this function in addition to their existing responsibilities.

13A 1986 Zakat Act further strengthened the state’s control over zakat funds. However, this new act separated zakat management from tax management and established the new Zakat Chamber under the Ministry of Social Affairs. The ensuing period saw unprecedented vertical and horizontal expansion of state administration of zakat in Sudan. Vertically, an administrative structure was established under the supervision of a secretary-general, who was appointed by the Council of Ministers. Horizontally, local zakat offices were established in various regions of Sudan.

14In 1989, the Islamist-led National Salvation Revolution took power through a military coup and embarked on what they called the Islamization project, which aimed to reorder society in accordance with a strict interpretation of Islam. This reordering focused on education, the civil service, the economy, and culture (Abbas 2015). The new government sought to Islamize all aspects of social and political life in Sudan, including the legal and military spheres; it advocated jihad and promoted anti-Western sentiment (Salomon 2016).

15The Islamist regime saw zakat as instrumental to its goals. Therefore, a new Zakat Act was introduced in 1990 to establish the novel role that zakat was to play in state and society. For the first time, state control of zakat funds was enforced through penalties for refusing, evading, or circumventing the payment of zakat to the state. Thereafter, a clearance certificate from the Zakat Chamber was required for many state services, from acquiring official documents to gaining financial privileges. Some scholars have endorsed the role of the state in zakat collection and distribution (Zaman 1987), while public resistance to the state control of zakat funds has been well documented (May 2013).

16The 1990 Zakat Act obliged the Sudanese diaspora to pay zakat to the Zakat Chamber, which would then determine its allocation. Another important shift during this period was the government’s effort to localize zakat operations by involving and delegating collection and distribution to local neighborhood and village committees, the country’s lowest level of administrative and political structures (Hamid 2002).

“Modernization”: Key Transformations in Zakat Practices in Sudan

17A decade after the 1989 coup, a conflict arose between the two leading figures in the Islamist regime. This led to what is known in Sudan as the mufâsala (“split”). At the head of one faction, President al-Bashir consolidated power as leader of the National Congress Party (NCP), which ruled the country for the next twenty years, until al-Bashir was ousted in the popular uprisings of 2019. On the other side, Hassan al-Turabi, the ideological figurehead of the Islamist movement in Sudan, formed an opposing faction by founding the Popular Congress Party (PCP), which he led until his death in 2016. Following this split in 1999, the NCP gave generous handouts to loyal Islamic scholars, and supported Islamic institutions that provided it with religious legitimacy through favorable fatwas and sympathetic interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) (Kostelyanets 2021, 97).

18In this context, a new Zakat Act was introduced in 2001 to strengthen the NCP and secure its power. Labeled revolutionary” by Ahmed al-Majzoub, a former secretary-general of the Zakat Chamber (interview with author, Khartoum, February 24, 2011), the 2001 Zakat Act expanded the role of zakat from helping the poor and needy to “cater[ing] to the duty of the State to safeguard religious and worldly concerns” (Zakat Act 2001, 5). The Act thus transformed zakat into a state matter—though at this point informal and private zakat distribution could still be practised in addition to the obligatory payment to the state. Control over zakat collection and distribution had in fact been granted by the previous Act, but the 2001 Act gave the Zakat Chamber more autonomy, flexibility, and independence. It also restructured the zakat administration to cohere more closely with the federal system of government that had been crafted to secure the regime’s total control over the state.

19Islamic scholars played a central role in legitimizing these transformations by expanding the sources of fiqh on the subject of zakat to produce favorable interpretations. Regarding relations between religion and state in Islamic societies, Jean-Philippe Platteau has argued as follows:

While the characterization of Muslim countries in terms of fusion between state and religion mistakenly suggests that political systems are theocracies, the idea that the state dominates religion and can even instrumentalize it points to autocracies led by absolute monarchs who are able to obtain religious approval whenever needed. Because of an important feature of Islam, the lack of a centralized religious authority structure, the great variability of interpretations of the Islamic law, and the absence of constitutional law, it is, indeed, relatively easy for an autocratic ruler to obtain legitimizing opinions from a number of religious scholars. (Platteau 2011, 256)

20Furthermore, Islamic scholars highlight the need to adapt interpretations of the Quran to the needs of contemporary Muslim societies. In scholarship on the Zakat Chamber, this process has been framed as modernization of the Quranic text according to “public interest” (al-maslaha al-‘âmma). Felicitas Opwis (2005) argues that

the concept of maslaha can serve as a vehicle for legal change. It presents jurists with a framework to tackle the problem, inherent in a legal system that is based on a finite text, of bringing to bear the limited material foundation of the law (i.e., Quran and Hadith) on everyday life in an ever-changing environment. It thus bestows legitimacy to new rulings and enables jurists to address situations that are not mentioned in the scriptural sources of the law. (Opwis 2005, 183)

21In line with this, in the Zakat Chamber, Islamic scholars used the concept of maslaha (“public interest”) to legitimize the significant changes introduced by the 2001 Zakat Act. These included the introduction of non-equal shares among zakat beneficiaries, and the prioritization of eight categories of zakat, namely: the poor; the needy; zakat administrators; new converts to Islam; slaves and captives; the debt-ridden; and those striving “in the cause of God” (fî sabîl Allâh), typically meaning jihad. Zakat distribution categories were also expanded to include national security and the propagation of Islam (Zakat Act 2001). The Zakat Chamber used strategies of da‘wa—that is, outreach or missionary work relating to the propagation of Islam—to legitimize these changes to the public.

The Administrative and Organizational Structure of the Zakat Chamber

22During the 1990s, the Islamist regime gradually took total control of zakat collection and distribution in Sudan and utilized it to advance the regime’s socio-economic and political agenda. In 2001, the Zakat Chamber’s administrative structure was established under the auspices of the Ministry of Social Affairs as an autonomous entity headed by the Supreme Council of Zakat Trustees (SCZT). The Chamber was to oversee the collection, management, and distribution of zakat funds in Sudan. The members of SCZT included Muslim scholars, zakat payers, and state delegates. One goal of the SCZT was to align the work of zakat with the rulings of the Islamic law in consultation with recognized Muslim schools of thought.

23The administrative structure of the Zakat Chamber was aligned with Sudan’s federal system of government: tasks were delegated from the Zakat secretary general to secretaries at the level of the federal states (wilayat). Zakat Chamber offices were established throughout the country. New Zakat Chamber buildings became important landmarks in cities and towns, as well as destinations for the poor and the needy who were desperate for zakat funds.

24The Zakat Chamber management pyramid (Figure 1) shows the hierarchical administrative structure of the institution. At the top, the secretary general was responsible for executive management of the Zakat Chamber, in coordination with the executive office, information center, legal advisors and the Higher Institute of Zakat Science, which was established as a training, educational and consultancy for the Zakat Chamber. Departments under the secretary general included financial affairs, zakat messaging, distribution planning, collection planning, training, and audits. Each department at this level was responsible for the tiers below it, which amounted to seventeen different sections and formed the bottom of the management pyramid.

Figure 1. Administrative and Organizational Structure of Zakat Chamber

Figure 1. Administrative and Organizational Structure of Zakat Chamber

Source: Zakat Chamber Secretary General, Statistics and Data Unit, 2011

25The Zakat Chamber underwent a gradual transformation starting in the 1990s and reaching its peak with the 2001 Zakat Act. This expanded the Zakat Chamber’s powers over collection and distribution operations. Among its provisions, it legalized the unequal distribution of funds among the various categories of recipients, without imposing any restrictions on how the Chamber prioritized the categories. This was facilitated by the Chamber’s adoption of the “jurisprudence of necessity” (fiqh al-darûra), which is meant to be applied in extreme situations where it is permitted to consume forbidden things in order to protect life. But this framework allows leaders to define any situation as extraordinary in order to warrant the decisions they have made, and its adoption in Sudan was not exclusive to zakat. In 2012, for example, the government approved the use of usurious loans to finance infrastructure projects on the authority of a fatwa from the Islamic Fiqh Academy, a governmental agency. The fatwa justified the step on the grounds of the state’s limited financial resources and the necessity of external financing (Sudan Tribune 2012). This development sparked great controversy in the Sudanese parliament, where representatives such as the Islamist leader Suad al Fatih objected to the legality of loans. However, it was approved by a large majority on the basis that “necessities permit prohibitions” (Elhussein 2013).

26Within the Zakat Chamber, there were two types of zakat distribution: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal distribution took the form of cash transfer and was managed by local zakat offices. The recipient categories it covered were: the poor and the needy, the indebted, and the stranded. Vertical distribution took the form of services and “productive” projects, and it was centrally managed by the Secretariat General of the Zakat Chamber. The categories of recipients in the vertical distribution included: zakat administrators, converts to Islam, slaves, and those striving “in the cause of God.” The post-2001 reforms allowed the Zakat Chamber to centralize politically sensitive decisions about distribution, such as funding activities related to da‘wa. The payment of cash transfers to the poor were combined with controversial vertical distribution in the form of projects notionally intended to serve the poor, such as health and drinking water projects. This led some, such as Aisha al-Ghabshawy, a Member of Parliament and leading Islamic Scholar, to criticize the Zakat Chamber for violating the rights of the poor to zakat in the form of cash transfer by tying funds to particular projects (Sudan Tribune 2012). Some Muslim scholars have also questioned the inclusion of “slaves” among zakat beneficiaries at this point in time and advocated for its removal (Elbeely 2001).

27With these developments, zakat ceased to form part of the personal, private domain, and entered the regulated public sphere. The expansion of the zakat administrative structure served to establish the collection of zakat as an exclusive right of the state, obliging citizens to pay zakat to the government. As a result, many came to view zakat as a state tax rather than a form of charity to help those in need.

28During visits to various Zakat Chamber offices, I had the opportunity to observe interactions between zakat officials and zakat seekers at first hand. The dignity of the latter was routinely undermined, as they had to wait in long queues outside Zakat Chamber offices for extensive periods, sometimes multiple days at a time, in extreme temperatures. This also entailed disrespect for their privacy. On one occasion, an official flogged zakat seekers with a whip and insulted them, in order to maintain an orderly queue. The required paperwork represented another challenge for zakat applicants, especially as staff were typically unwilling to answer their questions. Poor coordination among Zakat Chamber departments created further confusion, and seekers could find themselves shunted between different offices. It was clear that the overemphasis on structure, policies, and procedures was discriminatory towards beneficiaries, but supported the goals of influential politicians who interfere with zakat in order to benefit from it. The Chamber’s standardized procedures had become a tool to control the poor and make their lives miserable, while non-deserving categories could take advantage of the system.

29Although the standardized procedures have been said to be relatively fair and equitable compared to informal and private zakat distribution, in reality, this system presented its own challenges. Zakat seekers’ individual interests were undermined because this approach assumed that all people were the same and equally able to fulfill the Zakat Chamber’s complex requirements. For example, would-be recipients were asked to show birth certificates, proof of residence, national IDs, and certificates from local authorities. For some it was a challenge to produce these papers. The result was that the zakat system was favored urban beneficiaries in relatively stable settings, and could not meet the needs of those in war zones, nomads, or internally displaced persons, of which there are three million in Sudan (UNHCR 2021). Among the stated objectives of the Zakat Chamber was to lead people out of poverty and enhance their independence,” (al-Majzoub, private interview, Khartoum, February 24, 2011). This aim was undermined by the mistreatment of beneficiaries and disregard for their interests. It might be claimed that these problems were due to limited capacity at particular local offices. But given how widespread they were and the absence of attempts to address them, it is clear these were systemic problems, and characteristic of the government’s treatment of its citizens.

The Rise of In-Groups and the New Elite

  • 2 Not his real name.

30The following case study shows how the institutionalized zakat system contributed to the creation of a new elite of local notables. Yasir is a man in his mid-forties.2 He is originally from a village in central Sudan, and holds a degree in Sharia and Law from the University of the Holy Quran and Islamic Sciences. Yasir was active in student associations at a young age, and he joined the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as an undergraduate. After graduation, he continued to lead such MB-affiliated youth organizations as the General Students’ Union. Yasir’s engagement with the MB made him a perfect candidate for the Zakat Chamber in the mid-1990s, when the regime’s tamkîn (“empowerment”) policies were at their peak. Yasir’s recruitment to and promotion within the Zakat Chamber are a typical example of tamkîn.

31In 2004, Yasir’s career took a turn. He resigned from his job at the Zakat Chamber. He said this was because he was “no longer passionate about working in the civil service and … interested in business” (interview with Yasir, Omdurman, October 15, 2014). Yasir then started a catering business, and at the time of our interview, he was managing a zakat-funded water project in his neighborhood. He lived in a peri-urban area that was not served by the general water network in Greater Khartoum, so residents had to find alternative water supply sources. Possible options included building wells and creating a local water network, but it was challenging to obtain funding for such projects. However, while he was employed by the Zakat Chamber, Yasir used his position as a member of the zakat in-group to direct funds to a water project in his own neighborhood. Yasir then resigned from his position at the Zakat Chamber to work as a full time manager for the Chamber-funded water project in his neighborhood. This generated higher revenues for him than his former position at the Chamber. Not only did this project provide Yasir with material gain, it enabled him to climb the social ladder and quickly become the most powerful political figure across a large local area. The growth in Yasir’s influence shows how the regime’s zakat system created new elites by empowering Zakat Chamber employees to benefit personally from zakat funds.

32Given the hierarchical structure outlined in the previous section, each administrative level should have been responsible for passing down tasks or missions to those under them. However, this was frequently not the case, notably because the secretary general would often hijack the workflow, engaging limited numbers of staff in a few departments while other departments remained idle for several years. The staff employed in the busy departments would gain more experience, developing practical knowledge and skills. This enabled them to find ways to benefit personally, for example by directing zakat funds to projects that advantaged them. I came across several cases in which members of the Zakat Chamber’s leadership in-group directed funds to services projects in their own neighborhoods, which were not among the areas officially prioritized by the Zakat Chamber. The Chamber leadership approved funding for these projects as a favor to particular staff members, bypassing preexisting rules and plans. Staff members thus let their personal lives influence their professional lives. Incredibly, some staff members bragged about these favors during my interviews, and even claimed justification for them.

33The above practices created inequalities among Zakat Chamber staff, with small groups of personnel being favored and eventually integrated into the leadership in-group, while others were excluded. Staff members who strictly applied the rules and oppose political interference were deemed “stubborn,” and either marginalized or excluded from promotions. Meanwhile, staff members who compromised the rules and allowed political interference were promoted despite incompetence or behavior that brought the institution into disrepute (interview with a Zakat Chamber employee, Khartoum, January 28, 2010). The rise of an in-group of staff members who were closer to the leadership infused the organization with favoritism, and affected its overall performance. The concentration of decision-making within a small group enabled the leadership to transform the Zakat Chamber into a vehicle for serving the interests of the ruling party.

34With frequent interference in everyday operations from high-ranking politicians (Sudan Tribune 2012), the Zakat Chamber became subject to arbitrary decision-making processes, without regard for the stipulations of the Supreme Council of Zakat Trustees that supposedly governed it. One staff member described their experiences as follows:

We are suffering from political interference. Now we are unable to execute our plans properly because we often receive orders from above [high-ranking politicians such as governors] to direct the funds to some strange things. (Interview with a Khartoum State Zakat Chamber employee, Ombadda, April 5, 2010)

35Clearly, high-ranking politicians and governors frequently appropriated zakat funds to finance projects in order to create a positive public image. Furthermore, the Zakat Chamber leadership seemed to accommodate this arbitrary interference, even using the religious concept of maslaha to justify it (Opwis 2005). Political interference in the everyday work of zakat shifted the criteria that the regime used to assess the Chamber’s performance. Former president al-Bashir publicly praised the efforts of the Chamber (Akhir Lahza 2019), indicating that its performance was measured in relation to the regime’s agenda. In the 1990s, zakat funds were used to support the government’s war against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in South Sudan, a war that was characterized as jihad (Elbeely 2001). Revenues from the Zakat Chamber’s funded projects were used to support the re-election of al-Bashir and his ruling NCP (Abdalla 2017, 170). Zakat funds were given to elites and leaders within the NCP, who then distributed them to the poor to improve their public image (Al-Rizaigy 2014).

  • 3 For more on tamkîn policies see Mann (2011).

36As noted above, when it was first established, the Zakat Chamber was staffed by personnel from the Taxation Chamber (Dîwân al-Darâ’ib). These staff members were recruited on the basis of qualifications and technical skills, and operated independently of the regime’s political agenda. However, with its subsequent expansion and increasing structural complexity, the Zakat Chamber came to require additional staff. As the Chamber was now instrumentalized by the regime, the recruitment criteria changed: priority was given to Islamist loyalists. This was accomplished as part of the tamkîn policy agenda, the true aim of which was to consolidate the Islamists’ power across government.3

37Most Zakat Chamber staff are graduates of higher education institutions with Islamist leanings, such as the Omdurman Islamic University, the University of the Holy Quran and Islamic Sciences, and the International University of Africa. Bakheit Mohammed Nur (2020) believes that these universities have played a key role in Islamizing and Arabizing the education system in Sudan, and in propagating anti-Western sentiment in Sudanese society:

Islamists have begun to establish new learning institutions that promote political Islamic education and offer ideological training to those working in religious and governmental institutions. The most prominent among these institutions are the University of the Holy Quran and Islamic Sciences (UHQIS), Omdurman Islamic University (OIU), and the International University of Africa (IUA). These three universities are fundamentally oriented toward Islamic studies. (Nur 2020, 566)

38Following the shift in recruitment policies, two groups of zakat staff members emerged: those of the first generation, made up of career tax officials; and those hired for their loyalty to the Islamist regime. This dynamic facilitated the development of the elite group within the Zakat Chamber in the wake of the 2001 reforms. Distinguished by their loyalty to the regime, members of this group functioned as brokers and gatekeepers between the Zakat Chamber and the rest of the society, propagating the Chamber’s message and ensuring that its policies were implemented.

39The hierarchical dynamics that developed after the reforms were also evident in the operations of the Zakat Local Committees (ZLCs). These committees were supposed to assist the Zakat Chamber at the neighborhood or village level by identifying appropriate recipients of zakat. The ZLCs were intended to decentralize zakat work, to mobilize popular efforts to support the Zakat Chamber, and to function as a link between the Chamber and the beneficiaries at the neighborhood level. ZLC members included: the local imam; a member of the local popular committee (the lowest unit of administration in Sudan pre-2019); a member of the local mosque committee; a representative for zakat payers; one for young people; and one for woman. ZLCs counted and categorized the poor in each area to prioritize the most deserving. They conducted home visits and study the needs of the beneficiaries. Their work included social work as well as encouraging solidarity among members of the local community. However, in practice, ZLCs had some serious drawbacks. Reflecting the politicization of the Zakat Chamber, ZLCs did not function independently of the agenda of the ruling elite. Often, local popular committees took over the work of ZLCs and directed funds to serve the ruling party. Most ZLCs lack teamwork and had limited knowledge of zakat legal principles and of poverty alleviation.

40There was a further shortcoming, namely in the representation of women’s interests. As noted earlier, ZLCs were supposed to include at least one woman representative. However, during my fieldwork in various neighborhoods in Khartoum State, I observed that women’s participation in the daily work and decision-making of ZLCs was neglected. Instead of creating a system that would preserve dignity in poor families, would-be recipients of zakat could often be seen queuing in front of ZLC members’ homes begging to be considered in the allocation of funds. In the past, before the institutionalization of zakat, the poor and the needy received funds from zakat payers directly at their homes. Now, in practice, ZLCs exercise absolute power in the distribution of funds without oversight from the Zakat Chamber. Ultimately, while the ZLCs were supposedly established to decentralize zakat work, they have simply fostered the concentration of power in the hands of local elites. They did not constitute an effective link between the Zakat Chamber and the beneficiaries at the neighborhood level.

The Erosion of Public Trust in the Zakat Chamber

41Among its main objectives, the Zakat Chamber was supposed to encourage solidarity and compassion across society (Zakat Act 2001). In fact, the Chamber’s rent-seeking practices eroded public trust in the institution. This problem developed in particular after the establishment of zakat as an obligatory payment to the state, and the associated raising of expectations of as to the alleviation poverty in Sudan. The Chamber was severely criticized for using zakat funds for political purposes rather than helping the poor and needy. Zakat funds were used for projects in investment, trade, and micro-financing (Zakat Chamber 2016). These practices were consistent with the regime’s whole tamkîn agenda, which was geared towards consolidating power among Islamists. The 2001 reforms positioned the Chamber at the heart of the state’s political agenda, placing zakat funds at the disposal of politicians, with no accountability. The rent-seeking behavior of Chamber personnel reflected the “easy money” mentality that characterized the Inqaz (“Salvation”) regime of president al-Bashir, especially following the oil boom of the late 1990s, when state officials personally profited from oil revenues through exploitative behavior (Nour 2020).

42The Zakat Chamber not only misused zakat funds but also actively justified these practices. In 2007, the Zakat Chamber secretary general approved the funding of a private television channel with a starting amount of 50,000 USD. He further confirmed that the Zakat Chamber would continue funding the channel until it was launched. This was justified on the basis that it would broadcast Islamic content; that it was one of the country’s “Islamic endeavors”; and that therefore it fell under the category of da‘wa (Medani 2011, 116). It was practices such as these that eroded trust in the Zakat Chamber and in its ability to help address to the nation’s socio-economic challenges. As a result of this erosion, it became normal for pious individuals to pay zakat twice: both the obligatory amount to the Zakat Chamber, and private sums to the poor and the needy among their relatives and in their neighborhood. Numerous individuals that I interviewed in Omdurman expressed the opinion that paying zakat directly to the poor and needy enhanced solidarity and made them feel that they had maintained the true meaning of zakat. At the same time, some people welcomed the bureaucratization of zakat on a local level, on the grounds that, if done properly, it would make for a more transparent system, allowing for more long-term benefits.

43Abdullahi An-Na’im (2008) has argued that religious obligations such as zakat should remain voluntary and free of state interference:

This view is fundamentally Islamic because it insists on the religious neutrality of the state as a necessary condition for Muslims to comply with their religious obligations. Religious compliance must be completely voluntary according to personal pious intention (niyah), which is necessarily invalidated by coercive enforcement of those obligations. In fact, coercive enforcement promotes hypocrisy (nifaq), which is categorically and repeatedly condemned by the Qur’an. (An-Na’im 2008, 4)

44With the imposition of state control over zakat, the Sudanese state sought to legitimize the instrumentalization of this religious duty. Zakat was manipulated in service of rent-seeking behavior and the concentration of decision-making powers in small groups, all resulting in the erosion of public trust in the Zakat Chamber. The Islamist regime in Sudan said the experience of the Zakat Chamber was a model to be followed by other Muslim countries (Abdalla, S. M. 2017). Yet the regime’s attempt to incorporate zakat into a modern state framework shows the impossibility of creating a form of government that is both modern and Islamic. This supports Wael Hallaq’s argument that the creation of Islamic forms of governance in a modern state framework is “impossible” (Hallaq 2012).

45The history of the Zakat Chamber from 1989 to December 2018 demonstrates how the state fell into ruin under the Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir. In light of this, it is no surprise the 2018–2019 protests erupted in regions that had previously been relatively neutral or even in some cases favorable to the regime. One can only hope that any future civilian government of Sudan would rethink the whole structure of the Zakat Chamber in way that actually helps the segments of the population that are in dire need of it.

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Notes

1 The Laws of September 1983, also known as the September Laws, are Islamic laws declared by former Sudanese president Gaafar Nimeiry, who held the office from 1969 to 1985.

2 Not his real name.

3 For more on tamkîn policies see Mann (2011).

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Table des illustrations

Titre Figure 1. Administrative and Organizational Structure of Zakat Chamber
Crédits Source: Zakat Chamber Secretary General, Statistics and Data Unit, 2011
URL http://journals.openedition.org/esma/docannexe/image/3462/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 146k
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Salma Mohamed Abdalmunim Abdalla, « From Private Practice to State-Controlled Sector: The Transformation of Zakat in Sudan (1989-2018) »Égypte Soudan mondes arabes, 25 | 2024, 121-138.

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Salma Mohamed Abdalmunim Abdalla, « From Private Practice to State-Controlled Sector: The Transformation of Zakat in Sudan (1989-2018) »Égypte Soudan mondes arabes [En ligne], 25 | 2024, mis en ligne le 13 janvier 2025, consulté le 16 juin 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/esma/3462 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/134an

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Auteur

Salma Mohamed Abdalmunim Abdalla



Salma Abdalla holds a Ph.D. in Political Geography from the University of Bayreuth, Germany and a Master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Khartoum. She held several researcher positions and has been member of various international research projects. Her primary field of research has been political violence, diaspora political engagement, and religion-politics relationships. As a consultant, she provided policy advice to various think tanks and international institutions on issue of governance and strategies to development transformation of Sudan.

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