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Amphibolia and Rhetorical Criticism in Isocrates’ Panathenaicus

Getting to Grips With the Inaccuracies of Verbal Representation
Thomas Blank

Résumés

La discussion en classe mise en scène à la fin du Panathénaïque d’Isocrate (§199-266) contient la plus ancienne référence à l'amphibolie dans la littérature rhétorique. L’ancien élève laconophile présenté comme advocatus diaboli dans cette section décrit les arguments d’Isocrate comme des logoi amphiboloi (§239f). D’une manière très similaire à la notion d’amphibolia d’Aristote, il y voit des arguments destinés à obscurcir les implications morales et à dissimuler les visées d’un discours. Cet article soutient qu'en introduisant un tel concept rhétorique dans un cadre éducatif (et littéraire), Isocrate confie à ses étudiants (et à ses lecteurs) la tâche d’identifier l’ambiguïté morale des arguments qui leur sont présentés. Leur formation leur permet ainsi d’évaluer de manière critique les problèmes moraux sous-jacents aux questions débattues et de démasquer la flatterie ou la calomnie impliquées dans le discours public. Alors qu’Aristote a présenté l'amphibolie comme un type d’argument (faible) du point de vue de la composition rhétorique, Isocrate se concentre sur la réception par l’auditoire et la critique rhétorique. 

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I. Introduction

  • 1 For comprehensive interpretations of this scene see e.g. H. O. Kröner, « Dialog und Rede. Zur Deutu (...)
  • 2 Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 544–547 ; 565–570.
  • 3 See N. Livingstone, « Writing Politics. Isocrates’ Rhetoric of Philosophy », Rhetorica 25 (2007), p (...)
  • 4 Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 572–579.

1For long, and for good reason, the scholarly reception of Isocrates’ Panathenaicus has revolved primarily around what is probably the most striking feature of this text : Isocrates’ decision to produce a major piece of writing that over two thirds of its text presents itself as a praise of Athens in comparison to Sparta, only to include a unique final section in which this epideixis is presented as material for critical discussion to Isocrates’ students. This famous ‘dialogue section’ (§199-266)1 involves two altercations between Isocrates and a former student of his, whom he invites to the session as a kind of advocatus diaboli, since that person was sympathetic to the Spartan state and society. The Laconophile praises the truthfulness and persuasiveness of the epideixis on Athens, but seeks to maintain his pro-Spartan tendency in a manner that Isocrates describes earlier in the Panathenaicus as typical for those who were used to defending Spartan militarism and violence (§200–28 ; cf. 108–113).2 This first discussion is more dialogical in nature than the latter, since in this part the ex-student and Isocrates really exchange arguments. At the end of this first scene, however, Isocrates seems to lose his temper, and to his own later regret (§229–232), ends by attacking the associate for statements that he had not even made.3 Days later, Isocrates reports, he assembles his students as well as the Laconophile once again, and asks them about their opinion whether or not to publish the piece. Like in the first discussion, Isocrates’ other students applaud the speech without further discussion, now urging their teacher to publish it. And once more, the Laconophile takes the stage to present his views. But now he famously introduces, in a longer monologue, an altogether new interpretation of the epideictic speech on Athens and Sparta (§233–63)4 : while the exalted praise that Isocrates seems to have for Athens remains uncriticised, the Laconophile claims that most of the reproach against Sparta, in fact, were proof of the righteousness and legitimacy of Spartan war culture, warfare and imperial policies. He claims that because in majority his audience consisted of Athenians, Isocrates needed to disguise the praise he had for Sparta (§239f.), but that this praise would not escape those who understood that Isocrates had, in fact, been praising Sparta throughout his career. The task the teacher had thus set for his students were to identify those elements of the speech that purported to be reproachful against Sparta, but, in fact, amounted to covert praise.

  • 5 J. A. E. Bons, « Amphibolia. Isocrates on Written Composition », Mnemosyne n. s. 46 (1993), p. 160– (...)
  • 6 Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 166–168.

2This chapter addresses the way in which the Laconophile introduces his assumption that there was a method of obscuring opinion on Isocrates’ part. By introducing this idea the Panathenaicus automatically introduces the very notion of such a method itself. This Isocratean concept of dissimulation was aligned with Anaximenes’s logos eschematismenos some thirty years ago by Jeroen Bons and recently, more thoroughly, by Pierre Chiron who takes later treatments of figured speech into account.5 Bons argued that the Laconophile’s interpretation showcased the ways in which Isocrates tried to trigger critical reader-reception : his text used all the typical stylistic feats of public oratory, types of argument that proved persuasive in ephemeral performances and aural reception. Critical readers, however, were able to engage with the ambivalence of some of these arguments, thus arriving at diverging interpretations. Those trained in Isocratean education were meant to understand the genuine intention of this Isocratean amphiboly.6 Convincing as this interpretation is, it poses one problem that has not as yet been answered : if Isocrates’ students were meant to be the ones to decode the ‘correct’ interpretations of Isocrates’ ambivalence, why then, do they appear to be unable to do so ? Unlike the Laconophile, they are presented as a passive audience that does not critically assess the worth of single arguments. Instead, they simply cheer the speech as perfect, taken away by its persuasive power. Is this simply a matter of experience, insofar as the students are still among the learning, whereas the Laconophile already graduated from Isocrates’ school and, therefore, is superior to them ? I think not, as I will try to explain. I will try to reassess the exact way Isocrates has the Laconophile present his case for ambivalence. I will maintain that Isocrates presents the methodical approach of the Laconophile as correct and commendable, but that his eventual interpretation is presented as just as flawed as the uncritical reception of the younger students. My main focus in this interpretation will be on a term central to the Laconophile’s case for figured argument in Isocrates, and that is the term amphibolos logos. I will try to read this term against pre-Aristotelian as well as Aristotelian uses of the language of amphibolia, in order to better understand in which ways the ‘openness’ of arguments for diverging interpretations is introduced as a hermeneutical tool in Panathenaicus.

II. Aristotle on logos amphibolos

  • 7 OED s.v. « amphiboly », cf. Bernecker (1992) ; Le Nouveau Petit Robert (2007), s. v. « amphibologie (...)

3So what is logos amphibolos ? How do the modern derivates of that term relate to the concepts connected to it in antiquity ? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, « amphiboly » denotes either « ambiguous discourse ; a sentence which may be construed in two distinct senses » or « a figure of speech : ambiguity arising from the uncertain construction of a sentence or clause, of which the individual words are unequivocal ».7 Following this modern definition, amphibolia is distinct from homonymy. As a rhetorical figure it is defined as an intentional use of a type of language that, in its wording proper, seems clear and unequivocal but that still entails several possible interpretations or implications.

  • 8 See esp. Bons, op. cit. n. 5 ; surprisingly, the comprehensive assessment of rhetorical ambiguity i (...)
  • 9 Herodotus, V, 74,9 ; Epicharm. fr. 84,37 CGF (Austin).

4This modern meaning of the term stems directly from its use in Ancient Greek rhetoric, specifically in Aristotle (see below). But that does not mean a priori, that Isocrates’ logos amphibolos was necessarily informed by the same underlying concept. Although Isocrates was sometimes considered an early, if parenthetic, theorist of this rhetorical figure, he did not invent the term amphibolia (ἀμφιβολία), nor did he use it in a way as to give it a wholly new meaning.8 In fact, he does not even use the abstract noun which, to be sure, appears only twice in extant pre-Aristotelian literature.9 More common in earlier texts are verbal forms of amphiballein (ἀμφιβάλλειν) and the related adjective amphibolos (ἀμφίβολος) which Isocrates uses as well. Therefore, to understand the term it will be helpful to distinguish its pretechnical use from the Aristotelian (and Isocratean) notion.

  • 10 Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64 suggests a literal meaning (« hitting on both sides ») that does less c (...)
  • 11 Garment : Homer, Odyssey, 6,178 ; 22, 103 ; Hesiod, Op., 545 ; Sol. fr. 5.5 (West) (=[Aristotle] At (...)
  • 12 Bacchylides, Dithyr., 4,5–7 ; Aeschylus, Sept. c. Theb., 295–300 ; Herototus, V, 74,2 ; Thucydides, (...)
  • 13 Alc. fr. 7/1,15f. (Page) : « […] ἀμφίβ[ολ]ον πότ[ερον | […] ». Even though the context is very frag (...)
  • 14 Aeschylus, Sept. c. Theb. 863 ; Aesop, fab., 35/1,13f. (cf. 35/2,13f.; 35/3,12f.) ; Thucydides, IV, (...)

5In a literal sense, the verbum means ‘to cast one thing around another’, to ‘encircle’ or ‘embrace’.10 The adjective thus denotes something that is ‘cast or thrown around’ an object.11 In a more technical sense, the term is used in military contexts to denote the tactical situations of either encircling the enemy or taking him into crossfire.12 The adjective amphibolos has a further meaning which is already found in archaic lyric and relates more closely to our subject. As early as in a fragment of Alcman, it simply means ‘uncertain’, or ‘impossible to tell’.13 This general meaning remains the best documented un-technical use of the adjective.14 It also seems to be the basis for Aristotle’s more specific technical definition of amphibolia which he mostly propounds in his Poetics, Rhetorica, and Sophistical Refutations.

  • 15 Aristotle, Rhet., 1407a31–36 ; cf. Soph. el., 165b24–27 ; 166a6–14 ; 166a23-24 ; 175a36–b14 ; 175b2 (...)
  • 16 Aristotle, Rhet., 1375b10–12.
  • 17 Cf. Winter-Froemel & Zirker, op. cit. n. 7, p. 86–88.

6According to the philosopher the term refers to a quality of verbal expression (lexis), and needs to be distinguished from equivocation (homonymia).15 An equivocal signifier refers to different signified objects, whereas an amphibolic expression is unambiguous in what it signifies, but ambiguous in how its signifieds should be evaluated, put into order, or contextualised, in short : how the author makes sense of the expression in its argumentative function. For Aristotle, amphibolia is a lack of clarity about the rationale behind the use of a term, a sentence or an argument. In this sense, he claims that written laws allow for different interpretations, simply because of the fact that they do not indicate how exactly the lawgiver would have applied a particular law in all kinds of different circumstances.16 In dealing with amphibolic statements it is, therefore, the audience to a logos that has to make sense of the argument’s unclear meaning on their own, simply because the author fails to do so.17

  • 18 This is also the case in Aristotle, Poet., 1461a4–30 ; cf. Soph. El., 165b24–7 : Aristotle distingu (...)
  • 19 Cassin, op. cit n. 15, p. 74-75 pointed to the fact that, according to Aristotle, the sophists’ met (...)
  • 20 Aristotle, Rhet., 1419a20–25.
  • 21 Arist. Rhet. 1407a33–1407b6; cf. Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64–65.
  • 22 This does not mean that there were no technical and meaningful uses for ambiguous statements (see e (...)

7Accordingly, Aristotle mostly talks about amphibolia as a defect of style,18 and his suggestions for the rhetorical use of the phenomenon refer to the question of how a speaker might react to amphibolic language, how he might benefit from an opponent’s speech that allows for diverse interpretations – in consequence, amphibolia plays its most prominent part not in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but in the Sophistikoi Elenkhoi which are all about methods of refutation.19 There are only two passages in which Aristotle talks about the relevance of amphibolia for rhetorical composition. In one of these he suggests that one should avoid amphiboly or, at least, reduce it to the utmost minimum by explicit explanation of the intended meaning of a given statement.20 The other passage claims that the only rhetorical object one could possibly achieve by means of amphibolia was intentional obscurity.21 Clearly, Aristotle considers this a rather improbable objective of rhetoric.22 The example he gives for such obscurity has tellingly little to do with political oratory : amphibolia, he says, was a typical quality of oracular speech, such as in the Pythia’s famous answer to Kroisos :

Κροῖσος Ἅλυν διαβὰς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύει.

  • 23 Arist. Rhet. 1407a38. The adjective was possibly already used in this sense in early anecdotes abou (...)

By crossing the river Halys Kroisos will destroy a major empire.23

  • 24 Aristotle, Rhet., 1407a31–b6, quotation : 1407a38 ; Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64–65 ; cf. Herodotus, (...)
  • 25 Consequently, he allows oracles as untechnical proof if they are interpreted correctly ; Aristotle, (...)

8The example demonstrates what amphibolia really is for Aristotle : The lexis ‘major empire (μεγάλη ἀρχή) is very clear in terms of language. What is missing is context : the oracle leaves it to the enquirer to decide which empire will eventually fall.24 In Aristotle’s opinion, a good rhetorician should always provide his audience with the context necessary for correct understanding.25 The less context a speechwriter or speaker provides, the more he cedes control over the interpretation of his argument. Oracles, just like modern soothsayers, make use of this : by being obscure they minimize the risk of being refuted. To put it in the words of Heraclitus :

ἄναξ οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.

  • 26 Heraclitus VS 22 B93 (DK); cf. R. Parker, « Greek States and Greek Oracles », in P. A. Cartledge & (...)

The Lord whose oracle is in Delphi does not speak out nor does he conceal ; he indicates.26

III. Isocrates’ use of the term

  • 27 Isocrates, Or. XIII, 9–13.
  • 28 Eucken 1983, Isokrates. Seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philoso (...)
  • 29 Isocrates, Or. XII, 26–32 ; Livingstone, op. cit. n. 3, p. 31–32.

9This leads us to Isocrates’ and the Laconophile’s speech in Panathenaicus. It is striking how similar Aristotle’s ideas about amphibolia seem to be to some of Isocrates’ convictions about the limitations of logos. Take, for example, the notion that it was impossible to write down laws that were exact enough to be applied without interpretation to all kinds of situations : this notion immediately reminds of Isocrates’ conviction that it was impossible to treat logoi politikoi by a tetagmenē technē.27 The whole treatment of amphibolia is quite obviously influenced by ideas related to the criticism of scripture, in which Isocrates’ views very much converge with those of Plato and of Aristotle.28 All three thinkers are convinced that there is inaccuracy in every verbal expression, and that this needs to be taken into account by authors and speechwriters. Now, is there a chance that Isocrates refers to Aristotle in using the term amphibolos logos ? Usually (and correctly) he is considered a pre-Aristotelian thinker. However, the singular use Isocrates makes of the adjective amphibolos in Panathenaicus most probably postdates the completion of Aristotle’s Rhetorika as well as the Sophistikoi Elenkhoi. It furthermore seems possible that the circle around Aristotle is even adressed in the proemium of Panathenaicus.29 There accordingly is a slight possibility that Isocrates’ knew at least some of Aristotle’s texts dealing with amphibolia, though this does not necessarily mean that his own use of the term was in any way depending from it.

10That his definition of the concept seems related, but not identical, becomes clear if we take a closer look at the section in which Isocrates introduces the notion of logoi amphiboloi :

Εἰδὼς δὲ σαυτὸν ἐπῃνεκότα τὴν Σπαρτιατῶν διοίκησιν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος, φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀκηκοότας, μὴ δόξῃς ὅμοιος εἶναι τοῖς λέγουσιν τι ἂν τύχωσιν, καὶ τούτους νῦν ψέγειν οὓς πρότερον ἐπῄνεις μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων· ταῦθἐνθυμηθεὶς σκοπεῖσθαι ποίους τινὰς ἂν ἑκατέρους εἶναι φήσας ἀληθῆ τε λέγειν δόξεις περὶ ἀμφοτέρων, ἔχοις τἂν τοὺς μὲν προγόνους ἐπαινεῖν οὕσπερ βούλει, Σπαρτιατῶν δὲ δοκεῖν μὲν κατηγορεῖν τοῖς ἀηδῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς διακειμένοις, μηδὲν δὲ ποιεῖν τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν ἐπαινῶν αὐτούς. (240) Ζητῶν δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ῥᾳδίως εὑρεῖν λόγους ἀμφιβόλους καὶ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μετὰ τῶν ἐπαινούντων τῶν ψεγόντων ὄντας, ἀλλἐπαμφοτερίζειν δυναμένους καὶ πολλὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις ἔχοντας, οἷς χρῆσθαι περὶ μὲν συμβολαίων καὶ περὶ πλεονεξίας ἀγωνιζόμενον αἰσχρὸν καῖ πονηρίας οὐ μικρὸν σημεῖον, περὶ δὲ φύσεως ἀνθρώπων διαλεγόμενον καῖ πραγμάτων καλὸν καῖ φιλόσοφον.

(239) You knew that you had praised the organisation of the Spartiates more than anybody else : so you feared that it might appear to your hearers, as though you resembled those people who argue for whatever is at hand, and as though you were now censuring people whom you formerly used to praise more than others. With this in mind you pondered what kind of people you could say that each of them were, so that you would apparently speak the truth about both, and [what you could say] so that you would have arguments to praise your ancestors as you wished to, but appear to be incriminating the Spartiates to those who are ill-disposed toward them–yet without in fact doing that ; instead you would secretly praise them. (240) Searching for arguments of this kind, it was easy to find such that were amphibolic and would not side more with those who praise than with those who censure them ; such that, instead, were capable to contribute to both sides and leave room for dispute ; such that would be shameful and a clear indication of depravity when used by somebody striving for contracts or for personal gain, but beautiful and philosophical when used by someone who is conversing about the nature and actions of human people.

  • 30 Cf. Isocrates, Or. XII, 229–232 where Isocrates regrets that in the first discussion with the stude (...)
  • 31 Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 166–168. On Isocrates’ concept of philosophia see the debate between S. Hal (...)

11According to the former student, Isocrates can reasonably use amphibolic arguments, because his discourse does not aim at personal motives : he is neither a ‘dealmaker’ nor trying to get the better of his opponents, which means : he is not the typical Athenian orator so often censured in Isocratean discourse. Isocrates’ goal is not succes in a rhetorical combat,30 instead, it is intelligent discourse about humanity, in other words : philosophical discourse.31

  • 32 Cf. Livingstone, op. cit. n. 3, p. 32–33 ; Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 167 confuses the student’s defin (...)

12For the purpose of philosophical discourse amphibolia is a legitimate means of composition, claims the Laconophile. But what exactly does he mean by the term logos amphibolos ? He qualifies it as (A) an argument that cannot be better used for praise than for censure, since (B) it can be addressed by opposing parties and thus allows for or even affords discussion, and that means : interpretation.32

  • 33 Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 74.
  • 34 Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 166–167.

13This appears to be similar to Aristotle’s definition. An amphibolic statement is open to opposing interpretations, unless it is further explained or a consensus about its interpretation is reached by way of discussion.33 It remains to ask, however, whether Isocrates considers amphibolia a quality of style rather than thought, in other words : whether a logos amphibolos is a matter of wording or of reasoning. It seems to me, though, that the latter is the case. The Laconophile explicitly claims that Isocrates used amphibolic statements not to simply obscure his opinion (as Aristotle would have it), so as to keep the audience uncertain about the meaning of his statements, but to trigger philosophical discussion about the moral quality of that which is stated. The dianoia of the author has to be hypothesized by the audience’s hyponoia.34 The uncertainty in Isocratean amphibolia, as introduced by this former student, is, therefore, not an uncertainty about the exact meaning of an expression, not an uncertainty about that which is signified by it ; instead, it is an uncertainty about how to morally judge that signified. Is it apt for censure or for praise, for both or for neither ? In a very un-Aristotelian manner, this is what intentionally remains open to debate.

14The Laconophile in Panathenaicus thus claims that Isocrates’ argument about Athens and Sparta (and maybe even any verbal statement at all) is open to diverging moral validations or criticisms. But is this presented as a viable, maybe even a recommended interpretation ? The Laconophile’s reading of Isocrates’ comparison between Athens and Sparta is supposed to vindicate Sparta from the central points of criticism. To achieve this, he singles out the keywords by which Isocrates seems to reprimand Spartan policies – the Spartans’ greed for power (pleonexia), their haughtiness (hyperopsia), bellicosity (qualification of Spartans as polemikoi) and their oppressive regime (archē) both in domestic and foreign politics. The Laconophile acknowledges all of these concepts as traits of the Spartan state and identity. However, he claims that even though each of these traits was introduced as something reproachful within the speech, they would all really constitute a genuine encomium on the Spartiate way of life, and that Isocrates knew that very well. The Laconophile argues that once the audience took account of the positions Isocrates had taken toward Sparta in earlier publications, the true quality and meaning of these traits would become obvious, and that this evidence of former texts would prove that Isocrates, in reality, cherished these Spartan traits as political virtues.

15At the end of the dialogue, Isocrates replies to this interpretation in a very Laconic manner :

οὐ μὴν οὐδἐγὼ παρεστὼς ἐσιώπων, ἀλλἐπῄνεσα τήν τε φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐφθεγξάμην ὧν εἶπεν, οὔθὡς ἔτυχε ταῖς ὑπονοίαις τῆς ἐμῆς διανοίας οὔθὡς διήμαρτεν, ἀλλεἴων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν διέθηκεν.

  • 35 Isocrates, Or. XII, 265

I too did not stand there in silence but praised his nature and his concern, but I did not comment at all on what he said, either how his suppositions had hit or missed my own thoughts, but I let him continue to hold the opinions that he expressed.35

  • 36 The term used by Livingstone, op. cit. n. 3, 31–34.
  • 37 Y. L. Too, The Rhetoric of identity in Isocrates. Text, Power, Pedagogy, Oxford, Oxford University (...)
  • 38 Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 580–587.
  • 39 Cf. Isocrates, or. XIII, 10–15 where Isocrates first adopts the sophistic triad of physis, technē/e (...)

16Ever since Yun Lee Too’s important interpretation of Isocratean self-fashioning as a literary technique, the scholarly consensus holds that Isocrates included this scene into his final publication as a kind of ‘coda’ to his works;36 a coda which implemented instructions about the ideal mode of its reception for the generations to follow. There is, however, some disagreement as to how far Isocrates cedes control over his discourse to future readers by this reply.37 As I have argued before it is best explained as a recommendation of the Laconophile’s general approach (to test the value of arguments against the background of broader context), but not a validation of his specific political reading.38 To be sure, in stating that the Laconophile possessed the natural talent (physis) as well as endeavour (epimeleia) for such kind of analysis, Isocrates indicates implicitly, that this reader of his discourse lacked the decisive element of education (paideia) that Isocrates claimed to promote: doxa.39

  • 40 Isocrates, Or. XII, 1–2 ; cf. XII, 246–247 ; XII, 264–265.
  • 41 Cf. Roth, op. cit. no. 1, Id., op. cit. n. 37, p. 221 ; 236–237 who reasonably argues against the r (...)

17By doing so he takes up a claim he already had made at the very beginning of Panathenaicus in stating that his former speeches contained all kinds of techniques able to mislead an audience by use of style and pseudologia.40 So the critical approach of the Laconophile is recommended. What Isocrates leaves to the audience to judge is, whether the reading of the Laconophile that results from this approach is correct or not.41 This is what eventually constitutes the ‘openness’ of the whole discourse.

  • 42 Isocrates, or. XII, 36–41 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 505–510 ; 515–518.

18The position Isocrates takes in Panathenaicus is one that tries to balance praise and blame in descriptions of both Spartan and Athenian history : that’s what he announces at the end of the proemium (§36–41) when he states that an adequate treatment of historical material will exaggerate neither praise nor blame, but keep a moderate balance, so that the speech would not invite biased reactions.42 That, however, is the exact opposite of the interpretation of the Laconophile who, in the second discussion, reads the speech on Athens and Sparta with the same Spartan bias that appears to have already informed his readings of all former Isocratean texts. Before he takes the stage the students have already expressed their support for the pro-Athenian and the anti-Spartan tone of the speech. By his critique of the latter the Laconophile implicitly reproaches the bias of the other students who all uncritically applauded the speech as it was presented. But he is unable to realise that his own Spartan bias may be just as detrimental to sound interpretation. He does not even seem to imagine that his readings of former Isocratean discourses as pro-Spartan, on which he bases his interpretation of the Panathenaic speech, may already be misguided, and he also fails to see that the very features of the Spartan state that he cherishes are, in fact, seriously made responsible for the political and military decline of Sparta throughout Isocrates’ whole work. In sum, while opposing the biased (pro-Athenian) reaction of the other participants at the discussion, whom he implicitly describes as unable to see the speech’s genuine ‘philosophical’ meaning, the Laconophile presents an alternate reading that is just as biased.

  • 43 Isocrates, or. XII, 39–41 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 515–518.
  • 44 Jeroen Bons (op. cit. n. 5, p. 167–170 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 68–74, esp. p. 72–74 ; cf. p. (...)

19Beyond the political issues at stake, however, Isocrates tries to teach a general lesson on amphibolia through the dialogue scene. If a speaker fails to provide context to his arguments, then the audience will on their own account fill in the gaps amphiboly leaves. That is what both the Athenian students and the Laconophile do – they both read the speech as a corroboration of their respective political bias. The only difference between them is that it affords the Laconophile a lot more sophistry to establish a pro-Spartan reading in a Pan-Athenian speech. The Athenian students, on the other hand, fail to see that parts of the praise of Athens in the speech are only relative to harsh attacks against Sparta, and that the speech opens with a passage that explicitly states that comparison with something reproachful can never constitute pure and genuine praise.43 According to the proemium, then, there is no place for ‘whataboutism’ in Isocratean rhetoric.44 In their reactions to Isocrates’ speech, both the Athenians and the Laconophile, therefore, fail to distance themselves from their own preconceptions. The inconsistency in each case is the same : biased audiences either mistake their own convictions for those of the speaker/author, or they radically oppose the argument because of these convictions, and thus they suppress all possible alternative readings of a given argument.

  • 45 Cassin, op. cit. n. 15, p. 72–73 referring to the Sophistikoi Elenkhoi, esp. Aristotle, Soph. El., (...)

20Eventually, the effect of such lack of self-criticism in audiences is that they tend to receive a text uncritically, in order to boost their egos and their prejudice, and not with an open mind toward possibly changing their minds if an argument refutes or severely challenges their opinion. If amphibolia is not only a rhetorical figure but rather a characteristic of all communication, as Barbara Cassin has argued from an Aristotelian point of view,45 then this would amount to a fundamental problem for all speakers who tried to persuade of arguments other than those that are already predominant among the audience. Amphibolia represents the leeway that allows the audience to manipulate what they hear according to their own ideas – so that they will tend to read them either as affirmations or as provocations to their preconceived opinion. Consequently, they will not be persuaded but either feel self-assured or insulted.

  • 46 Cf. Morgan, op. cit. n. 37.

21Isocrates’ use of the term logos amphibolos thus closely resembles Aristotle’s amphibolia. Both authors consider it a defect in argumentation by which the audience is left to decide how to interpret a speech by putting its arguments into contexts that are not addressed within the speech itself. Unlike the Stagirite, however, Isocrates presents a method to make use of amphibolia, and that is in pedagogical contexts. While a democratic mass audience might make almost tyrannical use of their freedom of interpretation,46 this empowerment of the audience can be checked and balanced by the teacher’s control over communication in an educational setting. Students can be made aware of the bias underlying their own perspective ; and for that very reason, Isocrates confronts his Athenian students with the radical reinterpretation of the Laconophile whose Laconian bias is obvious for Athenians, but who at the same time also pinpoints their own Athenian bias. Thus, the ‘dialogue scene’ implicitly recommends a dialectical approach in the reception of rhetorical arguments. Audiatur et altera pars, listen to the antilogos before you finally decide a case : Isocrates seems to suggest this method not in order to be able to judge wich of the speakers is correct, but in order to discern to which degree both are correct in some, and incorrect in other respects.

  • 47 Without reference to Isocrates or Aristotle, oracles are used as an example for response-oriented a (...)
  • 48 Barker, op. cit. n. 24, p. 9–23 ; cf. J.-P. Vernant, « The Individual Within the City State », in F (...)
  • 49 Herodotus, I, 49 ; Barker, op. cit. n. 24, p.  9–19 ; 24–25 ; cf. Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64–68. S (...)
  • 50 Herodotus, VII, 139–142 ; Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64–65 ; Barker, op. cit. n. 24, p. 19–23.

22This orientation toward audience- and reader-response closely and surprisingly resembles the only use Aristotle acknowledges for amphibolia in composition : the ambiguity of oracles.47 In Herodotus’ account, Kroisos’ mind is already set for an invasion of Media when he approaches the Delphian oracle. Along the lines of this preconception there is only one way to read the oracle. He does not take into account that the oracle is ambiguous, and so he takes the wrong conclusions : eventually, it is not Media but his own empire that falls. Building on the reading of Jean-Pierre Vernant, Elton Barker has convincingly argued that Herodotus uses such oracles as a case to recommend democratic debate and deliberation as a superior mode of political decision-making.48 A tyrant like Kroisos does not need to ponder diverging views and opinions ; as tyrant he reads ambiguous statements as affirmative of his own preconceptions. The reason for that is that political decisions in tyrannies are taken monologically.49 In the case of the second oracle before the battle of Salamis, it is the very fact that different readings of it are democratically discussed in the ecclesia that allows the Athenians to take the best decision and board their ships instead of taking retreat on the Acropolis.50

23In a similar way, Isocrates makes a case for open and critical debate that takes all perspectives into account. In his perception, however, such dialectical openness has become impossible in the Athenian democracy. In the proemium of On the Peace as well as in other texts he bitterly complains that the people acted as quasi tyrants in assembly and lawcourts, and that they suppressed all arguments and opinions that did not humour their own preconceptions. For Isocrates, a truly democratic dialectical discussion is impossible in public debates at Athens (or in any other polis) ; it can only take place in the seclusion of the philosophical school, where the teacher can act as a moderator and where he can introduce diverging points of view when needed, in order to make people think about the ways in which they might be led astray by their own bias in receiving logoi.

IV. Isocratean Amphiboly : Beyond Panathenaicus

  • 51 See e.g. Isocrates, or. 6 passim ; VII, 56–77 ; IX, 54–57 ; 67–69 ; XV, 100–139 ; Bons, op. cit. n. (...)
  • 52 See Blank, op. cit. no. 1, p. 27–29 ; 503–504.
  • 53 S. Usener, Isokrates, Platon und ihr Publikum. Hörer und Leser von Literatur im 4. Jahrhundert v. C (...)

24If Panathenaikos shows a concept of amphibolia that is oriented toward reader-response, are there any examples for an active use of amphibolia by Isocrates in that sense, examples that might aim at persuasion rather than at critical interpretation ? Isocrates certainly employs a lot of ambiguous arguments in his discourses,51 and these contribute significantly to their openness to diverging interpretations. In fact, when it comes to the political views behind his arguments, there are as many interpretations as there are interpreters. But does that mean that these ambiguities are purposeful, and that Panathenaicus can be read as a guideline for the whole corpus?52 Does Isocrates want his audience to take a step back from his rhetoric so they can ponder the worth of every single argument? The answer lies behind the fact that Isocratean discourse is fictional speech published as literature to an educated audience. The effectivity of the arguments it contains can be evaluated against two types of communication : to the audience at assemblies and other public stages of the dramatic setting of a given discourse on the one hand, and to Isocrates’ reading audience on the other. If we take into account that Isocrates cleary distinguishes these two audiences and that his educational efforts are directed at his readers only,53 we should not be surprised if arguments that make use of amphobolia as a means of persuasion on the dramatic level, served a different purpose as part of a work of educational literature. In comparison, the audience of the latter, in particular readers that were trained in Isocratean philosophy, were in a far better position to apply methods of critical reception.

  • 54 Esp. Isocrates, Or. IV, 100–128 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 212–224.
  • 55 Isocrates Or. XII, 39–41 ; cf. VII, 70–73 ; Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 516–518.
  • 56 Isocrates, Or. VII, 70–73 ; cf. Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 168–170 ; Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 399–401.
  • 57 E.g. Isocrates, or. V 9–10 ; 93–95 ; IX, 73 ; XV, 55–56 ; 193–195 ; 252 ; Too, op. cit. n. 47, p. 1 (...)
  • 58 Isocrates, Or. XII, 271–272.
  • 59 See above n. 56.

25Two types of amphibolia in Isocratean discourse seem particularly relevant in this context. The first are arguments that consciously blind out context in order to obscure specific detail. These are not obvious as amphibolic, but once the reader considers these suppressed contexts, the arguments tend to fly in the face of their purported persuasive intention. In this sense, for example, Isocratean discourse repeatedly uses comparisons between Athens and a Sparta that is depicted as evil, as a means to persuade the audience that Athenian policies in the Delian League were not oppressive but mild, and that they even proved the high moral standard of the Athenians and their leadership in the empire.54 Here, he blinds out two important contexts that are able to disqualify this line of thought (and both can be found in different works of Isocrates) : On the one hand, Isocrates himself states that comparison of A with a morally reproachful B does not suffice as proof for the moral integrity of A ;55 on the other hand, he claims that the litmus test for Athenian political morality is comparison with Athens’ own political ancestors, Theseus in particular.56 A comparison stating that Athens committed fewer crimes than the horrific Spartan empire, eventually states that Athens committed (fewer) crimes. By blinding out the context of rhetorical theory as well as the context of what constitutes genuine paradigms for good politics, Isocrates renders a defective argument more persuasive.
The problem with this compositional use of
amphibolia in Isocrates is, that Isocrates time and again advises his readers that they should test his arguments by taking the whole of his works into account.57 The amphibolic argument might be persuasive to the audiences of the spoken word in politcal oratory. These are audiences that cannot probe whether or not the argument is consistent and unambiguous in all possible contexts. But that kind of criticism is exactly what Isocrates asks his ‘philosophic’ readers to do.58 If they follow this instruction, however, some of the arguments might lose their consistency. That is the case, if we read Isocrates praise of the late Athenian Leage alongside his repeated statement that whataboutism of this kind constituted a weak argument for praise.59 Eventually, it appears that Isocrates reproduces hidden ambiguities that were common in political oratory, but that he invites his reading audience to take a critical stance toward them and potentially refute them as inconsistent or unconvincing.

  • 60 Isocrates, Or. XV, 93.
  • 61 Demosthenes, Or. XXXI and XXXII.
  • 62 Ps.-Demosthenes, Or. LII, 30–31.
  • 63 G. O. Rowe, « Anti-Isocratean Sentiment in Demosthenes’ Against Androtion », Historia 49 (2000), p. (...)

26A different type of amphibolia is found in the Antidosis, where it is employed as a subtle, or implicit, rhetorical proof. In this discourse, framed as a pseudo-dicanic apology and periautologia, Isocrates reacts to the alleged accusation that his education had produced the worst kind of citizens, namely excessive litigants (sycophants) who parasitically lived on the revenues from courtroom activities (especially by denouncing the ‘innocent rich’). In refuting this accusation, Isocrates famously presents a list of nine of his students who he claims had all been introduced to the Ordre du Mérite, so to speak, as they were awarded golden crowns by decision of the Athenian demos.60 In this case as well, Isocrates blinds out important context, but this time in a way that would hardly have failed contemporary audiences (not only reader, but also live-audiences at public meetings). Put simply, the refutation evades the actual accusation : ‘(Athenian public opinion:) Your students are vicious sycophants.’ – ‘(Isocratean reply:) Well, they were awarded Golden Crowns.’ Unlike the argument suggests, both statements in this exchange can be true without contradiction. Interestingly, a closer look at the careers of the nine students that Isocrates mentions quickly reveals that even with our fragmentary knowledge we can confidently say that the majority of them were, indeed, involved in famous and scandalous trials, and that some of them are explicitly described as sycophants in extant works of contemporary dicanic oratory. This is most obvious in the case of Onetor and Philonides who were directly involved in Demosthenes’ guardian trials,61 or Callipus, the opponent of Apollodorus in a trial, and Lysitheides whom the plaintiff in the same case accuses of fraudulous arbitration.62 Generally, the evidence on these students seems so unequivocal that a while ago both Galen Rowe and Alfonso Moreno, independently from each other, claimed that they formed some sort of Isocratean Mafia in 4th-century Athens.63

27So, Isocrates’ does not explicitly and directly refute the accusation that those nine Athenians were morally depraved – and there even is some evidence that they were scandalous figures –, but he states that they were decorated heroes of the Athenian state. What can we make of this when we think about amphibolia ? My suggestion is that Isocrates instrumentalizes the fact that the persons he names as his students were both notorious litigants and respected (even honoured) democratic citizens at the same time. He introduces a typical accusation (they are immoral) that blinds out important and irrefutable context (they were awarded golden crowns) as a means to persuade the audience – the accusation, in this context, is amphibolic. Isocrates makes use of this amphiboly and counters the accusation by bringing up the very context that the accusation had suppressed. If Athenian public opinion holds that Isocrates was a trainer of sycophants, then they can only use this as a reproach against him if sycophants were, in fact, consistently persecuted as villains in Athens. If sycophants, instead, tend to be highly respected, then Isocrates can even name the most notorious of sycophants as his students and still claim that they were moral persons, simply because they received those rewards. He can refute the amphibolic accusation by providing the supplementary context that the accusation had suppressed. But what is more, this refutation forces the prosecutor (as well as the jury who consists of members of the ecclesia) to either accept the refutation as valid (the students were persons of integrity) or admit that the judgment of the body politic proved invalid because it awarded crowns to those very students.

28The amphibolia Isocrates employs here lies in the fact that he does not express the conclusion (‘It is you who pamper the sycophants, which disqualifies you as accusers of sycophancy’), but only states that his students are highly decorated, respected citizens. In a courtroom situation the fictive litigant could only either publicly accept Isocrates’ claim that the students were respectable persons (since the fact of their decorations cannot be denied), which would have meant to blind out the original accusation. Or, they were forced to claim that they were sycophants nonetheless, and thus unmask their own double-standard – if Isocrates was to be reprimanded for training them, all Athens must be for honouring them. So, Isocrates uses the precarious arguments of his cardboard-opponents in order to take them into crossfire.

29To conclude, in Isocrates’ view amphiboly is a technique that employs the ambiguity of both language and enthymemes to obscure the inconsistency of an argument. This can be put to different uses. In public oratory, such dissimulation can be used to delude both juries and assemblymen, who under the pressure of time and circumstance are less able to critically asses the plausibility of arguments. Amphiboly is thus used in flattery and slander and generally for arguments detrimental to the common good. Education in Isocrates ‘philosophy of logos’, however, seems to be conceived as a training in the very critical skills needed to identify the weak spots in such arguments. It is the task of the educated Isocratean philosopher to critically unmask and dismantle the amphiboly in others’ arguments and make use of amphibolia to indirectly point toward inconsistencies in public opinion on important matters.

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Notes

1 For comprehensive interpretations of this scene see e.g. H. O. Kröner, « Dialog und Rede. Zur Deutung des isokrateischen Panathenaikos. », in : A&A 15 (1969), p. 102–121 ; M. Erler, « Hilfe und Hintersinn. Isokrates’ Panathenaikos und die Schriftkritik im Phaidros », in : L. Rossetti (ed.), Understanding the Phaedrus, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag, 1992, p. 122–137. E. Alexiou, « Die Kommunikation mit dem Publikum. Dialogszenen bei Isokrates », WJA 25 (2001), p. 85-96 ; P. Roth, « Die Dialogszene im ‘Panathenaikos‚ », in W. Orth (ed.), Isokrates – neue Ansätze zur Bewertung eines politischen Schriftstellers, Trier, WV, Europäische und internationale Studien 2, 2003b, p. 140–149 ; T. G. M. Blank, Logos und Praxis. Sparta als politisches Exemplum in den Schriften des Isokrates, Berlin / New York, De Gruyter, KLIO Beihefte 23, 2014, esp. p. 572–583.

2 Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 544–547 ; 565–570.

3 See N. Livingstone, « Writing Politics. Isocrates’ Rhetoric of Philosophy », Rhetorica 25 (2007), p. 15–34 , esp. p. 31–32 ; Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 571–572 ; L. Walsh, « The Rhetoric of Oracles », RSQ 33.3 (2003), p. 55–78, esp. p. 73–74 correctly points to the fact that Isocrates explicitly quotes the Delphian motto ‘know thyself’ in the section.

4 Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 572–579.

5 J. A. E. Bons, « Amphibolia. Isocrates on Written Composition », Mnemosyne n. s. 46 (1993), p. 160–171 ; Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 563–587 ; P. Chiron, « Le Panathénaïque d’Isocrate et la doctrine rhétorique du discours figuré », in C. Bouchet & P. Giovanelli-Jouanna (eds), Isocrate. Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux, Paris, De Boccard, 2015, p. 59–70.

6 Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 166–168.

7 OED s.v. « amphiboly », cf. Bernecker (1992) ; Le Nouveau Petit Robert (2007), s. v. « amphibologie » (« Double sens présenté par une proposition ») ; see also J. Engels, s.v. « Polysemie », HWRh 6 (2003), p. 1530–1537 ; M. Bauer et. al., « Dimensionen der Ambiguität », Zeitschrift für Literatur und Linguistik 158 (2010), p. 7–75, esp. p. 7-40 for rhetorical/literary and ibid. p. 40–66 ; E. Winter-Froemel & A. Zirker, « Ambiguität in der Sprecher-Hörer-Interaktion », Zeitschrift für Literatur und Linguistik 158 (2010), p. 76-97 for linguistic definitons and approaches toward ambiguity and, more specifically, amphiboly.

8 See esp. Bons, op. cit. n. 5 ; surprisingly, the comprehensive assessment of rhetorical ambiguity in Bauer et. al., op. cit. n. 7 does not take Ancient Greek theories on amphiboly into account.

9 Herodotus, V, 74,9 ; Epicharm. fr. 84,37 CGF (Austin).

10 Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64 suggests a literal meaning (« hitting on both sides ») that does less conform to the actual use of the word in Greek literature than to the meaning of the term in later rhetorical theory.

11 Garment : Homer, Odyssey, 6,178 ; 22, 103 ; Hesiod, Op., 545 ; Sol. fr. 5.5 (West) (=[Aristotle] Ath. Pol. 12, 1, 8) ; Aesch. Tetr. 26B fr. 240 (Mette) (=exc. Herod. p.22.31) ; Euripides, Alc., 216–217 ; Bacch., 102–104 ; El., 1230 ; Ion, 1490–1491 ; Lycophron, Alex., 863 ; cf. Sophocles, Ant., 1092–1093 (of wearing one’s hair) ; arms/hands : Homer, Iliad, 23,97 ; Odyssey, 17,344 ; Timoth. lyr. fr. 15, col 4, 126f. (PMG) ; Euripides, Bacch., 1364 ; Phoen., 306ab ; Suppl., 69–70 ; rope : Euripides, Troad., 538 ; yoke : Aeschylus, Pers., 50 ; 71 ; net : Sophocles, Ant., 342–344 ; anchor : Ephorus, FGrHist 70 fr. 42,24f. ; Odysseus’ bedchamber : Homer, Odyssey, 23,192 ; cf. Hesiod, Op., 787 ; see also the metaphorical use in Pindar, Ol. 1,7-8 (of sound) ; Euripides, Androm., 110 (of slavery) ; 119 (of fateful marriage) ; Bacch., 385 (of sleep).

12 Bacchylides, Dithyr., 4,5–7 ; Aeschylus, Sept. c. Theb., 295–300 ; Herototus, V, 74,2 ; Thucydides, II, 76,3 ; IV, 32,3 ; IV, 36,3 ; cf. Euripides, Hippol., 1269–1271 (of the crossfire of the arrows of Eros).

13 Alc. fr. 7/1,15f. (Page) : « […] ἀμφίβ[ολ]ον πότ[ερον | […] ». Even though the context is very fragmentary, the construction of the term with πότ[ερον implies the meaning suggested above.

14 Aeschylus, Sept. c. Theb. 863 ; Aesop, fab., 35/1,13f. (cf. 35/2,13f.; 35/3,12f.) ; Thucydides, IV, 18,4 ; Hippocrates, Dec. habit., 17,7-8 ; Lysias, Or. 32, 18–22 (Carey) ; Xenophon, Mem. I, 2,35 ; Aeschines, or. 1, 162 ; Ps.-Aristotle Plant. 815a26–29 ; 816a22–25 ; Polioch. EIF fr. 1,7f FCGr (Meineke).

15 Aristotle, Rhet., 1407a31–36 ; cf. Soph. el., 165b24–27 ; 166a6–14 ; 166a23-24 ; 175a36–b14 ; 175b28–38 ; 177a9–15 ; 177b1 ; 179a19–21 ; top., 145b24–27 ; 160a28–34 ; B. Cassin, « Homonymie et amphibolie, ou le mal radical en traduction », Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 94 (1989), p. 71–78, esp. p. 75–76 ; cf. also Eudoxus, fr. 29.7-8 (Wehrli) ; Aeneas Tacticus, 24,1.

16 Aristotle, Rhet., 1375b10–12.

17 Cf. Winter-Froemel & Zirker, op. cit. n. 7, p. 86–88.

18 This is also the case in Aristotle, Poet., 1461a4–30 ; cf. Soph. El., 165b24–7 : Aristotle distinguishes five reproachful defects of style (lexis, λέξις), (1) kata glôttên (κατὰ γλώττην) – when rare terms from dialect or sociolect are used –, (2) kata metaphoran (κατὰ μεταφοράν) – whenever it remains unclear whether or not an expression is meant to be metaphoric –, (3) kata prosodian (κατὰ προσωδίαν) – when different pronounciations result in diverse meanings –, (4) kata ethos tēs lexeōs (κατὰ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως) – if pragmatic and literal meanings of an expression are all too different and might be misunderstood –, and finally (5) amphibolia (ἀμφιβολία) – a wording that, without further explanation, seems illogical or contradictory.

19 Cassin, op. cit n. 15, p. 74-75 pointed to the fact that, according to Aristotle, the sophists’ method of (pseudo‑)refutation is based upon the simple trick of ignoring ambiguities in the language of their opponents, a method that marginalises meaning against wording.

20 Aristotle, Rhet., 1419a20–25.

21 Arist. Rhet. 1407a33–1407b6; cf. Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64–65.

22 This does not mean that there were no technical and meaningful uses for ambiguous statements (see e.g. Winter-Froemel & Zirker, op. cit. n. 7, p. 84–86), but only that they are not normally useful under the typical circumstances of Athenian democratic oratory.

23 Arist. Rhet. 1407a38. The adjective was possibly already used in this sense in early anecdotes about Epimenides of Crete, see Epimen. FGrHist 457 T6,5–7 = F11,3–5 (= Plutarch, Def. orac., 409e).

24 Aristotle, Rhet., 1407a31–b6, quotation : 1407a38 ; Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64–65 ; cf. Herodotus, I, 53,3 ; Aesop, Fab., 139 (=241/t1) ; Diocl. fr. 57,5–8 (van der Eijck) ; 193a29–33 (van der Eijck). Importantly, Aristotle counts oracular chrēsmoi among the atechnai pisteis, yet precisely under the qualification that their interpretation be unambiguous : Aristotle, Rhet., 1375b10–12. On oracular ambiguity in general see J. van Ijzeren, « Ἀμφιβολία χρησμόδης », Mnemosyne 53 (1925), p. 351–360 ; Walsh, op. cit. n. 3 ; E. Barker, « Paging the Oracle. Interpretation, Identity and Performance in Herodotus’ History », G&R 53 (2006), p. 1–28, esp. p. 9–13.

25 Consequently, he allows oracles as untechnical proof if they are interpreted correctly ; Aristotle, Rhet., 1375b34–1376a2 ; Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 65. On implicit contexts as a means of evoking ambiguity see Bauer et al., op. cit. n. 7, p. 33–35.

26 Heraclitus VS 22 B93 (DK); cf. R. Parker, « Greek States and Greek Oracles », in P. A. Cartledge & F. D. Harvey (eds), Crux. Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Exeter, Imprint Academic, 1985, p. 298–326, esp. p. 301–302 ; T. E. H. Harrison, Divinity and History. The Religion of Herodotus, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, esp. p. 149 ; Barker, op. cit. n. 24, p. 2–3.

27 Isocrates, Or. XIII, 9–13.

28 Eucken 1983, Isokrates. Seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den zeitgenössischen Philosophen, Berlin, De Gruyter, 1983, UaLG 19, 121–139 ; Erler 1992, op. cit. n. 1.

29 Isocrates, Or. XII, 26–32 ; Livingstone, op. cit. n. 3, p. 31–32.

30 Cf. Isocrates, Or. XII, 229–232 where Isocrates regrets that in the first discussion with the students he acted as if exactly that were his objective.

31 Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 166–168. On Isocrates’ concept of philosophia see the debate between S. Haliwell, « Philosophical Rhetoric or Rhetorical Philosophy ? The Strange Case of Isocrates », in B. D. Schildgen (ed.), The Rhetoric Canon, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1997, p. 107–125 ; C. Balla, « Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle on Rhetoric », Rhizai 1 (2004), p. 45–71 ; N. Livingstone, op. cit. n. 3, p. 17–19 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 7–12 and Id., « Rhetorik als Philosophie und Pädagogik : Isokrates », in G. Ueding & F. Vidal (eds.), Handbuch Rhetorik und Pädagogik, Berlin, De Gruyter, Handbücher Rhetorik 8, 2023 (in print).

32 Cf. Livingstone, op. cit. n. 3, p. 32–33 ; Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 167 confuses the student’s definition of amphibolia with his suppositions about the use Isocrates makes of it, when he equals the Isocratean term to the logos eschēmatismenos or oratio figurata of later rhetorical theory ; see also Bauer et al., op. cit. n. 7, p. 24–25.

33 Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 74.

34 Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 166–167.

35 Isocrates, Or. XII, 265

36 The term used by Livingstone, op. cit. n. 3, 31–34.

37 Y. L. Too, The Rhetoric of identity in Isocrates. Text, Power, Pedagogy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 68–73; cf. K. Eden, « Hermeneutics and the Ancient Rhetorical Tradition », in : B. D. Schildgen (ed.), The Rhetoric Canon, Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1997, p. 127-150, esp. 128–129; N. Livingstone, « The Voice of Isocrates and the Dissemination of Cultural Power », in: Y. L. Too, (ed.), Pedagogy and Power. Rhetorics of Classical Learning, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 263–281, p. 276f.; Id. op. cit. n. 3, 33f.; S. von Reden & S. Goldhill, « Plato and the Performance of Dialogue », in Id. & R. Osborne (eds), Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 257–289, esp. p. 281f.; E. Alexiou, op. cit. n. 1, p. 94–97; K. A. Morgan, « The Tyranny of the Audience in Plato and Isocrates », in : Id. (ed.), Popular Tyranny. Sovereignty and its Discontents in Ancient Greece, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2003, p. 181–213, esp. p. 187f.; P. Roth, Der Panathenaikos des Isokrates. Übersetzung und Kommentar, München / Leipzig, Saur, MzA 196, 2003a, 253–256; Id., op. cit. n. 1, p. 144f.; J. D. Pratt, Isocrates in Athens. Public Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Display, Ph.D. thesis University of California at Berkeley, 2006, p.73–75 argues against the idea of a radical withdrawal from authority; D. Konstan, « Isocrates’ ‘Republic’ », in T. Poulakos & D. Depew (eds), Isocrates and Civic Education, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2004, p. 107–124, esp. 119f. argues that the contrast of biased readings by the Athenian students and the Laconophile proved that both sides’ reception of the speech was irrational; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 502–505 for an overview.

38 Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 580–587.

39 Cf. Isocrates, or. XIII, 10–15 where Isocrates first adopts the sophistic triad of physis, technē/epistēmē and epimeleia and argues that (1) it was impossible for educators to influence physis or epimeleia, and that (2) what they could offer was to train them how to make use of sound judgement (phronēsis informed by doxa) to secure the correct application of technical knowledge; cf. H. Olivier, « Isocrate, penseur engagé, intellectuel, nouveau Socrate? », in : C. Bouchet, P. Giovanelli‑Jouanna (eds.), Isocrate. Entre jeu rhétorique et enjeux politiques, Paris, 2015, CEROR n. s. vol. 47, p. 285–315, esp. p. 285–286.

40 Isocrates, Or. XII, 1–2 ; cf. XII, 246–247 ; XII, 264–265.

41 Cf. Roth, op. cit. no. 1, Id., op. cit. n. 37, p. 221 ; 236–237 who reasonably argues against the rejection by principle of any ‚Hintersinn‘ in V. Gray, « Images of Sparta. Writer and Audience in Isocrates’ Panathenaicus », in A. Powell & S. Hodkinson (eds), The Shadow of Sparta, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 223–271 ; cf. also Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 167–168 ; Pratt, op. cit. n. 37, p. 89–100. Gray’s reading, however, introduced the important idea that on a meta-rhetorical level, the Panathenaicus was a discourse on the reasonable mīxis of praise and blame. Interestingly, in the first dialogue scene (Isocrates, or. XII, 199–228), Isocrates closes the case addressed by the Laconophile with a very harsh and vigourous attack ; he thus prevents critical discussion to develop and later (or. XII, 229–232) regretfully suggests that his intervention might have been detrimental to his pedagogic aims.

42 Isocrates, or. XII, 36–41 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 505–510 ; 515–518.

43 Isocrates, or. XII, 39–41 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 515–518.

44 Jeroen Bons (op. cit. n. 5, p. 167–170 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 68–74, esp. p. 72–74 ; cf. p. 399–401) was first to point to Isocrates, or. VII, 56–69 as a more explicit statement of the principle. In that instance, it is made to qualify a seemingly positive evaluation of Spartiate political equality as relative to the despisable oligarchic structure of the Lacedaemonian state in its entirety.

45 Cassin, op. cit. n. 15, p. 72–73 referring to the Sophistikoi Elenkhoi, esp. Aristotle, Soph. El., 165a6–17 ; cf. Winter-Froemel & Zirker, op. cit. n. 7, p. 77–80.

46 Cf. Morgan, op. cit. n. 37.

47 Without reference to Isocrates or Aristotle, oracles are used as an example for response-oriented ambiguity in Bauer et al., op. cit. n. 7, p. 35–37.

48 Barker, op. cit. n. 24, p. 9–23 ; cf. J.-P. Vernant, « The Individual Within the City State », in F. I. Zeitlin (ed.), Mortals and Immortals. Collected Essays, Princeton, Princeton Unviersity Press, 1991, p. 303–317 (orig. : « L’individu dans la cité », in : Id. (ed.), L’individu, la mort, l’amour. Soi-même et l’autre en Grèce ancienne, Paris, Gallimard, 1989, p  211–232) esp. p.  306 ; 311 ; see also on this oracle van Ijzeren, op. cit. n. 24, p. 353. Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 59–60 points to the fact that open-ended questions are not normally used in real enquiries to an oracle, though they are at the heart of all famous literary examples for misinteretations of oracles.

49 Herodotus, I, 49 ; Barker, op. cit. n. 24, p.  9–19 ; 24–25 ; cf. Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64–68. See also Quintilian, Inst. IX, 2, 68 who introduces ambiguity as a method of oratio figurata and a means of criticising tyrants unbeknownst to them ; Bauer et al., op. cit. n. 7, p. 24–25.

50 Herodotus, VII, 139–142 ; Walsh, op. cit. n. 3, p. 64–65 ; Barker, op. cit. n. 24, p. 19–23.

51 See e.g. Isocrates, or. 6 passim ; VII, 56–77 ; IX, 54–57 ; 67–69 ; XV, 100–139 ; Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 168–171 ; J. Walker, The Genuine Teachers of this Art. Rhetorical Education in Antiquity, Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 2011, p. 136–150, esp. p. 148–150 ; Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 282–286 ; 348–349 ; 441–445 with n. 21.

52 See Blank, op. cit. no. 1, p. 27–29 ; 503–504.

53 S. Usener, Isokrates, Platon und ihr Publikum. Hörer und Leser von Literatur im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Tübingen, Narr, 1993 (ScripOralia 63).

54 Esp. Isocrates, Or. IV, 100–128 ; cf. Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 212–224.

55 Isocrates Or. XII, 39–41 ; cf. VII, 70–73 ; Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 516–518.

56 Isocrates, Or. VII, 70–73 ; cf. Bons, op. cit. n. 5, p. 168–170 ; Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 399–401.

57 E.g. Isocrates, or. V 9–10 ; 93–95 ; IX, 73 ; XV, 55–56 ; 193–195 ; 252 ; Too, op. cit. n. 47, p. 10–73, esp. 34–35 ; 42–48; Blank, op. cit. n. 1, p. 27–29.

58 Isocrates, Or. XII, 271–272.

59 See above n. 56.

60 Isocrates, Or. XV, 93.

61 Demosthenes, Or. XXXI and XXXII.

62 Ps.-Demosthenes, Or. LII, 30–31.

63 G. O. Rowe, « Anti-Isocratean Sentiment in Demosthenes’ Against Androtion », Historia 49 (2000), p. 278–302 ; Id., « Two Responses by Isocrates to Demosthenes », Historia 51 (2002), p. 149–162 ; A. Moreno, Feeding the Democracy, The Athenian Grain-Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007.

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Thomas Blank, « Amphibolia and Rhetorical Criticism in Isocrates’ Panathenaicus »Cahiers des études anciennes [En ligne], LX | 2023, mis en ligne le 21 avril 2023, consulté le 06 juin 2023. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudesanciennes/2570

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