- 1 For one of the first and most influential approaches see Eze 1997.
- 2 Prior to this, there were few isolated discussions of the topic in Germany, cf. Sutter 1989; Brandt (...)
- 3 This is also stated by Mensch 2017: 128.
1Immanuel Kant was one of the first philosophers to develop a theory of racial difference. Within his work, unmistakable statements can be found regarding the alleged deficiency in the ability of reasoning, self-reliance, and aesthetic sensibility of non-white people. Already among contemporaries, Kant’s race theory was discussed and criticized. International Kant scholarship long ignored these aspects of his work and only began addressing them in a systematic way about three decades ago.1 In the German-speaking world, this debate arrived belatedly in the wake of the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020.2 While today it is widely acknowledged that race and racism are relevant topics in the field of Kant studies, there is widespread disagreement about the place of race in Kant’s work and its implications for his philosophy.3
- 4 See, for an example, Willaschek 2020.
- 5 See Kleingeld 2007 and 2012. With a critique on Kleingeld: Bernasconi 2011.
- 6 She acknowledges that herself in Kleingeld 2012: 116.
2Especially in the German-speaking world, the discussion has been dominated by a personalizing view that frames the inquiry into the role of race and racism in Kant as a question of whether Kant was racist or not. Regardless of the answer, this question is based on the assumption that Kant’s view on race and racialized people does not belong to his philosophical work but is attributable to him as a (fallible and historically situated) individual. Irrespective of the evaluation of his statements, his philosophical work remains unaffected.4 Also Pauline Kleingeld’s much-discussed approach entails a similar problem. She traces a shift in Kant’s stance on slavery and colonialism: While he had been full of racist prejudices until the mid-1790s and had defended both colonialism and slavery, he revoked these positions towards the end of his life. In “Toward Perpetual Peace” (1795) he clearly and strongly rejected colonialism, while refraining from expressing the idea of a hierarchy of races.5 However, insofar as Kleingeld’s approach cannot explain the reasons that might have caused this change of mind in Kant,6 and insofar as her thesis leaves his whole critical work untouched (as all of it precedes his supposed change), Kleingeld’s analysis too – despite being nuanced and insightful –, ultimately perpetuates the notion that Kant’s racism is essentially irrelevant to his philosophy.
- 7 We share this approach with Lu-Adler 2023.
- 8 For a different angle in approaching Kant on race as “impurity” see Basevich 2020.
- 9 Louden 2000: 3-30; 93-106. For a similar position, see Wood 1999.
3We, therefore, want to move away from the personalizing view7 as it implies a presupposed division between what is considered “philosophy” (seen as universally and ahistorically valid) and what can be safely kept out of philosophy (deemed merely historical or personal). We believe that such a personalizing approach narrows the view because it fails to adequately address the question of what Kant’s theory of race means for his philosophy and for us as philosophers. However, a non-personalizing examination of Kant’s racial theory makes it necessary to dispense with the method of either debunking or absolving Kant by juxtaposing and weighing incriminating and exculpatory passages. Instead, we suggest starting with a close reading of Kant’s race theory, aiming to elaborate on its underlying conceptual presuppositions and contextualize them within the framework of his critical thought. This suggestion draws inspiration from approaches that consider Kant’s reflections on the empirical world as an essential part of his philosophical work, thereby understanding his philosophy as “impure.” Robert B. Louden, most famously, introduced the concept of “impure ethics” to describe this position.8 Louden understands Kant’s ethics as impure insofar as it is characterized by the often-ignored concern of how to apply the pure, ahistorical, and universal moral principles to the empirical world. In this context, Louden discusses Kant’s race thinking as an application error: Kant’s racist prejudices led him to apply his universalist moral philosophy to the empirical in a wrong (namely particularizing) way.9 However, even within this argument, the problem of the personalizing view resurfaces: By treating race as a mere misapplication of his a priori principles, the philosophical-conceptual level remains untouched again.
- 10 For a similar focus on teleological judgments and the aim of bridging nature and freedom see, among (...)
- 11 With this, we extend our analysis in Martínez Mateo, Stubenrauch 2022.
4We will also discuss Kant’s philosophy as impure but with a different emphasis. Its impurity stems not only from the necessity of applying the principles of moral philosophy to the empirical world but primarily from Kant’s assumption that the capacity for morality and reason itself has natural and social conditions that need to develop historically. This is why we consider teleological judgment to be of great importance: As described in the Third Critique, teleological judgment is what allows philosophy to determine these natural and historical conditions. We will demonstrate that Kant’s arguments about race become truly intelligible only within this context. They are part of Kant’s speculations regarding the path from nature to freedom and the question of who is better or worse suited to follow it.10 As we will show below, Kant’s racialism must therefore be understood in close proximity to his theory of teleological judgment; a proximity that not only sheds light on the theory of race, but also, conversely, renders Kant’s theory of teleological judgment questionable.11 Finally, we will advocate for an impure reading of Kant ourselves. For we agree with Kant (against the often prevalent “pure reading”) that freedom (as well as its negation) has material and social conditions. However, in order for teleological judgment to cease being, as in Kant’s case, a vehicle of racism and a justification of a world marked by colonial overexploitation, and instead become a potential source of its critique, it must be understood differently. We will outline this proposal in the concluding section of our paper.
- 12 This term refers to the three following essays: Of the Different Races of Human Beings (1775/77, tr (...)
- 13 For the discursive context of Kant’s race theory, see Lu-Adler 2023: ch. 4.
- 14 For an insightful and precise analysis of this development, see Larrimore 2008.
5In his so-called “Rasseschriften,”12 written over a period of 13 years, Kant elaborates his concept of race, situates it within contemporary discussions,13 and defends it against criticism. Within these writings, Kant introduces the concept of race to address questions regarding the notion of a species in general and the human species in particular. In the following, we will, first, introduce the essays on race and outline the main conceptual and methodological assumptions underlying them. Secondly, we will demonstrate that (across all differences and developments within them)14 these writings share a common philosophical intention, which becomes evident when they are related to Kant’s Critical Work, specifically the Critique of the Power of Judgment. For in his essays on race, Kant is not only concerned with the notion of species but also with the question of how systematic knowledge of nature is possible at all, given its empirical manifoldness. The reference to the Critique of the Power of Judgment also shows that exploring Kant’s theory of teleological judgment is necessary to understand these essays in depth. This procedure – as we will reveal in the third step – allows for a more detailed analysis of the relationship between race theory and racial hierarchism in Kant.
6Kant begins his first essay on race, “Of the different races of human beings,” by delineating two concepts of species – “natural species” and “school species” – as two distinct perspectives on nature and methodologies for its comprehension. According to Kant, those who hold on to a notion of “school species” (primarily targeting Linné and his adherents) classify statically according to similarities and differences at the level of appearances – that is: based on mere “description[s] of nature” (Kant 1775/77, tr. 2007: 89). Consequently, in Kant’s view, the classifications they offer are inherently superficial and ultimately arbitrary. While they may structure nature “for memory” by bringing it “under titles” (Kant 1775/77, tr. 2007: 84), they fail to contribute meaningfully to a systematic understanding of nature. Their contingent classifications may look like systematizations; however, they do not grasp the real connections and relationships underlying the diverse phenomena of nature.
7Kant contrasts this, in his view, misleading approach with the methodology underpinning the concept of a “natural species” that he advocates. This methodology doesn’t simply classify phenomena based on similarities. Instead, it seeks a reason-based regulative principle, as Kant states in his final essay on race (Kant 1788, tr. 2007: 196), that may guide the observation of nature. Only through such guidance by reason is it possible to organize experience systematically: After all, as Kant asserts, “only methodically conducted experience can be called observing” (Kant 1788, tr. 2007: 197). Through the application of a regulative principle, it becomes possible to “construct” units that – in contrast to the units of the school species which are derived directly from experience – are capable of generating a true understanding of nature.
8What is this regulative principle capable of establishing systematic unities in nature? In his first essay on race, Kant adopts such a principle from Buffon, when he states that a natural species is what is constituted by the “unity of the generative power” (Kant 1775/77, tr. 2007: 84), which refers to the capacity for reproduction. This principle redefines the concept of “species” as a temporal rather than an extensive notion: When the classification of organic beings is based on reproduction, the focus shifts from existing individuals to a temporal progression. Unlike those who seek to comprehend nature through mere description, the argument here is that these descriptions of nature must be systematized within a natural-historical perspective. With this argument, Kant interprets “natural history” quite literally – diverging from the common understanding of his time – as the historicization of nature; focusing on its course, namely the development of nature (Kant 1775/77, tr. 2007: 89).
9Kant’s argument about the difference between “school species” and “natural species” initially centers on the methodological inquiry into how systematic knowledge about nature is attainable. However, Kant swiftly transitions to the question of how to determine the human species. Applying the proposed regulative principle and advocating for monogenism, Kant posits that all human beings across the globe constitute a single species because, despite their apparent differences, they can all reproduce with one another and are thereby unified by a shared “generative power.”
10It is through this frame that race is introduced as the determining category of difference within the unity of the human species. Race is based on the same generative power that unifies the species, insofar as race can refer only to differences that are inherited, that is, differences that are based on reproduction. To be more precise: Those differences that are necessarily inherited and persist through generations are called “races,” thus inter-racial reproduction will necessarily lead to mixed races as none of the corresponding characteristics will disappear fully. Against those suggesting that observed population differences justify assuming multiple human species, Kant insists that despite the potential magnitude of human differences, their mere heritability affirms the species as a reproductive unit. His natural-historical methodology leads him to find a genealogical explanation for the emergence of racial differences within a shared ancestry: Kant invokes the (hypothetical) figure of a former “phyletic species [Stammgattung]” (Kant 1775/77, tr. 2007: 95) that used to contain all the predispositions (Kant says “seeds” [Keime]) for adapting to the most different climatic conditions. Humans were “destined for all climates and for every soil” (Kant 1775/77, tr. 2007: 90). As humans spread all over the globe, he claims, the adaptive seeds corresponding to the respective climatic conditions were actualized over time (ibidem). Initially, the development of these seeds was triggered by environmental influences, but it took multiple generations to reach completion. Thus, the developing seeds had to be inherited. What Kant calls “race” are the regionally different characteristics in humans that once emerged as an adaptation to different climatic conditions. However, today, the actualization of these seeds is completed, and the physical differences this process has created continue to be inherited – whether or not they still correspond to the natural environment. The actualization of the seeds is therefore irreversible for Kant: once races have developed, no other seeds can be actualized (Kant 1785, tr. 2007: 158-159).
- 15 We adopt this assumption from Sandford 2018. However, in contrast to Sandford, we claim that Kant’s (...)
11If we relate Kant’s “Rasseschriften” to the Critique of the Power of Judgment we see that his essays on race not only aim to develop valid concepts of species and race but also – and through that – to address a central philosophical problem. For it becomes visible that the discussion about methodologies of species formation refers to the philosophical question of how knowledge of nature is possible at all.15 By delving into the Critique of the Power of Judgment we can thus enrich our understanding of the “Rasseschriften.”
12In the introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant looks back on the Critique of Pure Reason published nine years earlier, and identifies a previously unresolved problem. As Kant recalls, in the Critique of Pure Reason he had introduced “concepts of nature” [Naturbegriffe] that allow for determining nature in general terms. However, this alone is insufficient for understanding the whole manifoldness of nature since “concepts of nature […] pertain only to the possibility of a nature (as object of the senses) in general” (Kant 1790, tr. 2007: 67). To grasp the manifoldness of nature it is also necessary to establish particular empirical laws. These laws, however, “as empirical, may seem to be contingent in accordance with the insight of our understanding” (ibidem). Hence, the problem is as follows: The particular empirical laws that enable us to understand the manifoldness of nature threaten to fall apart into a number of unsystematic contingent pieces of knowledge. For Kant, this endangers the unity of knowledge and therefore the whole project of knowledge itself.
13Just as in his essays on race, where Kant critiques the unsystematic efforts of naturalists to organize nature, here too, he concludes that mere descriptions of nature (and what can be derived from them) are inadequate for genuine knowledge. However, through the Critique of the Power of Judgment, we gain a clearer understanding of what Kant means when he asserts that the observation of nature must be methodical: Here, he argues that it is through the reflecting power of judgment that we can establish a regulative principle to construct plausible unities in nature (such as a “natural species”). The reflecting power of judgment, he continues, can only accomplish this by proceeding teleologically, that means, by assuming that nature functions as a purposive system and by making this assumption our guiding principle in searching for unity within the manifold empirical laws of nature. Therefore, Kant determines this hypothetical assumption of the “purposiveness of nature in its multiplicity” (Kant 1790, tr. 2000: 68) as the transcendental principle of judgment.
- 16 Mark Larrimore even states “that race might offer experimental confirmation of the critical philoso (...)
14By relating the essays on race to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, we find that Kant’s inquiry into the meaning of “species” and his insistence on the concept of “natural species” prove to be part of a larger epistemological program on understanding nature as a unity. “Generative power” and “race” turn out to be concepts that are formed through the application of teleological judgment and based on the principle of the purposiveness of nature.16 This principle also underpins the assertion that humans are “destined” to spread all over the world which builds the foundation for his theory of the development of races. Kant does not hide that the epistemological status of teleological judgments like these is ambiguous: Since their principle of the purposiveness of nature is regulative rather than constitutive, teleological judgments do not prescribe rules for nature. Instead, the principle merely gives rules for the reflection on nature. Thus, teleological judgments take on a hypothetical character. Nonetheless, according to Kant, without teleological judgments – despite their hypothetical character – there can be no theoretical knowledge as they condition the possibility to think of a “system of experience in accordance with particular laws of nature” (Kant 1790, tr. 2000: 67-68; emphasis ours).
15As has been shown, for Kant, race is a hypothetical concept that is made plausible through the assumption that the natural purpose of the human species is to spread across the globe. He claims that only by assuming such a purpose can we understand why humans in different places of the world differ from each other, without compromising the unity of the human species. Thereby race, as a result of teleological judgment, can contribute to uniting “the greatest degree of manifoldness in the generation” with “the greatest unity of phyletic origin” (Kant 1788, tr. 2007: 200). However, given this explanation of race, it remains unclear how exactly racial hierarchism becomes effective in Kant’s philosophy. How can a purposeful adaptation to climatic conditions lead to the unpurposeful developments of reason and affect Kant repeatedly ascribes to non-white people (as we will show in more detail below), especially considering that he presupposes nature to be a purposive whole?
16Kant is very clear in stating that the valid characteristics for racial classification are extremely limited: In his first essay on race he names “stature,” “hair growth” and “facial formation” (Kant 1775/77, tr. 2007: 91-95) – later on, he narrows it down to skin color (Kant 1785, tr. 2007: 148). Kant’s race theory does not in itself justify racial hierarchies. He explicitly distinguishes himself from Buffon’s theory of “degeneration,” which hierarchically positions all races in relation to the original “mould” (Lu-Adler 2023: 203-208): Buffon assumes that the white race is most similar to this original pure mould, from which all non-white races are regarded as deviations and thus as inferior. After initially adopting this model, from 1785 on Kant claimed that we have no knowledge of the original species and therefore cannot assume such a hierarchy among races (Kant 1785: A417). His theory is intended to be merely a theory of racial differences, not of racial hierarchies (Lu-Adler 2023: 211-214). This has led Kant scholars such as Pauline Kleingeld to postulate that his race theory can be separated from racial hierarchism and that only his explicit racist statements need to be problematized (Kleingeld 2007: 590). However, it is within the framework of the essays on race itself that one repeatedly finds such racist statements. Seemingly casually, he raises a ranking between black people and Native Americans: The latter “ranks still far below even the Negro, who stands on the lowest of all the other steps that we have named as differences of the races” (Kant 1788, tr. 2007: 211). This is why we believe that it is insufficient to hold on to the separation of race difference and hierarchism. Rather, it seems necessary to ask how exactly hierarchism is inscribed in Kant’s race theory. The hierarchizing statements suggest that Kant is concerned with more than merely the superficial physical differences he names in the “Rasseschriften.” Something like a deeper meaning seems to be associated with race. Therefore, we want to ask how this deeper meaning becomes part of his idea of race. To address this question, we suggest looking more closely at the structure of teleological judgment.
17As we have seen, in his essays on race Kant views nature from a teleological perspective, determining race as a result of an adaptation to different climatic conditions. In order to understand why these purposive natural differences called race can transform into hierarchizing categories, we need to further investigate the meaning he assigns to teleological judgment beyond its mere naturalist function. By doing so, we will discover that, when Kant defines race through teleological judgment, he implies a significance that extends beyond the mere understanding of nature, thereby laying the foundation for his racial hierarchism. What, then, is the broader significance of teleological judgments in Kant’s work?
- 17 While Sandford (2018) discusses the first of these two problems, the second one is left aside.
18In order to grasp this significance, we must once again turn our attention to Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. In the introduction, Kant outlines two problems that he subsequently seeks to solve through the analysis of the power of judgment and the deduction of its transcendental principle. The first problem we have already addressed: Kant sees the unity of theoretical knowledge threatened by the multiplicity and contingency of empirical laws. The second problem is even more far-reaching. It affects not only the possibility of theoretical knowledge but the entire transcendental philosophical project:17 While Kant has set out the transcendental conditions of theoretical knowledge or knowledge of nature in the Critique of Pure Reason and addressed the transcendental conditions of practical knowledge or moral freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason, the relationship between knowledge and freedom remains unclear. Through theoretical knowledge, one can know how the world is, through practical knowledge, one can know how it should be, but on the ground of the first two Critiques, it is still unclear whether and how the ought can become reality at all. This is why Kant speaks of an “incalculable gulf” (Kant 1790, tr. 2000: 63) between the concepts of nature guiding theoretical knowledge and the concept of freedom guiding practical knowledge which seems so fundamental as if “no transition is possible” (ibidem).
- 18 Kant assumes that nature as a purposeful whole can only be sustained by such a “final end” which li (...)
19When Kant, in the further course of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, thus deduces the purposiveness of nature as a transcendental principle of the power of judgment and sets out the structure of teleological judgment, he does so not only in order to solve the first problem concerning the unity of theoretical knowledge. Moreover, and this will be crucial for our further interpretation of the essays on race, Kant also claims to solve the second problem by the same means: he argues that teleological judgment provides an answer to the question of how to bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical freedom as well. Kant’s argument follows as such: By presupposing the purposiveness of nature as a transcendental principle, the power of teleological judgment presupposes not only that the world is arranged in a manner allowing for the unity of theoretical knowledge but also that the conditions for the actualization of moral freedom are inherent in nature. Judging teleologically does not only mean judging under the assumption that nature is purposefully arranged but also under the assumption that it is purposefully arranged in a way that moral freedom can be realized. This is what Kant is referring to when he calls the actualization of moral freedom the “final end” (Kant 1790, tr. 2000: 301) of nature.18 Accordingly, teleological judgment not only allows for securing the possibility of the unity of knowledge but also “the possibility of the final end, which can become actual only in nature and in accord with its laws” (Kant 1790, tr. 2000: 82).
20Thus, teleological judgment obtains a depth that is implied but not fully elaborated in the essays on race. The teleological power of judgment can not only assume the function of unifying the multiplicity of empirical laws (in the essays on race: natural history instead of descriptions of nature) and of identifying phenomena as serving the purpose of self-preservation (in the essays on race: adaptation to climatic conditions). It also allows for the investigation of natural phenomena to determine whether and to what extent they can be understood as conditions for the actualization of the final end, which is moral freedom. Kant exemplifies the latter in the Critique of the Power Judgment by outlining a theory that aims to demonstrate the possibility of freedom in a world determined by concepts of nature. At the heart of this theory lies the concept of “culture” which is ascribed to nature and at the same time understood as the “bridge” (Marwah 2012) between nature and freedom. In the following, we will delve into the concept of culture and its role in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, as we believe it to be crucial for comprehending why and how race becomes hierarchized in Kant’s theory, even though he introduces the concept of race only in the context of adaptation to climatic conditions.
- 19 The relation between civil society, culture, and the actualization of moral freedom is already deve (...)
21Culture exercises an important hinge function in Kant’s teleological theory. As a concept referring specifically to human nature, it mediates between the natural purpose of self-preservation and the final end of moral freedom. As natural beings, humans are conceivable (as we know from the essays on race) with regard to the natural purpose of self-preservation and the preservation of the species. But in so far as humans are also rational beings, they can set purposes for themselves. Thus, the human species has at least the potential to realize the final end, which is moral freedom. Kant asserts that the actualization of this potential relies on certain conditions. While the potential for moral freedom is naturally given to humans, its actualization needs to be achieved. This is where culture comes into play. To realize the final end of freedom, humans must undergo “cultivation:” On the one hand, they need to acquire the (physical) capability to realize their own purposes in general, while on the other hand, they need to acquire the (rational) ability to set themselves specific purposes, namely purposes of freedom. According to Kant, civil society (Kant 1790, tr. 2000: 300) stands as the sole historical formation fully capable of accomplishing this cultivation.19
22Culture is determined as “that which nature is capable of doing in order to prepare him [human] for what he must himself do in order to be a final end” (Kant 1790, tr. 2000: 298). The question of how race, as a concept of the understanding of nature, becomes associated with hierarchizing statements about human beings in different places of the world, needs to be addressed from here. If the Critique of the Power of Judgment and the essays on race are linked, it becomes apparent that not only the actualization of reason is conditioned by culture but that culture is conditioned itself. Certain natural conditions, such as climate, are more conducive to cultivation than others. It is not only the case, as Inder S. Marwah rightly states, that culture turns out to be a hierarchizing term, which distinguishes ways of life that, from Kant’s perspective, aid in the realization of freedom (and therefore qualify as culture) from those that do not (and therefore do not qualify as culture; Marwah 2012). More importantly, it becomes clear that culture has natural conditions which, as we will show in the following, do not coincide with the natural conditions that contribute to the formation of non-white races. Whether groups of people possess the natural dispositions for cultivation can thus already be discerned from their skin color. Kant’s theory of culture (and especially of its natural conditions) therefore gives his concept of race its deeper (hierarchizing) meaning. Kant understands this crucial connection between race and a reduced or even absent capacity for cultivation in at least two different ways.
23Firstly, according to Kant’s account, the so-called “red” American race is “too weak for hard labor, too indifferent for industry and incapable of any culture” (Kant 1788, tr. 2007: 211). Kant explains this by assuming that the process of adaptation to climatic conditions in which this race developed, failed in a way that rendered the development of culture impossible. Kant argues that the inhabitants of the Americas originally migrated from Europe to the Americas, moving northeastward. During that time, they began adapting to the northern climate and unfolded their respective adaptive seeds. However, when the inhabitants of America moved southward again (after they had reached the American continent) and settled there, the (irreversible) adaptive process they had already gone through, did not correspond to the new climate. The interruption of the adaptive process combined with the fact that their race developed under inadequate conditions resulted in a situation where they “did not achieve a perfect suitability for any climate” (Kant 1788, tr. 2007: 211). According to Kant, climate overpowers them, leading to a lack of culture and consequently a lack of freedom among the inhabitants of America. In their case, Kant diagnoses a direct causality between the failed adaptation to nature that formed the “red” race and the supposed inability of Native American people to develop culture.
24There is a second way in which Kant conceives of the link between race and reduced cultural capacities. According to Kant, under certain climatic conditions also successful adaptation may cause the development of characteristics that render people incapable of cultural achievement. Concerning so-called “Indians as well as Negroes” (Kant 1788, tr. 2007, note), Kant attributes a lack of self-reliance that seems to result directly from a successful adaptation to climatic conditions that did not demand much effort to survive. This is why, even though they have “faculty to work” (ibidem, italics in original), they also have “no greater predispositions to activity” (ibidem, cf. Larrimore 1999: 110). In Kant’s view, these characteristics (comparable to the seeds of race) remain unchanged once they have developed, even when people live under different climatic conditions that would demand more effort from them (Kant 1788, tr. 2007: 209, note). Again, Kant thinks that this incapacity for culture can be attributed to certain races. This time, however, the inability does not result from a failed adaptation (as with the inhabitants of America) but from a successful adaptation: The same climatic conditions that cause the development of specific seeds to respective races hinder the development of proper cultivation, as Kant already states in his first essay on race: “[…] in short, this results in the Negro, who is well suited to his climate, namely strong, fleshy, supple, but who, given the abundant provision of his mother land, is lazy, soft and trifling” (Kant 1775/77, tr. 2007: 93). Kant explicitly states that laziness is the well-suited response to the climatic conditions of Africa, but it is also an obstacle to the emergence of a cultural form that could enable the realization of reason. As he emphasizes in his philosophy of history, overcoming laziness is a necessary part of cultivation: Only after the human being has “overcome his propensity to indolence,” he will take his “first true steps from crudity toward culture, which really consists in the social worth of the human being” (Kant 1784, tr. 2007: 111). In this second form, one could speak of an indirect causality that links race to the inability to cultivate, as both are caused by the same factor: climate.
25Even though, for Kant, skin color counts as the only ground for racial classification, race also becomes a visible sign allowing for deeper assumptions about capabilities directly related to the actualization of the human potential for reason. In Kant’s theory, race reveals not only the climatic conditions to which people once had to adapt but also whether and to what extent they have the capacity to develop culture and thus whether they are capable of actualizing moral freedom. Through this link, the suitability for culture is naturalized to the very same level as skin color. Both are seen as equally hereditary as Kant emphasizes “that this inner predisposition extinguishes just as little as the externally visible one” (Kant 1788, tr. 2007: 209). This does not mean that Kant equates race and culture or describes culture itself as inheritable. Rather, the concept of culture and especially its natural preconditions add a depth to racial difference that always already exceeds the merely natural level. While race and culture are concepts that initially address different questions in Kant’s system, they intertwine in the ominous way described above, ultimately rendering Kant’s concept of race genuinely racist.
26As we have observed, Kant’s theory of race and his racist statements are closely related to his theory of teleological judgment. This implies that Kant’s theory of race cannot be regarded merely as his personal opinion or as a peripheral aspect of his work. For the theory of teleological judgment, which informs his racial theory and determines its methodological approach, plays an important role in his philosophical system, as it serves to establish the unity of knowledge, bridge the gap between how the world is and how it ought to be, and thereby complete the critical project. Furthermore, the proximity between the theory of teleological judgment and the theory of race raises the question of how to deal with teleological judgment, which, due to its pivotal position, is synonymous with the question of how to deal with Kant’s system in its entirety.
27One possible approach is to ignore the latter portion of the Third Critique, where Kant addresses teleological judgment, and instead prioritize the First and Second Critiques. This results in what Louden calls “pure” Kantianism: a Kantianism without empiricism, without history, which focuses exclusively on the a priori elements of epistemology and moral philosophy; a Kantianism of the kind taught at many departments of philosophy. In the following, we would like to express our opposition to such an approach. We believe that teleological judgment – as a method of interpreting the empirical world with the aim of demonstrating the possibility of a realization of freedom in it – is not only closely related to Kant’s theory of race and his racist statements but can also serve as an effective means of critiquing racism. Thus, the most problematic aspect of Kant’s work also proves to be one of the most intriguing and relevant. However, in order to transform teleological judgment into an effective tool for critiquing racism, it is necessary to first understand more precisely which aspects of Kant’s theory of teleological judgment make his (applied) teleological judgments in the theory of race so problematic.
28At the heart of Kant’s theory of teleological judgment lies, as we have seen, the (unprovable but, from his perspective, necessary) assumption that nature is purposive and leads humanity to the threshold of freedom – specifically through culture. In order to answer the question of how freedom can become real in the world, Kant interprets and systematizes the empirical descriptions of the world through teleological judgment, that is against the background of the assumption of purposiveness. We will contend that it is this particular assumption – the transcendental principle of his teleological judgment – that gives rise, in two respects, to the problems of racism within his theory.
29The first issue lies in Kant’s highly specific idea of what the path leading humanity to the threshold of freedom looks like. As we have already discussed, he assumes that this path necessarily passes through civil society, which he regards as the only society that truly cultivates and enables freedom. This leads Kant to interpret all forms of life that do not conform to European civil society as necessarily inferior. In our view, the problem here is not per se that Kant judges forms of life with regard to their ability to enable freedom. He is correct in recognizing that not all forms of life equally enable freedom, and it is indeed important to evaluate them on this account. The problem lies rather in Kant’s specific understanding of teleological judgment which prevents him from even considering forms of life deviating from bourgeois society as candidates for culture and the promotion of freedom.
30While this first problem with Kant’s understanding of teleological judgment lies in its failure to even consider non-European forms of life in relation to their contribution to the realization of freedom, the second issue arises in how Kant’s teleological judgment explains why freedom indeed struggles to develop within some forms of life. As mentioned above, Kant is right on a general level in stating that there are forms of life more conducive to realizing freedom than others, or that certain populations face particular obstacles in achieving freedom. He is even right when he assumes that non-white people often live in forms of life that make the realization of freedom more difficult – given that racist and colonial systems produce such obstacles. However, the way he formulates this judgment fundamentally veers in the wrong direction: instead of politicizing and critiquing the conditions of this lack of freedom, Kant legitimizes and naturalizes them. This problem is also related to one aspect of his understanding of teleological judgment: the assumed premise that it is nature, by virtue of its purposiveness, that releases this developmental path out of itself.
- 20 In Kant’s writings on the philosophy of history, even war, misery, and devastation appear as means (...)
- 21 Thomas McCarthy speaks of “a naturalistic rationale for existing power relations between Europeans (...)
31Although this assumption presupposed in teleological judgment does not lead Kant to justify everything happening in the world as purposive or to assume that nature does all the “development work” (thus requiring no politics to establish freedom), there is nonetheless a certain tendency inherent in Kant’s teleological judgment. The assumed premise that nature evolves by itself to the threshold of human freedom leads Kant to tend towards interpreting power dynamics as outcomes of a purposive natural process, thereby legitimizing and naturalizing them.20 Instead of interpreting the potential difficulty for racialized groups to attain freedom as the result of enslavement and colonial overexploitation (even though he criticizes these institutions in his later works), he views these difficulties as the result of natural developmental processes. These are not caused by domination but result from conflicts that arise in nature during its purposive development: for one group, adaptation to climate may succeed, yet tragically, this very climate’s conditions thwart the purpose of cultivation; for another group, failure to adapt to climate hinders the development of culture and consequently freedom. In either case, Kant’s presupposed assumption in teleological judgment that nature inherently guides humanity to the threshold of freedom leads him, in the application of teleological judgment, to legitimize emerging difficulties for racialized groups in attaining freedom as part of an (essentially purposive, albeit internally conflictual) natural process and to withdraw these obstacles from criticism.21
32Despite the fact that Kant’s teleological judgment is closely related to the racist elements of his theory, we believe, as already indicated, that teleological judgment should not be abandoned, but rather retained. For the question that the teleological power of judgment ultimately seeks to answer – how freedom can truly materialize in an empirical world – is also the question at hand when it comes to critiquing racism. Building on the analysis of the core problems in Kant’s understanding of teleological judgment, we therefore want to inquire into how an (admittedly significantly) altered teleological judgment could look – one that does not serve to legitimize and naturalize racist structures but is capable of critiquing them.
- 22 In a similar way, in The Idea of Natural History Adorno conceives of history as the denaturalizatio (...)
33To achieve this, we need to consider the assumption presupposed in Kant’s teleological judgment as a transcendental principle: the assumption that nature is purposive and leads humans to the threshold of freedom. This assumption, as we have seen, predisposes a tendency to legitimize and naturalize power dynamics. Instead of promoting the realization of freedom, teleological judgment does the opposite: it fosters unfreedom. Therefore, we propose that a radically altered teleological judgment, capable of critiquing racism and thus truly answering the question of how freedom can materialize in the empirical world, should presuppose a radically altered assumption as its transcendental principle: namely, the assumption that society is non-purposive, that is hierarchical, and causes unfreedom. Just as the Kantian transcendental principle does not obligate Kant to assert that everything in nature is actually purposive and conducive to freedom, our transcendental principle does not obligate us to assert that all societal formations are non-purposive and hinder freedom given that, without a social order, we could not think of freedom at all. However, this reinterpretation of the teleological judgment shifts the focus, thereby avoiding the Kantian problem. For while Kant’s teleological judgment calls for identifying and understanding those natural elements that promote freedom, and tends to legitimize and naturalize social and economic inequality as part of a natural-historical process, as in the case of racism, our altered teleological judgment calls for identifying those societal structures that hinder the realization of freedom. This enables us to identify those power structures that may appear as natural but are in fact contingent. Thus, this teleological judgment can recognize those racist structures that Kant’s judgments still naturalize and legitimize, as naturalized power relations – as second nature – and critique, politicize, and denaturalize them.22 By presupposing the non-purposiveness of society as a transcendental principle, teleological judgment serves the Kantian purpose of realizing universal freedom.
- 23 Kirkland 2017 uses the Kantian term “transition” [Übergang] (Kant 1790, tr. 2000: 63) in this sense (...)
- 24 This is the claim in Mills 2018, especially ch. 4.1.
34The difference between Kant’s naturalizing teleological judgment and the denaturalizing teleological judgment proposed by us can be clearly marked when we turn to the subject of race. While Kant uses race as a natural-historical concept, obscuring the violent origins of racialization and naturalizing the resulting inequalities, the revised understanding of teleological judgment uses race as a social-ontological concept. Race becomes an articulation of an inequality that is shaped by racializing relations of domination (cf. Haslanger 2012). Engaging in teleological judgment within this framework means to identify, criticize, and politicize these relations as changeable in order to think of a possible “transition” for overcoming a world shaped by racism.23 Therefore, rejecting a naturalizing concept of race need not and must not lead to embracing the abstract and color-blind universalism of pure Kantianism.24 For the transformed teleological judgment proves to be a form in which “racial difference” can be taken seriously as a social and economic relation and reflected as well as criticized against the background of the purpose of realizing universal freedom.