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School–Community Councils as Political Spaces in Decentralized Educational Governance in Brazil

Les conseils scolaires et communautaires en tant qu'espaces politiques dans la gouvernance décentralisée de l'éducation au Brésil
Rosane Cristina Feu et Juliana Nunes Rodrigues

Résumés

Cet article analyse les Conseils École–Communauté (CEC) comme des espaces politiques institutionnalisés dans le cadre de la décentralisation de la gouvernance éducative au Brésil. À partir du programme fédéral « Argent Direct à l’École » (PDDE), qui transfère des ressources directement aux établissements, les CEC constituent des instances locales chargées de la gestion et de la reddition de comptes des fonds publics.

S’inscrivant dans les débats de la géographie politique de la démocratie et de la gouvernance participative, l’article conçoit ces conseils comme des espaces relationnels et situés où se déploient la négociation, la délibération, les conflits et les apprentissages politiques. L’analyse repose sur une enquête menée dans onze écoles municipales de Niterói (État de Rio de Janeiro), fondée sur l’examen documentaire des rapports financiers et des procès-verbaux, ainsi que sur des entretiens et questionnaires auprès des membres des conseils.

Les résultats montrent que, malgré un cadre institutionnel homogène, les CEC présentent des configurations différenciées en matière de participation et d’accountability. Si des dynamiques d’apprentissage politique sont observables, la relation entre la gestion démocratique, le contrôle des ressources et l’amélioration des services éducatifs demeure complexe et non linéaire.

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Introduction

1In Brazil, decentralization has driven a series of state reforms (Nunes and Fonseca, 2018; Arretche, 2012; 2010; 1996; Barbosa, 2010; Abrucio, 2006; Souza, 2006; 2005), resulting in a new model of social policies that breaks with the centralized and authoritarian practices of the past. This transformation necessitated new relationships between the state and society, underpinned by principles of transparency in decision-making and the adoption of public accountability processes.

2In education, decentralization has shaped programs and policies linking the transfer of responsibilities by allocating federal resources to subnational governments, particularly municipalities. Municipalities, in turn, are primarily responsible for early childhood and primary education. Key examples include the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE), the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education, and the Valorisation of Education Professionals (Fundeb). The PNAE’s decentralization in the 1980s improved food procurement and distribution efficiency, reduced waste, supported local agriculture, and adapted to regional dietary preferences. Fundeb, by contrast, is a model of horizontal redistribution of resources based on student enrolment figures and tied to performance targets.

3Another example of decentralization is the Direct Money to Schools Program (PDDE), which epitomizes Brazil's approach to social policy decentralization by transferring resources directly from the federal administration to schools through the National Fund for Education Development (FNDE). Local councils such as School Control Councils (CECs) manage these funds.

4Since the 1980s, public education policies in Brazil have increasingly emphasized the transfer of resources and responsibilities, promoting social oversight of public policies and the democratization of public resource management as pathways to improving the effectiveness of social policies (Barroso, 2013; Arretche, 2015; 2012; 1996; Rodrigues, 2010).

5The underlying argument posits that local actors and agents, through closer horizontal relationships, would be better positioned to identify solutions to everyday school challenges and, as a result, influence resource allocation. However, this assumption is contestable – proximity has never guaranteed transparency or integrity in the use of public resources. This reality prompted an investigation into the nuances of decentralization in education. These mediations occur within the territories of everyday life, manifesting in diverse forms, configurations, and scales, all of which can be described and critically analyzed (Rodrigues and Machado Filho, 2023).

6Local councils were conceived – and strongly promoted by the federal government (LAVALLE et al., 2016) as a means of operationalizing a decentralized governance model in which processes of collective decision-making would foster greater transparency, public accountability, innovation, and improved outcomes in public management (AZEVEDO, 2018, 2016; ZAREMBERG et al., 2017; LAVALLE and BARONE, 2015; ABRAMOVAY, 2010). Beyond these political-institutional expectations, the interest of this investigation turns to the configuration of councils as political spaces (AZEVEDO, 2021; CASTRO, 2018).

7One of the most significant analytical challenges in the political geography of democracy lies in the emergence of participatory institutions and their spatial expressions. In Brazil, since the 2000s, the strengthening of initiatives such as councils, conferences, forums, and participatory budgeting, combined with the rise of progressive governments in the region, has consolidated participatory arenas. These experiences demonstrate that the political practices go beyond both the frameworks of representative democracy, operating in hybrid, permeable, and often contradictory spaces – what in this article we call political spaces.

8The concept of political space that we propose speaks directly to spaces where there exists a zone of interpenetration in which the boundaries between state and society become porous, and where practices of contestation, negotiation, and institutional co-production coexist (CORNWALL, 2002; CORNWALL, 2017; CORNWALL; COELHO, 2007).

9The aim is to offer a geographical perspective on the implementation of education policy, characterized by strong territorial interconnections and grounded in the involvement of school communities in organizational spaces linked to the allocation of public resources. Brazilian Geography has a promising research agenda focusing on participatory spaces and mediation between the state and society (Azevedo, 2021; 2018; Castro, 2012; 2005; Rodrigues, 2006; 2010). However, this agenda requires greater empirical investment. Despite the diversification of research in this area, existing studies remain limited and insufficient to address the questions raised by Brazil's evolving social policy frameworks.

10The large share of educational research that discusses the improvement of education services with a focus on school processes (Karino and Laros, 2017; Lück, 2012; Brooke and Soares, 2008; Franco et al., 2007; Soares and Andrade, 2006; Murillo, 2003; Goldstein and Woodhouse, 2000) tends to devote greater attention to standardized assessments and student outcomes than to schools’ organizational characteristics and their internal processes of financial, administrative, and pedagogical management (Sammons, 2008). We argue that the formation of new political spaces, within the CECs, can generate political processes that are decisive for the outcomes of education policies. Moreover, the notion of public accountability in Brazilian education, most often associated with large-scale exam results and systems of rewards and sanctions, can be exercised in other ways within councils, due to the expanded representation of the social and cultural dimensions of schooling, which directly shape educational processes.

11The research aimed to understand and demonstrate how local councils, influenced by contextual factors, can promote diverse public resource management processes. These processes vary in their degree of participation, their ability to enhance or diminish public accountability, and their effectiveness – or lack thereof – in achieving specific public policy goals.

12This text examines School-Community Councils (CECs) as political spaces for social oversight of decentralized resources allocated through Brazil's Direct Money to Schools Program (PDDE).

13The methodology involved analyzing PDDE resource accountability documents from 11 schools in Niterói, which is a municipality located in the state of Rio de Janeiro, where most of the campuses of the Federal Fluminense University are located. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with school directors, and mixed-format questionnaires were applied to council members. Parameters were also established to assess perceptions of service quality, considering internal processes, learning outcomes, and infrastructure. The analysis of collected data focused on political dimensions such as participation, debate, dissent, deliberative effectiveness, and political learning within the councils.

14The article is structured as follows: the first section addresses the transfer of responsibilities and decision-making authority – albeit limited – from federal to municipal levels, reflecting the broader municipalization of social policies. It also explores the territorial frameworks underpinning decentralized education policy management and the proliferation of local councils in Brazil. The second section analyses local councils as political spaces for representation, public accountability, and social oversight. The research methodology is then detailed, followed by an analysis of the nature and functioning of CECs in the selected schools. Finally, the article argues that studying institutionalized political spaces focused on resource oversight provides valuable insights into the quality of democratic processes. It highlights how collective decision-making and political learning dynamics emerge in these contexts.

Local Councils and Political-Administrative Decentralization in the Brazilian Federation

15In Brazil, the decentralisation of public policies is closely tied to the territorial complexity of the state, which operates under a federal model that, since 1988, recognizes municipalities as federative unit. In a federation, there is no hierarchy among powers, making it essential to understand the roles and responsibilities of federal entities, as well as the relationships established between them for policy implementation (Nunes and Fonseca, 2018; Rodrigues, 2006).

16Two key aspects of the decentralisation process within Brazil’s federal model must be emphasised: the negotiation between federative entities for ressource and responsabilities transfer and the coordination required to prevent overlaps, misaligned actions, and the exacerbation of territorial inequalities.

17States and municipalities can assume responsibilities for policy management through constitutional mandate, self-initiative, or voluntary adherence to programmes proposed by the federal government. Since adherence is the principle governing the assumption of responsibilities, the federal government and states must encourage municipalities to allocate resources while setting up targets and sanctions.

18Thus, to achieve the objectives of a decentralized policy, it is necessary to navigate a complex bargaining process that balances expected returns with competition and coordination (Nunes and Fonseca, 2018; Nunes and Sanfelici, 2018; Arretche, 2012, 1996; Abrucio, 2006).

19Throughout the 2000s, various authors (Arretche, 2012, 2000, 1996; Barbosa, 2010; Abrucio, 2005, 2006; Falleti, 2006; Almeida, 2001) argued that better outcomes in public policies and social oversight are not achieved quickly, linearly, or easily replicated across contexts. Success depends on a complex set of intergovernmental arrangements, meaning that policy outcomes vary significantly even with decentralised designs and specific institutional arrangements.

  • 1 In Brazil, basic education consists of Early Childhood, Elementary, and High School. Education netw (...)

20By the mid-1990s, municipal governments became the primary providers of elementary education services, following the principle of ensuring universal access to schools for all students nationwide1 (Souza, 2006). The literature considers the transfer of responsibility for implementing education policy to local governments as a success, attributed to a complex system of intergovernmental relations established primarily between the federal government and municipalities.

21The federal government employed mechanisms combining financial transfers with administrative incentives linked to predefined targets or programmes designed for nationwide implementation. This approach ensured a more structured and uniform decentralisation profile while preserving subnational governments' management autonomy (Abrucio, 2006).

22Some decentralisation programmes have been innovated by extending the process to the schools themselves. For example, the Direct Money to Schools Programme (PDDE) allocates resources directly to educational units based on school location (urban or rural) and student enrolment figures reported in the school census, submitted to the Ministry of Education (MEC) by each school nationwide. Based on programmed rules and needs identified by the MEC, the amounts transferred and the types of investments each school can undertake are determined.

23The receipt of these funds is contingent upon the existence of local councils that manage public resources. These councils vary in their degree of participation, their contribution to increasing or reducing public accountability, and their effectiveness or ineffectiveness in implementing certain public policies.

24The PDDE aims to provide resources for daily operations of basic education by depositing funds biannually into the accounts of executing units represented by school CECs. The resources are distributed into two main categories: PDDE Básico, which allocates funds based on student numbers and geographical location, and PDDE Estrutura and PDDE Qualidade, designed to meet specific needs with greater flexibility.

25The School Councils (Conselhos Escolares - CEC) are mandatory in all schools that adhere to the Direct Money to School Program (PDDE), thus forming part of the decentralization logic where their existence and multiplication are justified by strong federal incentives, particularly through the transfer of funds conditioned upon their existence (Lavalle et al., 2016).

26The existence of an Executive Unit (Unidade Executora - UEx), responsible for receiving the school's funds, is contingent on the formation and legitimization of the CEC (Brazil, 2013). The CEC must be managed by the general assembly, the board of directors, and the deliberative and fiscal councils.

27In practice, the general assembly must meet twice a year to elect council members and to account for the use of funds. The first occurs at the beginning of the school year, when council members, representing the mentioned segments, are elected, and the list of materials and services to be funded by the PDDE is approved. The second occurs at the end of the school year, with the primary purpose of presenting the school funds' financial reports. Extraordinary assemblies can be convened as needed, for example, to change council members or amend the presidency of the council.

28The deliberative council is a collegial body composed of representatives from different segments of the school community (students' legal guardians, teachers, staff, and the principal) that makes decisions about the administrative, financial, and political-pedagogical dimensions of the school. The main functions of the deliberative council are to evaluate the annual program of the UEx, its resource allocation plan, and financial reports; conduct investigations when necessary; issue opinions on relevant matters; and convene assemblies.

29The fiscal council serves as the supervisory body for management actions, with primary responsibilities including overseeing financial transactions, reviewing and approving the annual program, and examining and approving financial reports.

30As institutionalized entities, CECs across the country exhibit great similarity in their structure and basic operational conditions. However, the empirical data collected will enable the identification of important differences related to participation, accountability, and the improvement of educational services, linked to political distinctions.

Local Councils in the Decentralized Territorial Management Model: The Example of School-Community Councils as Political Spaces

31We understand political spaces as relational and situated arenas – both formal and informal, material and symbolic – in which different actors produce and contest rules, meanings, and forms of social regulation. More than simply participatory venues, such spaces materialize processes of democratic construction and institutional reinvention that go beyond classical models of representation. In Latin America, they take on distinctive contours, as they stem both from the conquest of invited spaces by historically marginalized movements and from the institutionalization of popular spaces in public policies and participatory governance arrangements (CORNWALL, 2002; 2017; GAVENTA, 2006). This conception underscores the procedural and politically generative character of interactions between society and the state, allowing us to understand political space as an analytical category capable of encompassing the co-production of institutionalities and the multiplicity of scales and repertoires of political participation in the region.

32Political spaces are therefore associated with arenas of dispute and governance. These spaces establish communication channels with institutionalised political power, amplifying the visibility of and response to social demands for voice and inclusion (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007). Within these spaces, political phenomena shape their organisation and, consequently, their quality (Machado Filho, 2023; 2017; Borges, 2020; Azevedo, 2018; 2016; Castro, 2018; 2012).

33Political processes are initiated within these spaces, where interests and demands are articulated, and narratives are voiced. They serve as platforms for pressuring decision-makers by publicising grievances and demands that are often underestimated or overlooked. Consequently, the concept of political space becomes an operational tool for analysing the functioning of political systems and the interactions between society and the state (Machado Filho, 2023; 2017; Rodrigues and Machado Filho, 2023).

34The structure and operation of School-Community Councils (CECs) align with the characteristics of limited political spaces, defined as forums for debate and representation of specific interests. These councils are thematic and institutionalised entities enabled by participatory norms (Azevedo, 2016; Lavalle et al., 2016). Their designation as "limited" reflects their restricted thematic agenda, which, in the case of CECs, pertains to collective decision-making on the financial, administrative, and pedagogical dimensions of schools.

35Despite their thematic and limited nature, CECs must consistently function as political spaces. They have the potential to strengthen democracy through participation and social oversight (Romão et al., 2017; Donaghy, 2011), thereby enhancing public policy outcomes and accountability.

36Public accountability entails transparency, reporting, responsibility, responsiveness, and good governance (Melo, 2007; Schedler, 1999; Manin et al., 1999; O’Donnell, 1998). It is also intrinsically linked to improving public policy outcomes and the use of public resources.

37The relationship between accountability and improved policy outcomes is widely debated in education, often focusing on the indicators used to evaluate educational services. Much of the national and international literature on educational quality emphasises school improvement indicators (Freitas, 2016, 2002; Sordi and Freitas, 2013; Afonso, 2012; Ravitch, 2010; Madaus, 2008, 1979; Alves and Soares, 2007; Albernaz et al., 2002; Reynolds, 1998; Murillo, 1996; Rutter, 1983).

38A considerable part of the debate has centred on the policy choice to associate the quality of education services with students’ performance in standardized assessments. One challenge of this approach is that it tends to oversimplify inherently complex processes. As a result, transparency and accountability often come to be expressed through comparative rankings of schools, municipalities, and states, which can narrow the understanding of public accountability to the relative positioning of institutions and actors, particularly schools and teachers. From this managerial perspective, improvement is frequently understood as a product of competition.

39The prominence of large-scale assessments in monitoring education quality in Brazil is closely linked to the growing influence of international cooperation and funding agencies. These actors have encouraged the adoption of standardized evaluation frameworks to assess public investments and policies, contributing to the centrality of indicators in both domestic policy debates and in the mobilization of external resources. In this process, two developments played an important role: Brazil’s participation in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and the consolidation of the Brazilian Public Education Evaluation System (SAEB).

40Studies on improving educational services gained prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and England (Brooke and Soares, 2008), highlighting evidence that students' skills and family background were determinants of varying levels of academic performance. In response to these studies, it was observed that, although family background significantly influences performance levels, schools in similar social circumstances, belonging to the same education system, and receiving the same resources could exhibit very different levels of educational progress (Sammons, 2008; Mortimore et al., 1988; Rutter et al., 1980, 1975). Research interest then shifted toward understanding schools and their functioning, acknowledging that improving education services was closely related to school processes.

41From the analysis of research lines (extensive internationally and more recent in the Brazilian context) dedicated to evaluating parameters that indicate improvements in education services with a focus on school processes (Karino and Laros, 2017; Arana and Martins, 2017; Lück, 2012; Brooke and Soares, 2008; Franco et al., 2007; Soares and Andrade, 2006; Gaviria et al., 2004; Murillo, 2003; Albernaz et al., 2002; Goldstein and Woodhouse, 2000), it becomes evident that studies have given much more attention to student assessments and outcomes than to the organizational characteristics of schools and their internal processes related to financial, administrative, and pedagogical management (Sammons, 2008).

42A key criticism of accountability in education stems from its almost exclusive association with standardised test results, which are used to rank schools, municipalities, and states, as exemplified by the Basic Education Development Index (IDEB) in Brazil. The limitation of this approach lies in its reliance on test outcomes to assess educational policy improvements, neglecting the social, political, and cultural dimensions that influence education processes. Despite these limitations, the IDEB highlights significant disparities between schools receiving similar resources, proportional to student enrolment, within the same political and curricular context. These differences reflect not only internal processes, such as the role of CEC decision-makers, but also locational factors, including socioeconomic conditions, violence rates, and proximity to cultural and health infrastructure (Soares and Alves, 2003; Albernaz et al., 2002; Alves and Soares, 2007; Lee, 1997).

43Schools, therefore, cannot be considered isolated entities unaffected by external influences. Instead, they function as integral components of a social and political system, simultaneously influencing and being influenced by their surroundings (Brooke and Soares, 2008).

44Many education scholars understand accountability as an authoritarian imposition of punitive consequences (Freitas, 2016; 2002; Afonso, 2012; Hout and Elliott, 2011; Ravitch, 2010; Chubb and Moe, 1990), closely tied to the logic of large-scale assessments and to the allocation of resources based on meritocratic criteria. These authors raise legitimate concerns about the growing role of private actors in Brazilian public education.

45We argue that, within the current configuration of state–society relations in Brazil – one that stands in contrast to a centralized and opaque state marked by non-transparent decision-making – it is necessary to broaden the exercise of public accountability. Here, accountability is understood as the assumption of responsibility, the possibility of being held to account, and the obligation to provide accounts, all associated with transparency in public action and in the use of public resources. We do not ignore the intense debates and conflicts surrounding the meanings of social practices; nevertheless, we advocate for accountability across all public services for two main reasons. First, there is a need to take a clear stance against Brazil’s relatively recent past, characterized by strong centralization and a lack of transparency in decision-making and in the use of public resources. Second, there is the challenge of addressing persistent socio-spatial inequalities, which constrain the exercise of rights through the uneven distribution of public goods and services across the national territory – an asymmetry that also affects service quality.

46Quality has been another area of intense debate in education. While this article cannot fully engage with that discussion, it is necessary to address certain aspects of accountability, particularly the measurement parameters employed. Large-scale assessment results are clearly insufficient on their own as indicators of educational quality, and accountability cannot rely solely on student performance in such tests. For this reason, we argue that researchers and actors involved in accountability processes – whether policymakers, implementers, or council members – should seek to understand and employ broader parameters that include indicators of schools’ internal processes, in addition to large-scale assessment results.

47Although they are not uncontested measures of quality, performance indicators capture a limited snapshot of social reality that, when critically examined, can reveal differences produced by school processes. These may include internal processes shaped by the specific social and cultural contexts of each school (FEU, 2022), as well as external processes driven by social forces beyond the school’s control. Such external factors also include locational characteristics, such as the social and economic profile of the population, levels of violence, population density, and the availability or proximity of public cultural and health facilities.

48For these reasons, performance indicators derived from large-scale assessments cannot be considered in isolation, as doing so risks reproducing the shortcomings of input–output methodologies, which assume a direct and linear relationship between inputs and outcomes. The parameters adopted in this research, as well as the rationale for their use, are presented in the methodology section.

49In contrast to forms of accountability based exclusively on large-scale assessment results, which tend to trigger meritocratic processes, Afonso (2012) argues that education should develop an alternative model of accountability. This model would include both reporting and responsibility, grounded in deliberative evaluation processes facilitated by discussion groups and forums, in which dialogue would serve as the primary means of expressing diverse interests. Afonso does not elaborate further on this model beyond these general outlines.

50We contend that the foundations for a broader exercise of accountability in education, as suggested by Afonso, already exist within School–Community Councils (CECs). As political spaces, these councils enable locally grounded evaluations that can activate processes of responsibility and public reporting, particularly directed toward the populations most directly affected by education policies.

51In this context, the following questions arise: a) Do CEC members perceive themselves as responsible and accountable for their decisions? b) Does the school community recognise the responsibilities of CEC members towards them? c) Are CEC members and the school community aware that the use of PDDE resources is intended to enhance educational quality? d) Do CEC members perceive themselves – or could they be perceived – as responsible for improving the quality of education services at their school?

Methodological Procedures

52Eleven schools in the municipality of Niterói were selected for the study. These schools were chosen because they are the only ones in the municipal network that offer the final years of elementary education (6th to 9th grades). Schools serving the final years generally have more teachers than those serving the early years (1st to 5th grades), thereby increasing the complexity of representation and relationships within the school.

53To address the research questions, a documentary analysis was conducted on the accountability processes for PDDE resources signed by the CECs, following the discussion by Visser and Jones (2010), Dixon (2010), and Cloke et al. (2004). These documents included the minutes of general assemblies (with attendance lists), lists of materials to be purchased and services to be contracted with PDDE funds – decisions that must be collectively planned – as well as budgets, invoices, and fiscal council reports. These records allowed comparisons between planning and execution, enabling the identification of whether school managers adhered to council decisions on priority materials, goods, and services. Participation rates in assemblies (e.g., elections, material approvals, and financial accountability) were also analysed. The minutes provided insights into the organisation and distribution of speaking and argumentation opportunities, offering valuable indicators of equality in participation among the council members.

54Eleven semi-structured interviews (Secor, 2010; Cloke et al., 2004) were conducted with the general directors of all schools to explore: i) The role of school managers as mediators in the daily functioning of the CEC; and ii) Their perceptions of democratic school management, shared responsibilities, resource use, and potential improvements in educational services.

55Questionnaires were distributed via Google Forms, combining closed, open, and interval-based questions, following the 5-point Likert scale model (Joshi, 2015; Dalmoro and Vieira, 2013), associating the opinions and motivations of interviewees and questionnaire respondents with opposing perceptions (positive, negative) or neutral. Of the thirty-three questionnaires distributed, twenty-nine were completed. Each school was asked to ensure that three council members responded: a) a representative of the teachers; b) a representative of the staff; c) a representative of parents and students.

56The interviews and questionnaires provided primary data from actors and agents directly involved in the political spaces, yielding insights not always available in official records or documents. This enabled an analysis of political processes such as participation, debate, dissent, deliberative effectiveness, and political learning, which may or may not conform to established patterns. These processes are shaped and occur through structural or causal relationships among council members and vary in their democratic quality depending on how collective decisions are made in everyday social contexts. Institutionalised participatory spaces can act as platforms for political learning and problem-solving through participation and debate. However, they may also become mere formalities with rigid routines (Abramovay et al., 2010).

  • 2 To consult the presentation and the detailed discussion of all indicators comprising the parameters (...)
  • 3 PNE 2014–2024 and Opinion No. 08/2010 of the National Education Council.

57The assessment of improvements in services at each school was based on a broad set of parameters2, including: indicators of internal school processes (Brooke and Soares, 2008; Reynolds, 1998; Sammons et al., 1995; Mortimore et al., 1988); learning indicators, such as the Basic Education Assessment System (SAEB) and Avaliar para Conhecer (an assessment programme developed by the Niterói municipal education system itself); and infrastructure indicators (Gaviria, 2004; Sammons, 2008), in line with the provisions of the National Education Plan3.

58We argue that no public policy implementation can dispense with the monitoring of its outcomes. To this end, certain quality parameters must be defined. When monitoring does not take place, it hinders both the evaluation and the recalibration of policy, and it also undermines accountability by failing to make public the responsibilities of agents involved, thereby limiting transparency.

59Public education policies engage with a complex reality, and improvements in quality can never be expressed solely through students’ performance in large-scale assessments. Such results are important primarily insofar as they reveal the impact of educational inequalities, whether related to disparities in available resources across regions, states, and municipalities, or to extra-school factors that affect learning, such as socioeconomic inequalities among students and racial inequalities (ERNICA and RODRIGUES, 2020; SOARES and ALVES, 2003). Nevertheless, it is essential to broaden the range of parameters associated with indicators of internal school processes – such as those that capture significant differences in pedagogical, administrative, and financial management – as well as infrastructure indicators, which remain particularly relevant in unequal contexts such as Brazil, where there are substantial disparities in schools’ inputs and learning environments.

60According to the response options in the questionnaires, participation, as perceived by the responding council members, was classified as "excellent, good, fair, poor, very poor"; and social control and accountability were classified as "very high, high, medium, low, very low."

61Social oversight and accountability were evaluated using a similar scale: very high, high, medium, low, and very low.

62The eleven schools’ CECs were anonymised as CEC1 through CEC11. The numerical designations do not correspond to the alphabetical order of school names or the administrative regions of Niterói; the assignments were random.

63This methodological approach facilitated the systematisation of the results, focusing on participation and public accountability processes within the CECs and their relationship with improvements in educational service outcomes. These findings are presented in the next section.

Results: The Political Processes in CECs, Participation, Public Accountability, and Improvements in Education Services

64Although the CECs were established as a prerequisite for participation in a federal programme, the eleven schools investigated have councils that function with significant variations. All eleven schools are public and part of the same educational network; however, they exhibit notable differences.

65The table below summarises observations on participation, accountability, social oversight of PDDE resources, political learning, and the relationship between these processes and improvements in educational services across the eleven CECs investigated.

66In the first row, under the identification of the CECs, contextual information is provided about the schools' locations. This includes the number of favelas and other urban communities in the surrounding region, the percentage of the population earning up to two minimum wages, and whether the school is located within subnormal agglomerations (Niterói, 2015).

67Subsequent rows assess council members' participation in CEC assemblies and in the broader school community, using a scale of Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor, and Very Poor. Accountability practices were assessed and rated as Very High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low. Social oversight and evidence of political learning were then highlighted and categorised as Yes or No for both. Finally, the relationship with improvements in educational services was identified as either positive (Improvement) or Negative (Decline).

Table 1: Summary table of the analysis of political processes occuring in the investigated CECs.

Table 1: Summary table of the analysis of political processes occuring in the investigated CECs.

Number of S.A. (Subnormal Agglomerations) served by the schools.

m.w. = Minimum wage.

68According to the summary table of the CEC analysis, participation evaluation revealed varying levels across the councils. Three CECs demonstrated good participation, three were rated as fair, four were considered poor, and one exhibited abysmal participation. Notably, no CEC scored "excellent participation" by council members or the school community.

69Accountability practices yielded the most concerning results. None of the CECs displayed high or very high accountability. Three were rated as having medium accountability, four as low, and four as very low. Social oversight was observed in seven CECs, while four showed no evidence of control over public resources.

70Political learning received the most favorable evaluation, with evidence of the formation of political actors observed in all eleven CECs. This evidence centered on collective decision-making and included the participation of representatives from all segments during deliberative moments, the valorization of dialogue in decision-making, and the recognition of dissent as inevitable and necessary.

71Even in CEC4, CEC8, and CEC10, where council members reported the absence of democratic resource management or pedagogical decision-making, they identified the lack of social oversight within their CECs. This indicates the development of a critical perspective, an essential component of democratic practice.

72Establishing a relationship between democratic management, accountability, and improvements in education services presents a complex challenge. However, the analysis identified such relationships in three cases: CEC6, CEC8, and CEC9. In CEC9, good participation, fair accountability, and the exercise of social oversight positively contributed to service improvements. Conversely, in CEC6, low involvement and accountability negatively impacted the school, deteriorating services. Similarly, in CEC8, negligible participation, extremely low accountability, and a lack of social oversight also correlated with declining service quality.

73Participation and collective decision-making were hindered by irregular council meetings, as observed in CEC2, CEC3, CEC4, CEC5, CEC6, and CEC8, and by low community attendance at general assemblies, noted in CEC2, CEC4, CEC6, CEC8, CEC10, and CEC11. No assembly exceeded 10% of the expected total attendance in these cases. In contrast, regular meetings were held in CEC1, CEC7, CEC9, CEC10, and CEC11, with good community participation reported in the general CEC3, CEC7, and CEC9 assemblies.

74Dissent was regarded as unfavorable and avoided only in CEC3 and CEC8. In all other cases, there were indications of dialogue being valued and dissent recognized as necessary.

75The effectiveness of CEC decisions was assessed through compliance with the prioritized list of materials, goods, and services. Non-compliance was identified in CEC4, CEC8, and CEC10 for various reasons. In CEC10, a comprehensive list established at the beginning of the year was not fulfilled, as the school administration avoided using PDDE funds, revealing that the expenditure plan set by the CEC was never intended to be implemented. In CEC4, fulfillment issues stemmed from difficulties changing the presidency and updating documentation required by FNDE. In CEC8, no list was created for 2019 due to the school administration’s decision not to utilize PDDE funds that year. Despite these examples, most CECs demonstrated accurate planning for decentralized resources.

76In CEC8 and CEC10, school management tended to centralize decision-making and unilateral actions, hindering shared responsibilities and collective decision-making.

77These examples underscore the critical role of school principals, as council presidents, in shaping the political processes within CECs. Principals can promote broader debates, shared responsibility, and collective decision-making or adopt a centralized approach limiting these dynamics. Their actions significantly impact service improvements and the public accountability processes facilitated by the CECs.

78In CEC1, CEC3, CEC4, CEC5, CEC7, CEC9, CEC10, and CEC11, evidence of council members' involvement in planning and pedagogical issues was observed. Such involvement is vital for fostering council members' sense of responsibility regarding the quality of education.

  • 4 For a more detailed account of the statements and actions of council members, please refer to the d (...)

79Given that schools are public spaces with highly regulated access, it is essential to note that social realities impose differing access levels for council members across all analyzed CECs. Parents of students generally access schools only during scheduled meetings or for administrative or pedagogical matters, whereas staff and teachers have daily access. While parents, teachers, and staff are equal in formal meetings, the constant presence of teachers and staff allows these groups to influence daily administrative and pedagogical decisions and resource planning significantly4.

80In summary, the investigation into the CECs revealed the complexity of relationships between participation, accountability, and improvements in education services, with significant variations across councils. Participation was rated as good in only three CECs, while accountability results were even more concerning, with most councils showing low or very low levels. Despite these shortcomings, evidence of political learning was observed in all CECs, highlighting progress in developing critical actors and recognizing the importance of social oversight.

81The effectiveness of decisions varied, hindered by irregular meetings, low community attendance, and centralized decision-making by the school management, particularly in CEC8 and CEC10. However, council involvement in planning and pedagogical issues in most CECs demonstrated potential for greater responsibility-sharing and improved governance. The role of school principals emerged as a pivotal factor, capable of fostering or hindering improvements in education services, public accountability, and democratic governance within the CECs.

Conclusions

82The empirical analysis reveals that, despite the institutionalized nature of the CECs – structured according to a standardized model applied to all public schools across the country under a federal resource decentralization policy – the functioning of the councils varies significantly. These variations are observed in school community and council member participation, the social oversight exercised by council members, financial reporting, and public accountability.

83Within the CECs, the dynamics of addressing differences openly are influenced by inequalities among agents, both in terms of institutional and procedural knowledge and in the advantages conferred by relationships among teachers, staff, and school principals. The teacher and staff segments dominate decisions regarding resources and school routines, whereas parental and family participation in education remains underdeveloped. It is essential to highlight the significant role of school administrators, as CEC presidents, in shaping the councils' routines by convening meetings and managing the dynamics of speech and participation.

84Based on the analysed data, these political spaces fulfil their intended purpose as intermediaries between the state and society and as facilitators of political learning. While there is still a long way to go in achieving fully democratic school management, the existence and continuity of the CECs have encouraged dialogue, debate, and collective decision-making among agents engaged with school realities in various ways.

85In their daily operations, the CECs bolster democratic processes through political learning, which, once established, can be applied at other levels of governance. Collective decision-making processes foster an appreciation of participatory practices among council members, expand their social relations, and enable learning about institutional procedures. The formation of political actors also supports decentralization objectives, as participation equips council members with the skills for collective decision-making and values their local knowledge in problem-solving.

86Conversely, the lack of interaction between different segments – caused by the undervaluation of routine meetings in some CECs – has led to political alienation, resulting in council members shirking responsibilities and weakening accountability practices.

87On the one hand, the recognition of political learning and state-society intermediation highlights that CECs, as political spaces, have demonstrated political feasibility as instruments within a broader institutional framework for decentralized territorial governance. On the other hand, it cannot be concluded that more horizontal decision-making processes and social oversight directly lead to improvements in education services. While democratic management and public control over resources have intrinsic value, their direct correlation with improved educational outcomes remains unclear.

88A localized debate on service improvement criteria, followed by diagnostics conducted by local agents and based on evidence gathered within the school, could help identify priority areas and actions. Such initiatives could revise strategies and methods related to pedagogy, organization, culture, and relationships within the school community. This process would exemplify accountability by incorporating responsibility, responsiveness, and reporting. Although the CECs provide a foundation for fostering such processes, none of the councils investigated exhibited progress in this direction.

89The current governance model necessitates public accountability, including the assumption of responsibility and the delivery of accountability by public agents directly involved in political processes. However, sufficient accountability within the CECs has not yet been observed. Council members do not appear to perceive themselves as co-responsible for improving or deteriorating educational services. Public accountability could link participation and social oversight of resources with service quality in education. Further analyses, particularly comparative ones, are needed to test this hypothesis.

90Such analyses are especially pertinent for Brazilian society. Political spaces like the CECs, when fulfilling their original purpose of mediating the relationship between culture and the state and fostering political actors, demonstrate effectiveness in ensuring social oversight of public resources and placing participation at the heart of public policy development. These characteristics can strengthen trust between citizens and political institutions, foster collaborative networks, build mutual trust, and drive innovation in Brazilian public management.

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Notes

1 In Brazil, basic education consists of Early Childhood, Elementary, and High School. Education networks connected to the three federal levels can provide these stages. However, the Federal Constitution establishes that, primarily, municipalities are responsible for offering Early Childhood Education and Elementary Education, states are responsible for High School, and the Federal Government is responsible for Higher Education.

2 To consult the presentation and the detailed discussion of all indicators comprising the parameters selected, please refer to the doctoral dissertation available at: http://objdig.ufrj.br/16/teses/929092.pdf

3 PNE 2014–2024 and Opinion No. 08/2010 of the National Education Council.

4 For a more detailed account of the statements and actions of council members, please refer to the doctoral dissertation available at: http://objdig.ufrj.br/16/teses/929092.pdf

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Table des illustrations

Titre Table 1: Summary table of the analysis of political processes occuring in the investigated CECs.
Légende Number of S.A. (Subnormal Agglomerations) served by the schools.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/docannexe/image/17813/img-1.png
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Rosane Cristina Feu et Juliana Nunes Rodrigues, « School–Community Councils as Political Spaces in Decentralized Educational Governance in Brazil »L’Espace Politique [En ligne], 57 | 2025-3, mis en ligne le 20 avril 2026, consulté le 20 mai 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/17813 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/1650i

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Auteurs

Rosane Cristina Feu

PhD Political Geography
Fluminense Federal University
rosanefeu@gmail.com

Juliana Nunes Rodrigues

Professor, Political Geography
Fluminense Federal University
juliananunes@id.uff.br

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