Bibliographie
Adam, J. (ed.) The Republic of Plato, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1902.
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981.
Babut, D., “L’unité du livre X de la ‘République’ et sa fonction dans le dialogue”, Bulletin de l’Association Guillaume Budé 1 (1983), 31-54.
Belfiore, E., “Plato’s Greatest Accusation against Poetry”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 9 (1983), 39-62.
Belfiore, E., “A Theory of Imitation in Plato’s Republic”, Transactions of the American Philological Association 114 (1984), 121-46.
Benson, H. H., “Plato’s Philosophical Method in the Republic: The Divided Line (510a-11d)”, in M. L. McPherran (ed.) Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 188-208.
Blondell, R., The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Burkert, W., “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gymnasium 66 (1959), 168-70.
Capra, A., Plato’s Four Muses: The Phaedrus and the Poetics of Philosophy, Washington DC, Center for Hellenic Studies, 2014.
Clinton, K., “The ‘Hymn to Zeus’, πάθει μάθος, and the End of the Parodos of ‘Agamemnon’”, Traditio 75 (1979), 1-19.
Demand, N., “Plato and the Painters”, Phoenix 29 (1975), 1-20.
Denyer, N., “Sun and Line: The Role of the Good”, in G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 284-309.
Destrée, P., “Happiness, Justice, and Poetry in Plato’s Republic”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 25 (2009), 243-69.
Dörrie, H., Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956.
Dorter, K., “The Divided Line and the Structure of Plato’s Republic”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (2004), 1-20.
Duncan, T. S., “Gorgias’ Theories of Art”, The Classical Journal 33 (1938), 402-15.
Else, G. F., The Structure and Date of Book X of Plato’s Republic, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1972.
Emlyn-Jones, C. and Preddy, W. (eds) Plato: Republic, 2 vols, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2013.
Emlyn-Jones, C. and Preddy, W. (eds) Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2017.
Emlyn-Jones, C. and Preddy, W. (eds) Plato: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2022.
Ferguson, J. (ed.) Plato: Republic X, Bristol, Bristol Classical Press, 1957 (repr. 2005).
Ferrari, G. R. F., “Plato and Poetry”, in G. A. Kennedy (ed.) The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 1: Classical Criticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 92-148.
Ferrari, G. R. F., “The Three-Part Soul”, in G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 165-201.
Gill, C., “Plato and the Education of Character”, Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 67 (1985), 1-26.
Halliwell, S., “Plato and Aristotle on the Denial of Tragedy”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 30 (1984), 49-71.
Halliwell, S. (ed.) Plato: Republic X, Oxford, Aris & Phillips, 1988.
Halliwell, S., “Plato and the Psychology of Drama”, in B. Zimmermann (ed.) Antike Dramentheorien und ihre Rezeption, Stuttgart, M&P Verlag, 1992, 55-73.
Halliwell, S., The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.
Halliwell, S., “The Republic’s Two Critiques of Poetry (Book II 376c-398b, Book X 595a-608b)”, in O. Höffe (ed.) Plato: Politeia, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005 (2nd ed.), 313-32.
Havelock, E. A., Preface to Plato, Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press, 1963.
Irwin, T. H., “The Parts of the Soul and the Cardinal Virtues (Book IV, 427d-448e)”, in O. Höffe (ed.) Plato: Politeia, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005 (2nd ed.), 119-40.
Janaway, C., Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
Kamtekar, R., “The Powers of Plato’s Tripartite Psychology”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2008), 127-50.
Kamtekar, R., “Plato on Education and Art”, in G. Fine (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Plato, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019 (2nd ed.), 605-26.
Laks, A. and Most, G. W. (eds) Early Greek Philosophy VIII, Sophists 1, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2016.
Le Merrer, N., Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., Paris, École Normale Supérieure, 2023.
Lesher, J. H., “The Meaning of ‘saphêneia’ in Plato’s Divided Line”, in M. L. McPherran (ed.) Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 171-87.
Leszl, W., “Il potere della parola in Gorgia e in Platone”, Siculorum Gymnasium 38 (1985), 65-80.
Liebert, R. S., Tragic Pleasure from Homer to Plato, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Lloyd-Jones, H. (ed.) Sophocles: Antigone, The Women of Trachis, Philoctetes, Oedipus at Colonus, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1994.
Lombard, D. B., Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984.
Mintz, A. I., “Plato, The Poets, and The Philosophical Turn in the Relationship between Teaching, Learning, and Suffering”, Studies in Philosophy of Education 41 (2022), 259-71.
Moore, C., The Virtue of Agency: Sôphrosunê and Self-Constitution in Classical Greece, New York, Oxford University Press, 2023.
Moss, J., “What is Imitative Poetry and Why Is it Bad?”, in G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 414-44.
Muller, R., “Platon et les poètes dans la République”, Philosophie antique 20 (2020), 215-36.
Munteanu, D., Tragic Pathos: Pity and Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Murray, P. (ed.) Plato on Poetry, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Nehamas, A., “Plato on Imitation and Poetry in Republic 10”, in J. Moravksic and P. Temko (eds) Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts, Totowa NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1982, 47-78.
Nehamas, A., “Plato and the Mass Media”, The Monist 71 (1988), 214-34.
Nettleship, R. L., Lectures on the Republic of Plato, London, MacMillan, 1901 (2nd ed.).
Nettleship, R. L., The Theory of Education in Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1935.
Nightingale, A., Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Nightingale, A., Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
North, H., Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1966.
Nussbaum, M. C., “Commentary on Kamtekar”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2008), 151-61.
Osborne, C., “The Repudiation of Representation in Plato’s Republic and Its Repercussions”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 33 (1987), 53-73.
Race, W. H. (ed.) Pindar: Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1997.
Race, W. H. (ed.) Pindar: Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1997.
Rademaker, A., Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint: Polysemy & Persuasive Use of an Ancient Greek Value Term, Leiden, Brill, 2004.
Reeve, C. D. C., “Blindness and Reorientation: Education and the Acquisition of Knowledge in the Republic”, in M. L. McPherran (ed.) Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 209-28.
Ribas, M.-N., La Querelle de l’expérience: Aristote, Platon, Isocrate, Paris, Garnier, 2019.
Ricciardelli, G., “La potenza della parola in Gorgia e in Platone”, Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale 45 (2003), 199-209.
Romilly, J., “Gorgias et le pouvoir de la poésie”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 93 (1973), 155-62.
Scolnicov, S., Plato’s Metaphysics of Education, London, Routledge, 1988.
Segal, C. P., “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 66 (1962), 99-155.
Shields, C., “Plato’s Divided Soul”, in M. L. McPherran (ed.) Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 147-70.
Singpurwalla, R., “The Tripartite Theory of Motivation in Plato’s Republic”, Philosophy Compass 5 (2010), 880-92.
Singpurwalla, R., “Plato and Tripartition of Soul”, in J. Sisko (ed.) The History of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. 1: Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, London, Routledge, 2018, 101-19.
Solmsen, F., “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gnomon 31 (1959), 469-75.
Sommerstein, A. H. (ed.) Aeschylus, Oresteia: Agamemnon, Libation-Bearers, Eumenides, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2009.
Sommerstein, A. H. (ed.) Aeschylus: Persians, Seven against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus Bound, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2009.
Tate, J., “‘Imitation’ in Plato’s Republic”, The Classical Quarterly 22 (1928), 16-23.
Tate, J., “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, The Classical Review 8 (1959), 79-80.
Vegetti, M. (ed.) Platone: La Repubblica, vol. VII, Naples, Bibliopolis, 2007.
Verdenius, W. J., “Platon et la poésie”, Mnemosyne 12 (1944), 118-50.
Verdenius, W. J., Homer, the Educator of the Greeks, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1970.
Haut de page
Notes
H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956. For a critical assessment of Dörrie’s book, cf. J. Tate, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, The Classical Review 8 (1958), 79-80; W. Burkert, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gymnasium 66 (1959), 168-70; F. Solmsen, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gnomon 31 (1959), 469-75.
τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον […] (“What do I deserve to have done to me, or pay? Just because I didn’t lead a quiet life […]”). Text and trans. for Ap. and Phd. in C. Emlyn-Jones and W. Preddy (eds) Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2017. Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 312n5, 319.
ἃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ λέγω, ὦ Ἀγάθων, μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παθημάτων γνόντα εὐλαβηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὥσπερ νήπιον παθόντα γνῶναι. (“And what I’m telling you too, Agathon, is don’t be deceived by this man, but learning from what we have experienced take care and don’t, like the proverb, learn it, like a fool, from suffering.”) Text and trans. for Symp. and Phdr. in C. Emlyn-Jones and W. Preddy (eds) Plato: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2022. Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 314-15, 317.
This is Dörrie’s thesis, but the phrase may also have a literal meaning, thus pointing to Alcibiades’ real suffering.
Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; (“But whenever the soul examines something on its own, it departs there to the pure, the eternal, the immortal and constant state of being, and being akin to it, always gets to be with the absolute whenever it comes to be by itself, and exists for itself; and it ceases its wandering about and, around those entities, it’s always in the same constant state because it’s in contact with beings of that sort: and this experience it goes through is known as wisdom, isn’t it?”) Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 330n1, 333-4.
ἅτ’ οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη, καὶ ἁπάσης ψυχῆς ὅσῃ ἂν μέλῃ τὸ προσῆκον δέξασθαι, ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὂν ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ […] (“So in as much as a god’s intelligence is nurtured both by pure mind and intellect, and that of every soul to the extent that it is concerned to receive its proper nourishment, in the course of time it sees reality and is both well content and in contemplating the truth it is fed and made happy […]”). Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 333-4.
It should be noted, however, that the meaning of the term is not exactly the same in both cases. In the Phaedrus passage, εὐπαθεῖ expresses the more determinate idea of being happy.
So is, more recently, A. I. Mintz, “Plato, The Poets, and The Philosophical Turn in the Relationship between Teaching, Learning, and Suffering”, Studies in Philosophy of Education 41 (2022), 259-71.
Dörrie himself carries out an investigation into the meaning of the proverb for the tragedians: cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 324-30, 331-2; also section 3.2 below.
Cf. R. Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 165-250. The Platonic revaluation in Republic X of the πάθει μάθος in tragedy is just one of the many ways in which Plato uses and transforms typically tragic themes in his dialogues. On the subject in general, cf. A. Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, 60-92. For more specific accounts, cf. D. Munteanu, Tragic Pathos: Pity and Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 52-69 (reassessment of the tragic emotions of pity and fear); A. Capra, Plato’s Four Muses: The Phaedrus and the Poetics of Philosophy, Washington DC, Center for Hellenic Studies, 2014 (reappropriation of poetic inspiration).
In sections 2.1-2.3, preference will be given to the basic systematic interrelationship between these doctrines regardless of the order of their appearance and exposition in Plato’s Republic.
At least in some of the reference commentaries on the criticism of poetry in Republic X—cf. J. Adam (ed.) The Republic of Plato, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1902 (2nd ed.), 384-5; J. Ferguson (ed.) Plato: Republic X, Bristol, Bristol Classical Press, 1957 (repr. 2005), 31; S. Halliwell (ed.) Plato: Republic X, Oxford, Aris & Phillips, 1988, 105; M. Vegetti (ed.) Platone: La Repubblica, vol. VII, Naples, Bibliopolis, 2007, 13-14—the focus is mainly on the moral, psychological, ontological and epistemological dimensions of Plato’s analysis and not enough importance is given to the educational concern that underlies it and which, as we shall see later, determines what is criticised, how it is criticised and the foundations of such criticism. A good exception is P. Murray (ed.) Plato on Poetry, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 14-24, 185-6. Cf. also N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023, 126-88 (the best reading so far of the educational motive of Plato’s critique of poetry in book X).
595a1-3: Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ᾠκίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω. (“‘Well now’, I said, ‘I have in mind many other things about the state which more than anything lead me to believe that we were right in the way we founded it, but I say that with poetry in mind especially.’”) Text and trans. for R. in C. Emlyn-Jones and W. Preddy (eds) Plato: Republic, 2 vols, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2013.
595a5-b3: Τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διῄρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη. (“Not to allow in anything which is in any way imitative, because it now appears even clearer that we must not allow it in, especially, so it seems to me, now that each of the parts of the soul have been defined.”) Cf. 607b2-4, 607e5-8b4.
595b5-9: Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι—οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς—λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα. (“Speaking between ourselves, for you won’t denounce me to the tragic poets and all the rest of the writers who use imitation, all this kind of thing seems to me to be a corruption of the minds of their audiences who don’t have the remedy of knowing exactly what it is really like.”)
595c1-5: Ῥητέον, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι. ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, ἀλλ’, ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον. (“‘I must speak out’, I said, ‘And yet I’ve had a kind of love and respect for Homer since my childhood, which makes me reluctant to speak. You see, I think he’s been the first teacher and guide to all the good tragic poets of today. But the fact is that a man mustn’t be respected above truth; so, as I say, I must speak out.’” Trans. slightly modified) Cf. 606e1-7a4, 8a1-3. On the conception of Homer as the educator of the Greeks, cf. E. A. Havelock, Preface to Plato, Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press, 1963, 61-86; the excellent essay by W. J. Verdenius, Homer, the Educator of the Greeks, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1970; P. Murray (ed.) Plato on Poetry, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 14-24.
At this stage, Socrates’ theses are only being announced and still need to be explained and duly substantiated. Their clarification within the framework of the question that occupies me in this essay will also be left for later. Cf. 3.2 and 3.3 below.
Of course, the first stages of Plato’s educational programme are designed for all citizens of the ideal city. However, I intend to address his programme from the perspective of the future rulers of the city, for only they will experience the programme in its entirety.
On this last point, cf. M.-N. Ribas, La Querelle de l’expérience: Aristote, Platon, Isocrate, Paris, Garnier, 2019, 329.
As already said above, this is just a very schematic and incomplete overview of Plato’s educational programme, with the modest purpose of highlighting some stages in it and key terms in their characterisation that will be important in my account of the πάθει μάθος tradition in Republic X. For a thorough discussion of the Platonic theory of education in the Republic, cf. R. L. Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic of Plato, London, MacMillan, 1901 (2nd ed.), 77-130, 259-93; R. L. Nettleship, The Theory of Education in Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1935; C. Gill, “Plato and the Education of Character”, Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 67 (1985), 1-26; S. Scolnicov, Plato’s Metaphysics of Education, London, Routledge, 1988, 112-19, 148-50; A. Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 80-2; C. D. C. Reeve, “Blindness and Reorientation: Education and the Acquisition of Knowledge in the Republic”, in Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 209-28; R. Kamtekar, “Plato on Education and Art”, in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019 (2nd ed.), 605-26.
For detailed discussions of the divided line, cf. J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, 242-71; K. Dorter, “The Divided Line and the Structure of Plato’s Republic”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (2004), 1-20; N. Denyer, “Sun and Line: The Role of the Good”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 284-309; H. H. Benson, “Plato’s Philosophical Method in the Republic: The Divided Line (510a-11d)”, in Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 188-208; J. H. Lesher, “The Meaning of ‘saphêneia’ in Plato’s Divided Line”, in Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 171-87.
In other passages (cf. R. 519b, 584e, Phlb. 38c-9b), he points to the same phenomenon with the vocabulary of ἐμπειρία. On the Platonic conception of an intellectual, philosophical experience of truth, cf. M.-N. Ribas, La Querelle de l’expérience: Aristote, Platon, Isocrate, Paris, Garnier, 2019, 10, 23, 24, 38, 324, 329. Nightingale shows how the Platonic conception of this experience of truth results from a transformation of the traditional Greek practice of θεωρία. In this sense, her analysis emphasises the visual aspect of Plato’s (metaphorical) description of such an experience. Cf. A. Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 72-93.
511d7-e5: Ἱκανώτατα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν.
For space reasons, I will not be able to explore the connection between the tripartition of the soul and the divided line, but it seems clear and not particularly controversial that the constitution of the just (or unjust) soul depends on the good (or bad) education of its rational element through knowledge (or lack thereof) of reality/truth.
On Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul in the Republic and elsewhere, cf. J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, 109-52; T. H. Irwin, “The Parts of the Soul and the Cardinal Virtues (Book IV, 427d-448e)”, in Plato: Politeia, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005 (2nd ed.), 119-40; G. R. F. Ferrari, “The Three-Part Soul”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 165-201; C. Shields, “Plato’s Divided Soul”, in Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 147-70; R. Kamtekar, “The Powers of Plato’s Tripartite Psychology”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2008), 127-50; M. C. Nussbaum, “Commentary on Kamtekar”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2008), 151-61; R. Singpurwalla, “The Tripartite Theory of Motivation in Plato’s Republic”, Philosophy Compass 5 (2010), 880-92; R. Singpurwalla, “Plato and Tripartition of Soul”, in The History of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. 1: Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, London, Routledge, 2018, 101-19.
Cf. in particular Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 307-12.
In this essay, in addition to considering the Platonic appropriation in Republic X and in close connection with this, I will briefly refer to the appropriations by the tragedians (cf. 3.2 below), Pindar and Gorgias (cf. below, 3.3.3, especially nn53-4). On the semantic variation, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 312-38; and for the latter appropriations, p. 316-19, 324-30 and 331-2 respectively.
Republic X is saturated with terminology relating to the meaning of παθεῖν/μαθεῖν. Ιn the passage concerning the critique of tragic poetry alone (605c7-6c1), the occurrences are numerous: cf. 605d2, d2-3, d4, d5, d8, e6-7, 6a3-4, a4, a6, a6-7, a7-b1, b1-2, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b9.
Although the myth of Er deals with the issue of immortality and the rewards of justice, I think that its length and richness make it stand out as an independent part of book X.
The idea that Homer is a tragic poet is already suggested in book III (387b-8d), when Socrates quotes passages from the Iliad and the Odyssey in which πάθη associated with tragedy are depicted.
Based on H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 326-30, whose interpretation seems to me to be accurate for the most part.
For H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 329, such a model is present in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles but is absent from those of Euripides. On the meaning of πάθει μάθος in Euripides—a question that will not concern me here—cf. D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984.
Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων
τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν,
τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδώ-
σαντα, τὸν “πάθει μάθος”
θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν.
στάζει δ᾿ ἀνθ᾿ ὕπνου πρὸ καρδίας
μνησιπήμων πόνος· καὶ παρ᾿ ἅ-
κοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν.
(“One who gladly utters loud songs of victory to Zeus
will score a perfect hit on the target of wisdom—
Zeus who set mortals on the road
to understanding, who made
‘learning by suffering’ into an effective law.
There drips before the heart, instead of sleep,
the misery of pain recalled: good sense comes to men
even against their will.”)
Text and trans. for Aesch. Ag. in A. H. Sommerstein (ed.) Aeschylus, Oresteia: Agamemnon, Libation-Bearers, Eumenides, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2009.
τὰ δ᾿ ἔνθεν οὔτ᾿ εἶδον οὔτ᾿ ἐννέπω·
τέχναι δὲ Κάλχαντος οὐκ ἄκραντοι.
Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει·
τὸ μέλλον δ᾿ ἐπει γένοιτ᾿
ἂν κλύοις […].
(“What followed I did not see and do not say;
but the skilled prophecies of Calchas do not fail of fulfilment.
Over the one side Justice looms, that they may suffer and learn.
The future one will hear about
when it happens […].”)
On the meaning of the adverb in this passage, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 325; also F. Solmsen, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gnomon 31 (1959), 470.
Temperance refers to the moderation and self-restraint of the σώφρων. The idea is that the suffering caused by Zeus follows from an excessive or licentious behaviour on the part of the ὑβριστής and ultimately leads human beings to become aware of the moral limits of their actions in a universe ruled by the gods and to adopt a balanced attitude that does not violate divine laws. On the possible meanings of the polysemic term σωφροσύνη, cf. H. North, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1966; A. Rademaker, Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint: Polysemy & Persuasive Use of an Ancient Greek Value Term, Leiden, Brill, 2004; C. Moore, The Virtue of Agency: Sôphrosunê and Self-Constitution in Classical Greece, New York, Oxford University Press, 2023.
However, cf. K. Clinton, “The ‘Hymn to Zeus’, πάθει μάθος, and the End of the Parodos of ‘Agamemnon’”, Traditio 75 (1979), 4, 13 and D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984, 42-4. For both scholars, this tragedy does not end with Agamemnon becoming temperate or acquiring any kind of ethical knowledge.
Cf. the myth of Protagoras in Pl. Pr. 320c-2d, where the sophist tells us that the human community only finds a solid foundation in the αἰδῶς and δίκη granted by Zeus to humans (322c-d).
Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 328; also F. Solmsen, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gnomon 31 (1959), 470.
[…] τἀν βροτοῖς δὲ πήματα
ἀκούσαθ᾿, ὥς σφας νηπίους ὄντας τὸ πρὶν
ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους.
(“[…] Instead, listen to the miseries of mortals, how infantile they were before I made them intelligent and possessed of understanding.”)
Text and trans. for Aesch. Prom. in A. H. Sommerstein (ed.) Aeschylus: Persians, Seven against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus Bound, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2009.
τὰ λοιπά μου κλυοῦσα θαυμάσῃ πλέον,
οἵας τέχνας τε καὶ πόρους ἐμησάμην.
(“When you have heard the rest of what I have to say, you will be even more amazed by all the skills and devices that I have contrived.”)
Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 329-30; also D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984, 39-40, 44 with respect to Aeschylus. But Lombard argues that the justification of suffering is no longer Sophocles’ concern (cf. p. 45, 49).
πολλῷ τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαιμονίας
πρῶτον ὑπάρχει· χρὴ δὲ τά γ᾿ ἐς θεοὺς
μηδὲν ἀσεπτεῖν· μεγάλοι δὲ λόγοι
μεγάλας πληγὰς τῶν ὑπεραύχων
ἀποτείσαντες
γήρᾳ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδίδαξαν.
(“Good sense is by far the chief part of happiness; and we must not be impious towards the gods. The great words of boasters are always punished with great blows, and as they grow old teach them wisdom.”)
Text and trans. for Soph. Ant. in H. Lloyd-Jones (ed.) Sophocles: Antigone, The Women of Trachis, Philoctetes, Oedipus at Colonus, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1994.
According to D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984, 49, this is also the aim of Aesch. Ag. as an illustration of learning from suffering. Cf. the use of the proverb by Alcibiades in Pl. Symp. 222b, which I mentioned in the introductory remarks. More on this important issue of learning through the suffering of others in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 below.
This is despite the fact that, in the allusions to such doctrines, there are some simplifications, such as the use of the notion of ignorance (600e6-1a3) instead of that of conjecture (533e) and the application of the dichotomy lower part/upper part of the soul (603a4-8) instead of using the concepts resulting from the doctrine of the tripartite soul (439d, 440e-1a). But the simplification is acceptable, since it does not disturb the effectiveness of the analysis, and can be explained by the feasibility of an enquiry that is intended to be concise and to the point and, above all, as a rhetorical dimension demanded by the greater vehemence of the criticism when compared to that carried out in books II-III. For a detailed investigation into the structure of book X and its importance for the Republic as a whole, cf. G. F. Else, The Structure and Date of Book X of Plato’s Republic, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1972; D. Babut, “L’unité du livre X de la ‘République’ et sa fonction dans le dialogue”, Bulletin de l’Association Guillaume Budé 1 (1983), 31-54.
For a thorough discussion of the many and complex problems raised by Plato’s critique of poetry in Republic X, cf. J. Tate, “‘Imitation’ in Plato’s Republic”, The Classical Quarterly 22 (1928), 16-23; W. J. Verdenius, “Platon et la poésie”, Mnemosyne 12 (1944), 118-50; N. Demand, “Plato and the Painters”, Phoenix 29 (1975), 1-20; A. Nehamas, “Plato on Imitation and Poetry in Republic 10”, in Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts, Totowa NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1982, 47-78; E. Belfiore, “A Theory of Imitation in Plato’s Republic”, Transactions of the American Philological Association 114 (1984), 121-46; S. Halliwell, “Plato and Aristotle on the Denial of Tragedy”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 30 (1984), 49-71; C. Osborne, “The Repudiation of Representation in Plato’s Republic and Its Repercussions”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 33 (1987), 53-73; A. Nehamas, “Plato and the Mass Media”, The Monist 71 (1988), 214-34; G. R. F. Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry”, in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 1: Classical Criticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 92-148; S. Halliwell, “Plato and the Psychology of Drama”, in Antike Dramentheorien und ihre Rezeption, Stuttgart, M&P Verlag, 1992, 55-73; C. Janaway, Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995; S. Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, 37-147; S. Halliwell, “The Republic’s Two Critiques of Poetry (Book II 376c-398b, Book X 595a-608b)”, in Plato: Politeia, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005 (2nd ed.), 313-32; J. Moss, “What is Imitative Poetry and Why Is it Bad?”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 414-44; P. Destrée, “Happiness, Justice, and Poetry in Plato’s Republic”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 25 (2009), 243-69; R. Kamtekar, “Plato on Education and Art”, in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019 (2nd ed.), 605-26; R. Muller, “Platon et les poètes dans la République”, Philosophie antique 20 (2020), 215-36; N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023.
605c7-9: Οὐ μέντοι πω τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινόν που.
In Plato, particularly in the sections of the Republic dealing with the tripartition of the soul and the harmful effects of (tragic) poetry on the soul’s harmony, the term “natural” (φύσει) has a normative meaning in that it points to the rule according to which something must be arranged in order to fulfil its proper function. Cf. 606a3-b9 (quoted in the main text below), where Socrates is implicitly referring to what he said a while ago when presenting his doctrine of the soul’s tripartition (cf. notably 441e-2b and 2.3 above).
It is clear that when Plato speaks of the ἐπιεικεῖς, he is mainly referring to the καλοὶ καγαθοί, i.e. those who embody the traditional ideal of virtue (ἀρετή)—cf. N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023, 126-88. However, it seems to me that Plato makes an ambiguous use of the term, according to which ἐπιεικεῖς also designates those who, having already completed a certain part of the educational curriculum outlined in books II-III, do not yet possess the philosopher-rulers’ intellectual development and knowledge. Cf. 409a7, where Socrates describes the ἐπιεικεῖς in a way that strongly reminds us of the education of the young in the ideal city (cf. 387b-8a, 8e-9b, 98a-b).
605c11-d6: […] οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ’ ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.
It is important to emphasise that in this passage (605c11-d6) Socrates uses the second person plural. This indicates that what is at stake is something that the whole community—including Socrates and his interlocutors—is exposed to. The decision to ban the poets from the ideal city is based on this shared experience of the emotional effects of poetry. Cf. the excellent analysis of this key aspect in N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023, 126-88.
These are, on closer inspection, the two major forms of approach to tragic poetry in 605c7-6c1. The first explains the seduction exerted by tragedy, while the second gives an account of the pretext for letting down one’s guard against such a seduction. The second form of approach is the one that determines the rest of the analysis and constitutes its most important section.
605d8-e2: Ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπῃνοῦμεν.
605e4-7: Ἦ καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτόν τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἀλλ’ αἰσχύνοιτο ἄν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν;
606a3-b9: Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὂν εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ὀλίγοις τισὶν μέτεστιν ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεινὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν.
On the importance of this dichotomy for understanding Plato’s greatest accusation against (tragic) poetry, cf. E. Belfiore, “Plato’s Greatest Accusation against Poetry”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 9 (1983), 39-62; C. Janaway, Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 136; N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023, 140-1 (with n258).
Cf. 606b5, where the object of λογίζεσθαι (“that enjoyment from the sufferings of others is bound to strike nearer home”) specifies that of τὸ εἰδέναι in 595b7 (“what it [sc. poetry] is really like”) and, consequently, the meaning of the φάρμακον requested.
In this sense, Plato is presenting a conception of the relationship between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν that is very close to Pindar’s. On learning in advance (προμαθεῖν) and the role of πόνος in it, cf. Pind. O. 8.59-61:
[…] τὸ διδάξασθαι δέ τοι
εἰδότι ῥᾴτερον· ἄγνωμον δὲ τὸ μὴ προμαθεῖν·
κουφότεραι γὰρ ἀπειράτων φρένες.
(“[…] Truly teaching is easier for one
who knows, and it is foolish not to have learned in advance,
for less weighty are the minds of men without experience.”)
Text and trans. in W. H. Race (ed.) Pindar: Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1997. Cf. also Pind. Isth. 1.40-1:
[…] ὁ πονή-
σαις δὲ νόῳ καὶ προμάθειαν φέρει.
(“[…] One
who has toiled also gains foresight for his mind.”)
Text and trans. in W. H. Race (ed.) Pindar: Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1997. For the connection of these passages with the πάθει μάθος tradition, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 316-18.
This view is diametrically opposed to Gorgias’, for whom the deception (ἀπάτη) produced by tragedy testifies to the greater wisdom of the one who is deceived: cf. Plut. Gloria Ath. 5,348 C (D35LM=B23DK): ἤνθησε δ’ ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ διεβοήθη, θαυμαστὸν ἀκρόαμα καὶ θέαμα τῶν τότ’ ἀνθρώπων γενομένη καὶ παρασχοῦσα τοῖς μύθοις καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀπάτην, ὡς Γοργίας φησίν, ἣν ὅ τ’ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος, ὅτι τοῦθ’ ὑποσχόμενος πεποίηκεν· ὁ δ’ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος· εὐάλωτον γὰρ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς λόγων τὸ μὴ ἀναίσθητον. (“Tragedy flourished and was acclaimed—it was a marvelous spectacle for the ears and eyes of the men who lived in those times, which produced by means of stories and sufferings, ‘a deception’, as Gorgias says, ‘in which the one who deceives is more just than the one who does not deceive, and the one who is deceived is more intelligent than the one who is not deceived’. For the one who deceives is more just because he has done what he has promised, and the one who is deceived is more intelligent, for whoever is not insensible is easily captured by the pleasure of words.”) Text and trans. for Gorg. in A. Laks and G. W. Most (eds) Early Greek Philosophy VIII, Sophists 1, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2016. The words attributed to Gorgias are written in bold. For a supposed Gorgianic theory of tragedy in its connection with the issue of the power of the λόγος on the emotions, cf. Gorg. Hel. 9 (D24LM=B11DK) and 14 (D24LM=B11DK); also T. S. Duncan, “Gorgias’ Theories of Art”, The Classical Journal 33 (1938), 402-15; C. P. Segal, “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 66 (1962), 99-155; J. Romilly, “Gorgias et le pouvoir de la poésie”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 93 (1973), 155-62; W. Leszl, “Il potere della parola in Gorgia e in Platone”, Siculorum Gymnasium 38 (1985), 65-80; G. Ricciardelli, “La potenza della parola in Gorgia e in Platone”, Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale 45 (2003), 199-209. R. S. Liebert, Tragic Pleasure from Homer to Plato, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 106-11, 159 explores the connection between Gorgias’ Hellen and the critique of poetry in Republic X. On Gorgias’ conception of πάθει μάθος, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 331-2.
Cf. παθήματα in 511d-e, within the context of the divided line, as well as 2.2 above on the various meanings of πάθος and its interchangeability with πάθημα.
In 584e, Plato claims that those who do not experience truth (ἄπειροι ἀληθείας; cf. 519b-c) do not make sound judgements on issues regarding pleasure and pain, one of his main concerns in his critique of poetry in book X.
This research is funded by national funds through the FCT—Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., under the Concurso de Estímulo ao Emprego Científico—CEECIND/02734/2018. I am indebted to the two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments and suggestions, which contributed to improving this essay significantly.
Haut de page