To find the maker and father. Proclus' exegesis of Plato *Tim.* 28c3-5

Jan Opsomer
The maker and father of this universe it is a hard task to find, and having found him, it would be impossible to declare him to everyone.

(Plato, Timaeus 28C3-5)

The above quotation from Plato’s *Timaeus* is for Proclus the occasion to insert into his *Commentary on the Timaeus* (1.299.13-319.21) an elaborate discussion of the ontological status of the demiurge and of his predecessors’ views concerning this matter. It is this section of the *Commentary* that I shall examine more closely, focusing on Proclus’ construal of the history of Platonic exegesis. In his classic commentary on the *Timaeus*, Luc Brisson has shown in a masterly fashion that even today Proclus’ exegesis can still be fruitful. More than anyone else, Luc Brisson has put the Neoplatonic commentaries on Plato to good use. He agrees with Proclus’ arguments that the demiurge is a *Nous* more particularly a *Nous* that is different from the Good, the intelligible forms, 1 the *Nous* of the world-soul, and the world-soul itself. Moreover, this demiurgic *Nous* is situated lower than the intelligible forms and above the world-soul. As one of the main differences between Proclus’ and his own interpretation, Brisson...
sees the Neoplatonic emanationist metaphysics, which makes the
demiurge a merely contemplating intellect, instead of a contemplating
and producing intellect. Indeed, in Proclus’ view the demiurge is a
motionless transmitter of the higher realities, creating by procession.
And although Proclus would probably contest this and maintain that
his demiurge possesses a true efficient causality, the nature of the
demiurge’s causation in an emanationist metaphysical context is
simply not the same as that in Plato.

For Proclus, given the context of his hierarchic ontology, to
explain who the demiurge is amounts to determining his position
in the hierarchy of beings. In order for us to understand Proclus’
argument it is mandatory to be familiar not only with the general
outline, but even with some of the details of his system. Reality
according to Proclus is graded according to the degree of unity
in beings. The supreme principle is the One itself, which transcends
Being. The beings themselves proceed from and revert to the One
in a continuous hierarchy, starting from the intelligibles, i.e. the
transcendent gods, via the gods of the world, down to the levels
of soul, nature, body, and matter (the lowest manifestation of the
One). This complex metaphysical structure is developed by Proclus
through his interpretation of the second part of the Parmenides.
The first hypothesis, which is entirely negative, he believes refers
to the supreme principle; the second displays the hierarchy of

3. On the demiurge’s μαίνοντος εἴνεργεια see H. D. Saffrey & L. G. Westerink,
Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, VI (CUF), Paris, 1997, p. 29 n. 2 (p. 139). See
also S. E. Gersh, Kinēsis. Arianitōs: A Study of Spiritual Motion in the
Philosophy of Proclus (Philosophia antiqua, 26), Leiden, 1975.

4. I do not take “emanation” in the restricted sense in which it is used by
L. P. Gerson in his discussion of Plotinus (as a per accidens causal series).
Plotinus (The Arguments of the Philosophers), London and New York, 1994, ch.
2. Actually, for the present purpose, the notion of “motionless production” will
do (a notion that can also be used in creationist accounts).
5. For Neoplatonists, the demiurge is an efficient cause, because he produces
in virtue of his activity (energeia), motionless as it may be. Cf. In Tim.
5.228.26-28 μετέχει γαρ, ὁλας διὰ τῶν τεπαρθήκης τῆς καὶ τῶν παραθέσεως,
ἐκ τούτου πεποίησε τῷ νομίμῳ μέλη. The universal demiurge transmits the powers
of the higher realities in order to create the world of becoming, and remains
firmly established in the immobile realm of the intelligible (largo sensu). On how
the notion of an efficient cause has changed since Aristotle, see R. Sorbey, Time,
attributes efficient causality to the Forms.
6. C. F. Steel, La théorie des Formes et la Providence: Proclus critique d’Aristote
Publiés sous la direction d’André Motte et de Joseph Denooz, Liège, 1996, p. 241-
254. That is why Proclus can claim that the first origin of all demiurgic activity is
to be situated in the paradigm (cf. infra).
7. When Proclus speaks of demiurgic activity or causation, he means an activity
that is related to the generation of the world of becoming. This excludes the
production through procession of the higher orders of reality. Cf. In Tim.
gods in the succession of attributes affirmed of the One [see Appendix 1].

Lat Athenian Neoplatonism is characterised by a proliferation of hypostases. This is a logical development of Iamblichus’ law of the mean terms or the principle of ontological continuity: any two successive ontological orders must always share an essential quality so that there are no gaps in the divine emanation. Therefore, in order to avoid ontological gaps, intermediate levels need to be inserted. The application of this principle, together with the necessity to find an ontological level corresponding to each of the attributes affirmed of the One in the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, and the need to accommodate all the divinities and principles found throughout Plato’s works as well as in the Orphic and Chaldean religious traditions, explains the complexity of Neoplatonic ontology. The main division of the Intelligible in the broad sense [II] is that between Being (or the Intelligible stricsto sensu [2]), Life (or the Intelligible-Intellective level [3]), and Intellect [4]. Proclus argues that the demiurge is an Intellect [4], more precisely the lowest term of the first Intellective triad [4.1.3].

After having quoted Tim. 28C3-5, Proclus announces that he will first examine the key words (ἡ λέξις τὸ θεωρεῖν) and then discuss the issue as a whole (ἡ ἐξέλιξις τοῦ θεολογίατου). His main argument is to be found in the ἐπιστήμη section, where he tackles the controversial issue of the demiurge’s ontological status. An account of his own position is preceded by a survey of the major interpretations of his predecessors [see Appendix 2 for a survey of the lemma].

After an examination of the ἐλευθεροποίησις, Proclus distinguishes two questions: “Who is the demiurge?” and “To which class of beings does he belong?” It is not immediately clear why an answer to the first question would not automatically constitute an answer to the second as well. In dealing with the second, Proclus endeavours to determine the precise correspondences with the divine names as found in the tradition of the Chaldean Oracle, more precisely the relation between the demiurge and the so-called triad of ἄρχοντα (which will be situated at level 5.1 of the scheme). His main argument, however, is to be found in the first part of the ἐπιστήμη, where he tackles the controversial issue of the demiurge’s ontological status. For the sake of clarity, let us first take a look at Proclus’ own view, which is essentially that of his master Syrianus. Proclus sees a clear break between Syrianus and the “ancient interpreters”. He adds that his

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7. The attributes revealed in the second hypothesis correspond to the negations in the first hypothesis.
8. In the following pages, numbers in square brackets are those of Appendix 1.
master is closest to Plato. It is of course Proclus’ view that Plato had a divine insight into the truth about the gods and that there is essential agreement between his teachings and those of the Chaldean Oracles and the Orphic poems. Yet Plato surpasses these other sources of wisdom, because in addition to their modes of exposition, he uses, most notably in the Parnassides, the dialectical mode, which is direct and uses abstract, ‘scientific’ terms.

What then does Syrianus, according to Proclus, teach about the demiurge? The demiurge is the god that “marks the border of the Intelective gods.” He is filled with the power of the intelligible monads and the sources of life (the hypostases above Intecllect, [2] and [3]); from him proceeds all demiurgic activity; he himself remains undisturbed at the top of the Olympus, while presiding over the lower demiurgic gods (1.310.9-15). He is the “maker and father of the universe”. However, different forms of demiurgy need to be distinguished. Whereas ‘the one demiurge’ creates and exercises providence over universal beings in a universal way and is called “the cause that produces universal beings in a universal way” (τῶν ὀλίγων ὀλίγως δημιουργικόν αἴτιον), Proclus in addition acknowledges the demiurgy that is the cause for partial beings in a universal way (τῶν μερῶν ὀλίγως), the demiurgy for universal beings in a partial way (τῶν ὀλίγων μερικῶς) and the demiurgy for partial beings in a partial way (τῶν μερῶν μερικῶς, 1.310.15-18). The first demiurgy is situated at [4.1.3] in the scheme; the second demiurgy is the work of the demiurgic triad at [5.1], which is dependent on the demiurgic monad (i.e. the first demiurgy [4.1.3]). The third and fourth demiurgy, which proceed in a partial way, analogously consist of a monad (Dionysus) and a triad operating at the encosmic level [7] (our knowledge of the lower part of Proclus’ scheme is incomplete, mainly because the corresponding parts of the Platonic...
Theology are not extant — if they were ever written at all; the general rule, however, is that the scheme becomes more complex as one moves downward and unity decreases. In addition to these four levels, there is also demiurgy at an even lower level, namely that carried out by the assistants of the partial demiurges, the angels and heroes, to which Proclus alludes at 1.310.24-26. The difference between the universal (οὐλοκύου) and the partial (μερικός) demiurgy corresponds to that between the first and the second demiurgy of the Timaeus (that of the young gods, whose responsibility is explained at Tim. 42D5 sqq.). In other words, the first two levels of Proclus’s scheme ([4.1.3] and [5.1]) correspond to the first, and Proclus’s third level of demiurgy (both at the encosmic hypostasis [7]) to the second demiurgy of the Timaeus. The universal demiurgy ([4.1.3] and [5.1]), i.e. the first demiurgy of the Timaeus, completely transcends the world, while that of the young gods (a monad and a triad in the encosmic realm [7]) is immanent to the world. In the present paper I shall confine myself to the demiurgic monad responsible for the universal demiurgy, the “maker and father of the universe”. As lower limit of the Intellective gods he is the third term of the “triad of the parents”, Kronos, Rhea, Zeus. Let us now examine the exegetical reasons put forward in the Commentary for assigning the demiurge to this particular place in the ontological hierarchy.

Proclus claims (1.311.5-14) that Plato’s description of the demiurge and his actions allow us to determine his rank infallibly. When creating, the demiurge contemplates (Tim. 29A3) the intelligible model. Now, that which looks at the intelligible is itself intellective...
Hence the demiurge is distinct from [2] the intelligible; He does not belong to [5] the intelligible-intellective realm either, for Plato explicitly says that he is an intellect. By saying that the demiurge is the best of causes (Tim. 29A6) Plato further distinguishes him from the lower demiurges. The conclusion so far is that the demiurge is an intellective god transcending the other demiurges. Now his precise place within the main intellective triad remains to be determined (1.311.14-25). If he were the first in the triad, he would limit himself to his inner activity, for this is typical of the first member of any order. But of course, as a demiurge he must also have an outward activity. Therefore he cannot be the first intellective god. If he were the second intellective god, he would above all be the cause of life, for this pertains to the second term in any triad. But for the creation of the soul he needs the use of a principle external to himself, the mixing bowl (ο νερόσ - identified with Hera), whereas when he imparts intelligence (φους) to the universe, he is able to do so entirely on his own (for the creation of body he collaborates with Necessity). So he is primarily the cause of intellection, not of life. Therefore he must be the third of the intellective fathers —the third is typically the intellective term of a triad.

Other typical activities of intellect are discovering and reasoning. Cf. Theol. Plat. V 14, p. 49 17-20. Cf. Tim. 50B1 (ονομαζόμενον ουν τόμαζεν) and 54B, 59E9 (καθορίζω). This, however, should not be understood literally, since there is no change in the demiurge. Cf In Alc. 208 3-5 (on the cognition of our soul, as opposed to that of intellect) or ψιθυρίζω γιά νέστι και οίκος άθροις ούδε άιμα- ταμίτες ἐφεστήκει, ὑπέρ ἢ τού τοῦ ἁμάρσκος καταδέχεται. See also Plotinus Enn VI 7 [38] 1-3.

The mention of causes in this context is indeed to be taken as a reference to demiurge, says Proclus, for this can be inferred from the words δια θέου τὸ γεγραμμένον ὑπ’ αἰτίας τινὸς ήταν ἡ γένεσις (Tim 28A4-5) which are closely followed by an explicit mentioning of the demiurge (A6: οὗτος μὲν οὐκ ἔχει τοῦ θεομορφοῦς κτῆς.) Compare Plotinus Enn 260B1-8.

It is no coincidence, so Proclus suggests, that Timaeus first of all mentions the creation of Intellect at 30B4-5; cf. Theol. Plat. V 15, p. 51 26-52 3. 32. Cf In Tim. 1 311.19-20 οὐκ ἀλλός ἢ δια τοῦ τοιοῦτος παρέχει. The demiurge

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25. Cf. Tim. 59E7-9 (cf. infra), and 47E4-48A2 (here, however, may also refer to the lower intellects in charge of the second demiurge).

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27. Cf In Tim. 1 311.13-14: κορός οὐν ἄστι θείας πύρως δημιουργμάτων ἐξηγημένοις.

28. Cf In Tim. 1 311.14-15: ἄλλ’ εἰ
creates, by his very being, the intellect which he then places in the soul (Tim. 50B4). The latter intellect is therefore, according to the categories that are fundamental to Proclus' metaphysics, a participated intellect, whereas the former (the demiurge himself) is the imparticippable intellect from which the participated intellect proceeds.

Proclus points out that Plato is very careful in his use of titles and names: he calls the demiurge an intellect, but never intelligible, whereas the paradigm is called intelligible but never intellective. Plato is also very consistent in his use of the title "maker and father", which, according to Proclus, he only bestows upon the universal demiurge. Previously, in the lexesis section, Proclus has already refuted Porphyry's view that the term "father" refers to a creation ex nihilo.

Proclus there explains that this cannot be what the term means, since the demiurge uses "stuff" which he does not create himself, namely matter (Proclus holds that matter is created by the supreme principle, being the lowest manifestation of its unlimited power).

Now, after having firmly established the position of the universal demiurge, Proclus comes back to the meaning of the title "maker and father", and specifies its precise meaning by distinguishing it from the titles "father", "father and maker", and "maker". The title "father" belongs to the summit of the intelligibles [2.1], whereas the mere "makers" are the young gods who bring into existence the partial and mortal encosmic beings [7]. The title "father and maker" characterises the third intelligible triad, intelligible intellect, which is the paradigm of the universe and the very first cause of all demiurgy (τό αὐτοκύριον [2.3]). "Maker and father", finally, singles out the universal demiurge. Whenever he is referring to the demiurge, Plato does not call him simply "father" or "maker" or "father and maker", but only names him by the formula "maker and father". Plato does so at the beginning of the physical account (the present lemma), and uses an equivalent formula in the demiurge's address to the young gods at 41A7 (ὡν ἔγα δημιουργός πατήρ τε ἐργαστεύων), just as the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman does when referring to the maker of the world (Pol. 273B1-2: τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρός).

In the next subsection Proclus argues that the universal demiurge is called Zeus by Orpheus and explains that the Orphic and Platonic teachings are in harmony on this subject, as they are in general. The tale of Zeus swallowing Phanes, for instance, corresponds to the Platonic doctrine that the demiurge interiorises the paradigm (the equivalence between Phanes and the third intelligible triad is here taken for granted). But Plato too explicitly calls the demiurge Zeus, for instance in the same passage of the Statesman or at Philebus...
This equivalence is confirmed by a number of other passages in various dialogues, such as Cratylus 596A8-B5, where the double etymology of 'Zeus' (genitive Δίος and Ἑρμός) is explained: 'through whom (Δίος) all possess life (Ἑρμός).\(^{36}\)

The last part of the discussion is devoted to the question as to which class of gods the demiurge belongs: is he one of the fontal (φαγαίοι) or one of the ruling gods (δικαικοὶ)? This distinction stems from the tradition of the Chaldean oracles and their exegesis.\(^{37}\) Proclus argues that the demiurge belongs to the higher class of the two, that of the Sources (the fontal gods), not without adding that a lengthy treatment would be needed to determine his exact position among the Sources.\(^{38}\)

Proclus concludes (In Tim. 1.319.11-21) by saying that one can easily understand why Plato was right in saying that it is not easy to discover the nature of the demiurge. However, now it should at least be clear what the words 'maker and father' mean. Those who think that the demiurge is maker for the inanimate beings and father for the ensouled beings only, are wrong. The demiurge, by a single, undivided activity, is father and maker for all beings. Proof of this is that he calls himself 'father of these works' (41A7, addressing the young gods). He does so because he is cause of both the substance and the unification of the 'works' (every being is one), and both supplies their existence and exercises providence over them once they have come into being.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{36}\) Crat 596A8-B3, and Proclus’ comments: In Crat. 100.1-4; 101.17-21. In addition, Proclus points to Gorg 523B4-524A7; Minos 319C3-4.


\(^{38}\) Iamblichus possibly held that the demiurge was inferior to the φαγαίοι. Cf. Michael Psellus, Op. min., Opusc. 40, p. 149 O’Meara, if indeed Psellus’ source for the doctrine reported there is Iamblicheus (cf. Iamblichii Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentarii et rum fragmenta. Edited with Translation and Commentary by John M. Dillon (Philosophia antiqua, 23). Leiden, 1973, p. 508-509).

\(^{39}\) It is remarkable that Proclus concludes with a polemical remark, since he had already refuted Porphyry’s interpretation of ‘maker and father’ in the lexicon part of the lemma and placed the critical survey of previous interpretations at the beginning of the theoria section. Numenius, too, treats the maker and the father as two distinct entities, and Proclus has criticised him for this: In Tim. 1.304.13-16. In his polemical remark at the very end Proclus does not name his opponents, but he may be referring to some of the philosophers he has discussed earlier. Or he may have others in mind: a similar view is mentioned in Plutarch of Chaeronea’s Platonist Question II 1000EF. According to the first interpretation reported by Plutarch, ‘father’ and ‘maker’ are mutually exclusive terms, the former for animate, the latter for inanimate beings. Plutarch’s own view is to be found in the third interpretation (1001AB); he argues that a father is a creator of an animate being (every father is, by consequence, also a maker) and insists on the father’s providence for its creatures.

*Études platoniciennes II*
Let us now take a look at Proclus’ survey of the interpretations of his predecessors. Before explaining his own and his master’s views, Proclus discusses critically the divergent views of his Platonic predecessors, “for different philosophers among the ancients were led to different opinions” (1.303.26–27). His arguments for rejecting their interpretations can easily be summarised. The most serious objection to any interpretation under scrutiny is that it is based on an erroneous ontology — for instance one that considers the supreme principle itself as a being or an intellect. Some predecessors make the wrong ontological divisions within the intelligible realm largo sensu or situate the demiurge at the wrong level. Some interpretations will be judged to be correct as far as their basic intuition is concerned, but found to be lacking in refinement. Indeed, if we leave aside Syrianus, none of his predecessors developed a metaphysical system that exhibits the same degree of complexity as Proclus’.

The first three interpretations discussed are those of Numenius, Harpocration, and Atticus, philosophers who are nowadays called Middle Platonists but who we’re already treated as one group by Proclus. Proclus reproaches them for neglecting the transcendence of the first principle. Numenius (1.303.27–304.22) celebrates three gods, the first of whom he calls “father”, the second “maker”, while the creation is the third god. Now, if he means that the “father” is indeed the very first God, he makes the unforgivable mistake of making the Good a principle among others. If Numenius were right, Plato would even be making the Good lesser than the “maker” at Tim. 28C3–4. Be that as it may, Numenius in any case does not respect the absolute transcendence of the supreme principle: the One is not to be set in any relation with inferior things, although the latter refer to it. Moreover, it is not appropriate to call the supreme principle “father”, as this title makes its appearance in the classes of gods below the One. Another mistake is to separate the “father” and the “maker”, for Plato is speaking about one single demiurg and one single demiurge (1.303.24–304.22).

Numenius’ view of the demiurge is more complex than Proclus allows for. Moreover, it is very unlikely that Numenius’ third god is identical with the world. Numenius’ three gods are rather (1) the first intellect, demiurge of being; (2) the second intellect, demiurge of becoming. The latter then divides into (2a) a truly divine intellect, and (2b) a demiurgic intellect. How then can we make sense of

40. Although the term ‘Middle Platonism’ was forged by nineteenth century scholars to denote post-Antiochian pre-Potentian platonism, Proclus seems to observe a certain kinship among the three philosophers he mentions. Harpocration is said to follow Numenius (ἐποίησε τῆς ἄδειας) by distinguishing three gods and making the demiurge twofold (1.304.24–26), whereas Atticus is identified as the teacher of Harpocration (1.305.6–7). The three of them are grouped together before Proclus begins his discussion of the view of Plotinus μετὰ δὲ τοῦτος τινὰ ἄνθροπος Πλοῦτος ὁ φιλόσοφος κτλ. (1.305.16–17).

41. Cf. 1.304.10–11.
Proclus' testimony regarding the third god?\(^4\) Perhaps Numenius indeed used the word *kosmos* (1.304.1), but not in order to refer to the material world as such, but to its order; this order could then be held to be identical with the world soul (and therefore with the demiurge; cf. *infra*).\(^4\)

Harpocration (304.22-305.6) is outright ridiculed by Proclus, who pretends to doubt whether Harpocration could make sense even to himself. Not only is he inconsistent and wavering, he apparently has a tendency to confer a multitude of names and titles upon the One, which ought to remain free of all multiplicity and cannot be named (1.304.22-305.6). Atticus' view is less fraught with ambiguity, yet clearly wrong (305.6-16): he expressly equates the demiurge with the Good. It takes Proclus only a few lines to reject this view: Plato calls the demiurge "good", but not "the Good";\(^4\) more importantly the demiurge is an intellect,\(^4\) whereas Plato undeniably puts the Good above being (and thus above intellect). Moreover, what is Atticus going to do about the paradigm if the demiurge is the same as the Good? For the paradigm — the intelligible — ought to be prior to intellect, but then the Good would no longer be the supreme principle. If, alternatively, the paradigm coincided with the demiurge/the Good, the Good would not be one, but at least two things. Or if — third possibility — the paradigm were posterior to the demiurge/the Good, the Good would be contemplating something inferior, *horribile dictu*.


\(^4\)Probably Atticus had argued that Timaeus calls the demiurge "good" and "the best of the causes" (*Tim.* 29A2-3, ὅ τε δημιουργὸς ἄγαθός ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων τῶν αἰτίων, Ἔ, ἄγαθός ἐν τούτῳ, which is what god is called in the *Republic* As Matthias Baltes, *Zur Philosophie des Platonikers Attikos*, in: Blume, Horst-Dieter - Mann, Friedhelm (eds), *Platonismus und Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie* (Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband 10), Münster, 1983, p. 40 points out, he could also have made the comparison between Resp. VII, 532C6, where the good is called τὸ ἀρχηγὸν τοῦ καλοῦν, and *Tim.* 37A1, where the demiurge is referred to as τοῦ παραγόντος ἀρχήν οὗ τῆς ἀρχῆς. Numenius, on the contrary, points out that *the* good is to be distinguished from the demiurge, who is merely good. "The Good" (τὸ ἀγαθόν) is called 'idea/form of what is' good (ἀγαθόν ἑδέα, cf. Resp. VI 508E2-5, 517B9-C1). Contrary to the Form, the demiurge is only good through participation in it. The Form of the good is equated with the first intellect, which is 'the good itself' (ἐὰν τὸ δημιουργὸς ἄγαθός ἐπερ ἐστι μεταμορφοῦσα τὸ πρῶτον ἀγαθόν ἄγαθόν, ἄγαθον ἑδέα ἐὰν οὐ ἐστιν πρῶτον οὐδὲν, ὃ οὐ παρέκμετον). Num. frg. 20 Des Places = Eus., *Pr. ev.* XI, 22.9-10. The good is also 'one': *Num.* frg. 19 = Eus. *Pr. ev.* XI, 22.6-8 ὅτα τὸ Πλατωνικὸν αὐτὸν ἐπιλαμβάνει τὸ ἀγαθόν ἑδέα ἐπιλαμβάνει τὸ αὐτὸν. Numenius does not take the good to be 'beyond' being and the Forms as something transcending them in an absolute way.

\(^4\)See also *Tim.* 1.359 25-26, 360 3-4.
Plotinus is treated with considerably more respect and benevolence. Proclus bases his account (1.305.16-306.1) of Plotinus' view of the demiurge not only on *Enn.* III 9 [15] 1, which deals with the interpretive problems raised by *Tim.* 39E7-9 (ἐπερ ὃν οὖς ἐνεποίησα ιδέας τῷ ὧ ἐστιν ζῷον, οὓς τε ἐνείς καὶ ὑς, καθόπη,'"According then, as Intellect perceives Forms existing in the Absolute Living Creature, such and so many as exist therein did he determine that this world should possess." trans. J. Dillon), but also, as I have argued elsewhere, on *Enn.* IV 4 [28]. It is true that *Tim.* 39E7-9 was central to the controversies related by Proclus: Numenius probably based his doctrine of three gods on this passage, as did Amelius and Theodorus, and also Plotinus' Gnostic opponents. Plotinus rejected the interpretation of the latter in *Enn.* II 9 [33] and offers an independent discussion of the passage in *Enn.* III 9 [15] 1. Yet in my view there were other, systemic and more cogent reasons that led to a diversification of demiurgy and that can be observed in *Enn.* IV 4 [28]. In this text, Plotinus shows himself not quite at ease with the restriction of demiurgy to the intellective realm, and looks for a second "ordering" principle (which he refuses to call "demiurgic", though). Here he expresses himself not as clearly as he could have, and as a result he could easily be misunderstood.

Proclus' account of Plotinus' position can be seen as a summary of the relevant chapters of *Enn.* IV 4 [28]: Plotin apparently makes the demiurge twofold, one in the intelligible world, the other the leader and ruler of the universe. And this is correct, Proclus says. For the immanent principle governing the world can in a sense also be called a demiurge. As for the "higher demiurge", Plotinus calls him intelligible because he situates him, correctly, in the


hypostasis of Intellect, which is his name for the whole realm between the One and the world, whereas Proclus limits Intellect to the lowest level of that realm. Another way of seeing this is that Proclus distinguishes the paradigm, which is also called Intelligible Intellect \([2,5]\), and the demiurgic \(\upsilon\) which is intellect as such, whereas for Plotinus these two intellects coincide in reality and are distinguishable only conceptually: the demiurge considered as intellect at rest (Kronos) contains the forms, while the demiurge considered as an actively thinking intellect (Zeus) contemplates the ideas. But this is a distinction, not a division.\(^49\)

In \textit{Enn.} IV 4 [28] Plotinus indeed mentions two “cosmopoeic” principles:

"But since the ordering principle is twofold, we speak of one form of it as the craftsman and the other as the soul of the all; and when we speak of Zeus we sometimes apply the name to the craftsman and sometimes to the ruling principle of the all." (\’\'Αλλ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ κοσμοτέρων δεττόν, τὸ μὲν ὡς τῶν δημιουργῶν λέγομεν, τὸ δὲ ὡς τῆς πάντως φύσει, καὶ τὸν Δία λέγομεν ὅτε μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν φερόμεθα, ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἱμμονόν τοῦ πάντος, IV 4 [28] 10,1-4).

The second ruling principle is the soul, or its thinking, i.e. its intellective aspect – Plotinus’ words remain somewhat vague.\(^50\) Proclus could take Plotinus to be referring to the intellect of the world soul, whereas Porphyry could claim that Plotinus just talks about ‘the soul or its intellective aspect’, without needing to be more precise.

The reasons for distinguishing two demiurgic or ‘ordering’ levels become apparent in \textit{Enn.} IV 4 [28]. Whereas the \textit{Timaeus}, at least when read in accordance with Neoplatonic hermeneutic principles, clearly suggests that the demiurge is an intellect, Plotinus’ understanding of what an intellect is makes it hard for him to accept that an intellect could do the kind of things the demiurge is described as doing. Plotinas sees intellect in essence as an Aristotelian self-thinking unmoved mover. Such a being would be incapable of discursive thinking – the planning and deliberating – and of the kind of active, punctual interventions attributed to the demiurge in the \textit{Timaeus}. That is why these tasks are confided onto a lower principle.

It is remarkable that those Middle Platonists who adopt an Aristotelian

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interpretation of intellect (Numenius and Alcinous, e.g.) likewise distinguish different levels of demiurgy. Moreover, Plotinus appears to think that the manual work of a craftsman is beneath the dignity of an intellect. Here the old polemics with the Epicureans may have played a role: they had ridiculed Plato’s demiurge for exactly this reason. Plotinus’ account is characterised by a general tension between models of interpretation: the demiurgic model, whereby order is imparted onto a pre-existing chaos, on the one hand, and the derivation model, that had gradually become dominant under the influence of the Neo-Pythagorean revival of the first centuries and that was clearly favoured by Plotinus. As a result, the demiurge was bound to become a rather sorry figure.

Historically, Plotinus’ treatment of the demiurge is situated between interpretations that identified the demiurge with the highest deity, and those of later Neoplatonists, who demoted the demiurge to some lower position within the intelligible. That option was not open to Plotinus, who worked with a simpler metaphysical scheme, because he refused to allow any real distinctions within the primary hypostases. So he equated the demiurge with intellect, but transferred as many of his activities as he could to the soul. This solution was not new either. As the most direct influence on Plotinus the Gnostics have been suggested, but also the Stoic active principle comes to mind, which was called, besides many other things, both demiurge and world soul. The idea, however, is still older. Already in the Epinomis the highest kind of soul, which possesses intelligence (982b5), is said to be the only thing suitable to mold and craft (πλάττειν και ἡμιοργεῖν, 981B8).

As I have already pointed out, Plotinus refuses to call the soul a demiurge. Unfortunately, he did not always express himself as unambiguously as he should have. By calling intellect the real demiurge, he seems to suggest that there is another, lesser demiurge. What is more, Enn. III 9 [13], Plotinus’ exegesis of Tim. 39E7–9,

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51 Numenius frg. 12; 15 3–10 Des Places; Alcinous Didask. 10, 164.18–27; 164.40–165.4. See also ps. Arist. De mundo 397b19–24; 398b12–22; 400b11–12; b51–52.

Études platoniciennes II
lends some support to Porphyry's claim that Plotinus considered the world soul a second demiurge, especially since Plotinus in his initial paraphrase of the Timaeus passage supplies the word 'demiurge' as the grammatical subject of the "planning", and concludes his interpretation with the suggestion that it is soul who does the planning.

Next in Proclus' doxography comes Amelius (the lesser known of Plotinus' pupils, the name of whom has been all but eclipsed by that of Porphyry), according to whom the demiurge is threefold, all three of them Intelligents (1.306.1-31): he who is, he who has, and he who sees. The first intellect truly is what he is; the second is the intelligible that is inside of him, but merely has the intelligible preceding him; the third is the intelligible that is inside of him, but has the intelligible that is in the second, and merely sees the intelligible that is in the first. Proclus could very well endorse the type of argument deployed by Amelius: the paradigm is present in the three different intelligents, according to the principle that "everything is contained in everything appropriately". Moreover, in other contexts Proclus himself can be found to apply the distinction "to be, to have, to see" to Intellect. And indeed, Proclus does not criticise the triple division as such, but points out (1.306.14-15: δέξιον οὖν έκείνα καὶ πρὸς τούτων λέγειν) that every multitude is preceded by unity and every triad by a monad. Therefore there has to be a demiurgic monad prior to the triad. The universal demiurge Timaeus is referring to in the present lemma must be this demiurgic monad. Proclus' objections entirely stem from his own metaphysical system, but so do the reasons for his positive appreciation of this predecessor.

Porphyry, whose interpretation of "maker and father" has already been refuted in the Lewis-section, once again cannot count on much

58. See also In Tim. 3.103.18-28, where Proclus objects to Amelius' distinguishing three different intelligents in Tim. 39E7.9 (ειδές εις άιδες [i.e. the ideas in 'he who has']) τό έστιν ζώον [i.e. the intellect that is τὸ έστιν ζώον (Dichl.) as τό έστιν ζώον]

59. Cf. 1.306.7-8: "for every intellect is the same as its conjoined intelligible." This could be either a reason offered by Amelius or Proclus' own gloss.

60. El. Theod. §103, p. 92.15: Πάντα είναί τά αίνειαν, ακόλουθος δέ ειν εκάσταυ. Cf. Porph. Sent. 10: Πάντα μέν εινάί τά αίνειαν, άλλα αι-

61. Cf. In Tim. 1.242.27-30 and 244.25-30. See also H.-D. Saflay, La Théologie platonicienne de Proclus et l'his-


62. Cf. 1.309.21-25, where Amelius is called γενναίος, not in an ironic way, I believe. Proclus again seems to applaud Amelius' threefold distinction, but instead of insisting on the need to place a monad before the triad and thus associating Amelius' threefold with his own demiurgic triad (5.1), he now seems to be saying that only one of the three, the lowest of them, is the demiurge and thus to associate the other two with the paradigm (as Amelius does himself) and with Life respectively.

Etudes platoniciennes II
sympathy (1.306.31-307.14): he thinks he is following Plotinus, but this claim is rejected by Proclus. Proclus tells us that Porphyry regards the hypercosmic soul as the demiurge, and equates the intellect belonging to this soul with the paradigm (the \( \alphaυτοφυσ \)).

To consider the demiurge as a soul is of course utter foolishness according to Proclus: Plato calls the demiurge \( \nuος \), not \( \psiυκή \). Moreover, the demiurge creates and transcends soul. If the world-soul were the demiurge, it would moreover be impossible for Plato to call the world a god, for what makes the world a god is the presence of the world soul in it. If, however, the soul were the demiurge, it would have to be outside of the world and could hence no longer be present in the world. Proclus’ final argument is based on the Neoplatonic conception of causality: the demiurge is well capable of creating (partial) encosmic intellects and gods, whereas soul could never do that, for it would be causing beings surpassing itself in excellence. But causes are always ontologically prior to their effects.

Porphyry intended his account of demiurgy to be an elucidation of the thought of Plotinus. His demiurge and paradigmatic intellect are meant to correspond to Plotinus’ (alleged) distinction between an immanent and a transcendent demiurge, i.e. between the thinking soul as the second ordering principle, and the immobile intellect as the true demiurge. It does not look as if Proclus has made an honest attempt to give a fair account of Porphyry’s views. Only a drastic simplification can occasion the reproach that Porphyry posited a straightforward equation of the demiurge with the world soul and thus banished the demiurge from the realm of intellect. Actually, Porphyry repeatedly calls the demiurge an intellect. W. Deuse, who has closely examined all the relevant fragments and testimonies concludes that for Porphyry there was no great divide between the realms of soul and intellect. The identification of the demiurge with soul does not automatically imply that he is denied an intellective existence. Porphyry conceives of demiurgy as a steady gliding down and self-development of intellect, that in his lowest manifestation becomes the transcendent soul, maker of the world of becoming and division. For Porphyry there is no contradiction between talking to what he had written. Amelius replied to this reply, and finally Porphyry changed his mind and endorsed Plotinus’ view (or so he thought).

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63 Cf. In Tim. 1.306.32-307.1: αύτοφυσ το Πλωτίνος σαμάξειν: Proclus most probably refers to the view held by Porphyry after the dispute reported by the latter in his Life of Plotinus (ch. 18). Porphyry tells the reader that he first wrote against Plotinus in an attempt to show that the objects of thought exist outside the intellect. At Plotinus’ request, Amelius then wrote a lengthy treatise against Porphyry. Porphyry replied to what he had written. Amelius replied to this reply, and finally Porphyry changed his mind and endorsed Plotinus’ view (or so he thought).

65 Cf. Tim. 92C7: ἐν ψυχής.

of the demiurge as a soul and as an intellect; it is just that at the end of the demiurgic process we find the soul taking over matter and imposing order on it.

That some being could be soul and intellect at the same time was a ghastly idea for a late Athenian Neoplatonist such as Proclus. Yet Porphyry did not seem to have problems with it. Neither, I should add, did some of his near contemporaries. Numenius too appears to refer occasionally to his third, demiurgic, intellect as a soul. Several scholars have argued that he considers the world soul to be the demiurge. Numenius is known for saying that soul is indistinguishably and inseparably identical with its principles, and conversely ascribes to the demiurge certain attributes and functions that are clearly those of the world soul. Porphyry's and Numenius' views on demiurgy are in fact remarkably similar. Both allow for a dynamic continuum in which the boundaries between deities are not always sharp, in which entities divide into two and merge again into one. Even Plotinus, as we have seen, did not clearly distinguish between soul, the intelligising soul or the intellect of the soul. Proclus, however, insists on clear-cut, well-defined and stable distinctions between hypostases.

Proclus is much more sympathetic to Iamblichus (1.307.14-309.15). The "divine Iamblichus" gets more credit, despite alleged inconsistencies and ambiguities in his interpretation. Proclus starts off by saying that Iamblichus went to great lengths to counter Porphyry and to expose the latter's interpretation as un-Plotinian. Proclus adds that Iamblichus himself, in his own Commentary on the Timaeus (frg. 34 Dillon), concurs with Plotinus in equating the demiurge with the entire intelligible realm. In support of this assertion Proclus even includes a literal quotation from Iamblichus' commentary, which presumably contains a reference to the passage at hand.

But after him (Porphyry) the divine Iamblichus, attacking the theory of Porphyry at length, and condemning it as being un-Plotinian, in giving his own theology, denominates the whole intelligible cosmos as the


69. Exp. in frg. 18 des Places.

70. Iamblichus, who was probably Proclus' source, was wont to criticise his rival, sometimes in quite offensive terms, as can be seen in the following quotation: "οὐδὲ φιλοσόφος ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄκτου τῆς θεωρίας, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνος ἀληθικὰς μετέχει (ap. Psel. In Tim. 1.153.9-10)."
demiurge, being in agreement himself, to judge at least by what he writes, with Plotinus. At any rate, he says in his Commentaries: "Real Existence and the beginning of created things and the intelligible paradigms of the cosmos, which we term the intelligible cosmos, and such causes as we declare to pre-exist all things in Nature, all these things the Demiurge—God whom we are now seeking gathers into one and holds within himself."[1] (In Tim. 1.307.14-25 = Iambl. In Tim. frg. 34, trans. J. Dillon)

These literal words could mean two things, says Proclus. There is no problem if Iamblichus merely wants to say that the "intelligible universe" and "true being" exist "demiurgically" in the demiurge, according to the well-known principle that everything is contained in everything, on each level appropriately. Yet if he means that the demiurge is identical with the entire realm between the world and the One (Plotinus' view), then we have a problem indeed (1.308.8: τὸ ὅπου ἐπιτρέπειν ἔδρα). Proclus endeavours to refute the view that the demiurge is identical with the intelligible realm from Iamblichus' own teachings (1.308.9: ἐὰν ἦσαν αὐτῶν ἀνεκάθαρσι). Suppose the demiurge were indeed all there is between the One and the world. In that case there would be no place for the other divine beings recognised by Iamblichus himself: neither for the so-called (Orphic) Kings who are prior to Zeus; nor for the three Kings mentioned by Plato in the second Letter. It is equally impossible to hold both that eternal being is the very first being and that the demiurge, who as allegedly coinciding with the paradigm is eternal being, occupies the whole intelligible realm. For the use of the term "very first being" (πρῶτος ὁ διὸ) cannot but refer to only one section in the realm of being, namely the highest.[3]

However, Proclus acknowledges that Iamblichus has treated the same matter with much more accuracy elsewhere, namely in his essay On the speech of Zeus in the Timaeus. There he holds, as Proclus reports, that first there are the intelligible triads, and then three intellective triads. Next is the intellective hebdomad, in which the demiurge occupies the third place among the fathers (i.e. the first triad in the hebdomad).[4] As far as concerns the demiurge, this interpretation coincides with that of Proclus, although Iamblichus' intellective realm is structured differently. That is, unless A. J. Festugière is right and we should change the text so that the succession would be: (three?) intelligible triads, three intelligible-

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intellective triads, the seventh, intellective triad. 76 This emendation 77 is supported by an ancient scholion in the Coislinianus relating lamblichus' view. 78 If it is correct, lamblichus' structure of the entire 'intelligible universe' would almost coincide with that of Proclus. Proclus concludes that lamblichus' theology deserves to be judged on the basis of this text rather than the treatment in his commentary, which is superficial and ambiguous if not erroneous. We can easily understand the reason for Proclus' sympathy for lamblichus: it was he who inaugurated an evolution away from the Plotinian monolithic conception of the intelligible towards a multi-layered structure closely resembling that endorsed by syrianus and Proclus. 79

Last in the row of 'ancients' comes Theodorus, pupil of Porphyry and of lamblichus, but also their opponent, and too eccentric or original ever to become canonical. Not unlike amelius, he distinguishes three demiurges. His threesome consists of 'substantial intellect' (or: 'the intellect which is being'), 'intellective substance' (or: 'pure intellect') and the 'source of the souls' (1.309.14-20). Theodorus does not situate these three demiurges immediately after the one (as amelius had done), 80 but after the intellective-intelligible gods, 81 in other words, on the level of lamblichus' intellective triad. 82 This explains why Proclus tries to argue (1.309.20-310.2) that only 'intellective substance' can rightly be identified with the demiurgic intellect. One would also have to change the order of Theodorus' threesome and assign the middle position to the 'source of souls'; indeed, 'power' or 'life' has this position in any triad. Finally the name of the now second god should be changed from 'source of

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76. μετά τῶν τριών ὁ λοιπός τριά
77. Thomas Taylor has suggested the same emendation, without knowing the scholion.
79. Cf. A.H. Armstrong, 'Plotinus', in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, 1967, p. 215. ‘The Neoplatonism of lamblichus was in many ways a fresh start, which helps to account for the fact that those very authority-minded people the later Neoplatonists never regarded Plotinus as an authority of the first rank, with whom it was not proper to disagree. The influence of Plotinus on later philosophy was very great, but he did not dominate the thought of his time or entirely determine the later development of Platonism'.
80. Proclus' supreme One that is, and not the One of Theodorus, which the latter equates with the intelligible. Cf. W. Deuse, Theodorus von Asine. Sammlung der Testimonien und Kommentar (Palingenesia, 6), Wiesbaden 1973, p. 108.
81. Again Proclus is referring to his own category of the intellective-intelligible, pace Deuse (ibid.).
souls’ to “source of life”, as the source of the souls is but one of the sources contained in the life-giving source (intellects are not as such ensouled — they are prior to soul —, but do possess life). Of course, a generous reader may agree that, if these points were conceded, Theodorus’ view would be in essential agreement with that of Lamblichus (and Proclus), at least according to the way it is presented by Proclus.

I have examined the way in which Proclus construes the relations among the interpretations of various Middle- and Neoplatonists in one particular lemma. Proclus clearly treats the pre-Plotinian Platonists as one group, not because of what they have positively in common, but rather because of the very fact that Plotinus’ insight was inaccessible to them. Plotinus understood that the figure of the demiurge should be analysed on two ontological levels and that the demiurge truly belongs to the intelligible realm. Thus Plotinus succeeded in keeping the true demiurge exempt from the world-immanent aspects of demiurgic activity and to safeguard his transcendence. He refused, however, to acknowledge anything more than conceptual distinctions in the hypostasis of Intellect. The necessary ontological divisions were introduced by Lamblichus, who developed a more refined and complex theology and consequently could assign to the demiurge a more precise place in the intelligible realm. He is visibly much less patient with Porphyry. Syrianus, finally, established the complete and correct interpretation of the demiurge’s theological status, situating the demiurge within a refined ontological hierarchy and explicating all the equivalences with the Chaldean and Orphic theological traditions. Of course, Proclus is not thinking in terms of different systems, but of different interpretations of Plato’s philosophy, which contains one single theological truth (albeit a complex one); this entails that Proclus cannot avoid that his own interpretation gets in the way of an unbiased understanding of alternative views.

The construction of the exegetical history as it is seen here is highly typical of Proclus’ procedure throughout the Commentary and is essential to his self-definition as a Platonist.

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83. One could argue, however, that Lamblichus actually developed certain tendencies already present in Plotinus’ work.
84. The introduction to the Platonic Theology contains a famous glorification of the Platonic philosophers who revealed Plato’s mystical insight in their sacred interpretations and who themselves have received a nature not unlike that of their guide, Plato. Plotinus was first, then came his disciples Amelius and Porphyry, and thirdly their disciples Lamblichus and Theodorus (“statues of wisdom”) followed by a number of others. From this tradition the authentic and pure light of truth came down to Syrianus, who communicated it to Proclus himself (Theod. Plat. I I, p. 6, 16-7. 84) and historical construction enables Proclus to consider him-
in philosophical style between Porphyry and Iamblichus which led to two currents in Neoplatonism was commonly recognised, and had already been emphasised by Iamblichus himself. Iamblichus defined his own approach as more "hieratic" as opposed to the more soberly philosophical style of Porphyry, and accordingly awarded an important place to theurgy. It is clear that Proclus counts himself as belonging to the Iamblichean tradition. Later Damascius will confirm the existence of these two traditions, not without adding, however, that Plato united the two approaches into one single truth.

The mysticism of the tradition to which Proclus belongs is nicely illustrated in the text-section of the present lemma. Proclus explains why Plato says it is difficult to find the demiurge and impossible to communicate this knowledge to others. In order to discover the demiurge the philosopher has to ascend from the lower realities towards the superior levels. However, more is needed. The soul has to become itself an "intellective universe" (meta kai logikai); it has to assimilate itself as much as possible to the intelligible universe and thus approach the god. In this manner the soul will discover the demiurge. It will neither "stumble upon" self the heir of an ancient and sacred theological tradition. It is hardly surprising that we do not find even a hint of criticism in this passage. The introduction to the Platonic Theology was indeed not the appropriate place for critical remarks against, e.g., Porphyry. On the philosophers bridging the gap between the generation of Iamblichus and Syrianus, who here remain anonymous, see Saffrey - Westerink I, p. XXXV-XLVIII. Compare also Hierocles De provid. ap. Phot. Bibl. 214.

Most scholars admit the difference of philosophical styles between Porphyry and Iamblichus (although certain qualifications need to be made) and the primal importance of Iamblichus for late Athenian Neoplatonism. Cf. Karl Praechter, Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonisimus, in: Genetlichen für C. Robert, Berlin, 1910, p. 105, 119 ("Die Richtung der Athenen stimmt mit der des Iamblich vollkommen überein"). 121: 141 ("Von Porphyros trennt ihn [u c. lambli.c] auf dem Hauptgebiete philosophischer Arbeit eine tief e Klaff hingegen ist von ihm zu Proklos vollkommen ebene Bahn").

Cf. A. Smith, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition. A Study in Post-Plotinian Neoplatonism. The Hague, 1974, p. 117 (commenting on "Olympiodorus" = Damascius In Phaedr. 1 § 144): "A familiar pattern emerges — Iamblichus as originator of an idea, Proclus as expounder and refiner".

Damascius In § 172. L. G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo. Volume II, Damascius, Amsterdam - Oxford - New York, 1977, p. 105 (trans. L. G. Westerink): "To some philosophy is primary (67 οί μὲν τὴν φιλοσοφικὴν προτείνον), as to Porphyry and Plotinus and a great many other philosophers; to others hieratic practice (67 δὲ τὴν ἱερεικήν), as to Iamblichus, Syrianus, Proclus, and the hieratic school generally. Plato, however, recognizing that strong arguments can be advanced from both sides, has united the two into one single truth by calling the philosopher a 'Bacchus' On Platon. Iamblichus and Porphyry's attitude to theurgy, see A. Smith, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition, ch. 5 esp. p. 139-141.

One may compare Marinus Vita Procli 22.

90. The famous doctrine of the οἰκουμένη (93), based on Theol. 176AB.
him through conjectural reasoning — which always remains uncertain and hardly exceeds the domain of the irrational —, nor will it discover him through scientific reasoning; for the latter is syllogistic and composite and therefore unable to grasp intellectively the intellective nature of the demiurge. What is needed is an immediate visionary intuition, a kind of contact, a unification. This is indeed not easy (ἐπίπυρ). But to explain the demiurge’s nature to others is more than difficult. It is impossible. For in order to express what one has seen one has to go back to language, and by doing so again lose the demiurge’s essence. According to the Seventh Letter the soul cannot grasp the true essence of a thing by means of a name, a definition, an argument, but only through intellect. This is true a fortiori for knowledge of the demiurge. Therefore it is impossible to communicate his intellective essence through nouns and verbs.

One could object that philosophers do speak about the demiurge. True, but they speak about him, they do not express him directly; and they speak in a discursive, not in an intellective way. Discursive thinking on its own will never be able to attain theological truth.

Appendix I

I. The One
1. The One, i.e. the first God

II. The Transcendent Gods
2. The intelligible Gods (Being)
   2.1. limit, unlimited, intelligible being
   2.2. limit, unlimited, intelligible life
   2.3. limit, unlimited, intelligible intellect (mixture)

3. The intelligible-intellective Gods (Life)
   3.1. being, life, intellect
   3.2. being, life, intellect
   3.3. being, life, intellect

93. Cf. In Tim. 1.303.8-16. Proclus does not seem to take into account that Plato actually merely says that it is impossible to explain his nature to everyone.
94. Cf. A. Smith, Porphyry’s Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition, p. 119: “From Lamblichus onwards the human is unable to attain direct knowledge where subject and object are identical. This is reserved to the divine level and can only be achieved by man when, with the help of the gods, he transcends himself and his own limited nous. The ordinary nous of man will always stand outside the object it contemplates, never be united with it, nor experience it, until aided by theurgy which enables it to be united with its object and become the sort of nous and enjoy the sort of noés that we find in Plotinus.” And p. 120: “Thus for Proclus theurgy is not a way of by-passing noesis but rather the only means of attaining it.”
4. The intellective Gods

(1ntellect)

4.1. triad of the “parents”
4.1.1. pure intellect (Kronos)
4.1.2. intellective life (Rhea)
4.1.3. demiurgetic intellect (Zeus)
4.2. triad of the immaculate
4.2.1. Athena
4.2.2. Korè
4.2.3. Kourètes
4.3. the “seventh divinity”

III. The Gods of the World

5. The hypercosmic Gods

(assimilative)

5.1. demiurgic triad (= Zeus): Zeus₂, Poseidon, Hades
5.2. life-giving triad (= Korè): Artemis, Persephone, Athena
5.3. converting triad (= Apollo)
5.4. immaculate triad (= Corybantes)

6. The hypercosmic-encosmic Gods

(apolutoi)

6.1. demiurgic Gods: Zeus₃, Poseidon₂, Hephaestus
6.2. guardian Gods: Hestia, Athena₂, Ares
6.3. life-giving Gods: Demeter₂, Herē₂, Artemis₂
6.4. educating Gods: Hermes, Aphrodite₂, Apollo₂

7. The encosmic Gods

[analogous to the preceding]
celestial gods not errant: stars
errant: planets
sublunary gods

8. The universal Souls

9. The Superior Kinds

(intelligible souls)

Angels
Demons
Heroes

Appendix 2. Proclus’ discussion of Tim. 28C3-5: Survey

1. Introduction (299.13-21)

299.19-21: ἡμᾶς δὲ πρώτον χρή τὴν λέξιν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν ἔξετάσαντας ἐπείτα οὐτω πρὸς τὰ ὄλην θεώραν αναδρομεῖν.

2. Explanation of isolated terms (299.21-303.23)

[Porphyry]
3. The wider issue (τίς ὁ δημιουργὸς οὗτος καὶ ἐν ποιήματι τὰ ὥσπερ τέτακται τῶν ὀφτων) (303.24-319.21)

3.1. Who is the Demiurge? (303.24-317.20)

3.1.1. Views of ancient philosophers (303.26-310.2)

1. Numenius (303.27-304.22)
2. Harpocration (304.22-305.6)
3. Atticus (305.6-16)
4. Plotinus (305.16-306.1)
5. Amelius (306.1-31)
6. Porphyry (306.31-14)
7. Iamblichus (307.14-309.13)
8. Theodorus (309.14-310.2)

3.1.2. The view of Syrius and Proclus (310.3-317.20)

The Demiurge is a divine intellect responsible for the creation in its entirety. Both Orpheus and Plato call him Zeus.

3.2. To which class of beings does the Demiurge belong? (317.20-319.21)

At first sight the Demiurge is to be equated with the third of the ἀρχαι mentioned by Julian the Theurgus. But it is better to situate the Demiurge beyond the triad of the Fathers that are called ἀρχαι, and to call him the unique causal source (as in the Oracles).