John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor in Dialogue: France, England, and Beyond
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1This special issue seeks to illuminate the social philosophy of John Stuart Mill by exploring its discursivity in two interconnected dimensions. On the one hand, we examine the discourses as intersubjective exchanges that shaped Mill’s intellectual trajectory, highlighting the influence of his private and public engagements on the development of his ideas. On the other, the essays collected here also consider the meta-discursive level, analyzing how different philosophical and socio-political traditions—particularly those of the Anglo-American and French intellectual spheres—have interpreted and contested these influences. By pursuing this dual line of inquiry in the duality of the socio-cultural contexts, this issue aims to illustrate the dual dialectical interplay between competing discourses and meta-discourses, a dynamic that is characteristic of any major intellectual figure’s reception and legacy.
- 1 Mary Lyndon Shanley, “The Subjection of Women”, pp. 396-422, in John Skorrupski, ed., The Cambridge (...)
2At the primary level of discursivity—Mill’s own intellectual engagements—our American contributor, Karen Adkins’ cutting-edge paper provides a compelling analysis of how his public commitments were profoundly shaped by personal and intimate conversations. She argues that these interactions enabled Mill’s public discourse to become more expansive, fluid, and exploratory, challenging the conventional distinction between the public and private spheres. Rather than viewing private discussions as distinct from philosophical discourse, Adkins presents friendship as a medium through which Mill was able to articulate ideas in a more nuanced, playful, and experimental manner. In the meantime, she avoids placing too much emphasis on the concept of “marital friendship”1, which clearly describes Mill’s relationship with his wife, Harriet Taylor.
3This perspective, viewing friendship as both a public (rational) and private (emotional) bond, may also raise broader theoretical questions about the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy. While public discourse is often framed as a competitive, rational endeavor, private discourse may allow for a more flexible and affective engagement with ideas. Camille Dejardin’s paper builds on this distinction by drawing a parallel with the Socratic challenge of defending philosophy against rhetoric, highlighting the tensions within Mill’s own intellectual commitments. By illustrating how this Socratic mentality was adapted by Mill in response to utilitarianism, Dejardin positions the dynamic of learning and teaching at the heart of her argument on Mill’s lecture of Gorgias. This demonstrates that Mill’s pedagogical interpretation cannot simply be reduced to praise for an institutional form of education like mandatory public school. Instead, Mill seems to demand a form of individual existential growth (an “elevation”) that may be grounded also in intersubjective commitments such as friendship and love. The process of educating oneself to become a better person can lead to the attainment of dignity, which is understood in this context as a sort of merit or quality deemed worthy of admiration. If successful, such an individual accomplishment might be taken as a model to be followed by others.
- 2 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1882, p. 122.
- 3 Autobiography by John Stuart Mill, London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1874, p. 151.
- 4 John Robson, “Civilization and Culture as Moral Concepts”, in The Cambridge Companion …, pp. 338-37 (...)
4Mill’s Inaugural Address at St Andrews – comparable to his On Liberty (“mental, moral, and aesthetic stature”2) written in South of France as “joint production”3 with Harriet Taylor – promotes also a third sort of education: “the aesthetic branch; the culture that comes through poetry and art, and may be described as the education of the feelings, and the cultivation of the beautiful”4. Like Dejardin, Ludmilla Lorrain does not hesitate either to touch upon the theme of education, too, albeit very briefly. She references Mill’s assertion that education can be as harmful as inheritance. This paradoxical statement becomes particularly salient when juxtaposed with Dejardin’s analysis. In discussing the ramifications of inheritance, Lorrain situates it within a socialist framework, suggesting that it provides a coherent justification for Mill’s position favoring reform of private ownership rather than its outright abolition. She argues that inheritance constitutes a remnant of feudalism, perpetuating disparities between beneficiaries of inheritance and those who receive no such advantages. Nevertheless, under socialist tenets, the redistribution of wealth through bequests may be validated. At this juncture, Lorrain draws a parallel between educational inequality—rooted in one’s upbringing—and the resultant disparities experienced by individuals lacking similar intellectual privileges. This discourse resonates with Saint-Simonian thought, emphasizing the socio-political ramifications of access to education in relation to Mill’s broader philosophical constructs. Furthermore, this marks a departure from Mill’s earlier Benthamite stance, which advocated neither the reformation of private ownership nor the abolition of inheritance. Mill’s discourse surrounding the reform of the inheritance system is, in fact, a culmination of discussions with Harriet, who also plays a pivotal role alongside the radical ideas emanating from the Saint-Simonian school.
- 5 Geraint L. Williams, “Introduction”, in John Stuart Mill on Politics and Society, Fontana & Collins (...)
- 6 T. H. Irwin, “Mill and the Classical World”, in Companion …, pp. 423-463.
5Without any doubt, the Saint-Simonian scholars influenced Mill to a very large extent. Like Comte, this school applied to social philosophy a division of history into organic and critical or transitional periods, thus providing it with a valuable prism through which to reconsider the abstract ideas of moral and political philosophy. Organic periods are characterized by positive beliefs, accepted institutions, and social unity, while critical periods are marked by skepticism, social unrest, and division. In his work “Spirit of the Age,” Mill also describes England as being in such a critical or transitional period5. So, history must play a crucial role in shaping political ideas. Therefore, it may be also important to anchor Mill’s work in history, including in classical thought6 beyond just Socrates and Plato. The rhetorical tradition that began with Cicero deserves specific attention as well. Cicero’s rhetoric, which aligns uniquely with the Socratic method of contrasting opinions, is a significant aspect of Mill’s essay “On Liberty.” Let me quote the famous account from Chapter 2 on the freedom of expression:
- 7 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 68.
6“What Cicero practised as the means of forensic success requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion. The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination”7.
7Any reasoning must be grounded in either a single or two opposing viewpoints that is supported by authority or personal inclination. This represents an ideal situation ; however, Mill himself does not adhere to this guideline on each critical issue, such as the status of colonies. Adkins also seems to balance Dejardin in a way that she further explores how Mill’s epistemic humility influenced his evolving positions on key political issues. Adkins identifies cases in which Mill revised his views—most notably on women’s emancipation and Irish self-government—contrasting these with instances where he remained rigid in his stance, such as his defense of British colonial rule in India. Despite numerous opportunities to reconsider his position on India, Mill persisted in his views, ultimately leading to a rupture with Alexis de Tocqueville, who, despite being an intellectual of another colonial power, urged him to rethink his justifications for British rule.
8Invoking Quentin Skinner’s critique of the “mythology of coherence” in the history of political thought, i.e. the tendency to impose artificial consistency on a thinker’s body of work, a complementary perspective is offered by Antal Szerletics. Above all, he highlights the tensions between Mill’s public theories and private convictions, particularly regarding his harm principle. While the harm principle in its “pure” form could be interpreted as permitting self-regarding actions such as lifelong contracts of servitude, Mill’s personal abolitionist commitments—especially in relation to the American context—complicate such a reading. This contradiction exemplifies the broader challenge of reconciling political theory with personal moral beliefs.
Diverging Interpretations: Anglo-American and French Perspectives
- 8 For many scholars in France, Mill’s On Liberty “n’a guère de valoir que pour l’Angleterre.” [Alan R (...)
- 9 Williams, “Introduction”, in John Stuart Mill …, p. 15.
9Like other receptions, the intellectual reception of Mill’s work has also been deeply shaped by national traditions, with notable divergences between French and Anglo-American interpretations8. One may observe that French scholars frequently position Mill as a public intellectual, emphasizing his engagement with socialism and Harriet’s crucial role in shaping his social philosophy. Regarding the real impact of Harriet Taylor on Mill’s intellectual development, I think it is more safe to say that it is challenging to assess. As Mill himself admitted after her passing, while her influence did not change the path he took, it encouraged him to follow that path more boldly and, at the same time, more cautiously9. In contrast, Anglo-American scholarship tends to situate Mill within the liberal tradition, interpreting his political philosophy primarily through the lens of the harm principle as a unique legitimate means of limiting state intervention. This framing often seeks to distill Mill’s thought into this “very simple principle”, in contrast to the more dialectical and socially embedded approach found in French interpretations. The reduction of Mill’s social philosophy to the harm principle reflects a broader analytical tendency to impose theoretical clarity at the expense of historical and intellectual complexity.
- 10 However, Mill rightly emphasizes the central role for the private ownership in civilizing nations, (...)
- 11 Comte believed that women are inferior to men for biological reasons. Mill understood this inferior (...)
10Lorrain contends that Mill’s critique of private ownership, when contextualized historically, adeptly weaves the social question into his overarching political and moral philosophy—one that remains steadfast in its advocacy of individual liberty10. This historical perspective complicates the simplistic view of Mill as simply a proponent of liberalism. In turn, Mill’s feminist commitments, particularly his advocacy for women’s rights, also highlight the contrasting receptions of his work. While corresponding with Auguste Comte—a thinker whose work was marked by a deeply patriarchal perspective—Mill maintained his defense of gender equality, a commitment that resonated with the influence of Saint-Simonianism11.
11Françoise Orazi’s study traces Mill’s engagement with the Saint-Simonian school, particularly through his interactions with Gustave d’Eichtal. While Mill never fully embraced the school’s doctrines, he was deeply influenced by its forward-looking ethos, which he described as “futurity.” Yet he remained skeptical of its rigid doctrinal coherence, which he saw as subordinating truth to systematic consistency. Orazi’s analysis sheds light on the extent to which Mill’s engagement with Saint-Simonianism informed his broader views on gender equality and social justice, complicating the dominant liberal interpretations of his work. Orazi rightly points out the limitations of the Saint-Simonian influence and emphasizes the unique characteristics of the French tradition of public intellectualism. She references that critique given by Mill, noting, “It appears to me, therefore, that most French philosophers are guilty of the fault that Cousin attributes to Condillac: they tend to see only one aspect of an issue instead of considering the multiple perspectives necessary for a fair assessment.”
12While one might say that Mill disliked the French dogmatism stemming from Cartesian philosophy, it is more important, as Orazi also highlights, to recognize that in certain cases, private conversations—including personal correspondence—can present more convincing arguments than those found in formally published works. This observation may also mirror Derrida’s critique of the phono-logocentrism that underlies Western culture. While an in-depth exploration of French deconstruction’s challenge to dichotomies like langue et parole is beyond the scope of this discussion, for our rather limited purpose it is essential to note a significant point regarding the history of ideas: Mill’s contributions extend far beyond the texts he published or the historical context of their reception, and some of his private dialogues, which may have seemed marginal at the first glance, could achieve greater significance through reinterpretation. This may raise the question as follows: does such a study of marginal discourse align with Foucault’s analytical approach in his Archaeology of Knowledge, which suggests prioritizing the study of such peripheral readings over mainstream interpretations, in Mill’s case, of the On Liberty, On the Representative Government and the Utilitarianism? Perhaps. However, it is equally essential to acknowledge the significance of public discourse in shaping societal understandings of individual conceptions of the good life.
Public Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and the Limits of Liberalism
13This special issue is inspired primarily by John Stuart Mill’s seminal work, On Liberty, that emphasizes the critical role of free expression while simultaneously prompting a deeper examination of the nature of public philosophy itself. Adkins’ paper aptly references Mill’s commendable response to William Wood, a worker from a pottery factory, exemplifying the archetype of the “everyman” who candidly articulated his thoughts to Mill.
- 12 See also Herbert L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, Harvard Law Review, (...)
- 13 Catherine Larrère, “Droit et mœurs chez Montesquieu”, Droits, 19 (1994), pp. 11–22.
14Even this wise little anecdote may contextualize the place of the harm principle in Mill’s philosophical edifice. In British moral and legal philosophy, Herbert Hart explored the potential of this principle regarding the argument against the legal enforcement of morals. In his popular work Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford U.P., 1963), he draws a parallel between James Fitzjames Stephen’s criticisms of Mill and Lord Devlin’s argument in favor of legal moralism12. Hart defends Mill by emphasizing that the harm principle does not imply a “selfish indifference” toward others’ behavior. His argument asserts that the law cannot serve as a means to enforce morals, particularly when immorality is harmless. Interestingly enough, the French tradition of sociology plays a significant role in the argument against Lord Devlin, particularly through Durkheim, whom Hart employs to counter the thesis that morals should be legally enforced in certain cases. It is worth mentioning that centuries before Durkheim and Mill, Montesquieu also argued similarly, claiming that laic moeurs have both conservative and progressive functions13. He suggested that these morals provide pre-legal social links between citizens. The Spirit of Laws (1748), serves as a guide for wise legislators who seek to transform morals into a rationalized legal form and facilitate the transition from feudal systems to civil society.
- 14 See Steven Lukes, “Durkheim on Law and Morality: The Disintegration Thesis”, Journal of Classical S (...)
- 15 Nicola Lacey, “Do the ‘Persistent Questions’ Persist?: Revisiting Chapter I in The Concept f Law”, (...)
- 16 Léon Duguit, L’État : le droit objectif et la loi positive [1901]. Paris : Dalloz, 2003.
- 17 Karl Olivecrona, “Realism and Idealism: Some Reflections on the Cardinal Point in Legal Philosophy” (...)
15One could argue that Hart seriously misunderstood Durkheim’s sociology14 and by de-institutionalising the legal phenomenon, missed the opportunity to link jurisprudence to social theory15. In turn, under Durkheim’s direct and indirect influence, French scholars have tended to eliminate normativity from legal discourse. For instance, Léon Duguit16, representing an instrumentalist view of law, went nearly as far as the Scandinavian realists17, a perspective that Hart later scrutinized critically. Duguit argued that normative concepts were meaningless, and for this reason, law lacks any normative or obligatory force. In the absence of normativity and meaningful legal concepts, scholars cannot integrate critical or public morality into a sociologically based doctrinal study of law. According to Duguit, similar to Comte, only the individual is an empirically observable fact; indeed, there is no concept of collective conscience as suggested by Durkheim. Solidarity is a social fact only to the extent that each individual possesses a sense of justice. This can be reformulated as a sum of individual sentiments.
16In a way, Hart’s reference to moderate altruism as the minimum content of natural law (i.e., social morality) can be seen as positioned between Durkheim’s concept of a collective conscience and Duguit’s emphasis on individual will. While Durkheim linked social morality—considered a “total social fact” (Mauss)—to the law, Hart sought to analytically separate them. Hart distinguishes between “positive” morality (accepted by a social group or society) and “critical” morality (general principles for evaluating social morality, including positive morality). In contrast, French scholars might be reluctant to make this distinction; for them, “critical morality” might simply mean participating in legislation in the name of freedom of expression. Millian liberalism remains agnostic toward such a republican solution to the law and morality problem.
17As Adkins argues, the individual autonomy in Mill should not be restricted to an idealized “marketplace of ideas” when it comes to understand the value of the freedom of speech; rather, public discourse is shaped by intrinsic structural characteristics, particularly the influence of power dynamics. Moreover, while the premise of free speech is inherently limited, so too is Mill’s conception of private ownership. Orazi’s paper effectively delineates these boundaries articulated by Mill, suggesting a reformation of private ownership akin to the framework proposed by John Locke. This perspective aligns with the goals of social justice, which resonate with the tenets of socialist movements but refuse the anarchism targeting the very institution of individual ownership.
- 18 The proof for Tocqueville’s influence on Mill is his two book reviews of Democracy in America, publ (...)
18Alexandre Viala’s contribution examines Mill’s theory of representative government through the lens of epistocracy. At the heyday of the republicanism of the 3rd Republic in France, Mill’s support for plural voting—a system in which individuals with higher levels of education receive additional votes—reflects his belief that democratic governance should be structured around cognitive competence. While critics have long regarded this proposal as an elitist deviation from democratic egalitarianism, Viala situates it within Mill’s broader epistemic approach to politics, arguing that Mill saw representative democracy as an ongoing competition for trust, rather than merely a system of numerical majoritarianism. This concern for the epistemic quality of governance reflects Mill’s engagement with Tocqueville’s analysis of the tyranny of the majority, as well as his pragmatic worries about the impact of universal suffrage on economic policymaking18.
19Szerletics further interrogates the implications of Mill’s political thought for paternalism. While the harm principle is often interpreted as an absolute rejection of paternalistic interventions, Mill’s own writings suggest a more nuanced position. In certain cases—such as preventing individuals from unknowingly crossing an unsafe bridge—Mill appears to allow for what might be termed “soft paternalism.” Szerletics critiques this soft paternalistic reading of Mill, arguing instead that his concern for autonomy is socially embedded rather than purely individualistic. This perspective aligns with Dejardin’s examination of the broader relationship between autonomy, rhetoric, and socialization, suggesting that Mill’s liberalism cannot be reduced to a simple opposition between state intervention and individual freedom. In this context, as I have already pointed out above, Mill’s ethical perfectionism might be understood as living a life that serves as an example for others to follow.
Conclusion
20This special issue aims to provide a nuanced account of the dynamics of John Stuart Mill’s intellectual development and the broader reception of his ideas in both the Anglo-American and French traditions. Through the contributions of Karen Adkins, Antal Szerletics, Camille Dejardin, Françoise Orazi, Alexandre Viala, and Ludmilla Lorrain, we gain insight into how Mill’s thought was shaped by personal interactions and larger ideological currents.
21This special issue aims to explore the complex nature of John Stuart Mill’s intellectual development and how he has been received within both the Anglo-American and French traditions. By placing Mill’s ideas within the context of personal relationships and dialogues between the United Kingdom and France, these contributions challenge the simplistic view of him as just a theorist of political liberalism or socialism. They demonstrate that he was not solely focused on the harm principle and was not inspired only by Harriet Taylor or by any specific abstract philosophical debates. Instead, they present him as a thinker deeply committed to education, friendship, rhetoric, equality, and political reform, all of which are intricately linked to the intellectual currents of his time.
22The essays collected in this special issue further illustrate the complex relationship between Anglo-Saxon analytical liberalism and the French sociological traditions influenced by republican ideals. This dual contextualization enriches the examination of the foundational concepts of Mill’s philosophy while also shedding light on its practical implications. In the specific realm of legal theory, a significant question arises : is it possible to reconcile Mill’s normative concepts—such as rights, harm, autonomy, and dignity—with Comtean positivism, a viewpoint that risks reducing these ideas to “meaningless abstractions” ? The rejection of natural rights by both Comte and Bentham highlights this concern. Nevertheless, as Adkins demonstrates through Miranda Fricker’s concept of “testimonial sensibility”, Mill’s willingness to revisit traditional ideas reflects Descartes’ methodological approach to questioning custom and bias.
23The various interpretations of Mill’s legacy across different discourse levels and socio-cultural contexts may reveal a deeper philosophical divide between liberal individualism and sociological embeddedness. By focusing on these intersections, this volume emphasizes the dialectical nature of intellectual history and the enduring complexity of Mill’s contributions. It also suggests future comparisons—such as between Mill and Hayek, who both grappled with the personal aspects of intellectual life, or between Mill and Rawls, whose work, when examined in a French context, demonstrates the continuity of Mill’s legacy into the core of twentieth-century philosophy.
Notes
1 Mary Lyndon Shanley, “The Subjection of Women”, pp. 396-422, in John Skorrupski, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Mill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 409f.
2 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1882, p. 122.
3 Autobiography by John Stuart Mill, London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1874, p. 151.
4 John Robson, “Civilization and Culture as Moral Concepts”, in The Cambridge Companion …, pp. 338-371 at p. 349.
5 Geraint L. Williams, “Introduction”, in John Stuart Mill on Politics and Society, Fontana & Collins, 1976, pp. 9–52, at p. 23.
6 T. H. Irwin, “Mill and the Classical World”, in Companion …, pp. 423-463.
7 Mill, “On Liberty”, p. 68.
8 For many scholars in France, Mill’s On Liberty “n’a guère de valoir que pour l’Angleterre.” [Alan Ryan, “Mill in a Liberal Landscape”, pp. 497- 540, in The Cambridge Companion …, p. 515., n. 47. Quote from Collected Works, vol. X. 550.]
9 Williams, “Introduction”, in John Stuart Mill …, p. 15.
10 However, Mill rightly emphasizes the central role for the private ownership in civilizing nations, especially in the agricultural societies, such as Ireland: “The magic of property turns sand into gold. … Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock, and he will turn into a garden ; give him a nine-year’s lease of a garden, and he will convert it into a desert.” Quoted from Young’s Travels in France. Ronson, “Civilization and Culture as Moral Concepts” The Cambridge Companion …, pp. 338-371, at 358.
11 Comte believed that women are inferior to men for biological reasons. Mill understood this inferiority as a matter of education, insofar as women had less access to schooling than men. For him, the issue of women’s emancipation was therefore eminently political. See also O. Robert, “La tentation comtienne de John Stuart Mill : une « disciple indiscipliné »”, Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines, 7 (2002) 2, pp. 129-156. https://doi.org/10.3917/rhsh.007.0129.
12 See also Herbert L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, Harvard Law Review,71 (1958), pp. 593–629.
13 Catherine Larrère, “Droit et mœurs chez Montesquieu”, Droits, 19 (1994), pp. 11–22.
14 See Steven Lukes, “Durkheim on Law and Morality: The Disintegration Thesis”, Journal of Classical Sociology,12 (2012), pp. 363–383; Steven Lukes and Andrew Scull, eds., Durkheim and the Law, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2013.
15 Nicola Lacey, “Do the ‘Persistent Questions’ Persist?: Revisiting Chapter I in The Concept f Law”, in Luis Duerte d’Almeida and others, Reading HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law, Hart Publishing 2013, pp. 269-273, at pp. 272–273.
16 Léon Duguit, L’État : le droit objectif et la loi positive [1901]. Paris : Dalloz, 2003.
17 Karl Olivecrona, “Realism and Idealism: Some Reflections on the Cardinal Point in Legal Philosophy”, New York University Law Review, 26 (1951), pp. 120–131.
18 The proof for Tocqueville’s influence on Mill is his two book reviews of Democracy in America, published in 1835 and 1840. However, the On Liberty goes beyond Tocqueville’s ideas to the extent that in this essay the author reached the position where freedom is not just a means to progress, not just a precondition of improvement but constitutive of them. Williams, “Introduction”, in John Stuart Mill …, p. 38.
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Mate Paksy, « John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor in Dialogue: France, England, and Beyond », Revue d’études benthamiennes [En ligne], 28 | 2025, mis en ligne le 01 décembre 2025, consulté le 17 janvier 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudes-benthamiennes/13078 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/15ccy
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