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“Us Versus Them” : The impact of homophily and trust in partner selection and cooperation intensity in coopetitive agreements

L’intensité de la coopération dans des accords coopétitifs
Hervé Chappert, Paul Chiambaretto, Anne-Sophie Fernandez et Raoul Djamen
Cet article est une traduction de :
L’intensité de la coopération dans les accords coopétitifs [fr]

Résumés

Un nombre croissant d'entreprises adoptent des stratégies de coopétition (coopération et concurrence simultanées), il est donc important de mieux comprendre comment elles sélectionnent leurs coopétiteurs (partenaires-concurrents) et comment elles fixent l'intensité de leur coopération avec ces partenaires-concurrents. Les études précédentes ayant sous-estimé les liens sociaux dans lesquels s'inscrivent les accords de coopétition, cette recherche répond à la question suivante : Comment l'homophilie et la confiance influencent-elles la sélection des partenaires et l'intensité de la coopération dans les accords coopétitifs ? Nous menons une étude de cas multiples pour examiner un réseau de relations coopétitives entre neuf entreprises camerounaises concurrentes dans la distribution de matériel de construction et de génie civil dans la région de Douala (la capitale économique du Cameroun) et nous utilisons les groupes ethniques pour mesurer la notion d'homophilie. Comme toutes ces entreprises ont conclu des accords coopétitifs inter-ethniques et intra-ethniques, nous avons pu étudier l'importance de l'homophilie dans la sélection des partenaires et dans l'intensité de la coopération dans ces accords coopétitifs. Nos résultats montrent, premièrement, que les coopétiteurs préfèrent coopérer avec des concurrents qui appartiennent au même groupe parce qu'ils leur font davantage confiance et craignent moins les tensions coopétitives et les comportements opportunistes. Deuxièmement, nous constatons que l'intensité de la coopération entre concurrents est beaucoup plus élevée dans les accords de coopétition intra-groupes (c'est-à-dire au sein d’un même groupe ethnique) que dans les accords de coopétition inter-groupes (c'est-à-dire entre deux entreprises dont les dirigeants appartiennent à deux groupes ethniques différents). Troisièmement, nous soulignons que la pression des pairs et l'existence de sanctions crédibles renforcent la relation positive entre l'appartenance à un même groupe et la confiance, et donc augmente l'intensité de la coopération entre concurrents.

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1. Introduction

1Organizations widely rely on coopetition, i.e., alliances with their competitors, to foster their innovation processes, deal with uncertainty, or sustain their growth (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Chiambaretto & Fernandez, 2016; Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Because they simultaneously combine the advantages of cooperation and competition, coopetition strategies are sources of potential increased benefits (Bouncken et al., 2016; Ritala, 2012). However, coopetition strategies also expose companies to a more prevalent risk of opportunism that creates tension at multiple levels (Fernandez et al., 2014; Tidström, 2014). Thus, to benefit from coopetition strategies, companies must efficiently manage these tensions (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016). The management of coopetition has become a pervasive research question identifying various principles, tools and mechanisms (Le Roy et al., 2018). Regardless of the approach, the main objective of coopetition management is to maintain a sufficiently high level of cooperation among partners despite their intense competition.

2Because many tensions are partner-dependent, the partner selection process might play a crucial role in the emergence and management of coopetitive tensions. Selecting the right partner may indeed prevent the emergence of some coopetitive tensions and favor collaborative behaviors in coopetitive agreements. Accordingly, firms tend to select coopetitors based on the coopetitive tensions they expect from coopetitive agreements (Kraus et al., 2018; Chiambaretto et al., 2020).

3Among the potential antecedents of partner selection and coopetitive tensions, the importance of social ties between coopetitors has been neglected in the coopetition literature. However, these social ties have been shown to be very important in interorganizational relationships (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Wong & Tjosvold, 2010) and to generate higher levels of trust that facilitate the development of coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 2003). Considering the importance of similarity in social ties, we build on the concept of homophily, which characterizes the fact that people who look alike tend to interact and trust each other more easily (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson et al., 2001).

4While there is growing interest in trust and coopetition, the specific roles of homophily and trust in selecting partners and in setting the intensity of cooperation in coopetitive agreements have received insufficient attention. It is indeed important to understand the extent to which homophily and trust can foster the sharing of resources, knowledge, technologies or information to create common value among competitors (Gnyawali and Ryan Charleton, 2018). Thus, in this research, we aim to address the following research question: How do homophily and trust impact partner selection and the intensity of cooperation in coopetitive agreements?

5To provide insightful answers this question, we conducted a multiple-case study based on a network of coopetitive relationships between nine competing Cameroonian firms in the distribution of construction and civil engineering equipment in the Douala region (the economic capital of Cameroon). To investigate the role of homophily, we split the cases studied into three ethnic groups, as ethnic groups play a crucial role in the development of economic relationships. The first group included companies owned (or managed by) Bamilekes (the leading ethnic group in the economy), while the second and third groups included companies that belong to Bassa and Doualas, respectively. Because all these firms have interethnic and intraethnic coopetitive agreements, we could address the importance of homophily in partner selection and in the intensity of cooperation in coopetitive agreements.

6Our findings show, first, that homophily and anticipated trust are key drivers when looking for a coopetitor. In other words, coopetitors prefer to cooperate with competitors that belong to the same group because they trust them more and anticipate less coopetitive tensions and opportunistic behaviors in the future. Second, we note that the intensity of cooperation between competitors is much higher in intragroup coopetitive agreements (i.e., within the same group) than in intergroup coopetitive agreements (i.e., between two companies whose managers are from two different groups). Third, we underline how peer pressure can moderate the link between homophily and trust on one side and cooperation between competitors on the other side. The presence of peer pressure and the existence of credible sanctions reinforce the positive relationship between being a member of the same group and trust and thus the intensity of cooperation between coopetitors.

7The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We first present the theoretical background in which we ground this research before detailing the methods and empirical setting. In the following sections, we present our empirical findings before discussing their theoretical and managerial implications in the discussion.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Coopetition : A paradoxical strategy generating tensions

8Coopetition can be defined as "a paradoxical relationship between two or more actors simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions, regardless of whether their relationship is horizontal or vertical" (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). As such, following Chiambaretto et al. (in press), two firms can be considered coopetitors if (1) they cooperate and compete simultaneously; (2) the competition between these firms is intense and takes place in critical markets; and (3) the cooperation among these firms is intense and relates to critical activities or markets.

9Firms rely on coopetition strategies to exploit the benefits of both cooperation and competition (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Fernández et al., 2018a). The collaborative dimension allows firms to access key resources or technologies to launch new products or enter into new markets, while the competitive dimension of coopetitive agreements is essential to avoid complacency and maintain creative tension between organizations (Quintana-Garcia & Benavides-Velasco, 2004; Gnyawali and Ryan Charleton, 2018). However, this improved performance does not result simply from the combination of competition and cooperation; it is derived from their simultaneity that forces firms to outperform their coopetitors and to avoid being outperformed by their coopetitors (Chiambaretto et al., in press).

10Accordingly, an increasing number of firms adopt coopetition strategies to foster innovation (Bouncken et al., 2018 ; Bouncken & Kraus, 2013 ; Fernandez et al., 2018), benefit from scale economies (Dussauge et al., 2000), improve resource utilization (Chiambaretto & Fernandez, 2016; Ralandison et al., 2018), share risks and resources (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; van den Broek et al., 2018), widen their offerings (Robert et al., 2018) or even reduce the time-to-market (Nemeh, 2018; Fernandez et al., 2021). By simultaneously combining the advantages of both cooperation and competition, coopetition strategies should produce higher performance levels than cooperative or competitive strategies (Bouncken & Fredrich, 2012; Kylänen & Rusko, 2011; Peng et al., 2012; Ritala, 2012). However, empirical studies have obtained mixed results either for innovation performance outcomes (Gast et al., 2018) or for market performance outcomes (Ritala, 2018).

11A possible explanation for these mixed results comes from the presence of multiple coopetitive tensions felt at different levels (Dorn et al., 2016; Fernandez et al., 2014; Tidström, 2014). In coopetition, firms must collaborate to create joint value while competing to capture the highest share of the value created jointly (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009; Ritala & Tidström, 2014; Chiambaretto et al., 2020). Because partnering firms remain competitors, the risk of opportunism is higher than in alliances such that coopetitors can be tempted to reduce their collaboration at the lowest level to limit these risks of plunder and unintended spillovers (Baumard, 2010; Fernandez & Chiambaretto, 2016). However, if coopetitors do so, coopetition can turn into a win‒lose strategy (or even a lose‒lose strategy) in which one or all the firms refuses to cooperate with the others (Fernandez et al., 2014). To avoid this situation and to transform coopetition into a win‒win relationship, coopetitors need to manage these tensions (Le Roy et al., 2018; Le Roy & Czakon, 2016).

2.2. From managing coopetitive tensions to anticipating them

12Because management is considered a key success factor of coopetition strategies, it has become a pervasive research subject (Fernandezet al., 2018; Le Roy et al., 2018). Previous studies have highlighted managerial principles, tools or organizational designs allowing firms to manage coopetitive tensions. These management principles, tools and mechanisms are not exclusive but complementary so that firms that can efficiently combine these principles, tools and mechanisms might perform better than others under coopetition strategies.

13Regardless of the principle, tool or mechanism used, the main objective of coopetition management is to maintain a sufficiently high level of cooperation among partners despite their intense competition; this relates to the notion of “coopetition capability” (Bengtsson et al., 2016; Rai et al., 2022), which invites firms to balance intense cooperation and intense competition. Accordingly, one must keep in mind that coopetitive tensions are central in coopetition strategies and that trying to eliminate them can be more harmful than anything else (Bengtsson et al., 2016).

14Nevertheless, some tensions are more energy-, time- or resource-consuming than others, so some recent contributions underline the necessity to keep only the “good” coopetitive tensions (that create value) and avoid the other tensions (that destroy value). As many tensions are partner-dependent, some authors argue that the partner selection process might play a crucial role in the emergence and management of tensions. In the alliance literature, many contributions have underlined the key role of partner selection in the longevity and success of an alliance (Shah & Swaminathan, 2008; Kale & Singh, 2009). Selecting the right partner may indeed prevent the emergence of some tensions and favor collaborative behaviors in the alliance. In the same vein, recent contributions in the coopetition literature have revealed that firms tend to select coopetitors based on the coopetitive tensions they expect from coopetitive agreements (Kraus et al., 2018; Chiambaretto et al., 2020). In other words, firms prefer cooperating with a “good competitor” (that will create more value by cooperating more than it will destroy) compared to a “bad competitor” (that will not cooperate sufficiently, creating useless tensions and destroying more value than it will create). Among the factors that can be used to assess the potential of a future coopetitor, trust and homophily may play a significant role.

2.3. Homophily and trust as determinants of partner selection and cooperation intensity in coopetitive agreements

15Among the potential antecedents of coopetitive tensions, the importance of social ties between coopetitors has been neglected in the coopetition literature. However, these social ties are of paramount importance in interorganizational relationships. Indeed, personal relationships (such as being part of the same group) increase the likelihood of partnering (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), facilitating conflict management (Wong & Tjosvold, 2010) and generating higher levels of trust that facilitate the development of coopetition (Bengtsson et al., 2003). Indeed, Saxton (1997) notes that firms from the same cultures or with a good level of organizational "fit" tend to cooperate more with each other. Similarities between firms positively influence the emergence of coopetitive relationships (Gnyawali & Park, 2009) and can also facilitate the management of these relationships (Estrada et al., 2016; Klimas, 2016).

16To explore how these similarities can facilitate the selection of partners and foster cooperation in coopetitive agreements, we build on a key concept in social network theory: homophily (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010). Homophily is defined as the fact that people who look alike tend to interact more together and trust each other more easily (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson et al., 2001). This notion of homophily can be apprehended through many dimensions, such as having the same gender (McPherson et al., 2001), the same age (Smith et al., 2014), the same race (Mollica et al., 2003), the same religion (Louch, 2000) or belonging to the same ethnic group (Leszczensky & Pink, 2019). Accordingly, the role of homophily (without explicitly using this term) in the emergence of coopetition has already been highlighted. Similarity (social or geographical) between companies increases the probability of creating a coopetition agreement between them (Czakon & Czernek, 2016; Czernek & Czakon, 2016) or facilitates daily interactions between competitors (Fernandez et al., 2021).

17According to social network theory, homophily impacts interorganizational relationships through the development of trust (Tang et al., 2013). Defined as “a psychological state that includes the acceptance of vulnerability based on positive expectations of another’s intentions or behavior(Rousseau et al., 1998), trust influences strategic alliances and coopetition at different stages and at different levels. Trust is a pervasive research topic in the alliance literature and, more recently, in the coopetition literature (Czakon & Czernek, 2018).

18First, trust increases firms’ willingness to cooperate, as it reduces the risk of opportunism between potential partners (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Li & Ferreira, 2008; Perry et al., 2004). A few studies have also highlighted the importance of trust in partner selection in alliances and coopetition (Chin et al., 2008; Czakon & Czernek, 2016; Glaister & Buckley, 1997; Raza-Ullah & Kostis, 2020). For instance, in the tourism industry, reputation and trust play essential roles in the emergence of coopetition, especially at the network level (Czakon & Czernek, 2016; Czernek & Czakon, 2016).

19Second, several articles have underlined the positive impact of trust on interorganizational performance (Jiang et al., 2015; Krishnan et al., 2006; Robson & Kessler, 2008; Zaheer et al., 1998). In the specific case of coopetitive relationships, because trust impacts the value creation-appropriation balance, it is supposed to accentuate the positive relationship between coopetition and innovation performance (Bouncken & Fredrich, 2012; Morris et al., 2007). Indeed, trust acts as an informal control mechanism that reduces the risks of opportunism and instability (Becerra et al., 2008; Das & Teng, 1998, 2001; Kale & Singh, 2009). Associated with simpler contracts, trust can reduce transaction and governance costs (Dyer & Chu, 2003; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008).

20Third, trust is supposed to smooth relations between partners (Claro & Claro, 2008; Kanagaretnam et al., 2010), especially when companies face a complex or paradoxical situation such as coopetition (Baruch & Lin, 2012; Lascaux, 2020; Tidström, 2014). Trust contributes to cognitive closeness between partners, allowing them to better understand problems and make faster decisions when facing paradoxical situations (McEvily et al., 2003; Thorgren et al., 2011). In addition, trust impacts a firm’s perception of how its partner balances self-interest against mutual interest, which is at the core of the management of coopetition (Chiambaretto et al., 2019 ; Jiang et al., 2011 ; Tidström, 2014 ; Walters et al., 2017).

21While there is growing interest in trust and coopetition, the specific roles of homophily and trust in selecting partners and in setting the intensity of cooperation in coopetitive agreements have received insufficient attention. Only a few studies have highlighted the importance of trust and social embeddedness in regulating coopetitive tensions (Baruch & Lin, 2012; Bengtsson et al., 2010; Chiambaretto et al., 2019; Tidström, 2014) or the influence of coopetition on the evolution of trust in the relationship (Castaldo & Dagnino, 2009). While the importance of social embeddedness has been evidenced when investigating the choice of a coopetitor (Czakon & Czernek, 2016), it has not been addressed when analyzing the intensity of cooperation and the management of tensions in coopetition. However, within a network, opportunistic behavior can be immediately communicated to the whole network and can lead to the “black-listing” of the company, depriving it of future business and collaborations (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Polidoro et al., 2011). Put differently, firms belonging to the same network or group are more willing to trust each other and should thus cooperate more.

22In this research, we aim to address the following research question: How do homophily and trust impact partner selection and the intensity of cooperation in coopetitive agreements?

23To answer this question, we conducted a multiple-case study based on a network of coopetitive relationships between nine competing Cameroonian firms in the distribution of construction and civil engineering equipment in the Douala region (the economic capital of Cameroon)

3. Methods

3.1. Research design and case selection

24To answer our research question, we used an explorative qualitative research design, which is particularly relevant in answering “how” questions such as ours (Einsenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2012). Because our objective leans more toward understanding a phenomenon than testing hypotheses, an exploratory research design seems more appropriate (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Therefore, we conducted a multiple-case study, not simply to increase the sample size (in the sense of statistical sampling) but to study the singularities and similarities of multiple cases. Drawing on the logic of a small-N case study (Abbott, 2001), our work relies on intra- and intercase analyses to bring out proposals (Eisenhardt, 1989).

25Yin (2009 p. 54) explains that when a theoretical replication approach is used, “each case must be carefully selected so that it allows (a) either to predict the same result (a real replication) or (b) to predict opposite results (a theoretical replication).” Thus, comparison methods can be used for intercase analysis. These methods allowed us to better understand the roles of homophily and trust in partner selection and cooperation intensity in a coopetitive portfolio.

26As Yin (2009) points out, the choice of context and cases is crucial. Accordingly, we wanted to study coopetitive relationships in a country and in an industry where homophily and trust play important roles. Among traditional approaches to homophily, ethnicity is one of the most commonly used to characterize group members (Bacharach et al., 2005 ; Easley & Kleinberg, 2010 ; Kao & Joyner, 2004 ; McPherson et al., 2001 ; Mollica et al., 2003). If ethnicity is essential in the development of economic relations in all countries, its role is even more important in developing countries such as African countries (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Eifert et al., 2010). In African countries, ethnic links are essential to understanding the nature of economic relationships between actors. Therefore, we focused our attention on Cameroon for two main reasons. On the one hand, Cameroon is one of the few African countries to experience strong political stability over several decades, allowing the GDP growth rate to reach more than 5% on a continuous basis. On the other hand, Cameroon has a very specific ethnic structure, as the highest share of economic power belongs to a single ethnic group, the Bamilekes. Belonging to this ethnic group or to another group has a tremendous impact on the trust between economic actors and on the repertoire of competitive actions tolerated (Khavul et al., 2009; Seny Kan et al., 2015). For these reasons, Cameroon represents a perfect context in which to study the role of homophily and trust in the management of coopetitive relationships.

27To provide new insights on this topic, we studied in depth nine competing Cameroonian firms in the distribution of construction and civil engineering equipment in the Douala region (the economic capital of Cameroon). These companies are not involved in building construction, but they do supply the necessary equipment to companies in charge of construction. They are therefore in competition for the supply of materials needed for building construction. These nine companies provide similar products (mainly construction and civil engineering equipment) to the same segments of individual and professional clients. As these firms market similar offerings to similar clients, they can be considered competitors. In parallel, these nine competing companies are connected to each other by cooperation agreements, although the intensity of the cooperation varies widely. To follow the replication logic (Yin, 2009), we split the cases studied into three ethnic groups. The first group included companies owned (or managed by) Bamilekes, while the second and third groups included companies that belong to Bassa and Doualas, respectively. Because all these firms have interethnic and intraethnic coopetitive agreements, we were able to address the importance of homophily in partner selection and in the intensity of cooperation in coopetitive agreements. In addition, to avoid further bias in our analysis, we ensured that the companies from each ethnic group had different sizes and ages such that the potential role of these additional factors may be neutralized (see Table 1 below).

Table 1. Companies studied in our analysis

Table 1. Companies studied in our analysis

3.2. Empirical background

28With more than 20 million inhabitants, Cameroon is a fast-growing African country. Cameroon is characterized by important ethnic diversity, with more than 250 ethnic groups identified throughout the country. The largest ethnic groups are Bamileke and Bamoun (24.5% of the population), Fang and Beti (18.6%), and Douala, Lundu and Bassa (14.7%). Due to their size and the economic structure of the country, each ethnic group dominates the governance of specific activities within the country. Thus, while political power is admittedly held by the Fangs and the Beti, economic power is held by the Bamileke and Bamoun (Fonchingong, 2005; Nyamnjoh & Rowlands, 1998; Seny Kan et al., 2015). Each ethnic group is structured around various chiefdoms (“chefferie”). Chiefdoms are typically characterized by a hierarchical political structure that relies on kinship ties, wherein the exclusive authority to hold formal leadership positions is held by the recognized senior members of specific families. Even if there is a town or village of origin, members of a chiefdom may live outside this geographical area (as in the economic capital Douala). Nevertheless, they meet up regularly in their geographical area of origin (their chieftaincy) to reunite with their families or to discuss the current affairs of chiefdom. In the remainder of this article, when we refer to an ethnic group chief, we refer to the leader of a chiefdom.

29Among the various sectors dominated by Bamileke, we studied the construction and building materials industry because it is one of the most critical industries in the country. While the contribution of this industry to Cameroon’s GDP is approximately 4%, its annual growth rate usually exceeds 15%; demand regularly exceeds supply. The supply of these materials is provided by foreign manufacturers and retailers (e.g., EB01 or ED03), large local manufacturers and retailers (e.g., EB02 or ED01) and manufacturers and retailers (e.g., EC01 or EC03). Despite the high number of supply firms, the level of demand remains higher, so competitors must often cooperate to meet customer expectations and handle the volume of demand. However, far from being randomly established, these coopetitive relationships are implemented and managed based on the ethnicity of the managers.

3.3. Data collection and analysis

30Data were gathered from primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected in two phases. First, we conducted 26 semistructured interviews with the CEO and strategic or commercial managers (in charge of the relationships) of the competing companies concerned (18 interviews), with a Bamileke chief (2 interviews), with a non-Bamileke ethnic chief (1 interview) and with sectoral experts, i.e., members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Douala (5 interviews). The interviews lasted between 33 and 57 minutes (with an average duration of 44 minutes) and were recorded and transcribed as soon as possible to avoid any interpretation bias. In parallel, following traditional measurements of cooperation in social network studies (Paldam, 2000; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Zeng et al., 2010), the companies interviewed were asked to rate their degree of cooperation with their competitors on a scale from 0 to 5 (0= no cooperation and 5= frequent and strong cooperation). Because we had access to the CEO or managers of all the firms, each agreement was rated twice (once by each partner). When a difference in the degree of cooperation appeared, we selected the lowest level. Based on these data, we represented the network of coopetitive agreements among these 9 firms and assessed the degree of cooperation between them. In parallel, for triangulation purposes, we collected secondary data (internal and external reports) on the industry, ethnic groups and level of competition and cooperation between the companies.

31All the empirical material was systematically analysed. Following Miles & Huberman (1994), the primary data were coded in two steps. The first deductive coding round aimed to identify (1) the coopetitive relationships between the firms, (2) the coopetitive tensions and their management in these coopetitive relationships, and (3) the importance of trust and homophily in the selection of the partner and in the setting of the cooperation intensity. The objective of the second inductive round was to reveal new themes, i.e., new information about how homophily and trust explain differences in the selection of partners or in the degree of cooperation. The first-order constructs were grouped into second-order themes that were aggregated into dimensions to highlight the relationships among them (Gioia et al., 2013). In parallel, social network analysis and representation software (NodeXL) were used to study the intensity of the cooperation among the different competing companies.

4. Results

32Our findings reveal how homophily and trust influence partner selection and the intensity of cooperation in coopetitive relationships. First, we highlight how homophily is a key driver when looking for a coopetitor. Second, we discuss how homophily can foster trust among competitors. Third, we show how homophily and trust foster cooperation between competitors and contribute to reducing tensions in coopetitive relationships. Finally, we underline how peer pressure moderates the link between homophily and trust and cooperation between competitors.

4.1. A preference for collaboration with competitors who belong to the same ethnic group

33To meet the growing demand, an increasing number of competing companies in the distribution of the construction and building materials industry in the Douala region (i.e., the economic capital city of Cameroon) have decided to establish more or less formal partnerships among themselves. These collaboration agreements (whether formal or informal) have different objectives, such as sharing information about customers’ needs, increasing the geographical coverage of the firms, offering more various products, etc. However, the main objective of most of these agreements is to ensure that if company A does not have the required material or part in stock, it can recommend that its customer buy the missing part from competitor B, and companies A and B will share the proceeds of the sale. This is illustrated by the manager of the Bassa Company (EC01).

The advantage of this information sharing is that it facilitates sales for all concerned. When any partner in the sector is out of stock of a specific item, for example, one that is in demand by its customer, the latter can buy directly from its competitor-neighbor at a price previously agreed in synergy ; and come and serve its customer at its usual price, which often includes a profit margin” (Bassa Company EC01).

34While the objective of these collaborations is more or less always the same, the competitors selected to set these partnerships may differ. An important factor accounted for in the selection of the coopetitor appears to be affiliation with the same tribe.

35As in many industries, Bamilekes have a leading position in Douala in the construction sector. As such, Bamilekes develop numerous alliances with competing companies, particularly with competitors whose leaders are also Bamileke. This practice is particularly important and has significantly structured the construction market (in the broad sense in Douala). This solidarity among members of the Bamileke ethnic group has enabled the companies of this group to maintain a high position on this market. The manager of the Bamileke company EB01 specified:

"Choosing a partner from the same ethnic group is the practice that has allowed the Bamileke to dominate the hardware market or distribution in Cameroon” (Bamileke Company EB01).

36However, the Bamileke are not the only market players, and other companies, non-Bamileke competitors, are also active in the market. For instance, in the construction industry, we also find firms that are led or managed by people coming from the Bassa or Douala tribes. However, these competitors face greater difficulties, as explained by the manager of Bamileke company EB01:

"It is not possible for an operator who is not from this tribe [the Bamileke] to succeed in this market because the firm will regularly be confronted by a swarm of bees, I mean all the other Bamilekes operating in this market" (Bamileke Company EB01).

37Facing more complex conditions, non-Bamileke companies cannot afford to be very selective when looking for a coopetitor. As they are not in a powerful position in the market, Douala or Bassa companies cooperate with competing partners regardless of their ethnic origin. The main criterion is economic, as evidenced by two non-Bamileke company managers in the sector:

"The most important thing here at home is the quality of the service provided to our customers. If we put the emphasis on cultural belonging when choosing our partners, it would be an obstacle to our own development" (Douala Company, ED02).

"It is the quality of the partner that is important. It is linked to the quality of its merchandise, regardless of its culture" (Bassa Company, EC03).

38It is therefore interesting to note that while being a member of the same ethnic group is important in the choice of partner, it does not play the same role for all market players. Homophily (i.e., being part of the same ethnic group) plays a much more important role for Bamileke (who are in a strong position in the market) than for non-Bamileke entrepreneurs, such as Bassa or Doualas. Indeed, because of their greater vulnerability in the market, non-Bamileke companies cannot afford to be so demanding in choosing a partner. The main criterion remains above all economic considerations.

"We collaborate with everyone regardless of their tribe : Bamileke, non-Bamileke ; the most important thing is the quality of this collaboration in the work" (Bassa Company, EC01).

39Putting in perspective these first findings, we can highlight the importance of membership in the same ethnic group in the choice of coopetitive partners. While all firms agree on the necessity of relying on coopetition strategies, when they have to choose a particular coopetitor, they tend to prefer a coopetitor belonging to the same ethnic group (Bamilekes or Bassas). This homophilic behavior is particularly important for the Bamilekes, who can build upon some common grounds, standards or norms to cooperate more efficiently. This phenomenon may be in part explained by the role of trust.

4.2. Belonging to the same ethnic group fosters trust among coopetitors

40If competitors belonging to the same ethnic group collaborate more often together than with competitors external to this group, it is because the level of trust among the involved partners differs. Indeed, belonging to the same group first provides some guarantees to competitors that they will have some common standards to set potential conflicts. This is explained by the manager of Bamileke company EB02:

"A competitor who belongs to the same tribe and with whom we have the same meetings, we will always find common ground... This is how we choose the partner" (Bamileke Company EB02).

41Cooperating with a competitor who belongs to the same ethnic group also reduces the chance that one of the coopetitors will behave opportunistically. More specifically, belonging to the same group means that other actors (beyond the two coopetitors involved) will be observing what is happening in the coopetitive agreement and may punish a coopetitor if it behaves opportunistically. A Bamileke Chief explains how the other members of the ethnic group can help solve and prevent conflicts between two Bamileke coopetitors:

"So whatever the scale of the problem, we fight for community members to help find a solution, a median solution, or even a consensual solution for both partners..." (Bamileke Chief).

42The indirect involvement of other members, who can act as referees, contributes to creating a trustful environment.

43In contrast, high levels of trust are hard to reach when the two coopetitors do not belong to the same group. For instance, interethnic coopetitive agreements can lead to more opportunism or can even sometimes be discriminatory, such that one of the coopetitors will behave opportunistically in favor of one of its own. A leader of the Bassa ethnic group (i.e., non-Bamileke) stated the following:

"I was dependent on my Bamileke suppliers in a very competitive market. However, I had to stop because they were hurting me for the benefit of their brothers. For example, I had to wait at least two weeks before receiving my order, unlike other non-Bassa (Bamilekes) who were supplied daily" (Bassa Chief).

44Providing a broader perspective, our findings show that when coopetitors belong to the same ethnic group (Bamileke, Bassa or Doula), they tend to trust each other more than when they cooperate with a competitor external to their ethnic group. Several mechanisms have been highlighted (such as sharing the same culture or the presence of peer pressure) explaining how membership in the same ethnic group can foster this trust. We also show that, by contrast, belonging to different groups can lead to discriminatory practices, reducing the trust among the involved coopetitors as much. However, does this level of trust impact the intensity of cooperation among coopetitors?

4.3. Belonging to the same ethnic group and trust as determinants of the intensity of cooperation between competitors

45In coopetition, to reduce the risks of opportunism, plunder or leakages, companies can be tempted to limit cooperation, even if it reduces the potential benefits. To avoid this suboptimal outcome, firms need to manage coopetition by balancing cooperation and competition. Therefore, it is important to assess the intensity of cooperation between competitors to understand whether intra- and interethnic group coopetitive agreements are managed differently.

46Although we have shown that Bamileke tends to prioritize partnerships with other Bamileke competitors, some coopetition agreements of lower strategic importance can be signed with non-Bamileke companies. In this context, we analyzed the overall relationships among the 9 companies to assess the importance of coopetitive agreements through the degree of cooperation between the competing partners. The respondents rated their degree of cooperation with the different competing companies on a scale from 0 to 5 (0= no cooperation and 5= frequent and strong cooperation) (Table 2), allowing us to present their network of coopetitive links (Figure 1).

Table 2. Intensity of cooperation within and between Bamileke and non-Bamileke competing firms

Table 2. Intensity of cooperation within and between Bamileke and non-Bamileke competing firms

Figure 1. Network of intra- and interethnic coopetitive agreements

Figure 1. Network of intra- and interethnic coopetitive agreements

47A detailed analysis of the coopetitive relationships reveals that the average level of cooperation (out of 5) between competing companies owned by Bamilekes is 4.33. Regarding the non-Bamileke companies, the average level of cooperation (out of 5) between competing companies owned by Bassa is 3.33 and is equal to 1.33 for competing companies both owned by Doualas. Finally, the degree of cooperation in interethnic alliances is 1.15, which shows a significant degree of homophily in the network (with stronger intragroup cooperation and lower intergroup cooperation).

48Furthermore, this strong degree of homophily in the network means that interethnic coopetitive agreements can display a lower degree of cooperation than those signed within each ethnic group. As highlighted earlier, two competitors belonging to different groups do not trust each other and thus limit the scope of their cooperation.

49Regarding intraethnic coopetitive agreements, it is interesting to observe that the degree of cooperation between competing companies is much higher. This result showed that belonging to the same group (i.e., ethnic group) fosters trust between competing partners and thus encourages them to cooperate more. However, this result does not explain the differences in the degree of cooperation between competitors within the Bamileke group (average cooperation 4.33) and within the other non-Bamileke groups (average cooperation 3.33 for the Bassa and 1.33 for the Doualas). Potential explanations could relate to differences in the importance of homophily and trust in the management of coopetitive relationships according to the groups.

4.4. The role of peer pressure in the differentiated impact of homophily and trust on the management of coopetitive relationships

50The different degrees of cooperation observed in each ethnic group can be explained by the presence of a chief with more or less important coercive power. While ethnic groups play an important role in business life in Cameroon, ethnic chiefs can also indirectly be central actors in economic relations, although this is not necessarily the case for all tribes. We thus highlight that, depending on the role and importance of the chief in the tribe, the intensity of the cooperation might differ. Among the Bamilekes, the chief continues to play an important role in economic affairs, while the chief’s economic importance is lower among the Bassa and even lower among the Doualas. The prince of a Bamileke chiefdom (“Chefferie”) detailed his role as follows:

"When two people of my community fight, whatever the reason, my responsibility is engaged. (...) In the last resort, it is the traditional or customary power that prevails because order is given to the sons and daughters of the region to never meet in the courts” (Prince of a Bamileke chiefdom).

51In contrast, in other ethnic groups (such as the Bassa), the power of the chief is limited to customary issues. A Bassa chief specifies his role as follows:

"Among the Bassa, the chief has no influence over the sons and daughters of the village. He may not impose any conduct on his brothers or sisters and may not interact in any dispute between sons or daughters of his regency. (...) The chief among the Bassa cannot have any influence on the business activities of his tribe (...) Each of his sons evolves in total freedom, and this without any influence from anyone on his business" (Non-Bamileke Chief).

52The different roles of ethnic chiefs have a significant impact on the behaviors in their groups and thus on the companies’ strategies. Indeed, the management of the opportunism and conflicts that may arise between coopetitors is a key issue. In ethnic groups where the leader has significant power, he or she can mediate the conflicts between coopetitors. A Bamileke manager clarified this point as follows:

"In case of conflict, they [the coopetitors] meet either around a dish of yellow sauce, which is their favorite food, or in the chiefdoms in the village and try to settle it amicably. (...) All the company managers, who are competitors on a daily basis, meet up with the chief every weekend ; it is obviously to fix some issues... On Monday, everything is more peaceful between them" (Bamileke Company EB02).

53When the ethnic chief acts as referee, he or she turns coopetition into a more peaceful relationship. A climate of trust develops between coopetitors simply because they know that their conflicts can be easily resolved by the leader of their common ethnic group. From this perspective, cooperating with a competitor from the same ethnic group seems easier, especially when the chief is highly involved in the economic life of his group. A Bamileke manager detailed this idea as follows:

"When you come from the same tribe, the same region or even the same village, trust is born by itself because you have guarantees with these people because you know that, in case of a problem, you will find them in the village, with the same superior chief, you will find them in the same tontines and necessarily you will find a common ground ! ! ! Compared to a partner whose origins and structure we have no control over..." (Bamileke Company EB02).

54In other ethnic groups, when the chief has less power, he or she cannot act as a referee between coopetitors such that the peer pressure exerted related to ethnic affiliation is much lower. The power of the chief is then essentially symbolic, and conflicts between coopetitors are resolved only through the market. A manager and an entrepreneur of Bassa companies (EC01 and EC03) emphasized this point as follows:

"Generally, in case of conflict between us, we try to find a consensus, and the chief must stay away from our business transactions and exclusively deal with his chiefdom ; it may be wrong, but it is so !... the title has no importance, and the chief can in no way influence us with his power, which is only administrative. In the event of a dispute between us, everything is regulated by the market and according to the rules of the market" (Bassa Company EC01).

"The chief truly has no authority over his operators. He is truly not very different from a simple individual in his village. He has no influence on us ; he can never interfere in our business transactions in the city. (...) Conflicts are managed exclusively between us in the marketplace" (Bassa Company EC03).

55Thus, when the leader's coercive power is low, coopetitive relationships can only be regulated by the market. When opportunistic behavior or conflicts appear, entrepreneurs cannot rely on benevolent arbitration by the tribal chief. Thus, when a chief’s coercive power is low, it reduces the impact of homophily on trust and thus the probability of coopetition agreements. This is why, for instance, the intensity of cooperation between Douala competitors (for which the tribal chief plays a very marginal role) is almost equal to the intensity of cooperation between competitors from different tribes. In contrast, when a chief’s power is strong, peer pressure will be much higher to prevent opportunistic behaviors, such that it generates a climate of trust between competitors. Competitors can rely on the chief to sanction possible opportunistic behaviors so that they can trust each other more and cooperate more.

56In summary, and as shown in Table 3 below, companies manage their coopetitive agreements differently according to the ethnic group of their coopetitors. When the coopetitor belongs to a different ethnic group, trust remains scarce, and cooperation is limited. In contrast, when coopetitors belong to the same ethnic group, peer pressure and the credibility of social sanctions strengthen the trust between competitors, and cooperation is fostered (despite being competitors). However, to be in the presence of intense cooperation between competitors belonging to the same group, peer pressure must be large enough to sanction opportunistic behaviors.

Table 3. Intercase analysis

Table 3. Intercase analysis

5. Discussion and concluding remarks

5.1. Homophily and trust as determinants of partner selection and the intensity of cooperation in coopetitive agreements

57Our cases reveal, first, that for some firm owners or managers (especially those from a powerful ethnic group), the ethnicity of partners is a fundamental criterion in partner selection to create a coopetitive agreement. Belonging to the same ethnic group (and therefore homophily) fosters a sense of trust in the potential partner so that he or she has a greater chance of being chosen. This result is in line with most contributions highlighting the importance of homophily and trust in partner selection for alliances and for coopetition (Chin et al., 2008; Czakon & Czernek, 2016; Glaister & Buckley, 1997).

58 Our findings extend previous contributions, as we show that coopetitors use partner selection as a way to anticipate future coopetitive tensions to mitigate them while fostering the intensity of cooperation. While previous studies have highlighted the importance of trust in balancing cooperative and competitive behaviors (Baruch & Lin, 2012; Bengtsson et al., 2010; Chiambaretto et al., 2019; Tidström, 2014), we investigate the roots of this trust, and we show how belonging to the same group can be a key antecedent of trust and thus of higher cooperation. Indeed, we showed that the intensity of cooperation between competitors is much higher in intragroup agreements (i.e., within the same ethnic group) than in intergroup agreements (i.e., between two companies whose managers are from two different ethnic groups). These different intensities of cooperation can be explained by different levels of trust generated by homophily. Indeed, belonging to the same group (or homophily) has a significant and positive impact on the degree of cooperation between competitors. These findings go beyond previous contributions showing that homophily fosters trust and cooperation (Doney & Cannon, 1997; Morris et al., 2007; Saxton, 1997) by underlining that different groups yield different levels of cooperation within a coopetitive agreement. We summarize these insights in the following proposition 1:

59Proposition 1: Homophily increases trust between potential coopetitors so that coopetitors prefer coopeting with a coopetitor belonging to the same group and will cooperate more with this coopetitor than with a coopetitor outside the group.

5.2. Peer pressure as a moderator of the impact of homophily on the intensity of cooperation

60If homophily fosters trust and thus cooperation between competitors, we should observe more or less the same degree of cooperation for all agreements signed, as long as they are signed between two coopetitors who belong to the same group. Quite surprisingly, we observed strong differences in intragroup agreements based on the ethnic group (4.33 for the agreements among Bamilekes, 3.33 for the agreements among Bassa and 1.33 for the agreements among Doualas), highlighting different levels of trust in these ethnic groups. Thus, the relationship between homophily and trust is moderated by another factor.

61In our empirical setting, the interviews revealed the key role of the chief or leader of the ethnic group and his ability to arbitrate potential conflicts. When the chief has a lot of power and can pressure coopetitors to avoid opportunistic behaviors, then the degree of trust and thus of cooperation increases. This situation echoes the literature on self-enforcing governance that highlights the importance of peer pressure in regulating opportunistic behavior between partners in alliances (Gulati, 1995; Marchington & Vincent, 2004; Polidoro et al., 2011). The presence of a mechanism of social control (i.e., peer pressure) thus appears as a catalyst of the creation of coopetitive agreements and of a higher level of cooperation. Indeed, belonging to a common group can generate enough pressure to avoid opportunistic behavior and facilitate conflict management for both partners (Wong & Tjosvold, 2010). However, this ability to limit opportunistic behavior (and thus foster cooperation) depends on the actual ability to sanction the deviant partner.

62Our cases provided strong illustrations of these mechanisms. The high degree of cooperation between competitors among the Bamileke compared to other ethnic groups (Bassa or Doualas) was due to the regulatory power of the chief of the ethnic group. Among the Bamilekes, the chief plays a critical role in regulating the economic affairs of his members, mediating conflicts and sanctioning any deviant behavior. As they know that the chief (and ethnic peers) would protect them from opportunistic behaviors, competitors can thus cooperate with confidence. Peer pressure and coercive power reinforce trust among competitors and increase the intensity of the cooperation between them. In contrast, in other ethnic groups (such as the Bassa and even more in the Doualas), where the chief has a more symbolic role, his action in economic transactions remains limited. Thus, the chief cannot ensure that peer pressure will be sufficiently strong to interfere in conflicts between competitors and punish the deviant partner. Consequently, the members of these ethnic groups were more moderate and cautious in their coopetitive relationships. The absence of peer pressure tends to negatively moderate the positive relationship among homophily, trust and cooperation.

63More specifically, we show that hierarchical control (embodied by the chief) enables social mechanism controls (peer pressure) to efficiently regulate coopetitive tensions among members. Even if peer pressure is potentially present in each ethnic group, its ability to actually impact members’ behaviors depends upon the power of the chief. In that sense, our findings extend previous research that highlighted the role of social embeddedness in the degree of cooperation (Polidoro et al., 2011; Wong & Tjosvold, 2010) by underlining that social embeddedness and peer pressure impact trust and cooperation only when there is a strong potential sanction, guaranteed, for instance, by the leader of the group (i.e., the chief in our setting). Put differently, the credibility of the threat from the social network has a positive impact on the degree of trust and cooperation within a group. This leads to the following Proposition 2:

64Proposition 2: Peer pressure and credible sanctions act as moderators between homophily and trust between potential coopetitors so that coopetitors cooperate more with a coopetitor belonging to the same group if this group acts as a guarantor against opportunistic behaviors.

65Figure 2 summarizes our main theoretical findings stemming from the cases:

Figure 2. Summary of the main findings

Figure 2. Summary of the main findings

5.3. Theoretical contributions

66Our contribution to the literature on coopetition is twofold.

67First, this research contributes to the emerging literature on the role of trust in coopetitive relationships (Castaldo & Dagnino, 2009; Czakon & Czernek, 2016, 2018; Morris et al., 2007). Not only do we confirm the authors’ results by underlining the importance of trust as a driver of partner selection or coopetition formation, but we extend their conclusions in two ways. First, we investigate some of the antecedents of trust and, more precisely, the role of homophily in the emergence of trust between coopetitors (Fernandez et al., 2021). In that sense, we highlight the importance of considering the context and the groups to which coopetitors belong when investigating trust in coopetition (Czakon & Czernek, 2016). As such, this research is one of the first to explicitly investigate the importance of homophily in the emergence of coopetitive relationships. Second, we go further than these past contributions by analyzing the role of trust in the reduction of coopetitive tensions. More precisely, we show how trust arising from belonging to the same group contributes to regulating the risk of opportunism and reduces coopetitive tensions (Fernandez et al., 2014). Nevertheless, we underline that belonging to the same group does not automatically generate enough peer pressure to foster trust. To be in the presence of efficient peer pressure, the existence of more hierarchical control mechanisms, such as the presence of a leader enforcing credible sanctions, might increase the positive effect of peer pressure on the level of trust.

68Second, this research contributes to the emerging literature on partner selection in coopetition (Kraus et al., 2018; Chiambaretto et al., 2020). More precisely, we underline that partner selection can be used as a way to anticipate potential coopetitive tensions. While the importance of partner selection in the longevity and success of alliances has already been investigated (Kale & Singh, 2009), this has not been precisely studied in the specific context of coopetition. More precisely, our findings reveal that selecting the right coopetitor (i.e., that belongs to the same group or presents high levels of trust) can be used as a way to anticipate and optimize coopetitive tensions. More precisely, the selection of the right coopetitor helps keep the “good” coopetitive tensions (those that contribute to creating value) while limiting the “bad” tensions (those that potentially destroy value).

5.4. Managerial implications

69This study also presents several managerial implications. First, we underline the importance of similarity or belonging to the same group in the choice of a coopetitive partner. There is a very high probability that companies seek partners that are similar to themselves or that are from the same group. Indeed, and this is the second point, belonging to the same group fosters the emergence of trust between partners and facilitates the regulation of complex and paradoxical relationships such as coopetition. Finally, we highlight the importance of peer pressure in the regulation of coopetitive relationships. The greater the group can sanction deviant behaviors, the more trust and cooperation between competitors can be developed in coopetitive relationships.

5.5. Limitations and research directions

70Despite the various insights provided by our study, our research suffers from numerous limitations that are also future research directions.

71First, our approach to homophily has been limited to the ethnic dimension, which is certainly important in Africa but can play a more limited role in other contexts. Other approaches to homophily deserve to be understood, such as political affiliation (Huber & Malhotra, 2017), race (Mollica et al., 2003) or alumni networks (Kossinets & Watts, 2009). It would be interesting to test the external validity of our results with other group configurations (Gibbert et al., 2008).

72Second, our research is strongly rooted in the context that informal relationships are very strong (Bratton, 2007). These informal relationships foster peer pressure and tend to reinforce the effects of homophily. It therefore seems important to question the validity of our results in other sectors or countries where informal relations play a more secondary role.

73Third, our empirical analysis (multiple-case study) is based on a network of coopetitive relationships between nine competitors. While the goal of our investigation is to investigate the role of homophily on partner selection and on the intensity of cooperation, other variables may also have had an influence on these outcomes. Despite the fact that we have tried to compare firms presenting similar profiles in the three ethnic groups, some differences either in terms of age or size may bias some of our results (for instance, an older firm could have more time to develop more cooperative agreement). With these limitations in mind, future research could investigate from a quantitative standpoint how homophily impacts the intensity of cooperation while controlling for firm-specific variables (age, size, etc.).

74Finally, in carrying out the analysis, this study suffers from the small size of its sample, particularly regarding the ability to draw conclusions from the social network analysis. A more systematic analysis of the links between competing companies based on their group membership would make it possible to study the importance of homophily more deeply in coopetitive relationships.

75Despite these limitations, we remain confident that our research provides novel insights regarding the role of homophily and trust in partner selection and cooperation intensity in coopetitive agreements.

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Annexe

Appendix. The interview guide

Introduction

Presentation of the study (context and objectives)

Introduction to the interviewee

Environment and business context

Could you describe your activity and your company?

What are the main challenges that your company has to address?

What are the main difficulties to maintain your competitive advantage?

Coopetition antecedents

Could you describe your alliances?

Could you describe your alliances with your competitors?

Why do you cooperate with you competitors?

What are your main objectives?

Coopetitor selection

How do you choose the competitors you collaborate with?

How do you feel about potential partners that are also members of your tribe/ethnic group?

How do you feel about potential partners that are not members of your tribe/ethnic group?

How important is the tribe/ethnic group when forming alliances with your competitors? Can you explain why ?

Could you explain the differences between the different tribes/ethnic groups that are present in Cameroon?

How important is the chief of the tribe/ethnic group in your business activities? Can you explain why ?

Could you share with us previous experiences of collaborations with competitors?

Can you give us an example of situation when your Chief of tribe/ethnic group has been involved into one of your alliances?

Coopetition difficulties and management

What are the risks associated with alliances with your competitors?

How do you manage them?

How far does the tribe/ethnic group help to manage them?

How far does the chief of the tribe/ethnic group help to manage them?

According to you, what makes an alliance with competitors a success?

According to you, what makes an alliance with competitors a failure?

Conclusion

Anything you would like to add?

Any recommendation for other interviews?

Acknowledgments and greetings

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Table des illustrations

Titre Table 1. Companies studied in our analysis
URL http://journals.openedition.org/fcs/docannexe/image/12200/img-1.png
Fichier image/png, 42k
Titre Table 2. Intensity of cooperation within and between Bamileke and non-Bamileke competing firms
URL http://journals.openedition.org/fcs/docannexe/image/12200/img-2.png
Fichier image/png, 26k
Titre Figure 1. Network of intra- and interethnic coopetitive agreements
URL http://journals.openedition.org/fcs/docannexe/image/12200/img-3.png
Fichier image/png, 145k
Titre Table 3. Intercase analysis
URL http://journals.openedition.org/fcs/docannexe/image/12200/img-4.png
Fichier image/png, 53k
Titre Figure 2. Summary of the main findings
URL http://journals.openedition.org/fcs/docannexe/image/12200/img-5.png
Fichier image/png, 35k
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Référence électronique

Hervé Chappert, Paul Chiambaretto, Anne-Sophie Fernandez et Raoul Djamen, « “Us Versus Them” : The impact of homophily and trust in partner selection and cooperation intensity in coopetitive agreements »Finance Contrôle Stratégie [En ligne], NS-14 | 2024, mis en ligne le 01 mai 2024, consulté le 09 mai 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/fcs/12200 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/11r8c

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Auteurs

Hervé Chappert

Maître de Conférences; Institut Montpellier Management (MOMA) - Université de Montpellier; Laboratoire MRM (Montpellier Recherche en Management)

Paul Chiambaretto

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Anne-Sophie Fernandez

Professeur des Universités; Institut Montpellier Management (MOMA) - Université de Montpellier; Laboratoire MRM (Montpellier Recherche en Management); anne-sophie.fernandez@umontpellier.fr

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Raoul Djamen

Enseignant-Chercheur; IUT Nice Côte d’Azur; Raoul.DJAMEN-KOUPTOUDJI@univ-cotedazur.fr

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