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Law as a catalyst and remedy for civic violence in early Rome : two examples from Dionysius of Halicarnassus

Stefano Carlo Sala

Résumés

Cet article analyse le récit de l’historien Denys d’Halicarnasse concernant l’adoption de deux lois plébéiennes, la lex Publilia Voleronis en 471 av. J.-C. (D.H. A.R. 9.37-49) et la lex Icilia de Aventino publicando en 456 av. J.-C. (D.H. A.R. 10.31-32). L’analyse se concentre en particulier sur les stratégies narratives adoptées par Dionysos pour présenter l’éruption et la résolution de la violence résultant des conflits internes provoqués par ces propositions de loi. Parmi ces stratégies, Dionysos privilégie la caractérisation des tribuns plébéiens et de leurs opposants, la modération des premiers Romains, ainsi que l’insertion d’idées issues de la pensée politique grecque dans les discours de ses personnages. En adoptant ces stratégies, Dionysos dresse un tableau idéalisé du développement politique de la Rome primitive, où la modération et le recours aux débats s’opposent à la violence extrême de la République tardive.

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1In Book 2 of the Roman Antiquities, the Greek historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus praises the remarkable attitude of the early Romans towards civic violence:

  • 1 Transl. E. Cary.

[the Romans] never in the course of six hundred and thirty years proceeded to bloodshed and mutual slaughter, though many great controversies arose between the populace and their magistrates concerning public policy, as is apt to happen in all cities, whether large or small; [3] but by persuading and informing one another, by yielding in some things and gaining other things from their opponents, who yielded in turn, they settled their disputes in a manner befitting fellow citizens. But from the time that Gaius Gracchus, while holding the tribunician power, destroyed the harmony of the government, they have been perpetually slaying and banishing one another from the city and refraining from any irreparable acts to gain the upper hand. (D.H. A.R. 2.11.2-3)1.

  • 2 See the studies of L. Bertelli (1972) and J.-C. Richard (1977) on the first plebian secession; W. P(...)

2This remark provide the interpretative key for understanding the instances of civic turmoil in Rome in the historical narrative of the Roman Antiquities. Previous scholarship of Dionysius’ historical work has analysed many episodes of his narrative on the Struggle of the Orders, from the first secession of the plebs and the feat of Coriolanus down to the attempted coup of Appius Herdonius and the sedition of Spurius Cassius2. All of these instances generally conform to the picture of Roman internal conflicts offered by Dionysius at 2.11.2-3: tensions, however high they may get, are always resolved through long-winded debates between leaders of the patrician and plebeian factions, and temperance seems always to prevail. The present paper intends to further contribute to the study of the Struggle of the Orders in Dionysius’ historical work by analyzing Dionysius’ narrative on the passing of the lex Publilia Voleronis in 473-471 BC (D.H. A.R. 9.37.2-49.4) and on the struggle for the approval of the lex Icilia de Aventino publicando in 456 BC (D.H. A.R. 10.31.1-32.5). These two events have been specifically chosen as they both deal with the passing of laws which were perceived as milestones for the improvement of the political status of the Roman plebs.

3Furthermore, the featuring of a bill proposal as both the catalyst of civic conflict and the final remedy that ends to internal turmoil in Rome poses a significant challenge for Dionysius, who has to reconcile both aspects in his account of the events. For these reasons, the paper will focus on the narrative strategies adopted by Dionysius to present the eruption and resolution of violence resulting from the internal strife caused by these bill proposals. After giving a brief overview of Dionysius’ narrative of the events, each section will isolate the scenes of the eruption of violence and analyze the strategies employed by Dionysius to introduce the resolution of the conflict.

1. The lex Publilia Voleronis (D.H. A.R. 9.37.2-39.4)

  • 3 Piso FRHist 9 *F 25 = Liv. 2.58.2; Liv. 2.54.3-61.9; Dio F 22.1 ; Zon. 7.17.

4Even though Dionysius, like other ancient historians3, locates the final passing of the lex Publilia Voleronis, establishing the tribal assembly for the election of the plebeian tribunes, in 471 BC, he presents it as the result of a prolonged struggle between the patricians and plebeians, spanning across multiple years. The narrative goes back to the year 473 BC, when the tribune Gnaeus Genucius put the consuls of the previous year to trial due to their opposition to an agrarian bill. On the day of the trial, Genucius was found dead in his own house due to natural causes, at least according to Dionysius (D.H. A.R. 9.37.2-38.2). After seeing where Genucius’ recklessness led him, the plebeian tribunes lost heart, and the consuls took advantage of this by enacting a strict military levy. On that occasion, the consuls offended a plebeian centurion, Publilius Volero, by lowering his rank and sending a lictor to make him comply by violent means. In response, after appealing to the tribunes, Volero punched the lictor and rallied the plebeians to boycott the levy and protect the tribunes. This action forced the consuls to back down and leave the Forum (D.H. A.R. 9.38.3-39.6). After a pestilence that was resolved by burying alive the Vestal Orbinia, in the next year (472 BC) Volero was elected plebeian tribune and proposed a new bill to transfer the elections of the tribunes from the curiate assembly to the tribal assembly. According to Dionysius, this was meant to speed up the process and to avoid interference from the patricians, as the tribes could be gathered without the approval of the senate nor the need to take auspices, and their meetings lasted only one day. After many days of debates amongst the plebeians and patricians, Publilius sought to forcefully remove and exclude the patricians from the discussion of the law. Such efforts, deemed tyrannical by Dionysius, were thwarted by a pestilence that ravaged Rome for the rest of the year (D.H. A.R. 9.40.1-42.2). In 471 BC Volero was re-elected tribune and added a provision to have even the plebeian aediles elected by the tribal assembly. In the same year, Appius Claudius and Titus Quinctius were elected consuls, two men with different attitudes and approaches towards the plebeian issue: while Appius was a hard-liner, Quinctius was more moderate and willing to reach a compromise. This was clearly reflected in their respective address to the people: if Quinctius’ moderate speech came really close to have the plebeians repeal their own law, the animosity of Appius’ speech, attacking the institution of the tribunate, alienated the plebeians and entrenched them all the more in their opposition (D.H. A.R. 9.42.3-45.2). In response to Appius’ speech, the tribune Gaius Laetorius argued in favor of the tribunes and of the law, which he swore to protect with his life. After this, a brawl arose in the Forum between the supporters of Claudius and Laetorius: to punish Laetorius, Claudius sent a lictor, who was brutalized by Laetorius’ supporters, whereas Laetorius sent one of his henchmen to seize Appius and throw him into prison. Only the swift intervention of Quinctius avoided a violent escalation, but tensions remained at an all-time high, as the plebeians occupied the Capitoline in protest (D.H. A.R. 9.46.1-48.5). In the following meeting of the Senate, a compromise was reached, thanks to Quinctius’ unwavering effort to mediate between the Senate and the tribunes. The bill proposed by Publilius Volero was approved by the Senate, which ended the turmoil (D.H. A.R. 9.49.1-4).

1.1. The role of violence in Dionysius’ narrative

  • 4 On the Capitoline started the clash that lead to the flight of Gaius Gracchus in 121 BC (App. Civ. (...)

5The three-year crisis that forms the background for the passing of the lex Publilia Voleronis is presented by Dionysius as a στάσις that threatened multiple times to destroy the citizen body from the inside. To further hammer in this point, Dionysius inserts several authorial comments that frame his narrative: by the end of the year 473 BC, the city is described as in complete turmoil (D.H. A.R. 9.39.4 διειστήκει πᾶσα πόλις), as the issue of the conflict between the patricians and plebeians shifts from the allotment of the public land to constitutional matters (D.H. A.R. 9.39.4 περιειστήκει τε περὶ τῆς κληρουχίας στάσις εἰς ἕτερον μείζονα {διὰ τὸν} ὑπὲρ τοῦ κόσμου τῆς πολιτείας ἀνῶνα). The internal turmoil then resumes in 472 BC, after the first epidemic wave is placated through the punishment of the Vestal Orbinia (D.H. A.R. 9.41.1 δ' ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου διαμένουσα ἐν τῇ πόλει στάσις, ἣν οἱ δημόται πρὸς τοὺς πατρικίους ἐστασίαζον, ἀνίστατο πάλιν). Finally, the political crisis peaked in 471 BC, after the clash between the supporters of Appius Claudius and Gaius Laetorius in the Forum has been quelled: the στάσις is once again resumed (D.H. A.R. 9.48.4 τε πόλις ὅλη διοιδοῦσα καὶ ἀγριαινομένη διειστήκει) with Laetorius and his supporters occupying the Capitoline hill, a move that is probably a projection of the turmoil of the Late republican period4.

  • 5 A lictor sent by the consuls of 473 BC against Publilius Volero: D. H. A.R. 9.39.1-2 οἱ ὕπατοιτο (...)
  • 6 D.H. A.R. 9.39.2 ; D.H. A.R. 9.48.2 τῶν δὲ ῥαβδούχων πρῶτος ἐπιτυχὼν παίων αὐτὸν ἀπήλασε. Quite s (...)
  • 7 It has been widely accepted that the lex Publilia Voleronis of 471 BC is a duplication of another l (...)
  • 8 While Livy has Laetorius simply moderate his stance towards the consuls after his re-election in 47 (...)

6All of these authorial comments are placed after major outbreaks of violence, namely the attempt of the consuls of 473 BC to punish Publilius Volero by having him flogged by a lictor due to him objecting to the lowering of his rank, to which Volero responded by striking the two lictors sent to seize him (D.H. A.R. 9.39.1-3), and the brawl in the Forum in 472 BC, following an attempt by the consul Appius Claudius to have Gaius Laetorius seized, to which the tribune reciprocated by sending his assistant to take Appius to jail (D.H. A.R. 9.48.1-2). Both scenes share many similarities with one another: in both cases a lictor is sent by the consul(s) against a rebellious plebeian (tribune)5, who in turn reacts by striking the lictor6. The duplication of these two mirroring scenes, featured both in Dionysius’ and in Livy’s historical accounts, is meant to tie both Publilius Volero and Gaius Laetorius in their political struggle and justifies Laetorius taking the helm of the campaign in favor of his predecessor’s bill. On the other hand, the duplication of this event is a result of the attempt by the Roman historical tradition to reconcile the existence of two different promoters for the same law, which likely originated from the later political competition between the plebeian gentes of the Publilii and Laetorii to claim a crucial role in bringing forth the reform of the tribunate7. As a result of the need to accommodate both a Publilius and a Laetorius as the promoters for the plebeian law of 471 BC, the debate on the lex Publilia Voleronis was stretched to span across multiple years, which, in turn, led to the overshadowing of Volero by his colleague Laetorius, explained differently by Dionysius and Livy8.

  • 9 Both these instances are also featured in the list of attestations for the term βία in B. Adam Jeru (...)
  • 10 A. W. Lintott (1970), pp. 24-29 and R. T. Ridley (1990), pp. 127-128.

7Violence is also heavily featured in Dionysius’ narrative for 473-471 BC and in the speeches of those years: the Greek term βία appears two times associated with the pushing of improper political practices (at D.H. A.R. 9.41.5, as part of the obstructionism of the patricians and their clients in occupying the Forum in 471 BC, and at 9.45.1, when Appius Claudius depicts in his speech the introduction of the plebeian tribunates as an act of violence)9. Another critical feature of Dionysius’ narrative is the employment of armed bands of young patricians by Appius Claudius to stifle the debate of the laws (D.H. A.R. 9.48 cf. Liv. 2.56.11): such groups are frequently depicted as ultra-conservative hooligans in numerous instances of the Struggle of the Orders, and are often associated with the activities of the staunchly anti-plebeian Appii Claudii10. Apart from the brawl in the Forum in 471, bands of young patricians also supported Appius Claudius’ crackdown on the debt-ridden plebs in 495 BC (D.H. A.R. 6.39 and 65), and they were later co-opted as bodyguards of the decemvir Appius Claudius (D.H. A.R. 10.41-42).

1.2. Strategies of resolution within Dionysius’ narrative

  • 11 9.40.2-3, esp. 9.40.2 νόσος ἐνέσκηψεν… <> καλουμένη λοιμική and 9.42.1 νόσος γὰρ ἥψατο λοιμικὴ τῆς(...)
  • 12 S. J. Northwood (2006).
  • 13 This suggestion was already presented by Fiona Radford & Peta Greenfield in episode 86 of the podca (...)
  • 14 D.H. A.R. 9.42.1 Ἐπέσχε δαὐτοῦ τὰ βουλεύματα ὄντα τυραννικὰ ἑτέρα συμπεσοῦσα θεήλατος συμφορά. νό (...)
  • 15 D.H. A.R. 9.42.2 ὡς δὲ τὸ δεινὸν ἐλώφησεν, ἐπἐξόδῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὢν Πόπλιος, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο κυρ (...)

8Dionysius’ narrative presents also various strategies to alleviate tension and to introduce the resolution of civic violence. The first is the introduction of two waves of pestilence at the beginning and at the end of the narrative of the year 472 BC11. Epidemics are commonly attested throughout the Roman historical tradition, and while the picture offered by the tradition can be generally considered sound12, the historical plausibility of the epidemic of 472 rests on shaky grounds. Livy does not record any epidemic in his narrative of the year 472 BC and Dionysius purposefully frames the pestilence as playing a crucial role in his narrative. In its first appearance (D.H. A.R. 9.40.2-3), the epidemic is framed between the final events of 473 BC (the attempted levy by the consuls and Publilius Volero’s prouocatio ad populum) and the election of Publilius Volero as a plebeian tribune together with the drafting of his bill. This epidemic hit mostly women, and it is ended only once the Vestal Orbinia was ritually buried alive. The ritual punishment of a Vestal provides an excellent expiation for a disease that affects mostly women13. The pestilence at D.H. A.R. 9.40.1 is also presented as a divine punishment for the deterioration of the body politic as a result of the violent actions of the consuls. It is quelled only thanks to the punishment of a plebeian Vestal and thanks to the later drafting of Publilius’ bill proposal. A second epidemic wave is introduced at D.H. A.R. 9.42.1-2, which ravages throughout all Italy, and hits Rome with incredible violence. As all political activities were suspended due to the pestilence, this prevented Publilius Volero from carrying out his tyrannical intent of forcefully excluding the patricians from the debate on his law in the Forum14. Furthermore, the long duration of the pestilence left Volero no time to campaign for his law, thus forcing him to stand for the tribunate for the following year15. The two epidemic waves of 472 BC are thus artfully arranged to ease up the tension that has built up from the previous clashes between the patricians and plebeians and provide a segue for the next stage of the conflict.

  • 16 See for example P. Demont (1988) on Herodotus, S. Grimaudo (2012) on Plato, and E. Zamperini (2022) (...)
  • 17 P. Ellinger (2005), see also E. C. L. Van der Vliet (2008), p. 346: « Evil is ended by legislation, (...)

9The location of two outbreaks to frame Volero’s campaigning in favour of his bill also enables Dionysius to engage with the depiction of στάσις as a disease (νόσος), a trope that, in all its implications, has been thoroughly explored in Classical Greek drama and political literature16. In Dionysius’ account νόσος is introduced both as a foil for the stasis, because it further debilitates the citizen body, and as a sort of divine punishment for the political turmoil. However, by placing disease outbreaks both before and after the lex Publilia Voleronis is first introduced, Dionysius partially subverts the usual association between law (νόμος), disease (νόσος), and στάσις in ancient Greek thought. As a matter of fact, law formed the basis for stability in the Greek polis and legislators were therefore depicted as purifiers in bringing order and harmony to the city through chanted laws, while the city was suffering under the equivalent and alternative forms of plague and revolution17. In light of this, one would be perfectly justified in thinking that drafting Volero’s bill would be enough to quell the first epidemic wave, as the disposition of events in Dionysius’ account would seem to suggest. However, this idea is shattered against the escalation of violence in the debate in the Forum in 472 BC and against Volero’s attempt to violently remove the patricians from the Forum: once Publilius’ campaigning takes an unwanted turn and threatens to upset the social balance of the city, another pestilence comes to put an end to his schemes. In presenting this account, Dionysius seems to suggest that the law by itself does not constitute a good enough remedy for the (metaphorical and real) disease brought up by civic dissension but that it instead draws efficacy and legitimacy from how it is campaigned for and the moral character of its initiator. Only once the second wave has passed can the campaigning for Volero’s bill resume in a more legitimate fashion, and Laetorius can shine as a defender of the initiative of his colleague. The presence of the epidemic at the beginning and at the end of 472 BC reflects, in a way, the presence of two promoters for the same law and is thus another instance of the duplication affecting the historical tradition of the lex Publilia.

10Among the strategies presented by Dionysius’ account to resolve outbursts of civic violence, there is the rallying of the plebeians to protect Publilius Volero from the consuls and the various instances of the moderation of Titus Quinctius, the other consul of 471 BC.

  • 18 Liv. 2.55.5-6 Volero appellat tribunos. Cum auxilio nemo esset, consules spoliari hominem et uirgas (...)
  • 19 D. Cloud (1998), p. 28. Volero’s prouocatio ad populum in 473 BC is one of the earliest examples of (...)
  • 20 Liv. 2.55.6 Volero et praeualens ipse et adiuuantibus aduocatis repulso lictore.
  • 21 D.H. A.R. 9.38.3 εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδὲν ἔτι πολυπραγμονοῦντες οἱ ὕπατοι διετέλεσαν, ἀλλ’ ἀφῆκαν ὡς ὁ δαίμ (...)
  • 22 Liv. 2.56.15 certatumque haud incruento proelio foret, ni Quinctius, consul alter, consularibus neg (...)
  • 23 D.H. A.R. 9.48. 2 λόγοι τἀσχήμονες ἐγένοντο εἰς ἀλλήλους καὶ καταβοαὶ καὶ σωμάτων ὠθισμοί· καὶ τε (...)

11Despite their apparent similarities, Dionysius and Livy present Volero’s response to the sending of lictors against him in a slightly different way. In Livy’s account, Volero tries to appeal in vain to the tribunes and then rallies the plebeians to defend and support the tribunes against the consuls by means of a prouocatio ad populum, thanks to which he also manages to overcome and repeal the lictor sent to seize him18. Conversely, Dionysius has no mention of the prouocatio19, but has instead Volero appeal to the tribunes and ask for a fair trial. It is only when the consuls pay no heed to his plea and repeat their order to the lictors to seize the man and flog him that Publilius Volero punches both lictors. It is such a daring action in the face of a greater injustice that compels the plebeians to protect Volero and the consuls and their lictors to leave the Forum. While both ancient historians depict Volero’s appeal to the tribunes, they give different reasons for its failure: whereas Livy presents the tribunes as too frightened from Genucius’ death to act against the consuls, Dionysius instead shifts the blame to the consuls, who ignore the just request of Publilius Volero. Another crucial difference is Volero’s more violent reaction in Dionysius compared to Livy: Dionysius has Volero punch both lictors sent against him, an act that Livy glosses over by merely having Volero overpower one lictor with the help of his fellow countrymen20. This different characterization of Volero’s reaction also affects the response of the plebeians in both historical accounts: while in Livy the people rush to protect Volero before he is properly attacked by the lictor, in Dionysius the crowd is inspired to take action thanks to Volero’s violent retort against the lictor. Overall, even if Dionysius stresses far more than Livy the lack of restraints of the consuls in carrying out their levy21, he has Publilius Volero and the plebeians react in a much more violent way to the consuls’ attempt to coerce Volero into submission. A similar instance of the different ways in which Dionysius and Livy paint the civic turmoil of those years is given by the clash between the supporters of Appius and Laetorius in the Forum in 471 BC: whereas Livy states that if Quinctius had not intervened, the clash would have turned into a bloody battle,22 Dionysius in a crescendo describes the shouting, the pushing of body against body, the blows, and the throwing of stones before Quinctius’ intervention23.

  • 24 A. Delcourt (2003), pp. 483-525 and esp. 488-491 on Dionysius’ depiction of the Claudii ; for furth (...)

12Another saving grace in the political crisis provoked by the debate around the lex Publilia is the attitude of Titus Quinctius Capitolinus, the consul colleague of Appius Claudius in 471 BC. Dionysius, following a common trend in the historical tradition, depicts Appius as a conservative hardliner24, in stark contrast with his depiction of his colleague Quinctius as a moderate prone to compromise with the plebeians. Consequently, Quinctius always acts as a foil to his colleague, representing the more moderate part of the aristocracy. The contrast between the attitudes of Appius Claudius and Titus Quinctius is presented multiple times throughout Dionysius’ narrative: firstly at D.H. A.R. 9.43.2-3, where Appius’ suggestion of keeping the plebeians occupied with a war is opposed by Quinctius on the grounds of the turmoil caused by the levy in 473 BC; and then again at D.H. A.R. 9.44.1-2, where Appius’ call to arms in defense of the established constitution is overtaken by Quinctius’ suggestion of hosting a debate concerning the law with the tribunes. The different character of the two consuls also emerges in their addresses to the people during the debate on the law: while Quinctius, thanks to his eloquence, narrowly persuades the plebeians to drop Volero’s bill (D.H. A.R. 9.44.4), the violent contempt expressed by Claudius towards the bill and the institution of the tribunate (D.H. A.R. 9.44.5-45.2) alienates any support to the consuls from the people. It is also thanks to the swift intervention of T. Quinctius that a major clash between the supporters of Laetorius and Appius Claudius is de-escalated, and thanks to his unwavering effort that a compromise with the plebeians on the Capitoline is struck. Finally, it is Quinctius who argues in favor of the bill, facilitating its passing in the senate session. Overall, the contrast between Appius Claudius and Titus Quinctius reflects the common trope in the early Roman historical tradition of having a more moderate pro-plebeian consul share the consulship with a staunch opponent of the plebs. Dionysius adheres to this framework in other instances of his narrative on the Struggle of the orders: for example, consular pairs composed of a pro-plebeian and a pro-patrician consul are introduced by Dionysius in 482 (D.H. A.R. 8.90.5) and 481 BC (D.H. A.R. 9.1.1), and a further parallel can be drawn with the ἀντιλογία between Marcus Valerius and Appius Claudius in 495 BC concerning the remission of debts to the plebeians (D.H. A.R. 5.64.1-68.5).

1.3. Dionysius’ distinctive approach to the turmoil of 473-471 BC

  • 25 Liv. 2.54.10.
  • 26 Dio 5 F 22.1; Zon. 7.17.
  • 27 Antiph. 5.68; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 25.4; Plut. Per. 10.7 = Idomeneus of Lampsacus FGrHist 124 F 16; D (...)
  • 28 R. M. Ogilvie (1965), p. 373, invokes both these historical parallels for the death of Genucius.

13It is also worthy to point out some distinctive traits that separate Dionysius’ account from that of other ancient historians. The first one is Dionysius’ insistence on the death of the plebeian tribune Genucius due to natural causes. Dionysius is the only ancient author to adopt this position on the matter of Genucius’ death: while Livy does not state explicitly the cause of the tribune’s death, he has the plebeians and tribunes suspect that he was killed by the patricians, together with the young patricians boastfully claiming responsibility for the tribune’s murder25. Conversely, it is likely that political assassinations akin to the murder of the tribune Genucius lie behind the picture offered by Dio and Zonaras of the patricians secretly slaughtering the boldest representatives of the plebeians26. Furthermore, the mysterious death of the tribune Genucius before a trial is also heavily reminiscent of the death of other ancient reformers, like Ephialtes in Athens in 462/1 BC27, Scipio Aemilianus in 129 BC, and Marcus Livius Drusus in 91 BC28. By dispelling any suspicion concerning the violent death of Genucius, Dionysius shifts the blame for this act away from the consuls, which are then presented in a more favorable light, until they decide to rage against the plebeians. The removal of the violent death of Genucius in Dionysius’ account results also in the erasure of one destabilizing element which in other branches of the tradition fueled the eruption of violence at the end of 473 BC.

  • 29 Liv. 2.56.8 rudis in militari homine lingua cf. Liv. 2.27, where another Marcus Laetorius, a plebei (...)
  • 30 D.H. A.R. 9.46.1 Γάιος Λαιτώριος, ἀνὴρ ἔν τε τοῖς πολέμοις ἐγνωσμένος εἶναι ψυχὴν οὐ κακὸς καὶ τὰ π (...)

14Another element which singles out Dionysius from other historians is his focus on the eloquence of Gaius Laetorius. This is in stark contrast to Livy’s depiction of the same tribune as a rough military man, which is coherent with other depiction of the Laetorii in Livy’s historical work29. Dionysius instead introduces Laetorius as an expert in political matters30, an ability which shines through in his rebuttal to the speech of Appius Claudius (D.H. A.R. 9.46.1-47.4). Firstly, Laetorius rebukes Claudius’ previous claim that « the legitimate courts, to which the commonwealth had formerly entrusted the trial of causes involving death or banishment, » had been transferred « from the most incorruptible senate to the vilest mob » (D.H. A.R. 9.44.7) by citing the recent law that ratified the transferal of trials from the centuriate assembly to the tribal one (D.H. A.R. 9.46.4). Secondly, Laetorius disproves Appius’ long tirade against the plebeian tribunate as a disease introduced to the detriment of the republic in the following way:

  • 31 Transl. E. Cary.

Have you not been able, then, to learn even this, that in saying these things you traduce both the Senate and your own magistracy? For the Senate, having risen against the kings, whose arrogance and insults they resolved to bear no longer, established the consulship, and before they had expelled the kings, invested others with the royal authority. [3] So that everything you say against the tribunician power as having been introduced for a mischievous purpose, since it had its origin in sedition, you say against the consulship also; for there was no other ground for introducing that magistracy than the sedition of the patricians against the kings (ἡ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς τῶν πατρικίων στάσις.). (D.H. A.R. 9.47.2-3)31.

  • 32 Cf. for example [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 41 on the history of the Athenian constitution as one dictated (...)

15In response to Appius’ claim Laetorius raises a thought-provoking point, by presenting both the first plebeian secession and the birth of the Roman republic as the results of revolutions. In doing so, Laetorius follows Greek theories on regime change32, while at the same time introducing the idea that the Roman Republic had always been a state prone to revolution since its very own inception.

  • 33 Dio 5 F 22.1; Zon. 7.17. See also M. Lindholmer (2019), pp. 201-202.

16Overall, Dionysius’ account of the political crisis that characterized the years before the passing of the lex Publilia Voleronis tends to emphasize the outburst of violence compared to the parallel narrative of Livy, as becomes apparent in the cases of Volero’s reaction to the lictor and the brawl in the Forum between the supporters of Laetorius and Appius Claudius. On the other hand, Dionysius erases any violent undertone from the death of the tribune Genucius, thus placing the start of the violence on the cruelty shown by the consuls in carrying out the levy, instead of a politically charged murder. Furthermore, both Livy and Dionysius represent a branch in the historical tradition that presented a relatively tame version of the political turmoil of those years. This becomes especially clear when looking at the much more violent narrative of Cassius Dio and Zonaras, where lictors are struck by the plebeians, the patricians secretly murder the most ardent leaders of the people, and the plebeian tribunes burn at the stake the colleagues of the year prior due to their inaction33 !

2. The lex Icilia de Aventino publicando (D.H. A.R. 10.31.1-32.5)

17Compared to the account of other ancient historians like Livy, who simply states that a law concerning the partition of the Aventine was passed in 456 BC, Dionysius presents a far more detailed account on the passing of that law. Dionysius opens his account of the events of 456 BC by stating that the tribune Lucius Icilius wanted to diminish the power of the consuls by giving the tribunes the faculty to call a meeting of the senate. To that end, he proposed a partition of public land on the Aventine hill to quench the people’s thirst for land, which had destabilized the state for a long time. As the consuls kept procrastinating the vote on the matter, Icilius sent one of his attendants to persuade them to call a meeting of the senate together with the plebeian tribunes. As soon as the consuls sent a lictor to punish the tribune’s assistant, Icilius and his colleagues threatened to hurl the lictor down the Tarpeian Rock. The consuls tried in vain to stir the other tribunes against Icilius, as he had his colleagues previously swear an oath to support each other in whichever action they took. Ultimately, the tribunes abstained from carrying out their violent intent, as they knew that such an act would have only escalated tensions and worked against their goal. A meeting of the senate was then called, where Icilius defended his own actions and the law, which was passed with relatively few oppositions.

2.1. The role of violence in Dionysius’ narrative

  • 34 [Aur. Vict.] uir. ill. 66.8 Caepionem inimicum actionibus suis resistentem ait se de saxo Tarpeio p (...)
  • 35 Val. Max. 9.5.2; Flor. 2.5.8; [Aur. Vict.] uir. ill. 66.9.

18In Dionysius’ narrative there is only one major scene of the eruption of violence, namely the threat of the plebeian tribunes to hurl down the lictor from the Tarpeian Rock in response to the lictor being sent to punish the delegate of Icilius (10.31.3-6). Once again, this scene pits a lictor sent by the consuls against the assistant of a tribune, thus presenting some sort of similarities with the scenes of Volero and Laetorius clashing with the lictors. The clash with a lictor is here also combined with the threat of hurling a political enemy down the Tarpeian Rock, invoking the punishment reserved for traitors. This threat appears for the first time in the account of the trial of Coriolanus. In that occasion the tribune Sicinius wanted to have Coriolanus hurled down the Tarpeian Rock, only to be dissuaded by his colleague Lucius Iunius Brutus, who argued for a more moderate punishment (D.H. A.R. 7.35.3-36.4). Dionysius’ narrative on the clash between Icilius and the lictor is also reminiscent of the sedition of tribune Marcus Livius Drusus in 91 BC: like Icilius, Livius threatened to hurl down his opponent Servilius Caepio from the Tarpeian Rock34 and he ordered one of his clients (instead that one of his attendants) to seize the consul by the throat and hurl him into a prison cell35. Contrary to Livius Drusus, Icilius and the tribunes showed more restraint in their threat to the lictor and paid heed to the moderation of the oldest senators in letting the lictor go (D.H. A.R. 10.31.6).

19Another important reference to violence is contained within the clauses of the lex Icilia:

  • 36 Transl. E. Cary.

All the parcels of land held by private citizens, if justly acquired, should remain in the possession of the owners, but such parcels as had been taken by force or fraud by any persons (ὅσα δὲ βιασάμενοί τινες ἢ κλοπῇ λαβόντες ᾠκοδομήσαντο) and built upon should be turned over to the populace and the present occupants reimbursed for their expenditures according to the appraisal of the arbitrators; all the remainder, belonging to the public, the populace should receive free of cost and divide up among themselves. (D.H. A.R. 10.32.2)36.

  • 37 F. Serrao (1981), p. 142 and G. M. Oliviero (1995), pp. 528-529. See also T. Lanfranchi (2015), cha (...)

20The law distinguishes between three cases for the public land on the Aventine: the land already held by privates, the land that had been seized through illegal means, and the remaining land that was not held by privates nor built upon. The second clause reveals that public land on the Aventine had been illegally occupied and built upon before 456 BC, another factor which adds fuel to the internal turmoil of those years. Scholars of Roman law have also noted that the reimbursement of the previous landowners was likely given by the new tenants out of their own pockets and not by the state37: this makes clear that the provisions regulated by the lex Icilia were the result of a compromise between the previous occupiers of the Aventine and the plebeians who wished to have land assigned to them. Nonetheless, it is without doubt that the lex Icilia of 456 BC facilitated the settlement of the Aventine by the plebeians, thus making an important step towards the affirmation of the plebeians on the political scene in Rome.

2.2. Strategies of resolution within Dionysius’ narrative

  • 38 The idea of pitting the tribunes against each user using their veto powers was introduced, accordin (...)
  • 39 App. Civ. 1.12; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 10.1-8.

21Apart from emphasizing the restraint of Icilius and his colleagues, Dionysius also puts great emphasis on the solidarity amongst the tribunes and in the characterization of Icilius. In 456 BC the tribunes acted in full agreement with each other, because Icilius had them swear an oath to support each other at the beginning of the year (D.H. A.R.10.31.5). This was done to avoid having any action stopped by the veto of other tribunes, a strategy which had been previously used ever since 485 BC and which the consuls tried once again in vain when they got news of the seizing of their lictor (D.H. A.R. 10.31.4)38. The weaponization of the tribune’s veto in favor of the patricians is another detail which reflects later practices, especially its first implementation in historical times by the tribune Octavius against Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BC39.

  • 40 T. Lanfranchi (2015), chapter 8, §177-184, esp. §178.

22Another important factor that favors the passing of the bill concerning the partition of the Aventine is Icilius’ eloquence and knowledge of constitutional matters. Dionysius firstly introduces Icilius as « a man of action (δραστήριος δέ τις ἦν ἀνὴρ) and, for a Roman, not lacking in eloquence » (ὡς Ῥωμαῖος εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἀδύνατος D.H. A.R. 10.31.2). Dionysius’ characterization of Icilius as δραστήριος is far more neutral than Livy’s depiction of the same as acer (Liv. 3.44.2). His restraint in the face of the threat formulated against the lictor not only places him at the same level of his moderate predecessors, such as Lucius Iunius Brutus, but also aligns with the characterization of the gens Icilia in the Roman historical tradition.40 Furthermore, Icilius opens his final speech in favor of his law by framing his first call for a senate session and his treatment of the lictor as within his legal rights, and in doing so he cites the sacred laws that protected the plebeian tribunes against any mistreatment from other citizens (D.H. A.R. 10.32.1). Dionysius’ characterization of Icilius therefore largely overlaps with that of Gaius Laetorius, in that they are both depicted as eloquent and experts in constitutional matters, both qualities that help them gather enough support for their law to be approved.

3. Conclusions

  • 41 Dionysius explicitly contrasts the moderation of the early Romans with the ruthlessness of their de (...)

23Both of Dionysius’ accounts on the passing of the Publilian law and the lex Icilia present many points of contact in showcasing the strategies of the early Romans to deal with civic turmoil. Amongst the shared strategies reappearing in 473-471 and in 456 BC the most conspicuous include the moderation of the early Romans, the solidarity between the plebeian tribunes, and the ability of the tribunes to persuade through speeches. These qualities tally with the picture of the early Romans as generally avoiding political violence and preferring to resolve their internal conflicts through discussion and compromise offered by Dionysius at 2.11.2-3. At the same time, Dionysius, like the other Roman historians before him, uses these strategies to draw an idealized view of the early Republican period, which is contrasted with the excesses of the late Republic41. Even though many aspects of the political violence of the Struggle of the Orders took inspiration from events of the Gracchan times and of the late Republic, these were generally refashioned by historians like Dionysius to present the events of the past under a more favorable light. Furthermore, to facilitate the immersion of the Greek part of his audience into the political squabbles of Early Rome, Dionysius gives his own spin to the narratives handed down to him by the previous Roman historians. Glimpses of this can be observed in his framing of the epidemics of 472 BC, which play on the typical Greek pairing of νόσος and στάσις, as well as in the refashioning of discourses to include concepts typical of Greek political thought, as showcased in the case of Dionysius’ depiction of Gaius Laetorius.

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Notes

1 Transl. E. Cary.

2 See the studies of L. Bertelli (1972) and J.-C. Richard (1977) on the first plebian secession; W. Pabst (1977) and E. N (1979) on the story of Coriolanus, E. N (1977) on the attempted coup of Appius Herdonius, and E. Gabba (1974), F. D’Ippolito (1975), and M. Basile (1978) on the sedition of Spurius Cassius.

3 Piso FRHist 9 *F 25 = Liv. 2.58.2; Liv. 2.54.3-61.9; Dio F 22.1 ; Zon. 7.17.

4 On the Capitoline started the clash that lead to the flight of Gaius Gracchus in 121 BC (App. Civ. 2; Plut. C. Gracch. 13.3 [38.3]) ; the same hill was garrisoned by supporters of Cicero in 63 BC (Cic. Mur. 52; Cat. 3.5; Sall. Cat. 26.5).

5 A lictor sent by the consuls of 473 BC against Publilius Volero: D. H. A.R. 9.39.1-2 οἱ ὕπατοιτοῖς ῥαβδούχοις ἐκέλευσαν τὴν ἐσθῆτά τε περικαταρρῆξαι καὶ ταῖς ῥάβδοις τὸ σῶμα ξαίνειν. … ὡς δοὐ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ τὸν νοῦν οἱ ὕπατοι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ῥαβδούχοις ἄγειν καὶ τύπτειν ἐπεκελεύοντο Cf. Liv. 2.55.4 ad Voleronem Publilium de plebe hominem quia, quod ordines duxisset, negaret se militem fieri debere, lictor missus est a consulibus. A lictor sent by consul Appius Claudius against the plebeian tribune Gaius Laetorius in 471 BC: D. H. A.R. 9.48.2 καὶ μὲν ὑπηρέτης κελευσθεὶς ὑπαὐτοῦ προσῆγεν ὡς τοῦ σώματος ἐπιληψόμενος· Cf. Liv. 2.56.13-14 Ardens igitur ira tribunus uiatorem mittit ad consulem, consul lictorem ad tribunum.

6 D.H. A.R. 9.39.2 ; D.H. A.R. 9.48.2 τῶν δὲ ῥαβδούχων πρῶτος ἐπιτυχὼν παίων αὐτὸν ἀπήλασε. Quite strikingly, Livy has neither Volero nor Laetorius punch any lictor, but has them always shielded by the throng of their supporters (Liv. 2.55.5; 2.56.14 uiolatusque esset tribunus, ni et contio omnis atrox coorta pro tribuno in consulem esset, et concursus hominum in forum ex tota urbe concitatae multitudinis fieret).

7 It has been widely accepted that the lex Publilia Voleronis of 471 BC is a duplication of another lex Publilia proposed by the dictator Q. Publilius Philo in 339 BC, which was also concerned with the limitation of the auctoritas patrum. For a detailed analysis of the historical problems concerning this law, see L. Thibaud (2015), chapter 5, §41-82. The Publilii were also amongst the first plebeians to attain the consular tribunate in 400 BC. On the Publilii, see E. Pais (1918), pp. 171‑172; R. M. Ogilvie (1965), p. 373; A. Drummond (1989), p. 217. The Laetorii also had a long history of protecting the interests of the plebs: a certain Laetorius died heroically while protecting the flight of Gaius Gracchus in 121 BC (Val. Max. 4.7.2; Plut. C. Gracch. 17.1 [38.1]; Oros. 5.12.7), while a Marcus Laetorius was proscribed by Sulla in 88 BC (App. Civ. 1.60). On the Laetorii, see E. Pais (1918), pp. 107-108 and T. Lanfranchi (2015), chapter 8, §89-90.

8 While Livy has Laetorius simply moderate his stance towards the consuls after his re-election in 471 BC, leaving thus only his colleague Laetorius to confront Appius Claudius (Liv. 2.56.5-8), Dionysius instead has Volero fade into irrelevancy after extending his bill also to the election of the plebeian aediles (D.H. A.R. 9.43.4 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πόπλιον δήμαρχοι), before introducing Laetorius at 9.46.1.

9 Both these instances are also featured in the list of attestations for the term βία in B. Adam Jerue (2023), pp. 73‑74, esp. n. 47.

10 A. W. Lintott (1970), pp. 24-29 and R. T. Ridley (1990), pp. 127-128.

11 9.40.2-3, esp. 9.40.2 νόσος ἐνέσκηψεν… <> καλουμένη λοιμική and 9.42.1 νόσος γὰρ ἥψατο λοιμικὴ τῆς πόλεως.

12 S. J. Northwood (2006).

13 This suggestion was already presented by Fiona Radford & Peta Greenfield in episode 86 of the podcast The Partial Historians (timestamp 15:09-16:20). On the ritual punishment of Vestals in general, see T. J. Cornell (1981) and M. Beard (1980).

14 D.H. A.R. 9.42.1 Ἐπέσχε δαὐτοῦ τὰ βουλεύματα ὄντα τυραννικὰ ἑτέρα συμπεσοῦσα θεήλατος συμφορά. νόσος γὰρ ἥψατο λοιμικὴ τῆς πόλεως, γενομένη μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην Ἰταλίαν, μάλιστα δὲ πλεονάσασα κατὰ τὴν Ῥώμην.

15 D.H. A.R. 9.42.2 ὡς δὲ τὸ δεινὸν ἐλώφησεν, ἐπἐξόδῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς ὢν Πόπλιος, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐδύνατο κυρῶσαι τὸν νόμον ἐν τῷ περιόντι χρόνῳ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων ἐπιστάντων, μετῄει πάλιν τὴν δημαρχίαν εἰς τὸν ἐπιόντα ἐνιαυτόν, πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα τοῖς δημόταις ὑπισχνούμενος· καὶ ἀποδείκνυται πάλιν δήμαρχος ὑπαὐτῶν καὶ δύο τῶν συναρχόντων.

16 See for example P. Demont (1988) on Herodotus, S. Grimaudo (2012) on Plato, and E. Zamperini (2022) on Sophocles.

17 P. Ellinger (2005), see also E. C. L. Van der Vliet (2008), p. 346: « Evil is ended by legislation, like a disease can be cured. It creates a change from stasis, and thus kakonomia, to eunomia, as harmony creates music ».

18 Liv. 2.55.5-6 Volero appellat tribunos. Cum auxilio nemo esset, consules spoliari hominem et uirgas expediri iubent. « Prouoco » inquit, « ad populum » Volero, « quoniam tribuni ciuem Romanum in conspectu suo uirgis caedi malunt quam ipsi in lecto suo a uobis trucidari. » […] Tum Volero et praeualens ipse et adiuuantibus aduocatis repulso lictore, ubi indignantium pro se acerrimus erat clamor, eo se in turbam confertissimam recipit clamitans : « Prouoco et fidem plebis imploro ».

19 D. Cloud (1998), p. 28. Volero’s prouocatio ad populum in 473 BC is one of the earliest examples of this practice as an appeal against the random punishment of a civilian by a magistrate attested in the tradition, but its historicity is heavily debated. It is generally considered one of the best examples of the practice by scholars like A. W. Lintott (1968), p. 11; A. W. Lintott (1972), pp. 229-231, and C. Pelloso (2016), pp. 22-23. Conversely, more recent studies, like D. Cloud (1998), have rightfully raised doubt on its historicity of the tale, which would reflect later developments of the practice.

20 Liv. 2.55.6 Volero et praeualens ipse et adiuuantibus aduocatis repulso lictore.

21 D.H. A.R. 9.38.3 εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδὲν ἔτι πολυπραγμονοῦντες οἱ ὕπατοι διετέλεσαν, ἀλλ’ ἀφῆκαν ὡς ὁ δαίμων ἐκοίμησε τὴν στάσιν, οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτοὺς ἔτι κατέλαβε κίνδυνος, νῦν δ’ εἰς αὐθάδειαν καὶ καταφρόνησιν τοῦ δημοτικοῦ τραπόμενοι καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς κράτος, ὅσον ἐστίν, ἐπιδεῖξαι βουλόμενοι, κακὰ ἐξειργάσαντο μεγάλα. Cf. Liv. 2.55.1 Sub hac pessimi exempli uictoria dilectus edicitur, pauentibusque tribunis sine intercessione ulla consules rem peragunt. Tum uero irasci plebs tribunorum magis silentio quam consulum imperio.

22 Liv. 2.56.15 certatumque haud incruento proelio foret, ni Quinctius, consul alter, consularibus negotio dato ut collegam vi, si aliter non possent, de foro abducerent.

23 D.H. A.R. 9.48. 2 λόγοι τἀσχήμονες ἐγένοντο εἰς ἀλλήλους καὶ καταβοαὶ καὶ σωμάτων ὠθισμοί· καὶ τελευτῶσα εἰς χεῖρας ἀπέσκηψεν ἔρις, καὶ εἰς λίθων ἤρξατο προβαίνειν βολάς.

24 A. Delcourt (2003), pp. 483-525 and esp. 488-491 on Dionysius’ depiction of the Claudii ; for further bibliography on the stereotypical depiction of the Claudii as staunch opposers of the plebs, see T. Lanfranchi (2016), 221-222, 231-232; and J. H. S. Richardson (2012), pp. 26-30.

25 Liv. 2.54.10.

26 Dio 5 F 22.1; Zon. 7.17.

27 Antiph. 5.68; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 25.4; Plut. Per. 10.7 = Idomeneus of Lampsacus FGrHist 124 F 16; D.S. 11.77.6. Ancient sources just disagree on the identity of the real culprit, on which they are uncertain. Conversely, Ephialtes’ death due to natural causes has only been upheld only by D. Stockton (1982). The deaths of Ephialtes and Genucius present indeed some similarities, because both politicians acted as accusers in trials before their death and because both their bodies were discovered only on the day after their death.

28 R. M. Ogilvie (1965), p. 373, invokes both these historical parallels for the death of Genucius.

29 Liv. 2.56.8 rudis in militari homine lingua cf. Liv. 2.27, where another Marcus Laetorius, a plebeian centurion, is appointed by the people to dedicate the temple of Mercury in 495 BC instead of the consul Appius Claudius.

30 D.H. A.R. 9.46.1 Γάιος Λαιτώριος, ἀνὴρ ἔν τε τοῖς πολέμοις ἐγνωσμένος εἶναι ψυχὴν οὐ κακὸς καὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν οὐκ ἀδύνατος « Gaius Laetorius, a man acknowledged to be of no mean courage in warfare and not without ability in public affairs ». This distinction between the characterization of Laetorius in Livy and Dionysius was also noted by T. Lanfranchi (2015), chapter 8, §189.

31 Transl. E. Cary.

32 Cf. for example [Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 41 on the history of the Athenian constitution as one dictated by change (μεταβολαί) and Polyb. 6.9.12 on the idea of the Roman Republic as being especially suited to withstand change.

33 Dio 5 F 22.1; Zon. 7.17. See also M. Lindholmer (2019), pp. 201-202.

34 [Aur. Vict.] uir. ill. 66.8 Caepionem inimicum actionibus suis resistentem ait se de saxo Tarpeio praecipitaturum.

35 Val. Max. 9.5.2; Flor. 2.5.8; [Aur. Vict.] uir. ill. 66.9.

36 Transl. E. Cary.

37 F. Serrao (1981), p. 142 and G. M. Oliviero (1995), pp. 528-529. See also T. Lanfranchi (2015), chapter 6, §136.

38 The idea of pitting the tribunes against each user using their veto powers was introduced, according to both Livy and Dionysius (Liv. 2.43.3-4 and 2.44.2-6 ; D.H. A.R. 9.1.3-2.2) by Appius Claudius in 481 BC. This strategy was successfully implemented in the following years.

39 App. Civ. 1.12; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 10.1-8.

40 T. Lanfranchi (2015), chapter 8, §177-184, esp. §178.

41 Dionysius explicitly contrasts the moderation of the early Romans with the ruthlessness of their descendants in at least two passages: firstly at 2.11.3, when he accuses Gaius Gracchus of having completely destroyed the ties between patrons and clients (presented by Dionysius as the earliest safety net of Roman society), and at 8.80.2, where the cruelty of Sullan proscriptions, considering the sons complicit in the crimes of their fathers, is contrasted with the leniency showed by the senate towards the sons of Spurius Cassius in 485 BC.

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Stefano Carlo Sala, « Law as a catalyst and remedy for civic violence in early Rome : two examples from Dionysius of Halicarnassus »Cahiers des études anciennes [En ligne], LXII | 2025, mis en ligne le 11 avril 2025, consulté le 19 mai 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudesanciennes/5886

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Stefano Carlo Sala

PhD Student - University of St Andrews

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