• 1 The word “standardization” is used here to describe a process of defining norms. The word “unificat (...)

1Between 1680 and 1780 the Qing empire vastly expanded its territory by military conquest. In the course of several long-lasting campaigns it had turned out that, for the sake of smoother administration and cutting expenditure, a ‘nationwide’ arrangement of military regulations was necessary. The compilers of such regulations aligned those of various provincial ones that in some cases differed substantially from each other. In the War Supplies and Expenditure Regulations (Junxu zeli) and the two Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations (Junqi zeli and Gongbu junqi zeli) such standardization was brought about by evening out conflicts between local norms.1

• 2 Amelung 2005: 291.
• 3 On the law codes and the relation between statutes and sub-statutes, see Head and Wang (2005: 18) w (...)
• 4 Even the sub-statutes to the Da-Qing lüli (the li) were consulted as an individual code before 1707 (...)
• 5 A concise discussion on this matter can be found in Xia 1991: 98-100. See also Li 2010: 75.

3The term zeli is a combination of the words “regulations” (ze) and “precedents” (li), meaning that a substantial part of the regulations was based on precedent ad-hoc or customary solutions to specific problems arising in daily administration. The obligatory nature of the “established regulations” (dingli) gives them a binding character similar to codified law: Officials violating these regulations were subject to sanctions. Iwo Amelung, who describes the creation and use of the “Regulations and Precedents for River Work” (Hegong zeli) therefore stresses that the “[judicial] reliance on precedents was one of the main features of the Qing administration”.2 It seems therefore justified to call the zeli collections ‘canons’, rather than using the literal meaning of this word. Yet this does not mean that zeli had the same status as laws. The main difference between the canonized law (as found in the legal code Da-Qing lüli and the administrative code Da-Qing huidian) and the zeli was that the latter were created with a certain amount of flexibility which made them adaptable to specific circumstances. Moreover, collections or sets of zeli were to be revised regularly, some every ten years, others in shorter intervals. Zeli were also much more concrete and specified than codified laws, and served—to use a traditional Chinese analogy—as the “meshes” (mu) of a greater net structure (gang, i.e. laws) providing the general structure of rule. Some authors compare the zeli with the shili, which constituted a separate and more detailed set of rules and regulations for the administrative code, Da-Qing huidianshili, or with the tiaoli sub-statutes to the law code.3 Yet while these two sets of supplementary regulations were indispensable parts of the two canons (even if the Huidian shili collection was published separately), 4zeli were autonomous collections regulating detailed administrative matters of individual institutions or jurisdictional areas.5 These arguments lead to the conclusion that the term zeli is best translated somewhat ambiguously as “regulations”.

• 6 For instance, the (currently operative) administrative regulations of the Ministry of Justice Xingb (...)
• 7 Like the regulations for minting of the Ministry of Revenue Hubu guzhu zeli (1769) or the regulatio (...)
• 8 Like Hunan sheng li or Jinzheng jiyao (on Shanxi). This issue is treated in the contribution of Wan (...)

4Two types of zeli can be found, relatively general regulations with a wide range of specifications of high-level government institutions, mainly the Six Ministries,6 and specialized regulations dealing with the organization of specific administrative matters like collecting taxes, arresting fugitives, education, material and labour cost, official discipline, grain transport, or ceremonies.7 Apart from zeli regulations valid ‘nationwide’, there were also provincial regulations (shengli).8

• 9 Tanii 1995: 137-239.
• 10 Amelung 2005: 291.
• 11 Moll-Murata 2001: 255-271.
• 12 A very short bibliography on zeli texts can be found in Wilkinson 2012: 843-844. Most helpful is Me (...)

5A first study of the compilation process of central and provincial zeli texts was written by Tanii Yōko.9 She focuses on the early phase of the zeli compilations during the Kangxi reign (1662 – 1722). The most intensively studied regulations are those on handicrafts and construction, Jiangzuo zeli. A brief introduction to this type of regulations can be found in a proceedings volume with a collection of papers on this topic,10 as well as in an article by Christine Moll-Murata that gives quite a good insight into the nature of zeli regulations.11 Apart from these studies, literature on zeli is scarce.12

• 13 The word shili is also used in the same way as zeli and sometimes even just as shiyi, e.g. the regu (...)

6The terminology of regulations “based on precedents” (as will be seen later, not all established regulations had precedents) is somewhat confuse. The vague terms shiyi, zhangcheng and zhouzhang (“rules”, “statutes”, “regulations”, and the like) denote ad-hoc regulations written down for the purpose of providing a kind of guide for officials involved, but also of giving account to higher authorities. In a next legislative step these were acknowledged and confirmed by higher authorities, like the Ministry in question. The terms for such “established” or “established regulations” were dingli or chengli. Zeli finally was the highest status of regulations and had, as far as can be seen from the history of these compilations, to be approved by the emperor. The terms tiaoli and shili were mainly reserved for sub-statutes to legal and administrative codes, but also occasionally used otherwise.13

• 14 Bodde and Morris (1967): 67. William C. Jones’ translation of the code (1994), does not include the (...)

7In spite of their applicability to judicial issues the sub-statutes and the zeli were not unquestionable. Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris explain that sub-statutes (and in analogy, also the zeli) “proved helpful for dealing with situations unthought-of by the original framers of the [Qing] Code”, but “a good deal of confusion and difficulty sometimes resulted from the rather ad hoc manner in which the sub-statutes had often originated”.14 To avoid these problems, the regulations were to be revised in regular intervals, at least in theory.

• 15 The list of compilers is headed by Agūi (1717-1797). In Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. 857.
• 16 QL 41/4/6 means the 6th day of the 4th lunar month of the 41st year of the Qianlong era (1736-1795)
• 17 About this incidence, see Naquin (1981).

8The preface of the War Supplies and Expenditure Regulations (Junxu zeli) quotes several imperial edicts concerned with the compilation of the regulations.15 It begins with a document from QL 41/4/6 (May 23rd, 1776),16 in which the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736-1795) explains why it was necessary to compile such a set of regulations. The very first sentence includes a critical term related to geography: During the campaign against the rebel Wang Lun in Shandong (1774)17 some officials had, when submitting their final accounts, not taken into consideration that the Wang Lun affair had taken place “inside [provincial] territory” (neidi), for which different rules were valid from those for military campaigns outside provincial territory (waidi, kouwai—in contrast to “inside provincial territory”, kounei). Only cost incurred as a result of campaigns beyond provincial territory was considered as “military needs” (junxu).

• 18 Junxu zeli, prefatory memorials, fol. 1a.
• 19 [Bingbu] Junqi zeli, in Xuxiu siku quanshu, vol. 857, juan 6, fol. 7a. Banner troops had to provide (...)

9The basic problem was that there existed in fact no clear rules defining what costs were allowed as military expenditure (junxu) and what costs only as such for ‘constabulary operations’ (case-related regulations for the arrest of bandits, Bu daozei shiyi).18 Such matters had been under discussion before, with the only outcome that the costs for ‘constabulary operations’ were to be brought to account within the framework of case-related regulations (shiyi), as opposed to questions concerning the cost for the deployment of troops from another province. The apparent difference between rules for ‘constabulary operations’ and rules for ‘war supply’ raises the question of how ‘war’ was to be defined. It seems that there were two factors determining the difference between “arresting bandits” and fighting a veritable enemy, namely troops crossing a provincial border and operating on territory ‘outside of China’ (which only applied to provinces located in border regions, as Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan), and troops from one province operating in another. A further criterion for the definition of what was a ‘war’ can be found in the weapons and military equipment regulations. Certain objects are defined there as not belonging to the basic equipment of the garrisons, but fit for being brought to account as “military needs”. The expression “belongs to the items of military needs” (gui yu junxu kuan nei) mainly refers to iron tools used for pioneer work and war arrows (so-called “plum-head arrows” meizhen jian).19

• 20 Theobald 2013: 94.
• 21 Ibid., 38.

10From the emperor’s words in the edict quoted at the beginning of the printed version of the War Supplies and Expenditure Regulations, it seems to be evident that there was a clear distinction between the rules valid for troops in one province and those of others, and therefore problems arose when military units of different provinces were involved in a campaign. Surprisingly this was not a new problem. Among the many military campaigns going on since the Qing conquest of China there were several large-scale and long-lasting ones like the suppression of the Three Feudatories (1673-1681) and the wars against the Western Mongols of Dzungaria (several campaigns during the long period between 1677 and 1757). The Qianlong Emperor planned a tighter control over the military bureaucracy throughout the empire and intended to continue earlier projects aiming at a standardization of the imperial administration. But the most important reason for the standardization of accountancy procedures to be undertaken in the late 1770s was without doubt the enormous extent of misappropriation of state funds by officials during the second Jinchuan war (1771-1776), with more than 5 million silver taels that could not be accounted for.20 Hidden cost mainly crept up in relation to expenditure for transport. The second Jinchuan war had cost 53 million silver taels, 38 million of which were spent for the transport of grain and another 4 million for that of equipment.21 No wonder that clear regulations had to be created defining the transport conditions. Nothing would therefore be better than to take measures for future developments, and to compare all individual provincial regulations for military expenditure (junxu shili) and “to compare and fix common rules” (heding guitiao) everyone could and had to adhere to in the future, without relying on “temporary statutes” (linshi zhouzhang). Such a common set of regulations for war supply and expenditure would “provide something to prevent [financial] disasters” (you bei wu huan).

• 22 On the problem of calling the Banners “Manchu”, see Elliott (2001), 337-344.
• 23 Junxu zeli, prefatory memorials, fol. 2a.

11A problematic issue was that in some provinces the so-called “baggage pay” (zhengzhuangyin, xingzhuangyin), paid out to the troops to make themselves ready for campaigning, and the so-called “stipend for appeasing the family” (anjiayin, family allowance) was paid out as a loan, while in others it was a wartime grant not to be paid back. Apart from the ethnical boundary between the Manchu Banner troops (manbing, qibing)22 and the purely Chinese Green Standard troops (lüyingbing), another one separated these ‘imperial’ troops from the native auxiliary troops (tubing) dispatched by allied chieftains of local tribes. To complicate things even more, the amount of the baggage pay, the daily rice rations (kouliang) and the so-called “salted-vegetable pay” (yancaiyin) differed from province to province and between the ethnic types of troops, let alone the beasts of burden their officers were allowed to get paid, the number of orderlies they could use, and the cost of military equipment and its transport. All this had to be unified in military expenditure regulations “valid universally and to be adhered to in eternity” (yongyuan tongxing zunzhao).23

• 24 Beijing, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan Shaanxi, Gansu, Guizhou, and Yunnan. See Theobald 2013: 47.
• 25 Junxu zeli, prefatory memorials, fol. 5b. On the lengthy auditing process of the account of this wa (...)

12The whole set of regulations was based on the 1760 “finalized regulations” of the military campaigns in the Western Territories (Xichui chengli) which were critically compared with the regulations from the “old files” of the Burma campaigns (1766-1769, Yunnan jiu’an) and those from the Jinchuan campaigns. One reason for delay were the many differing regulations in the various provinces that had dispatched troops to the war theatre.24 It would be necessary to decide whether old models would be kept intact or a “golden mean between differing rules” was found (zhuoding hezhong).25

• 26 Junxu zeli, prefatory memorials, fol. 9a.

13The Ministry of Revenue had joined with the Ministries of War (bingbu) and Works (gongbu) to create a tripartite set with “unified” (tonggui huayi) regulations for war supply and expenditure. It consists of 64 articles under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Revenue (called Hubu junxu zeli), 40 under that of the Ministry of War (Bingbu junxu zeli), and 15 were related to the Ministry of Works (Gongbu junxu zeli). The compilers explained that while some ancient rules had been retained unaltered, the figures (pay, horses, orderlies, etc.) of some were adapted to meet the present conditions throughout the empire, and were either raised or reduced. The rules concerning weapons and military equipment had not been changed at all in the new regulations. Matters of dispute had been left open to the provinces to meet the local conditions. 47 articles were newly determined. The regulations were finished on QL 50/2/9 (March 19th, 1785) and printed and bound in six volumes, with a length of 16 juan or chapters.26

• 27 Zheng 1991.

15The old regulations from the campaigns in the Western Territories or the Burma campaigns (the Yunnan regulations) have not survived in a compact form, but only as truncated quotations in the commentary on the War Supplies and Expenditure Regulations. The only more or less surviving regional war supply and expenditure regulations are those from the Jinchuan campaigns as part of the collection Pingding Liang Jinchuan junxu li’an, reconstructed and published by Zheng Qishan.27 In the Jinchuan collection of regulations it can be seen that in some respect the rules of the province of Sichuan, responsible for the conduct of the campaign, differed from those of Guizhou, Yunnan and Shaan-Gan (Shaanxi and Gansu).

• 28 Junxu zeli: Hubu junxu zeli, juan 1, fol. 3b.

16A few examples of the War Supplies and Expenditure Regulations might serve to illustrate the method by which the compilers reconciled contradictory regulations of the earlier regulations. The reconstruction of the regulations of the second Jinchuan campaign in the Pingding Liang Jinchuan junxu li’an allows a direct and exemplary comparison between the regulations for baggage pay in four different regions, namely Sichuan, Shaan-Gan (the provinces responsible for the Western campaigns), Hu-Guang (i.e. Hubei and Hunan, whose troops took part in practically all great campaigns), and Yun-Gui (i.e. Yunnan and Guizhou, from where the Burma campaigns were conducted). This information adds to the commentary to the War Supplies and Expenditure Regulations, where it is only succinctly stated that all regulations “differed widely” (shen xuan shu) from province to province.28

• 29 Christine Moll-Murata has written about labour pay in the Wujiao jiazhi zeli, see her “Remarks on W (...)
• 30 Junxu zeli: Gongbu junxu zeli, juan 1, fol. 2a.

19In spite of its character as a collection of administrative regulations valid all over the country, there were still local differences, mainly in the cost for objects used to produce equipment and weaponry. The accounting of objects like cannonballs (brass or iron), clothing, sulphur, nitre, charcoal, timber (for boats), or the wide array of small arms and polearms, was permitted according to the regulations on prices and wages (Wuliao jiazhi zeli) of the province in question.29 In quite a few instances the prices of goods—and not only those for grain—rose because of the high demand in war time, for instance, that of nitre.30 The Ministry of Revenue, responsible for all state expenditure, accepted such fluctuations because basic material as sulphur, nitre or lead was not available in all provinces and districts.

• 31 Junxu zeli: Hubu junxu zeli, juan 3, fol. 3a-4b).

20Other rules involving the issue of space are found in regulations concerning the daily rations of troops.31 From the day they left the garrison, they were granted a daily rice ration, and from the time they left their respective home province (li gai sheng) or provincial territory (chu kou or chu biankou), they were additionally paid out the salted-vegetable money (in case of common troops: 0.4 tael per month). When returning home after the end of the campaign, the procedure was reversed: As soon as they set foot on provincial territory (or their home province), payment of the salted-vegetable money was discontinued. The same procedure was followed for all types of troops, as well as for civilian officials serving in the logistics.

• 32 A Chinese introduction was presented by You 2005: 307-324.
• 33 To distinguish the latter from the regulations of the Ministry of War, they are called Gongbu junqi (...)
• 34 (QL 56) [Bingbu] Junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 1a.
• 35 (JQ 9) [Bingbu] Junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, [fol. 3a].
• 36 Ibid.
• 37 (JQ 21) [Bingbu] Junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 1a.

21The history of the Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations is somewhat more complex.32 It can be seen that the production and procurement of weapons was also a question in the third part of the War Supplies and Expenditure Regulations (called Gongbu junxu zeli), and many details were left open to local conditions. This is also the case in the Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations and makes them all the more interesting concerning the issue of the relation between law and space. There were two of them, one compiled by the Ministry of War ([Bingbu] Junqi zeli) and regulating the maintenance of objects in all garrisons throughout the empire, and one compiled by the Ministry of Works (Gongbu junqi zeli), focusing on the production of weapons and equipment.33 The enormous diversity of equipment required a higher standardization of maintenance work, yet from the beginning the compilers of the regulations took into consideration the “diversity of the local conditions of each province” (ge sheng qingxing) influencing the repairing and maintenance periods and the lifespan of material.34 “Local conditions” meant the fertility of the soil (difang feiji), the laboriousness of the troops (bingding laoyi), and the climate (diqi zhi zaoshi).35 The new, empire-wide regulations therefore kept to the existing “old regulations” (jiuli) and the “established regulations of each garrison” (benying dingli) and respected them to such an extent that it was not desired that the slight differences between individual garrisons might be quoted as precedents for changes in other garrisons or provinces.36 The resulting regulations thus aimed at standardization with “variations wherever considered appropriate” (zhuoliang biantong). Since local conditions differed, only the respect for such variance would be “profitable” (yi zi li yong).37

• 38 Finalization of the Chinese and Manchu version on JQ 20/12/15 (January 13th, 1816). The Manchu tran (...)
• 39 (QL 56) [Bingbu] Junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 3b.
• 40 (QL 56) [Bingbu] Junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 1a.
• 41 (QL 56) [Bingbu] Junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 1b.

22The most widespread edition of the Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations (of the Ministry of War) is that of 1816,38 compiled under the supervision of Dong Gao (1740-1818), with a length of 24 juan. The oldest compilation of this type was begun as early as 1771 and finished in 1791 (not divided into juan), followed by a revision in 1805 (32 juan).39 The compilation of a new edition was ordered as early as 180140 but was delayed for more than ten years before the thorough investigation was really put into operation. The highest local military commanders in charge were ordered to have reports collected from each garrison providing information about how many and what types of tools were kept, and to add descriptions of their specifications, along with drawings (the latter are unfortunately not included in the printed version of the regulations).41

• 42 The term ta’an was more often used by the Banners and in Sichuan, duo’an in Hunan.

23The resulting book details types, properties and maintenance periods (xiuzhi nianxian) of weapons and equipment in the possession of Banner and Green Standard garrisons. The [Bingbu] Junqi zeli shows what objects were used in which province. With the help of it a kind of virtual map can be drawn indicating the local use of certain weapons or tools. Horse saddles (ma’an), for instance, are only mentioned as equipment of the Firearms Brigade (huoqiying) in the capital, some individual garrisons in the colonial territory in the west and such in the provinces, but in all garrisons in Yunnan (as “monkey-head saddles”, hu’ertou ma’an). Transport saddles (ta’an, duo’an)42 are exclusively listed in Hunan, Sichuan and provincial Banner Garrisons. Saddles for transporting light cannon (duopao’an, in Sichuan and Hunan called pao’an) were only used in the western regions in Turkestan (modern Xinjiang), Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan and Hunan. In the western regions cannons were carried by camels (as “camel guns”, luotuo pao). Boots called xue were only known in Zhejiang, while the term xie was used otherwise, except (or only rarely) in Hunan, Guangdong, Fujian and Zhili. Oil cloth (youbu) was uncommon in Shandong, Henan, Sichuan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Shaanxi and Gansu. Surprisingly this distribution does not express climatic conditions, while the use of camels is surely restricted to the dry climate in the north and northwest of China. Targets for training archery (jianba), artillery (paoba) or musket shooting (qiangba) are not found in Zhili (today’s Hebei) and rarely in Jiangnan (today’s Jiangsu). Iron saws (tieju) as equipment of the pioneers were not listed in garrisons of Zhili, Jiangnan, Shandong, Henan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, and parts of Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Gansu and Guizhou. The standard weapon of all garrisons was the so-called “bird musket” (niaoqiang), called thus because of the ‘pecking’ movement of the cock when slashing down the fuse on the pan. Only very few garrisons were not equipped with it, but the bow was likewise an indispensable weapon for all types of troops all over the empire, barring most naval garrisons. Of the many types of guns some were quite widespread, like the “gun of far-reaching authority” (weiyuan pao, with concentrations in the northwestern colonial garrisons, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, and Guangxi), but others were only in local use, like the “victorious gun” (desheng pao) popular in Yunnan and rarely found elsewhere. Some other examples can be found in Map 1.

• 43 (JQ 21) [Bingbu] Junqi zeli, juan 11, fol. 3a-8b.

26Even in this highly standardized pattern, differences between the garrisons within one province can be found. In some garrisons of Shandong, for instance, the maintenance of “double swords” (shuangdao) and “single swords” (dandao) was declared to be discontinued, in others only that of the double swords. In some garrisons the troops were responsible for their own quivers, boots, jackets, and trousers, in others they had additionally to have ready blue-green clothes (qingyi, qingmao, qingku), as well as “war belts” (zhanyao), fuses, leather pouches and brass powder flasks (tong yaoguan). While some garrisons had to produce and keep in order leather bags and wooden boards for announcing the watches (gengqian), others were exempt, whereas yet others had to prepare a wide array of musical instruments (trumpets, drums, horns and gongs), used for a kind of military band, or for signalling in battle.43

• 44 Gongbu junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 1a.

28The Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations (of the Ministry of War) had three aims, namely to reduce cost and to prevent waste and abuse, to ensure a proper maintenance of the objects in order to have them in good condition in case of war, and standardize production methods, the type of materials, as well as material and labour cost (zuofa, gongliao […] jiazhi) for the production of weapons and other objects.44 Yet there was no empire-wide unification of these issues. The regulations therefore list all provinces and even all garrisons throughout Qing China, and describe the specifications of a large amount of weapons and military equipment on a garrison level, and not on a ‘national’ one.

• 45 Gongbu junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 2a.
• 46 Gongbu junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 1a. The effect of the revision can be seen in (...)

29The Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations of the Ministry of Works from 1811 begins with a request of the Ministry from JQ 13/4/7 (May 2nd, 1808) to revise the original regulations from 1798 (begun in 1793). New local information had to be incorporated (the northeastern provinces and Xinjiang), and details of the production methods and cost of weapons already included in the regulations of the Ministry of War that was under compilation. It was suggested to send out special staff to all garrisons to inspect the terminology and specifications of objects there (junqi mingmu), and so create a virtual ‘inventory’ of all weapons used by the Qing military. The result was a first draft of regulations on the manufacturing methods of weapons and equipment (Junqi zuofa zeli).45 The final regulations were to be brought up to date every ten years.46

• 47 Gongbu junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 5a. Unlike the Da-Qing huidian and the Liqi tu (...)
• 48 Gongbu junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 9b.

30A particular problem was the varying terminology for objects in different places and that weapons and equipment were produced with different materials in different quality and according to varying specifications. The provincial governors were requested to supply information on the garrisons in their territory, with specifications on all objects, along with drawings.47 These were subsequently more or less standardized in order to ensure a more uniform supply for all garrisons. The tremendous task was only finished on JQ 17/9/12 (October 16th, 1812), when the emperor gave his imprimatur to the regulations, so that both, that of the Ministry of Works and that of the Ministry of War, could be sent as reference guides to the garrisons throughout the empire.48

• 49 Gongbu junqi zeli, juan 25, fol. 5b-7a.

31The authors of the regulations tried to standardize the most basic properties of weapons. Concerning cannons, for instance, the regulations of the Ministry of Works specify the raw material and components for different types of iron. For 100 jin (c. 500 g) of “refined iron” (shutie), for instance, 400 jin of crude iron (huangtie) were used, one cover for the melting pot (gaihuo), 2 jin of steel (gang) and 2 jin of oil. For melting 100 jin of crude iron, 20 jin and 8 liang of charcoal (mutan) were used and 700 jin of coal (meitan). For processing 100 jin of iron, 1 “work unit” (yi gong, i.e. the work of one day) of “iron labour” (tiejiang) was necessary, 0.5 unit of “wringing labour” (ningjiang), and 0.2 unit of drilling work (zaojiang), with 5 men (zhuangfu) performing one work unit.49 Similar requirements are presented for gun barrels made of pig iron (shengtie) and brass (shengtong). The prices of iron and brass differed from province to province, but the regulations fixed how much the government would be willing to pay. An example from Gongbu junqi zeli, juan 43, fol. 8a-9b; juan 44, fol. 8a-10a; juan 45, fol. 9a-10b; juan 46, fol. 8a-10a, showing differences in the prices of brass (in tael):

• 50 Gongbu junqi zeli, juan 1, prefatory memorials, fol. 1b-2a.

35The two Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations standardized the tools used in all garrisons of the empire, but allowed a very great measure of autonomy. While the number of types was somewhat reduced and the costly maintenance periods fixed, the specifications of material and the price the government was willing to pay for production remained subject to local conditions. It is therefore out of the question to talk of a thorough unification of standards. The autonomy of provinces and individual garrisons in the use of specific weapons and equipment was accepted, and even promoted: The prefatory memorials of the revised regulations explicitly state that the regulations were compiled in order to include types of equipment and weaponry not found in earlier versions.50 While the Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations (of the Ministry of War) fixed the ‘amortisation cost’ (the repair and replacement of old weapons and equipment) and determined who shared what expenditure (individual soldiers, the garrisons, or the Ministry of Revenue during war time), the Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations of the Ministry of Works created a ceiling to production cost. The unification of armament was not an aim of these two sets of regulations.

• 51 You 2005: 307, Chinese version on 323-324.
• 52 In how far the administration of the Daoguang Emperor (r. 1820-1850) is to be blamed for the abando (...)

36You Zhanhong in his article on the Weapons and Military Equipment Regulations blames the Qing government that “by insisting on the unification of standards [fagui de tongyi] and the saving of expenses [the] Junqi zeli [regulations] to some extent impeded the development of military technology”.51 He brings forward two arguments, namely the aim of the regulations to curtail expenditure by defining what objects garrisons were to use and how much these should cost, and second, that standards were set throughout all provinces which integrated outdated weaponry into the arsenal. Ancient types of cannon were not taken out of service, but only their production and maintenance discontinued. The outdated guns continued to be used “without a phase-out [management]” (wu yong ding xian), with fatal consequences during the First Anglo-Chinese War (1839-1842). As has been shown, there was indeed no real “unification of standards” in the sense of norms valid for the whole empire. Instead, great respect for local autonomy in the use of certain types of weapons and equipment prevailed, making it impossible to rely on standards like firepower when it came to the planning of a campaign. A third problem of the Chinese military was that the diversity of weaponry was never again thought about by the central government and types and specifications not any more discussed after the promulgation of the regulations in 1816. The compilers of the regulations had recommended a revision of the regulations every ten years. Yet this “spirit of flexibility”52 fell asleep after the Jiaqing reign and brought about the ‘freezing’ of the inventory of the Qing arsenals.