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Dossier : L'Empeiria chez Platon

The Tragic Passions Do Not Teach

Plato’s Revaluation of πάθει μάθος in Republic X
Paulo Lima

Résumé

Résumé : In this essay, I would like to reconsider a few aspects of Plato’s critique of tragic poetry in Republic X. I intend to demonstrate that Plato is totally opposed to all the key aspects of the tragic conception of learning through suffering (πάθει μάθος). The tragic passions (πάθη) nurture the irrational part of the soul and promote the former’s control over the latter. Such an effect is based on ignorance and produces injustice in the soul. However, this does not mean that Plato would not accept any form of connection between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν. His educational model in the Republic, in its connection with the divided line and the doctrine of the tripartite soul, allows us to conclude that he accepts a certain version of πάθει μάθος. Indeed, he leaves room for a possible meaning for the proverb, an eminently philosophical one: that learning results from an experience (πάθος) of truth conceived as the culmination of a continued educational endeavour. It can be said, therefore, that for Plato πάθει μάθος means learning through the experience of truth, when the soul is affected by the latter and acquires a (just) disposition determined by it. Far from involving any kind of suffering, this experience is in itself purely pleasurable.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Guiding questions

1According to the well-known verdict of Republic X, the poets must be expelled from the city because they nourish the irrational part of the soul by making an ignorant audience succumb to the passions of pleasure and suffering. Without intending to dispute that this is the general thesis that Plato upholds in the Republic, I would like to reconsider a few aspects of his reflection on tragic poetry in the light of two main concerns (hoping that this might sharpen our perception of what the Platonic thesis means).

2First: What is the relationship between the tragic passions of pleasure and suffering, as explored by the tragic poets, and Plato’s claim that the harmony of the individual soul (as well as the harmony of the city) must be secured by the prevalence of the rational constituent over the other constituents of the soul? Second and most importantly: In what sense does Plato’s solution to this problem involve a reassessment of πάθει μάθος? And does his reassessment mean a rejection of this tradition or a different conception of it?

3The first question is abundantly considered in scholarship on the Republic and will serve here only as the background necessary to adequately understand the meaning and range of Plato’s revaluation of πάθει μάθος; so I will be as brief as possible about it. The second set of questions represents my fundamental concern in this essay and is where I believe I can add something to our understanding of Republic X; which means that it is the point that will occupy me the longest on the present occasion.

4Throughout the essay, I use πάθει μάθος as a general formula for the idea that one learns from suffering, being aware that it is only one of the formulations such an idea takes on. It is not, however, a random choice, as it is its best-known formula (cf. Aesch. Ag. 177).

1.2. Plato’s place in the development of the πάθει μάθος tradition

  • 1 H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, (...)

5The close connection between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν, according to which one learns from suffering, goes back as far as Homer and has a long tradition in ancient Greek culture. Dörrie’s study1 is still the most complete and systematic on the subject; so it is impossible to begin to ascertain Plato’s place in this tradition without first considering his position on this particular issue. It is against the backdrop of his position that I will try to fully describe the problem I will be dealing with here and further clarify what my contribution to the topic of πάθει μάθος in Plato is.

  • 2 τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον […] (“What do I deserve to h (...)
  • 3 ἃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ λέγω, ὦ Ἀγάθων, μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παθημάτων γνόντα εὐλα (...)
  • 4 This is Dörrie’s thesis, but the phrase may also have a literal meaning, thus pointing to Alcibiade (...)
  • 5 Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθαὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύ (...)
  • 6 ἅτ’ οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη, καὶ ἁπάσης ψυχῆς ὅσῃ ἂν μέλῃ τὸ προσῆκον (...)
  • 7 It should be noted, however, that the meaning of the term is not exactly the same in both cases. In (...)

6Two kinds of passage from Plato are cited and commented on by Dörrie. First of all, passages in which there is an explicit reference to the tradition of πάθει μάθος: Ap. 36b,2 where Socrates alludes to one of the usual meanings of the proverb (that a fool only learns from suffering), suggesting that it is not applicable to his case, since his condemnation will result from him having dedicated his life to philosophical reflection; Symp. 222b,3 where Alcibiades advises Agathon not to be deceived by Socrates—not to be another example of the proverb according to which the fool only learns from their own suffering—but to learn from the suffering of others like him, who have already been deceived by Socrates into thinking that he was the lover when in fact he was the beloved (Alcibiades is making an ironic use of the proverb here, as ἐρωτικὰ παθήματα are not real sufferings4). And secondly, passages in which Plato deals with issues concerning the connection between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν but without directly referring to the proverb: Phd. 79d,5 Phdr. 247c.6 In both cases, Plato makes a positive use of πάθος—unlike the mostly negative use he makes of the notion throughout his work—based on which it means a pure state of the soul in which the latter is experiencing truth.7

7Besides these isolated passages, from which he does not develop any Platonic conception of the proverb, Dörrie presents a general view of Plato’s understanding of the relationship between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν according to which the passions (suffering and pleasure) do not give rise to learning; this suggests that the philosopher would not have approved of the proverb in any of its possible meanings.

  • 8 So is, more recently, A. I. Mintz, “Plato, The Poets, and The Philosophical Turn in the Relationshi (...)
  • 9 Dörrie himself carries out an investigation into the meaning of the proverb for the tragedians: cf. (...)

8The following analysis of the Platonic revaluation of πάθει μάθος in Republic X aims to complement Dörrie’s study, which is silent on this text8 that seems all the more relevant because it deals, inter alia, with the tragic genre, where the proverb has a marked presence and conveys a fundamental message concerning human learning that frequently occurs in tragedy.9 During my analysis, it will be key to ascertain whether or not, and in exactly what terms, Republic X confirms the view that Dörrie suggests was held by Plato, namely that the proverb—and the link between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν in general—represents, all things considered, a piece of false wisdom.

  • 10 Cf. R. Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (...)

9It is important to note that this essay only aims to consider a Platonic critique, that of Republic X, of one tradition often present in tragedy, namely that one learns through suffering. Both tragedy and Plato’s dialogues are polyphonic and neither proposes any educational doctrine without reservation. On the one hand, tragedy sometimes presents a conception of suffering as not leading to any form of learning (cf. e.g. Euripides’ Hecuba and Trojan Women). On the other hand, Plato’s dialogues are multifaceted and Socrates, in the Republic itself, plays at times with philosophical views that seem divergent.10

2. Key elements of the doctrinal background to Republic X

  • 11 In sections 2.1-2.3, preference will be given to the basic systematic interrelationship between the (...)
  • 12 At least in some of the reference commentaries on the criticism of poetry in Republic X—cf. J. Adam (...)

10As it is located at the end of the Republic, book X—especially, the critique of poetry as μίμησις—involves many of the doctrines set out throughout Plato’s opus magnum. Since what I am interested in exploring here represents only one particular aspect of the Platonic critique of tragic poetry in Republic X, I will try to indicate only—and for reasons of space, in a very schematic way—some elements of three of the central doctrines of the Republic in their interrelationship: the so-called divided line, the tripartition of the soul and Plato’s educational programme.11 Although in a simplified and somewhat imprecise way, such a critique of tragic poetry alludes to these doctrines, without the consideration of which it becomes more difficult to fully understand the Platonic revaluation of πάθει μάθος in the context of Republic X (not least because, as I will try to point out, in all of them there is a terminology linked to affections and knowledge, directly and indirectly associated with παθεῖν/μαθεῖν and therefore with the tradition of πάθει μάθος). Like his criticism of mimetic poetry in Republic II and III, Socrates’ critique of poetry in book X is motivated above all by an educational concern.12 In Republic X, this critique is supported by the doctrine of μίμησις—which clearly refers to the divided line—conceived as a corruption (λώβη) of the mind, a thesis closely associated with the tripartite conception of the human soul.

  • 13 595a1-3: Καὶ μήν, ἦν δἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ᾠκίζομ (...)
  • 14 595a5-b3: Τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέ (...)
  • 15 595b5-9: Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι—οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλ (...)
  • 16 595c1-5: Ῥητέον, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει (...)
  • 17 At this stage, Socrates’ theses are only being announced and still need to be explained and duly su (...)

11As on many other occasions in Plato’s dialogues, the beginning of the discussion in Republic X is essential for defining its framework, and there the centrality of the educational issue becomes clear. Socrates begins by saying that, because of its imitative nature, poetry13 cannot be accepted in the city and that this becomes even clearer than before after the three parts of the human soul have been determined,14 because poetic μίμησις corrupts the mind.15 But what is at the centre of the discussion is the revaluation of poetry as the mainstay of human education in the city, a status it has traditionally had above all because of Homer—the educator of Greece and the master of the tragic poets16—and that is why it is important to consider its status as a mimetic activity and whether or not it corrupts the mind.17

2.1. Some essential points of Plato’s educational programme in the Republic

12To a large extent, this prevalence of the education question in Republic X represents a particular case of what happens in Plato’s magnum opus as a whole where, due to such prevalence, many of its fundamental moments—for example, the divided line and the doctrine of the tripartition of the soul—are framed within the theory of education, whose importance only seems to be superseded by the ethical-political issue. For this reason, let us first consider, very schematically, some aspects of Plato’s educational programme that will be important to better understand his criticism of poetry in book X.

  • 18 Of course, the first stages of Plato’s educational programme are designed for all citizens of the i (...)

13In books II and III, Socrates begins to present the first stages of the rulers’ education,18 which is decisive for establishing justice in the city (376c-d). Among the fundamental prescriptions of these first stages is the prohibition of stories—such as those told by Homer in the Iliad and the Odyssey—which depict heroes complaining and lamenting: the wise man that the future ruler must become does not find the death of his loved ones fearful (387b-8a); or which depict them being overcome by laughter: rulers must not develop a penchant for laughter, as this produces a violent change in the soul (388e-9b). Rulers should not practise μίμησις, since they have only one task, which is to watch over the freedom of the city (395b-c), and it is impossible to imitate many activities well or to do all those things that μίμησις imitates (394e-5b). They can, exceptionally, imitate the virtues that they need to acquire from childhood—such as courage, temperance, piety, freedom and the like (395c)—but not vices, because μίμησις, if carried out from an early age and throughout life, becomes a natural disposition of the body, voice and mind (κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν) (395c-d). For these reasons, the poet who imitates all things must be expelled from the city and replaced by a poet or storyteller who imitates the diction of the decent man (398a-b).

  • 19 On this last point, cf. M.-N. Ribas, La Querelle de l’expérience: Aristote, Platon, Isocrate, Paris (...)
  • 20 As already said above, this is just a very schematic and incomplete overview of Plato’s educational (...)

14In book VI, Socrates begins the discussion, which will continue in Republic VII, on what kind of knowledge (μαθήματα) rulers should acquire and what kind of exercises they should perform (502c-d). Since rulers will have to be philosophers (503b), their education will have to be thorough, involving tests that certify not only the firmness of their character in the face of fear (φόβος) and pleasure (ἡδονή), but also whether they are capable of enduring the learning process that leads to the highest knowledge (τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα) (503e-4a). It is a long journey, requiring no less effort (οὐχ ἧττον πονητέον) to learn than physical exercise (504d), and whose ultimate goal is to reach τὸ μέγιστον μάθημα, the idea of the good on which justice and all the other virtues depend (505a). Πόνος indicates the arduous effort involved in carrying out a particular undertaking, as well as the resulting physical and mental exhaustion and suffering. In the case of Platos educational programme in the Republic, suffering relates to the physical and intellectual activities that the future rulers must perform and which lead them to the ultimate goal of knowing the idea of the good. It is, therefore, suffering related to the activities of the future rulers that precede the knowledge of the ideas and prepare them for this experience of truth (cf. 511d-e). Thus, suffering does not concern this experience as such, which is rather characterised by pure pleasure, one devoid of any mixture with suffering (cf. 585d-e).19 The specific education of rulers is therefore a conversion to the good (518d) and is made up of the acquisition of various μαθήματα such as arithmetic (522c-6c), geometry (526c-7d), astronomy (527d-8a), stereometry (528a-9a) and harmony (530c-1c). All this represents a study preliminary to dialectics, which ultimately leads to the knowledge of the good (531d-2b).20

2.2. The main structure and findings of the divided line

15The learning curriculum from the hypothetical sciences to dialectics finds an ontological and epistemological foundation in the divided line, where Socrates presents a progressive division of the different degrees of being from the lowest to the highest accompanied by the progression of the respective degrees of knowledge. The latter, especially with regard to the degrees of knowledge of intelligible reality, reflects the movement proper to the specific education of the future rulers (510b).

16Following the criterion of the degree of clarity/truth (509d-10a, 511e), Socrates divides the multiplicity of beings and the respective forms of knowledge into two fundamental sections, which are in turn internally divided into two subsections. As far as the degrees of being/reality are concerned, the main division is between the visible and intelligible worlds. In the former, we find images—shadows, reflections in water or on solid, smooth and shiny surfaces (509e-10a)—and, above them, living beings, natural things and artefacts (510a). In the latter, there is, first of all, the lower class of intelligible beings, the hypotheses, which are the subject of sciences such as geometry (511a-b). And above all other realities, there is the second class of intelligible beings—which is accessed through dialectics—made up of ideas and, above them, the unhypothetical first principle which is the idea of the good (511b-c).

  • 21 For detailed discussions of the divided line, cf. J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Ox (...)

17With regard to the forms of experience (παθήματα) of these different degrees of reality, Socrates presents the following correspondences (511d-e). In the sphere of the visible, images are grasped through conjecture (εἰκασία), while living beings and the like are grasped through belief (πίστις). On the intelligible plane, the lower intelligibles are known by thought (διάνοια), while the higher ones are known by understanding (νόησις). Later, in Republic VII, Socrates groups conjecture and belief under opinion (δόξα) and thought and understanding/knowledge (νόησις/ἐπιστήμη) under νόησις (cf. 533e-4a).21

  • 22 In other passages (cf. R. 519b, 584e, Phlb. 38c-9b), he points to the same phenomenon with the voca (...)

18In ancient Greek, particularly in Platos work, πάθος has a multiplicity of meanings centred on the idea that the term expresses what happens to someone (cf. R. 612a, Tht. 193c) and affects them in a certain way, what someone goes through, whether good or bad (cf. Phd. 96a). In short, it is the idea of experience. In this sense, Plato uses the term to refer to the misfortune or calamity that befalls someone (cf. R. 380a), but also to the emotions or passions that someone feels (cf. Phdr. 265b). Πάθημα also points to the idea of experience, to what happens to someone, including the suffering or calamity that someone goes through (cf. Smp. 222b). The term also indicates emotion or affection (cf. R. 437b, 511d, Phlb. 186c) and the disposition acquired by someone as a result of a particular experience (cf. Phd. 79d). Πάθημα and πάθος therefore have very similar meanings and are, to a large extent, interchangeable. In some decisive passages (cf. Phd. 79d, R. 511d-e), Plato uses πάθημα to refer to the experience of truth, the souls direct contact with truth and the way in which the latter disposes the former.22 This is the case in the passage from the divided line now under focus:

  • 23 511d7-e5: Ἱκανώτατα, ἦν δἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα (...)

‘You have understood it very adequately’, I said. ‘Now take these four functions which are found in the soul in addition to these four segments—understanding at the highest level, thought at the second, belief at the third, and apprehension by images at the bottom—and put them in proportion according as you think each contains a measure of clarity to the degree that its objects contain a measure of truth.’23

19At stake here are affections of the soul. Plato is speaking of παθήματα in relation to modes of cognition with varying degrees of purity. However, as he indicates at the end, in all of them there is a more or less perfect contact with truth. Consequently, all παθήματα involve this contact with truth. According to another passage from the Republic, at least the most perfect form of knowledge does not seem to cause any kind of suffering in the soul but rather a pure pleasure (cf. 2.1 above).

2.3. Justice and injustice in the doctrine of the tripartition of the soul

20The tripartition doctrine identifies the various elements of the psychological constitution of the human being, whose different hierarchies—which result in forms of justice or injustice in the soul—reflect a good or bad upbringing (τροφή)/education (παιδεία). The importance of the doctrine of tripartition is based on an analogy between the character of the city and that of the individual, as well as the idea that the former derives from the latter (435e-6a).

21There are three distinct and irreducible elements in each individual soul: a rational or reasoning element (τὸ λογιστικόν); an irrational or appetitive element (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), which loves, feels hunger, thirst and all other desires and tends towards certain pleasures (τινῶν ἡδονῶν) (439d); and finally, a spirited or passionate one (τὸ θυμοειδές) which, according to its nature, supports τὸ λογιστικόν if it is not destroyed by a bad upbringing (ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρῇ) (440e-1a).

  • 24 For space reasons, I will not be able to explore the connection between the tripartition of the sou (...)

22In line with the city/individual analogy, the latter is just in the same way as the former: if the city is just when each of its classes fulfils its function (441c-d; cf. 434c), the individual is just when each of their elements does what it should according to its nature (441d-e). Τὸ λογιστικόν is in charge because it is wise—because it knows what belongs to each part of the soul and to the whole of it (cf. 442c)—and it has foresight (προμηθεία) about the latter (441e). Τὸ θυμοειδές should obey τὸ λογιστικόν and help it (441e). Together, τὸ λογιστικόν and τὸ θυμοειδές govern τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, when they are well brought up and educated: in the case of the former, with fine speeches and knowledge (λόγοις τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθήμασιν) (cf. 441e-2b).24

  • 25 On Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul in the Republic and elsewhere, cf. J. Annas, An Introducti (...)

23Injustice and the other vices—such as licentiousness, cowardice and ignorance—express an internal conflict within the soul: some elements unduly interfere with the functions of others by trying to govern the soul as a whole when it does not belong to their nature to do so (444b). If justice is the hierarchisation of the elements of the soul according to their nature, injustice is their hierarchisation contrary to their nature (444d). Life is not worth living (βιωτόν) in injustice, when the nature of the life principle itself (sc. the ψυχή) is upset and destroyed (τῆς φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης) (445a-b).25

3. Plato’s reassessment of πάθει μάθος in his critique of tragic poetry in Republic X

3.1. The question of πάθει μάθος in book X of the Republic

24Having established that the problem of education is the central concern of book X (595a1-608c2) and the doctrinal background against which the latter unfolds, we must now move on to consider the Platonic revaluation of πάθει μάθος in the context of his critique of tragic poetry in Republic X. The presence of the issue of πάθει μάθος in book X is not obvious, not least because no version of the proverb “learning from suffering” occurs there.

  • 26 Cf. in particular Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen D (...)
  • 27 In this essay, in addition to considering the Platonic appropriation in Republic X and in close con (...)

25In order to understand in what sense it can be said that the tradition of πάθει μάθος is being reconsidered by Plato in his critique of tragic poetry in Republic X, we must be aware that this tradition has taken on different manifestations. According to Dörrie,26 we are in the presence of the πάθει μάθος tradition when there are occurrences of the proverb that “one learns from suffering”—which is defined by the sound and semantic play between variants of παθεῖν and μαθεῖν—or when ideas involving the relationship between suffering and learning are involved (even if the aforementioned kinds of word play or the use of variants of παθεῖν/μαθεῖν do not take place). It is therefore decisive to indicate that the variation within the tradition of πάθει μάθος is not restricted to the verbal dimension, but also extends to the semantic one, since the relationship between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν has been appropriated in multiple ways, which are quite different and sometimes even contradictory to each other.27

  • 28 Republic X is saturated with terminology relating to the meaning of παθεῖν/μαθεῖν. Ιn the passage c (...)

26In this sense, although Republic X does not contain the proverb in any of its forms, the Platonic critique of tragic poetry in book X involves a reappraisal of the tradition of πάθει μάθος. A trace of this is the multiple occurrence of cognates of παθεῖν/μαθεῖν and, in general, of vocabulary concerning πάθη (suffering/pleasure) and learning/knowledge.28 More importantly, such occurrences are associated with a pivotal problem in book X, which is the relationship between the tragic πάθη and learning/knowledge (already at stake at key moments in the doctrinal background of Republic X, as I tried to emphasise earlier). As we shall see below, a certain conception of the πάθει μάθος tradition—more precisely, of the meaning of suffering, the nature and content of learning, the identity of the agent of human suffering, etc.—is frequently present in tragedy, which indicates that the Platonic revaluation of the tragic genre must involve (if only implicitly) a reassessment of this tradition; or at least, that such a revaluation can be better understood if it is viewed through the issue of πάθει μάθος.

3.2. The critique of tragic poetry in Republic X: its status and implications

  • 29 Although the myth of Er deals with the issue of immortality and the rewards of justice, I think tha (...)
  • 30 The idea that Homer is a tragic poet is already suggested in book III (387b-8d), when Socrates quot (...)

27The section that, strictly speaking, Plato dedicates to criticising tragic poetry is quite small (less than a Stephanus page: 605c7-6c1) when compared to the other sections that make up his general criticism of poetry in book X (595a1-608c2). I would argue that, despite this, it is one of the most important, if not the most important, of the first of the three main parts that make up Republic X: 1. the critique of poetry (595a1-608c2); 2. the immortality of the soul and the rewards of justice (608c3-14a5); 3. the myth of Er (614a6-21d4).29 This is the moment when the critique of poetry reveals itself to be the most substantial, the culmination of all the research carried out in book X, the section in which the entire conceptual arsenal (educational, ontological-epistemological, moral-psychological) coined so far throughout Republic X—and previously based above all on the three doctrines I briefly outlined earlier—finds application in the analysis of one of the fundamental cultural manifestations of fourth-century BC Athens. The centrality of the section in which tragedy is criticised becomes clear if we take into account that Homer is considered in Republic X to be a tragic poet, the master of the tragedians (595c2-4, 607a2-3). It is as a result of the short, but dense and sharp critical reflection on tragedy that the culminating thesis of the expulsion of Homer and poetry in general from the city (607a4-9, b2-4, e5-8b4)—announced at the very beginning of the discussion (595a5-b3)—gains greater persuasive force.30

  • 31 Based on H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen (...)
  • 32 For H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denk (...)

28Since we are going to address the Platonic critique of tragedy in Republic X from the angle of the πάθει μάθος tradition, let us now take a general look at the tragic conception of this piece of traditional wisdom.31 In close connection with the tradition of πάθει μάθος, many tragedies advocate a certain model of learning/education (παιδεία) through the experience of suffering.32 Next, we will briefly analyse a few key passages in this respect from some of Aeschylus’ and Sophocles’ tragedies considered eminent examples of the tragic genre.

  • 33 Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων
  • 34 τὰ δ᾿ ἔνθεν οὔτ᾿ εἶδον οὔτ᾿ ἐννέπω·
  • 35 On the meaning of the adverb in this passage, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn (...)
  • 36 Temperance refers to the moderation and self-restraint of the σώφρων. The idea is that the sufferin (...)
  • 37 However, cf. K. Clinton, “The ‘Hymn to Zeus’, πάθει μάθος, and the End of the Parodos of ‘Agamemnon (...)

29In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (cf. above all 174-81,33 248-5234), learning from suffering (177: πάθει μάθος; cf. 250: παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν) is superior (178: κυρίως35) to all other kinds of learning, including rational ones. Zeus is the agent of suffering, the one who makes human beings suffer, thereby giving them insight into how things are (176: φρονεῖν) and leading them to temperance (181: σωφρονεῖν)36. By inflicting suffering, Zeus therefore aims to transform ὕβρις into σωφροσύνη (cf. Soph. Ant. 1350-3), which corresponds to a complete change in humans’ way of being.37 According to a model frequently present in tragedy, true learning does not take place through a human being’s voluntary and planned action, but through suffering that is inflicted on them in spite of their will (cf. Aesch. Ag. 180-1: παρ-|κοντας; 250: Δίκα […] ἐπιρρέπει).

  • 38 Cf. the myth of Protagoras in Pl. Pr. 320c-2d, where the sophist tells us that the human community (...)
  • 39 Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denk (...)
  • 40 […] τἀν βροτοῖς δὲ πήματα
  • 41 τὰ λοιπά μου κλυοῦσα θαυμάσῃ πλέον,

30In Prometheus Bound (cf. the long ῥῆσις by Prometheus in 436-71, 476-506), we find an opposite example to the one who learns from suffering and becomes temperate. First of all, Prometheus is the one who, as his name suggests, has the power of foresight and is therefore prepared to face future events. Βut, in the context of the Aeschylean play in which he is the protagonist, he refuses to learn from the punishment inflicted on him by Zeus. In this way, Prometheus does not become σώφρων, he does not stop being the ὑβριστής who stole the divine fire to give it to humans. This play by Aeschylus indicates that, regardless of all the skills and devices (477: τέχνας τε καὶ πόρους) that human beings can acquire as a gift from the Titan or from their own discoveries—as is the case, e.g., in the first stasimon of the Antigone (332-75)—human education (παιδεία) is only complete with what is learnt from Zeus.38 By insisting on his ὕβρις even after being punished by the disposer of all things (526: πάντα νέμων), Prometheus does not recognise this cosmic law39 and continues to assert himself as the great educator of mankind (442-4,40 476-741).

  • 42 Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denk (...)
  • 43 πολλῷ τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαιμονίας
  • 44 According to D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, (...)

31Πάθει μάθος, as understood in Aeschylean and Sophoclean tragedy, thus constitutes a fundamental component of a certain tragic worldview, according to which there is a justification for suffering because it fulfils a function in the just order of the universe and is a divine instrument for human education42. From the perspective of the conception of πάθει μάθος in Aeschylus and Sophocles, a central point to emphasise, which is clear from the γνώμη in the final verses of the Antigone (1348-53),43 is that learning through suffering is not only acquired by those who suffer —that is, by the tragic characters—but also by those who watch and listen to the performance of the plays. In a word, it is possible to learn from the suffering of others as portrayed in tragic representations.44

32Because this tragic worldview is largely rooted in the above conception of the fundamental learning/education of the human being, it is also to this that Socrates must be reacting when he elaborates his critique of tragedy in Republic X. What is this reaction? Is Socrates totally against such a conception, or are there aspects in which he agrees with it? If so, which ones? In the following sections, it will be key to address these questions.

3.3. Analysis of Republic X (605c7-6c1)

3.3.1. Its immediate context and main claims

  • 45 This is despite the fact that, in the allusions to such doctrines, there are some simplifications, (...)

33The structure of the part dedicated to the criticism of poetry generally reflects the three levels of analysis that derive from its close connection with the doctrines on which it is based: in addition to the educational framework that I have already dealt with here (595a1-c6; cf. section 2 above), this part includes a first, ontological-epistemological enquiry (595c9-602b12), a second one of a moral-psychological nature (602c1-6d8) and an epilogue in which the need to expel poetry and the poets from the just city is reaffirmed (606e1-8b5).45

34The passage in which tragic poetry is considered most intensively (605c7-6c1) is part of the second moment mentioned above and, as such, is mostly in the field of moral psychology. Despite this, it decisively involves fundamental theses previously established in the context of the ontological-epistemological enquiry. Several reasons associated with Plato’s exposition strategy contribute to this: although his claims are targeted against poetry as a whole, crucial references are also made throughout book X to tragedy in particular; the evaluation of the latter is a special—and central—part of the general appraisal of poetry; between tragic poetry and poetry tout court there is only a very thin and easy to cross boundary, which is why just as the conclusions concerning tragedy can be considered valid for all poetry so the reverse is also true.

35Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the longest and most substantial passages dedicated to the assessment of tragedy, and in order to get an overall sense of the claims against poetry in Republic X that can minimally contextualise my analysis, I will briefly and schematically list such claims.

36The points established in the ontological-epistemological enquiry aim to demonstrate and develop the idea that all poetry is μίμησις (595a5, b5-7, 600e6-8, 2b9-11). Poetry in general is doubly removed from reality (597e3-8, 8b6-8, 602c1-2). It produces images of images (600e6-8) and has an all-encompassing capacity (596c4-9, 8c8-d2). It does not possess knowledge (601c1-2, 2a10-11, b1-4, 6-9) nor, consequently, is it capable of transmitting knowledge (600c4-8). It is, however, capable of deceiving the ignorant (598c3-5) and, in their eyes, appearing to have knowledge (598c8-d7) and to convey it (600a7-b1). This conception of poetry is the result of an analogy between poetry and painting, based on the idea that both are imitative activities (597e3-7).

37In the psychological-moral enquiry, poetry is considered mostly autonomously, outside the framework of the analogy with painting, with the aim of determining its psychological effects on the audience, particularly with regard to the moral disposition of the soul (603c1-4; but cf. 605a8-b2). Generally speaking, poetry fosters the emotions and the irrational part of the soul (603b3-5, 4d8-10). Tragedy, in particular, represents a greater danger than any other poetic manifestation, as it is able to fascinate and corrupt even decent human beings, with the exception of a few (605c7-9, 6b6-9). It maximises the audience’s emotions and nurtures the lower part of the soul, giving it mastery over the latter as a whole, including its rational part (605b2-c5, 6d4-7). The audience openly indulges in shameful emotions such as suffering and despair, using as a pretext that it is not their own affairs but the affairs of others (605c11-6b9). But Socrates maintains that pleasure and sympathy with the suffering of others end up having harmful consequences for the audience’s own affairs, as they tend to replicate the same emotional behaviour when they themselves have to face misfortunes (606b6-9). As a sort of appendix to his appreciation of tragedy, Socrates concludes the same thing about the audience’s enjoyment of the ridiculous in comedy, which ends up translating into the transformation of humans into ridiculous beings in their own lives (606c2-9). And this also happens, mutatis mutandis, with the other forms of poetry (607a6-9).

  • 46 For a thorough discussion of the many and complex problems raised by Plato’s critique of poetry in (...)

38The epilogue determines the expulsion of the poets from the ideal city, based on the two fundamental conclusions of the two levels of enquiry that I have briefly outlined: they do not have a true knowledge of reality (608a8-b1) and, in close connection with this, they contribute to the destruction of the natural harmony of the soul leading to a just life (608b1-4).46

3.3.2. A closer inspection

39Within the framework of this general presentation, let us now take a closer look at the Socratic analysis of tragedy in book X, which will allow us to determine more precisely in what sense it is also (if only implicitly) a critique of the tragic conception of πάθει μάθος.

40Socrates introduces his densest and fiercest analysis of tragedy on the grounds that it is the kind of poetry with the most damaging effect on the harmony of the human soul (or, at least, the one in which such an effect is most easily visible and identifiable):

  • 47 605c7-9: Οὐ μέντοι πω τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λω (...)

However, I don’t think we’ve yet delivered the greatest part of our indictment against it, namely that its capability of harming even decent people, apart from a very few, is in my view most damning.47

  • 48 In Plato, particularly in the sections of the Republic dealing with the tripartition of the soul an (...)
  • 49 It is clear that when Plato speaks of the ἐπιεικεῖς, he is mainly referring to the καλοὶ καγαθοί, i (...)

41First of all, it should be emphasised that the effect Socrates is referring to is that of disharmony or imbalance in the natural power relationships—in the normative sense of the term “natural”—between the constituent elements of the human soul.48 It is suggested, from the outset, that what is at stake is a weakening or rendering inoperative (605c7: λωβᾶσθαι; cf. λώβη in 595b5 and λελωβημένον in 611b9) of the rational part and a strengthening and becoming dominant of the irrational one (to make use of one of the conceptual simplifications mentioned in n44 above). The incomparable scale of this effect produced by tragedy is evident in the type of human being whose soul it is capable of upsetting: the decent or moderate one (605c7: τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς; cf. 605c10: οἱ [...] βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν), i.e. those who possess a just soul and are inclined in accordance with the soul’s nature—which dictates that the rational part dominates over the irrational one—but whose reason and character have not been strengthened by the higher education intended for the rulers of the ideal city.49 Socrates makes the point, which implicitly allows him to reaffirm the centrality of the superior education of the rulers, that there are very few human beings (cf. 605c7, 6b5-6) who are able to resist the superlatively admirable and dangerous effects (605c8: πάνδεινόν) of tragedy: those, it is implied, who have fully developed the soul’s rational part as a result of their learning the hypothetical sciences and dialectics, allowing them to achieve knowledge of reality and a firm, just disposition of the soul (cf. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 above).

42Socrates bases his analysis on the form and, above all, the content of tragic performances (which once again include Homer):

  • 50 605c11-d6: [] οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν μιμουμένο (...)

[…] you see the best of us, I imagine, listen to Homer and any of the other tragic poets representing the grief of one of the heroes as they pour forth a long speech in their lamentation, even singing and beating their breasts, and, you know, we enjoy it, we surrender ourselves to it and suffer along with the characters as we follow and eagerly applaud whoever thus affects us in this way the most as a good poet.50

  • 51 It is important to emphasise that in this passage (605c11-d6) Socrates uses the second person plura (...)

43According to Socrates, tragic performances show heroes giving long speeches (605d2: μακρὰν ῥῆσιν; cf. Aesch. Prom. 436-71, 476-506) and gesticulating dramatically, with words of lamentation (605d2: ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς; cf. 387d1, e7) and behaviours of despair that express a certain attitude towards misfortune. On the audience’s side, there is a perverse mirroring of the heroes’ emotions: the spectators of tragedy give themselves over to the heroes’ pain, their lament and despair, and try to feel the same as them (605d4: συμπάσχοντες). But what they get out of this psychological and emotional operation is, at the same time, a feeling of pleasure. Maximising this perverse feeling (605d5: οὕτω) is, for them, the criterion of the best poetry and the best poet.51

  • 52 These are, on closer inspection, the two major forms of approach to tragic poetry in 605c7-6c1. The (...)

44The subtlety of Socrates’ analysis lies in the way he identifies a dissolution and crossing of boundaries first on the strict level of emotions, as we have just considered, and then between the ontological spheres in which emotions can manifest themselves.52 Resorting to common sense and popular morality, Socrates argues that what he has shown about the way human beings, in their overwhelming majority, behave towards tragic passions is totally opposite (605d7-8: ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ), because they are fictionalised πάθη, to what they themselves consider to be the right attitude when the same misfortunes actually happen to them. On the one hand, when it comes to a real situation concerning their own life, they think they should be calm, firm and courageous:

  • 53 605d8-e2: Ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν (...)

But whenever a private affliction arises in any of us, do you again notice that we are proud of ourselves on doing the opposite, if we can stay calm and resolute as this is the manly thing to do, while what we approved of before is what women do.53

45On the other, when it is a fictional situation and concerns someone else, they praise and take pleasure in something that, if it concerned them, would be unworthy, shameful and disgusting:

  • 54 605e4-7: Ἦ καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτόν τις μὴ (...)

‘Then is this approval truly good’, I asked, ‘when we see such a man as we would not accept in ourselves, but would rather be ashamed of, and yet we don’t feel a loathing toward the sight but enjoy and commend it?’54

46Based on this dichotomy between reality and fiction, Socrates proceeds to demonstrate what happens to each of the two fundamental parts of the soul when situations are real and when they are fictional:

  • 55 606a3-b9: Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακ (...)

If you bear in mind what was forcibly suppressed in the case of our personal misfortunes and craved for tears and the satisfaction of a good cry, since it is its nature to desire these things, this is precisely what is satisfied and gratified by the poets. That which is naturally the best part of us, because it has not been sufficiently educated by reason and habit, relaxes its restraint on the lamenting part, in that it is watching the suffering of other people, and there is nothing shameful for it in praising and pitying another person who claims to be good, but grieves inappropriately; but it thinks that the pleasure it gets is profit, and it wouldn’t let itself be deprived of it by renouncing the whole poetical performance. You see, I think only a few people have it in them to calculate that enjoyment from the sufferings of others is bound to strike nearer home, since having fostered a strong sense of pity in viewing the former, it’s not easy to control it in one’s own emotions.55

47In real situations, the irrational part of the soul—that which by nature desires to grieve (606a5: φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν; cf. 439d)—must be restrained and, by implication, the best part of us (606a6-7: τὸ […] φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν), the rational one (606b5: λογίζεσθαι; cf. 439d)—that which is made to control the irrational part—must be nurtured and strengthened. In the context of tragic fiction, the opposite happens in the soul of the spectator: the irrational part, which should be restrained in the context of real situations, is nurtured, while the rational part, which should be strengthened in such situations, loses its control over the irrational one.

  • 56 On the importance of this dichotomy for understanding Plato’s greatest accusation against (tragic) (...)

48It is clear from Socrates’ indications that the audience of tragedy is exposed to tragic passions because it presupposes an unyielding dichotomy between what happens in reality and what happens when the audience is confronted with other people’s πάθη in a fictional context.56 As it is a question of other people’s πάθη—so apparently nothing to do with their own—the spectator’s soul has no problem feeling sorry for the grieving heroes. Furthermore, by considering the latter as good men—which, according to Platonic criteria, they are not—the spectator’s soul does not think it shameful to feel sorry for the heroes’ lamentations and take pleasure in such a spectacle, even if it recognises that the way the latter grieve would not be appropriate if it were real. A decisive aspect at this point in Socrates’ analysis is that it is the best part of us—i.e., the logical or rational part—that opens the door to its own weakening and neglect in restricting the irrational one. In other words, it seems that the rational part is at the helm even when it comes to giving up control of the soul, so that it seems to be by its action that control is handed over to the irrational part. Socrates attributes this giving up of the rational part, which only a few escape, to its insufficient education both in terms of reasoning and character formation (cf. 606b1: οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει). In terms of character, this educational deficiency does not allow the soul to block entry to tragic πάθη. In terms of knowledge, it prevents the soul from being aware that sympathising with the others’ πάθη manifested in tragic representations has a harmful effect on one’s own life.

49The contagion between spheres of existence that is implicitly denied by the spectators of tragedy is affirmed by Socrates and constitutes a fundamental cornerstone of his critique of tragedy in Republic X. According to Socrates’ argument, the decisive element that dissolves the boundary between reality and fiction—and thus also between one’s own πάθη and those of others—is the perverse pleasure felt by the spectator when sympathising with (i.e., having the same πάθη as) the tragic heroes. On the one hand, it is pleasure that seduces and motivates sympathy; it is pleasure that strengthens the irrational component and promotes its domination over the soul as a whole. On the other, because of its perverse nature —i.e., because it is a πάθος that is felt concomitantly with the tragic πάθη (pain, suffering, anguish, despair, etc.)—it is pleasure that carries these πάθη from the plane of fiction to that of reality, from the plane of other people’s affairs to one’s own affairs. The boundary dissolution thus made possible by perverse pleasure is a factor in the real corruption of the spectator’s soul. Socrates’ argument about the corrupting effects of sympathy with tragic πάθη goes so far as to produce a quasi-unification of the planes of reality and fiction. It seems that, for Socrates, πάθη—in this case, the tragic ones—are always really felt, regardless of whether they concern real, personal situations or fictional situations regarding others. In this way, the corruption they produce in the soul is always a real one, which creates a bad habit and ends up determining the spectator’s behaviour in real situations.

  • 57 Cf. 606b5, where the object of λογίζεσθαι (“that enjoyment from the sufferings of others is bound t (...)

50By pointing to the deficit in the education of character and reason as what allows the whole process of corruption of the soul by tragedy, Socrates is simultaneously indicating that only the full education of character and reason (cf. 2.1 above) can prevent this from happening. It should be borne in mind that, according to Socrates, only a few can escape the corruption of the soul by tragedy, so that the education in question must include the study of the hypothetical sciences and dialectics by the future rulers. First of all, only a just character can prevent the dominance of the irrational part over the soul through sympathy with the tragic πάθη. Secondly, it is the full development of reason that allows one—through knowledge of the good and how justice is formed in the soul—to be aware that sympathy with the tragic heroes’ πάθη corrupts the soul and prevents it from achieving individual (and for that matter, collective) justice. In other words, it allows one to be in possession of the remedy (φάρμακον) referred to by Socrates in 595b7.57

3.3.3. Republic X (605c7-6c1) and the tragic conception of πάθει μάθος

51At this point, having considered the tragic conception of πάθει μάθος and the Platonic critique of tragedy in the Republic (as well as the doctrines underlying it), we are in a position to better understand in what sense book X involves a critical revaluation of such a conception. Everything we have sought to analyse throughout the essay allows us to now formulate the terms of this revaluation in a precise, clear and succinct way.

  • 58 In this sense, Plato is presenting a conception of the relationship between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν that (...)
  • 59 This view is diametrically opposed to Gorgias’, for whom the deception (ἀπάτη) produced by tragedy (...)

52Let us then take a brief look at the main aspects of the Platonic rejection of the conception of πάθει μάθος in tragedy, as this rejection is implied in Republic X. The (tragic) poets do not possess nor convey knowledge to their audience (600c4-8, 1c1-2, 2a10-11, b1-4, 6-9), although they appear to their ignorant audience as having it and transmitting it through their poetry (598c3-5, 8-d7, 600a7-b1). As a result, the depiction by the poets, as well as the feeling by the characters, of tragic πάθη do not involve the possession of knowledge nor teach or educate the audience. In fact, it is not just that they do not educate: they prevent any education (either of character or reason) and they can set back the education that has already been achieved (cf. the effect of the tragic πάθη on οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς in 605c7-9; also n47 above on the meaning of the term ἐπιεικής) as long as it is not fully accomplished (cf. πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων in 605c9, i.e. those who are fully educated and therefore cannot be corrupted by tragic poetry). As we have just indicated in some detail, the tragic πάθη corrupt the soul by strengthening the irrational part and weakening the rational one. The experience that educates is not that of suffering or evil (πάθος) sent by Zeus as punishment (cf. 3.2 above, notably nn32-3), but that of the active and voluntary effort (πόνος; cf. 504d) of learning according to a gradual and previously planned educational programme, whose aim is to lead to the formation of a just character and the knowledge of the idea of the good (cf. the entire section 2 of this essay).58 Although the effort required to complete the educational programme involves suffering, this does not respect the knowledge of truth but only the development of the intellectual capacities that make it possible (cf. 2.1 and 2.2 above). In this sense, suffering is linked to the insistence by the future rulers on overcoming their intellectual limitations and the resistance that their minds offer during this process. However, the experience of truth, which is what ultimately corresponds to the acquisition of knowledge and learning, does not in itself imply any suffering but rather sheer pleasure (cf. 585d-e). Such a learning process cannot be carried out through the πάθη of the heroes as they are represented in tragedy, because sympathising with other people’s πάθη in a fictional context corrupts the spectator’s soul and leads them to behave unworthily in real situations of misfortune (cf. 606a3-b9; and 387b-8a, with section 2.1 above); it can only be carried out by taking as a point of reference the real situations in which one experiences one’s own misfortunes and the way in which the rational part of the soul dictates that one should deal with them (i.e., calmly, firmly and courageously: cf. 605d8-e2).59

4. Conclusion

  • 60 Cf. παθήματα in 511d-e, within the context of the divided line, as well as 2.2 above on the various (...)
  • 61 In 584e, Plato claims that those who do not experience truth (ἄπειροι ἀληθείας; cf. 519b-c) do not (...)

53According to what we have just seen, in Republic X Plato is totally opposed to all the key aspects of the tragic conception of πάθει μάθος. The tragic πάθη nurture the irrational part of the soul and promote the latter’s control over it. Such an effect is, on the one hand, based on ignorance—on not being in possession of the φάρμακον that can prevent this from happening— and promotes this very ignorance in the audience. On the other hand, it produces a moral flaw (i.e., injustice, the state of the soul in which its parts do not carry out their proper, natural function). But does this mean that Plato does not accept any version of the proverb, any form of connection between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν? In my view (pace Dörrie; cf. 1.2 above), what we have seen here about his educational model—in particular, when we think about its connection with the divided line and the doctrine of the tripartite soul—allows us to conclude that he accepts a certain version of the proverb, which above all involves an understanding of πάθος that is not the one that he himself rightly attributes to tragedy and is many times reflected in his own use of the term (i.e., πάθος as suffering, misfortune, evil; cf. 1 and 2.2 above). Indeed, Plato leaves room for a possible meaning for the proverb, an eminently philosophical one: that learning (μάθος; cf. μαθήματα in 502c-d, 3e-4a) results from a πάθος of truth (i.e., an experience of truth or direct contact with it and, above all, with the idea of the good60) conceived as the culmination of a continued educational endeavour.61 It can therefore be said that, for Plato, πάθει μάθος means learning through the experience of truth, when the soul is affected by the latter and acquires a (just) disposition determined by it (cf. 441e-2b; also Phd. 79d, Phdr. 247c, quoted in nn. 5-6 above). It is important to emphasise that the πάθος that brings about the μάθος amounting to the knowledge of the ideas, especially that of the good, does not involve suffering but rather pure pleasure (cf. 585d-e). When it comes to this most fundamental learning, the meaning of the proverb admitted by Plato excludes the presence of any kind of suffering bringing it about. Instead, what brings about such a learning is the affection of the soul corresponding to the latter’s experience of truth.

  • 62 This research is funded by national funds through the FCT—Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I (...)

54This is the meaning of πάθει μάθος that Plato accepts in his work, indeed a philosophical one. As we have seen (cf. 2.1 and 2.2 above), there is a kind of suffering involved in the educational programme sketched out in the Republic, which is connected with the effort applied by the future rulers in fulfilling it to the end. This suffering has to do with the future rulers’ natural resistance to overcoming the cognitive limitations of their souls and seeks to prepare them for the πάθος of truth. However, it is not involved in this πάθος as such in any way. If there is any room for suffering in the Platonic understanding of the proverb, it must be reserved for this preparatory moment. The meaning of πάθει μάθος admitted by Plato is that of a learning consisting in an experience of truth which provides pure pleasure.62

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Notes

1 H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956. For a critical assessment of Dörrie’s book, cf. J. Tate, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, The Classical Review 8 (1958), 79-80; W. Burkert, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gymnasium 66 (1959), 168-70; F. Solmsen, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gnomon 31 (1959), 469-75.

2 τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον […] (“What do I deserve to have done to me, or pay? Just because I didn’t lead a quiet life […]”). Text and trans. for Ap. and Phd. in C. Emlyn-Jones and W. Preddy (eds) Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2017. Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 312n5, 319.

3 ἃ δὴ καὶ σοὶ λέγω, ὦ Ἀγάθων, μὴ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παθημάτων γνόντα εὐλαβηθῆναι, καὶ μὴ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὥσπερ νήπιον παθόντα γνῶναι. (“And what I’m telling you too, Agathon, is don’t be deceived by this man, but learning from what we have experienced take care and don’t, like the proverb, learn it, like a fool, from suffering.”) Text and trans. for Symp. and Phdr. in C. Emlyn-Jones and W. Preddy (eds) Plato: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2022. Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 314-15, 317.

4 This is Dörrie’s thesis, but the phrase may also have a literal meaning, thus pointing to Alcibiades’ real suffering.

5 Ὅταν δέ γε αὐτὴ καθαὑτὴν σκοπῇ, ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον, καὶ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ μετἐκείνου τε γίγνεται, ὅτανπερ αὐτὴ καθαὑτὴν γένηται καὶ ἐξῇ αὐτῇ, καὶ πέπαυταί τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ἅτε τοιούτων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται; (“But whenever the soul examines something on its own, it departs there to the pure, the eternal, the immortal and constant state of being, and being akin to it, always gets to be with the absolute whenever it comes to be by itself, and exists for itself; and it ceases its wandering about and, around those entities, it’s always in the same constant state because it’s in contact with beings of that sort: and this experience it goes through is known as wisdom, isn’t it?”) Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 330n1, 333-4.

6 ἅτ’ οὖν θεοῦ διάνοια νῷ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ ἀκηράτῳ τρεφομένη, καὶ ἁπάσης ψυχῆς ὅσῃ ἂν μέλῃ τὸ προσῆκον δέξασθαι, ἰδοῦσα διὰ χρόνου τὸ ὂν ἀγαπᾷ τε καὶ θεωροῦσα τἀληθῆ τρέφεται καὶ εὐπαθεῖ […] (“So in as much as a god’s intelligence is nurtured both by pure mind and intellect, and that of every soul to the extent that it is concerned to receive its proper nourishment, in the course of time it sees reality and is both well content and in contemplating the truth it is fed and made happy […]”). Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 333-4.

7 It should be noted, however, that the meaning of the term is not exactly the same in both cases. In the Phaedrus passage, εὐπαθεῖ expresses the more determinate idea of being happy.

8 So is, more recently, A. I. Mintz, “Plato, The Poets, and The Philosophical Turn in the Relationship between Teaching, Learning, and Suffering”, Studies in Philosophy of Education 41 (2022), 259-71.

9 Dörrie himself carries out an investigation into the meaning of the proverb for the tragedians: cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 324-30, 331-2; also section 3.2 below.

10 Cf. R. Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato’s Dialogues, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 165-250. The Platonic revaluation in Republic X of the πάθει μάθος in tragedy is just one of the many ways in which Plato uses and transforms typically tragic themes in his dialogues. On the subject in general, cf. A. Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, 60-92. For more specific accounts, cf. D. Munteanu, Tragic Pathos: Pity and Fear in Greek Philosophy and Tragedy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 52-69 (reassessment of the tragic emotions of pity and fear); A. Capra, Plato’s Four Muses: The Phaedrus and the Poetics of Philosophy, Washington DC, Center for Hellenic Studies, 2014 (reappropriation of poetic inspiration).

11 In sections 2.1-2.3, preference will be given to the basic systematic interrelationship between these doctrines regardless of the order of their appearance and exposition in Plato’s Republic.

12 At least in some of the reference commentaries on the criticism of poetry in Republic X—cf. J. Adam (ed.) The Republic of Plato, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1902 (2nd ed.), 384-5; J. Ferguson (ed.) Plato: Republic X, Bristol, Bristol Classical Press, 1957 (repr. 2005), 31; S. Halliwell (ed.) Plato: Republic X, Oxford, Aris & Phillips, 1988, 105; M. Vegetti (ed.) Platone: La Repubblica, vol. VII, Naples, Bibliopolis, 2007, 13-14—the focus is mainly on the moral, psychological, ontological and epistemological dimensions of Plato’s analysis and not enough importance is given to the educational concern that underlies it and which, as we shall see later, determines what is criticised, how it is criticised and the foundations of such criticism. A good exception is P. Murray (ed.) Plato on Poetry, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 14-24, 185-6. Cf. also N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023, 126-88 (the best reading so far of the educational motive of Plato’s critique of poetry in book X).

13 595a1-3: Καὶ μήν, ἦν δἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ᾠκίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω. (“‘Well now’, I said, ‘I have in mind many other things about the state which more than anything lead me to believe that we were right in the way we founded it, but I say that with poetry in mind especially.’”) Text and trans. for R. in C. Emlyn-Jones and W. Preddy (eds) Plato: Republic, 2 vols, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2013.

14 595a5-b3: Τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διῄρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδη. (“Not to allow in anything which is in any way imitative, because it now appears even clearer that we must not allow it in, especially, so it seems to me, now that each of the parts of the soul have been defined.”) Cf. 607b2-4, 607e5-8b4.

15 595b5-9: Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρῆσθαι—οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς μιμητικούς—λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα. (“Speaking between ourselves, for you won’t denounce me to the tragic poets and all the rest of the writers who use imitation, all this kind of thing seems to me to be a corruption of the minds of their audiences who don’t have the remedy of knowing exactly what it is really like.”)

16 595c1-5: Ῥητέον, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· καίτοι φιλία γέ τίς με καὶ αἰδὼς ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὁμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι. ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ, ἀλλ’, ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον. (“‘I must speak out’, I said, ‘And yet I’ve had a kind of love and respect for Homer since my childhood, which makes me reluctant to speak. You see, I think he’s been the first teacher and guide to all the good tragic poets of today. But the fact is that a man mustn’t be respected above truth; so, as I say, I must speak out.’” Trans. slightly modified) Cf. 606e1-7a4, 8a1-3. On the conception of Homer as the educator of the Greeks, cf. E. A. Havelock, Preface to Plato, Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press, 1963, 61-86; the excellent essay by W. J. Verdenius, Homer, the Educator of the Greeks, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1970; P. Murray (ed.) Plato on Poetry, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 14-24.

17 At this stage, Socrates’ theses are only being announced and still need to be explained and duly substantiated. Their clarification within the framework of the question that occupies me in this essay will also be left for later. Cf. 3.2 and 3.3 below.

18 Of course, the first stages of Plato’s educational programme are designed for all citizens of the ideal city. However, I intend to address his programme from the perspective of the future rulers of the city, for only they will experience the programme in its entirety.

19 On this last point, cf. M.-N. Ribas, La Querelle de l’expérience: Aristote, Platon, Isocrate, Paris, Garnier, 2019, 329.

20 As already said above, this is just a very schematic and incomplete overview of Plato’s educational programme, with the modest purpose of highlighting some stages in it and key terms in their characterisation that will be important in my account of the πάθει μάθος tradition in Republic X. For a thorough discussion of the Platonic theory of education in the Republic, cf. R. L. Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic of Plato, London, MacMillan, 1901 (2nd ed.), 77-130, 259-93; R. L. Nettleship, The Theory of Education in Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1935; C. Gill, “Plato and the Education of Character”, Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie 67 (1985), 1-26; S. Scolnicov, Plato’s Metaphysics of Education, London, Routledge, 1988, 112-19, 148-50; A. Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 80-2; C. D. C. Reeve, “Blindness and Reorientation: Education and the Acquisition of Knowledge in the Republic”, in Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 209-28; R. Kamtekar, “Plato on Education and Art”, in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019 (2nd ed.), 605-26.

21 For detailed discussions of the divided line, cf. J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, 242-71; K. Dorter, “The Divided Line and the Structure of Plato’s Republic”, History of Philosophy Quarterly 21 (2004), 1-20; N. Denyer, “Sun and Line: The Role of the Good”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 284-309; H. H. Benson, “Plato’s Philosophical Method in the Republic: The Divided Line (510a-11d)”, in Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 188-208; J. H. Lesher, “The Meaning of ‘saphêneia’ in Plato’s Divided Line”, in Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 171-87.

22 In other passages (cf. R. 519b, 584e, Phlb. 38c-9b), he points to the same phenomenon with the vocabulary of ἐμπειρία. On the Platonic conception of an intellectual, philosophical experience of truth, cf. M.-N. Ribas, La Querelle de l’expérience: Aristote, Platon, Isocrate, Paris, Garnier, 2019, 10, 23, 24, 38, 324, 329. Nightingale shows how the Platonic conception of this experience of truth results from a transformation of the traditional Greek practice of θεωρία. In this sense, her analysis emphasises the visual aspect of Plato’s (metaphorical) description of such an experience. Cf. A. Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, 72-93.

23 511d7-e5: Ἱκανώτατα, ἦν δἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτω, διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον, ὥσπερ ἐφοἷς ἐστιν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν.

24 For space reasons, I will not be able to explore the connection between the tripartition of the soul and the divided line, but it seems clear and not particularly controversial that the constitution of the just (or unjust) soul depends on the good (or bad) education of its rational element through knowledge (or lack thereof) of reality/truth.

25 On Plato’s theory of the tripartite soul in the Republic and elsewhere, cf. J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, 109-52; T. H. Irwin, “The Parts of the Soul and the Cardinal Virtues (Book IV, 427d-448e)”, in Plato: Politeia, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005 (2nd ed.), 119-40; G. R. F. Ferrari, “The Three-Part Soul”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 165-201; C. Shields, “Plato’s Divided Soul”, in Plato’s Republic: A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 147-70; R. Kamtekar, “The Powers of Plato’s Tripartite Psychology”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2008), 127-50; M. C. Nussbaum, “Commentary on Kamtekar”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2008), 151-61; R. Singpurwalla, “The Tripartite Theory of Motivation in Plato’s Republic”, Philosophy Compass 5 (2010), 880-92; R. Singpurwalla, “Plato and Tripartition of Soul”, in The History of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. 1: Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity, London, Routledge, 2018, 101-19.

26 Cf. in particular Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 307-12.

27 In this essay, in addition to considering the Platonic appropriation in Republic X and in close connection with this, I will briefly refer to the appropriations by the tragedians (cf. 3.2 below), Pindar and Gorgias (cf. below, 3.3.3, especially nn53-4). On the semantic variation, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 312-38; and for the latter appropriations, p. 316-19, 324-30 and 331-2 respectively.

28 Republic X is saturated with terminology relating to the meaning of παθεῖν/μαθεῖν. Ιn the passage concerning the critique of tragic poetry alone (605c7-6c1), the occurrences are numerous: cf. 605d2, d2-3, d4, d5, d8, e6-7, 6a3-4, a4, a6, a6-7, a7-b1, b1-2, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b9.

29 Although the myth of Er deals with the issue of immortality and the rewards of justice, I think that its length and richness make it stand out as an independent part of book X.

30 The idea that Homer is a tragic poet is already suggested in book III (387b-8d), when Socrates quotes passages from the Iliad and the Odyssey in which πάθη associated with tragedy are depicted.

31 Based on H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 326-30, whose interpretation seems to me to be accurate for the most part.

32 For H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 329, such a model is present in the works of Aeschylus and Sophocles but is absent from those of Euripides. On the meaning of πάθει μάθος in Euripides—a question that will not concern me here—cf. D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984.

33 Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων

τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν,

τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδώ-

σαντα, τὸν “πάθει μάθος”

θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν.

στάζει δ᾿ ἀνθ᾿ ὕπνου πρὸ καρδίας

μνησιπήμων πόνος· καὶ παρ᾿ ἅ-

κοντας ἦλθε σωφρονεῖν.

(“One who gladly utters loud songs of victory to Zeus

will score a perfect hit on the target of wisdom—

Zeus who set mortals on the road

to understanding, who made

‘learning by suffering’ into an effective law.

There drips before the heart, instead of sleep,

the misery of pain recalled: good sense comes to men

even against their will.”)

Text and trans. for Aesch. Ag. in A. H. Sommerstein (ed.) Aeschylus, Oresteia: Agamemnon, Libation-Bearers, Eumenides, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2009.

34 τὰ δ᾿ ἔνθεν οὔτ᾿ εἶδον οὔτ᾿ ἐννέπω·

τέχναι δὲ Κάλχαντος οὐκ ἄκραντοι.

Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει·

τὸ μέλλον δ᾿ ἐπει γένοιτ᾿

ἂν κλύοις […].

(“What followed I did not see and do not say;

but the skilled prophecies of Calchas do not fail of fulfilment.

Over the one side Justice looms, that they may suffer and learn.

The future one will hear about

when it happens […].”)

35 On the meaning of the adverb in this passage, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 325; also F. Solmsen, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gnomon 31 (1959), 470.

36 Temperance refers to the moderation and self-restraint of the σώφρων. The idea is that the suffering caused by Zeus follows from an excessive or licentious behaviour on the part of the ὑβριστής and ultimately leads human beings to become aware of the moral limits of their actions in a universe ruled by the gods and to adopt a balanced attitude that does not violate divine laws. On the possible meanings of the polysemic term σωφροσύνη, cf. H. North, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1966; A. Rademaker, Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint: Polysemy & Persuasive Use of an Ancient Greek Value Term, Leiden, Brill, 2004; C. Moore, The Virtue of Agency: Sôphrosunê and Self-Constitution in Classical Greece, New York, Oxford University Press, 2023.

37 However, cf. K. Clinton, “The ‘Hymn to Zeus’, πάθει μάθος, and the End of the Parodos of ‘Agamemnon’”, Traditio 75 (1979), 4, 13 and D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984, 42-4. For both scholars, this tragedy does not end with Agamemnon becoming temperate or acquiring any kind of ethical knowledge.

38 Cf. the myth of Protagoras in Pl. Pr. 320c-2d, where the sophist tells us that the human community only finds a solid foundation in the αἰδῶς and δίκη granted by Zeus to humans (322c-d).

39 Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 328; also F. Solmsen, “Review of Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung”, Gnomon 31 (1959), 470.

40 […] τἀν βροτοῖς δὲ πήματα

ἀκούσαθ᾿, ὥς σφας νηπίους ὄντας τὸ πρὶν

ἔννους ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους.

(“[…] Instead, listen to the miseries of mortals, how infantile they were before I made them intelligent and possessed of understanding.”)

Text and trans. for Aesch. Prom. in A. H. Sommerstein (ed.) Aeschylus: Persians, Seven against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus Bound, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2009.

41 τὰ λοιπά μου κλυοῦσα θαυμάσῃ πλέον,

οἵας τέχνας τε καὶ πόρους ἐμησάμην.

(“When you have heard the rest of what I have to say, you will be even more amazed by all the skills and devices that I have contrived.”)

42 Cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 329-30; also D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984, 39-40, 44 with respect to Aeschylus. But Lombard argues that the justification of suffering is no longer Sophocles’ concern (cf. p. 45, 49).

43 πολλῷ τὸ φρονεῖν εὐδαιμονίας

πρῶτον ὑπάρχει· χρὴ δὲ τά γ᾿ ἐς θεοὺς

μηδὲν ἀσεπτεῖν· μεγάλοι δὲ λόγοι

μεγάλας πληγὰς τῶν ὑπεραύχων

ἀποτείσαντες

γήρᾳ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐδίδαξαν.

(“Good sense is by far the chief part of happiness; and we must not be impious towards the gods. The great words of boasters are always punished with great blows, and as they grow old teach them wisdom.”)

Text and trans. for Soph. Ant. in H. Lloyd-Jones (ed.) Sophocles: Antigone, The Women of Trachis, Philoctetes, Oedipus at Colonus, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1994.

44 According to D. B. Lombard, Πάθει μάθος in Three Tragedies of Euripides, Ph.D. diss., Johannesburg, Rand Afrikaans University, 1984, 49, this is also the aim of Aesch. Ag. as an illustration of learning from suffering. Cf. the use of the proverb by Alcibiades in Pl. Symp. 222b, which I mentioned in the introductory remarks. More on this important issue of learning through the suffering of others in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 below.

45 This is despite the fact that, in the allusions to such doctrines, there are some simplifications, such as the use of the notion of ignorance (600e6-1a3) instead of that of conjecture (533e) and the application of the dichotomy lower part/upper part of the soul (603a4-8) instead of using the concepts resulting from the doctrine of the tripartite soul (439d, 440e-1a). But the simplification is acceptable, since it does not disturb the effectiveness of the analysis, and can be explained by the feasibility of an enquiry that is intended to be concise and to the point and, above all, as a rhetorical dimension demanded by the greater vehemence of the criticism when compared to that carried out in books II-III. For a detailed investigation into the structure of book X and its importance for the Republic as a whole, cf. G. F. Else, The Structure and Date of Book X of Plato’s Republic, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1972; D. Babut, “L’unité du livre X de la ‘République’ et sa fonction dans le dialogue”, Bulletin de l’Association Guillaume Budé 1 (1983), 31-54.

46 For a thorough discussion of the many and complex problems raised by Plato’s critique of poetry in Republic X, cf. J. Tate, “‘Imitation’ in Plato’s Republic”, The Classical Quarterly 22 (1928), 16-23; W. J. Verdenius, “Platon et la poésie”, Mnemosyne 12 (1944), 118-50; N. Demand, “Plato and the Painters”, Phoenix 29 (1975), 1-20; A. Nehamas, “Plato on Imitation and Poetry in Republic 10”, in Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts, Totowa NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1982, 47-78; E. Belfiore, “A Theory of Imitation in Plato’s Republic”, Transactions of the American Philological Association 114 (1984), 121-46; S. Halliwell, “Plato and Aristotle on the Denial of Tragedy”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 30 (1984), 49-71; C. Osborne, “The Repudiation of Representation in Plato’s Republic and Its Repercussions”, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 33 (1987), 53-73; A. Nehamas, “Plato and the Mass Media”, The Monist 71 (1988), 214-34; G. R. F. Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry”, in The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 1: Classical Criticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, 92-148; S. Halliwell, “Plato and the Psychology of Drama”, in Antike Dramentheorien und ihre Rezeption, Stuttgart, M&P Verlag, 1992, 55-73; C. Janaway, Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995; S. Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, 37-147; S. Halliwell, “The Republic’s Two Critiques of Poetry (Book II 376c-398b, Book X 595a-608b)”, in Plato: Politeia, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005 (2nd ed.), 313-32; J. Moss, “What is Imitative Poetry and Why Is it Bad?”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 414-44; P. Destrée, “Happiness, Justice, and Poetry in Plato’s Republic”, Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 25 (2009), 243-69; R. Kamtekar, “Plato on Education and Art”, in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019 (2nd ed.), 605-26; R. Muller, “Platon et les poètes dans la République”, Philosophie antique 20 (2020), 215-36; N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023.

47 605c7-9: Οὐ μέντοι πω τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβᾶσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινόν που.

48 In Plato, particularly in the sections of the Republic dealing with the tripartition of the soul and the harmful effects of (tragic) poetry on the soul’s harmony, the term “natural” (φύσει) has a normative meaning in that it points to the rule according to which something must be arranged in order to fulfil its proper function. Cf. 606a3-b9 (quoted in the main text below), where Socrates is implicitly referring to what he said a while ago when presenting his doctrine of the soul’s tripartition (cf. notably 441e-2b and 2.3 above).

49 It is clear that when Plato speaks of the ἐπιεικεῖς, he is mainly referring to the καλοὶ καγαθοί, i.e. those who embody the traditional ideal of virtue (ἀρετή)—cf. N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023, 126-88. However, it seems to me that Plato makes an ambiguous use of the term, according to which ἐπιεικεῖς also designates those who, having already completed a certain part of the educational curriculum outlined in books II-III, do not yet possess the philosopher-rulers’ intellectual development and knowledge. Cf. 409a7, where Socrates describes the ἐπιεικεῖς in a way that strongly reminds us of the education of the young in the ideal city (cf. 387b-8a, 8e-9b, 98a-b).

50 605c11-d6: [] οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ’ ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.

51 It is important to emphasise that in this passage (605c11-d6) Socrates uses the second person plural. This indicates that what is at stake is something that the whole community—including Socrates and his interlocutors—is exposed to. The decision to ban the poets from the ideal city is based on this shared experience of the emotional effects of poetry. Cf. the excellent analysis of this key aspect in N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023, 126-88.

52 These are, on closer inspection, the two major forms of approach to tragic poetry in 605c7-6c1. The first explains the seduction exerted by tragedy, while the second gives an account of the pretext for letting down one’s guard against such a seduction. The second form of approach is the one that determines the rest of the analysis and constitutes its most important section.

53 605d8-e2: Ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπῃνοῦμεν.

54 605e4-7: Ἦ καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ ὁρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτόν τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἀλλ’ αἰσχύνοιτο ἄν, μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ χαίρειν τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν;

55 606a3-b9: Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὂν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότ’ ἐστὶν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον· τὸ δὲ φύσει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίησιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὂν εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στερηθῆναι καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ὀλίγοις τισὶν μέτεστιν ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεινὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν.

56 On the importance of this dichotomy for understanding Plato’s greatest accusation against (tragic) poetry, cf. E. Belfiore, “Plato’s Greatest Accusation against Poetry”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 9 (1983), 39-62; C. Janaway, Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 136; N. Le Merrer, Le différend entre philosophie et poésie: de la critique des homérolâtres au renvoi du poète mimétique (Platon, République, X, 595a-608b), Ph.D. diss., École Normale Supérieure, 2023, 140-1 (with n258).

57 Cf. 606b5, where the object of λογίζεσθαι (“that enjoyment from the sufferings of others is bound to strike nearer home”) specifies that of τὸ εἰδέναι in 595b7 (“what it [sc. poetry] is really like”) and, consequently, the meaning of the φάρμακον requested.

58 In this sense, Plato is presenting a conception of the relationship between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν that is very close to Pindar’s. On learning in advance (προμαθεῖν) and the role of πόνος in it, cf. Pind. O. 8.59-61:

[…] τὸ διδάξασθαι δέ τοι

εἰδότι ῥᾴτερον· ἄγνωμον δὲ τὸ μὴ προμαθεῖν·

κουφότεραι γὰρ ἀπειράτων φρένες.

(“[…] Truly teaching is easier for one

who knows, and it is foolish not to have learned in advance,

for less weighty are the minds of men without experience.”)

Text and trans. in W. H. Race (ed.) Pindar: Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1997. Cf. also Pind. Isth. 1.40-1:

[…] ὁ πονή-

σαις δὲ νόῳ καὶ προμάθειαν φέρει.

(“[…] One

who has toiled also gains foresight for his mind.”)

Text and trans. in W. H. Race (ed.) Pindar: Nemean Odes, Isthmian Odes, Fragments, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1997. For the connection of these passages with the πάθει μάθος tradition, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 316-18.

59 This view is diametrically opposed to Gorgias’, for whom the deception (ἀπάτη) produced by tragedy testifies to the greater wisdom of the one who is deceived: cf. Plut. Gloria Ath. 5,348 C (D35LM=B23DK): ἤνθησε δ’ ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ διεβοήθη, θαυμαστὸν ἀκρόαμα καὶ θέαμα τῶν τότ’ ἀνθρώπων γενομένη καὶ παρασχοῦσα τοῖς μύθοις καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀπάτην, ὡς Γοργίας φησίν, ἣν ὅ τ’ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος, ὅτι τοῦθ’ ὑποσχόμενος πεποίηκεν· ὁ δ’ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος· εὐάλωτον γὰρ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς λόγων τὸ μὴ ἀναίσθητον. (“Tragedy flourished and was acclaimed—it was a marvelous spectacle for the ears and eyes of the men who lived in those times, which produced by means of stories and sufferings, ‘a deception’, as Gorgias says, ‘in which the one who deceives is more just than the one who does not deceive, and the one who is deceived is more intelligent than the one who is not deceived’. For the one who deceives is more just because he has done what he has promised, and the one who is deceived is more intelligent, for whoever is not insensible is easily captured by the pleasure of words.”) Text and trans. for Gorg. in A. Laks and G. W. Most (eds) Early Greek Philosophy VIII, Sophists 1, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2016. The words attributed to Gorgias are written in bold. For a supposed Gorgianic theory of tragedy in its connection with the issue of the power of the λόγος on the emotions, cf. Gorg. Hel. 9 (D24LM=B11DK) and 14 (D24LM=B11DK); also T. S. Duncan, “Gorgias’ Theories of Art”, The Classical Journal 33 (1938), 402-15; C. P. Segal, “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos”, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 66 (1962), 99-155; J. Romilly, “Gorgias et le pouvoir de la poésie”, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 93 (1973), 155-62; W. Leszl, “Il potere della parola in Gorgia e in Platone”, Siculorum Gymnasium 38 (1985), 65-80; G. Ricciardelli, La potenza della parola in Gorgia e in Platone”, Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale 45 (2003), 199-209. R. S. Liebert, Tragic Pleasure from Homer to Plato, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 106-11, 159 explores the connection between Gorgias’ Hellen and the critique of poetry in Republic X. On Gorgias’ conception of πάθει μάθος, cf. H. Dörrie, Leid und Erfahrung: Die Wort- und Sinn-Verbindung παθεῖν-μαθεῖν im griechischen Denken, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1956, 331-2.

60 Cf. παθήματα in 511d-e, within the context of the divided line, as well as 2.2 above on the various meanings of πάθος and its interchangeability with πάθημα.

61 In 584e, Plato claims that those who do not experience truth (ἄπειροι ἀληθείας; cf. 519b-c) do not make sound judgements on issues regarding pleasure and pain, one of his main concerns in his critique of poetry in book X.

62 This research is funded by national funds through the FCT—Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., under the Concurso de Estímulo ao Emprego Científico—CEECIND/02734/2018. I am indebted to the two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable comments and suggestions, which contributed to improving this essay significantly.

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Paulo Lima, « The Tragic Passions Do Not Teach »Études platoniciennes [En ligne], 20 | 2025, mis en ligne le 22 janvier 2026, consulté le 12 avril 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/etudesplatoniciennes/3599 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/15lfv

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Paulo Lima

Philosophy Department of NOVA University Lisbon/IFILNOVA

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