• 1 Plut. Per. 4.2: ὁ δὲ Δάμων ἔοικεν ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστὴς καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα πρὸς (...)
• 2 Plut. Per. 4.3-4: οὐ μὴν ἔλαθεν ὁ Δάμων τῇ λύρᾳ παρακαλύμματι χρώμενος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς μεγαλοπράγμων καὶ φ (...)
• 3 Cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4, Plut. Per. 4, Arist. 1, Nic. 6, Liban. Socr. Apol. 1.157 with Wallace (2 (...)

1In a well-known passage of Plutarch’s Pericles, Damon is distinctively depicted as a ‘first-rate sophist (ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστής)’ who ‘found refuge behind the name of music in order to disguise his cleverness before the multitude, while he associated with Pericles, as if he were the trainer and teacher of this champion of politics’.1 Plutarch continues by observing that Damon’s attempt to ‘employ the lyre as a veil’2 turned out to be extremely unsuccessful, as he was ostracised and became the object of the satirical verve of comic poets: a double rejection, physical and cultural, seems to be the ultimate destiny for this important member of Pericles’ circle.3

• 4 For recent examples of this approach, cf. Delattre (2007), Delattre (1994) and Ritoók (2001), who b (...)

2Plutarch’s testimony stands in sharp contrast to the mainstream scholarly representation of Damon: a conservative musicologist with some vague ‘Pythagoreanising’ leaning4 who, in Plato’s view, personified the ‘ideal’ authority with regard to musical matters. But what if Plutarch’s testimony presents a historically legitimate alternative? And, on the other hand, what if the image of Damon that is generally attributed to Plato should be regarded as not such a ‘pure’ and historically reliable one as many scholars seem to believe?

• 5 Cf. the aforementioned Ritoók (2001), Ryffel (1947), Lasserre (1954) and Koller (1954). A different (...)

3In order to assess this last point, it is worth examining what Plato actually wrote about Damon, since many reconstructions of Plato’s views on this historical character seem to be based on fairly imaginative and partial readings of the musical passages in Books 3 and 4 of the Republic.5

• 6 The question of this dialogue’s authenticity has widely been discussed: cf. the recent assessments (...)

5I would like to start from the First Alcibiades,6 a text that has often been overlooked in previous works on Damon. However, in my view it provides a fresh starting point to reconstruct Damon’s intellectual profile and the perspective opened by this apparently ‘minor’ passage allows us to avoid the risk of interpreting all the Platonic references to Damon on the basis of what is regarded as the ‘real’ meaning of the ‘Damonian’ passages of the Republic. While these texts certainly contain very important information for our purposes, they need to be contextualised precisely within Plato’s own agenda in order to be understood correctly and, for these reasons, they will be examined in later sections of this essay.

• 7 Cf. Podlecki (1998), 17-34. See as well Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4, where both the close connection betw (...)
• 8 On the musical activities of Pythocleides, especially in relation to Damon, cf. section 4: ‘Music, (...)

7In just a few lines, Alcibiades presents a very interesting outline of the characters that populated the intellectual environment of Pericles’ youth and maturity: Anaxagoras, Pythocleides and Damon, all generically included in the category of σοφοί.7 Strikingly enough, in such a short description Damon is not explicitly associated with any musical element, the aspect that is generally regarded as the most important feature of this historical character. Instead, the value of his presence is openly associated with his capability to make Pericles a ‘wise man’ (σοφός), just as Pythocleides8 and Anaxagoras allegedly used to do when he was younger.

• 9 The exact same expression (διδάσκαλος μουσικῆς) is used to describe Damon in the pseudo-Platonic Ax (...)

8Bearing in mind the apparently simple, yet rarely emphasised testimony of the Alcibiades, let us move on to the Laches. Damon’s intellectual figure is evoked in numerous passages of this dialogue but, in itself, the abundance of references to him is pretty unsurprising, given that this dialogue is mainly concerned with the educational needs of two well-born young boys, the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias. In contrast with the unusual characterisation of the First Alcibiades, here Damon is presented in a more predictable way, primarily as a teacher of music.9 However, as Nicias subsequently observes, Damon is not only a teacher of music:

• 10 Cf. Soph. 234b1, Resp. 4.426e5, Phaedr. 230b6, Prot. 309b1, Prot. 320c7. Interestingly, in Philod. (...)
• 11 In relation to this, cf. Plato Apol. 20b4-5, the only passage of this text where Socrates uses the (...)

9First of all, we are told that it was Socrates who recommended and introduced Damon to Nicias as a teacher of music for his son. Once more, an apparently minor observation is very precious for our analysis, since the fact that Socrates and Damon knew each other and that Socrates appreciated Damon’s skills, at least to the extent of recommending him as a teacher, is presented as a fairly unproblematic detail of the historical context of the dialogue – a characterisation that would not make much sense if this were not a pretty well-known piece of information. Moreover, in this passage Damon is characterised as being χαριέστατος (‘the most accomplished and graceful’), a very rare adjective in the superlative form in Plato’s prose,10 not only with regard to music but also for some other ‘mysterious’ kind of expertise, which makes him a generally valuable companion for young men who are looking for advanced education.11

• 12 Lach. 199e13-200a3.

10Damon’s special skills are explicitly evoked again later in the dialogue, for instance when Laches, making fun of Nicias’ inability to define what courage is, ironically refers to the big hopes he had in him and in ‘the wisdom he acquired from Damon (τῇ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφίᾳ)’.12 Once more this passage refers to the enigmatic knowledge that Damon transmitted to his associates and pupils, but we again have no specific indications about its nature.

• 13 Cf. Gorgias DK 82 B 11.1.1-3: Κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι (...)

11Luckily, the content of Damon’s σοφία is explicitly examined in the immediately preceding passage, where we are presented with another of Laches’ attempts to make fun of Nicias for his subtle conceptual distinctions, in this case concerning the differences between the notions of fearlessness and courage (Lach. 197b-c). The precise words used to describe Nicias’ ability are illuminating: Laches labels his expertise in playing on subtle abstract nuances as being able to ἑαυτόν κοσμεῖν τῷ λόγῳ (Lach. 197c2-3), an expression that perhaps evokes some Gorgianic echoes.13 But this is not the only reason to think of Damon’s σοφία as a type of ‘sophistic’ wisdom; Socrates himself makes this association explicit in his own following statement, as he tells off Laches for his negative attitude towards Nicias:

• 14 See e.g. Plato Prot. 341c7-8. Cf. Kerferd (1981) chap. 7 for a very useful overview on the subject.
• 15 Cf. Crat. 391b-c and Crat. 384b. Prodicus, in particular, is associated with this theme in numerous (...)
• 16 Cf. the aforementioned Edmunds (2006), as well as the slightly different position defended by Tell (...)

12Finally Damon’s wisdom is given some content: it is clearly associated with Prodicus’ investigations into the correctness of names (ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης) and into the related question of establishing accurate terminological distinctions (ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν), both well-known sophistic preoccupations.14 As Plato tells us in the Cratylus, a dialogue entirely devoted to these questions, sophists of the calibre of Protagoras and Prodicus were famous experts in this τέχνη and expensive teachers of this skill.15 However, in apparent contrast with the recurrent Platonic critical attitude towards the so-called ‘sophists’,16 here Socrates depicts Damon as ‘friend of ours’ (ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος): why does he choose this expression?

• 17 Hipp. maj. 282c1-6 and Resp. 6.496b (Theages). On Socrates’ use of vocatives in Plato’s dialogues, (...)
• 18 Cf. Halliwell (1995), 95: ‘the force of the term hetairos on Socrates’ lips, or on those of his ass (...)

13While, on the one hand, this remark could be interpreted simply as an ironic note that warns the reader not to take the content of Socrates’ words at face value, it does not seem plausible to reduce it just to this function, given that the role attributed to his expertise does not seem completely and obviously negative; moreover, it is worth noting that the expression ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος is quite rare in Plato’s dialogues and is always used by Socrates to designate a character that somehow manages to make a positive contribution to the development of the dialogue.17 Still, why does Damon belong to the category of ‘friends’ or even to that of ‘companions’18? And, also, why does Socrates distinguish between sophistic ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’?

• 19 Personal prestige and wealth in the case of the sophists; the case of Theages is more complex: cf. (...)

14In my view, it is possible to find an answer to these questions by focusing on the actual quality of the intellectual results achieved respectively by the two ‘categories’ of sophists mentioned in Plato. In fact, the Platonic Socrates seems to accept as ‘friends’ those intellectuals who, although ultimately aiming at different ends,19 actually managed to provide some kind of valuable contribution to intellectual research. Despite the fact that, in the case of many sophists, these theoretical achievements were exploited in order to increase one’s prestige and power, Plato seems to think that the quality of the achievements themselves, independently of their actual use, should be recognised and praised.

• 20 Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 360-ff., where the Clouds state that, among the contemporary meteorosophistai, t (...)
• 21 Interestingly, in these passages Socrates undertakes a type of literary analysis of Simonides’ ode (...)
• 22 Prot. 341a1: κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἡ Προδίκου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, ἤτοι ἀπὸ Σιμων (...)
• 23 Prot. 341a5: ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητὴς εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουΐ.
• 24 Cf. Plato Charm. 163d, Meno 96d and Crat. 384b-c: here Socrates specifies that he could afford only (...)
• 25 Prot. 341d6-9: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε (...)
• 26 Cf. Symp. 177b4, where ὁ βέλτιστος Πρόδικος is defined as a χρηστὸς σοφιστής and his Encomium of He (...)

15This attitude is attested also in the characterisation of another ‘good’ sophist20 in Plato’s writings, Prodicus – precisely the person who is presented as Damon’s regular associate in the Laches. Mentioned over forty times in the dialogues, Prodicus is often praised for his interventions and, in general, his character appears to be valuable for the overall development of the philosophical analysis undertaken in the contexts where he is mentioned or appears in person; however, at the same time Plato seems to feel the need to highlight the potential danger of his philosophical approach, if taken entirely seriously, by accompanying these flattering remarks with a light touch of irony. This ambiguity in Plato’s approach to Prodicus’ intellectual figure is demonstrated clearly in a passage from the Protagoras, 339e-342a. Here Socrates, in calling upon Prodicus to help him in interpreting the real meaning of Simonides’ poem,21 describes his linguistic σοφία as ‘divine’ (θεία)22 and even calls himself a disciple of his23 – a declaration that is repeated also in other dialogues and that is never associated with any other sophist.24 This surprising statement is soon clarified by Socrates, as he highlights one aspect of Prodicus’ sophia which is strikingly similar to his own method of inquiry: Prodicus knows how to ‘play’ (παίζειν) with his interlocutors on the subtle differences between near-synonyms, sometimes even concealing what his real opinion is on some specific matter, as happens for instance in this passage of the Protagoras, in order to ‘test’ (ἀποπειρᾶσθαι) other people’s ability to support their own statements (τῷ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν):25 this technique certainly strikes us as very much ‘Socratic’. Therefore, while the definition of Prodicus’ wisdom as ‘divine’ is clearly excessive, nonetheless it represents a sort of first step that helped Socrates to acquire the linguistic skills that subsequently he was to employ in an ethically ‘correct’ way in his quest for virtue.26

• 27 It is also worth noting that in this passage the ‘sinister’ aspect of Prodicus’ skill seems to be r (...)

16It does not seem accidental, then, that the expression ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος, which characterised Damon in the Laches, is the same that the Platonic Socrates uses to illustrate his relationship with Prodicus at Hipp. Maj. 282c1-6:27 both are considered ‘dangerously’ skilled sophists who, nonetheless, deserve to be openly praised and to be considered as ‘companions’ for the useful, if collateral, achievements of their intellectual research.

• 28 Ἁρμονία is a concept that we tend to link to our idea of tonality, though it would be more correct (...)

18First of all, it is necessary to outline briefly the context in which Damon’s name is mentioned in Book 3, his first appearance in the text of the Republic. Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the technical aspects of the musical education that will be imparted to the future Guardians of kallipolis. At the centre of Socrates’ analysis of musical language lies the ethical role that ἁρμονίαι28 and rhythms will play in the educational system of the ideal constitution, specifically by representing particular types of behaviour by means of musical constructions. Applying the same criteria employed to select the appropriate themes to be treated in poetic μῦθοι, Socrates begins his analysis by enumerating the types of behaviour that will not be appropriate for the future φύλακες: indulging in dirges and laments as well as in drunkenness, softness and laziness. Then, after having curiously addressed Glaucon as μουσικός (3.399e1), Socrates asks him to state what musical ἁρμονίαι are suitable to represent those specific ethical dispositions, so that the musical modes associated with undesirable attitudes may be excluded from the musical repertoire available to children in kallipolis.

• 29 On the malleable nature of young minds, cf. Resp. 2.377a11-b5, 2.377c1-6; on the role of μίμησις in (...)

19Subsequently, Socrates moves on to identifying the ‘positive’ ethical characteristics that, instead, need to be expressed by the ἁρμονίαι allowed in the ideal city in order to stimulate the young citizens to imitate them: this form of repeated ‘imitation’, as Socrates emphasises, will help them to interiorise these dispositions in their souls, due to the quasi-magical and pre-rational moulding effect that music exerts on young and malleable people.29 In order to characterise these ‘positive’ models, Socrates presents two separate, but complementary, categories of attitudes and actions to be represented in music: the first will feature the actions and words of a person who, when at war or in otherwise painful circumstances, faces these situations bravely and with self-control; the second will comprehend the actions of a person who, in peaceful times, is capable both of entertaining significant and pleasant relationships with other citizens and of maintaining a well-balanced relationship with himself, being serene and self-controlled. In a more concise formulation, the first musical mode will give musical shape to the virtue of ἀνδρεία, the second to σωφροσύνη, and Glaucon identifies the two ἁρμονίαι respectively with the Dorian and Phrygian.

• 30 3.400a3-4.
• 31 This kind of classification divides the fundamental rhythms on the basis of thesis-arsis pairs (fee (...)
• 32 3.400a7-8. Cf. also Wallace (2005), which contains many useful observations, although some of the a (...)

20Socrates, then, asks Glaucon to make the same type of ‘ethical’ distinction with regard to rhythms30 but, surprisingly, the young man declares himself unable to undertake this task appropriately. Glaucon mentions an elementary, empirical division of rhythms into three categories, on the basis of the ratio established between the internal components of different rhythmical feet,31 but affirms himself incapable of telling Socrates ‘what sorts of life each of them is an imitation of (ποῖα δ’ ὁποίου βίου μιμήματα, λέγειν οὐκ ἔχω)’.32 At this point, Socrates calls on Damon’s expertise in order to disentangle this question and provides us with an interesting description of the areas of his technical proficiency:

• 33 Cf. Edmonds (2006), 420: ‘The sophist is the type of the expert and, in particular, someone who is (...)

22It is important to note that Damon, so far as Plato’s text indicates, is not going to be responsible for the selection of what rhythms are to be performed or not in kallipolis: this task had already been undertaken by Socrates and Glaucon, on the basis of the future educational needs of the citizens, even though they were not capable of evaluating from a technical point of view what rhythms would correspond to each of these ethical categories. Therefore, there is no reason to attribute to Damon the specific ethical preferences, translated into musical language, that are outlined in Republic 3: this is a question that belongs explicitly to Plato’s ethico-political project. Damon is rather consulted here as a proper ‘expert’,33 who is capable of identifying what emotional and psychological reactions are triggered in the souls of the listeners by means of definite musical elements, focusing on the psychagogic effect of this art and not on the ethical consequences of being exposed to determinate styles. He seems to embody the musical version of the model of technical competence that is described, with regard to rhetoric, in the following passage of the Phaedrus:

• 34 This idea certainly seems to resemble the Gorgianic theory of the effects of logoi on the soul – Cf (...)
• 35 The opposition between these two approaches may be signalled by the inversion of the roles attribut (...)

23The definition of a true holder of a τέχνη resembles very closely the representation of Damon provided in Republic 3: he is not only capable of telling Socrates which rhythms are appropriate in order to elicit specific emotions,34 but he is also is said to have classified them both with regard to their different denominations (composite enhoplios, dactyl, heroic, iamb, etc.) and their technical structure (short and long syllables, ups and downs). In addition, it is worth noting that in this passage of the Phaedrus recurs a peculiar expression which is similar to one that attracted our attention earlier: the real τεχνικός is described here as the one who is able to τιθέναι καὶ διακοσμεῖν his λόγος so that it can be suitable for different types of listeners – a strategy that certainly is analogous to the one which Laches criticised in the speech of Damon’s associate Nicias. However there is one significant difference between them: the ‘true’ technician of the Phaedrus arranges his discourse in view of the needs of his listeners while, in Laches’ view, Nicias employs his ‘Damonian’ verbal skills in order to make himself appear subtler in his analyses and more intelligent (ἑαυτὸν κοσμεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, Lach. 197c2-3).35

• 36 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1358b6–13: ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβουλευτικόν, δι (...)
• 37 The terms δάκτυλος and ἐνόπλιος appear also in Aristoph. Nub. 651, once again in the mouth of Socra (...)
• 38 Cf. Arist. Poet. 1459b32-34, where the ἡρῳικὸν μέτρον is identified with epic dactylic hexameters.
• 39 From what we can reconstruct, all of these rhythms were somehow ‘dactylic’ in nature. Cf. West (198 (...)

25I think that this striking omission can be explained in a much more direct and useful way. From what we can understand on the basis of this passage, Socrates’ knowledge of Damon’s research does not result from a direct conversation; his account of Damon’s theories seems to derive from listening to one of his epideictic speeches, rhetorical exercises which consisted exactly in discourses of praise or blame.36 This impression is further confirmed by Socrates’ account of Damon’s examination of rhythms, as he says that the theorist played in his discourse with a series of terms – enhoplios (ἐνόπλιόν τέ τινα), ‘finger’ (δάκτυλον)37 and ‘heroic’ (καὶ ἡρῷόν γε)38 – which refer to rhythms that are very similar to each other;39 this strategy, which ultimately creates a lot of confusion in the listeners by comparing and contrasting very similar concepts, seems to be analogous to the aforementioned sophistic manipulation of near-synonyms and could be exploited very effectively in the context of a ‘demonstrative’ speech.

• 40 Cf. Barker (2007), 309-310.

26So this is why, in this passage of the Republic, Socrates does not relate in detail the content of Damon’s speeches: in the form he actually heard them, their content would not be useful to improve the ethico-aesthetical analysis of Book 3, given that in these speeches the orator exploited specific materials – in this case, rhythmical ones – in order to impress his audience. On the contrary, a direct conversation with Damon about the technical elements of his research – in particular on the relationship between rhythms and virtues/vices – could provide Socrates and Glaucon with important elements that they could use in developing a detailed outline of the educational process of the ideal city.40 And this is exactly what Socrates proposes here, a direct consultation with Damon.

• 41 This comedy, which apparently featured both Socrates and a chorus of phrontistai, won the second pl (...)

27This interpretation seems even more natural if we remember that, as we have seen above, in the Laches (180d) Damon was presented as a good acquaintance of Socrates, who went so far as to recommend him to Nicias as a teacher of music. Clearly, Plato’s Socrates shows that he appreciates the skills taught by Damon, despite the pretty confused manner in which the content of his knowledge is referred to in the Republic; on the other hand, however, it would have been really odd if Plato chose to portray Socrates giving a detailed account of Damon’s musical theories: his lack of musical talent was renowned and was even mocked in a very successful comedy, Ameipsias’ Connus.41

• 42 While the epideictic discourses of praise and blame obviously must have included some sort of evalu (...)
• 43 Cf. for this claim Philod. De Mus. 4 col. 148 Delattre = 4.34 Kemke.

28In conclusion, in Book 3 Damon seems to deserve Plato’s respect for his truly ‘technical’ expertise, which can be usefully employed in researches about musical (and particularly rhythmical) ethics, but not his complete admiration, because he did not take the additional step of assessing the true ethical value of the contents he could handle so precisely.42 Instead, he exploited his knowledge in order to achieve what, in Platonic terms, cannot be defined as ethically ‘good’ objectives: increasing his personal prestige by means of persuasive speech.43

• 46 See e.g. DK 37 B 10, where the whole text is presented as one of Damon’s fragments.

30Similarly to the case of Rep. 3.400b-c, the entire content of this text has generally been attributed to Damon46 and it has been regarded as evidence of his conservative attitude in relation to musical aesthetics, which is allegedly indicated by the emphasis put on the dangers connected with musical νεωτερισμός and on the recurrent necessity to guard (φυλάττειν) musical models against this destructive process. But, if we actually look at what the Platonic texts says, it is pretty clear that Damon’s statement is mentioned in order to back up a theoretical inference derived from the philosophical reflections undertaken in the dialogue itself. In other words, Socrates strategically presents Damon’s assertion as a legitimate conclusion of the previous argument, which focused on the need to maintain unaltered the musico-poetic style established in Book 3; however, taken on their own, the words attributed to Damon here do not necessarily imply the whole argument of this Platonic section. Damon’s words underline only the existence of a connection between musical styles and political phenomena, but do not entail as a consequence that the forms of μουσική and γυμναστική should be kept unaltered.

• 47 Cf. Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4.3, Plut. Pericl. 9.2, Olympiod. In Pl. Alc. 1 138.4-11.

31At any rate, the fact that Damon’s interest in the relationships between educational and political forms is attested here, independently of the context of Plato’s reflections, should not surprise us any more: in all the Platonic instances we have examined, he is presented as a sophistic intellectual with outstanding linguistic and musical expertise, who associated with the most influential politicians of his age and advised them in various domains, such as the management of their relationship with the citizens.47 From this perspective, I see no reason to attribute to Damon anything more than the fact that he theorised a co-implication of musical and political νόμοι; all the additional content of this passage seems to me entirely Platonic.

• 48 Andoc. De myst. 16.2, Isocr. Antid. 15.235, Arist. Ath. Pol. 27.4.3, [Plato] Axioc. 364a.

32The Platonic texts we have looked at clearly testify that the analysis of the relationship between musical νόμοι and their influence on political institutions represented a crucial part of Damon’s intellectual interests. It is important to remember that, on the other hand, we have many sources contemporary to Plato48 that report Damon’s active political commitment in 5^th-cent. Athens and his closeness to people with oligarchic tendencies, such as Charmides, Cleinias and Alcibiades. We can obtain a clearer idea of his position between active politics and musical theory if we go back to some of the Platonic passages we have previously looked at, focusing on an aspect that, up to now, I have deliberately ignored: Damon’s relations with other characters.

• 49 Cf. Isocr. Antid. 15.235, which confirms a similar intellectual scenario, and Olympiod. In Pl. Alc. (...)
• 50 Plut. Pericl. 4 = Αrist. fr. 401 Rose: Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ παρὰ Πυθοκλείδῃ μουσικὴν διαπονηθῆναι τὸν ἄνδ (...)

34First of all, we find an association between the figures of Pythocleides, Anaxagoras and Damon.49 While the content of Anaxagoras’ philosophical research and his important intellectual influences are widely attested, Pythocleides is much more shadowy a figure, on account of the scarcity of extant textual references to his activity; nonetheless, we have explicit descriptions of him as a musician, specifically a professional αὐλητής according to Aristotle.50

• 51 Schol vet. On Plat. Alc. 1 118c: Πυθοκλείδης μουσικὸς ἦν, τῆς σεμνῆς μουσικῆς διδάσκαλος, καὶ Πυθαγ (...)

35The scholiast on the Platonic Alcibiades provides us with more detailed information about the nature of the relationship established between Pythocleides and Damon and outlines a continuous succession of masters and pupils featuring respectively Pythocleides, Agathocles and Damon51 – a connection that appeared also in one of the aforementioned passages of the Laches (180c10-15). Interestingly, the same characterisation of Pythocleides and Agathocles as members of a continuous tradition is attested in another Platonic instance, the famous first speech of Protagoras in the eponymous dialogue (Prot. 316b-317c). Strikingly, here they are all mentioned in the group of those sophists who managed to hide their real nature by means of special ‘masks’:

• 52 Cf. Nails (2002), 309 and Wolfsdorf (1997). Brancacci (2008b), 24, agrees in detecting in this pass (...)
• 53 This hypothesis is also compatible with the information provided in an aforementioned passage of th (...)
• 54 Cf. Stadter (1989), 70.
• 55 Cf. Plut. Arist.1.7, Plut. Nic. 6.1-2.

37This is a difficult question to answer. However, the dramatic date of the dialogue (around 433-432) gives us a possible explanation:52 if we date his ostracism between 442 and 440, he would still have been in exile from the city in the year of the dialogue.53 This possibility could explain the use of such a vague expression as καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, which follows the names of the ‘musical’ sophists mentioned in this passage. So Damon may be lying in the shadowy group indicated by this expression: after being cast out of the physical boundaries of the city, even his name was to be exiled from the cultural dimension of Athens. But this strategy does nothing else than confirm, however indirectly, Protagoras’ claim, which is at least partially echoed54 in the section of Plutarch’s Pericles mentioned at the beginning: Damon tried to ‘employ the lyre as a mask (παρακάλυμμα)’ but failed in his attempt and was hit by the consequences of the people’s hatred.55

• 56 For this reason, the position maintained by Lord (1978), according to whom τὸ πρέπον must be regard (...)

40In this perspective, it seems pretty clear that Plato, in Republic 3, could not merely take Damon’s results as a ready-made solution for the music-related educational needs of the ideal city; as we have seen in detail, Plato instead seems to select the correct modes and rhythms from the whole set of results obtained by Damon, on the basis of the ethical stimuli that he deemed appropriate for the children of kallipolis.56

• 57 Cf. [Plut.] De musica 1136 e3-5, where Damon is presented as the person who discovered the ‘relaxed (...)

41The same process of interpretation and selection of contents seems to be at work in Book 4 of the Republic, where Damon’s aphorism concerning the mutual correlation of musical and political νόμοι is quoted. Damon’s words do not seem to imply at all the complex argument presented by Socrates in the previous sections of the text, and especially not the indictment of musical innovation:57 Damon’s expression reflects simply a psycho-sociological observation. All the ethical implications that derive from the idea that musical and political changes imply some kind of dangerous and negative modifications in the constitution of the city, as well as of the souls that inhabit it, seem to me nothing other than the result of Plato’s use of Damon’s theory.