Agar, N., Humanity’s End: Why we should reject radical enhancement, MIT Press, 2010.
Agar, N., ‘On the prudential irrationality of mind uploading’, in Intelligence Unbound: the future of uploaded and machine minds, edited by R. Blackford and D. Broderick, Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, pp. 146-160.
Blackford, R, and Broderick, D., Intelligence Unbound: the future of uploaded and machine minds, Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.
Bostrom, N., Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, Oxford University Press, 2014.
Broome, J., Climate Matters, WW Norton, 2009.
Chappell, T., ‘The future-person standpoint’, Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series) 4, 2014, pp. 29-46.
Cowen, T, and Parfit, D., ‘Against the social discount rate’, in Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, edited by P. Laslett and J. Fishkin, Yale University Press, 1992, pp. 144-161.
Crisp, R., ‘Well-Being’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/well-being/>.
Darwall, S., The Second-Person Standpoint, Harvard University Press, 2009.
Feldman, F., ‘What we learn from the experience machine’, in The Cambridge Companion to Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, edited by R. M. Bader and J. Meadowcroft, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 59-86.
Finnis, J., Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, 1980.
Fletcher, G., ‘A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being’, Utilitas 25, 2013, pp. 206-220.
Floridi, L., and Sanders, J. W., ‘On the morality of artificial agents’, Minds and Machines 14, 2004, pp. 349-379.
Floridi. L., The Fourth Revolution: How the infosphere is reshaping human reality. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Griffin, J., Well-Being, Oxford University Press, 1986.
Hanson, R., The Age of EM, Oxford University Press, 2016.
Hauskeller, M., Better Humans? Understanding the enhancement project, Acumen, 2013.
Hooker, B., Ideal Code, Real World, Oxford University Press, 2000.
Jackson, F., From metaphysics to ethics, Oxford University Press, 1999.
Kumar, R., ‘Defending the moral moderate: Contractualism and Commonsense’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 28, 2000, pp. 275-309.
Kumar, R., ‘Who can be wronged?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, 2003, pp. 99-118.
Kumar, R., ‘Wronging future people: a contractualist proposal’, in Intergenerational Justice, edited by A. Gosseries and L. Meyer, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 251-272.
Kurzweil, R., The Singularity is Near, Duckworth, 2005.
Mulgan, T., The Demands of Consequentialism, Oxford University Press, 2001.
Mulgan, T., Future People, Oxford University Press, 2006.
Mulgan, T., Ethics for a broken world: reimagining philosophy after catastrophe, Acumen, 2011.
Mulgan, T., ‘Ethics for Possible Futures’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114, 2014, pp. 57-73.
Mulgan, T., ‘Replies to Critics’, Philosophy and Public Issues 4, 2014, pp. 58-92.
Mulgan, T., Purpose in the Universe: The moral and metaphysical case for Ananthropocentric Purposivism, Oxford University Press, 2015.
Mulgan, T., ‘Mill and the broken world’, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 69, 2015, pp 205-224.
Mulgan, T., ‘Theory and intuition in a broken world’, in Intuition, theory, and anti-theory, edited by Sophie-Grace Chappell, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 141-166.
Mulgan, T., ‘Utilitarianism for a Broken World’, Utilitas 27, 2015, pp. 92-114.
Mulgan, T., ‘Theorising about Justice for a Broken World’, in Theorizing Justice: crucial insights and future directions, edited by Krushil Watene & Jay Drydyk, Rowman and Littlefield, 2016, pp. 15-32.
Mulgan, T., ‘How should utilitarians think about the future?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47, 2017, pp. 290-312.
Mulgan, T., ‘Moral imaginativeness, moral creativity and possible futures’, in Creativity and Philosophy, edited by B. Gaut and M. Kieran, Routledge, 2018, pp. 350-368.
Mulgan, T., ‘Corporate Agency and Possible Futures’, Journal of Business Ethics. Online early [Open Access], May 2018: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3887-1
Mulgan, T., ‘Answering to Future People’, The Journal of Applied Philosophy 35(2), 2018, pp. 532-548. Online early: DOI: 10.1111/japp.12222
Mulgan, T., Utilitarian Future Ethics, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
Mulgan, T., Future Worlds, draft manuscript.
Mulgan, T., ‘Moral Philosophy, Superintelligence, and the Singularity’, draft manuscript.
Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Blackwells, 1974.
Parfit, D., Reason and Persons, Oxford University Press, 1984.
Parfit, D., On What Matters, Oxford University Press, 2011.
Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971.
Scanlon, T. M., What we owe to each other, Harvard University Press, 1999.
Singer, P., ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 1972, pp. 229-243.
Singer, P., Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition, 2011.
Thomson, J., ‘Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem’, The Monist 59, 1976, pp. 204-217.