Arnold, M.B. 1960, Emotion and Personality. Psychological Aspects, New York, Columbia University Press.
Baggio, G., Caruana, F., Parravicini, A., Viola, M. (a cura di) 2020, Emozioni. Da Darwin al pragmatismo, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier.
Barbero, C. 2010, Chi ha paura di Mr. Hyde? Oggetti fittizi, emozioni reali, Genova, il nuovo melangolo.
Barbero, C. 2013, Filosofia della letteratura, Roma, Carocci.
Barbero, C. 2017, Who’s afraid of fictional characters?, “Rivista di Estetica”, 66: 148-164.
Benbaji, H. 2013, How is recalcitrant emotion possible?, “Australasian Journal of Philosophy”, 91, 3: 577-599.
Ben-Ze’ev, A. 2000, The Subtlety of Emotions, Cambridge (MA), The MIT Press.
Campeggiani, P. 2020, Nec cogitare sed facere: the paradox of fiction at the tribunal of ancient poetics, “Theoria”, 86, 6: 709-726.
Campeggiani, P. 2021, Introduzione alla filosofia delle emozioni, Bologna, Clueb.
Caruana, F., Viola, M. 2018, Come funzionano le emozioni. Da Darwin alle neuroscienze, Bologna, il Mulino.
D’Angelo, P. 2016, Piangere per Ecuba. Emozioni genuine e oggetti di finzione, in T. Andina, C. Barbero (a cura di), Ermeneutica, estetica, ontologia. A partire da Maurizio Ferraris, Bologna, il Mulino: 89-99.
D’Arms, J., Jacobson, D. 2003, The significance of recalcitrant emotion, in A. Hatzimoysis (a cura di), Philosophy and the Emotions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 127-146.
Döring, S. 2008, Conflict without contradiction, in G. Brun, U. Doğuoğl, D. Kuenzle (a cura di), Epistemology and Emotions, Aldershot, Ashgate: 83-104.
Döring, S. 2014, Why recalcitrant emotions are not irrational, in S. Roeser, C. Todd (a cura di), Emotion and Value, Oxford, Oxford University Press: 124-136.
Edmonds, D. 2014, Would You Kill the Fat Man? The Trolley Problem and What Your Answer Tells Us about Right and Wrong, tr. it. di G. Guerriero, Uccideresti l’uomo grasso? Il dilemma etico del male minore, Milano, Raffaello Cortina, 2014.
Friend, S. 2020, Fiction and emotion: The puzzle of divergent norms, “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 60, 4: 403-418.
Greenspan, P.S. 1988, Emotions and Reasons. An Inquiry into Emotional Justification, New York - London, Routledge.
Griffiths, P. 1997, What Emotions Really Are. The Problem of Psychological Categories, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Grzankowski, A. 2020, Navigating recalcitrant emotions, “The Journal of Philosophy”, 117, 9: 501-519.
Helm, B.W. 2001, Emotional Reason. Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Helm, B.W. 2015, Emotions and recalcitrance: Reevaluating the perceptual model, “dialectica”, 69, 3: 417-433.
Lazarus, R.S. 1991, Emotion and Adaptation, New York, Oxford University Press.
Majeed, R. 2022, What not to make of recalcitrant emotions, “Erkenntnis”, 87, 2: 747-765.
Marraffa, M., Viola, M 2017, Quale mappa per il dominio delle emozioni?, “Sistemi Intelligenti”, 29, 1: 85-108.
Miščević, N. 2016, In defence of the twin earth–the star wars continue, “European Journal of Analytic Philosophy”, 12, 2: 107-126.
Moyal-Sharrock, D. 2009, The fiction of paradox: really feeling for Anna Karenina, in Y. Gustafsson, C. Kronqvist, M. McEachrane (a cura di), Emotions and Understanding: Wittgensteinian Perspectives, London, Palgrave Macmillan: 165-84.
Naar, H. 2020, The real issue with recalcitrant emotions: Reply to Grzankowski, “Erkenntnis”, 85, 5: 1035-1040.
Neu, J. 2000, A Tear is an Intellectual Thing. The Meanings of Emotion, Oxford - New York, Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, M.C. 2001, Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions, tr. it. di G. Giorgini, L’intelligenza delle emozioni, Bologna, il Mulino, 2004.
Paolini Paoletti, M. 2014, Il paradosso della finzione, “APhEx”, 9: 289-317.
Prinz, J.J. 2004, Gut Reactions. A Perceptual Theory of Emotion, New York, Oxford University Press.
Radford, C. 1975, How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society”, 49: 67-80.
Rawls, J. 1971, A Theory of Justice, tr. it. di U. Santini, Una teoria della giustizia, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2010.
Roberts, R.C. 2003, Emotions. An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Sacco, G. 2021, «Che cos’è un’emozione?»: una domanda senza (possibile) risposta?, “Sistemi Intelligenti”, 33, 2: 319-334.
Sacco, G. 2022, The passionate beliefs. a defense of the cognitive-evaluative theory of emotions, “Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel”, 50, 3: 1391-1411.
Sacco, G. 2023, Il problema delle emozioni recalcitranti, “Sistemi Intelligenti”, 3: 513-533.
Scarantino, A. 2016, The philosophy of emotions and its impact on affective science, in L. Feldman Barrett, M. Lewis, J.M. Haviland-Jones (a cura di), Handbook of Emotions: Fourth Edition, New York, Guilford Press: 3-48.
Smith, M. 2018, In defense of the argument for emotional assent, “American Philosophical Quarterly”, 55, 1: 51-62.
Solomon, R. 1976, The Passions. The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions, Garden City, Doubleday Anchor.
Stecker, R. 2011, Should we still care about the paradox of fiction?, “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 51, 3: 75-106.
Sunstein, C.R. 2005, Moral heuristics, “Behavioral and Brain Sciences”, 28, 4: 531-573.
Tappolet, C. 2016, Emotions, Value, and Agency, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Tullmann, K., Buckwalter, W. 2014, Does the paradox of fiction exist?, “Erkenntnis”, 79: 779-796.
Walton, K.L. 1978, Fearing fictions, “The Journal of Philosophy”, 75, 1: 5-27.
Walton, K.L. 1990, Mimesis as Make-Believe. On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, tr. it. di M. Nani, Mimesi come far finta. Sui fondamenti delle arti rappresentazionali, Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2011.