• 1 A previous version of this article was published in Portuguese in Historia contemporánea. Problemas (...)

1Democracy and representation have different origins and meanings. Coined originally in Ancient Greece, democracy means rule (kratos) of the people (demos).1 Representation (representatione), on the other hand, is of Latin origin. Its first documented parliamentary use traces back to 1188, the year in which Alfonso IX, King of León, gathered members of the Iberian nobility as a way to gain political and economic support. The noblemen of the Cortes of León acted as representatives because their decisions were considered as if they were made by the inhabitants of the places they ruled over.

• 2 See, for instance, Barber, Benjamin. Strong Democracy (Berkeley, University of California Press, 19 (...)

2Given the difference between the concepts of “representation” and “democracy,” some advocates of the latter might consider it incompatible with the former. Whereas democracy referred to an ancient type of government where the whole citizenry governed themselves, representation was used by monarchs and noblemen to govern a population who lacked freedom. Hence the criticism, vigorously voiced by some contemporary writers, that the attempt to combine representation and democracy would be as promising an endeavor as trying to teach an elephant to fly.2

• 3 For a discussion of the contemporary literature defending the democratic credentials of representat (...)
• 4 See Philosophy and Democracy: An Anthology, ed. T. Christiano (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 200 (...)
• 5 This does not mean, of course, that Rousseau rejected representation in toto. According to him, it (...)

3Contrary to this critique, an increasing number of authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, representation can be democratic.3 The scholarship on democracy and representation, which has increased over the last years, indicates that investigating the relationship between the two concepts is one of the main debates in contemporary philosophy and political theory.4 Leaving most of the contemporary literature aside, this article assesses the origins of the debate between democracy and representation in modern political thought by turning to the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. The article first examines Rousseau’s critique of representation in The Social Contract (1762). Rousseau can be considered a critic of representation insofar as he asserts that representation denies a pivotal element of democracy, namely popular sovereignty.5 The incompatibility between democracy and representation postulated in his work is based on the following assumptions: (1) sovereignty consists solely of the will; and (2) representation is a form of delegation.

• 6 For a comprehensive analysis of the theory of representation put forward by Rousseau and Mill in th (...)
• 7 They also typify different traditions of political thought: while Rousseau belongs to civic republi (...)

5The theme of democracy and representation was addressed by Mill and Rousseau in other books and, over time, their approach to the matter has changed.6 However, detailing the changes such a theme underwent in the many works of each writer is beyond the scope of this article. Since the goal is to outline the two positions that shaped the debate on the relationship between democracy and representation in modern political thought, this article focuses on the works of two philosophers that typify the competing sides of this debate.7 In what ways does Mill’s defense of representative democracy respond to Rousseau’s critique of representation? This is the main question the current article aims to answer.

• 8 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings (Cambridge, Cambridg (...)

6In Book III of The Social Contract, Rousseau identifies democracy with self-government and contends that in the democratic regime the legislative power and the executive power are united: after making the law, the people also execute it. Having defined democracy, Rousseau lists its four prerequisites. First, democracy is suitable only for small states, as the simultaneous assembly of an entire people is not feasible in larger states. Second, democracy demands great simplicity of morals. Given that it requires citizens to interact on a constant basis, democracy would not last long in a society composed of heterogeneous social groups. When they share the same customs, citizens can interact among themselves without running the risk of entering “thorny discussions” which could threaten the perpetuation of their coexistence.8 Third, democracy demands equality of ranks and fortunes. This prerequisite relates to the former, for its goal also consists in avoiding social diversity. The more similar the fortunes and classes of citizens, the more likely that their customs will be simple. When people’s fortunes and classes are not fairly similar, the equality of rights and authority, which is the cornerstone of democracy, becomes impossible.

• 9 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, Cartas a Christophe de Beaumont e outros escritos sobre a religião e a mora (...)
• 10 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 91.

7Finally, democracy demands little or no luxury. Luxury presupposes and fuels social inequality, thus becoming contrary to the democratic spirit. As if it were not enough, luxury stimulates vanity and laxity, both of which are undemocratic because democracy demands virtuous people. “The word virtue means strength.”9 Virtuous people have the strength to execute the laws they enact and to defend the homeland in times of danger. Luxury makes the exercise of virtue difficult and “corrupts rich and poor alike,” for it removes their opportunity to live among equals, a life that is characteristic of democracy.10

• 11 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 91.
• 12 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 91.

8Taken together, these four prerequisites disclose that Rousseau endorsed a robust conception of democracy—so robust, indeed, that it led him to conclude that “a genuine Democracy never has existed, and never will exist.”11 Democracy is suitable only to gods, not to human beings. Rousseau confesses it is difficult for him to imagine people gathering non-stop to manage their public affairs. Even in the smallest and most cohesive political community, citizens will desire, at one moment or another, to obtain a respite from public life. It is thus understandable that they will want to “establish commissions,” which in turn would ruin democracy.12

• 13 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 113.

9In the chapter where he discusses democracy, Rousseau neither explains what he understands by commissions nor does he clarify why they would dismantle democracy. It is only in chapter fifteen of Book III that such explanations emerge. Entitled “Of Deputies or Representatives,” this chapter begins by associating representation with political apathy and privatism. People who elect representatives “stay at home” because they choose to delegate their political power to the politicians they vote for.13 Representation, in this sense, implies the delegation of political power from the represented to the representative and the lack of popular participation.

• 14 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 113.
• 15 In Considerations on the Government of Poland, Rousseau concedes that there should be representativ (...)
• 16 Robert Derathé seems to have misinterpreted this point. He contends that Rousseau would have aligne (...)

10Ultimately, democracy is incompatible with representation because in “a truly free State, the citizens do everything with their hands.”14 Rousseau’s aversion to representation stems from the idea that the members of a free polity must carry out by themselves all actions necessary for the preservation of the political body. His censure of political representation descends from a larger criticism of Rousseauian philosophy: the critique of commerce, modern economy, and its attendant division of labor. In The Social Contract, Rousseau claims that electing a representative is like hiring a third party to perform an action that is the duty of the hirer to perform.15 Although this understanding has been reviewed over time, in all of Rousseau’s political writings, the thesis that representation is a form of delegation plays a crucial role.16

• 17 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 114.
• 18 Witness the case of the Cortes convened by Alfonso IX in 1188. Although their meeting was initially (...)

11Rousseau attributes the emergence of political representation to the following reasons: (1) the decline in patriotism; (2) the increase in private interests; (3) military conquests; (4) the vastness of states; and (5) government abuses.17 Notice that the first two items of this list are primarily subjective, in the sense that they refer to changes in people’s behavior. Rousseau’s brief genesis of representative government does not entirely ring true when contrasted with a more comprehensive historical study of representative institutions. A rigorous analysis of the emergence of representative institutions in Europe corroborates, on the one hand, the last three causes on Rousseau’s list. On the other hand, it also reveals that representative institutions did not arise due to a supposed increase in individual interests. On the contrary, representative institutions have consolidated because of political interests, that is, the interests of groups of citizens driven by the desire not to be dominated (in this case, by the monarch).18 Such a claim, moreover, is not necessarily correlated with a decline in love for the homeland. If they work democratically, representative institutions can stimulate patriotism.

• 19 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 57.

12In addition to the thesis that representation is a delegation of political power, another core premise of Rousseau’s philosophy that leads him to disparage the English representative government is that sovereignty consists exclusively of the will. “I say, then, that sovereignty, since it is nothing but the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated.”19 Rousseau insists sovereignty cannot be represented because it is impossible to transfer the will to do something to somebody else. Once it is understood that the will is the only component of sovereignty, attempting to reconcile popular sovereignty and political representation makes no sense.

• 20 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 114.
• 21 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 115.

13Rousseau affirms that the English are mistaken when they believe that they live under a free regime. In English representative government, people are free only on Election Day. Once representatives are elected, the country is “enslaved.”20 The English people whom the rulers swore to represent could not direct their will, if for no other reason than because suffrage was restricted to a small portion of the population. Rousseau’s critique reveals, in short, that the English representative government of the eighteenth century was nothing more than tyranny disguised as freedom. Hence Rousseau’s somber tone at the end of his chapter on representation: “the instant a People gives itself Representatives, it ceases to be free; it ceases to be.”21

• 22 Vaughan, Charles Edwyn, “Introduction: Rousseau as Political Philosopher,” in The Political Writing (...)
• 23 Vaughan, C. E., “Introduction,” p. 5.
• 24 CW I, p. 168. All page references to the writings of Mill are to The Collected Works of John Stuart (...)
• 25 CW XVIII, p. 253. This laudatory tone toward Rousseau also appears in A System of Logic (1843), in (...)
• 26 CW XVIII, p. 253.
• 27 CW XVIII, p. 253.

15In his introduction to Rousseau’s political works, Charles Vaughan contends that Rousseau was the “strongest force” influencing English political philosophy “during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century.”22 Rousseau’s influence would be “manifest,” for example, in Mill’s political thought.23 Vaughan’s assertion gains plausibility when we read Mill, in his autobiography, declare that his mature “political philosophy” was influenced by “Continental thought.”24 Such influence is noticeable in the second chapter of On Liberty (1859), when Mill states that “the paradoxes of Rousseau” must be “asserted as much as ever.”25 According to him, Rousseau’s critique of civilization exploded “like bombshells” in the midst of eighteenth-century philosophy.26 Although Mill considers it exaggerated, he regards Rousseau’s critique as having offered a “salutary shock” because it forced some people to recognize the mistakes that their enchantment with civilization had led them to commit.27

• 28 CW XIX, p. 515.

17In Representative Government the expression “representative democracy” appears only five times, whereas “representative government” has almost seventy occurrences. The difference in the frequency of the terms shows that representative democracy has a more restricted meaning than representative government. While the former designates a political regime in which representation is practiced democratically, the latter refers to any government that resorts to political representation. Every representative democracy is a representative government, but not every representative government is a representative democracy. The concept of “democratic representation” put forward in Representative Government indicates that many self-identified representative democracies are merely oligarchic representative governments.28 This is one of the greatest contributions of Mill’s political philosophy: by investigating what distinguishes representative democracy from representative government, Mill helps us identify the undemocratic aspects of extant representative governments. Such contribution is important because if we do not challenge the thesis that all forms of representation are necessarily antidemocratic, we hinder the development of theoretical tools that enable us to democratize existing representative institutions. From the premise that representation is necessarily oligarchic, the conclusion that follows is that efforts to construct mechanisms to democratize existing governments would be useless. After all, these governments are representative and thus would never be democratic.

• 29 CW XIX, p. 393.

18Mill’s search for democratic representation is related to his understanding of political philosophy. According to him, the role of political philosophy is not to propose programmatic content to be directly applied to concrete political life. Such a task would belong more to the “science or art of government” rather than to political philosophy.29 The appropriate object of political philosophy consists in investigating the good regime, or more precisely, the just regime. However, this does not mean that political philosophy is abstract and non-contextual. In addition to explaining what a good regime should be, political philosophy must expound how existing political communities can achieve it.

• 30 CW XIX, p. 389
• 31 CW XIX, p. 385

20According to Mill, political philosophy is inevitably normative because it must clarify what constitutes a good government and a virtuous citizen. “If we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good government . . . depends, we find that the principal of them, the one which transcends all others, is the qualities of the human beings composing the society.”30 Since the good regime depends on virtuous citizens to exist, it must foster “virtues in the community,” which is why political philosophy cannot dispense with ethics.31 Nevertheless, this broader concern must be combined with a narrower, more contextual consideration, because to satisfy the organizational criterion, political philosophy must take into account the specific reality of a given people.

• 32 CW XIX, p. 376.
• 33 CW XIX, pp. 377, 385, 483.
• 34 CW XIX, p. 378.
• 35 CW XIX, p. 377.
• 36 CW XVIII, p. 266.

22Mill begins the book by noting that a free government does not demand the mere acquiescence of the people but also “their active participation.”32 Popular participation is necessary because it develops virtues that are fundamental for a free regime. As examples of such virtues, Mill cites integrity, prudence, political awareness, justice, and public spirit.33 Before explaining how participation fosters such virtues, it is worth pointing out that Mill echoes Rousseau’s critical diagnosis when he writes that “representative institutions are of little value, and may be a mere instrument of tyranny or intrigue, when the generality of electors are not sufficiently interested in their own government . . . or, if they vote at all, do not bestow their suffrages on public grounds.”34 Far from uncritically advocating for representative government, Mill concedes that this type of regime can become tyrannical. Simply put, any representative government in which the people do not participate in the exercise of sovereignty is despotic.35 If this description of despotism is juxtaposed with the definition that Mill offers for the term in On Liberty—namely that “whatever crushes individuality is despotism”—popular participation can be seen as conducive to the development of citizens’ individuality.36 The relationship between democratic participation and the development of individuality will be detailed in the next section.

• 37 CW XIX, p. 403.
• 38 CW XIX, p. 381
• 39 Rosanvallon, Pierre, A democracia inacabada (São Paulo, Alameda, 2018), p. 60 and Urbinati, N., Rep (...)

23How does Mill understand sovereignty? In Representative Government, he defines it as “the supreme controlling power in the last resort” and adds that “the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty . . . is vested in the entire aggregate of the community.”37 In representative democracy, the controlling power of sovereignty comprises two elements: the will, which is expressed when a subject makes a decision, and judgment, which results from people’s opinions.38 Mill does not dispute Rousseau’s thesis that the will is impossible to be represented, but he denies that sovereignty is limited to it. Insofar as it also consists of judgment—the opinions of the people aligned with their will—popular sovereignty is compatible with representation. A diarchic sovereignty is a defining feature of representative democracy.39 In an oligarchic representative government, like that of eighteenth-century England, sovereignty is not diarchic because the will guiding the representatives’ decisions does not take into account people’s opinions. In representative democracy, however, sovereignty is diarchic because people’s judgment determines their representatives’ decisions. One can find here Mill’s rejection of the Rousseauian assertion that popular sovereignty cannot be represented.

• 40 CW XIX, p. 448.
• 41 That is why, in The Subjection of Women, Mill asserts that the fact that some women consented to pa (...)

24By refuting Rousseau’s conception of sovereignty, Mill’s theory of diarchic sovereignty shows that popular sovereignty involves not only the moment of authorization provided by elections but also the ongoing deliberative process that happens before and after that moment. A majoritarian vote does not necessarily imply a democratic decision, that is, a decision that bolsters popular power. To assess whether a decision was made democratically, it is necessary to consider the entire deliberative process that preceded it. In other words, it is necessary to examine a longer period than the moment of popular ratification. Popular sovereignty is not limited to the moment in which the popular vote is counted. Electoral authorization is just the tip of the iceberg, so to speak. In a representative democracy, electoral decisions result from a long process of adjudicative maturation. If the judgment and deliberative process that guided people’s decisions were manipulated, the majority decision does not qualify as democratic. Instead, it would be a decision whose democratic character was “false”: although it may disguise itself as democratic, it would not be so because it would not promote people’s autonomy.40 Consensus alone is insufficient to ascertain the autonomous nature of an action. To evaluate whether an action was autonomous, it is imperative to analyze the adjudicative process through which the subject consented to it.41

• 42 CW XIX, p. 511.

25Besides articulating popular sovereignty and representation, Mill criticizes “the delegation theory of representation.”42 This is the theory that Rousseau presents in The Social Contract when he states that by electing a representative, the represented delegate their capacity for political action. Against such a theory, Mill argues that representation does not need to function as a form of delegation that divests the represented of political power. If it operates democratically, representation encourages, rather than inhibits, the participation of the represented in the political process.

• 43 CW XIX, p. 535.

26A democratic representative government cannot restrict people’s participation to the moment of voting. In the chapter where he defends the creation of local representative institutions, Mill affirms that democratic representation requires cultivating participatory mechanisms “in the interval between one parliamentary election and another.”43 Local institutions, public meetings and demonstrations, the drafting of petitions, as well as the existence of a free and diverse press are some of the necessary channels of participation for a representative government to be democratic. By challenging Rousseau’s conception of sovereignty and his delegation theory of representation, Mill develops a model of representative democracy that combines political representation and popular participation.

• 44 CW XIX, p. 535
• 45 CW XIX, p. 535. In addition to the developmental justification, Mill provides a protective justific (...)
• 46 CW XIX, p. 401.

27In addition to allowing the people to direct the decisions of their representatives, the channels of popular participation necessary for democratizing representative government are “most instrumental to the nourishment of public spirit and the development of intelligence.”44 Representative democracy satisfies the developmental criterion because it promotes “the public education of the citizens.”45 Representative democracy corresponds to the modern good regime because, by maintaining free institutions over a vast and densely populated territory, it fosters popular development. Mill justifies the thesis that free institutions encourage people’s development by referring to the Greek and Roman experience. The ancient republics provided the most notable examples of citizens because “the energy, patriotism, and enlargement of mind . . . are the fruits solely of freedom.”46

• 47 Bain, Alexander, John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections (London, Longmans, Green (...)
• 48 CW XI, p. 314.
• 49 CW XIX, chap. 3. On Mill’s epistemic justification of representative democracy, see Dalaqua, Gustav (...)

28The influence of the ancient Greeks on Mill’s political philosophy, as well as on how Victorian thinkers interpreted democracy, has been the subject of many studies. Some commentators have suggested that Mill’s defense of democracy resulted from his being “a Greece-intoxicated man.”47 Yet however fascinated he might have seemed by the ancients, Mill was not nostalgic. He did not intend to turn back time and make modern representative government a copy of Athenian democracy. For him, modern democracy was “superior” to the democracy of the ancients because it spread civic freedom more widely.48 This breadth of liberty resulted not only from the abolition of slavery but also from representation, a device that would allow the moderns to coordinate, over a vast territory, political actions performed in different times and places. By extending the maturation time of a political proposal and increasing the number of participants who can influence it, representation tends to avoid the imprudence that decisions performed in haste often entail. Mill’s defense of representative democracy contains an epistemic justification: representation can produce wiser decisions because it encourages the participation of a greater number of people over a longer period of time. This epistemic aspect is evident not only in the product of representation (the decision) but also in its agents (the citizens who made the decision).49

• 50 CW XIX, p. 457.
• 51 CW XVIII, p. 266.

29As a utilitarian, Mill never dissociated the value of political institutions from the benefit they provide to the greatest number of people. By creating a public forum that urges citizens to judge politics, representative democracy promotes critical reflexivity. One of Mill’s greatest fears regarding modern governments was their tendency towards “collective mediocrity.”50 Collective mediocrity would be the extinction of diversity and conflict, both of which are necessary for the development of individuality and democracy. In On Liberty, Mill identifies the danger of collective mediocrity with the rise of the middle class and the ensuing hegemony of bourgeois puritanism. To counteract collective mediocrity, he contends that representative governments ought to reclaim the “Pagan self-assertion” or, more specifically, the “Greek ideal of self-development.”51 For representative government to be democratic, it must preserve the conditions for the existence of individuality.

• 52 CW XI, p. 319.

30Democracy uses majority rule, but is not defined solely by it. Drawing from Pericles’ funeral oration, narrated by Thucydides in History of the Peloponnesian War, Mill points out that democracy, since its inception, denotes not only a form of government but also a form of society. In his speech honoring the soldiers who died in defense of Athens, Pericles indicates that democracy is a form of government in which citizens are equally capable of deciding political affairs, and also a form of society characterized by “freedom from social intolerance” and a “lively interest and energetic participation in public affairs.”52 The two constitutive principles of democracy are, in short, equality and freedom.

• 53 CW XIX, p. 378.
• 54 CW XVIII, p. 165.

31To democratize representative government, Mill reclaims the two democratic principles mentioned in Pericles’ funeral oration. Regarding equality, representative government could be democratized if, along with the expansion of suffrage, it created mechanisms that allowed the represented to influence representatives’ decisions in an equitable manner. To ensure that citizens have equal power to influence their representatives’ proposals, Mill advocates for the creation of a free press, which, for representative democracy, would constitute “the real equivalent … of the Pnyx.”53 In Athenian democracy, the Pnyx was the place where citizens judged political matters. Alongside the agora, the Pnyx delimited the scope of isegoria. A fundamental dimension of democratic citizenship, isegoria denoted the equal power every Athenian had to direct political decisions through participation in public debate. If they are to democratize themselves, representative governments must promote the isegoria of citizens. Therefore, along with legal equality, they must promote equality of speech. Since it is not possible to gather the entire population to debate in one place, a free press serves as a mechanism to unite the people “simultaneously in one agora.”54 A free press is the modern agora, a discursive space where the judgments of the represented are articulated publicly and influence the decisions of the representatives.

• 56 CW XIX, p. 401.

35Rousseau and Mill share the same diagnosis: due to commercialism, modern societies are filled with a competitive individualism that jeopardizes their orientation toward the common good. They diverge, however, in the path they envisage to overcome this problem. While Rousseau claims in The Social Contract that the restoration of a free and virtuous community requires abolishing representation, Mill emphasizes that representative democracy can help people overcome privatism and act in a public-spirited manner. When they enter the modern agora, citizens are confronted with different social perspectives and are compelled to conclude that the way a particular issue initially appeared to them does not correspond to the perspective of an individual from a different background. This “enlargement of mind” helps spread virtues indispensable for representative democracy, such as integrity, prudence, political awareness, justice, and public spirit.56

• 57 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 123.
• 58 Freitas, Jacira, Política e festa popular em Rousseau: a recusa da representação (São Paulo, Humani (...)
• 59 Thompson, Dennis Frank, John Stuart Mill and Representative Government (Princeton, Princeton Univer (...)

36Note that, in the last indented passage, Mill characterizes the claims represented in the agora of the moderns as conflicting. This point is noteworthy because it exposes another difference between Mill and Rousseau. In The Social Contract, Rousseau states that “long debates, dissensions, [and] disturbances signal the ascendancy of particular interests and the decline of the State.”57 As Jacira Freitas points out, Rousseau’s critique of representation is linked to his longing for a type of politics that “overcomes conflict.”58 Likewise, in his comparative analysis between Mill and Rousseau, Dennis Thompson affirms that one of the major differences between them is that, while Mill asserts that political conflict is essential for a democratic regime, “the salient feature of [Rousseau’s] republic is consensus.”59

• 60 Urbinati, N., Representative Democracy, p. 108.
• 61 Rousseau, J.-J., Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, p. 104.
• 62 Rousseau, J.-J., Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, p. 61. See also Rousseau, Jean-Jacq (...)
• 63 Rousseau, J.-J., Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, pp. 75–6.
• 64 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, p. 121.
• 65 Urbinati, N., Representative Democracy, p. 89.
• 66 Rousseau, J.-J., Social Contract, pp. 121, 204.

38In Rousseau’s descriptive view of representation, representatives “do not make the law but give the law explicit material form.”60 In this sense, the role of the representative assembly would not be to build the just law but to describe it. “All the rules of natural right are … engraved in the hearts of men.”61 The just law is already formed in the human heart before political deliberation begins, which is why representative assemblies should not “last long, and six weeks’ duration seems to me quite sufficient for the ordinary needs of the State.”62 Moreover, it is not advisable for representatives to discuss much among themselves because votes taken collectively “always proceed less directly to the common interest than do those taken separately by individuals.”63 The general will determines whether the law voted by the assembly is just or not. Its standard of righteousness is independent of any political debate people may have and its “necessity is universal.”64 Enacting the just law is like solving a mathematical equation. In both cases, what is sought is “an answer to a true/false question.”65 Just as the best mathematician can solve an equation most parsimoniously, so too the best political assembly is one that promulgates the just law as quickly as possible. Hence the criticism of “eloquence” and the long and “idle discussions” in which people commonly engage when discussing politics.66

• 67 CW XIX, p. 432.

39A major difference regarding Mill’s theory of representation is that, as a critic of natural law theory, Mill believes that drafting a just law requires long debates among politicians. After all, this is the only way to anticipate the possible ramifications that the law chosen by the assembly might have among the different groups of the political community. The most appropriate means to arrive at a just law is not introspective reflection, the listening to the human heart done by an isolated individual. The just law must be constantly updated and can be approached only in a representative assembly where the multifarious social perspectives of the people confront one another. Democratic representation is an endless task and the representative assembly must remain in operation year-round. The work of representation is not to describe a pre-existing reality, but rather to ensure that the different positions held by the body politic on a given issue “can produce itself in full light.”67 This production is inherent to the representative process. Mill denies the existence of a natural law capable of providing legislators with an immutable standard of righteousness. The just law is a dynamic construct that can only be fully fleshed out through debate and confrontation among the different social perspectives of the people. That is why Mill deems conflict indispensable for political deliberation.

• 68 CW XIX, p. 448.
• 69 CW XIX, p. 448.

40To ensure the perpetuation of conflict in the representative assembly, Mill proposes a system of proportional representation that would inject agonism into deliberation by including the most diverse social groups. Hence his differentiation between false democracy and true democracy: while the former is confused with a “government of privilege” that serves only the interests of the representatives of the majority, the latter serves the interests of all groups that make up the demos.68 True democracy is “the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented.”69 It is the government that, by providing equitable conditions for everyone to judge politics in a critical manner, promotes popular autonomy.

• 70 CW XIX, p. 388.
• 71 CW XIX, p. 441. On Mill’s critical appropriation of Bentham’s democratic theory, see Murata, Minami (...)

41Affiliating himself with the way “the ancients” conceived politics, Mill warns that if left to its own devices, every political institution tends toward degeneration.70 If people cease to participate in politics, true democracy soon dies. When a representative government becomes tyrannical, elected representatives act under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community. Like Jeremy Bentham, Mill thought that representative government would remain oligarchical as long as representatives have “sinister interests.”71 Sinister interests come about when a privileged group is able to impose its own sectional interest as if it were the public good. Elected representatives constitute a class apart from the people and, as such, they may develop interests that are at odds with the public interest. To overcome this conflict of interest, representatives’ interests have to be brought into line with their constituents’. This is to be achieved by the dismissal that becomes possible with democratic election, as well as with the pressure of public opinion and popular participation in everyday politics.

• 72 Koselleck, Reinhart, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford (...)

42Mill’s appreciation for conflict derives from his understanding that conflict is indispensable to human development. The advantage of a contentious political debate over a harmonious one is that the former facilitates the development of a better proposal. As Mill explains in On Liberty, a proposal that has withstood the test of various objections is better than one that has never been contested. The creation of wiser proposals comes along with another benefit of conflict: the development of individuality. The nineteenth century was “a century of Bildung.”72 Influenced by the German philosophy of his time, Mill posited an intimate connection between conflict and the development of individuality. Although this thesis is present in Representative Government, the book where Mill explores it the most is undoubtedly On Liberty. To be sure, Mill claims that On Liberty is:

• 74 CW XIX, p. 488.

43More than a form of government, representative democracy denotes a way of life. Every political institution has a “spirit” of its own that produces a certain “impression . . . on the mind of the citizen,” which in turn favors his or her development in a particular way.74 Representative democracy is the regime of individuality. Both are inextricably bound up with one another and depend on each other to exist. Only in a regime of freedom can individuals grow to their utmost. Mill does not deny that exceptional people may develop a critical individuality even in despotic environments, but he argues that the diffusion of the development of individuality for the majority of the people only occurs in a free government.

• 75 CW XIX, p. 508.

44No less than its ancient counterpart, the free government of the moderns requires individuality. If people are not capable of thinking for themselves, representative democracy sooner or later degenerates into tyranny. The spirit of representative democracy goes against the “school of reverence” typical of despotic regimes.75 Representative democracy needs subjects brave enough to use their own understanding autonomously. People cannot self-govern when their judgments are heteronomous. In representative democracy, the judgment of the represented determines not only whom they will vote for but also which proposals their representatives will present in the assembly in the interval between one election and another. The extinction of critical individuality is therefore very grave for representative democracy.

• 76 CW XIX, p. 409.

45In order to prevent democracy from undermining the “spiritual” foundation on which it is based, Mill proposes some political arrangements to safeguard the conditions necessary for the existence of individuality.76 According to the organizational criterion presented at the beginning of the book, a good regime must organize popular participation in a way that preserves conflict and the competence that arises from it. If it can keep the flame of conflict burning, democracy protects the formation of individuality and disseminates more critical political positions among representatives and the represented, thus making them more competent in dealing with collective problems.

• 77 Mill stopped defending the adoption of plural votes when he saw conservative politicians invoke suc (...)

46Many of the political arrangements proposed in Representative Government seem unusual to contemporary eyes. One of them is the proposal to grant plural votes for the most educated, which evidently curtails the democratic aspect of Mill’s philosophy. The defense of plural votes is one of the passages of Representative Government where the principle of competence works against democracy.77 Alongside his defense of plural voting, Mill argues that everyone should vote publicly. According to him, this would enhance the deliberative aspect of voting and reduce the likelihood of someone voting based on selfish motives. For Mill, what is interesting about representative government are not elections themselves, but rather the debates, justifications, and revisions they provoke among citizens.

• 78 CW XIX, p. 516.
• 79 CW XIX, p. 475.

47Moreover, Mill affirms that it would be beneficial for representative democracies to divide the Legislature in a manner similar to the Roman Republic: one House would correspond to the Senate; the other, to the Tribunes of the Plebs. “If one House represents popular feeling, the other should represent personal merit.”78 He also recommends the creation of Legislative Commissions inspired by the nomothetai, a more restricted body of Athenian democracy that held the authority to amend or annul laws passed by the popular assembly—the ekklesia—if they were deemed inconsistent or dissonant with the city’s customs. Perhaps the Millian proposal that is least removed from our reality is proportional representation, the logic of which is applied in some countries. Nevertheless, it is important to note that all of Mill’s proposals are suggestions and must be “open to much discussion . . . and to objections.”79 It would thus be wrong to read Representative Government as a manual containing measures to be immediately implemented in existing governments. The merit of Mill’s work does not lie in offering a treatise on the science of the art of government, but rather in developing a political philosophy that, rejecting the two assumptions of Rousseau’s critique of representation, clarifies what makes representation democratic.