1The Caribbean region is intellectually exciting to study, as it is complex, heterogeneous, fragmented and enriched by the statuses, languages, ethnicities, identities and economies that exist side by side. Alongside the great American and European powers and the small independent States of the Caribbean, the non-independent territories have managed to carve out a serious international place for themselves, despite their small size. Several non-independent territories lead international activities of regional and global scope. They also engage in the same international activities as other sub-state entities: signature of international agreements, representations abroad, membership in regional/international organizations, trade and tourism promotion, participation in cooperation, etc. Yet, they have received little attention, few studies have been carried out on them; most of the literature on the international action of sub-state entities focuses on entities in Western countries and large emerging countries, neglecting entities in small countries and particularly small non-independent islands.
2In this regard, Godfrey Baldacchino (2010 :142) argues:
Subnational island jurisdictions are among the least recognized players in conventional international relations studies, and yet many of them are now keenly engaged in unexpected external relations, acquiring means to enhance their regional and even global presence – whether in sports, cultural exchange, trade agreements, tourism promotion, disaster preparedness, and representation (via full or associate membership) in regional and international organizations.
3It is therefore important to highlight the international action of these territories. This is why this study aims to uncover the international action of the small island of Aruba. In its approach, it will mainly take into consideration the link between Aruba and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The territory, which has its own local government and parliament, has been linked to the Kingdom of the Netherlands by the status of “autonomous country” since 1984, which gives it broad autonomy in the management of its internal affairs.
4The Kingdom of the Netherlands is made up of four autonomous countries: the Netherlands, Sint Maarten, Curaçao and Aruba. The government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is partly the same as that of the autonomous country of the Netherlands. It is in fact the government of the Netherlands, to which are added plenipotentiary ministers from the other autonomous countries, representing their territories in the state government. This original governance raises questions on many aspects (Corbin, 2002), but it is intended to be in line with the principles set out in the Charter of the Kingdom in 1954: autonomy, mutual consent, solidarity, partnership, equality. The Kingdom’s government thus manages the affairs entrusted to it by the Charter. Article 3 sets out those areas reserved to the Kingdom, including foreign relations. In the Charter, this responsibility is not delegated to any of the four countries, and remains in the portfolio of the Kingdom’s government. In areas not mentioned in the Kingdom’s portfolio, Aruba and the other autonomous countries have complete autonomy in the responsibility and management of their affairs, however with regards to international action, they are limited by the Kingdom’s responsibility. While the principles of the Kingdom of the Netherlands require the four autonomous countries to jointly assume responsibility for matters falling within the Kingdom’s remit (De Jong, 2005), how does this apply in the field of foreign affairs?
5Despite some common points between Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten, generalization won’t be made, as each has their own national and international trajectories, its own relationship with The Hague and its own political culture. Thus, this study focuses on the case of Aruba and aims to reveal the model of its international action vis-à-vis its home State, the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In order to determine this model, the analysis will draw on evidences gathered from documentary sources and semi-directive interviews with territorial and State actors. The model of Aruba’s international action will be observed in the light of several elements: the legal framework, the mechanisms established to manage the territory-State relationship, the positions of State and territorial actors, their attitudes and the involvement of the territory and its actors in the State’s foreign policy.
6Firstly, the study will establish the nature of the link between Aruba’s international action and the Kingdom of the Netherlands foreign policy; secondly, it will focus on Aruba’s contribution to the foreign policy of the Kingdom; and finally, on the logic of coordination between the territory’s international action and the Kingdom’s foreign policy.
7The international action of sub-state entities, while now widespread and widely accepted, continues to raise issues concerning State foreign policy. Ivo Duchacek argues that the forms, subjects and objectives of the international action of sub-state entities “arouse both interest and worry on the part of central authorities in charge of national foreign policy” (Duchacek, 1990 :27-28). Concern because such international action by sub-state entities could potentially threaten State sovereignty and hinder State foreign policy objectives (Wolff, 2007). And interest because State purposes can be achieved through the pursuit of local objectives (Quinqueton, 2007).
8States remain heedful to the international activities of their sub-national entities, regardless of the levels of autonomy granted. And beyond control, coordination or consultation, State and local authorities also determine the link that can be established between the guidelines of territories’ international action and those of the State’s foreign policy. From one territory to another, from one State to another, this link may vary, since it is established in a precise and delicate manner, according to the wishes and interests of the territory and the State (Quinqueton, 2007).
9Ivo Duchacek (1990 :29) outlines four possible configurations between a territory’s international orientations and its State’s foreign policy framework:
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Secessionist fragmentation of both policies and actors, in preparation for territorial secession.
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Tight centralization in foreign policy as a reaction to too many international actors.
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Combinative foreign policy, that is, a co-ordination of foreign policy in matters other than national security.
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Co-operative/competitive segmentation. By this is meant a mix between co-operation on the part of non-central governments in some issue-areas but duplication or competition in others.
10Alexander Kuznetsov (2015) also discusses four configurations:
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(Cooperation) assumes regional involvement in international relations under the formal or informal coordination of the federal government;
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the joint cooperative formula consists of the formal or informal inclusion of constituent diplomacy into national foreign policy;
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parallel harmony presumes that regional governments act independently in the international area, but at the same time, their actions are harmonized and do not contradict national foreign affairs;
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parallel disharmony is the case regional authorities’ external actions oppose national government policy.
11By using the configurations of these two authors, between strong centralization and disharmonious fragmentation, we detect three kinds of links that can exist between a territory’s international action and its State’s foreign policy. Firstly, a territory’s international action and its objectives can be included in the State’s foreign policy in a centralization logic, which can be more or less strong. Global foreign policy is then pursued by associating the territorial actors, considering their interests and contributions. Secondly, a territory’s international action may be exercised with a certain degree of autonomy, but remains in line with the center’s foreign policy interests, thanks to coordination and affirmation of unity. In this case, territory and State cooperate, but the State’s objectives prevail and cannot be contradicted. It is up to the territory to remain aligned with the State’s policy. Finally, the territory’s international action may be completely detached from the State’s foreign policy, with the two operating separately, in parallel. In such cases, if it has the legal and political means at its disposal, the State nevertheless ensures that the territory’s interests do not conflict with its own; if it does not have this means, then the territory is free to pursue interests that contradict those of the State.
12The international action of sub-state entities then takes place along with mechanisms and channels of coordination (Lecours, 2008). For the States and sub-national entities concerned, coordination of central and local international actions is now on the agenda. Panayotis Soldatos argues that coordination occurs “when the federal government joins force with the subnational unit, co-ordinates or monitors subnational international initiatives, and manages to harmonize the various trans-sovereign activities with its own policies” (Duchacek, 1990 :30). André Lecours draws a distinction between consultation and coordination. He argues that the difference lies in the depth of the mechanism. For him, consultation is limited to the exchange of information and documents and occasional dialogues on specific topics. Coordination, on the other hand, would be deeper and more regular (Lecours, 2008).
13A sub-state entity will be subject to consultation or coordination depending on the scope of its international action. If the entity only engages in cooperative actions, simple consultation is sufficient, however if the entity pursues international action on a global scale, covering numerous areas of competence, coordination is inevitable (Lecours, 2008).
14This coordination, motivated by the center’s desire to control, often takes the form of a political body set up specifically to enable State and sub-state governments to discuss on a regular basis, only about the harmonization of sub-state international action and State’s foreign policy. The existence of this type of political body means that the State officially recognizes its sub-state entities’ international activity, that it reiterates its predominance in this field, and that sub-state entities accept this prevalence (Lecours, 2008).
15Aruba exercises its international action through the international responsibility of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (2.1) and relies on the equality and the unity maintained between the constituent countries in the common construction of a foreign policy (2.2).
16Since the establishment of the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1954, the Kingdom and its constituent autonomous countries have been governed by the principles of unity, equality, solidarity and autonomy. Unity and autonomy, in particular, must coexist in order to maintain the Kingdom’s original balance. This balance must be preserved in all areas of public life, both domestically and internationally. In the document “One Kingdom – Four Countries”, which explains the framework for the Kingdom of the Netherlands’ practice of international action, the Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides guidance on how this balance is to be achieved in the field of international action:
There is one Minister of Foreign Affairs who has ultimate responsibility for the foreign relations of the Kingdom as a whole and for incorporating the interests of all four autonomous countries in the Kingdom’s foreign policy to the best extent possible. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies, consulates and missions abroad work for the Kingdom as a whole and all its constituent parts. Aruba, Curaçao and St Maarten maintain their own international contacts in the areas in which they have autonomous responsibilities. However, when pursuing these international contacts they must operate within the framework of the Kingdom’s foreign policy, since foreign affairs are a competence of the Kingdom (Government of the Netherlands, 2015).
17The explanation provided by the Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes how the Kingdom’s foreign policy operates. There are two aspects to this; which recognize the autonomy of the constituent countries, the equality between them and the unity that binds them together as a Kingdom. Firstly, responsibility for the Kingdom’s foreign policy lies with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs alone. But this responsibility is to feed the Kingdom’s foreign policy of each country’s interests and with the Kingdom’s interests as a whole. The principles of equality and unity are particularly significant in this respect. In the second aspect, it is the principle of autonomy that is satisfied, but to a limited extent. Indeed, the autonomous countries are able to export their internal autonomy on the international stage, by maintaining contacts with international partners. However, this autonomy is restricted when the autonomous countries wish to further develop their contacts by giving them concrete diplomatic and legal form. The principle of unity refers to the Kingdom’s international framework within which they must operate, using the Kingdom’s official channels.
18Peter Davidse, former Deputy Director of Aruba’s Department of Foreign Affairs, commenting on this aspect and describing the functioning of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Aruban government’s international action, maintains: “We can manage our own foreign affairs within the framework of the Kingdom’s foreign affairs […] And ultimately it’s the Minister of Foreign Affairs (of the Kingdom) who is responsible. There is the framework and within the framework we are autonomous […]” (Interview, 2019).
19Cherishing their autonomy, Aruba’s actors indicate that they are aware of their limits of freedom, but feel that they are primarily Aruban and Aruba’s representatives in the international arena.
20They also consider that, despite the need for central government intervention in their international action, they are well recognized by their partners as “Aruba”, and not mistaken for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
21Still supporting this conception of autonomy, Ghislaine Nicolaas, policy advisor at Aruba’s Department of Foreign Affairs, argues: “Aruba’s national policy (in the international field), is within the scope of the foreign policy of the Kingdom, and within that space we find the area for the national priorities that Aruba has set” (Interview with Ghislaine Nicolaas, 2019).
22Edwin Abath, Director of Aruba’s Department of Foreign Affairs, specifies (Interview, 2019):
We can always pursue our own interests. For instance, if we want to have a direct strategic relationship with a country, it is possible as long as we take into consideration the bigger framework and the boundaries in which the Kingdom functions. So I cannot go and do something that contradicts the principles of the foreign policy of the Kingdom. As Aruba, we see the Kingdom as a strategic partnership. Within that framework we try as much as possible to realize our own ambitions, with the help of all the different resources that are available. An example of these resources is the whole embassies network worldwide. Those are also our embassies.
[...]. It is a fact that we are part of the Kingdom, but in dealings, the Kingdom becomes a vehicle for us to address issues on a State to State level. Whenever we want to deal with a State or an autonomous country, it has to go through the Kingdom’s channel for us to establish the means of communication and to have trade going on.
23In this statement, Edwin Abath describes the Kingdom as a partner on the one hand, and as a vehicle on the other. The term “vehicle”, as used to designate the Kingdom in matters of international action, refers to the Kingdom’s legal framework and official channels through which Aruban actors must necessarily operate, but also to the country’s interests incorporated into the Kingdom’s foreign policy. And the term “partner” refers to the principles of equality and solidarity, which require that the tools of the Kingdom’s diplomacy are accessible to actors from Aruba and the other autonomous countries. For the Kingdom of the Netherlands and for Aruba, autonomy is not incompatible with unity and equality.
24Finally, it should be emphasized that the Kingdom’s framework referred to in State and local declarations is twofold. A legal framework, but also and above all, a political framework which is none other than the Kingdom’s overall foreign policy, to which Aruba’s objectives must also conform. Attention needs to be paid to the construction of this political framework, in which Aruba takes part.
25The Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the Kingdom’s foreign policy, and this responsibility translates into a leading role in the co-construction of the Kingdom’s foreign policy, in collaboration with the autonomous countries, while respecting the fundamental principles of unity and equality. Indeed, the Kingdom of the Netherlands’ foreign policy should not be seen as a policy imposed from above and imposing itself on the constituent parts, but as a policy made up of all the interests of the autonomous countries. Discussed, negotiated and then determined, those interests may concern one country, more than one, or the Kingdom as a whole.
26Nout van Woudenberg, political strategy advisor of the Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assigned to Aruba, explains further (Interview, 2019):
The policy of the Kingdom on foreign affairs is developed in cooperation with Aruba, Curacao, Sint Maarten and the Netherlands. […] And that’s also the reason why I am here in Aruba with my colleagues in the other countries, to communicate the specific priorities of Aruba in regards to foreign affairs, so that Aruba can recognize their priorities in the broader foreign policy.
27This foreign policy of the Kingdom, which aims to be global and co-constructed, is so designed that each country finds its place in it, pursues its objectives, but also so that it can be pursued and defended by the agents of the Kingdom, for all constituent parts. When autonomous countries develop their partnerships, they must comply with the Kingdom’s unified guidelines. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains that its agents in The Hague and its diplomatic missions throughout the world work for the Kingdom as a whole and for all its constituent parts. The vocation of Dutch embassies to serve all the Kingdom’s autonomous countries once again highlights the Kingdom’s principles of equality, unity and solidarity, which it strives to put into practice. Whether they are actors from the Kingdom, Aruba, Curaçao or Sint Maarten, they respect these principles and apply them on the international stage. Co-construction and unity also imply that any interest is an interest of the Kingdom and can be pursued by any agent of the Kingdom. Indeed, the Kingdom works for the benefit of all its constituent parts, and the constituent parts work for the Kingdom they form together. When Kingdom’s officials speak on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, they do so on behalf of all the constituent countries, and explicitly stipulates this. Likewise, actors of the autonomous countries have the opportunity to demonstrate this unity by occasionally representing the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the international stage, in organizations or on official visits.
28There have been several occasions when officials of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, whether ministers, Kings or ambassadors, have spoken at the UN on behalf of the Kingdom. In their speeches, they found a way to specify the names of the Kingdom’s constituent parts. In September 2015, while the Kingdom of the Netherlands was campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, King Willem-Alexander (Royal House of the Netherlands, 2015), addressing the General Assembly, declared:
It is a privilege to address this General Assembly on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. A Kingdom made up of four autonomous countries – the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten – and rooted in both Europe and the Caribbean. […]
29On the UN stage, Kingdom’s agents are often keen to present the composition of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Lise Gregoire-van Haaren, 2019; Karel J.G. van Oosterom, 2018), even in cases where the interests of the autonomous Caribbean countries do not appear to be directly affected. And when the issues discussed have a direct or indirect bearing on the autonomous countries of the Caribbean, the latter are always brought to the fore. The Kingdom’s unity is thus proudly displayed, particularly in the field of foreign policy.
30Not only do the Kingdom’s agents speak at the UN mentioning the autonomous Caribbean countries, but the Prime Ministers of these countries also have the opportunity to speak at the UN, not on their own behalf but on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Aruba’s actors act naturally this way, as they feel that they are united with the other parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and with the Kingdom itself.
31In July 2015, Mike Eman (Security council report, 2015), speaking at a UN Security Council debate on security and peace in small island states, said:
I have the honor to speak on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as Prime Minister of Aruba. We welcome the initiative by New Zealand to hold this meeting within the Security Council to address the peace and security challenges that SIDS are facing. It is a topic of particular interest to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, since three out of the four autonomous countries within the Kingdom – Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten are in fact SIDS.
32The 11th of March 2014, in an UN Commission on the Status of Women, Evelyn Wever-Croes (UN Journal, 2024), introduced her speech by these words:
As the Prime-Minister of Aruba, a small island in the Caribbean, I am honored to co-deliver the statement of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as it contains the commitments to gender equality of all four countries which comprise the Kingdom: Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and the Netherlands.
33The Prime Ministers of Aruba seize the opportunity to reflect the Kingdom’s unity by speaking on the international stage on behalf of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. They openly support campaigns and issues championed on the international stage by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, knowing that they are playing an active role in a unified foreign policy logic, co-constructed and pursued together. Even when Aruba’s interests do not seem to be directly concerned, Aruba can still get involved with the Kingdom.
34In this way, the autonomous countries and the Kingdom of the Netherlands demonstrate that the foreign policy is united. It respects the particularities of each country, as it encompasses their interests. Together, the Kingdom’s constituent parts pursue the foreign policy they have forged in a unified and egalitarian manner.
35In maintaining its link with the Kingdom of the Netherlands and in compliance with the principles of unity of the Charter, Aruba naturally contributes directly (3.1) and indirectly (3.2) to the Kingdom’s foreign policy.
36The international activities of Aruba and the other autonomous countries are closely linked to the foreign policy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The various objectives of the autonomous countries form, in a spirit of unity, the body of the Kingdom’s international priorities. So, once again, the structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands manages to bring together the principles of autonomy, unity, equality and solidarity, this time in the field of international action. While Aruba’s actors feel that they are first and foremost representatives of Aruba, they are also aware that they are ultimately agents of the Kingdom. Aruba’s international action contributes to the Kingdom’s foreign policy. Local elected representatives readily accept this reality, and are even proud of it. Thus, Aruba’s international action contributes to the foreign policy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in both direct and indirect ways.
37The following case study clearly shows how Aruba is directly involved in the Kingdom’s foreign policy. Between 2014 and 2016, the Kingdom of the Netherlands embarked on an election campaign for one of the five non-permanent membership seats that would be available in 2017-2018 on the UN Security Council. The Kingdom launched an intense global campaign against Italy and Sweden for the Western European seats. The Dutch campaign mobilized, on a full-time basis, almost fifteen agents from the Kingdom. Special envoys made official visits to many countries around the world. In total, the three-year campaign cost almost 4 million euros. The strategy also included an electoral program, whose theme was “Peace, justice and development”. While campaigning, Bert Koenders, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, said repeatedly (Diplomat magazine, 2016): “Since the new constitutional order of 10 October 2010, the Kingdom of the Netherlands consists of four autonomous countries: the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and St Maarten. Together, we are one UN Member State”.
38Bert Koenders did well to specify the composition of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and to mention that the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Saint Maarten stood together in this election. While Koenders was actively campaigning in Africa, where he had connections after working there for several years, including heading an UN mission in Mali, the Dutch Prime Minister, William Marlin, solemnly appealed to the Prime Ministers of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten to also campaign on their side (Saint-Martin News Network, 2016). The governments of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten and their foreign affairs departments were heavily involved in this campaign, targeting Caribbean and Latin American countries and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) with which they maintain relations and friendships.
39After the Kingdom of the Netherlands obtained the seat, Bert Koenders (Government of the Netherlands, 2016) did not forget the autonomous countries of the Caribbean in his closing speech to the UN General Assembly that day: “In closing, first of all, the Kingdom of the Netherlands – also my colleagues here, the prime ministers from Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten – is extremely grateful for the large support we have received during our campaign in our fight for peace, justice and development.”
40Beyond the mere naming, the Kingdom knows that this victory is also the victory of the autonomous countries of the Caribbean, as they have actively contributed to the campaign. On the Aruba side, it is also recognized that this victory is also an Aruba victory and the result of teamwork and unity.
41Nout van Woudenberg points out (Interview, 2019):
We really made it a Kingdom campaign, where there was a huge role for the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom. ’Kingdom of the Netherlands, four countries European and Caribbean, one Kingdom. In our campaign, we really emphasized that, and especially the Prime Ministers of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. We especially asked attention for the problems SIDS have, and for this side of the campaign it was very important that the Kingdom of the Netherland consists of Caribbean parts.
42Peter Davidse emphasizes (Interview, 2019):
Without our Prime Minister’s campaign, we would not have won the seat. It is thanks to our Prime Minister’s connections with other Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Caribbean islands.
43Finally, Edwin Abath adds (Interview, 2019):
The Kingdom saw us, and we (Aruba) made the case proactively for the Kingdom to require that seat, by running a campaign and accentuating those very important aspects that this seat has, liabilities but also opportunities worldwide. So we campaigned and we brought in votes from different countries.
44This case sheds light on how Aruba’s actors voluntarily and directly contribute to the Kingdom’s foreign policy. While having their own objectives, they sometimes become agents of the Kingdom in order to pursue common goals with other parts of the Kingdom, in accordance with the Charter’s principles of unity and solidarity. Internally and on the international stage, it is clear that Aruba and other parts of the Kingdom work together, openly and directly in the Kingdom’s interests.
45Aruba’s international activities also contribute indirectly to the Kingdom’s foreign policy. For the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Dutch territories in the Caribbean have gone from being a burden to an asset, thanks to their geographical, identity and cultural proximity to the Caribbean and Latin America.
46The Kingdom of the Netherlands has very specific objectives in the Caribbean and Latin America. Within South America, its preferred partners are Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia. In the Caribbean, Cuba and regional organizations are the most frequent partners.
47The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands considers the region to be of strategic importance and wishes to be active there in several ways and for several reasons. These include bilateral political cooperation with partner States and participation in multilateral forums. Secondly, the objectives pursued focus on economic and trade opportunities (import/export, investment), opportunities in sustainable development, energy, climate change and resource management, agricultural and water issues, issues related to international justice and human rights, as well as peace, stability and security.
48Of all these interests, trade, justice and security are the most widely pursued. In collaboration with the United States, France, Great Britain and sometimes Venezuela, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, through its Coast Guard, is waging war against international trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings. As the majority of drugs circulating in Europe originates in South America and transits through the Caribbean, it is more effective to conduct the fight directly in the Caribbean. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is also involved in security, rescue and assistance missions following natural events caused by climate change, to which small territories and States of the Caribbean are particularly vulnerable.
49Then, on the economic and commercial front, it is important for the Kingdom of the Netherlands to support the private sector, that is to say to provide a favorable political and legal framework and security to Dutch and European entrepreneurs and companies wishing to establish themselves and prosper in Latin America and the Caribbean. Dutch companies investments in South America and the Caribbean are therefore facilitated by the presence of the Kingdom’s autonomous countries in the area, and by the links they maintain with the neighboring States. Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten are, in a way, Dutch “hubs” in the Caribbean (De Jong, Van Der Veer, 2012 :77).
50The Kingdom of the Netherlands’ presence in the region is therefore more practical than ideological.
51In June 2013, Mike Eman, then Prime Minister of Aruba, and Hans Timmermans, Kingdom’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, agreed that “the Kingdom’s Caribbean countries are a springboard to Latin America, thanks to their geographical location, language skills and commercial and personal ties”. Timmermans pointed out (Government of the Netherlands, 2013): “We need to reduce the distance between Europe and Latin America, Aruba can help us do that. With the Caribbean countries, the Kingdom already has one foot in Latin America.”
52For his part, Edwin Abath argues (Interview, 2019):
We are strategically located as a gate for Holland to Latin and Central America. So if a large holland multinational wants to do business in Latin America they can establish their office here, people speak the language, they know the reality of the region, they know the culture, they can be great assets to help Holland do business. We are very well connected with the whole region, so these are all positive points to consider if a Holland multinational company wants to do business in Latin America. We position ourselves as a hub to Latin America and the Caribbean.
53The mere presence of Aruba and other Dutch territories in the Caribbean contributes to the Kingdom’s foreign policy, for logistical, military, politico-diplomatic and security purposes. Dutch territories in this region represent privileged bases for the Kingdom’s commercial and military activities and those of its citizens. Aruba and the other Dutch territories in the Caribbean also have the advantage of being culturally close to some Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as to the Netherlands. This dual affiliation enables them to act as intermediaries for Dutch activities.
54The Kingdom’s foreign policy relies not only on the geographical presence of the autonomous countries, but also on the political and diplomatic ties established by Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten with the governments of the surrounding States and territories, thanks to their identity and cultural proximity. The Kingdom’s government’s call to the Dutch Caribbean countries to use these friendships to support the international campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council is a clear demonstration of the quality of the international action maintained by the Caribbean countries; a quality on which the Kingdom relies. In Washington too, where Aruba has a representative office, Aruba’s reputation among some partners builds bridges with embassy officials.
55As explained above, the Kingdom’s interests also include those of the various autonomous countries. Thus, the Kingdom works in Latin America and the Caribbean to satisfy the European side and the Caribbean countries. Likewise, Aruba’s objectives and actors also work indirectly to satisfy the Kingdom and its other constituent parts. Thus, given that Aruba’s international action is carried out within the broader framework of the Kingdom’s foreign policy, the many contacts established and actions carried out by the territory with foreign partners are also marked by the Kingdom’s imprint. In the Caribbean and Latin America, this logic benefits the Kingdom, which, thanks to the friendships of the autonomous Caribbean countries, spreads its reputation and diplomacy.
56Furthermore, all the interests pursued are interlinked, in order to ensure that the Kingdom and its constituent countries enjoy a good sustainable economic development. The Kingdom of the Netherlands’ principles of unity and solidarity lead State and local actors to agree that the autonomous Caribbean countries and their international actions are an advantage for the achievement of the Kingdom’s objectives. Aruba’s own objectives, considered in the Kingdom’s overall policy, create contacts, connections and opportunities with international partners on behalf of the Kingdom and all its constituent parts. Indirectly too, Aruba’s international action thus serves the Kingdom’s foreign policy.
57Therefore, Aruba’s actors and international action indeed contribute to the pursuit of the Kingdom of the Netherlands’s foreign policy interests, both directly and indirectly.
58In order to ensure the cohesion of Aruba’s international action with the foreign policy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, several means of coordination are put in place, such as The Kingdom Conference on Foreign Relations (4.1), the international policy strategy advisor of the Kingdom (4.2) and the common front within international organizations (4.3).
59Between Aruba and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, there is a form of coordination with regard to the territory’s international action and the State’s foreign policy as a whole. This form of coordination is based on a political will shared by the parties, but is not enshrined in law. This coordination takes place through a special meeting held annually between the Kingdom’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Ministers of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. This meeting is known as the “Kingdom Conference on Foreign Relations”. Every year, the Kingdom’s Minister of Foreign Affairs tours the Caribbean territories, as well as the region, to maintain dialogue with international partners, mainly Latin American countries.
60During this tour, after meeting individually with each of the three Prime ministers of the autonomous countries, and with other ministers when necessary, he sets and chairs the Conference in one of the three territories. At this meeting, only international issues are discussed. Given the Kingdom’s predominance in this area, ‘the Minister of Foreign affairs works closely with the three autonomous Caribbean countries […] Working visits like this one are a chance to strengthen political relations and decide on joint initiatives and opportunities.’ (Government of the Netherlands, 2015). After each Conference, the Government of the Kingdom summarizes the topics discussed, the decisions made and the actions taken.
61These topics concern firstly the international interests of the autonomous countries in the region and the world, and secondly the Kingdom’s interests in Latin America and the Caribbean. The whole purpose of these conferences is to determine how the Kingdom and the autonomous countries can work together to serve the interests of all (Government of the Netherlands, 2013). The Minister’s visits and the Kingdom Conference on Foreign Relations, aim to discuss the international objectives of the autonomous countries and the Kingdom’s foreign policy in the region and beyond (Government of Aruba, 2018). Bert Koenders, Kingdom’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2017, stating that he was constantly informed about the interests of the autonomous countries, said (Government of the Netherlands, 2017): “This lets us accommodate them within the Kingdom’s foreign policy as much as possible. Many of our interests are shared interests”.
62Coordination of international action between the governments of the autonomous countries and that of the Kingdom therefore takes the form of an annual meeting, the “Kingdom Conference on Foreign Relations”. It is a strategic tool that enables the Kingdom’s foreign policy to be shaped collectively, in a spirit of unity. All autonomous countries must find satisfaction in the guidelines of this foreign policy. Edwin Abath explains (Interview, 2019):
This meeting is indeed a mechanism to make sure that the foreign policy is maintained in the framework, and to make sure that we have one coherent policy. It is necessary for the departments to come together, Aruba, Sint Maarten, Curaçao, and the department of western hemisphere (within the Ministry there are different departments and Aruba falls under this one).
63This coordination certainly contributes to limiting Aruba’s autonomy in Aruba’s international action, but this limitation is accepted by local actors who respect the framework and benefit from it. Indeed, the construction of the Kingdom on a basis of equality, unity and solidarity implies that the international interests of all countries must be pursued by the Kingdom.
64Between Aruba and the Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is another coordination tool. This is a special envoy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who acts as a political strategy advisor to Aruba. Curaçao and Sint Maarten also each have their own advisor. This advisor is responsible for coordinating Aruba’s interests with those of the Kingdom. His first task is to advise Aruba on foreign affairs. Secondly, he keeps the Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed of Aruba’s specific foreign relations objectives and priorities, so that these can be integrated into the broader foreign policy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Finally, he ensures that Aruba’s international orientation and public discourse are aligned with the Kingdom’s foreign policy framework (Interview with Nout van Woudenberg, 2019).
65The political strategy advisor sent to Aruba is therefore an agent who aims to be a facilitator between foreign affairs in The Hague and foreign affairs in Aruba. But although he is very active in serving Aruba’s interests and bringing them into line with those of the Kingdom, the Aruban government and foreign affairs department are under no obligation to work with him. Yet, his mission is no less significant and important, especially for the Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as it allows the Ministry to be more aware of Aruba’s actions and positions, and to monitor, supervise and coordinate them with its foreign policy. Overall, the coordination of international action, obviously essential from the Kingdom’s point of view, is well accepted in Aruba. The territory’s actors believe that these coordination mechanisms are legitimate and that they intervene to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Charter and the Kingdom’s stability. Edwin Abath maintains (Interview, 2019): “These are mechanisms that control, check balances within the countries. Whenever something goes wrong, the council of ministers has the ability and the tools to step in, control and take measures.”
66For Aruba, these control and coordination measures in no way prevent its international activities from flourishing. The Kingdom’s cooperative attitude and culture of consensus help in this regard. Nicole Ghislaine explains (Interview, 2019): “The coordination is a very open structure. So for Aruba, it’s about finding its place in this wide scope to work on our national priority, using instruments and platforms that are available.”
67This coordination between The Hague and Oranjestad also applies to regional/international organizations. It goes without saying that the Aruban authorities must also coordinate with the Kingdom within organizations to which both parties belong. Coordination takes place ahead of meetings on certain topics, while other topics are not subject to coordination and can be addressed freely by Aruba (Interview with Peter Davidse, 2019). The subjects on which Aruba is free to express itself within regional and international organizations are those that fall within its areas of competence (Interview with Nout van Woudenberg, 2019). Beyond these limits, Aruban authorities must coordinate with those of the Kingdom and follow the instructions of the Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the autonomous countries have a large degree of internal autonomy, and these internal competencies can be exported internationally, the Kingdom is keen to maintain overall coherence and unity on the international stage.
68This culture of unity has been part of the Kingdom’s DNA since the Charter was established in 1954. This unity implies less autonomy, which Aruba and the other autonomous countries accept, despite a strong spirit of autonomy; to the point where, even when they have the opportunity to go against the Kingdom’s positions, they prefer to give up this autonomy (Interview with Peter Davidse, 2019).
69For the Kingdom, coordination within regional and international organizations is obvious, logical and efficient. Within the ACS, for example, the Kingdom always tries to use its four representations for strategic purposes (Interview with Ghislaine Nicolaas, 2019). But the obvious unity for the Kingdom is sometimes counterbalanced by the autonomist cultures of the Caribbean countries, which engage in rivalries among themselves; very often in the tourism, transport and financial sectors (Interview with Edwin Abath, 2019).
70In the Dutch system, the Kingdom’s international competence refers to its role in defining the Kingdom’s foreign policy objectives as a whole. In this approach, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes account of the interests of the autonomous countries, which it uses to shape the Kingdom’s foreign policy. The Kingdom’s foreign policy then brings together the objectives of all the autonomous countries, and is pursued in a unified manner. The Kingdom’s actors and those of the autonomous countries thus work together to achieve the objectives set together.
71In Aruba, the principles of unity, equality and solidarity of the Kingdom of the Netherlands lead actors to participate fully and voluntarily in this configuration of the Kingdom’s foreign policy. Moreover, they often and naturally become agents of the Kingdom, as they feel involved in all the Kingdom’s objectives.
72Aruba’s international action is immediately integrated into the Kingdom’s foreign policy, which is also built considering the international orientations of the other autonomous countries. Aruban actors, acting in their country’s interests, are both agents of Aruba and agents of the Kingdom; the Kingdom’s foreign policy being pursued in a unified manner by all autonomous countries. Thus, Aruba’s international action contributes openly, directly and indirectly to the foreign policy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Aruban actors consider this to be a normal and logical reality, in line with the principles of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
73Observing the link between the territory’s international action and the State’s foreign policy reveals that Aruba’s international interests are integrated into the foreign policy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This excludes the pattern of separation/scission from the State’s foreign policy and parallel international exercise, as can be observed in the case of Quebec or the British Virgin Islands. However, it is not possible to distinguish between centralization and relative autonomy, since the characteristics of Aruba’s international action vis-à-vis the State’s foreign policy borrow from both configurations. We observe a central strategic role for the State, the participation of local actors in the State’s international objectives, but also a certain autonomy granted to territorial authorities and coordination mechanisms in order to achieve unity. The link between Aruba’s international action and the Kingdom’s foreign policy therefore lies between centralization and relative autonomy.
74Aruba’s international action is closely coordinated with the Kingdom of the Netherlands’ foreign policy, which aims to be united. Coherence on the international stage is a shared challenge for the territory and the central government. This coordination takes place, among other things, through an annual meeting exclusively intended for this purpose, the “Kingdom Conference on Foreign Relations”. Outside this meeting, at the level of regional/international organizations and diplomatic posts, the relationship between local and State actors confirms that sustained coordination exists between Aruba and the Kingdom. This coordination is accepted and even deemed necessary by local actors, who consider it to be essential to the achievement of their international objectives.
75For Aruban actors, it’s important to maintain an efficient cohabitation with State officials; this ensures the success of their affairs. For Aruba, consensus is more useful in achieving its international objectives than freedom-seeking. Indeed, the parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Kingdom itself are committed to their principles of unity, equality, mutual consent and solidarity, which always lead to consensus-building in international action as in other fields.
76Thus, Aruba’s international action operates in a spirit of cooperation with the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The territory does not consider the Kingdom’s framework to be a constraint; on the contrary, it believes that it is useful in the pursuit of its international objectives. Similarly, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, by incorporating Aruba’s objectives into its foreign policy, ensures the balance between the territory’s autonomy and the unity of the Kingdom. Thus, the Kingdom’s framework is a resource for Aruba’s international action, a model well summed up in this Edwin Abath’s phrase: “The Kingdom (as) a vehicle”.