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Special issue

Bentham’s Universal Jurisprudence and Theory of Legal Transplant

Jeremy Bentham : Jurisprudence universelle et transplant juridique
Michihiro Kaino

Résumés

Dans son ouvrage de référence A Turn to Empire, J. Pitts défend la thèse que le projet benthamien se distingue des aspirations libérales de ses successeurs en Grande-Bretagne, aspirations promouvant la civilisation des pays considérés comme arriérés. D’un autre côté, Pitts éprouve des difficultés dans le traitement des descriptions benthamiennes présentant les pays islamiques comme des lieux de barbarie et d’ignorance irrémédiables. Je voudrais défendre l’idée que la théorie de Bentham est exempte du genre de contradictions suggérées par Pitts. Tout d’abord, dans la deuxième partie, je me pencherai sur le texte 'Place and Time' et montrerai que, contrairement à l’interprétation de Pitts, Bentham a tenté de changer les religions, traditions et coutumes des pays non occidentaux, qui sont incompatibles avec son principe d’utilité. Néanmoins, cette entreprise se fondait sur la conception benthamienne d’une nature humaine universelle. Dans la troisième partie, j’examinerai la tentative de Bentham de fonder une jurisprudence universelle afin de clarifier sa conception de la nature humaine universelle. Je montrerai ensuite dans quelle mesure Bentham a continuellement essayé de disséminer cette conception dans les pays civilisés aussi bien que non civilisés, ce qui ferait de lui un théoricien non impérialiste.

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Texte intégral

Introduction

  • 1 Pitts, Jennifer, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton (...)

1In her influential book A Turn to Empire, Jennifer Pitts contrasts 18th-century thinkers, including Jeremy Bentham, who had 'persistent doubts about the justice of European political and social orders' and 19th-century ones, such as John Stuart Mill, who had 'the dramatically increased sense of cultural or civilizational confidence' over the non-European countries.1

  • 2 Pitts, Jennifer, '"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought', in Selected Writings: J (...)
  • 3 Engelmann, Stephen and Pitts, Jennifer, 'Bentham’s "Place and Time"', The Tocqueville Review, 32 (2 (...)
  • 4 Bentham, Jeremy, Jeremy Bentham’s Economic Writings: Critical Edition based on his Printed Works an (...)

2Relying on Bentham’s 'Place and Time,' which was written around 1780, Pitts similarly argues that Bentham’s project was 'very different in spirit from later liberal aspiration to use British despotism to civilize the backward.'2 On the other hand, however, Pitts, with Stephen Engelmann, admits that Bentham’s 'translation of various individual circumstances, perspectives, and the desires into the language of pleasure, pain, happiness and finally interest […] involves a kind of ‘cultural’ imperialism of the first order.'3 Moreover, Pitts appears to struggle with how to treat Bentham’s description, for instance, of Islamic countries as 'a region of which incurable barbarity and ignorance seem to be inseparable features.'4

  • 5 Quinn, Michael, 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains: What is the legislator to do when the people err i (...)
  • 6 It might be suggested to use 'cosmopolitanism' rather than universal human nature to deny imperiali (...)

3In this article, I will argue that there was no such contradiction as suggested by Pitts in Bentham’s theory. I will, in the second section, discuss Bentham’s 'Place and Time' and show that, unlike Pitt’s interpretation, Bentham tried to change the religions, traditions and customs of non-western countries, which are at odds with his principle of utility. However, this was based on Bentham’s conception of universal human nature. Bentham made a distinction between abstract utility, which relates to 'the pains and pleasures liable to be experienced by human agents as such,' and net utility, which are the pains and pleasures actually experienced by the people, and tried to bring the latter in line with the former.5 However, Bentham’s abstract utility was based on an empirical generalization of universal (non-western as well as western) human nature and was meant to be attained without forcing compliance in non-western or non-civilized countries at his time. In the third section, I will examine Bentham’s enterprise of universal jurisprudence to elucidate Bentham’s conception of universal human nature. I will then discuss how Bentham consistently tried to disseminate this conception around civilized as well as non-civilized countries, which would make him a theorist of universal human nature rather than an imperial theorist.6

Bentham’s 'Place and Time' Revisited

  • 7 This is a word by José del Valle in his letter to Bentham. Bentham, Jeremy, ‘Legislator of the Worl (...)
  • 8 According to Armitage, Bentham’s 'developing universalism was […] shaped by his response to the cha (...)

4Bentham aspired to be 'the legislator of the world.'7 He sought to invent complete codes of laws, known as ‘Pannomion,’ which mainly comprised the Constitutional Code, the Civil Code, the Criminal Code and the Procedure Codes based on the principle of utility. Bentham also argued that, as human beings are sufficiently similar, his Pannomion could be introduced universally,8 and he developed a theory of legal transplants in his article, 'Place and Time.'

  • 9 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', eds. P. Schofield and S. Engelmann, in Selected Writings: Jeremy Ben (...)

5In 'Place and Time,' Bentham discusses what changes are necessary when transplanted to foreign countries: '[t] he laws which I would propose are established in this my country; and they are, of course, according to my conception of them, the best that can be devised [that is, his Pannomion].' He chooses Bengal as the model for the countries where laws are to be transplanted. According to Bentham, '[t]hat it may be as instructive as possible, this second country should, in regard to the circumstances in question, form as strong a contrast with England as possible.' In his view, '[s]uch an example we seem to have in the province of Bengal', for 'diversity of climate, mixture of inhabitants, natural productions, face of the country, present laws, manners, customs, religion of the inhabitants; every circumstance, on which a difference in the point in question can be grounded, as different as can be.'9

  • 10 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, pp. 121, 146.

6In A Turn to Empire, Pitts contrasts the writings on India of Bentham, who did not impose 'from above without concern for the opinions of the ruled [including the Indian people] or for their interests as they themselves understood them' and those of John Stuart Mill, for whom India was an 'appropriate model of colonial governance for backward society.'10 Pitts, in parts, justifies her points mainly thorough discussing Bentham’s theory of legal transplants developed in 'Place and Time.'

7When Bentham discusses the influence of time on legislation, he asks whether:

  • 11 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 193

the laws that are the best possible for a given place, at the time present being found ; would the same laws, had they happened to be found in time past, have been the best possible for that time past [] and the like, with relation to the time future.11

  • 12 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, p. 120.

8According to Pitts, what is important in this statement and the other related discussions in 'Place and Time,' is that 'in discussing these different "ages" of society, Bentham always compared particular societies with their own pasts European with the European pasts and the Islamic society with the age of Mohomet.' Unlike John Stuart Mill, Bentham did not suggest that 'India or Asia generally represented the "rude" age.'12

  • 13 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, p. 119.
  • 14 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, p. 119.

9Pitts also focuses on Bentham’s discussion of the introduction of the jury system in India. According to Pitts, when Bentham, in his Principle of Judicial Procedure, discussed the introduction of the jury system into India, although he 'believed that the level of education among the general Indian population was too low to enable the proper function of juries selected from the whole population, he made no claim that Indian society as such was so rude or barbarous as to prevent the possibility of juris altogether.'13 Pitts again contrasts Bentham’s 'understanding of education and those of James and John Stuart Mill'.14

10More related to this article is Pitts’ argument that:

  • 15 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, p. 121. Pitts adds that Bentham’s plan for Indian juries 'was designed (...)

In formulating a reform plan tailored to Indian society, Bentham resisted suggesting that that society or its members were in particular need of improvement. For reasons such as these, Bentham’s proposal for jury reform in India should not be confused with the 'improvement' proposed by his successors which rested precisely on claims about the peculiar backwardness or incapacity of Indians.15

11In 'Place and Time,' Bentham developed the eight rules for legal transplants, which were universally applicable. These rules were based on Bentham’s insights about 'circumstances influencing sensibility.'

12In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Bentham explains his principle of utility and explains how it works:

  • 16 Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, eds. J. H. Burns and (...)

sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and the pains on the other. … Take the balance, which, if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals concerned ; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same community.16

  • 17 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 51.

13In calculating the value of pleasure and pain, Bentham cited seven dimensions, the most important of which are intensity, duration, certainty and propinquity. Bentham thought that duration, certainty and propinquity of pain or pleasure could be measured precisely. However, according to Bentham, intensity that 'reflects a particular person’s response to a particular pleasure or pain' cannot be measured precisely because 'in the same mind such and such causes of pain or pleasure will produce more pain or pleasure than such or such other causes of pain or pleasure: and this proportion will in different minds be different.'17

  • 18 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 155.

14The difference or variety of intensity among people is caused by bias and sensibility among people. What is interesting is that Bentham thought that biases or sensibilities are not only different among individuals but also different among communities. In 'Place and Time,' although he denied that different countries have different catalogues of pleasures and pains, he argues that the difference lies in their causes. Bentham proceeds to argue that even the same individual event, which would produce pain or pleasure in one country, would not produce the same effect of the same sort, or not to an equal degree, in another country.18

15According to Bentham, in the catalogue of circumstances influencing sensibility,

  • 19 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 155.

we shall find the sum total of the principles of which we are in search : the principles which, in our inquiry concerning the influence of place and time on matters of legislation, are to serve as a guide.19

16The legislator should thus be provided with two tables to do the work required:

  • 20 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 155-7.

Those of the first set would exhibit a number of particulars relative to the body of laws which has been pitched upon for a standard. [] [T]hose of the other set will be : a general table of the circumstances influencing sensibility [] [such as] [] tables or short accounts of the moral, religious, sympathetic and antipathetic biases of the people for whose use the alterations are to be made.20

17In her article ‘"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought,' where Pitts focuses on Bentham’s discussion of circumstances influencing sensibility, she argues that:

  • 21 Pitts, J., '"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought', pp. 488-9.

As 'Place and Time' makes clear, for Bentham, societies were distinguished not by their different characters but by what he called circumstances. [] Religious beliefs, traditions, and customs were seen by Bentham not as the basis for judgements about the character of a people as a whole but parameters within which individual make choices and as features of a society that must 'with perfect propriety' be acknowledged by any legislator. In penal law, for instance, what constitutes a crime or extenuating and aggravating circumstances will have to vary according to the beliefs prevailing in a society, as will appropriate punishments.21

18Pitts adds that:

  • 22 Pitts, J., '"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought', p. 489.

He treats such customs as analogous to physical circumstances, such as frequency of avalanches versus floods or famines, that should properly affect legislation. So, he describes Hindu custom of caste forfeiture, for instance, not as evidence of superstition and barbarism, but simply as a constraint on appropriate penalties.22

19However, in 'Place and Time,' Bentham focuses on the difference between the physical circumstances and moral, religious or political circumstances which influence sensibility:

  • 23 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 167.

the first, consisting of those in which the influence of circumstance operating as a ground of variation is insurmountable : the other, consisting of those in which that influence is not necessarily and absolutely insurmountable. [] In the former predicament stand all those cases in which the ground of variation is brought about by causes purely physical. [] Of this nature are the circumstances of climate and texture of earth. [] Of the opposite nature come the circumstances of government, religion, and manners.23

  • 24 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 158-9, 162, 165.

20With regard to the first class of the influence of circumstances, Bentham gave the example that a wound in a hot climate may be much more painful, that confinement in a hot country may result in significant pain and that drunken persons in the south may be more harmful than those in the north. Concerning the second class of the influence of circumstances, he gave the example that the confinement of a Hindu may result in serious pain by excluding him from religious ceremonies, that the votary of every sect may receive a cruel wound from any discourse which reflects contempt for the object of his veneration; that imputation of homosexuality may be much more painful in England than in ancient Greece (so that false claims of homosexuality must be punished more heavily in England) and that keeping wives in confinement may be reasonable in Mahometan countries.24

  • 25 I use the term, 'donee countries' to denote the countries to where laws were to be transplanted.

21As we saw above, Bentham describes the circumstances of government, religion and manners as 'not necessarily and absolutely insurmountable.' Pace Pitts, Bentham’s theory of legal transplants involves the reformation of donee countries, including India.25

  • 26 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 174.
  • 27 Quinn, Michael, Bentham (Cambridge, Polity, 2022), p. 65.

22Bentham set out eight rules for legal transplants. The following are important. '[T]he clear utility of the law will be as its abstract utility, deduction made of the dissatisfaction and other inconvenience occasioned by it ' is the fifth rule, which is complemented by the sixth rule, 'the value of dissatisfaction will be in the compound ratio of 1. The multitude of the persons dissatisfied; 2. The intensity of the dissatisfaction in each person; 3. The duration of the dissatisfaction on the part of each.' We should also note the seventh rule, which is that 'as a means of obviating dissatisfaction, indirect legislation should be preferred to direct: gentle means, to violent: example, instruction, and exhortation should precede or follow, or, if possible, stand in the place of law.'26 Here, Bentham’s usage of the word, 'legislation' is very broad and the 'indirect legislation' included 'everything done by government which was not exclusively an exercise in direct legislation.'27

23My point is that Bentham tried to bring the net utility of donee countries in line with the abstract utility, which was based on common and universal human nature as understood by Bentham himself by reforming the sensibilities of the people of those donee countries. When we discuss Bentham’s theory of legal transplants in 'Place and Time,' we should take Bentham’s aspiration to be the 'legislator of the world' into consideration. As we will see in the following section, Bentham’s universal jurisprudence and his Pannomion were based on abstract utility or common and universal human nature as understood by Bentham. In 'Place and Time,' Bentham did not, as suggested by Pitts, try to adjust his Pannomion according to the moral or religious sensibilities of the donee countries but vice versa.

  • 28 Quinn, M., 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains', p. 77.

24According to Michael Quinn, Bentham also made a distinction between abstract and net utility. 'Abstract utility' relates to 'the pains and pleasures liable to be experienced by human agents as such, which are embodied in the empirical generalizations [by Bentham himself] about human psychology.'28 'Net utility' is identical to 'clear utility' in the fifth rule of legal transplants. Bentham was aware that net utility would fluctuate with the introduction of his codes based on abstract utility according to the prejudicial biases or sensibilities of the natives reacting to his Pannomion. Thus, Bentham argued that to bring net utility in line with abstract utility, 'indirect legislations' were necessary, and the main components of indirect legislations were 'example, instruction, and exhortation,' as shown in his seventh rule of legal transplants.

25However, this would not lead Bentham to what Pitts calls 'a kind of "cultural" imperialism.' In 'Place and Time,' Bentham writes about homosexual acts:

  • 29 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 162-3.

In England, not only the letter of the law makes them capital, as in other parts of Europe, but the law is carried into execution with a degree of zeal which no other species of criminality is sufficient to inspire. But were it even altogether unpunishable by law, a groundless imputation of this nature would be an injury scarcely less atrocious than at present: since the consequence of being reputed guilty would be attended with a degree of infamy which can be compared to nothing so properly as that which attends forfeiture of caste among the Hindoos.29

  • 30 Quinn, M., 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains', p. 82.

26As to the punishment, Bentham proposed that consensual homosexual acts should be punished by banishment instead of by hanging in the face of strong prejudice against homosexuality and the expected unpopularity of decriminalizing homosexual behaviour in 19th-century England. As is well known, Bentham often argued that consensual homosexual acts were harmless. To mitigate the strong prejudice, he suggested that “if you were able to demonstrate that, for instance, widely admired figures in the nation’s military or political history had been in the habit of engaging in consensual homosexual acts, and successfully disseminated that demonstration, you might hope that hostility to homosexuality would gradually abate. » 30

27Bentham’s devices to bring net utility in line with abstract utility, which is shown in his seventh rule of legal transplants, were to be used in western countries as well as non-western countries. To put it in another way, Bentham tried to bring the net utility of western as well as non-western countries in line with the abstract utility or with his Pannomion, which was based on common and universal human nature. In the next section, I will examine Bentham’s enterprise of universal jurisprudence to elucidate Bentham’s conception of universal human nature.

Bentham’s Universal Jurisprudence and Conception of Universal Human Nature

28In 1811, when proposing the adoption of his Civil and Criminal Codes to President Madison, Bentham described himself as follows:

  • 31 Bentham, J., Legislator of the World: Writings on Codification, Law, and Education, p. 26.

Nor, if I may venture to say as much, would it be easy to find any person, more compleatly aware of the demand, presented by the nature of the case, for attention to those local exigencies ; nor more compleatly in the habit of looking over the field of law in this particular view. Of this disposition, and this habit, exemplifications of considerable amplitude may be seen, in the already mentioned work, which for these nine years, has been under the public eye.31

  • 32 The work mentioned by Bentham is in The Theory of Legislation (1802).

29'Place and Time' is substantially identical to the work mentioned by Bentham in the extract above.32 Thus, to President Madison, 'Place and Time' should be understood in the light of Bentham’s Pannomion project and its basic theories.

30Bentham’s basic theories, as set out in his Pannomion, can be equated with his theory of universal jurisprudence. In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, as to universal jurisprudence, Bentham writes:

  • 33 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 6.

Plan of a body of law, complete in all its branches, considered in respect of its form ; in other words, in respect of its method and terminology ; including a view of the organization and connexion of the ideas expressed by the short list of terms, the exposition of which contains all that can be said with propriety to belong to the head of universal jurisprudence.33

  • 34 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 6, n.c.

31Bentham’s universal jurisprudence includes his discussion of different forms of Pannomion. Bentham’s 'short list' above comprises terms such as 'obligation, right, power, possession, title, exemption, immunity, franchise, privilege, nullity, validity and the like.'34

32On the other hand, a division of offences, developed in Chapter 16 of Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, is related to the substances of the Pannomion. In that work, Bentham writes:

  • 35 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 305.

To class offences … is therefore to class laws : to exhibit a complete catalogue of all the offences created by law … would be to exhibit a complete collection of the laws in force : in a word, a complete body of law, a pannomion, if so it might be termed.35

  • 36 Postema, Gerald, Utility, Publicity, and Law: Essays on Bentham’s Moral and Legal Philosophy (Oxfor (...)

33As Postema argues, in Bentham’s concept of law, every legal provision 'must ultimately be tethered to empirical facts (‘real entities’).' Due to his ontology, fictitious entities, which include rights, duties and the like, should be 'understood by displaying the relationship that its import bears to the import of the sentence using names of real entities in place of names of fictitious ones.'36 Ferraro refers us to Bentham’s remarks:

  • 37 Bentham, Jeremy, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. P.Schofield (Oxford, Clare (...)

An act is a real entity : a law is another. A duty or obligation is a fictitious entity, conceived as resulting from the union of the two former. A law commanding or forbidding an act thereby creates a duty or obligation. A right is another fictitious entity, a kind of secondary fictitious entity, resulting out of a duty.37

34According to Bentham, laws with only civil provisions cannot have the nature and effects of laws without being connected with laws 'commanding or forbidding an act,' which 'thereby creates a duty or obligation,' which arise due to the real entity of 'the union of' act and law.

35In Bentham’s Pannomion, the Civil Code, for instance, would confer proprietary rights, whereas the Penal Code would impose duties by naming offences and prescribing punishments for those offences. As to the relationship between those parts, Bentham writes:

  • 38 Bentham, Jeremy, Of Laws in General, ed. H. L. A. Hart (London, The Athlone Press, 1970), p. 177.

Now every law in which there is an exceptive clause may be resolved into two provisions. These provisions where the law is … of the negative or prohibitive kind are 1. a primordial mandate of the prohibitive kind, the more extensive of the two: 2. a superventitious mandate of the permissive kind which is the least extensive of the two, being revocative but revocative pro tanto only and not pro toto of the former. No man shall meddle with the field (describing it): Praetextatus and such other persons as he allows may meddle with the field.38

36For Bentham, every civil law, which confers a right, is an exceptive clause of ('resulting out of') the corresponding penal law, which deals with offences and creates duties. It was, for instance, possible for Bentham to list all of the laws conferring property rights by listing all of the offences related to property.

  • 39 Ferraro, F., 'Utility, Predictability, and Rights: Bentham’s Utilitarianism and Constitutional Enti (...)
  • 40 Ferraro, F., 'Utility, Predictability, and Rights: Bentham’s Utilitarianism and Constitutional Enti (...)

37As we saw above, Bentham argued that every legal provision should be tethered to real entities of act and law. Bentham tries to show this connection by treating every right-conferring law as an exceptive clause of the corresponding penal law―law 'commanding or forbidding an act.' Moreover, Bentham thought that not only civil laws but every kind of legal provision should be tethered to the real entity of '[s]overeign’s expression of will accompanied by the threat of punishment,'39 which event is what Bentham meant by the real entity of 'the union of ' act and law.40 According to Postema,

  • 41 Postema, G., Utility, Publicity, and Law: Essays on Bentham’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, p. 294.

At the core of Bentham’s model of a complete law is the idea of a directive for action that includes in it everything necessary for adequate public guidance of behavior, including all the qualifications, limitations, elaborations that apply to it, and all the institutional and procedural conditions of its implementation and enforcement.41

38Thus, a complete division of offences, which is identical to a complete division of directive laws, or with that of the laws creating obligation, would be 'a complete collection of the laws in force.'

39It is now possible to discuss the nature of Bentham’s Pannomion and its basic theories and their implications for his theory of legal transplant. In Chapter 17 of Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham shows some divisions of jurisprudence. Bentham at first divides jurisprudence in terms of the object:

  • 42 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 294.

A book of jurisprudence can have but one or the other of two objects: 1. to ascertain what the law is: 2. to ascertain what it ought to be. In the former case it may be styled a book of expository jurisprudence; in the latter, a book of censorial jurisprudence. or, in other words, a book on the art of legislation.42

40The other division particularly relevant here is Bentham’s division into particular and universal jurisprudence:

  • 43 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 294.

in point of extent, what is delivered concerning the laws in question, may have reference either to the laws of such or such a nation or nations in particular, or to the laws of all nations whatsoever : in the first case, the book may be said to relate to local, in the other, to universal jurisprudence.43

41As Bentham’s Pannomion was meant to be a universal project, there is no doubt that the basic theories are universal as well. For the present purpose, the more important issue is whether Bentham’s basic theories for Pannomion―or his universal jurisprudence―were expository or censorial.

42As to universal expository jurisprudence, Bentham suggests that its scope is very narrow:

  • 44 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 295.

To be susceptible of universal application, all that a book of the expository kind can have to treat of, is the imports of the words : to be, strictly speaking, universal, it must confine itself to terminology.44

  • 45 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 6, n.c.

43As we saw in this section, the 'words' in the above quotation include terms such as 'obligation, right, power, possession, title, exemption, immunity, franchise, privilege, nullity, validity and the like.'45

44The rest of Bentham’s basic theories set out in his Pannomion seems to be founded on universal censorial jurisprudence. About the forms of Pannomion, Philip Schofield offers the following argument:

  • 46 Schofield, Philip, 'Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart’s Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence', Jurispru (...)

According to Bentham, Common Law was 'sham law' or 'quasi-law,' and to call for the adoption of Common Law merely reflected, on the part of the advocate, the existence of a sinister interest. To call for the adoption of a system of laws codified according to utilitarian principles reflected, on the part of the advocate, the existence of right and proper interest, that is a desire to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number.46

  • 47 Postema, G., Utility, Publicity, and Law: Essays on Bentham’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, pp. 150-1 (...)
  • 48 Bentham, J., Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, p. 196.

45It seems reasonable to regard Bentham’s theory on the form of the Pannomion as based on universal censorial jurisprudence, as suggested by Schofield. It is well known that it was Bentham’s discontent with the common law that led him to struggle to construct a Pannomion. Bentham distinguished the utilities derived from security of expectations ('expectation utilities' vs 'original utilities'). Bentham argued that expectation utilities or utilities derived from the security of expectations have special weight.47 Bentham criticized the common law because judges could overthrow precedents that were contrary to 'reason', for its uncertainty and obscurity by arguing that 'if there be still a man who will stand up for the existence and certainty of a rule of customary law, give him everything he asks, he must still have recourse to fiction to produce any such rule'.48 Bentham tried to replace it with his Pannomion, comprised of determinate rules for the purpose of securing people’s expectations. Thus, Bentham’s theory of the form of Pannomion is certainly based on Bentham’s normative or censorial considerations.

  • 49 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 305.
  • 50 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 16.
  • 51 Lobban, Michael, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 17601850 (Oxford, Oxford University Pres (...)

46As to the substance of the Pannomion, Bentham remarked that 'to exhibit a complete catalogue of all the offences created by law […] would be to exhibit a complete collection of the laws in force'49 and 'a complete catalogue of all the offences' was to be deduced from the division of offences. In Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham divided offences into 1. private offences, 2. self-regarding offences, 3. semi-public offences and 4. public offences.50 He continued to subdivide each of these offences. For instance, he subdivided private offences into offences against the person, offences against the reputation, offences against the property and offences against the condition. In dividing offences, Bentham’s method was that of bipartition. It was 'based on contradictory formula: what was classed in one division would thus be contradictory to what was classed in other.'51 The division of offences would continue until the species of offences, which were also complementary, such as wrongful destruction, wrongful occupation, and theft, among others, were obtained.

  • 52 Schofield, P., 'Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart’s ‘Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence', p. 157.
  • 53 Bentham, Jeremy, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L (...)
  • 54 Bentham, J., A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, p. 417.

47Bentham’s division of offences is based on natural arrangement, which is integrated by the principle of utility and classifies offences according to the objects of pain they produce. According to Bentham, in contrast with a natural arrangement, the technical arrangement of English law was confusing and unsatisfactory, and its terminology, such as misprisions, contempts, felonies, praemunires, and the like, did not show any connections between wrongful acts and the principle of utility.52 In discussing the natural arrangement, Bentham was focusing on replacing 'technical reasons, such as none but a Lawyer gives, nor any but a Lawyer would put up with'53 with utilitarian 'reasons, such as were they in themselves what they might and ought to be, and expressed too in the manner they might and ought to be, any man might see the force of as well as he [a lawyer].'54 Thus, the substance of the Pannomion, which would be generated by the division of offences, is also based on Bentham’s normative or censorial considerations.

48However, if the substance of Bentham’s Pannomion is based on normative or censorial considerations, and if, as I argued in the previous section, what Bentham tried was to adjust the moral or religious sensibilities of the donee countries according to his Pannomion by means of indirect legislation, Bentham would be no less an imperial theorist than James Mill and John Stuart Mill were.

  • 55 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 155.

49However, as we have seen, in 'Place and Time,' Bentham denied that different countries have different catalogues of pleasures and pains by saying that 'thus far at least, human nature may be pronounced to be everywhere the same.'55

  • 56 Loring, Robert, 'The Role of Universal Jurisprudence in Bentham’s Legal Cosmopolitanism', Revue d’é (...)

50As Loring argues, for Bentham, 'the kinds of pains and pleasure humans experience are more or less universal.' Bentham certainly shows a possible way out of the dilemma of descriptive accuracy versus universality, by directing our attention to the sources of human pleasure and pain and the social practices that are organised around avoiding pain and seeking pleasure.56

51Loring’s interpretation seems to be in line with Bentham’s intention. In A Fragment of Government, Bentham writes:

  • 57 Bentham, J., A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, p. 417.

The synopsis of such an arrangement [of offences] would at once be a compendium of expository and censorial Jurisprudence. [] Such a synopsis, in short would be at once a map, and that an universal one, of Jurisprudence as it is, and a slight but comprehensive sketch of what it ought to be.57

  • 58 The most reasonable interpretation is offered in Zhai, Xiaobo, 'Bentham’s Natural Arrangement and t (...)

52This is a very complex passage with many possible interpretations.58 It may be possible to understand Bentham’s distinction between 'expository' and 'censorial' in terms of the distinction between 'net utility' and 'abstract utility,' which we discussed in the previous section. According to Bentham, the difference in human nature:

  • 59 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 155.

lies not in the pains and pleasures themselves, it must lie, if anywhere, in the things that are, or are liable to be, their causes. [...] The same event, an event of the same description, nay, even the same individual event, which would produce pain or pleasure in one country, would not produce the same effect of the same sort, or if of the same sort, not in equal degree, in another.59

  • 60 As Schofield argues, it is important to note here that at first 'Bentham’s theory of sovereignty di (...)

53The 'causes' in the above quotation are identical to 'circumstances influencing sensibility.' Although the abstract utilities are based on common human nature, net utilities would vary among countries due to the variety of moral or religious sensibilities. Although the abstract utility or the division of offences in the Pannomion is based on the common nature of human being, the net utility of each country from time to time deviates from it due to moral or religious sensibilities. Thus, 'abstract utility,' although based on an 'expository' description of common human nature, sometimes becomes 'censorial' to the net utility of donee countries into which Bentham tried to introduce his Pannomion. It is important to note that Bentham, who aspired to be 'the legislator of the world,' regarded western as well as non-western countries as the candidates for 'the donee countries.'60

Conclusion

54In this article, I tried to argue against Pitts that Bentham’s theory of legal transplants involves the reformation of non-western countries. In 'Place and Time,' as to the laws of Mahometan countries, Bentham argues that:

  • 61 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 199-200.

Take what nation you will, give them what character you please, where could have been the advantage that injuries should have been left without redress : that the liberty of men should be teased and perplexed by a chain of minute and frivolous obligations : that punishments, perhaps of the severest kind, should be heaped on them for acts from which no mischievous consequences can be traced.61

55Bentham also argues that:

  • 62 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 197.

Give me, then, the words of Koran : give me the ideas that belong to them : I ask no more. Out of them and them alone I will undertake to produce a code which shall contain a hundred times the useful matter there is in that, without any of those absurdities, the existence of which, upon comparison made with the idea of utility we have at present, you can not but acknowledge.62

56Bentham certainly tried to reform the legal systems of non-western countries by introducing the Pannomion and by bringing the net utility of donee countries in line with the abstract utility embodied in his Pannomion through indirect legislation. However, this would not make Bentham a cultural imperialist, as suggested by Pitts. As we can see from Bentham’s approach to consensual homosexual acts, which we discussed at the end of section 2, Bentham’s Pannomion and the abstract utility embodied in it is based on common human nature and was meant to reform the laws and the moral or religious sensibilities of western as well as non-western countries. Bentham’s approach was based on universal human nature.

57However, there might be at least two major criticisms of this conclusion. The first possible objection might be related to Bentham’s view on colonization. According to Schofield, Bentham argued that:

  • 63 Schofield, P., Utility and Democracy, p. 218.

emancipation for British India was inappropriate, since the inhabitants were unable to give themselves security for their property, and could only receive such security from the slow and gradual influence of European civilization.63

58It is important here to compare Bentham’s view on colonization and that of John Stuart Mill. According to Levin, John Stuart Mill thought that:

  • 64 Levin, Michael, J. S. Mill on Civilization and Barbarism, (London, Routledge, 2004), p. 46.

The Indian people were not yet fit recipients of liberty, which would become their due only at a later stage of development. In June 1852, Mill had informed a House of Lords committee that the public of India afford no assistance in their government. Only occasionally had reform come from within to a barbarian people.64

  • 65 Bentham, Jeremy, 'On the Liberty of Press, and Public Discussion', eds. C. Pease-Watkin and P.Schof (...)

59As we saw in Section 2 of this article, Bentham tried to bring the actual utility experienced by the natives in line with the abstract utility which is embodied in his Pannomion by 'indirect legislations.' The main components of indirect legislation were example, instruction and exhortation. Bentham thought that through indirect legislation, people would find their 'true interests' and would abandon laws that were at odds with his Pannomion. Thus, although Bentham supported the colonial rule of India, he tried to introduce his Pannomion incrementally and consensually. On the other hand, Bentham defended the liberty of the press and public discussion as universally desirable. Bentham argued that the liberty of the press and the public discussion was 'indispensable, at all times and every where'65 because he thought people could understand their 'true interests' through these devices, which are also the devices of indirect legislation. In introducing his Pannomion, Bentham invited the Indian people to 'reform' their prejudices which are at odds with universal human nature through the liberty of the press and public discussion. This approach is certainly different from that of John Stuart Mill, who, as seen above, admitted the minor role of Indian people in their government or reforms.

  • 66 Rosen, Fred, 'Introduction', in Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principle of Moral and Legis (...)
  • 67 Quinn, M., 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains', p. 82.

60However, it might be argued that Bentham’s universal human nature was nothing but a Eurocentric concept, which is the second possible objection discussed here. In Section 2, we saw Bentham’s proposal that consensual homosexual acts should be punished by banishment in the face of strong prejudice against homosexuality. Bentham did not try to abolish the punishment for consensual homosexual acts all at once. This shows that Bentham did not force people to abandon their prejudice. Rosen emphasizes that Bentham’s principle utility had empirical or conventional nature, and that is also the case with his universal human nature.66 Although Bentham tried to enlighten people by indirect legislation to find their true interests, he did not try to force them to accept those interests. As Quinn suggests, for Bentham, 'the only way to combat a prejudice is by presenting evidence'67 through indirect legislation. Bentham’s concept of human nature may be Eurocentric, but it was not imperialistic.

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Bibliographie

Armitage, David, 'Globalizing Jeremy Bentham', History of Political Thought, 32 (2011)

Bentham, Jeremy, Of Laws in General, ed. H. L. A. Hart (London: The Athlone Press, 1970)

Bentham, Jeremy, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart (London, The Athlone Press, 1977)

Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, eds. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. With a New Introduction by F. Rosen (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996)

Bentham, Jeremy, Legislator of the World: Writings on Codification, Law, and Education, eds. P. Schofield and J. Harris (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)

Bentham, Jeremy, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. P. Schofield (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010)

Bentham, Jeremy, 'Place and Time', ed. P. Schofield and S. Engelmann, in Selected Writings: Jeremy Bentham, ed. S. Engelmann (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2011)

Bentham, Jeremy, 'On the Liberty of Press, and Public Discussion', in Jeremy Bentham, On the Liberty of Press, and Public Discussion and Other Legal and Political Writings for Spain and Portugal, eds. C. Pease-Watkin and P. Schofield, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2012)

Bourcier, Benjamin, 'Bentham’s International Political Theory: Taking States’ Responsibilities Seriously', Utilitas, 33 (2021)

Engelmann, Stephen and Pitts, Jennifer, 'Bentham’s "Place and Time"', The Tocqueville Review, 32 (2011)

Ferraro, Francesco, 'Utility, Predictability, and Rights: Bentham’s Utilitarianism and Constitutional Entitlements', Ratio Juris, 35 (2022)

Levin, Michael, J. S. Mill on Civilization and Barbarism, (London, Routledge, 2004)

Lobban, Michael, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 17601850 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991)

Loring, Robert, 'The Role of Universal Jurisprudence in Bentham’s Legal Cosmopolitanism', Revue d’études benthamiennes 13 (2014)

Niesen, Peter, 'Bentham’s cosmopolitan constitutionalism', in Bentham on Democracy, Courts, and Codification, eds. P. Schofield and X. Zhai (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022)

Pitts, Jennifer, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2005)

Pitts, Jennifer, '"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought', in Selected Writings: Jeremy Bentham

Postema, Gerald, Utility, Publicity, and Law: Essays on Bentham’s Moral and Legal Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019)

Quinn, Michael, 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains: What is the legislator to do when the people err in assigning mischief', in Bentham’s Theory of Law and Public Opinion, eds. X. Zhai and M. Quinn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014)

Quinn, Michael, Bentham (Cambridge, Polity, 2022)

Rosen, Fred, 'Introduction', in Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principle of Moral and Legislation

Schofield, Philip, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006)

Schofield, Philip, 'Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart’s Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence', Jurisprudence, 1-2 (2010)

Zhai, Xiaobo, 'Bentham’s Natural Arrangement and the Collapse of the Expositor–Censor Distinction in the General Theory of Law', in Bentham’s Theory of Law and Public Opinion

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Notes

1 Pitts, Jennifer, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 14.

2 Pitts, Jennifer, '"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought', in Selected Writings: Jeremy Bentham, ed. S. Engelmann (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2011), p. 489.

3 Engelmann, Stephen and Pitts, Jennifer, 'Bentham’s "Place and Time"', The Tocqueville Review, 32 (2011), pp. 58-9.

4 Bentham, Jeremy, Jeremy Bentham’s Economic Writings: Critical Edition based on his Printed Works and Unprinted Manuscripts, vol. 3, ed. W. Stark (London and New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 249 cited in Pitts, J., '"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought', p. 499.

5 Quinn, Michael, 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains: What is the legislator to do when the people err in assigning mischief', in Bentham’s Theory of Law and Public Opinion, eds. X. Zhai and M. Quinn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 77.

6 It might be suggested to use 'cosmopolitanism' rather than universal human nature to deny imperialist aspects of Bentham. But Niesen argues that Bentham was not a cosmopolitan in his plan for global order. According to Niesen, Bentham’s 'international law relates nations through their "sovereigns" to each other' and excludes 'any entitlements of stateless individuals and non-state people from an international code.' Niesen also shows that 'common and equal utility of nations,' much quoted Bentham’s object of international law, 'means that total happiness of a small country would be of equal weight to that of one with a numerous populations' and that it is anti-cosmopolitan in the sense that 'its concern for the equality of collectives entails a differential concern for individuals.' See, Niesen, Peter, 'Bentham’s cosmopolitan constitutionalism', in Bentham on Democracy, Courts, and Codification, eds. P.Schofield and X. Zhai (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2022), pp. 346-7.

7 This is a word by José del Valle in his letter to Bentham. Bentham, Jeremy, ‘Legislator of the World’: Writings on Codification, Law and Education, eds. P.Schofield and J. Harris (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 370.

8 According to Armitage, Bentham’s 'developing universalism was […] shaped by his response to the challenge of the period,' such as Seven Years War and the American War of Independence. See, Armitage, David, 'Globalizing Jeremy Bentham', History of Political Thought, 32 (2011), pp. 67-9. Armitage includes Bentham’s universal jurisprudence and his plan of International law as the examples of Bentham’s 'developing universalism.' However, this paper focuses on Bentham’s plans of universal codes and universal jurisprudence. As to Bentham’s international law or international political theory, see Bourcier, Benjamin, 'Bentham’s International Political Theory: Taking States’ Responsibilities Seriously', Utilitas, 33 (2021). According to Bourcier, 'Bentham’s political theory explicitly embedded a set of cosmopolitan responsibilities for particular ministers, public officials and governors who are accountable for the direct impact of their decisions and actions on individuals’ happiness regardless of criteria of nationality, community membership, ethnicity and religion' (p. 301). It is important to note that Bourcier discusses 'cosmopolitan responsibilities' rather than cosmopolitanism itself in Bentham’s theory.

9 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', eds. P. Schofield and S. Engelmann, in Selected Writings: Jeremy Bentham, pp. 153-4.

10 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, pp. 121, 146.

11 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 193

12 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, p. 120.

13 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, p. 119.

14 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, p. 119.

15 Pitts, J., A Turn to Empire, p. 121. Pitts adds that Bentham’s plan for Indian juries 'was designed on the one hand as a check, in the form of publicity and public opinion, and on the other hand as a form of civic education.' (p. 120). Bentham’s jury plan for England had the same purposes. See, Schofield, Philip, Utility and Democracy: The Political Thought of Jeremy Bentham (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 312.

16 Bentham, Jeremy, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, eds. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. With a New Introduction by F. Rosen (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 40.

17 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 51.

18 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 155.

19 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 155.

20 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 155-7.

21 Pitts, J., '"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought', pp. 488-9.

22 Pitts, J., '"Great and Distant Crimes": Empire in Bentham’s Thought', p. 489.

23 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 167.

24 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 158-9, 162, 165.

25 I use the term, 'donee countries' to denote the countries to where laws were to be transplanted.

26 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 174.

27 Quinn, Michael, Bentham (Cambridge, Polity, 2022), p. 65.

28 Quinn, M., 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains', p. 77.

29 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 162-3.

30 Quinn, M., 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains', p. 82.

31 Bentham, J., Legislator of the World: Writings on Codification, Law, and Education, p. 26.

32 The work mentioned by Bentham is in The Theory of Legislation (1802).

33 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 6.

34 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 6, n.c.

35 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 305.

36 Postema, Gerald, Utility, Publicity, and Law: Essays on Bentham’s Moral and Legal Philosophy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 294, 20. By this argument, Bentham tried to expel sheer fictions such as natural rights, natural laws and the like, which cannot be tethered to empirical facts from the human discourses.

37 Bentham, Jeremy, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. P.Schofield (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2010), pp. 316-7, cited in Ferraro, Francesco, 'Utility, Predictability, and Rights: Bentham’s Utilitarianism and Constitutional Entitlements', Ratio Juris, 35 (2022), p. 44.

38 Bentham, Jeremy, Of Laws in General, ed. H. L. A. Hart (London, The Athlone Press, 1970), p. 177.

39 Ferraro, F., 'Utility, Predictability, and Rights: Bentham’s Utilitarianism and Constitutional Entitlements', p. 44.

40 Ferraro, F., 'Utility, Predictability, and Rights: Bentham’s Utilitarianism and Constitutional Entitlements', p. 44.

41 Postema, G., Utility, Publicity, and Law: Essays on Bentham’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, p. 294.

42 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 294.

43 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 294.

44 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 295.

45 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 6, n.c.

46 Schofield, Philip, 'Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart’s Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence', Jurisprudence, 1-2 (2010), p. 156.

47 Postema, G., Utility, Publicity, and Law: Essays on Bentham’s Moral and Legal Philosophy, pp. 150-152.

48 Bentham, J., Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, p. 196.

49 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 305.

50 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 16.

51 Lobban, Michael, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence 17601850 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 164.

52 Schofield, P., 'Jeremy Bentham and HLA Hart’s ‘Utilitarian Tradition in Jurisprudence', p. 157.

53 Bentham, Jeremy, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart (London, The Athlone Press, 1977), p. 417.

54 Bentham, J., A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, p. 417.

55 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 155.

56 Loring, Robert, 'The Role of Universal Jurisprudence in Bentham’s Legal Cosmopolitanism', Revue d’études benthamiennes 13 (2014), para.47.

57 Bentham, J., A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, p. 417.

58 The most reasonable interpretation is offered in Zhai, Xiaobo, 'Bentham’s Natural Arrangement and the Collapse of the Expositor–Censor Distinction in the General Theory of Law', in Bentham’s Theory of Law and Public Opinion, p. 174. According to Zhai, for Bentham, '[a] really meaningful account of the nature of law as it is abstracts and describes the interesting properties of really existing laws. […] the concepts arising from this account [natural arrangements], are necessarily or naturally useful.'

59 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', p. 155.

60 As Schofield argues, it is important to note here that at first 'Bentham’s theory of sovereignty did not in itself prescribe a particular constitutional structure […] It was only when he eventually came to consider what form of government would be most desirable that he needed to relate his theory of sovereignty to the constitutional structure in question'. Bentham turned to political radicalism around 1809 and realised in 1817 or 1818 that constitutional reform was a precondition for introducing his Pannomion. He after then 'believed that only a government or people "professing liberal opinions" would take seriously his offer to codify'. See Schofield, P., Utility and Democracy, pp. 227-8, 249.

61 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 199-200.

62 Bentham, J., 'Place and Time', pp. 197.

63 Schofield, P., Utility and Democracy, p. 218.

64 Levin, Michael, J. S. Mill on Civilization and Barbarism, (London, Routledge, 2004), p. 46.

65 Bentham, Jeremy, 'On the Liberty of Press, and Public Discussion', eds. C. Pease-Watkin and P.Schofield, On the Liberty of Press, and Public Discussion and Other Legal and Political Writings for Spain and Portugal (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2012) p. 4.

66 Rosen, Fred, 'Introduction', in Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principle of Moral and Legislation, p.lvii.

67 Quinn, M., 'Popular Prejudices, Real Pains', p. 82.

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Michihiro Kaino, « Bentham’s Universal Jurisprudence and Theory of Legal Transplant »Revue d’études benthamiennes [En ligne], 24 | 2023, mis en ligne le 30 août 2023, consulté le 14 juin 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/10870 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/etudes-benthamiennes.10870

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Michihiro Kaino

Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan

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