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Agriculture, alimentation, crises

Agricultural Mutual Insurance in Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean: An Integrative Review of the Micro-Level Schemes

Mutualité agricole en Asie, en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes : un examen intégratif des régimes au niveau micro
El seguro mutuo agrícola en Asia, América Latina y el Caribe: una revisión integrativa de los esquemas de nivel micro
Rival Valcin, Tomohiro Uchiyama, Rika Terano, Dario S. Celestin et Bénédique Paul

Résumés

Le partage des risques est un excellent complément à la réduction des risques dans le secteur agricole, deux des quatre principales stratégies de gestion des risques. L’assurance mutuelle agricole (AMI) devient progressivement le moyen le plus durable de promouvoir les produits d’assurance, en particulier en ce qui concerne l’assurance agricole. En outre, le mode de mise en œuvre de l’AMI varie d’un pays à l’autre. Cette étude propose de répondre aux questions suivantes : qu’est-ce que les systèmes réussis ont en commun ? Qu’est-ce qui explique leurs particularités ? Quelle approche doit encore être mise en œuvre qui pourrait être pertinente ? En outre, nous discutons de la façon dont le Mécanisme d’assurance contre les risques de catastrophe dans les Caraïbes (CCRIF SPC) pourrait être une occasion pour les pays des Caraïbes comme Haïti de développer des structures de microassurance qui atteignent efficacement les exploitations agricoles.
Conception/Méthodologie/Approche Pour répondre à ces questions, nous passons en revue divers documents faisant état de régimes d’IAM en Asie, en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes. En effectuant une recherche (« Assurance agricole » et « Assurance mutuelle ») sur Google Scholar, on a trouvé 1091 résultats en avril 2024. Nous avons utilisé des articles écrits en anglais ou en français, publiés dans des revues avec (DOI ou URL), des rapports officiels de pays ou d’Organisation des Nations unies, des rapports de la Banque mondiale, des livres et des mémoires approuvés ou publiés. Nous en avons examiné 58 en fonction de leur pertinence pour l’étude. Un accent particulier a été mis sur les pays où l’assurance mutuelle de microniveau a été mise en œuvre, tels que le Japon, la Chine, l’Inde, le Bangladesh, le Népal et le Mexique. Le Japon est mondialement connu pour être une référence en matière de gestion des risques ; son système d’assurance mutuelle agricole (AMI) est le plus performant au monde. Les pays des Caraïbes qui connaissent des phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes ont beaucoup à apprendre des stratégies japonaises tout en développant leurs techniques particulières.
Les mutuelles agricoles performantes partagent des caractéristiques pertinentes, telles que la participation des collectivités locales et le faible coût des primes (10 % de la somme assurée). En l’absence de réassurance, les fonds de placement communs sont inadéquats contre les catastrophes ; par conséquent, lorsqu’ils n’ont pas accès à la réassurance gouvernementale, ils ont recours au marché international de la réassurance. L’assurance mutuelle est généralement développée parmi les agriculteurs cultivant une culture similaire ou appartenant à une coopérative, où les abonnements peuvent être individuels ou en groupes. D’autre part, les prêts agricoles sont souvent utilisés comme un moteur d’assurance agricole, ce qui permettra ensuite d’améliorer le portefeuille de crédit agricole. Par conséquent, les syndicats fournissant du crédit aux agriculteurs en Haïti constituent une excellente structure pour promouvoir le produit MIF. Les pays à haut risque de catastrophe, comme Haïti, Porto Rico, le Myanmar et les Philippines, sont potentiellement des bénéficiaires appropriés de Fonds, tels que le Cat Bond de la Banque mondiale et le CCRIF. Enfin, l’étude montre que le MIF mis en œuvre en tant que partenariat public-privé ou suivant un modèle intersectoriel est plus susceptible de réussir.

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Introduction

1Insurance is an effective risk management strategy for different economic activities in every sector (Kunreuther et al., 2013, cited by Epetimehin & Bayo, 2020). Various insurance schemes have been implemented in agriculture in many countries (Surminski & Panda, 2020). The choice of an approach may depend on many aspects, such as the country’s economic condition, its exposure to natural hazards, or the frequency of the events; solutions are designed based on specific problems (Machinski et al., 2016). Every country is trying to find a more suitable approach for agricultural insurance adoption because approaches such as the conventional multi-peril and the area or weather-based index insurance show each one their inconvenience (Wenner & Arias, 2003).

2Due to the increasing impact of natural disasters on agriculture worldwide, many countries vow to develop a mutual mode of agricultural insurance because it appears to be a viable and lower moral hazard due to a higher involvement of the members (Breustedt & Larson, 2006). For example, through the 2014-2020 European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the European Union has decided to execute legislation regarding agricultural mutual insurance (AMI) that should be protected by the states (Glauber et al., 2021). In Asia, Japan and South Korea are known for their well-developed and successful mutual insurance system (Zhang, 2009). Several successfully developing mutual insurance schemes have been reported in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as FONDOS in Mexico, Paraná State Cooperative in Brazil, and CIB in Jamaica. The Caribbean has the first multi-country risk pool globally (World Bank, 2009); that structure provides insurance and reinsurance on a macro level to countries and institutions (Hermann et al., 2016). However, on a micro level, farming in some countries in the Caribbean is still mostly uncovered against risks (Latin, 2012). In Haiti, for example, agricultural insurance coverage is less than 1% (Radu, 2022). This study suggests that Haiti and other Caribbean countries could develop their mutual insurance scheme by learning from the challenges and successes of other countries. This review focuses on countries from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean because those regions have suffered the most from natural hazards during the last two decades. Nine of the top ten countries most affected by natural disasters between 2000 and 2019 are from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean (Eckstein et al., 2021). Therefore, a successful model within this region could inspire countries facing the same adverse conditions. To that end, this research proposes to investigate the answers to the following questions: What do successful agricultural mutual insurance schemes have in common? What triggers their particularities? Which approach still needs to be implemented that could be relevant? In addition, how the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF SPC) could be an opportunity for Caribbean countries such as Haiti to develop micro-insurance structures that effectively reach the farm level?

3In accordance with the above research questions, the main objective of this review is to design a representative business model based on features from successful agricultural mutual insurance (AMI) schemes. Specifically, the study aims to identify common features among selected successful schemes; to analyze the causes of differences between approaches; and find out what approach is yet to be considered which could be appropriate in the case of Haiti.

4Such a study will provide swift insight for decision-makers on some critical factors to consider when developing a new agricultural insurance scheme. Haitian leaders are planning to implement a framework for agricultural funding, including agrarian insurance; findings from this study will inspire and guide their actions towards effectiveness.

5This study is divided into five sections. The previous section exposes the background of the study; the following section will review the characteristics of agricultural mutual insurance in the related countries. After that, we will describe the methodology used to select literature, data within the literature, and types of analysis. In the fourth position, we will show and discuss the findings and conclude while providing specific recommendations for practical uses.

1. Review on Agricultural Mutual Insurance Schemes

1.1. Agricultural Mutual Insurance (AMI) Schemes in Asia

6Due to their exposure to the monsoon phenomena, Asian countries, particularly Southeast Asia, are the most affected by natural disasters (Eckstein et al., 2021). However, these regions are home to some of the most successful agricultural mutual insurance schemes (AMIS) worldwide (Wenner, 2005; Zhang, 2009). Countries such as Japan, China, India, Philippines, Thailand, Nepal, and Bangladesh have long experience in agricultural insurance. In this section, we expose how their respective scheme is structured and what are the most relevant features.

1.1.1. The Japanese case, the NOSAI scheme

7Regarding natural disasters, Japan is known to be a very risky country (Edgington, 2019). The country frequently faces various natural hazards, such as earthquakes and typhoons (Heimburger, 2018; Ikeda & Palakhamarn, 2020). According to the 2023 World Risk Report, Japan is the third country with a higher exposure to risk (Bündnis et al., 2023). Based on that reality, the Japanese government established in the year 1947 a national system to support farmers, including implementing agricultural insurance. The NOSAI (Nogyo Kosai Saido: agricultural mutual aid) is a prefectural mutual aid operated by local farmers’ associations called Agricultural Mutual Relief (AMR) (Prabhakar & Ozawa, 2014). The NOSAI is supported by national legislation and is implemented according to 5 commodity-based types. It covers almost all agricultural products nationwide. According to the nozai.or.jp, that successful structure is characterized by five key features:

  1. The government reinsures it,

  2. It is compulsory when associations cultivate the major crops,

  3. within the association, it is compulsory for farmers over a specific acreage,

  4. The government pays a part of the premium,

  5. The government bears a part of the operational expenses of the organization.

8The organizational structure of the agricultural insurance starts from local farmers’ cooperation, continuing the AMRs. The prefectural federation then reinsures them, and each prefectural unit is re-reinsured by the national government through the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Japan (NOSAI, 2014). Shares held by the government are worth about half of the program, and farmers hold the second half (Yonekura, 2017). For a premium cost lower than 10%, the average loss ratio is between 50% and 100%, and the payout during a failure is generally higher than 50% (Yonekura, 2019).

1.1.2. The Chinese case, the Heilongjiang model

9Xiao and Zhang (2007) mentioned three principal agricultural insurance in China: the Shanghai, Xinjiang, and Heilongjiang modes. The Heilongjiang model was described as an agricultural mutual insurance fund. It was implemented by the first mutual insurance in China, the Sunlight Agriculture mutual insurance company (Nie, 2021). This mode presents three main features: 1) About 20% of the premium is borne by the General Bureau of Land Reclamation of Heilongjiang Province, a governmental structure; 2) the General Bureau also keeps 10% of premium revenue as reinsurance; 3) high managerial transparency, such as loss evaluation and indemnity encash (Xiao & Zhang, 2007). The insurance scheme involves different crops and includes natural and biological disasters (Zhao et al., 2020).

10Regarding organizational structure, the General Bureau of Land Reclamation organizes the insurance; farmers are Sunlight Agricultural Mutual Insurance Company members, and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission issues regulations (Zhang, 2009). In the 2023 classification of the World Risk Report, China was the second country with a higher exposure to risk (Bündnis, 2023); moreover, Northeast China, where the Heilongjiang Province is located, experienced the worst excessive rain in decades (Liu, 2016). The average loss ratio is 66% and sometimes exceeds 100% (Xiao & Zhang, 2007). Farmers pay 65% of the premiums (Turvey et al., 2013).

1.1.3. The Indian case, the BASIX Scheme

11According to UNFCCC (2008), BASIX has implemented the first micro-level rainfall insurance worldwide. This microinsurance institution focused on addressing high loan defaults and damages caused by excessive rainfall faced by smallholder farmers (Hermann et al., 2016). Deshmukh and Khatri (2012) reported that BASIX launched the first Indian rainfall insurance program after four years of pilot experience. Since India is an agricultural country highly dependent on monsoons, weather-based insurance would reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection (Deshmukh & Khatri, 2012; Cole et al., 2013). This scheme was introduced in Andhra Pradesh (Cole & Xiong, 2017), a region with climate-extreme conditions (Naik et al., 2023). Basix started his scheme as a multi-level mutual insurance. As reported by the World Bank (2003), it begins between farmers in one village, then pooled at different levels with other villages; however, the model became viable when they entered a partnership with ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company and gained support from the World Bank. The BASIX model is structured so that the insured (farmers) participate in the administration. The insurance product is included in the credit agreement, while BASIX has a weather insurance contract with ICICI Lombard, which is eventually reinsured by international weather risk market makers (World Bank, 2003). The important features of this scheme are the following:

  1. The insurance product is usually sold within a loan agreement,

  2. Insured farmers pay lower interest rates because of default risk reduction,

  3. The government is not a key stakeholder in the scheme; they are reinsured internationally,

  4. When loan-related, the premium should be at least 2% of the credit amount.

12Initially, the BASIX scheme focused on rainfall; nowadays, the weather contract also covers temperature and relative humidity (Mahato & Saha, 2019). Starting with only 140 farmers in the Andhra Pradesh region in 2003, the BASIX scheme is now available in other regions with thousands of contracted farmers (Amarnath et al., 2021).

1.1.4. The Philippine case, Binhi crop insurance scheme

13The Philippines Republic has higher exposure to natural disasters, as suggested by the recent World Risk Report (Bündnis et al., 2023). The Philippines is located in the typhoon belt. They are seriously impacted by El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and La Nina, respectively, provoking droughts and heavy rainfall that cause floods (OCDE, 2020). Between 2000 and 2019, the Philippines was the fourth country most affected by disasters worldwide, with 304 weather-related disasters (UNDRR, 2020). The governmental entity responsible for crop insurance in the Philippines is the Philippines Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC); being insured is a requirement for obtaining credit from some banks, such as the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) (Reyes et al., 2019). Meanwhile, to our knowledge, no mutual insurance structure at a micro-level has been reported. Furthermore, private initiatives of agricultural insurance are totally limited (Lansigan et al., 2017). However, a recent public-private partnership between the PCIC and the CARD Pioneer Microinsurance, Inc. (CPMI) has received the support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to start promoting crop insurance covering losses due to typhoons, floods, and monsoon rains (ADB, 2022). As reported by Ordinario (2016), the product is offered under the name of Binhi Crop Insurance was previously created with the assistance of the World Bank, and its main features are:

  1. The coverage is low (about USD 200), of which the premium represents 10%;

  2. The premium can be paid weekly, monthly, or annually;

  3. Compensation can be received within five days after a claim;

  4. The maximum (100%) coverage is paid if damages reach 80% to 100%, and 50% is paid if losses are from 20% to 79%, but no disbursement if damages are under 20%.

1.1.5. The South Korean case, Nonghyup mode

14Korea was classified right after Japan in terms of mutual insurance development and effectiveness (Zhang, 2009). Unlike many other countries, Korea has experienced a constant rise in expenses on risk management tools (Glauber et al., 2021). Considering that changes in climate conditions have been faster in Korea than the global average, extreme weather events in agriculture have occurred (Park & Kim, 2017). To help farmers adapt to these adverse effects, crop insurance was introduced in 2001. Their insurance system, as presented by the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LCHK) (2019), is featured as follows:

  1. There are three mean agricultural insurance programs (crop, livestock, and aquaculture) which cover 91 types of agricultural commodities,

  2. The programs cover more than three perils.

  3. Farmers can join voluntarily; meanwhile, the penetration rate was nearly double (17, 5% to 33%) between 2001 and 2018.

  4. It is a public-private partnership where the government acts as the reinsurer and facilitator between different companies. The structure operates as a co-insurance pool managed by one of the companies designated by the government.

  5. The government subsidizes the program at more than 50%; besides, underwriting loss exceeds the ratio of 150% to 180%.

  6. Farmers bear 18% of the premium cost, which is only 0.8% of their average annual income.

  7. In compensation, the indemnity varies from 60% to 100% of the loss incurred by the claimer.

15Regarding their organizational structure, the Nongyup ensures local farmers and is partly reinsured by the government and other insurance companies; the latter are reinsured on the global reinsurance market (Robert, 2013). The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) manages the agricultural insurance scheme in the Republic of Korea (Mia et al., 2015).

1.1.6. The Thai case, Sompo mode

16Win (2016) reported that conventional agricultural insurance has been introduced in Thailand since 1978, and farmers have joined crop insurance voluntarily; the insurance program, set to support farmers facing natural disasters, covers more than three perils. The entity facilitating the agricultural insurance delivery between insurance companies and farmers is the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) (Win, 2016).

17Between 2000 and 2019, Thailand was 9th in the top 10 countries most affected by natural disasters (Eckstein et al., 2021). Some recent changes were implemented in the system when they discovered that rice production in northern and central Thailand was becoming significantly vulnerable to climate change (Sinnarong et al., 2022). Public-private collaboration was promoted to respond to an increased insurance penetration motivated by flood and drought threats to agriculture (Poontirakul et al., 2022). A successful example is the partnership between Sompo and the BAAC, which provides weather index insurance to farmers in 17 provinces of Thailand (Yoshida et al., 2019). Despite that, agricultural insurance in Thailand was considered undeveloped compared to the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, and Taiwan (Ali et al., 2021). The organizational structure of the Sompo scheme is that farmers who maintain loan agreements with the BAAC can upgrade for a weather index insurance cover as part of the loan contract from 2019 to 2021 for some crops (Sompo-hd, 2023). The BAAC is then insured by Sompo Insurance Thailand, a branch of Sompo Japan (Sompo group) (Fuji, 2023). Farmers and the government share premiums, and premiums and compensation are determined based on the amount of the credit, which varies between 10% and 40% (Sirimanne et al., 2015).

1.1.7. The Bangladeshi case, Proshika mode

18Bangladesh has always been a highly flood-prone country, with a significant increase in intensity and frequency lately (Hossain et al., 2022), it has become the seventh country most affected by natural disasters (between 2000 and 2019) worldwide (Eckstein et al., 2021). Bangladesh is known to be the starting place of microcredit (from which microinsurance is inspired) with the Grameen experience of the mid-1970s (Anjaneyulu, 2011). Meanwhile, up to 2012, Bangladesh was the Asian country with the lowest insurance penetration; however, it has recently experienced an expansion in scheme numbers (Surminski & Panda, 2020). Being the largest and the fastest developing country globally (Noor-Khan & Hasan, 2022), its numerous risk management strategies are paying off. Index-based flood insurance (IBFI) uses satellite and public data to estimate the losses from crop flooding, which has been implemented in Bangladesh for several years (Amarnath et al., 2019). The NGO Proshika is a classic example of an insurance scheme, as it is offered on a micro level to groups of farmers, bundled with savings (Hermann et al., 2016). When Bangladeshi farmers experience damage due to flooding, they receive compensation payments worth twice their savings (Melcher et al., 2006; UNFCCC, 2008; Hermann et al., 2016). Proshika’s insurance is a community-based model where the risk is managed and absorbed within MFIs, NGOs, and Cooperatives, with less donor support and no involvement of commercial insurers (Melcher, 2014). Ahsan et al. (2013) also mentioned a Grameen scheme with even more clients in Bangladesh, as the premium rate is lower compared to Proshika, 2.5 and 3.0 percent of the loan amount, respectively. The advantage of Proshika is that the total value of the loan is covered while only 50% of it is insured in the case of Grameen (Ahsan et al., 2013).

1.1.8. The Nepalese Case, SFCL mode

19Agricultural insurance was introduced in Nepal in 1987 by a collaboration between the Nepal Rastra Bank (Central Bank of Nepal) and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) (FAO, 2012). At the same time, private cooperatives (mutual) launched a similar program, the Small Farmer Corporation Limited (SFCL) (Ghimire & Kumar, 2011). The SFCL provides livestock insurance and named crops and peril insurance to its members (FAO, 2012). The central government subsidizes the insurance premium at about 50%; however, Nepalese agricultural insurance has no reinsurance structure (Khanal, 2014). Linked to credit, the SFCL’s insurance is compulsory or voluntary, with a premium rate of 10% for livestock (Ghimire, 2013) and up to 15% of their estimated production for crops (Aryal et al., 2020). The compensation payout (up to 80%) is set to be paid 30 days after the claim; the long-term loss ratio is under 20% for an underwriting cost higher than 50% (FAO, 2012 ; Bhushan et al., 2016). Farming has always been hazardous in Nepal (Ghimire et al., 2016); this is linked to Nepal being among the ten countries most affected by natural disasters between 2000 and 2019 (Eckstein et al., 2021). Severe windstorms are one of the most common events that hit agriculture in Nepal; therefore, the most common insured crop in that country is the banana (Thapa & Bam, 2020).

1.2. Agricultural Mutual Insurance (AMI) Schemes in Latin America and the Caribbean

20Before 2004, the insurance market was not widely spread in Latin America and the Caribbean despite the growing demand (Masci et al., 2007). Agricultural insurance in LAC was mostly public (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Panama) or private (Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela) (Wenner, 2005). However, after the catastrophic events between 2004 and 2010, agricultural insurance penetration, in terms of country number, has jumped to place the LAC before Asia and the African region (Mahul & Stutley, 2010). Mutual insurance funds could then be found in a few countries: Mexico, Southern Brazil, and Uruguay. Meanwhile, the Southern American countries (Uruguay and Brazil) share a similar scheme of agricultural (hail mutual) insurance (World Bank 2010), as they are all vulnerable to hailstorms (INECI341, 2018). In Argentina, however, for nearly 100 years, a highly competitive unsubsidized hail insurance system has been marketed (Mahul & Stutley, 2010). The situation is that inputs suppliers usually sell at credit to farmers; to protect their business activity against possible extreme weather events, those farmers are required to have insurance coverage (Varangis et al., 2003). Argentina relies strictly on the private sector for agricultural insurance (Skenjana, 2023).

1.2.1. The Mexican case, Fondos model

21Like the AMRs in Japan, the Mexican Fondos are constituted by local farmers (Levin & Reinhard, 2007). A Fondo is a non-profit organization with a maximum of 300 members, allowing it to sell insurance exclusively to its members (Breustedt & Larson, 2006). They are considered among the legal forms of a community-based organism or social group in the country (Bonfil & Oulhaj, 2019). Fondos has been reported to be Mexico’s sole agricultural insurance fund (World Bank, 2013). The World Bank report (2013) shows a significant increase in Fondos numbers between 2001 and 2012. They have their own supervisory structure and are reinsured through a 100% stop-loss agreement by Agrosemex, a governmental entity (Hess et al., 2016; Index, 2017). Throughout the years, private reinsurers have also joined as partners to the Fondos system. The insurance provided by Fondos is a multi-peril insurance (Hazell et al., 2017), for which farmers have to pay less than 10% of the insured sum as premium cost. The government subsidizes this cost at 30% (Arias & Covarrubias, 2006). The Fondos system covers only named perils, which makes it a positive exception in terms of viability and an effective strategy against moral hazard (Breustedt & Larson, 2006). The peer monitoring possibility offered by the Fondos scheme strengthens its effectiveness in combating moral hazard (Levin & Reinhard, 2007; Mahul & Stutley, 2010). Mexico has experienced frequent hurricanes and devastating floods over the years (Saldaña-Zorrilla, 2007), and the persistence of the Fondos shows the system’s viability.

1.2.2. The South American case: Hail Mutual Insurance (Agribusiness Cooperatives)

22Like Mexico, Brazil is on the short list of developing countries with successful and viable agricultural insurance programs (Hess et al., 2016). There are several state-run innovative agricultural insurance initiatives in Brazil, such as PROAGRO and SEAF; meanwhile, due to extreme events, the country still loses about 1% of its agricultural production every year (Ferreira et al., 2022). Generally, state programs could be more cost-effective due to a lack of monitoring; mutual-based insurance programs offer various advantages for smallholders. Therefore, the focus could be on a mutual insurance scheme developed in Paraná State to help farmers manage risks incurred in crop production and livestock (Machinski et al., 2016). In Brazil, the Agricultural Cooperatives in Paraná State manage group mutual insurance for producers and cooperative members, where the insurance is mandatory only if the member finances his harvest with funds from the cooperative (Machinski et al., 2016).

23Until 1993, agricultural insurance was a state monopoly in Uruguay, followed by some private initiatives up to the early 2000s (Wenner & Arias, 2003). Around 2007, for example, 68% of the cropped area was insured (crop hail insurance) without any subsidy (Mahul & Stutley, 2010). A few mutual insurance funds have been established in complementarity to the public and private interventions, such as Banco de Seguro del Estado (BSE), MAPFRE, and La Compañia Cooperativa de Seguros (SURCO) (Wenner & Arias, 2003).

24Unlike Mexico, there is limited official information about the features of the existing mutual insurance funds in southern America, as they are also underdeveloped compared to their existing public or private programs. However, agribusiness input providers as a delivery channel of agricultural insurance (Mahul & Stutley, 2010) are a particularity of the region.

1.2.3. Caribbean case, WINCROP, and AGRODOSA

25Before 2013, only two agricultural insurances for individual farmers have been reported in the Caribbean: the Aseguradora Agropecuaria Dominicana SA (AGRODOSA) and the Windward Island Crop Insurance Ltd. (WINCROP) (Carballo & Dos Reis, 2013; Havemann, 2016). If the AGRODOSA is mainly a public program with some public-private schemes, WINCROP was established in 1987 as a mutual insurance entity owned by the banana growers’ association in Winward Island (Havemann, 2016). Besides, a special program has been reported in Jamaica administrated by the Coffee Industry Board (CIB), which lasted until 2006; supported by the governments, hurricane vouchers were used in a partnership between public Banks and insurance providers (Carballo & Dos Reis, 2013). A decade later, WINCROP spread to other Caribbean islands, such as St. Vincent and Grenada, to help small-scale farmers cope with windstorms and volcanic events (Havemann, 2016). According to Dewey (2007), the WINCROP scheme has a reputation as a successful model; its viability can be imputed to the following features:

  • The strategy is based on a commercial insurance principle and a business-like system.

  • The administrative tasks are minimized to facilitate premium collections and indemnity payments.

  • It is a single peril coverage, which allows easy loss assessment on a large scale.

  • They have a well-established database to manage registration and claims efficiently.

  • Growers are constantly and strongly willing to maintain cash in their reserve funds.

  • They are reinsured on the international market.

26Therefore, when analyzing the current structure of WINCROP, it can no longer be considered micro-level mutual insurance because the stakeholders have been diversified. Besides the St. Vincent Banana Growers’ Association (SVBGA) and the Grenada Banana Cooperative Society (GBCS), there are also the Dominica Banana Marketing Corporation (DBMC) and the St. Lucia Banana Corporation (SLBC) that make it more of a (meso-level) insurers’ mutual (Naturales, 2010).

2. Balancing Theory and Practice

27The article provides a detailed analysis of mutual agricultural insurance schemes, combining theoretical discussions with practical recommendations. However, to enhance the relevance and understanding of the recommendations, a better balance between theory and practical examples is necessary. This section aims to illustrate how detailed case studies can enrich theoretical discussion.

2.1. Theoretical Discussion

  • Theory of Agricultural Mutual Insurance: The theory of agricultural mutual insurance is based on the collaboration among farmers to pool risks and resources. The theoretical advantages include reduced transaction costs, improved access to insurance for small farmers, and reduced the moral hazard through peer monitoring.

  • Reinsurance Models: Reinsurance is a key theoretical concept where mutual insurance funds protect themselves against catastrophic losses by transferring a portion of their risks to reinsurers. This allows the funds to remain solvent even after significant events.

  • Public-Private Partnerships (PPP): PPPs are often theorized as an effective solution for developing agricultural insurance schemes, combining the resources and expertise of the public and private sectors. This approach can enhance the resilience and sustainability of insurance programs.

2.2. Practical Examples

  • Case Study: NOSAI in Japan

    • Context: The NOSAI scheme in Japan is a successful example of risk pooling in agriculture. It is supported by the government and involves local agricultural producer associations.

    • Practice: Each local association collects premiums and manages claims, with substantial financial support from the government for reinsurance and premium subsidies. Farmers growing major crops are required to participate, ensuring a broad base and better risk distribution.

    • Results: This model has maintained financial stability for Japanese farmers even during major natural disasters like typhoons and earthquakes.

  • Case Study: Heilongjiang in China

    • Context: The Heilongjiang model is based on a provincial mutual insurance scheme supported by the General Bureau of Land Reclamation of Heilongjiang Province.

    • Practice: The General Bureau covers part of the premiums and keeps a reserve for reinsurance. The model emphasizes transparency in management, particularly in loss assessment and indemnity payments.

    • Results: This approach has led to high farmer engagement and better risk management, reducing economic losses from natural disasters.

  • Case Study: BASIX in India

    • Context: BASIX pioneered rainfall insurance for small farmers in India, particularly in the Andhra Pradesh region.

    • Practice: BASIX integrates rainfall insurance into loan contracts in partnership with ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company, supported by the World Bank. Farmers benefit from reduced premiums and preferential interest rates in exchange for participating in the program.

    • Results: The scheme has reduced loan default rates and improved farmer resilience to climate risks.

3. Methodology

28This study focuses on Asian and the LAC countries. Being at the forefront of natural disasters, those countries are often listed among the most exposed and most affected by natural disasters (GermanWatch, 2021). Their conditions can be explained partly by their dependence on phenomena such as monsoons and El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) (Jury et al., 2007; Loo et al., 2015). Assuming that successful experiences from countries within those two regions could be adapted to others in the same region, by combining the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines (Mother et al., 2009) with the Whittemore & Knafl (2005) updated methodology, we reviewed micro-level mutual insurance with a specific indicator of success.

3.1. Search Scope and Strategy

29Grant and Booth (2009) presented a typology of fourteen types of reviews through which evidence could be drawn from existing literature. Critical review, literature review, rapid review, umbrella review, state-of-the-art review, scoping review, overview, systematic review, and meta-analysis are common. However, an integrative review (IR) is a form of systematic review with the advantage of providing a comprehensive view of the topic as it may include gray and published literature (Kutcher & LeBaron, 2022). Therefore, we conducted a general search on the previously mentioned to identify all papers mentioning the key phrases (‘Agricultural Insurance’ and ‘Mutual Insurance’) from 2004 to 2024 (April). In addition, backward and forward snowball searches were conducted to complete the relevant database with information from official reports (World Bank, United Nations Organizations, Regional Banks, and Government reports), books, and approved or published dissertations.

3.2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

30The review concerns only AMI schemes starting before 2013. We consider a minimum of ten years of operation as an indicator of success for the models. The survival trial of new ventures is usually confirmed after ten years (Brixy & Grotz, 2007; Coad et al., 2016). The IR was focused on Asian and LAC countries. Some countries, such as Brunei and Singapore, were excluded as they have no insurance program due to the low representativeness of the agricultural sector, as well as countries where the agricultural insurance program is still at an embryonal stage, such as Lao PDR, Malaysia, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam (ASEAN, 2022). Afterward, we consider countries where the implemented agricultural insurance scheme is a public-private partnership, a micro-level mutual, or an NGO/community-based model. Based on these criteria, the selected Asian countries are Japan, China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, South Korea, and Nepal.

3.3. Selection and data extraction

31We screened all titles and abstracts of relevant studies from ScienceDirect, Google Scholar, Scopus, and MDPI. We save all studies providing some information that matches the criteria and drop out the unfitted papers. We used the saved studies to review the general features of the selected schemes. Additional features were found by running specifical search on Google to consult official reports and data. The retained literature should provide some information on one of the targeted components of a business model canvas:

32key partnership, key activities, cost structure and revenue streams, and delivery channel. Figure 1 shows the detailed process.

Figure 1: Selection process chart

Figure 1: Selection process chart

4. Results

4.1 Critical Features of Successful Agricultural Mutual Insurance Schemes

33Based on the relevant literature and official reports reviewed, we come up with some important features that characterize the selected successful schemes. Some features are shared by all (or the majority of) the schemes, while some relate to the particularities of a certain category. According to the five selected components of a business model canvas, the findings are as follows:

4.1.1. Key Partnerships Features of the Schemes

34In a business model canvas, the key partnerships section shows business partners necessary to help reduce risks, as well as gaining specific resources and know-how (Millaningtyas et al., 2023), it exhibits suppliers and partners promoting external activities (Punkkinen, 2021). The retain features were chosen based on the suggested model of Amarnath et al. (2021), in which they presented some examples of the business model for agricultural insurance schemes from Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Table 2 shows a feature-based comparison between the selected schemes. Yes/No refer respectively to the presence or the absence of a feature in a scheme, and the number in parentheses corresponds to the cited literature at the bottom of each table.

Table 2: Partnership-based comparison of the related schemes

Country

(SCHEME)

Partners

Japan

(NOSAI)

China

(HEILONGJIANG)

India

(BASIX)

Bangladesh

(PROSHIKA)

Nepal

(SFCL)

Mexico

(FONDOS)

Indicator (source)

Indicator (source)

Indicator (source)

Indicator (source)

Indicator (source)

Indicator (source)

C. Government

Yes (high) (1)

Yes (high) (4)

Yes (low) (7)

No (NGO) (10)

Yes (moderate) (14)

Yes (moderate) (17)

State Re-insurer

Yes (1)

Yes (4)

No (7)

No (11)

No (14)

Yes (18)

International Re

No (2)

No (5)

Yes (7)

No (11)

No (14)

Yes (19)

Regional/World Bank

No (3)

No (6)

Yes (8)

Yes (12)

Yes (15)

No (20)

MFIs

No (2)

No (5)

Yes (9)

Yes (13)

Yes (16)

No (20)

CITED PAPERS

(NOSAI, 2014)

(Prabhakar & Ozawa, 2014)

(Rola, 2021)

(Xiao & Zhang, 2007)

(Zhang, 2009)

(Zhang, 2009; OCDE, 2024)

(World Bank, 2003)

(Gunaranjan, 2007)

(Amarnath, 2021)

(Quayyum et al, 2018)

(Melcher, 2014; Quayyum et al, 2018)

(Ozaki, 2016; Deb, 2016)

(Melcher, 2014)

(Khanal, 2014)

(Shakya, 2009; Singjali, 2022)

(Kayastha, 2012)

 (Arias & Covarrubias, 2006)

(Hess et al., 2016; Index, 2017)

(Hess et al., 2016)

(World Bank, 2013)

Notes: C. (Central) Government: including Ministries (agriculture, finance, economy…)
Meteor (Meteorological and/or Stat. – Statistical – Department – s –
International Re (Re-Insurer)
Government support – Low: <30%; moderate: [30%, 60%]; high: > 60% –

Source: Compiled from literature survey by authors

  • Relevant Similarities: The majority – 5 out of 6 – shows a certain level of involvement of the local government in the scheme. It is, therefore, a vital condition for the success of an AMI scheme to receive state support, specifically in times of great losses. Nshakira-Rukundo et al. (2021) suggest that government support is necessary in many ways, such as policy development, market regulation, as well as ensuring an appropriate business environment for insurance providers.

  • Relevant Particularities: The schemes managed by MFIs or whose MFIs are main financial partners tend to receive less support from the government and no state reinsurance. To survive, they resort to international reinsurance and benefit from regional banks or the World Bank. Because reinsurance is for them a means to ensure their solvency – Jarzabkowski et al., 2019 – .

4.1.2. Key Activities Features of the Schemes

35The ‘Key activities’ section is where the set of activities performed by the entity to create and deliver the proposed value are described – Keane et al., 2018 – . In Table 3, we summarize how much each of the selected activities is represented in each scheme. Those activities were selected according to the above-mentioned model of Amarnath et al. (2021).

Table 3: Activity-based comparison of the related schemes

Country

SCHEME

Activities

Japan

– NOSAI –

China

– HEILONGJIANG –

India

– BASIX –

Bangladesh

(PROSHIKA)

Nepal

– SFCL –

Mexico

(FONDOS)

Indicator – source –

Indicator – source –

Indicator – source –

Indicator – source –

Indicator – source –

Indicator – source –

Generate Data – SS./WA –

Yes – 21 –

Yes – 25 –

Yes – 28 –

Yes – 33 –

No / L.I. – 39 –

Yes – 44 –

Set up / Provide Incentives

No – 22 –

No – 26 –

Yes – 29 –

Yes – 34 –

Yes – 40 –

Yes – 45 –

Disaster Prevention Program

Yes – 22 –

Yes – 27 –

Yes – 30 –

Yes – 35 –

Yes – 31 –

Yes – 46 –

Providing Loan

No – 22 –

No – 5 –

Yes – 7, 31 –

Yes – 36 –

Yes – 40 –

No – 47 –

Training and Education

Yes – 23 –

Unknown

Yes – 32, 41)

Yes (37)

Yes (41, 42)

Yes (17)

Monitoring and Evaluation

Yes (24)

Yes (25)

Yes (29)

Yes (38)

Yes (43)

Yes (48)

CITED PAPERS

(Sonobe, 2014; Hongo et al., 2015)

(Yonekura, 2019)

Atmowidjojo et al., 2024)

(Kayano et al., 2016; Fan & Huang, 2020)

Harvey, I., & Cat, S. (2017)

(Belete et al., 2007)

(Xiao & Zhang, 2007)

(Ciumaș et al., 2012)

(Kloeppinger-Todd & Sharma, 2010)

(Roy et al., 2018)

(Giné et al., 20129

(BASIX, 2024)

(Amarnath et al., 2019)

(Chowdhury, 2019)

(Matin & Taher, 2001)

(Ahsan et al., 2013)

(Khatun, 2014)

(Ahmad, 2013)

(Ghimire, 2013)

(Staschen, 2001)

(Stutley, 2011)

(Aryal, 2006)

(Staschen, 2001)

(Magaña-Hernández et al., 2013)

(Breustedt & Larson, 2006)

(Saldaña-Zorrilla, 2008)

(Saldaña-Zorrilla, 2007)

(Mahul & Stutley, 2010)

Notes: SS.: from Stations or Satellite (Weather/Assessment)
L.I.: Livestock insurance is the most developed in Nepal; crop insurance is at its infant stage.

  • Relevant Similarities: Generally, the schemes use data generated from stations or satellites for weather previsions and loss assessment. Accurate data is always necessary for decision-making, specifically in agricultural insurance, as it helps to better predict and protect against risks (Bhardwaj & Agarwal, 2022). In addition, all the selected schemes implement some subsequent disaster prevention programs, they conduct monitoring and evaluation, and the majority (5 out of 6) provides training and education to farmers. Disaster prevention can be focused on reducing exposure, reducing vulnerability, or establishing better structures and infrastructure for response to disasters (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011). Therefore, insurance institutions also protect themselves by promoting these activities. Pratiwi and Budiasa (2022) suggest that the effectiveness of an agricultural insurance program is highly dependent on good training and guidance as well as proper monitoring and evaluation. The latter is crucial to a more comprehensive contingency planning (Linnerooth-Bayer & Mechler, 2008)

  • Relevant Particularities: In the framework of agricultural mutual insurance managed by MFIs, insurance is usually bundled with the loan as a strategy to protect either of the two products against great loss. Schemes with high support from the government do not necessarily resort to such a combination. Furthermore, where the insurance program does not benefit from substantial government subsidy, alternative incentives are set or provided to encourage farmers to join, stay in, and follow the agreement.

4.1.3. Cost Structure and Revenue Stream Features of the Schemes

36The cost structure exposes all costs necessary to the realization of the proposed value; it may be influenced by the chosen strategy, the business environment, as well as the size of the entity (Millaningtyas et al., 2023). However, the revenue stream is the amount of cash the entity is expected to earn from its operations (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010; Elsanhoury, 2018); it may be transactional or recurrent (Endratno & Santoso, 2020). Table 4 shows how the cash flow (cost and revenue) pattern is different or similar from one scheme to another.

Table 4: Cost Structure and Revenue stream-based comparison of the related schemes

Scheme (country)

Criteria

Japan

(NOSAI)

China

(HEILONGJIANG)

India

(BASIX)

Bangladesh

(PROSHIKA)

Nepal

(SFCL)

Mexico

(FONDOS)

Subsidized by the Central Government

Yes (1)

Yes (50)

Yes (19)

No (10)

Yes (41)

Yes (17, 45)

Average operational/underwriting cost (<15%) of the sum insured

No (49)

No (52)

No (53)

No (10, 54)

Yes (40)

No (20)

Average operational/administrative cost [15%-30%] of the sum insured

Yes (49)

Yes (52)

Yes (53)

Yes (54)

No (40)

Yes (20)

Farmers bear <30% of the Premium cost

No (49)

Yes (50

Yes (19)

No (10)

No (41)

No (17)

Farmers bear ]30%; 60%] of the premium cost

Yes (49)

No – 50

Yes – 19

No – 10 –

Yes (41)

No (17)

Farmers bear more than 60% of Premium cost

No (49)

No (50)

No (19)

Yes (10)

No (41)

Yes (17)

Premium costs ≤10% of the sum insured

Yes (22)

Yes (26)

Yes (7, 19)

Yes (36)

Yes (39, 41)

Yes (48)

Premium costs ]10%, 20%] of the sum insured

No (22)

No (26

Yes (19)

No (36)

No (41)

No (48)

Premium costs more than 20% of the sum insured

No (22

No (26)

No (19)

No (36)

No (41)

No (48)

High payouts during failure >80% of the total premium

Yes (22)

Yes (4)

No (53)

No (10,41)

No (41)

No (20)

Moderate payouts during failure [40%, 80] of total premium

Yes (22)

Yes (4)

Yes (53)

Yes (10, 41)

Yes (41)

Yes (20)

Low payouts during failure < 40% of the total premium

No (22)

No (4)

No (53)

Yes (10,41)

Yes (41)

Yes (20)

Average long-term lost ratio <50%

No (41)

No(41)

Yes (41)

No (41)

Yes (41)

Yes (17)

Average long-term lost ratio [50%, 80]

Yes (41)

Yes (41)

Yes (41)

Yes (41)

No (41)

Yes (17, 20)

Average long-term lost ratio > 80%

Yes (41)

Yes (41)

No (41)

No (41)

No (41)

No (20)

CITED PAPERS

49- (Yonekura, 2019)

50- (Shen & Odening, 2013)

51- (Turvey et al., 2013)

52- Zhong & Huang, 2015)

53- (Manuamorn, 2005)

54-)- Chaudhury et al., 2022 –

  • Relevant Similarities: Almost all the schemes receive financial support – subsidy – from their local government; in such cases, the state contribution to the premium payment goes from 40% to 70%. On a general basis, the average operational and administrative cost is between 15% and 30% of the sum insured; the premium costs do not exceed 10% of the sum insured; the average long-term lost ratio varies from 50% to 80%. On the one hand, a high loss ratio hindrance the development of insurance programs as it may lead entities into bankruptcy – Qingshui & Xuewei, 2010 – ; therefore, for schemes to survive, it is crucial to maintain a reasonable average long-term loss ratio. On the other hand, very high premium costs will result in jeopardizing the agricultural insurance demand – Nonguierma, 2022 – ; it is, according to Yufei et al. (2022), one of the more severe obstacles to agricultural insurance in developing countries.

  • Relevant Particularities: Only schemes with high governmental support can afford a high payout – >80% – in times of failure. These schemes are also able to survive even with an average loss ratio higher than 80%. Because as stated by Stutley – 2011 – , with an average long-term loss ratio exceeding 75%, the insurance institution will not be working in profit.

4.1.4. Delivery Channels Features of the Schemes

37As a component of the canvas business model, ‘delivery channels’ refer to customer touchpoints – Brunner & Wolfartsberger, 2020 – ; they are the way through which entities communicate the proposed value to customer segments – Sparviero, 2019 – . Table 5 presents two categories of options in the delivery channels of the selected schemes, whether farmers subscribe individually or in groups or whether they join the agreement voluntarily or compulsorily.

Table 5: Delivery Chanel-based comparison of the related schemes

(country –

Scheme

Criteria

Japan

– NOSAI –

China

– HEILONGJIANG –

India

– BASIX –

Bangladesh

– PROSHIKA –

Nepal

– SFCL –

Mexico

– FONDOS –

Individual Registration

Yes – 1 –

Yes – 50 –

Yes

Yes – 13 –

No – 56 –

Yes – 20 –

Group Registration

AMR – 1 –

No – 50 –

No

Yes – 13 –

Yes – 56 –

Fondo – 20 –

Voluntary

No – 1 –

No – 48 –

No – 55 –

No – 13 –

No – 56 –

No – 20 –

Compulsory – mandatory if.–

Yes – 1, 48 –

Yes – 48 –

Yes – 55 –

Yes – 13 –

Yes – 56 –

Yes – 20 –

55- – Reddy, 2004 –

56- – BASIX, 2010 –

57- – Hermann et al., 2016 –

58- Kayastha, 2012 –

38Both types, individual and in groups, are represented in the schemes. Group subscriptions are often used as a peer monitoring strategy against moral hazard, but premiums and compensations are managed individually. On the other hand, all the schemes prioritize the mandatory adhesion for farmers having loans, cultivating a certain crops, having access to some government subsidies (Timsina et al. 2028), or when exceeding a certain area (Reyes et al. 2017). This is a penetration strategy (Ngunjiri, 2013), as agricultural insurance in developing countries is still very low (Mahul & Stutley, 2010; Reyes et al. 2017; Robles, 2021).

5. Discussions

39The review on the structure and the features of the most successful agricultural mutual insurance schemes was conducted to come up with a summarized model that countries with similar conditions, in terms of natural disaster exposure could learn from, and implement more effective agricultural insurance programs on their own. Table 6 highlights the relevant features related to five of a business model canvas component. The selected components were choses based on their high potentiality to influence the viability of a given program.

Table 6: Business model Canvas Representative of a Successful AMI Scheme

Partners

Government

State Re-insurer

International Re

Regional/World Bank

MFIs

Activities

Generate Data (SS./WA)

Set up / Provide Incentives

Disaster Prevention Program

Providing Loan

Training and Education

Monitoring and Evaluation

Value Proposition

(subjective, promise)

Each firm can state their value proposition individually, by the ultimate purpose is managing risk.

Customer relationships

(Generally personal)

Direct relationship between MFIs and Farmers, or

Relationship with farmers through agribusiness firms (selling inputs/ buying crops)

Customer segments

Identical (Farmer)

However, schemes can take farm size into account,

apparent Vulnerability level, as well as

availability of irrigation water.

Key Resources

(Derived from Partners and Activities)

Natural and financial resources vary from one country to another. However, resources such as data and technology must be created by partners through conducting proper activities.

Channels

(Generally Direct)

Prioritize the mandatory adhesion for farmers having loans, cultivating a certain crop, having access to some government subsidies, or when exceeding a certain area.

Both types, individual and in groups subscription, can be necessary in the schemes

Cost Structure & Revenue Streams

State contribution to the premium: from 40% to 70%.

Average operational and administrative cost is between 15% and 30% of the sum insured.

Premium costs do not exceed 10% of the sum insured.

Average long-term loss ratio varies from 50% to 80%.

Only schemes with high governmental support can afford a high payout (>80%) in times of failure.

Social Costs

(subjective and relative)

To be minimized by governmental arbitration.

Social Benefits

(subjective and relative)

To be maximized by governmental arbitration.

40Haiti is the initial focus of this review. In Haiti, the budget allocated for agriculture has significantly decreased over the year (Shamsie, 2012). It has therefore become less than what is actually necessary to sustain the agricultural sector (Bargout & Raizada, 2013). Based on this situation, the Haitian government may not be able to provide substantial financial support to develop agricultural insurance in the country. However, the government can still play its role as regulator, and facilitator partnership between private actors (Varangis et al., 2003).

41Regarding the MFIs, they have contributed to reducing the financial inclusion gap in Haiti, by providing loans to low-income economic actors, such as farmers and small merchants (Sifrain, 2022). Therefore, they present a high potential for promoting the agricultural insurance product among farmers. In 2012, the MFIs were targeted by the System of. Financing and Agricultural Insurance’ (SYFAAH) project (Word Bank, 2019). Many of the MFIs currently operating in Haiti have the status of saving and credit cooperative societies, whose members include smallholders. As explained by Messabia et al. (2022), their success in Haiti is the result of key activities such as training and education of members, creation of proximity effect, community rooting, and meeting of the needs of the environment. Busse, R. (2007) argued that MFIs are crucial for Haiti, he described them as part of the Haitian solution to its pervasive poverty.

42Based on the relevant features from Table 6, Haiti, whose agricultural insurance is currently less than 1% (Radu, 2022), has access to important partners that could help boost its insurance sector. Through its government, Haiti is insured by the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF SPC). This insurance covers losses incurred during catastrophe events such as hurricanes and major droughts. For several years, Haiti could not afford the premium cost on its own; as a strategy for risk management in the Caribbean, the CDB has decided to help Haiti pay its insurance premium for hurricanes, excess rainfall, and earthquake to the CCRIF from 2017 to 2021 (CDB, 2018). From the year of its integration, Haiti has been compensated times by the CCRIF SPC. A Multi-Donor Trust Fund supports the CCRIF with the contributions of the Canadian government, the European Union, the World Bank, the United Kingdom, France and other European countries (Abah, 2021). In the aftermath of the earthquake that occurred in Haiti in 2010, the country received US$8 million from the CCRIF, which was worth 20 times its premium for the earthquake (US$385,500) (Abah, 2021). By giving the opportunity to farmers to participate to the payment of this premium via a national pooling of an AMI scheme, Haiti will be capable of higher contributions to the premium payment. This will give the possibility to farmers to be proudly compensating in the aftermath of a disaster which the CCRIF SPC has covered. Thus, Haiti has access to all the necessary key partners to develop a viable and successful AMI scheme, MFIs, regional bank (CDB), international reinsurer (the CCRIF SPC through the Haitian government).

5.1. Discussion of the Limitations of Available Data and Potential Biases

5.1.1. Limitations of Available Data

  • Variability of Sources: The data used in this study comes from various sources, including academic articles, official reports, books, and dissertations. While this diversity enriches the analysis, it also presents challenges in terms of consistency and comparability of information. Methodological differences between studies can affect the comparability of results and the validity of the conclusions drawn.

  • Accessibility and Currency of Data: Some data may be outdated or not reflect recent developments in agricultural mutual insurance systems. For instance, government policies and economic conditions evolve rapidly, which can render some information obsolete. Additionally, limited access to up-to-date data, especially in less developed or crisis-affected regions, poses a significant barrier.

  • Representativeness of Samples: The studies included in this review may not be representative of all mutual agricultural insurance schemes in each country or region. Some studies focus on specific examples or particular geographic areas, which can introduce geographic and contextual biases.

5.1.2. Potential Biases in Study Selection

  • Publication Bias: There is a potential bias related to the selection of published studies. Studies with positive or significant results tend to be published more frequently than those with negative or non-significant results. This can lead to an overestimation of the success of mutual agricultural insurance schemes.

  • Language Bias: The review primarily considered studies in English and French, which may exclude relevant research published in other languages. This limits the scope of the conclusions and may introduce a language bias.

  • Selection Bias: The process of selecting studies based on specific search terms may have excluded relevant work that uses different terminology or methodological approaches. Furthermore, selecting studies based on their online availability may also introduce a bias, as some important studies may not be freely or digitally accessible.

  • Confirmation Bias: There is a risk of confirmation bias, where selected studies may have been unconsciously chosen to support the authors’ pre-existing hypotheses. An impartial and exhaustive selection of studies is essential to minimize this bias.

5.1.3. Suggestions to Minimize Limitations and Biases

  • Stricter Methodological Approach: Adopting a stricter methodological approach for selecting studies, including explicit quality criteria and a critical evaluation of each source, could improve the rigor of the analysis.

  • Inclusion of Unpublished Data: Integrating unpublished data, such as internal organization reports, unpublished theses, and field data, could offer a more comprehensive view and reduce publication bias.

  • Analysis of Recent Developments: Regularly updating the data used and including contemporary case studies would better reflect current realities and enhance the relevance of the conclusions.

  • Linguistic Diversity: Expanding the search to include studies in other relevant languages for the regions studied, with the help of translators or international collaborators, could enrich the database and reduce language bias.

By addressing these limitations and applying measures to mitigate potential biases, the study can enhance its academic rigor and provide more robust and generalizable conclusions about mutual agricultural insurance schemes in the studied regions.

Conclusion and Recommendations

43This integrative review on selected successful agricultural mutual insurance schemes (AMIS) reveals some relevant features that success AMIS have in common. The near omnipresence of the government support; international reinsurance, specifically for initiatives where MFIs are the main partners; reasonable premium costs and bearable average long-term ratio. In terms of particularities, AMIS with more substantial government support can afford larger payout amounts and are able to survive without international reinsurance. Based on the results of the study, we were able to formulate the following recommendation:

  1. The support of the local government is crucial for the success of any AMIS even though this support is not necessarily financial.

  2. Without (or with low/moderate) financial support from the government, reinsurance is indispensable to ensure the AMIS solvency.

  3. Activities such as alternative disaster prevention programs, training and education, monitoring and evaluation are necessary to minimize losses.

  4. As much as possible, premium cost should be below 10% of the insured sum, because it will be more affordable for poor farmers. In the case of Haiti, Valcin at al. (2023) found that farmers are willing to pay around 10% to join an insurance program.

  5. A combination of individual and group subscription will be a good strategy, as it will help to combat moral hazards through peer monitoring.

  6. MFIs should inevitably get the insurance product bundled with another product such as loans and saving.

  7. As found in some Southern American countries, Agribusinesses providing inputs to farmers (and purchasing commodities from farmers) will be some key partners in an AMIS; because they will help reduce the moral hazard as well as market risks; by filling two different links of the value chain.

44Practical Recommendations Based on Case Studies:

  • Partnership and Government Support: Governments should play an active role in implementing and supporting mutual agricultural insurance schemes. Financial participation and favorable policies are essential for long-term viability.

  • Integration with Financial Products: Insurance schemes should be integrated with other financial products, such as agricultural loans, to encourage participation and improve access to insurance for small farmers.

  • Transparency and Claims Management: Transparency in fund management and the claims process is crucial to maintain farmer trust and ensure fair distribution of compensation.

  • Utilization of International Reinsurance: Insurance schemes should explore international reinsurance options to protect against catastrophic losses and ensure solvency.

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Rival Valcin, Tomohiro Uchiyama, Rika Terano, Dario S. Celestin et Bénédique Paul, « Agricultural Mutual Insurance in Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean: An Integrative Review of the Micro-Level Schemes »Études caribéennes [En ligne], 59 | Décembre 2024, mis en ligne le 17 décembre 2024, consulté le 11 février 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudescaribeennes/32188 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/132zb

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Rival Valcin

Graduate School of Agriculture, Tokyo University of Agriculture, Japan
rivalcing7@gmail.com

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Tomohiro Uchiyama

Faculty of International Agriculture and Food Studies, Tokyo University of Agriculture, Japan

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Rika Terano

Faculty of International Agriculture and Food Studies, Tokyo University of Agriculture, Japan

Dario S. Celestin

Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Quisqueya University, Haiti

Bénédique Paul

Faculty of Agricultural Sciences and Environment, Quisqueya University, Haiti

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