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Notes
Decleva Caizzi 1966 t. 51 = Prince 2015, t. 187.
For the historical and conceptual background of the analogy between φάρμακον and λόγος, see M. Serra, « Alle origini di un’analogia: la parola come pharmakon », Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, vol. 15, n° 1, 2021, p. 4‑17.
See L. Ayache, « L’arme du crime : la référence médicale chez Platon », Noesis, n° 2, 1998, p. 89‑102; S. B. Levin, Plato’s Rivalry with Medicine: A Struggle and Its Dissolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.
See L. Edelstein, « The Rôle of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium », Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, vol. 76, 1945, p. 85‑103 ; C.T. Mársico, « Modelos de medicina en el Banquete y la República de Platón », Revista Hypnos, n° 4, 1998, p. 168‑180 ; F. Sheffield, « The Role of the Earlier Speeches in the “Symposium”: Plato’s Endoxic Method? », in J.H. Lesher, D. Nails, and F. Sheffield (eds.), Plato’s Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2006, p. 23‑46, esp. 37-8 ; F. Trivigno, « A Doctor’s Folly: Diagnosing the Speech of Eryximachus », in P. Destrée and Z. Giannopoulou (eds.), Plato’s Symposium: a critical guide, Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 48‑69.
See W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture: Volume III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato, Oxford [England] ; New York, Oxford University Press, 1971, trad. G. Highet, p. 3 ; J.W. Lidz, « Medicine as Metaphor in Plato », Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 20, n° 5 (1), 1995, p. 527‑541, esp. p. 534 ; G.E.R. Lloyd, In the Grip of Disease: Studies in the Greek Imagination, Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.142–175; S. Marino, « Medicina », in G. Cornelli and R. Lopes (eds.), Platão, Coimbra companions, Coimbra, Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra = Coimbra University Press, 2018, p. 349‑360 ; M. Vegetti, « La Medicina in Platone », Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia, vol. 21, n° 1, 1966, p. 3‑39.
See Á.V. Campos, « Socrates as a physician of the soul », in G. Cornelli (ed.), Plato’s Styles and Characters, De Gruyter, 2015, p. 227‑240 ; S. Marino, « Socrates Medicus: Una Rappresentazione Platonica », in C. Marsico (ed.), Socrates and the Socratic Philosophies: Selected Papers from Socratica IV, International Socrates studies volume 2, Baden-Baden, Academia, 2022 ; J. Moss, « The Doctor and the Pastry Chef: Pleasure and Persuasion in Plato’s Gorgias », Ancient Philosophy, vol. 27, n° 2, 2007, p. 229‑249.
Throughout this paper, I translate τέχνη primarily as “art” and occasionally as “technique” to capture the semantic range of the Greek term. “Art” better preserves the notion of systematic knowledge and skilled practice that characterizes τέχνη in Plato’s dialogues, encompassing both theoretical understanding and practical application. While “technique” may sometimes be employed to emphasize the methodological or procedural aspects of certain arts, “art” remains the preferred translation as it avoids the merely mechanical connotations of modern “technique” and maintains the connection between knowledge, skill, and purposeful activity central to the Platonic conception. This translation choice allows the term to accommodate the full range of systematic, rule-governed practices that τέχνη denotes in Plato’s dialogues, from medicine and navigation to rhetoric and dialectic. For the etymology of the term, see P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: histoire des mots, Paris, Klincksieck, 1999, p. 1112. For its meaning from Homer up to Plato, see D. Roochnik, Of Art and Wisdom: Plato’s Understanding of Techne, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996, p. 17‑88. For a comprehensive study of τέχνη in Plato, see G. Cambiano, Platone e le tecniche, Torino, Einaudi, 1971.
On the medicine-rhetoric analogy in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus see, for instance, T. Irani, Plato on the Value of Philosophy: The Art of Argument in the Gorgias and Phaedrus, Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 170‑171 ; W. Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture: Volume III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato, op. cit., p. 192‑193 ; T. Lier, Reason, Rhetoric, and the Philosophical Life in Plato’s Phaedrus, Lanham, Lexington Books, 2019, p. 130 ; H.F. North, «Swimming Upside Down in the Wrong Direction’ Plato’s Criticism of Sophistic Rhetoric on Technical and Stylistic Grounds », Traditio, vol. 32, n° S1, 1976, p. 11‑29, p. 25. On the paradigm of medicine as foundational for the Platonic διαλέγεσθαι through a close study of the Protagoras, see S. Marino, Il corpo del dialogo: una teoria della comunicazione a partire dal Protagora di Platone e dal Corpus Hippocraticum, Napoli, Paolo Loffredo, 2019.
On the importance of analogical thinking in Plato’s dialogues, accounting for its different usages and shortcomings, see G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two types of argumentation in early Greek thought, Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. 389‑403 ; R. Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, Ithaca, N.Y, Cornell University Press, 1941, p. 214‑234.
In the terminology of Renato Matoso, I undertake in this paper a “diachronic analysis” that seeks to detect the “underlying unity” or “deep philosophical structure” of the medicine-rhetoric analogy. While the “diachronic analysis” puts in comparison and shows the connections between different dialogues, a “synchronic analysis” deals with a single dialogue and tackles an argument, theory, or doctrine in isolation from other dialogues. See R. Matoso, « Perspectivism and Conciliation in the Reading of Plato’s Dialogues », O que nos faz pensar, vol. 27, n.° 43, 2018, p. 287-301.
E.g., R. Burger, Plato’s Phaedrus: a Defense of a Philosophic Art of Writing, University, University of Alabama Press, 1980, p. 6 ; E.L. Hunt, « Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians », in A.M. Drummond (ed.), Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking: In Honor of James Albert Winans, Whitefish, Montana, Literary Licensing, 2013, p. 42 ; J. Koritansky, « Socratic Rhetoric and Socratic Wisdom in Plato’s Phaedrus », Interpretation, vol. 15, n° 1, 1987, p. 29‑53, p. 46‑47 ; R. Reames, « The Μῦθος of Pernicious Rhetoric: The Platonic Possibilities of Λογός in Aristotle’s Rhetoric », Rhetorica, vol. 30, n° 2, 2012, p. 134‑152, p. 138 ; Seeming and Being in Plato’s Rhetorical Theory, Chicago ; London, The University of Chicago Press, 2018, p. 51 ; R. Waterfield, Plato: Phaedrus, Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. xxxv. I shall return to this discussion in the following sections of this paper.
In a well-argued piece on the theoretical foundations of rhetoric in the Phaedrus, in contradistinction to both Isocrates and Cicero, John Cooper fails to notice the importance of medicine for raising rhetoric to the status of a true τέχνη in Plato. See J.M. Cooper, «Plato, Isocrates and Cicero on the Independence of Oratory from Philosophy », in Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 65‑80.
For an argument that a τέχνη, qua τέχνη, is value-neutral and, as such, need not be good-directed or is good-directed only in the weaker sense of being goal-directed, see E. Hulme Kozey, « The Good-Directedness of Τέχνη and the Status of Rhetoric in the Platonic Dialogues », Apeiron, vol. 52, n° 3, 2019, p. 223‑244. I address this reading in my second section, specifically in footnote 51.
On the concepts of φύσις and δύναμις in the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine in relation to Platonic philosophy, see S. Marino, Il corpo del dialogo, op. cit., p. 68‑83 ; M.J. Schiefsky, Hippocrates: On Ancient Medicine, Leiden ; Boston, Brill, 2005, p. 68‑71.
For Plato’s indebtedness to the Hippocratic method of dividing natures according to powers, see A. Macé, « Plato and ‘Hippocrates’ on Nature and Power: Reading Phaedrus 269d–272b in the Light of the Hippocratic Treatise On Ancient Medicine », in C. Araújo (ed.) Plato’s Power, Leiden, Brill, 2025, p. 1-41.
See G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two types of argumentation in early Greek thought, op. cit., p. 172‑176.
See S. Marino, Il corpo del dialogo, op. cit., p. 239‑242 ; C. Perelman, « Analogy and Metaphor in Science, Poetry and Philosophy », in C. Perelman, The New Rhetoric and the Humanities, Dordrecht, Springer Netherlands, 1979, p. 91‑100 ; D.B. Robinson, « Review of Polarity and Analogy, Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought, by G. E. R. Lloyd », Philosophy, vol. 43, n° 165, 1968, p. 289.
Alternatively, I could have cited the ἀναλογία between the sun and the Form of the Good in Rep. VI 506d6-511e5. For a careful exposition of the analogical relations between the sun and the Form of the Good, see A. S. Ferguson, « Plato’s Simile of Light Again », The Classical Quarterly, vol. 28, n° 3-4, 1934, p. 190-210. At Rep. VI 508b13, the term “ἀνάλογος” is explicitly used to refer to the sun as the offspring of the good (τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον), which the good engendered as its analogue (ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ).
These passages are also cited and investigated in G.E.R. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy: Two types of argumentation in early Greek thought, op. cit., p. 396‑403.
This is what S.B. Levin terms “the subject-matter requirement.” To specify what constitutes a proper τέχνη, Levin argues that three conditions must be satisfied: (i) the practice must possess a determinate subject matter (the subject-matter requirement); (ii) it must provide a rational account of the relevant causal principles governing that subject matter (the knowledge or understanding requirement); and (iii) it must pursue what is objectively beneficial for its recipient (the goodness requirement). According to Levin, a practice qualifies as a genuine τέχνη only when it fulfills all three requirements. See S. B. Levin, Plato’s Rivalry with Medicine, op. cit., chapt. I.2. This understanding of a τέχνη qua τέχνη, particularly requirement (iii), diverges from the view broached in footnote 13. My own position attempts to work out a middle ground. While I agree with E. Hulme Kozey that good-directedness is subordinate to goal-directedness in the definition of a τέχνη qua τέχνη, for otherwise one could not account for the various instances of τέχναι recorded by Plato in the dialogues, I dispute the claim that rhetoric is a value-neutral art. Just as medicine, as a form of θεραπεία, is a τέχνη that cares for the body, rhetoric is a τέχνη that cares for the soul. See also footnote 51.
“Craft” terminology suggests productive knowledge (e.g., shoemaking, woodworking, weaving). However, as David Roochnik has demonstrated, Plato’s concept of τέχνη is much broader, encompassing purely theoretical forms of knowledge like mathematics. See D. Roochnik, « Socrates’s Use of the Techne-Analogy », Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 24, n° 3, 1986, p. 295‑310 ; Of art and wisdom, op. cit.
G. Cambiano, « Platon et les rapports entre théorie et praxis dans la médecine hippocratique », Études platoniciennes, n° 10, 2013 ; L. Dean-Jones, « Literacy and the Charlatan in Ancient Greek Medicine », in H. Yunis (ed.), Written texts and the rise of literate culture in ancient Greece, Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 97‑121, p. 104 ; D.R.N. Lopes, « Retórica », op. cit., p. 351‑353 ; M. Vegetti, « La Medicina in Platone », op. cit., p. 11ff.
Cf., Gorg. 452e4-5: καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἕξεις τὸν ἰατρόν. See also Phil. 58a7-58c6.
Plato also cites a book containing the eulogy of salt (Symp. 177b4-c1).
Jessica Moss « The Doctor and the Pastry Chef », op. cit., offers a superb reading of this contrast between the doctor and the cook in the dialogue, hinting at the apologetic tone behind it, with Socrates assuming the position of a doctor who is beneficial to the city, but incapable of persuading the citizens because of their appetitive attachment to bodily pleasure.
J. K. Larsen, « Defining Rhetoric Dialectically: Confronting Philosophy with Rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias », Ancient Philosophy, vol. 45, n. 1, 2025, p. 53-81, argues that the procedures of collection and division are central to the Socratic task of defining rhetoric in the Gorgias, as they reveal the proportions or analogies between forms of genuine caretaking and their corresponding forms of flattery. These methodological procedures at issue in the Gorgias, according to the author, bear significant resemblance to passages in the Sophist and Statesman (Soph. 226b1-230d4; Pol. 279a7-283a9), where Plato similarly employs proportions among various types of expertise to illuminate the nature of specific kinds of expertise.
While the standard view (as presented, e.g., in E. R. Dodds (ed.), Gorgias: A Revised Text, with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959, p. 228; H. Yunis, Taming Democracy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 125) holds that rhetoric is condemned for aiming at pleasure, J. K. Larsen, «Defining Rhetoric Dialectically: Confronting Philosophy with Rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias», op. cit., with which I am in agreement, argues that the real issue is rhetoric’s pretense to be a genuine art of soul-care despite lacking true expertise. On his reading, pleasure functions not as rhetoric’s end but as its means of deception.
For the centrality of the concept of health in Plato’s thinking, see J. Moravcsik, « Ancient and Modern Conceptions of Health and Medicine », Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 1, n° 4, 1976, p. 337‑348.
Against the rhetoric vilified in the Gorgias, the Phaedrus works with a value-laden, normative conception of rhetoric, which has the ethical goal of gratifying gods instead of human beings (273e5-8-274a2). More on this issue in the next two sections.
See J. Beversluis, Cross-examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s Early Dialogues, Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 324‑325.
The next two sections of this analysis examine how the Phaedrus advances beyond the Gorgias to provide a constructive account of philosophical rhetoric as a legitimate τέχνη, developing a comprehensive analogy between medicine and rhetoric that specifies the knowledge required and the methods necessary for rhetoric to achieve genuine technical status. As the Phaedrus makes manifest, rhetoric’s proper object is the soul, and it must meet certain epistemic requirements to count as a τέχνη, such as possessing a rational account (λόγος) of its object, understanding the causal mechanisms involved in its operations, and producing beneficial outcomes to its recipient.
See D. Roochnik, « Socrates’ Rhetorical Attack on Rhetoric », in F.J. Gonzalez (ed.), The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies, Lanham, Md, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995, p. 81‑94, who argues that Socrates employs the techne-analogy, with medicine at the forefront, as a “rhetorical device.” In my view, the medicine-rhetoric analogy is not simply a “rhetorical device,” for there is a more substantial and methodological reason for Plato to develop the analogy between medicine and rhetoric. See, in this respect, G. Cambiano, « Dialettica, medicina, retorica nel Fedro platónico », Rivista di Filosofia, vol. 57, n° 3, 1966, p. 284‑305 ; « Platon et les rapports entre théorie et praxis dans la médecine hippocratique », op. cit.. I develop this thought in the next couple of sections.
Among scholars who maintain that Plato’s treatment of rhetoric differs significantly between the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, see J. Koritansky, « Socratic Rhetoric and Socratic Wisdom in Plato’s Phaedrus », Interpretation, op. cit., p. 30-31; C. J. Rowe, « The Unity of Plato’s Phaedrus: A Reply to Heath », Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 7, 1989, p. 180-181; C. J. Rowe, « Public and Private Speaking in Plato’s Later Dialogues », in C. Eggers (ed.), Platón: los diálogos tardíos (Actas del Symposium Platonicum 1986), Sankt Augustin, Academia-Verlag, 1994, p. 127-129; G. Nicholson, Plato’s Phaedrus: The Philosophy of Love, West Lafayette, Purdue University Press, 1999, p. 45-53; M. C. Nussbaum, « ‘This Story Isn’t True’: Madness, Reason, and Recantation in the Phaedrus », in The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 227. Conversely, scholars who defend the continuity of Plato’s treatment of rhetoric across both dialogues include R. W. Quimby, « The Growth of Plato’s Perception of Rhetoric », Philosophy & Rhetoric, vol. 7, n° 2, 1974, p. 71-79; M. Heath, « The Unity of Plato’s Phaedrus », Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 7, 1989, p. 156, 169-170; D. S. Werner, « Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus », Greece and Rome, vol. 57, n° 1, 2010, p. 46, n. 55; H. Yunis, « Eros in Plato’s Phaedrus and the Shape of Greek Rhetoric », Arion, vol. 13, n° 1, 2005, p. 102-103; T. Irani, Plato on the Value of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 107.
Although I find D. Roochnik, « Socrates’ Rhetorical Attack on Rhetoric », op. cit., incomplete for it does not address the techne-analogy in the debate with Callicles, D. Roochnik, Of art and wisdom, op. cit., devotes a whole section to the Socrates vs. Callicles debate on the question of techne.
See, inter alia, T. Irani, Plato on the value of philosophy, op. cit., p. 62‑66 ; J. Moss, « The Doctor and the Pastry Chef », op. cit. ; D.S. Werner, « Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus », op. cit., p. 46, n. 55 ; H. Yunis, « Plato’s Rhetoric », in I. Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric, Oxford, UK, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007, p. 75‑89, p. 78‑79. for the recognition that a good and genuine rhetoric is already found latent in the Gorgias.
It is strange that Socrates permits the uninhibited satisfaction of appetite by a healthy person, allowing them to eat and drink as much as they wish (ὅσον βούλεται, 505a7). I think the underlying assumption is that this healthy body is combined with a temperate soul, which would imply that the individual only wishes for (βούλεται) a moderate amount of food and drink to satisfy their appetite.
This same expression (ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος) is used in Phdr. 270b3-7 to develop the analogy between medicine and rhetoric, as I shall point out in the following section.
On Callicles’ strong version of hedonism at this point of the dialogue, see E. R. Dodds (ed.), Gorgias: A Revised Text, with Introduction and Commentary, op. cit., p. 304-305. By Gorg. 500a6, Callicles espouses a milder version of the hedonist position. See E. R. Dodds (ed.), Gorgias: A Revised Text, with Introduction and Commentary, op. cit., p. 316.
In an argumentative pattern that was competently examined by D. Roochnik, Of art and wisdom, op. cit., p. 192‑193. See also D.W. Graham, « Socrates, the Craft Analogy, and Science », Apeiron, vol. 24, n° 1, 1991, p. 14.
G. Cambiano « Dialettica, medicina, retorica nel ‘Fedro’ platónico », op. cit., p. 296‑297, contrasts Gorgias, for whom rhetoric is the foundation of medicine and every other art, with Plato, for whom, based on his reading of the Phaedrus, dialectics is the foundation of medicine, rhetoric, and every other art.
Against Polus, Socrates argues that rhetoricians, as well as tyrants, have the least amount of power (σμικρότατον) in the cities. He supports this claim based on a distinction between doing what one wishes (ποιεῖν ὧν βούλοντα) and doing what would seem to be best (ποιεῖν… ὅτι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι, 466d5ff.). See J. Beversluis, Cross-examining Socrates, op. cit., p. 321‑338 ; T. Irwin, Plato: Gorgias, Oxford : New York, Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 139ff. for a reconstruction of this argument.
On the consistency of Plato’s approach to rhetoric across the dialogues, see P.M.G. Dotto, « The Consistency of Plato’s Treatment of Rhetoric », DoisPontos, vol. 21, n° 2, 2024. Further, on the continuity between the Gorgias and Phaedrus regarding Plato’s treatment of rhetoric, see the authors cited in n. 30.
Cf. Symp. 176d; 223b; and Prot. 315c for Phaedrus’ reliance on the authority of medicine.
A non-exhaustive list would include: τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην (260d4); πείθειν τέχνῃ (260d9) αὐτῇ λόγοι...τέχνῃ (260e3-4) οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη ἀλλ’ ἄτεχνος τριβή (260e4); τοῦ δὲ λέγειν...ἔτυμος τέχνη (260e5); ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων (261a7-8); Λόγων... τέχνην (262c1); τέχνης τινὸς τοῦ λέγειν (262d5); τέχνην ῥητορικὴν (263b6); ἡ λόγων τέχνη (266c3); ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις (266d6); λόγων τέχνην (267b4); λόγων τέχνης πέρι (267d8); τὴν τῆς τέχνης δύναμιν (268a2); ῥητορικὴν τέχνην (269b3); τὸ τῆς τέχνης ἣν... ὡς ῥητορικὴν (269c7); τὴν τοῦ τῷ ὄντι ῥητορικοῦ τε καὶ πιθανοῦ τέχνην (269c7); τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην (270a7); ἄν τῴ τις τέχνῃ λόγους διδῷ (270e1); τέχνην ῥητορικὴν (271a5); τέχνας λόγων (271c3); λόγων τέχνης (272b4); τὰ τέχνῃ λεγόμενα (273c5); περὶ τέχνης λόγων (273d7); τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι (274b3).
D. Roochnik, « Socrates’s Use of the Techne-Analogy », op. cit., p. 309.
See note 14.
On the relationship between rhetoric and dialectics, which I cannot thoroughly address in this paper, see O.L. Brownstein, « Plato’s Phaedrus: Dialectic as the Genuine Art of Speaking », Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 51, n° 4, 1965, p. 392‑398 ; A. Hayase, « Dialectic in the Phaedrus », Phronesis, vol. 61, n° 2, 2016, p. 111‑141 ; J.S. Murray, « Disputation, Deception, and Dialectic: Plato on the True Rhetoric (Phaedrus 261-266) », Philosophy & Rhetoric, vol. 21, n° 4, 1988, p. 279‑289 ; H. Yunis, « Dialectic and the Purpose of Rhetoric in Plato’s Phaedrus », op. cit.. For Cambiano « Dialettica, medicina, retorica nel ‘Fedro’ platónico », op. cit., medicine and rhetoric have in common the analysis of τὸ ὅλον since both of them presuppose the dialectical method. Thus, what brings them together is only the dialectical method, but nothing in terms of content.
For the conventional character of these requirements, with variations appearing in Isocrates and Alcidamas, see P. Shorey, « Φύσις Μελέτη Επιστήμη », Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, vol. 40, 1909, p. 185‑201 ; H. Yunis, Plato: Phaedrus, op. cit., ad loc.
For Irani, the nature of a true rhetoric in the Gorgias remains incomplete mainly because it lacks an understanding of the soul qua proper object of rhetoric, while the Phaedrus affords a moral psychology and, thus, brings to completion the promissory note for a true rhetoric foreshadowed in the Gorgias. I agree with him on this point. See T. Irani, Plato on the value of philosophy, op. cit.
In agreement with E. Jelinek and N. Pappas, « Hippocrates at Phaedrus 270c », Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 101, n° 3, 2020, p. 409‑430. G. Cambiano, « Dialettica, medicina, retorica nel Fedro platónico », op. cit. ; J. Jouanna, « La Collection Hippocratique et Platon (Phèdre 269c-272a) », Revue des Études Grecques, vol. 90, n° 428, 1977, p. 15‑28, also insist on the methodological and dialectical input of the concept of τὸ ὅλον in connection to Hippocrates.
Emily Hulme Kozey does not take this passage of the Phaedrus (273e5-274a5) into consideration in her analysis of the grounds and scope of rhetoric as a τέχνη. I agree with her general point that good-directedness is subordinate to goal-directedness when it comes to τέχνη qua τέχνη. However, just as medicine as a τέχνη is a form of caring technique (θεραπεία) for the body, rhetoric would be a form of caring technique (θεραπεία) for the soul. See E. Hulme Kozey, « The Good-Directedness of Τέχνη and the Status of Rhetoric in the Platonic Dialogues », op. cit.
Pace C.J. Rowe, « The Argument and Structure of Plato’s Phaedrus », Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, vol. 32, 1986, p. 106‑125; « Public and Private Speaking in Plato’s Later Dialogues », op. cit., and in agreement with M. Heath, « The Unity of the Phaedrus: A Postscript », Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 7, 1989, p. 189‑191, the technical rhetoric of the Phaedrus has much more in common with the Gorgias than the Statesman, and it is highly unlikely that there can be a public/political rhetoric, in the strictest sense of the term rhetoric, according to the theoretical perspective of the Phaedrus and the Gorgias at least. By “the strictest sense of the term rhetoric” I mean a practice of rhetoric that remains as close as possible to the theoretical model outlined in the Phaedrus, and which is patterned after the medical epistemology of Hippocrates. I disagree with T. Lier, Reason, Rhetoric, and the Philosophical Life in Plato’s Phaedrus, op. cit., p. 95‑154. too, who structures an entire chapter in a contrast between public and private rhetoric in the Phaedrus. The public, democratic rhetoric condemned in the Gorgias is not an art of speech, but a rule-of-thumb procedure for manipulating words to approve certain resolutions. But the true rhetoric that arises in the dialogue is a medicine of the soul (Gorg. 504d5ff.), which pays heed to the features of singular souls and makes use of suitable speeches to lead it towards knowledge and virtue.
In agreement with H. Yunis, « Dialectic and the Purpose of Rhetoric in Plato’s Phaedrus », op. cit. ; H. Yunis, Plato: Phaedrus, op. cit., p.10‑14., and against, inter alia, O.L. Brownstein, « Plato’s Phaedrus », op. cit. ; C.H. Kahn, Plato and the post-Socratic dialogue: the return to the philosophy of nature, Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 136 ; D.S. Werner, « Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus », op. cit.. My point of disagreement with Yunis is that I take the genuine rhetoric of the Phaedrus to be, by definition, value-governed. I believe that Yunis misses this insight because he does not take into proper consideration the medicine-rhetoric analogy that is fundamental for the structuring of rhetoric as a τέχνη in Plato.
This interpretation diverges, for instance, from G. Cambiano, « Dialettica, medicina, retorica nel Fedro platónico », op. cit., who argues that medicine and rhetoric share only their common dependence on the dialectical analysis of the whole (τὸ ὅλον), with no substantive connection beyond the method. I contend, however, that Plato’s conception of philosophical rhetoric incorporates medicine’s teleological orientation toward the good. Just as medicine aims at health, genuine rhetoric must be directed toward the benefit of souls, and this normative dimension transcends a mere methodological correspondence between medicine and rhetoric.
R. Waterfield, Plato: Phaedrus, op. cit., p. xxxv.
Even if the distinction between laymen and professional doctors was still ill-defined, and in the process of acquiring clearer contours. See L. Dean-Jones, « Literacy and the Charlatan in Ancient Greek Medicine », op. cit. ; W.H.S. Jones, Hippocrates, Vol. 2. with an English Translation by W. H. S. Jones, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1923, p. xli‑xliv ; J. Jouanna, Hippocrates, Baltimore, Md, John Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 184‑185 ; K.-H. Leven, « Ethics and Deontology », in P.E. Pormann (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Hippocrates, Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 152‑179, p. 165‑166.. Cf. V.M. I.8-15; IX.16-29; Acut. VI; Arte V, on the difference between layman and expert in medicine.
R. Waterfield, Plato: Phaedrus, op. cit., p. xxxv.. For variations of this view, see R. Burger, Plato’s Phaedrus, op. cit., p. 6 ; E.L. Hunt, « Plato and Aristotle on rhetoric and rhetoricians », op. cit., p. 42 ; J. Koritansky, « Socratic Rhetoric and Socratic Wisdom in Plato’s Phaedrus », op. cit., p. 46‑47.
“Rhetoric is allowed to go to the ball, but only after it has completed such tasks as would necessarily preclude it from ever shedding its base rags.” R. Reames, « The μῦθος of Pernicious Rhetoric », op. cit., p. 138. This view is reaffirmed in a later work of his: “By such an interpretation, there is not necessarily any conflict between the views on rhetoric presented here and those presented in the Gorgias. In both cases, we might conclude that Plato’s opinion (articulated in the voice of Socrates) was intractable. In the Gorgias he demeans it as a civic canker, and in the Phaedrus he presents an unrealizable cure. According to such a reading, his apparent acceptance of rhetoric is merely a display of Socratic irony” R. Reames, Seeming and Being in Plato’s Rhetorical Theory, op. cit., p. 51.
“The ‘true rhetoric’ to which the Phaedrus refers is (I will argue) something akin to a heuristic or regulative ideal: that is, a form of discourse whose main features can be indicated or pointed to, but which can never be fully instantiated in practice” D.S. Werner, « Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato’s Phaedrus », op. cit., p. 22.
I was inspired by J. Moravcsik, « Ancient and Modern Conceptions of Health and Medicine », op. cit., p. 339, on the idea of health in Plato possessing a theoretical and a normative aspect.
“Science must therefore be causal or it is not science. In these earliest epistemological texts of ancient Greece, some of the leading concepts that were to guide the development of science for centuries afterwards can be seen to emerge with quite stunning clarity from reflection upon the art of medicine. There remains, of course, a gap between theoretical assertion and practical application. The author of On Ancient Medicine, for example, despite his fine statements about the need for causal knowledge, does not proceed to try to carry out his program through experimental investigation. But a certain conceptual architecture was nonetheless now in place” J. Jouanna, Hippocrates, op. cit., p. 255.
J. Jouanna, Hippocrates, op. cit., p. 256.
Such as in Franco Trabattoni’s example of the Leaning Tower of Pisa. See F. Trabattoni, « On the Distinguishing Features of Plato’s “Metaphysics” (Starting from the Parmenides) », in Essays on Plato’s Epistemology, Leuven (Belgium), Leuven University Press, 2016, p. 199‑218.
See C.L. Griswold, « Self-knowledge and the ‘ἰδἐα’ of the soul in Plato’s Phaedrus », Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 86, n° 4, 1981, p. 477‑494.
See, for instance, F. Trabattoni, Scrivere nell’anima: verità, dialettica e persuasione in Platone, Firenze, Nuova Italia, 1. ed, 1994.
See S. Noriega-Olmos, « The Epistemological Status of Medicine in the ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΑΙΗΣ ΙΗΤΡΙΚΗΣ », DoisPontos, vol. 10, n° 2, 2013; M.J. Schiefsky, Hippocrates: On ancient medicine, op. cit., p. 13‑18;185‑207; 217‑222; D. S. Hutchinson, « Doctrines of the Mean and the Debate Concerning Skills in Fourth-Century Medicine, Rhetoric and Ethics », Apeiron, vol. 21, no 2, 1988, p. 42-43.
See F. Dunn, « On Ancient Medicine and its intellectual context », in P.J. van der Eijk (ed.), Hippocrates in Context, BRILL, 2005, p. 49‑67 ; L. Edelstein, « The Rôle of Eryximachus in Plato’s Symposium », op. cit., p. 90‑91 ; G.E.R. Lloyd, « Aspects of the Interrelations of Medicine, Magic and Philosophy in Ancient Greece », Apeiron, vol. 9, n° 1, 1975, p. 1‑16 ; S. Noriega-Olmos, « The Epistemological Status of Medicine in the ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΑΙΗΣ ΙΗΤΡΙΚΗΣ », op. cit.. Cf. V.M. IV, and XX; Nat.Hom. I-II; Acut. VII-VIII; Arte as a whole.
See G.E.R. Lloyd, In the grip of disease, op. cit., p. 149‑150; D. S. Hutchinson, « Doctrines of the Mean and the Debate Concerning Skills in Fourth-Century Medicine, Rhetoric and Ethics », op. cit., p. 34-35.
J. Pigeaud, « Qu’est-ce qu’être malade ? Quelques réflexions sur le sens de la maladie dans Ancienne médecine », in Poétiques du corps: aux origines de la médecine, Paris, Les Belles lettres, 2008, p. 105‑130, p. 210.
As the Loeb translator of the Corpus Hippocraticum, W. H. S. Jones, sustains: “a working hypothesis, although wrong, is better than no hypothesis at all.” W.H.S. Jones, Hippocrates, Vol. 2. with an English translation by W. H. S. Jones, op. cit., p. iv.
See J. Moss, « Soul-Leading: The Unity of the Phaedrus, Again », in B. Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 43, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1‑23.
Θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῇ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν μουσικῇ συνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάττονος ἀκριβείας μετισχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος.
See D. Roochnik, Of art and wisdom, op. cit., p. 53‑57. My point is that the genuine rhetoric of the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, which Roochnik does not tackle, would fall under the category of fallibilistic or “stochastic” arts (techne2 in his terminology) rather than the rigorous, determinate, and accurate kind of art (techne1), following his classification.
See D. Roochnik, Of art and wisdom, op. cit., p. 52‑57..
Another way to think about is with Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between “achievement verbs” and “task verbs.” Both “cure” and “persuade” are achievement verbs, and, as such, they imply success in the activity. If medicine was to be reduced to curing, and rhetoric to persuading, whenever there were failure in their accomplishment, one could raise doubts whether the activity peculiar to each art was realized or not. See G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, London ; New York, Routledge, 2009, p. 131‑135.
Compare it with the uses of ὑπόμνημα, ὑπόμνησις, and ὑπομιμνήσκω in the Phaedrus’ criticism of writing: 276d3 ὑπομνήματα; 275a5 ὑπομνήσεως; 275d1 ὑπομνῆσαι; 278a1 ὑπομνήσεως.
H. Yunis, « Dialectic and the Purpose of Rhetoric in Plato’s Phaedrus », op. cit., p. 239.
Whether the perfect political science of the Statesman is available or not in our current, post-Cronos age, see C. L. Griswold, « Politikē Epistēmē in Plato’s Statesman », in J. Anton and A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy III: Plato, New York, State University of New York Press, 1989, p. 141-167.
τοὺς ἰατροὺς δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα νενομίκαμεν, ἐάντε ἑκόντας ἐάντε ἄκοντας ἡμᾶς ἰῶνται, τέμνοντες ἢ κάοντες ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἀλγηδόνα προσάπτοντες, καὶ ἐὰν κατὰ γράμματα ἢ χωρὶς γραμμάτων, καὶ ἐὰν πένητες ὄντες ἢ πλούσιοι, πάντως οὐδὲν ἧττον ἰατρούς φαμεν, ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐπιστατοῦντες τέχνῃ, καθαίροντες εἴτε ἄλλως ἰσχναίνοντες εἴτε καὶ αὐξάνοντες, ἂν μόνον ἐπ’ἀγαθῷ τῷ τῶν σωμάτων, βελτίω ποιοῦντες ἐκ χειρόνων, σῴζωσιν οἱ θεραπεύοντες ἕκαστοι τὰ θεραπευόμενα· ταύτῃ θήσομεν, ὡς οἶμαι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ, τοῦτον ὅρον ὀρθὸν εἶναι μόνον ἰατρικῆς καὶ ἄλλης ἡστινοσοῦν ἀρχῆς.
As J.S. Murray, « Disputation, Deception, and Dialectic: Plato on the True Rhetoric (Phaedrus 261-266) », op. cit., p. 284 correctly suggests: “The technical, or rhetorical,’ notion of ἀπάτη, as leading one away from current opinions, may well find a place as part of Plato’s true rhetoric.” Perhaps Kierkegaard was right when he declared: “One can deceive a person out of what is true, and—to recall old Socrates—one can deceive a person into what is true. Yes, in only this way can a deluded person actually be brought into what is true—by deceiving him.” S. Kierkegaard, « The Point of View of My Work as an Author: A Direct Communication, Report to History », in H. V. Hong and E. H. Hong (eds.) The Essential Kierkegaard, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 467.
This distinction between two forms of medical practice could perhaps dispel Irani’s worry that philosophical argument, following the analogy with medical treatment, would entail a relationship of dominance. See T. Irani, Plato on the value of philosophy, op. cit., p. 164–65.
Earlier in the Laws (IV.722d3ff.), the Athenian had requested a prelude to the laws to ensure the willingly compliance of the citizens with the norms of the city. He uses a medical analogy to drive home his point. The prelude is to be a persuasive and make use of exhortation to balance the normative commandment of the laws, as it also happens with the mixture of smooth persuasiveness and despotic prescriptions by doctors.
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