Navigation – Plan du site

The Materialization of “Developmental State” in Ethiopia: Insights from the Gibe III Hydroelectric Development Project Regime, Omo Valley

The Materialization of “Developmental State” in Ethiopia: Insights from the Gibe III Hydroelectric Development Project Regime, Omo Valley
Edegilign Hailu Woldegebrael

Résumés

Les investissements en infrastructures hydroélectriques sont un pilier de la stratégie gouvernementale de construction de l’Etat par la modernisation hydroénergétique. A travers le cas du projet hydroélectrique de Gibe III, cette étude montre les aspects matériels de la construction de l’ «Etat développemental » par le Front Démocratique Révolutionnaire des Peuples d’Ethiopie (FDRPE). Construit sur la base d’enquêtes de terrain au sein du projet, cet article dresse une analyse détaillée des pratiques de gouvernement concrètes à l’œuvre dans la construction du barrage. L’analyse se penche sur des processus contradictoires quant à la matérialisation de l’Etat développemental dans la vallée de l’Omo. D’un côté, le gouvernement central accroit ses capacités de contrôle et d’extraction des ressources dans cette périphérie (ce que l’on peut appeler les « effets de l’Etat développemental »), et assure sa légitimation par la construction effective du barrage. De l’autre côté, l’action autoritaire du gouvernement dans la construction et son incapacité à reconnaître les revendications des populations affectées par le projet menacent sa légitimité politique.

Haut de page

Texte intégral

  • 1 The paper neither intends to delve into theory of developmental state nor judge whether Ethiopian s (...)
  • 2 This paper departs from an essentialist view of the authoritarianism as a label to categorize regim (...)

1Top down economic development and state building define successive Ethiopian regimes since the early 20th century. Coercive modernizing projects were carried out under the various ideologies and institutional structures of successive regimes: imperial monarchy, Marxist military dictatorship, and the current ''ethnocratic'' regime as well as “developmental state”1 [lematawi mengist] (Hagamann & Abbink, 2011; Clapham, 2006). Clapham convincingly showed such a historical continuity and asserted Ethiopia’s development trajectory as a series of attempts by top-down modernizing elites to emulate the development mechanisms from other countries as an instrument of power (Clapham, 2006:109). In this light Ethiopia’s ruling coalition (Ethiopian people’s revolutionary democratic front (EPRDF) -in power since 1991-largely framed its policies in line with donor’s agenda of “democratization” and “free market economy” as a source of its legitimacy during its first decade of rule-1990s. Particularly the ethno-federal project, de facto since 1991 and de jure since 1995, has promised to reverse the historical unequal center-periphery relations. The ethno-federalism was thought to reflect each ethnic group’s territory. Although the Constitution ratifies the state ownership of the land, officially, these peoples are sovereign within their regional states, and are the ones supposed to govern access to land. However, since the early 2000s, the promise of self-rule and ethnic empowerment through this federal arrangement countered by the increasing ascendance of the regime’s mission of the “developmental state” [lematawi mengist] that focused on achieving highly ambitious economic growth targets as a new source of legitimacy (Fana, 2015; Planel, 2014). The ultimate objective of the EPRDF’s developmentalism is to elevate the country to a status of “middle income” by 2025. To this end “development” is “rendered technical” (Li, 2007), which is accompanied by depoliticized approaches to interventions (Ferguson, 1994). In this context, in keeping with Scott’s scenario of an authoritarian high modernist paradigm, the government has bent on “technology-driven development” and top-down planning (Scott, 1998; Mosley & Watson, 2016; Asnake & Fana, 2014). These ideas are represented by the notion of lemat- the translation of “development” in Amharic. These lemat and transformation continue to be defined at the center, by self declared all knowing state’s experts, with little or no regard for local interests (Abbink, 2012). This type of top-down imposition is most evident in the massive hydraulic infrastructural projects that lie at the core of the EPRDF’s state building both in symbolic and material terms, which has become the centerpiece of the authoritarian2 developmentalism (Fantini and Puddu, 2016).

  • 3 This paper approached “simplificationsfollowing James Scott’s (1998) conception of simplification (...)
  • 4 The concept of state of exception was used in this study following Fantini & Puddu (2016) who used (...)

2Academics have approached the “developmental state” as a model of economic development/industrialization in other areas-particularly in the East Asian countries (Johnson, 1982; Leftwich, 2008). However, in this paper following Moon and Prasad (1994) we argue that EPRDF’s “developmental state” is mainly a political project. It is the ruling party’s political agenda of consolidating power through cultivation of performance legitimacy. To this end, as the empirical section of this paper will demonstrate, the regime used various mechanisms such as presenting the project as a “national interest”, use of “simplifications”3 tactics, and “neoliberal othering” as well as pursuing “exceptional powers”4, to legitimize its centralized developmentalism in the hydropower projects within a federal republic and hence. In connection with this the government consistently proclaimed [as it continues to] that large scale development projects, particularly big dams, as a necessity for “national security” and bring “economic progress for all” (Carr, 2017). Such projects are sealed off any open and critical debates, which arguably unlocked the way for the central government to pursue exceptional powers to construct large hydro-power dams (Fantini, 2017). Consequently, the decision making practices in this project are marked by a sense of urgency at any costs that bypassed standard decision-making procedures. Thus the project was governed in an authoritarian political space, partly, by producing “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005). Additionally-justifying its top-down intervention, the government seemed to supplement the narratives of an urgent need to meet the national interest of energy production with a simplified representation of the project areas and “neoliberal othering” [the regime’s nationalist stances to fight against transnational opposition to the dam-by framing them as vectors of neoliberal agenda against the EPRDF’s developmentalism] as part of its tactics to marginalize any concerns about the project induced impacts.

  • 5 The Gibe III is the third of five dams planned along the Gibe-Omo River.
  • 6 The project incurred an estimated cost of over 1.5 billion Euros, of which 40 % self financed and t (...)

3Over the last years the expansion of large dam investment projects to sustain the economic growth in Ethiopia has led to renewed debates from scholarly and policy circles. However, the scholarships dedicated to Ethiopia’s developmentalism and its flagship dam projects have mainly focused on institutionalist (state-centric) analysis (Abbink, 2012; Verhoeven, 2013). This study complements existing researches by focusing on the less researched materiality and concrete practices of the EPRDF’s “developmental state” through the analyses of the Gibe III hydropower project [hereafter Gibe III project] as a case study. The Gibe III5 project is part of the GTP II’s grander schemes with a projected capacity of 1870 MW, which is estimated to double the country’s power generation. The dam [with height of 243 meter] is situated in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Regional State of Ethiopia (SNNPR) at the border between the Wolayta and Dawuro Zones (cf. figure 1 & 2). The source of the Omo River on which the dam was built starts from the southwestern highlands of Ethiopia and flows to southwards that terminate into Lake Turkana (Kenya). This river has the largest estimated hydropower potential in the country-only next to the Nile River (Carr, 2017). The project’s main components, among others, consisted of the construction of a Roller Compacted Concrete dam, the Sodo-Chida realignment road, and the Ethiopian Electric Power’s permanent camp, and from the Gibe III to Sodo 400 kilovolt power transmission line projects (MDI, 2009).6 Thus, the Gibe III project in this paper refers to one or more of these project components. In so doing, we relied on the works of other researchers who argued that the State is an effect of its very governance practices (Mitchel, 1991) and on those who analyzed as to how the State is consolidated and constituted through its practices of transforming “nature” from political ecology of States perspectives (Harris, 2017; Scott, 1998). Following Migdal’s (2001) “State in Society” thinking, we considered the state not as a distinct actor external to society, rather as deeply embedded in social forces even in authoritarian situations like Ethiopia. Building on works of this type, we wish to conceptually contribute towards materialization of the “developmental state” and empirically to highlight the state of the party-State at work. Focusing on the making of this project provides a more efficient approach to understand the materiality of the regime’s authoritarian “developmental state” due to the following reasons. The project is portrayed both as an achievement and a core of the “developmental state.” In this vein, the central government agencies retain an exceptional power in the design and implementation of the project in line with the tenets of the EPRDF’s state developmentalism (Abbink, 2012). Furthermore, it was also produced by an authoritarian regime within a context where the design of an economic agenda in general has remained entirely in the hands of State power, which is synonymous with the ruling party in Ethiopia (Fana, 2015). Finally, the project constituted an authoritarian situation that was developed within a “closed political space”-sealed off outsiders be it nongovernmental organizations, journalists or researchers (Fantini, 2017), which was implemented as part of the party-state’s domination practices. Thus the Gibe III dam case provides a valid empirical entry point into understanding the way Ethiopia’s authoritarian “developmental state” takes a material form in its whole historicity and geographic specificity.

4Even though this subject is widely studied and commented at the global scale, very little is known when it comes to Ethiopia in general and the Gibe III dam site in particular (Carr, 2017; Fantini & Puddu, 2016; Mosley & Watson, 2016). This paper attempts to fill this academic gap by analyzing the empirical evidence of materialization of the EPRDF’s “developmental state” in the form of this project. To this end, the study is based on a qualitative case study design (Yin, 2003), which is a product of 12 months of fieldwork conducted both at the national and sub-national scales in 2016 & 2017. The majority of the field work constituted key informant in-depth interviews, formal and informal discussions, on site observations and document research (including Ethiopian language documents). Discussions and interviews were conducted with more than forty eight experts and officials at multiple scales. We also interviewed more than eighty eight local Project affected persons (PAPs) to understand their roles in the project process and their perception towards it. The paper proceeds with a brief account to situate large-scale hydroelectric dam projects within Ethiopia’s authoritarian “developmental state” paradigm and then moves on to discuss fieldwork findings with regards to the party state’s project legitimization process, and decision making practices. Finally, it analyses the “State effects” of the project governance practices in the Omo valley and consequent contestations against the project in the fourth and fifth sections respectively.

Figure 1: Location of the Gibe III dam and study areas

Figure 1: Location of the Gibe III dam and study areas

Source: Author, 2016

Figure 2: The Gibe III Hydroelectric project at the dam site

Figure 2: The Gibe III Hydroelectric project at the dam site

Source: fieldwork, October 2016).

The “developmental state” and building large hydroelectric dams

  • 7 Data obtained from MoWIE, December 2016

5This section highlights the case study, recalling how hydropower dam development is framed as a key component of the government’s official discourse on state building and economic growth, and describes as to how it seeks to legitimize in implementing the Gibe III dam project. One of the pillars of these proposed development strategies encompasses water development (hydropower) stemming from the construction of large dams (National Planning Commission, 2015). To this end, since the turn of the new millennium, the government has devised aggressive hydropower dam programmes aimed at taming its estimated 45,000 MW of potential hydroelectric power. The second GTP (from 2014/15-2019/20) aims to increase the domestic power generation capacity from 4,180MW in 2014/15 to 17,208MW by the end of the plan period. Out of this, 13,817MW is planned to be generated from hydropower, mainly from large dams that are to be developed by the central government (National Planning Commission, 2015, p.179). With fourteen dams in operation, six currently under construction and sixteen planned dams, the dam program is therefore central to the government’s plan of the modernization drive to transform the national economy and further integrate it into the global markets.7

6In the light of the above, mega hydropower dam projects such as the Gibe III has become central to the transformation agenda of rapid industrialization through state-produced programming and hence, legitimization of EPRDF’s uninterrupted grip on power (Custa-Fernández, 2015). The public discourses increasingly identified the project with the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his dream of transforming Ethiopia into the categories of middle income countries. For instance, the poster (cf. figure3) displaying the photograph of Meles Zenawi, using a dam model as a background, in the caption pledges to uphold his legacies for realizing a prosperous Ethiopia. It seems to uncover the political targets of the large dams [legitimization of the ruling party’s continued stay in power -as his legacy] on the top of their economic goals. Thus, the rationale behind the national derive for large hydropower dam projects, as a political-economic development priority, rests on these logics-at least in the calculation of the ruling elites.

figure 3: The late Prime Minister Meles’s photograph-back grounded by a dam model, posted in the Gibe III project site office

figure 3: The late Prime Minister Meles’s photograph-back grounded by a dam model, posted in the Gibe III project site office

Source: fieldwork, November 2016

Legitimizing the Gibe III Project

7The party state propagated manifold narratives and practices of legitimizing the construction of the Gibe III dam, mainly aimed at depoliticizing its intervention as a power-strategy. The following sections uncover the legitimization process embedded in making this project and thus strengthening the regime’s continued stay in power-be they or not the result of an acknowledged strategy.

The Gibe III dam as a “national interest”: disguising “exceptional power” practices?

  • 8 Interviews with the EEP and project site officials, December 2016
  • 9 Ibid
  • 10 Interview with official in EEP, September 2016.
  • 11 Interview with official in MoWIE, August 2016.
  • 12 Ibid

8In the official rhetoric and consulted project documents, a broader national perspective to legitimize the Gibe III hydroelectric dam, by elevating it to a national development project and by systematically embedding it within the discourses of large dams as issues of national interest and unstoppable driver of progress.8 These narratives were also evidenced during the fieldwork. For instance, our national and project site respondents9- dominantly presented energy security for national development [hagerawi lemat] as a justification for the construction of the Gibe III dam. For instance, an interviewed EEP official, while commenting on the necessity of building the Gibe III dam, underscored an account of urgency: We [as a nation] are striving for survival,”10 and he shared the late Prime Minter’s argument: “[…] we will cease to exist as a nation unless we grow fast and share our growth.” As the notion of the EPRDF’s self declared “developmental state” ascended to the center stage in the early 2000s, the government framed poverty as an internal “existential threat” to the state and its population. This was accompanied by securitization of large scale “development” projects-particularly big dams (Carr, 2017). An interviewee in the Ministry of water, irrigation and electricity (MoWIE)11 supported this assertion and explained, due to this, particularly those fast-tracked large hydro-power projects including Gibe III were implemented through extra-conventional project governance structures (Cf. Section 3). Such securitized projects were sealed off any open and critical debates, which arguably unlocked the way for the central government to pursue exceptional powers expanding the construction of large hydro-power dams such as the Gibe III in a fast-tracked mode. Consequently, in the name of urgency to fulfill the growing energy demand, the regime arguably depoliticized the dam intervention by leaving-out important realities on the ground such as its adverse socio-environmental impacts, issues of unequal cost and benefit distributions and local autonomy. For the state elites, by portraying the dam as a necessity for Ethiopia’s “national security” and “economic transformation for all”, its local developmental impact is seemingly assumed as an automatic.12 However, as a single purpose project for hydroelectric production that is meant almost entirely for use elsewhere at least in the foreseeable future, the concerns as to how those directly affected communities concretely benefit from the project were evaded in this and similar rhetoric.

  • 13 Interview with officials from MoWIE and regional government agency, December 2016.

9Furthermore, officials from the MoWIE and regional environmental and forestry agency asserted that the neighboring countries too are hopefully waiting for the Gibe III’s completion to improve their economic futures and underlined the project’s significance in terms of regional integrations.13 The project was presented as part of the plans aimed at consolidating Ethiopia’s economic and diplomatic weights at the East African regional level through the water-led energy diplomacy by expanding its energy export. Nonetheless, concerns about socio-environmental impacts on the downstream indigenous communities in the Omo valley and around Lake Turkana (Carr, 2017; Abbink, 2012) were silenced in this rhetoric of the dam as a “regional development”. Thus there seem to be a high political stakes in the project. The ruling party through delivery of a visible evidence of such “development” at least at the national level, arguably aims at garnering legitimacy for its continued rule at home. It also seemingly aims to realize its aspiration to play a prominent role at the East African regional level by (re) configuring the geography of the electricity and hence, political power-through the cultivation of internal and external legitimacy. Thus the EPRDF’s “developmental State”, which takes a material form in this project, is arguably a political project aimed at legitimization of the government’s uninterrupted grip on power.

Simplifications: the Omo Valley-as a clean sheet for a revolutionary project?

  • 14 Interviews with EEP and MoWIE experts and officials, August-September 2016
  • 15 Ibid

10In order to justify these top-down decision making practices in the dam building, the government provided narratives explaining an urgent need to meet national energy security needs and then supplemented these narratives with a simplified representation of the project area to diminish any concerns about the project’s local impacts. In this light the interviewed officials and experts in the Ethiopian electric power (EEP) and MoWIE assured me that the Omo Valley, where the dam development site is located, as a “barren land” and explained the project’s minimal impacts.14 The State elites’ way of seeing appeared to share terra nullius perspectives regarding the project areas. Thus, their response reveals the government’s mission of taming space by claiming the valley as an “unused” and the Omo River as a readily available natural resource for extractions. In so doing, they effaced its local meaning and connections.15

  • 16 Interviews with PAPs, October-December 2016

11However, this kind of representation of the project area from government officials contradicted with fieldwork results and reports from the consultant (MDI, 2009) that established the significance of the valley in supporting the local livelihoods. For instance, the interviewed villagers reported that the lowland was used as common resources for grazing and farming sustaining livelihoods for years. Moreover, they used to depend on these resources to generate additional income sources through the collection and selling of forest products such as construction materials and firewood, charcoals, honey from tree trunks, grasses for animal fodder and other related activities.16 Hence, it is not clear what research was involved to make such conclusions, rather it seemed to rely on implicit criticisms of the current local land uses and livelihoods based on their economic efficiency. This arguably reflects the continuity of the historical core of the Ethiopian state-“deeply hierarchical and carries embedded within it an intense awareness of power relations” (Clapham, 2006:109), which approaches the periphery with “simplifications”-representing it as “backward” and its natural resources as “underutilized.” These discursive accounts in turn were used to downplay the dam’s local impact thereby to justify the “exceptionally” fast-tracked approach to the dam‘s construction, which was partly achieved through the government’s monopoly of information or denial of any space for alternative representations (Fantini, 2017). Thus the current political system that arguably operates based on logics of domination has reorganized the Omo landscape as if it was a clean sheet to construct the Gibe dam- the regime’s self declared revolutionary project.

Neoliberal “othering”: Fighting against transnational oppositions through nationalism?

12Scholars have argued that the groundwork for the EPRDF’s “developmental state” was structured based on the premise of neoliberal “othering”, comparable to anti-imperial rhetoric of 20th century East Asian countries as a pathway-out both for Ethiopia’s and Africa’s neoliberal paradigm-induced development dead ends (Fana, 2015). In line with this, as reflected in the prime minister’s inaugural address and reports of state owned Media, the materialization of the dam at any cost seems to be also seen as an instrument for ensuring the autonomy from, what the government used to call, a western neoliberal domination while referring to opposition to the dam. In this context, government owned media outlets such as televisions (both national and its regional replications), newspapers and other government publications hailed the inauguration of the Gibe III dam over months in which the erection of the dam appeared to be a success story- “a temple” to defeat poverty despite criticisms of the western NGOs. One of these government owned newspaper quotes the late prime minister’s speech regarding the project:

  • 17 The Ethiopian Herald, 14 January 2017

It will be finished at any cost. They don’t want to see developed Africa; they want us to remain undeveloped and backward to serve their tourists as a museum.17

13And it praised the completion of the project as a victory against these “Ethiopian enemies. Similarly, in its editorial views, the other publication of the same news paper argued:

  • 18 The Ethiopian Herald, 11 January 2017

Opposing such development undertakings that could help Ethiopian citizens achieve progress is the same as opposing self-reliance and development and that Ethiopians are not allowed to develop with their own initiative. […] it is part of these groups’ campaign to blocking Ethiopia from achieving growth outside of their say […] however the benefits of the power generating dam [Gibe III] are infinite - contrary to the claims of the neo-liberal extremists.18

14Thus by elevating the Gibe III to a national development project, the above quote situates the claims against the project in the Global South-North debates on environment and development. It seems to suggest that the international NGOs’ claimed concern for the environment was laminated as western neoliberal’s conspiracy to deter the prospect of the country’s “development”-by equating the project with economic growth. Thus the materialization of the dam at any cost seems to be seen as a pathway to achieve autonomy from western neoliberal dominations by demonstrating the ruling party’s project execution capacity without their support. Despite the controversies on this project, any genuine local grievances and dissents against the dam were dismissed as evil designs of these neoliberal anti-development elements. Therefore, the use of this and similar rhetoric were arguably aimed at curtailing democratic debates about the project by labeling any dissenting voices as siding with Ethiopia’s “enemies.” Thus the government’s narratives against the NGOs-laminating them as perpetuators of a neoliberal agenda were arguably used to contain criticisms against the project and legitimize its construction.

The planning and decision making practices: Engaging or evading citizens?

  • 19 Interview with official in MoWIE, August 2016
  • 20 Interview with the EEP expert , September 2017
  • 21 Interview with an official in MoWIE, December 2017
  • 22 Interview with the EEP expert, September 2016

15In this section we try to highlight how the EPRDF-led regime has materialized the state in its interpretation of the “developmental state” through analysis of concrete practices of making the Gibe III project. The practical process of hydropower project governance in the country significantly deviates from the formal institutional structures and is circumscribed by a blurring reality. In this context, the national and local level interviews revealed that the fast-tracked dam projects operated according to the logics of the “state of exception”, bypassing standard procedures for decision making practices. In this light, interview respondents in the MoWIE19 explained those fast-tracked dam projects, including Gibe III were implemented through extra-conventional project governance structures. For instance, although MoWIE is delegated to deal with the technical aspects of the Environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs), in the name of urgency to fulfill the growing energy demand, interviewed experts noted that many of the decisions for big dam projects were made at higher scales-council of ministers even before the ESIAs were completed.20 In the case of Gibe III project, the EEP adopted extra-conventional private public partnerships to directly issue a no-bid Engineering procurement and construction (EPC) contract to an Italian based company-Salini Costruttori S.p.A before EIAs were conducted that violated the federal directives for procurements and bypassed the standard norms for ESIAs’ procedures. The EEP’s decision to rely on executive decisions to approve the project entailed violation of standard procedures for ensuring accountability by regulatory authorities such as the Environmental protection agency (EPA), the parliament, and the regional power that oversees land allocation. Similarly, the directive that requires all dam projects to undertake a “full review” and license approval by the EPA prior to construction was also bypassed. In this respect, although the construction works commenced in 2006, the ESIA was formally approved by EPA in July 2008.21 The EPC contractor autonomously decided the project site and designed the dam and related infrastructures. The company also determined the size of the reservoir as well as associated land use changes and signed a contract agreement with the central government represented by the EEP.22The exceptional measures accompanying the project implementation, denied any spaces for the affected local authorities, communities and their elected representatives to participate in the project and to voice their concerns. Thus, the regime’s authoritarian project governance practices entailed the denial of politics, as a power-strategy, by arena shifting away from the conventional loci of decision makings in relevant regulatory bodies through institutional delegation and public private partnerships.

  • 23 Interview with local officials, October 2016.

16The interviews with institutional actors and analysis of documents also confirmed that the regional government and local authorities affected by the dam construction were not involved in the project’s planning and major decision making processes. The local government officials reported that everything was managed by the central government including its financing aspects-in terms of both funding and benefits. They were rather limited to play facilitative roles in the project implementation, particularly in the areas of ensuring security and compensation processes.23 The interviewed regional authorities, regarding their roles in the Gibe III project planning and implementation, stated:

  • 24 Interview with advisors of chief SNNP regional sate administrator, December 2016

The project was pre-studied by the national government, our involvement was limited to merely ensuring the security aspect and compensation processes.24

  • 25 The Ethiopian Herald, 29 October 2010
  • 26 Interview with EEP officials, August 2016

17This context is further illustrated from the responses of a former Dawuro Zone administrator to a journalist’s question about his role in the project: “it would have been proper if our roles had been told by the project, but we are doing all necessary things to support it.”25 Clearly the local government, despite the ethno-federal state structures in place tended to function as an extended administrative arm of the nation state, but not a geographical scale with a devolved authority. Consequently, as these officials confirmed, neither the process, nor the criterion by which the project was planned and prioritized (by implication-its local impacts) were understood at the sub-national levels. In a similar vein, all interviewed villagers recalled their first encounter with the project by associating it with arrivals of some foreign people along with national experts-conducting a survey and followed by machines-bulldozing on their land and in their neighborhoods-being escorted by security forces. The Salini Costruttori S.p.A-the “strategic partner”, as some EEP’s respondents put it,26 had the free hand to design the dam in the basin without a need for informed consent from the local people. For instance, a farmer from the right bank in Addisu Bodire village, Loma Wereda avowed:

  • 27 Interview with PAPs, November 2016

I did not have any idea of the project before the commencement of its construction, but as I used to go to my plot every day, I saw them [Salini Costruttori S.p.A.] constructing the site camps on our land.27

  • 28 Ibid
  • 29 A proclamation to provide for the expropriation of land holdings for public purpose and payment of (...)

18In a situation where the local people had to be uprooted, enough time was not allowed for them to be prepared for relocation. For instance around fifty four households in the Zaro village, Kindo-didaye Wereda, as the project displaced them without resettlement, had to encounter security forces escorted machines-bulldozing their housing, crops and their family graves before they were compensated and cleared from the area. The painful lived experiences of chaos and turmoil during the implementation of the project were repeatedly recalled by the PAPs -particularly at the EEP permanent camp.28 Furthermore the project also personified the power of the state through the material practices of administering the compensation sums. Regarding the process of estimating the compensation prices for lost private assets to public purpose, the EPP was responsible as per the national law.29 Accordingly the EEP hired a consultant to carry out the inventory of properties and assets owned by the PAPs. The Midday International Consulting Engineers –a national consultant did the enumerations of assets and their valuations following the central government standards for the people affected by the major project components such as the Sodo-Chida road realignment, dam and reservoir and EEP permanent Camp (MDI, 2009). The consultations with the PAPs took place after two years of commencement of the project as part of the social and environmental impact assessments-primarily aimed at estimating the compensation costs. Accordingly, the consulting team portrayed the project as “irreversible” through claims that it was already under implementation and its development was non-negotiable since it was coming from the central government for “a national interest”. For example, the interviewed community members on the EEP’s permanent camp site reported:

  • 30 Interview with PAP, October 2016

We were invited to attend the consultation but we went to listen to them and they told us that the project implementation would be inevitable as it was hagerawi lemat [national development] and hence, the discussions focused on compensation issues for what was to come.30

19Thus, the consultations were aimed at information sharing and asset enumeration than meaningful debates that could lead to any change in the project implementation process. Our respondent also reflected on the imposed nature of these procedures:

  • 31 Ibid

The people, who came to inventor properties, counted the number of the items we had and on another occasion they came back to tell us the total amount of money we deserved at the kebele level meeting. We have no idea about how the unit value was calculated, and what was included or excluded from the compensations.31

  • 32 Interview with the EEP experts, local committee members, October 2016
  • 33 Interviews with PAPs, October-December 2016

20The compensations for all lost private properties- including land were limited to only cash payments. The interviewed local government officials, citing lack of a vacant land as a justification, confirmed that those displaced people were neither given a replacement land nor resettled. Five years average annual income produced from a given land was multiplied by ten years to calculate the compensation sums.32 The interviewees unanimously underscored the unfairness of the land compensation and claimed that when they compared the losses of their invaluable assets against the ten year equivalent cash payments of an estimated annual yield per hectare, the compensation was too little.33

  • 34 The members of committee included representatives from development sector offices of the respective (...)
  • 35 Ibid

21For the Gibe III to Sodo 400 Kilovolt power transmission line project, the project site based Environmental monitoring unit (EMU) [a department within the Gibe III project coordination site office] conducted the ESIA and the report was revealed three years after the beginning of the dam’s construction (EMU, 2009). In a similar vein, consultation for this component too, involved meetings to share information about the project mainly focusing on compensation issues. Despite the establishment of local compensation and resettlement committees34 for the transmission line project at Wereda level, their roles were limited to participation in the property inventory and enumeration processes. Evidently, the committee did not have much voice in making major decisions of the compensation measures, including determination of who is eligible and estimation of the unit value of the properties. The exceptional EMU’s involvement in the process circumvented the standard norms for conducting ESIAs by an independent institution and thus possibly the practice suffered from a conflict of interests. For instance a Wereda committee member complained about the EMU’s interference and cost reduction oriented mentality in the process of enumerating and estimating the compensation payments.35 He illustrated the EPP’s interference in the local power using a case of a farmer who continued to live under the dangerous high voltage power transmission lines due to unsettled compensation payment, despite the Wereda grievance redress committee’s approval of compensation demand (cf. figure 4). Therefore, the assertion of the EEP’s experts to be neutral technicians with no institutional stakes in the consequences can hardly be accepted at face values.

Figure 4: A transmission line project affected person who continued to live due to unsettled compensation

Figure 4: A transmission line project affected person who continued to live due to unsettled compensation

Source: fieldwork, November 2016

  • 36 Interview PAP, November 2016
  • 37 Interview with local officials, November 2016
  • 38 Interview with PAP, November 2017
  • 39 Interview with project site expert, November 2016

22This heavily centralized and increasingly authoritarian decision making practice was also reflected in unaddressed problems of some farmers excluded from the ESIAs. These farmers were neither consulted nor were their assets enumerated as the consultant considered them out of reach of the reservoir.36 However, with the inundating of the river, their farm and grazing lands, trees as well as perennial crops were flooded for the reservoir both in Loma and Kondo-didaye Weredas. Consequently, they lost their assets without any compensation.37 Another typical bypassed household example had rented a farmland from his kebele administration but had received no direct communication from project officials, although his land was flooded for the reservoir.38 Despite the consultant’s projection of possible impacts from the reservoir, it was assumed that its extent was knowable and thus it would not warrant serious inquiry by then. However the top down risk assessment practices ended-up with a partial knowledge about the project impacts. The project site expert acknowledged the problem and noted that as these farmers were not included in the consultant’s impact assessment report, they would not be eligible.39 Hence, the technical report produced by a democratically unaccountable agency is referred not only as knowledge about the project’s possible impacts, but it also works as binding rules that determine the PAPs’ rights to the compensation. Thus, the EEP, as a central government agency, is a powerful actor that drives the project implementation-bringing to bear often unchecked power over the local authority and community with extensive impunity under the banner of the “national development” project.

Making sense of the “State effects” in the Omo Valley

  • 40 Interview with EEP expert, November 2017
  • 41 Ibid
  • 42 Interview with local government expert, October 2016
  • 43 Interview with Project site official, November 2017
  • 44 Interview with PAP, November 2017
  • 45 Ibid

23The central government through the Gibe III project seemingly reconfigured the control over water resource management and related land uses in the project areas, among others. This is exemplified by enclosure of the waste land, as the EEP and MoWIE officials would like to call it, due to flooding of the lowland [areas below 893 masl]40 for the reservoir. The EEP has also demarcated the area surrounding the reservoir [areas below1100 masl]41 as a protected project site from the dam’s security management perspectives. Since then it has belonged to the central government, being codified in a site plan map as a property of the EEP, and the communities would be prohibited from entering the area that had supported their livelihoods for centuries.42 In addition the EEP also identified eleven districts and six Zones (provinces) as project areas and proposed buffer zone for an environmental rehabilitation program for the Gibe III reservoir through a watershed management (MDI, 2009).43Therefore, in the interest of protecting the siltation of the reservoir, the socio-environmental governance of the project areas is now to be dictated by the central government. By controlling the way of the natural resource [both land and water] used in the locality, the central government gained power, whilst undercutting the autonomy of lower levels of government. Thus the project nullifies the constitution, which mandates the regional states to administer the land and related natural resources in accordance with central federal laws. For instance a farmer in Gocho village, Kindo-didaye Wereda, who lost his farmland that he had contracted from his Kebele administration due to flooding for the reservoir, stated that he was never contacted by any project officials.44 However, when he complained to the Kebele administration, the latter responded to him that it could do nothing as the dam was the central government’s project. He described the sudden disconnection of the local power: “Suddenly, there is no kebele there!”45- pointing his finger towards the project site. He tellingly asserted that his kebele administration did not exist anymore in the project site as it was transferred to the central government through the project. Thus, the strengthening of the central government’s power in the locality through this intervention was accompanied by disconnection of the local government’s power over its people and resources without a need for changing the constitution.

  • 46 Interview with project site officials, December 2016
  • 47 Interview with EEP officials, November 2016
  • 48 Discussions with PAPs, October-December 2016

24On the other hand the interviewees at the project site office revealed that there was no direct benefit sharing mechanism for the locality from which they could generate revenues, nor was there any specific plan for the delivery of electricity after the dam.46 They noted that they had no idea about the local electrification issue as that was the mandate of another department-the Universal electricity access program (UEAP). Rather, they recommended that the residents of the rural town might request the EEP through their local government to be considered at least in this program.47 The implication is that there is no specific electrification plan for the communities due to the location of the dam. Nonetheless the discussions with residents in nearby villages showed that the continued blackout, while the EEP employees enjoying exclusive power connected residential homes, schools and offices constructed on the community members’ former residential and farmland next to their doors, has generated questions about which citizens benefit from the State’s hydropower development.48

Contesting the project

  • 49 Proclamation No.621/2009), 15th Year No.25, 13th February, 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
  • 50 These organizations included Friends of Lake Turkana, Human Rights Watch; Survival International an (...)
  • 51 Interview, with international consultant, November 2016.

25In the domestic arena, particularly following the 2005 contested elections, activities of civil society were severely restricted through various mechanisms (Carr, 2017). One of the mechanisms was the decree of "Charities and Societies”49 proclamation to provide for the registration and regulation of charities and societies that constrained their access to foreign funds and their spaces of participations. Consequently, despite the prevailing grievances, the authoritarian power was able to prevent any organized domestic movements against the project from emerging-at least overtly in the public space. Consequently, the most outspoken oppositions to the dam based on its adverse local socio-environmental impacts have been projected from few “environmentalist” and “rightist” non-governmental organizations outside of Ethiopia.50 They were claimed to stop funding from International Financial Institutions through their campaign and to contribute for the project delay (Carr, 2017). However, some scholars characterized these NGOs as conservationists in their approach, which focused on universally rejecting the projects or on a narrow campaign of stopping the dam’s construction (Abbink, 2012). In this context of the unhelpful antagonistic situation, after four years of the project’s stalemate, the government opted for alternative sources of fund such as China to construct the dam.51

  • 52 The community is approached here as homogenous only to facilitate the smooth flow of the analysis, (...)
  • 53 Interview with PAPs, October 2017

26In spite of this prevailing authoritarian space that did not tolerate any alternative views to the dominant narratives imposed from the centre, as observed in other cases(Scott, 1985), the subordinate groups do not passively comply with their domination, even in a situation where they believed open resistance is dangerous. Accordingly, closer and nuanced observation revealed that the affected communities52 designed various subtle strategies to contest the domination through their agency to respond to the imposed development vision and practices. The community’s reactions, ranged from complaining to the authorities, signing petitions, criticizing (offstage) of the project-challenging the legitimacy of the official development discourses to filing lawsuits against the project developer. For instance, the project affected persons in Addisu Bodire village, Loma Wereda were able to stop its work for days as they fought an invasive bulldozer on their grazing and farm lands escorted by the security forces. The local government intervened and negotiated with farmers on the ground that it was “illegal” to stop the national development project and assured them as they would be compensated, although the promise remained unfulfilled. All of the affected 30 households with ownership documents came together to file a lawsuit against the EEP, which had gone up to the highest federal supreme court level following repeated repeal by the project developer. However, finally the victims lost the legal battles after ten years. One of these PAPs [68 years old farmer] discredited the verdict: “We know the truth… the land belongs to us, and the pressure is from somewhere”53, casting his doubt on the independence of the judicial system.

  • 54 Ibid
  • 55 Interview with local officials, November 2016

27In addition, the communities’ contestation also included manipulation of the national state project to their own advantage often in collaboration with local state agents without directly confronting the dominant power. The mobilization of villagers in both Weredas of Wolayita Zone to change the location of the realignment road construction project was a case in point. In this regard, initially the realigned road was planned to pass along the riverside with an intention of reducing compensation costs. Accordingly, the villagers of both Weredas in Wolaita Zone forcefully stopped the project developer from operating in the area and signed a petition demanding the government to realign the road so that they could benefit from the development that a road close to the villages would lead to. In this vein our respondent stated: “we wanted to live as human beings, we wanted to be connected to other areas”54, while explaining the value of the road in their daily lives and hence, the reason for the mobilization. The petition was sent to the federal parliament and following its endorsement, the newly proposed road was redesigned back to pass through the community’s neighborhood. This decision was at the expense of the EEP’s greater compensation costs for the increased number of households with affected private assets in contradiction to the rejected one that was planned to pass mostly through the communally owed “wasteland” that would not have been compensated.55 As they changed the location of the realigned road, the villagers managed to reduce the state to a manipulable bureaucratic provider of infrastructures. This community’s encounter can be read as part of the contestations. Even though it does not imply a direct confrontation with the state power, it provided a safe mode of subverting the profit oriented logic of the dominant power, which paved a channel of appropriation thereby mitigating the effects of the domination.

Conclusions

  • 56 Ibid

28The case of the making of the Gibe III project demonstrates the materialization of the EPRDF’s “developmental state” from above geared towards the expansion of production by handing power to all knowing national technocrats and international private actors-upholding centralized decision making practices within a federal republic, although crucially here through the lens of hydro-energy. To this end it also draws attention to how, by referring to apolitical considerations-stressing the urgency and the necessity to promote the national interest of energy production, the central government [the EEP] pursued an “exceptional” power to advance its top-down practices in making the project. In this respect, the project was rendered “technical” (Li, 2007)-within apolitical56 universe of “national interest” that partially legitimized “exceptional” measures outside the accepted realm of political governance structures and thus arguably the regime’s uninterrupted grip on power. This modality has restricted any national debates and increased the central government’s technical power for unconstrained resource control and extraction without changing the constitution. In this arrangement, the government’s depoliticization of its intervention by means of extra-conventional public-private partnership is also visible in which the Salini Costruttori S.p.A as “anti-politics machine” (Ferguson, 1994) contributed significantly not only in terms of producing the electric power but also techno-scientific knowledge (political power) and hence, embedding the state domination practices. The government also opted for increasingly a nationalist stance and laminated any foreign nongovernmental organizations’ criticisms of the dam on socio-environmental grounds as a neoliberal agenda against its developmentalist strategy- as part of its efforts to delegitimize any alternative views on the project impacts.

29Likewise the government seemed to supplement the narratives of the urgency of energy production with a simplified representation of local realities to justify its project imposition and seemingly, to marginalize any concerns about the project’s adverse consequences. In this light, the EPRDF’s “developmental state” which takes a material form in this dam project reproduces the historical center-local/state-society relations characterized by domination and subordination (Markakis, 2011). The mismatch between the “hidden transcript” and “public transcript” (Scott, 1990) becomes visible during the field research as the resentment against the project, frustration and sense of coercive dispossession surfaced in contradiction to the official local developmental rhetoric professed by the central government. Throughout the discussions regarding the project, the respondents positioned the state as external and also as “unknowing” with respect to the local realities and to their pressing needs that seriously threatened their values, identity and livelihoods. In this regard, despite the closed political space, more nuanced observations revealed that the local communities have designed various subtle strategies to contest the imposed development vision and practices without directly confronting the state power. The regime’s increasingly authoritarian [exceptional] power restricted the emergence of PAPs’ actions, confined resistance to conventional, but futile forms of ad hock and unorganized contestation which left them with little room for maneuver. In sum the analysis of the Gibe III project-making practices demonstrates a complex and contradictory effects of the EPRDF’s “developmental state” at work. On the one hand the central government certainly increased its capacity of resource control and extraction at the periphery of the country by reordering the society and natural [water and land] resource uses through the project intervention. On the other hand increasingly an authoritarian form it took in the material practices of land acquisitions and electricity appropriation, and the lack of recognition of the affected peoples’ claims arguably jeopardized its political legitimacy. Thus the case study highlights as to how the ruling party materializes the authoritarian “developmental state” in the Omo valley or strengthens its grip on power in this periphery, and as to how this grip on power is not without limits too.

The author is highly indebted to Dr. Sabine Planel (Institute for Development Research, Paris) for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would like to also thank anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. Finally, funding for the fieldwork by the French Center for Ethiopian Studies and Paris-Nanterre University are also gratefully acknowledged.

Haut de page

Bibliographie

AGAMBEN, G., 2005, State of exception, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

ABBINK, J., 2012, « Dam controversies: contested governance and developmental discourse on the Ethiopian Omo River dam », Social Anthropology, Vol. 20, n°2, p. 125-144.

ASNAKE, K., & FANA, G., 2014, « Expansion of the sugar industry in the southern pastoral lowlands » in Desalegn R., et al., (eds) Reflections on development in Ethiopia: new trends, sustainability and challenges, p. 247-286.

CARR, C.J. 2017, River basin development and human rights in Eastern Africa - a policy crossroads, Cham, Springer International Publishing AG.

CUESTA-FERNÁNDEZ, I., 2016, « Mammoth dams, lean neighbors: Assessing the bid to turn Ethiopia into East Africa’s powerhouse1 », A New Scramble for Africa?: the rush for energy resources in Sub-Saharan Africa, p.93-110.

EMU (Environmental Monitoring Unit), 2009,« Gibe III-Sodo400 KV power transmission lines project”, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

FANA, G., 2015, « Securitization of development in Ethiopia: the discourse and politics of developmentalism », Review of African Political Economy, vol. 4, n° 1, p. 64-74.

FANTINI, E., 2017, « Dams and democracy », FLOWS, [online] online since 22 February 2017, URL: https://flows.hypotheses.org/235, accessed on 24 April2017.

FANTINI, E. & Puddu, L., 2016, « Ethiopia and international aid: between high modernism and exceptional measures », in Hagmann, T. & Reyntjens, F., (eds.), Aid and authoritarianism in Africa: development without democracy, London, Zed Books, p.91-118.

FERGUSON, J., 1994, Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

HAGMANN, T. & ABBINK, J., 2011, »Twenty years of revolutionary democratic Ethiopia, 1991 to 2011 », Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol.5, n°4, p.579-595.

HARRIS, L. M., 2017, « Political ecologies of the state: recent interventions and questions going forward », Political Geography, p.90-92.

JOHNSON, C. A., 1982, MITI and the Japanese miracle, Stanford, CT, Stanford University Press.

LI, M. T., 2007, The will to improve: governmentality, development and the practice of politics, London, Duke university press.

MARKAKIS, J., 2011, Ethiopia: the last two frontiers, Oxford, James Currey.

MDI (Mid Day International Consulting Engineers), 2009, « Gibe III hydroelectric project resettlement action plan: Dam and reservoir areas», Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

MIGDAL, J. S., 2001, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One another, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MOON, C. I. and PRASAD, R., 1994, « Beyond the developmental state: networks, politics, and institutions », Governance, vol.7, n°4, p.360-386.

MOSLEY, J. & WATSON, E. E., 2016, « Frontier transformations: development visions, spaces and processes in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia », Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol.10, 3, p.452-475.

NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, 2015, “Growth and transformation plan II” (2015/16-2019/20), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

PLANEL, S., 2014, « A view of a bureaucratic developmental state: local governance and agricultural extension in rural Ethiopia », Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol.8, n°3, p.420-437.

SCOTT, J.C., 1998, Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Scott, J. C., 1990, Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts, New Haven: Yale University press.

SCOTT, J. C., 1985, Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance, New Haven: Yale University Press.

VERHOEVEN, H., 2013, « The politics of African energy development: Ethiopia’s hydro-agricultural state-building strategy and clashing paradigms of water security », Royal society publishing, n°2002, p.1-16.

YIN, R. K., 2003, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, London, Sage Publications.

Haut de page

Notes

1 The paper neither intends to delve into theory of developmental state nor judge whether Ethiopian state is developmental or not, rather it uses the notion of the EPRDF’s self declared “developmental state” as a point of departure to examine how the “developmental state” takes material form through practices of the Gibe III dam construction.

2 This paper departs from an essentialist view of the authoritarianism as a label to categorize regimes and rather focuses on nuanced analysis of materiality and concrete practices of state authoritarianism in making the Gibe III dam project.

3 This paper approached “simplificationsfollowing James Scott’s (1998) conception of simplifications applied by the state to complexity and diversity of a reality so as to abstract it to a situation amenable to the State.

4 The concept of state of exception was used in this study following Fantini & Puddu (2016) who used it in their analyses of exceptional practices persistently adopted by the Ethiopian regimes, international donors and companies to implement development aid programmes in the country.

5 The Gibe III is the third of five dams planned along the Gibe-Omo River.

6 The project incurred an estimated cost of over 1.5 billion Euros, of which 40 % self financed and the 60% was secured on-loan from China (Carr, 2017).

7 Data obtained from MoWIE, December 2016

8 Interviews with the EEP and project site officials, December 2016

9 Ibid

10 Interview with official in EEP, September 2016.

11 Interview with official in MoWIE, August 2016.

12 Ibid

13 Interview with officials from MoWIE and regional government agency, December 2016.

14 Interviews with EEP and MoWIE experts and officials, August-September 2016

15 Ibid

16 Interviews with PAPs, October-December 2016

17 The Ethiopian Herald, 14 January 2017

18 The Ethiopian Herald, 11 January 2017

19 Interview with official in MoWIE, August 2016

20 Interview with the EEP expert , September 2017

21 Interview with an official in MoWIE, December 2017

22 Interview with the EEP expert, September 2016

23 Interview with local officials, October 2016.

24 Interview with advisors of chief SNNP regional sate administrator, December 2016

25 The Ethiopian Herald, 29 October 2010

26 Interview with EEP officials, August 2016

27 Interview with PAPs, November 2016

28 Ibid

29 A proclamation to provide for the expropriation of land holdings for public purpose and payment of compensation, Negarit Gazeta, No.455/2005, 11th year no. 43, Addis Ababa 15th of July 2005.

30 Interview with PAP, October 2016

31 Ibid

32 Interview with the EEP experts, local committee members, October 2016

33 Interviews with PAPs, October-December 2016

34 The members of committee included representatives from development sector offices of the respective Weredas and a representative of the EEP (Discussions with local government officials, October 2016).

35 Ibid

36 Interview PAP, November 2016

37 Interview with local officials, November 2016

38 Interview with PAP, November 2017

39 Interview with project site expert, November 2016

40 Interview with EEP expert, November 2017

41 Ibid

42 Interview with local government expert, October 2016

43 Interview with Project site official, November 2017

44 Interview with PAP, November 2017

45 Ibid

46 Interview with project site officials, December 2016

47 Interview with EEP officials, November 2016

48 Discussions with PAPs, October-December 2016

49 Proclamation No.621/2009), 15th Year No.25, 13th February, 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

50 These organizations included Friends of Lake Turkana, Human Rights Watch; Survival International and International Rivers, among others.

51 Interview, with international consultant, November 2016.

52 The community is approached here as homogenous only to facilitate the smooth flow of the analysis, otherwise, its heterogeneity in terms of capacity to react and adapt the project are acknowledged.

53 Interview with PAPs, October 2017

54 Ibid

55 Interview with local officials, November 2016

56 Ibid

Haut de page

Table des illustrations

Titre Figure 1: Location of the Gibe III dam and study areas
Crédits Source: Author, 2016
URL http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/docannexe/image/4985/img-1.png
Fichier image/png, 1,3M
Titre Figure 2: The Gibe III Hydroelectric project at the dam site
Crédits Source: fieldwork, October 2016).
URL http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/docannexe/image/4985/img-2.png
Fichier image/png, 3,4M
Titre figure 3: The late Prime Minister Meles’s photograph-back grounded by a dam model, posted in the Gibe III project site office
Crédits Source: fieldwork, November 2016
URL http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/docannexe/image/4985/img-3.png
Fichier image/png, 2,1M
Titre Figure 4: A transmission line project affected person who continued to live due to unsettled compensation
Crédits Source: fieldwork, November 2016
URL http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/docannexe/image/4985/img-4.png
Fichier image/png, 3,7M
Haut de page

Pour citer cet article

Référence électronique

Edegilign Hailu Woldegebrael, « The Materialization of “Developmental State” in Ethiopia: Insights from the Gibe III Hydroelectric Development Project Regime, Omo Valley  », L’Espace Politique [En ligne], 35 | 2018-2, mis en ligne le 29 octobre 2018, consulté le 13 novembre 2018. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/espacepolitique/4985 ; DOI : 10.4000/espacepolitique.4985

Haut de page

Auteur

Edegilign Hailu Woldegebrael

Ph.D. candidate
Paris-Nanterre Université
yetemgetu@yahoo.com

Haut de page

Droits d’auteur

Licence Creative Commons
Les contenus de L’Espace politique sont mis à disposition selon les termes de la Licence Creative Commons Attribution - Pas d’Utilisation Commerciale - Pas de Modification 3.0 France.

Haut de page
  • Logo Compte twitter de la revue
  • Logo Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne
  • Logo DOAJ - Directory of Open Access Journals
  • OpenEdition Journals