Navigation – Plan du site

AccueilNuméros240Notes et documentsColonial and Postcolonial Legacy ...

Notes et documents

Colonial and Postcolonial Legacy of “Ethnic” and “Religious” Clashes in Eastern Sudan

Héritage colonial et postcolonial des affrontements « ethniques » et « religieux » dans le Soudan oriental
Abdaljbar A. M. M. Ejami
p. 973-980

Résumés

Basée sur les données ethnographiques d’une recherche en cours, cette note analyse les affrontements qui ont eu lieu au Soudan oriental pendant l’été 2019. Elle propose de remplacer leur interprétation réductrice en tant qu’affrontements « ethniques » ou « religieux » par une explication sociohistorique plus poussée en termes de luttes de classes ancrées dans la formation de classe d’une économie capitaliste coloniale et postcoloniale à Kassala.

Haut de page

Texte intégral

1During my last field trip in Sudan, in summer 2019, after the victory of the revolution, clashes exploded in eastern Sudan. They began in Gedaref, shifted to Kassala and then to the town of Port Sudan in the Red Sea State, where they were largely violent. These clashes have been quickly labeled by media, young activists and new governors as “tribal.” Another reading, supported by the particular political context and the widespread fear of counter-revolution, underlined the role of Islamists in fueling the conflict. Yet, both explanations remained at the level of a simplistic interpretation through the monolithic ambivalent lens of “ethnicity” and “religion.” Being at the final phase of a long ethnographic fieldwork (2017-2020) for my PhD thesis in anthropology (Colonial and Postcolonial Politics of Religion and Ethnicity in Eastern Sudan: Making Capitalist Economy of Local Elites), I realize how problematic it is to focus on religion and ethnicity without putting them in their historical context. This note is an attempt to explore these clashes in relation to colonial and postcolonial class formations of capitalist economy in Kassala, where class struggle is, in a misleading way, read as “ethnic” or “religious” conflict.

Historical Roots of Class Formation within Colonial Capitalism in Kassala

  • 1 See Poussier in this volume.
  • 2 The term nazir defines the paramount (tribal) chief, upon which minor leaders (omda and sheikhs) (...)

2In contrast with the rest of Sudan, Kassala region was historically colonized three times: by the Turks (1821-1885), by the British (1898-1954) and, for a shorter period, by the Italians (1894-1897; 1940-1941). As in other colonies, the first goal that colonizers tried to achieve in Kassala was to establish peace and order. In doing so, they set up and developed a central administrative system conceived also for supporting their project of capitalist expansion in Eastern Sudan. This system, which is widely known as colonial indirect rule, was partially different in Kassala than in the rest of Sudan. First, it was not restricted to rural areas, rather it included towns: the establishment of an urban ‘omodiyya (native leadership represented by an ‘omda) in Kassala was a unique experience within the British system. Second, colonizers exerted their efforts to integrate pre-colonial traditional institutions of the Beja (the main local ethnic group composed of several tribes1 that had been separated particularly as religious and political leaderships. Third, in order to increase central control, the colonial administration established a divide between tribes and Sufi brotherhoods, labeling and opposing them as “native” versus “non-native,” or in other terms as “good” versus “bad,” then trying to integrate the “bad non-native” into the “good native,” which became administratively responsible for the former through their unchangeable recognized channels (defined as nazirates and turuqs).2

  • 3 During colonization, “good-native” leaders were favored in terms of education, local power and aut (...)

3Based on previous steps, the colonial administrations used to empower what it categorized as “good-native” leaders while it halted “bad non-native” ones. The former category was further economically empowered and exclusively granted with freehold ownership.3 If nazirs were in charge of administering nazirates, saids were given most land of urban ‘omodiyya. More importantly, as they were empowered and closer to colonial authorities, “good-native” leaders were able to shape powerful socioeconomic and political structures in Kassala. That colonial support for the benefits of good-native groups laid the basis for the formation of a dominant class within a developing capitalist system, constituted primarily by saids of the Khatmiyya tariqa, and nazirs, ‘omdas and sheikhs of Hadendowa (Tirik’s family) and Halanga (Shaikhenda’s family) nazirates, that would dominate in postcolonial Kassala.

Capitalist Expansion and Class Formation in Postcolonial Kassala

  • 4 It is said that Islamists knew from the beginning that Hadendowa could not be part of their civili (...)

4Since political independence, colonial policies, like that of the British, dividing dominated groups into “good” and “bad,” “native” and “non-native,” have been widely criticized by scholars (Reynolds 2001; Mamdani 2012). Nevertheless, postcolonial governments in Kassala have unfortunately repeated the same dichotomic and hierarchical categorizations. Politically, the main reason for this repetition seems to be the colonial capitalist outcome itself. The colonially-formed capitalist class, headed by “good-native” leaders, has broadly dominated all democratic eras in Eastern Sudan. For undemocratic postcolonial governments, it was difficult either to totally rely on them or to face them. In order to adapt to this situation, Sudanese rulers adopted a dual strategy: they used to cooperate with the colonially-formed capitalist class and meanwhile, they worked to undermine its influence in order to build and favor their own loyal elite. For example; if the Khatmiyya tariqa was classed and empowered by colonial authorities as “good,” Bitai tariqa has been highly supported by postcolonial governments for the same purpose, as it was considered as the ideal model for “moderate” Islam (wasatiyya), neither “mythological,” as sufism, nor extremist, as wahhabism. Postcolonial classification of Bitai tariqa had nothing to do with Islam, it was rather a political strategy to undermine the influence of Khatmiyya tariqa (saids) among Hadendowa in Hamashcoraib and Telkuk, the areas dominated by Bitai tariqa. It also aimed to divide Hadendowa Nazirate, the largest among Beja, into two groups (Hadendowa of Tirik and Jimailab of Bitai family). For this purpose, Ingaz regime (1989-2019) brought the latter for presidency of the legislative council of Kassala State (2015-2019). Postcolonial governments, Ingaz in particular, have also supported Beni Amir tribe through integrating Eritrean refugees of the same group into their nazirate. Three political goals determined their choice: first, strengthening Salafist Beni Amir refugees to curtail political influence of saids. Second, weakening the influence of Hadendowa Nazirate by favoring another powerful competitor in sharing wealth and authority.4 Third, promoting the “Islamist civilizing project,” at the core of the Ingaz regime, by socially integrating and politically exploiting Beni Amir Muslim refugees. This dual strategy has eventually formed a postcolonial capitalist class, headed by Bitai tariqa and its family, Beni Amir Nazirate (Nabtab) and Salafists (mainly Beni Amir).

Class Composition and Capitalist Expansion: The Gabila (Tribe)’s “Free Market”

5The interventions of colonial then postcolonial politics resulted in the creation of six dominant groups. Among them, three are mainly religious (saids of Khatmiyya tariqa, Bitai tariqa and Salafists), and three are rather ethnically based (Tirik of Hadendowa, Nabtab of Beni Amir and Shaikhend of Halanga tribes). It is important to note that behind widespread labels through which these dominant groups are defined, other categories qualify their members, who are traders, politicians, governors and regional leaders, educated elites such as university professors or legal experts. These positions illustrate the variety in class composition of a dominant elite who has been powerfully interconnected since the colonial era. Due to the dependency of postcolonial governance in Kassala on socioeconomic and political structures left by the British, this group of “good-native leaders” took a significant part in ruling their territory until today, and they also largely monopolized sociopolitical representation. This prominent status was built on and justified by the assumption that “good-native” leaders know their tribes and followers (and are obeyed by them) better than State official governors. A political essence of this indirect representation is that once “good-native” leaders receive their part of wealth and power, their entire community is supposed to be also included in this share.

6This uneven power and wealth distribution has led to competition between dominant elites and dominated groups wishing to widen the scope of their actual political representation. In this competition, “bad non-native groups,” which were mainly powerless migrants, refugees and workers, have become a profitable market. We use the expression “gabila’s free market” to refer to the attitude of dealing with groups by establishing unequal economic and power relationships based on their categorizations within administrative structure. This trend was first initiated by the British when in the name of native system and local governance they attached “bad non-native” tribes and migrant workers as subalterns to “good-native” nazirates and appointed nazirs chosen from what they perceived as the “royal blood” (Hjort & Dahl 1991). Tribes where thus reshaped by the central power in order to fit a stratified class composition favorable to the functioning of a capitalist economy. This market has expanded in postcolonial Kassala: when economy got more dynamic, migrations increased and refugees intensively entered Eastern Sudan and the local division of labor. The major investors (and beneficiaries) in this market are both ruling regimes and “good-native” leaders. The former seek political support of the locally called “newcomers” and “newly naturalized people,” in order to get more seats and political positions to ground their economic power according to the number of tribes they administratively represent, while the latter aim to widen their political representation. Conversely, subordinated groups who are being “traded” within this market, seek for local identity (mainly as Beja) and assimilation in the native system to be fully recognized as citizens. For various reasons linked to colonial heritage, ethnic and political grounds, Beni Amir Nazirate has been the first winner in this market, a fact that partly explains their conflict with Hadendowa, who recently addressed a letter to Kassala Governor expressing their frustration against “foreigners” living in their State and contesting their Sudanese papers delivered during the last regime.

Post-Revolution Conflicts: Ethno-Religious Clash or Class Struggle?

7Since the eruption of the Sudanese revolution in 2018-2019, ethnic clashes appeared in Eastern Sudan, which have drawn the attention of intellectuals, activists and new governors. Yet, those conflicts have more complex and deeper reasons than those set out by State and media. Some of them were simply ignored, others were largely simplified as being either “tribal” or “political conspiracy.” Unless we look at postcolonial governance institutions from within, considering how “tribal” and “religious” labels have been manipulated since the colonial administration of nazirates and turuq, we fail to understand the real dimension of such clashes, which can be better read as an expression of class competition and class struggle.

  • 5 Exploited groups or tribes include Beja refugees, working tribes as the Hausa, and tribes stigmati (...)
  • 6 This suggestion seemed to be built upon historical struggle: Dirar (1991) argued that Almada’s hea (...)

8In this regard, the increasing mobility within and between nazirates and the claims for it, are a first element to take into account. Mazlama (grievance) is put forward by exploited groups, labeled as tribes, as the main reason behind moving from one nazirate to another.5 Mazlama implies discrimination, oppression, persecution, but more precisely the lack of access to positions for sharing wealth and power, and class exploitation expressed through the relations between landowners and landless people. In this struggle, exploited tribes very often leave their nazirates for joining the conflicting ones. This reflects their frustration and refusal of an imposed class structure. The impact of this class struggle is confirmed by the suggestion, advocated by nazirs during the Ingaz regime, to abolish norms of native administration that allow mobility between nazirates.6

9A second example of class competition is the most traditional and frequent conflict between Hadendowa and Beni Amir (Nadel 1975). These groups represent the two largest nazirates of the area with distinctive economic and political positions. Their rivalry is due to several reasons: although expressed in claims about Beja identity, it is mainly grounded in issues of access to land natural resources and to political titles, but also in competition for international organization funds (like the Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Funds), within the frame of what we called “gabila’s free market” for obtaining wealth and power. Recently, this ancient competition turned to a harsher conflict when each tribe strove to get positions in the new revolutionary government. When the Sovereign Council was formed in August 2019, a member of the Hadendowa Nazirate was chosen to represent the Eastern Region. A similar post-revolution conflict involved Jimailab and Hadendowa: its old roots refer to historical antagonism between their paramount leaders (Tirik and Bitai), the most prestigious families within the nazirate, backed by a major economic competition for the control over Gash agricultural scheme and gold mines in the area. Either between tribes or branches of the same tribe, such conflicts illustrated a situation of competition between sections of a dominant local elite that has turned into violent encounter due to their wish to hold on their power after the changes brought by the last revolution.

10Other conflicts that emerged in the post-revolutionary context can be rather read as a manifestation of class struggle between dominant elites and dominated groups. This is the case of fighting between Nuba and Beni Amir or between Hausa and Hadendowa. Roots for both conflicts are also ancient. While Hadendowa and Beni Amir as native land owners represent the two largest nazirates in Eastern Sudan, Hausa and Nuba in the same region are landless people and the main component of local working class. Since the British rule, Sudanese and non-Sudanese West Africans were encouraged to migrate in order to provide man-power for the needs of a rising capitalist agrarian economy (O’Brien 1986). Groups like Hausa and Nuba were parallel integrated into the native system, in which native land owners were administratively responsible for workers. These migrant workers were not allowed to move from one nazirate to another, as in the case of indigenous (Beja) groups.

11In the case of Hausa, the major part of the working class in Gash scheme, there are two main reasons for conflict: first, Hadendowa Nazirate used to give them bad infertile and non-irrigated lands; second, their contribution in terms of production was not appreciated and the Nazirate did not include them in the share of wealth and power. As a consequence, since 2003, the Hausa insisted on leaving Hadendowa Nazirate and creating an independent one. After the breaking of a violent conflict, the Islamic government granted an independent imara (jurisdiction of an amir in the new native system) limited to Kassala town but rejected their demand and kept the Hausa ‘omodiyya in Gash under the control of Hadendowa Nazirate. This fueled the opposition that emerged in recent times. In the second case, the conflict between Nuba and Beni Amir—the most frequent after revolution—has common reasons with conflict between Hausa and Hadendowa, but was fired by additional factors. Unlike Hadendowa, not all Beni Amir are landowners, as many of them are refugee workers in competition over labor market with Nuba, who live next to them in urban centers. Moreover, if the restrictive nationality law that denies rights to migrants is one reason for the conflict, the issue is much more complicated. On the one hand, Sudanese Beni Amir identify Nuba as “newcomers” and landless who should not be given the same rights as indigenous ethnic groups like the Beja (in which they include non-Sudanese Beni Amir). On the other hand, Nuba reply by considering that Beni Amir migrant workers are not indigenous but refugees and that they should not be treated as Sudanese like themselves. Islamists of the Ingaz regime used to support Beni Amir (even the non-Sudanese among them) at the expenses of Nuba. Relations between both groups became very sensitive and conflict broke out openly after the revolution.

12In the form of a class struggle between elites and subordinated groups, or of a competition within a same class (the dominant as well as the dominated), the cases presented in this note show the need to deconstruct the simplistic visions which label post-revolutionary clashes as “ethnic” or “religious,” and to go back to the colonial and postcolonial dynamics of capitalist expansion and class formation in Eastern Sudan in order to achieve a better understanding of these conflicts.

Haut de page

Bibliographie

Dirar S., 1991, History of Tribes of Habab and Hamassin in Sudan and Eritrea (Khartoum: Sudanese House of Books).

Hjort A. O. & Dahl G., 1991, Responsible Man: The Atmaan Beja of North-Eastern Sudan (Uppsala: Stockholm Studies in Social Anthropology).

Mamdani M., 2012, Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity (Cambridge-London: Harvard University Press).

Nadel S. F., 1975, “Notes on Beni-Amir Society,” Sudan Notes and Records 26: 51-94.

O’Brien J., 1986, “Toward a Reconstitution of Ethnicity: Capitalist Expansion and Cultural Dynamics in Sudan,” American Anthropologist 88 (4): 898-907.

Reynolds J., 2001, “Good and Bad Muslims: Islam and Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria,” International Journal of African Historical Studies (34) 3: 601-618.

Haut de page

Notes

1 See Poussier in this volume.

2 The term nazir defines the paramount (tribal) chief, upon which minor leaders (omda and sheikhs) depend. “Nazirate” is the English term for his jurisdiction, often corresponding to a “tribal homeland” (dar in Arabic). “Turuq,” plural of tariqa, is the Arabic term used for Sufi brotherhoods, whose religious leaders are called said.

3 During colonization, “good-native” leaders were favored in terms of education, local power and authority, while “bad non-native” leaders were withdrawn or attached to the former in a subaltern position. Moreover, leadership within nazirate became more centralized within nazir’s family instead of subtribes.

4 It is said that Islamists knew from the beginning that Hadendowa could not be part of their civilizing project. Therefore, they empowered Beni Amir refugees by giving them Sudanese papers.

5 Exploited groups or tribes include Beja refugees, working tribes as the Hausa, and tribes stigmatized as “bad-native” since colonial times as the Habab.

6 This suggestion seemed to be built upon historical struggle: Dirar (1991) argued that Almada’s head in 1949 wanted to separate from Beni Amir Nazir ate but the resistance of Beni Amir nazir brought the British to refuse.

Haut de page

Pour citer cet article

Référence papier

Abdaljbar A. M. M. Ejami, « Colonial and Postcolonial Legacy of “Ethnic” and “Religious” Clashes in Eastern Sudan »Cahiers d’études africaines, 240 | 2020, 973-980.

Référence électronique

Abdaljbar A. M. M. Ejami, « Colonial and Postcolonial Legacy of “Ethnic” and “Religious” Clashes in Eastern Sudan »Cahiers d’études africaines [En ligne], 240 | 2020, mis en ligne le 04 janvier 2023, consulté le 16 avril 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/32742 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesafricaines.32742

Haut de page

Auteur

Abdaljbar A. M. M. Ejami

Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology, University of Khartoum, Sudan; Laboratoire architecture ville urbanisme environnement (LAVUE), Université Paris 8 Saint-Denis, France

Haut de page

Droits d'auteur

Le texte et les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés), sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

Haut de page
Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search