Navigation – Plan du site

AccueilNuméros28DOSSIER THÉMATIQUE Guerre et aut...Warfare and Polis Formation in th...

DOSSIER THÉMATIQUE
Guerre et autorité en Grèce archaïque

Warfare and Polis Formation in the Archaic Peloponnese

Guerre et formation de la cité dans le Péloponnèse archaïque
Mait Kõiv

Résumés

Les sources narratives, probablement issues de traditions orales, évoquent des conflits de grande envergure dans le Péloponnèse archaïque. Les vers de Tyrtée, qui corroborent en partie ces traditions, suggèrent que les guerres de conquête étaient bel et bien une réalité à cette époque. Les Spartiates conquirent ainsi la Laconie et la Messénie, réduisirent en esclavage au moins une partie des populations locales, tentèrent d’asservir les Tégéens, et affrontèrent victorieusement les Argiens, qui cherchaient sans doute à imposer leur propre hégémonie dans la région. Ces guerres, qu’elles soient menées pour la conquête, la défense ou le maintien du pouvoir sur des territoires et communautés assujettis, exigeaient une force militaire considérable et une organisation efficace. Cet article se propose d’examiner les implications de ces éléments pour la compréhension du développement de la guerre en Grèce, notamment des tactiques hoplitiques, ainsi que de l’impact des conflits sur l’évolution sociale et la formation de l’État dans les communautés du Péloponnèse.

Haut de page

Texte intégral

1. Introduction

  • 1 For Spencer, see Hart et al. (2018), Oppenheimer (1909).
  • 2 Carneiro (1970).
  • 3 E.g. LeBlanc (2006), Turchin & Gavrilets (2009), Morris (2015, 64–111), Sheidel (2017, 44).
  • 4 The role of warfare in promoting individuals and elite leadership is stressed e.g. by Carneiro (197 (...)
  • 5 Roscoe (2013, 62–64).

1The importance of warfare for state formation has featured in the discussion of the origins of statehood since the late 19th and early 20th centuries when Herbert Spencer and Franz Oppenheimer put forward their concepts of early militant societies and of the creation of states by conquering herders.1 More recently, the concept of Robert Carneiro about formation of chiefdoms and states through intercommunity warfare in ecologically or socially circumscribed regions has proved both influential and controversial.2 Regardless of the debatable justification of Carneiro’s emphasis on circumscription, the impact of martial conflicts on the development of social complexity and the eventual state formation is widely recognised in research.3 This impact can be seen as twofold. On the one hand, warfare was likely to enhance the position of the incipient elite. Its leadership could have been indispensable in armed conflicts, and its members were most likely to profit from the success and could consequently instigate conflicts because of ambition and greed. On the other hand, protection against enemies was in everybody’s interest while successful attacks against others could bring a share of booty to all the fighters, which was likely to enhance cooperation among the community members and thereby integral cohesion.4 Both factors could have promoted polity formation, though shaping this differently, either by giving elite leaders a chance to enhance their power, or by allowing the commoners to exercise some control of the elite, perhaps granting the right to participate in the decision making. To put emphasis on either of these aspects, we can speak about top‑down or bottom‑up approaches to the impact of warfare on state formation. In this connection, scholars have variably emphasised the formative and integrative role of defensive and offensive warfare, while Paul Roscoe has recently stated a difference between the ways these kinds of conflict shape the communities’ development. He notes that offensive action against neighbours was usually instigated and executed by some, possibly outstanding, community members driven by personal interests, while the community as a whole had no part in this and could suffer from the repercussions. This could promote the individuals and the emergence of an elite, but was not, in his opinion, likely to enhance communal cohesion. The defence of the community, however, was the task and concern of the whole community, in which every man participated for the sake of his own and his family’s safety or even survival.5

  • 6 Nilsson (1929), Lorimer (1947), Andrewes (1956), Salmon (1977), Hanson (1989), Viggiano & Van Wees  (...)
  • 7 For an overview of the development of the concept and its criticism, see Echeverría (2021), Lloyd, (...)
  • 8 The meaning of phalanges in Homer is admittedly ambiguous and could signify simply the mass of figh (...)
  • 9 Iliad, XVI, 212–217 clearly refers to close fighting of heavily armed soldiers (quote from 215: ἀσπ (...)
  • 10 See Latacz (1977), Raaflaub (1997 and 2005), Raaflaub & Wallace (2007, 25–27), Van Wees (2008, 278)
  • 11 For the bowl and its implications, and for the Greek mercenaries in the east in general, see Luragh (...)
  • 12 Van Wees (2005, 47–60, 151–197), Krentz (2007), Echeverría (2012 and 2021), Lloyd (2017 and 2021). (...)
  • 13 For the Late Geometric and early archaic pictorial scenes, see e.g. Viggiano & Van Wees (2013), Llo (...)
  • 14 Tyrt. fr. 11.31–38 West; quote from 31–32: καὶ πόδα πὰρ ποδὶ θεὶς καὶ ἐπ’ ἀσπίδος ἀσπίδ’ ἐρείσας, / (...)

2We can expect that warfare shaped the formation of the political communities also in the Greek world, where the formative archaic period was characterised by relatively frequent intercommunity conflicts, as the following discussion will demonstrate. In Greece, however, an additional factor comes into play. This is hoplite tactics, i.e. the fighting of heavily equipped infantry men in relatively closed ranks—the phalanx—which dominated Greek battlefields by the end of the archaic period at the latest. The origins of hoplite warfare and its social implications are, however, debatable. For a long time, it was accepted that the seventh century witnessed a “hoplite revolution” promoting an emergent social middle class, mainly farmers, from which the bulk of the hoplites derived, and that this development undermined the previous elite power.6 This concept is now questioned from at least two perspectives.7 On the one hand, it is recognised that mass fighting was familiar to Homer. As the Iliad is usually dated to the late eighth or early seventh century, this would suggest that fighting in close formation was established already before the supposed seventh century revolutionary change. Homer repeatedly mentioned phalanges, which, though not necessarily referring to close knit phalanx,8 demonstrates that mass fighting must have been usual at his time. Moreover, he compared the front line of the fighters to a wall built of close‑set stones and described the warriors fighting “shield pressed on shield, helm upon helm, and man on man”, very similarly to Tyrtaios exhorting the Spartans to fight in such formation perhaps a half of a century later.9 Homer assumed that common men formed the bulk of the armies and were equipped with shields and spears like their heroic leaders.10 The early beginning of hoplite warfare is moreover suggested by a late eighth century Phoenician bowl from Amathous on Cyprus, which depicts Greek-style hoplites both defending and attacking a city. This suggests that already at that date the hoplites were hired as mercenaries by the eastern powers, although cannot indicate how massive these forces were or how closely knit was their battle formation.11 The recognition that hoplites appeared on the battlefields by the late eighth century and that Homer was familiar with mass fighting of heavily equipped soldiers has pushed the beginning of hoplite warfare earlier than previously accepted. On the other hand, scholars have suggested that the hoplite tactics evolved gradually and the phalanx assumed its classical rigidity only by the fifth century, while in the archaic period the ranks of the warriors were relatively loose, allowing the hoplites to use the spears for throwing and the light armed soldiers—gymnetes—to fight besides them.12 Early vase painting indeed depicts hoplites with two spears, one of which was probably used for throwing,13 and Tyrtaios, although exhorting to fight “setting foot beside foot, resting shield against shield, crest beside crest, helm beside helm”, which implies closed ranks of the heavily armed soldiers, still urged the gymnetes to hit the enemies “besides the hoplites (panoploi)”, which cannot be easily reconciled with a closely knit hoplite phalanx.14

  • 15 Hdt. IX, 28 notes 5,000 hoplites from Corinth, 3,000 from Megara and from Sikyon, 1,500 from Tegea (...)
  • 16 Hdt. II, 163.1 states that there was 30,000 Karians and Ionians in the army that Apries led against (...)
  • 17 E.g. Foxhall (1997, 119): “[…] generally the poleis of Archaic Greece were little more than a stand (...)
  • 18 Raaflaub & Wallace (2007), Robinson (1997), Kõiv (2011), Raaflaub (2024), Ma (2024, 121–127, 189–19 (...)

3Connected to this uncertainty about the evolution of hoplite warfare is the difficulty to establish the social status of hoplites in archaic Greece. Hoplite equipment was relatively expensive and providing for it would have required a certain amount of wealth, which must have excluded the poor. But we do not know how broad or narrow was the social circle of men who could acquire the equipment and fight as hoplites. Nor is it clear how significant was the role of gymnetes in the battles. By the time of the Persian invasion the majority of the hoplites must surely have been smallholders, indicated by the thousands of them that the poleis were able to put in to field according to Herodotos.15 Most of these forces, like the thousands of Greek mercenaries hired by the Egyptian pharaohs in the sixth century,16 could not have derived from an elite leisure class. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that in the earlier archaic period, when the hoplites were perhaps less numerous and fought in looser formations mingled with the light armed fighters, they still did form a restricted elite from which a big majority of the men was excluded. We cannot therefore be sure about the social impact of the development of hoplite tactics. On the one hand, if, or when, the hoplites formed only a relatively narrow elite who possessed a virtual monopoly of heavy equipment and were, due to athletic exercises allowed by the available leisure time, better fighters than the poorer community members, this would have enhanced their position, promoted social hierarchies and contributed to the establishment of an elite power. On the other hand, if, or when, the majority of the hoplites came from among the smallholders who did thereby significantly contribute to the outcome of the battles, the hoplite tactics would have helped to confirm their role in the political sphere and allowed to check the increase of elite domination. In both cases the military factor, including the development of the hoplite tactics, would have impacted social development and state formation, although in different ways. The first scenario would suggest the formation of polis as a more or less exclusively elite institution where the majority of people had to accept political and probably economic subjection.17 This would conform to the top‑down approach to state formation. The second scenario would rather recommend a bottom‑up approach, suggesting that the poleis emerged as broadly based participatory communities including the smallholders more as participants than subjects.18

4The following discussion will address this question on the basis of the evidence for warfare in the archaic Peloponnese. It will focus on three states, or regions, the histories of which were densely intertwined and for which relatively good evidence is available: Sparta, Argos and the Arkadian poleis. It will start with an overview of what can be gathered from the sources about the wars between these communities, for highlighting the significance of the warfare in this period, will attempt to establish the status of the warriors and the social strata interested in and profiting from the wars, and will eventually discuss the impact of the warfare on the state formation in the Peloponnese.

2. Warfare in the archaic Peloponnese

  • 19 Tyrt. fr. 5 West. The exact meaning or the extent of Messene is not specified, and Luraghi (2008, 7 (...)
  • 20 Tyrtaios indicates firmly at least two wars: at the time of Theopompos and at the time of his own. (...)
  • 21 Hdt. VIII, 131.2 and Paus. III, 7.7–9 place Theopompos 8 (Herodotos) or 7 (Pausanias) generations b (...)

5The earliest evidence for warfare and conquest in the Peloponnese is given by Tyrtaios, probably composing around the middle of the seventh century or slightly afterwards. The poet exhorted the Spartans to fight bravely against the Messenians, and indicates that they had already conquered the “spacious Messene” some time before, in a war which had lasted for twenty years, fought by “the fathers of our fathers” led by King Theopompos.19 The war at Tyrtaios’ time was thus a renewal of the conflict. The conquest by “the fathers of our fathers” does not necessarily indicate exactly two generations between the initial conquest and the second war, as the ancients understood it,20 and can hardly provide a secure dating for the conquest. However, the leadership of King Theopompos places the conquest relatively firmly around 700, because this was the time when the king must have ruled, if any credence can be placed on the sequencies of the Spartan kings transmitted by Herodotos and Pausanias.21

  • 22 The main accounts are Ephoros FGrH 70 F 117, 118 and Paus. III, 2.6–7, 20.6. For the complex set of (...)

6Messenia, however, could hardly have been the first conquest of the Spartans. Sparta in the strict sense was a relatively small community in Lakonia, on the western bank of the River Eurotas, separated form Messenia by the Taygetos mountain range. Before attacking Messenia on the other side of it, the Spartans almost certainly must have had Lakonia, or at least most of it, already under their control. If we will not suppose that the other Lakonian communities, later known as the Spartan perioikoi, and the part of the population enslaved as the helots, did willingly surrender their independence and freedom, we must accept that the control of Lakonia was achieved through conquest, as it is suggested by the later literary tradition.22 This will date the start of the Spartan conquests to the eighth century at the latest. As the result of this set of events, two vast regions—Lakonia and Messenia—were under Spartan control by ca 700. The exact limits either of their sphere of domination at that time or the status of the subjected people cannot be easily specified.

  • 23 Paus. IV, 14.4 quoting Tyrtaios (fr. 6 West) does not indicate if the conquered Messenians, presuma (...)

7At the time of Tyrtaios the Spartans, we must suppose, achieved a new victory and confirmed their grip over Messenia. They might have enlarged their sphere of domination, subjecting the part of Messenia westwards of the Stenoklaros and Pamisos plains, which might have remained independent after the initial conquest. This region certainly belonged to Sparta by the classical period, but there is no reliable evidence on when it was conquered. This might have been achieved already by Theopompos, or at the time of Tyrtaios, or still later in the archaic period. Similar uncertainty concerns the time when the Messenians were enslaved as the helots, which might have taken place already after the initial conquest, or after the suppression of the seventh century revolt, or still afterwards.23

  • 24 Tyrt. fr. 23a West: …]καδες ᾿Αργείωνυνελ[…, where the first word could be restored as ᾿Αρκάδες. See (...)
  • 25 See e.g. Adshead (1986, 26–28), Zingg (2016), Bourke (2018, 76–77). Note Strab. VIII, 4.10 implying (...)
  • 26 Paus. II, 24.7 dates the battle to the fourth year of Ol. 27, thus to 669. His dates for the second (...)
  • 27 Diod. VII, 13.2; the exact meaning of Diodoros and the context of the reputed event remains unclear (...)

8Tyrtaios mentions the Spartans fighting not only against the Messenians, but also against the Argives and the Arkadians.24 This can give some support to the later tradition, which reports an anti‑Spartan coalition with the Argive and Arkadian participation during the so‑called Second Messenian War caused by the Messenians’ revolt, and which might have been directly supported by some verses of Tyrtaios lost for us.25 Pausanias, moreover, notes that the Spartans were defeated by the Argives in a battle at Hysiai (a settlement in a small but steep valley between Argos and the Arkadian polis Tegea), which he dated immediately before the end of the Second Messenian War.26 If this evidence is reliable, it suggest that the Spartan force was able to cross the land of Tegea in south-eastern Arkadia, because Hysiai is best approachable from Sparta through the Tegean territory. Diodoros reports a tradition that at some point of time the Spartans caused much trouble for the Argives who consequently blamed their king (basileus) for allotting land to the Arkadians, and that the king had to flee to Tegea as the result.27 This can imply Tegean involvement in the conflict. Whether or not this occasion was connected to the fighting for Hysiai cannot be verified.

  • 28 Hdt. I, 66, dating the battle to the time of the Spartan kings Leon and Hegesikles who ruled during (...)
  • 29 Hdt. I, 67–68, dating this to the time of Kroisos, about a generation after the previous Tegean vic (...)
  • 30 Hdt. I, 82. Herodotos’ narrative, as well as the later elaborations of the story, surely contained (...)
  • 31 See the discussion in Cawkwell (1993), Wolff (2010), Roy (2018, 355–360).

9Be this as it may, we can trust the account of Herodotos that the Spartan attempted to conquer Tegea and enslave its people in the early sixth century, but suffered shameful defeat, were imprisoned and chained to work the Tegean fields. The event was commemorated by the dedication of the chains of the Spartans in the Tegean sanctuary of Athena Alea.28 Around the middle of the century, however, they in some way succeeded to get Tegea under their control, probably as a subject ally.29 This was also the time when they conquered the plain of Thyrea on the eastern coast of Peloponnese, defeating the Argives who had previously possessed the district.30 By the end of the sixth century almost all the Peloponnesian poleis, with the notable exception of Argos, had become Spartan allies, but the way this was achieved cannot be reconstructed.31

  • 32 Hdt. I, 82.2.
  • 33 Ephoros FGrH 70 F 15; for the traditions concerning the Lot of Temenos, see Kõiv (2003, 216–217).
  • 34 Hdt. VI, 92.2, noting that the Sikyonians paid a part of this fine, thus apparently recognized some (...)
  • 35 Hdt. V, 67.1.
  • 36 Ephoros FGrH 70 F 115, 176; Marm. Par. FGrH 239 ep. 30.

10Sparta, however, was by no means the only Peloponnesian community conquering adjacent territories during the archaic period. Argos seems to have been almost equally aggressive, although with less success. Herodotos believed that in an early time the Argives had possessed the whole of the eastern coast of Peloponnese up to the Cape of Malea in its south-eastern top.32 The reliability of this evidence, however, may be doubtful. Nor can we accept without reservations the tradition that the Argive king or tyrant Pheidon had once united the reputed inheritance of his legendary ancestor Temenos, which would mean the control of most of the north-eastern Peloponnese.33 However, Herodotos reports that in the early fifth century the Argives were entitled to impose punitive fines on Sikyon and Aigina, thus having some authority over these poleis at that time.34 As the relatively well known late sixth century events immediately before that time present no context for the creation of this authority, it must have been inherited from an earlier period. Herodotos indicates an enmity between Argos and Sikyon during the reign of the Sikyonian tyrant Kleisthenes in the early sixth century,35 and later tradition claimed that Pheidon was able to issue coins at Aigina,36 which may be unreliable, but implies memories about Pheidon’s domination over the island. All this evidence, however, is too uncertain to allow reliable conclusions about the extent and the time of the beginning, perhaps even the very reality, of the broad sphere of Argive hegemony.

  • 37 Hdt. VI, 127.3; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 115; Paus. VI, 22.2.
  • 38 Herdotos VI, 127.3 implies dating to the late 7th or early 6th century (for the worth of this evide (...)
  • 39 Paus. II, 36.4–5; III, 7.4 (Asine); IV, 35.2 (Nauplia, allegedly destroyed at the time of the secon (...)
  • 40 Pollux, Onom., III, 83 (gymnetes); Steph. Byz. s.v. Chios: (gymnesioi). See Willets (1959, 496–498) (...)

11This uncertainty, however, cannot deny the Argive conquests. We can probably credit the tradition that Pheidon invaded Olympia and forcibly celebrated the Games,37 although the uncertainty about Pheidon’s date—the possibilities range from the eighth to the early sixth century—does not allow to establish the context for this remarkable event.38 Around the end of the eighth century the Argives destroyed Asine on the coast near the Argive plain, and a few generations later Nauplia still closer to them on the coast.39 They certainly fought against the Spartans at the time of Tyrtaios, and probably defeated them in the Battle of Hysiai, which suggests that the valley of Hysiai was subsequently, if not already before that, under Argive control. We already noted their alleged troubles in a war against the Spartans, where the Tegeans also were involved, which may demonstrate their active interests in the eastern Arkadian affairs. And we can trust the tradition that they possessed the district of Thyrea which the Spartans conquered from them around the middle of the sixth century. Later sources mention a servile population in Argos, called the “naked ones”—either gymnetes or gymnesioi. We can guess that these people were subjected through conquest, but there is no evidence for when this was achieved, nor where exactly the “naked ones” dwelt. They could have been the inhabitants of some conquered territories.40

  • 41 Kallisthenes FGrH 124 F 23 (quoting the inscription); Strabo VIII, 4.10; Paus. VIII, 5.13; IV, 17.2 (...)
  • 42 Herakleides Pontikos ap. Diog. Laert. I, 94.
  • 43 Trapezous in Paus. VIII, 5.13; IV, 17.2–3; Orchomenos in Strabo VIII, 4.10.
  • 44 Paus. VIII, 5.11–12. Pausanias distinguished between two rulers called Aristokrates—grandfather and (...)
  • 45 The inscription quoted by Kallisthenes FGrH 124 F 23, which recorded the punishment of a treacherou (...)

12For the Arkadians the evidence of Tyrtaios confirms their fighting against the Spartans at the time of the poet, thus probably during the Second Messenian War. Later tradition shared this view. There was moreover a tradition about an Arkadian basileus Aristokrates who headed his compatriots in the war, but betrayed them, caused the defeat in the battle “at the great trench”, and was stoned to death when the betrayal was discovered. This event was later commemorated by an inscription set up near the altar of Zeus Lykaios, in the pan‑Arkadian sanctuary on Mount Lykaion.41 Herakleides Pontikos in the fourth century believed that Aristokrates and his son were ruling over “almost the whole of Arkadia”, that Aristokrates’ daughter was married to Prokles the tyrant of Epidauros and gave birth to the future wife of the infamous Corinthian tyrant Periandros.42 The sources however disagreed about the home polis of Aristokrates, describing him either as the king of Trapezous in the western Arkadia at the foot of Mount Lykaion, or as the ruler of Orchomenos in Arkadia’s eastern part.43 In Orchomenos, moreover, Aristokrates was apparently known to have been stoned by the people because of the rape of a local priestess.44 The accounts are obviously confused and their reliability highly debatable.45 However, they show Aristokrates as a famous figure in the Arkadian traditions. His alleged leadership of the Arkadians suggests that he was remembered as a warlord, and the statement of Herakleides Pontikos about his large realm may suggest that this enabled him to attain hegemony over several Arkadian communities.

  • 46 For this “Battle of Fetters”, see above with note 28 and below with note 105.
  • 47 Besides the tradition concerning the “Battle of Fetters” there was a story about the imprisonment o (...)

13Be this as it may with the tradition about Aristokrates, the Arkadians’ fighting against the Spartans at the time of Tyrtaios can hardly be doubted. Nor is there any doubt that in the early sixth century the Tegeans defeated the Spartans who tried to conquer them, being victorious in the famous battle where they imprisoned at least a part of the invaders.46 The Tegean tradition preserve numerous stories about successful fighting against the Spartans. The exact context of these occasions, or the reliability of these accounts, cannot be established, but they indicate memories about frequent fighting against Sparta.47 The submission to Spartan domination around the mid‑sixth century could have resulted from a military defeat, but no obvious account of this particular instance has come down to us.

  • 48 The evidence in Nielsen (2002, 186–187), Kõiv (2018, 475).
  • 49 Thuk. IV, 134 (the battle in Orestis between the Tegeans and the Mantineians in 423); V, 65.4 (allu (...)
  • 50 Thuk. IV, 134 (the battle in Orestis between the Tegeans and the Mantineians and the allies of both (...)

14There are, however, records of several dedications by the Arkadian poleis in various sanctuaries, made from the spoils taken from the defeated enemies. In some cases, these enemies were surely other Arkadian communities, indicating warfare between the Arkadian poleis.48 The enmity and fighting between Mantinea and Tegea in the classical period is well recorded,49 and we have every reason to assume that this dates back to the archaic era. For some time during the classical period both these poleis succeeded to build up their spheres of hegemony, dominating a number of dependant allies.50 For the archaic period comparable evidence is absent, but the tradition about the wide power sphere of Aristokrates—perhaps the ruler the Mantinea’s northern neighbour Orchomenos—can imply archaic antecedents for the hegemonic ambitions of Arkadian poleis.

  • 51 Euseb. I, 197–198 Schoene: a war between Dyme and Elis at 668; Paus. VII, 26.2–3, 13: early wars of (...)
  • 52 A late sixth century decree from Olympia mentions the Eleans (Faleioi) and their symmachia (Siewert (...)

15What has been noted here, does by no means exhaust the evidence for warfare in archaic Peloponnese. There are traditions about engagements between the northern Peloponnesian poleis,51 and we can be certain about the hegemonic ambitions of Elis which by the sixth century achieved control over Olympia and its surroundings, and headed an alliance of probably dependent communities. The establishment of this hegemony surely involved warfare and conquest.52 Moreover, what the later sources record based on oral traditions are surely only the most memorable examples of the wars. All this considered, there will be no doubt that warfare was fairly common during the archaic period. Armed conflicts took place both on a local and pan‑Peloponnesian level, and various communities tried to subject their weaker neighbours and established spheres of domination. The Spartans were only the most successful in these attempts. This must have had an impact on social development and formation of political communities. For understanding this impact we must ask about the status of the men who fought these wars, about the social groups who profited from the conflicts and the conquests, and eventually, about the ways these factors shaped the social order and power relations in the forming communities.

3. The status of the warriors

  • 53 Tyrt. fr. 6–7 West quoted by Paus. IV, 14.5.
  • 54 The obligation of “wailing for the masters […] whenever the baneful doom of death came upon any” (f (...)

16The main contemporary evidence for the social implications of warfare in archaic Peloponnese comes from the poetry of Tyrtaios, which illuminates the conquest of Messenia, the fate of the conquered Messenians, and the way the Spartans fought to confirm their rule. The preserved fragments are, however, rather laconic in this respect. They state that the conquest was achieved by the “spearmen, the father of our fathers”, and that the conquered Messenians had to deliver half of their harvest to their “masters” (desposynoisi) and to come with their wives to mourn the “masters” (despotas) in the funerals.53 Surrendering of a half of the harvest, even if exaggerated, indicates heavy exploitation, but cannot establish the exact status of the subjected people who might or might not have been already enslaved as helots, i.e. the slaves tilling the kleroi of individual Spartiates. Nor do the verses show how broad a social circle among the conquerors did the “masters” form—i.e. which social strata among the Spartans did directly profit from the conquest.54 For understanding this we must consider the evidence for the subsequent period.

  • 55 Tyrt. fr. 11.35–38 West—see note 14.
  • 56 Hdt. IX, 28.2 reports that in the Battle of Plataia there was 10,000 Lakedaimonians of whom 5,000 w (...)
  • 57 The inclusion of the gymnetes among the Spartiates is suggested by Van Wees (2018b, 250); for the f (...)
  • 58 8,000 Spartans noted in Hdt. VII, 234.2, which corresponds to the 5,000 Spartans in the Battle of P (...)
  • 59 See the calculations in Jameson (1992, 136–138), Hodkinson (2000, 131–145), Figueira (2003, 199–203 (...)

17Tyrtaios composing about two generations after the first conquest pointed out the role and responsibility of both the hoplites and the gymnetes in the battle.55 The verses, however, do not specify if all these fighters were imagined as Spartan citizens, or were the perioikoi also involved in the fighting, as they were involved beside the Spartans at the time of the Persian War and afterwards.56 We therefore cannot say if the gymnetes could have derived from among the perioikoi, while all the Spartans fought as hoplites like in the classical period, or were the gymnetes also the citizen members of the Spartan political community, as can be suggested by the numerous dedications of archers’ figurines in the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia.57 We therefore cannot tell if the requirement for the Spartans to be able to serve as hoplites did already apply at that time. If it did, this would probably have required something resembling the later landholding pattern—the Spartans owning plots of land in Lakonia and Messenia—which provided the basis for their hoplite status and must have been consequently already established by that time. We do not know even the approximate number of the Spartans, or the Spartan hoplites, during Tyrtaios’ time. The earliest more or less reliable evidence for these numbers comes from Herodotos, who believed that in the early fifth century the Spartans numbered 8,000. Ca 5,000 of them fought in the Battle of Plataia against the Persians, all serving as hoplites.58 As every hoplite was allegedly accompanied by seven helots, we can be certain that the Spartans were rentier landlords, possessing relatively big parcels (necessary for feeding seven helots besides the master’s family). The size of a plot was probably on average 14–18 ha.59 This system of land tenure obviously required the lands in both Lakonia and Messenia and could have resulted only from the conquests.

  • 60 Pace Van Wees (2018b, 251–254) who suggests that the number 8,000 was achieved with a late 6th cent (...)
  • 61 Shipley (2004, 578, 594) includes both Thyrea and Anthana among the poleis with territories of no m (...)
  • 62 The comparative evidence suggests that usually no more than a third of the polis territories was ar (...)

18This evidence does not indicate when this landholding pattern emerged. However, there are reasons to think that the broad circle of the Spartan landholders was not a recent creation by the end of the archaic period.60 As the system was based on the lands acquired by conquests, we could suppose that the numbers of the citizen landholders increased when new lands were taken in possession. No acquisition of new lands, however, is recorded after the conquest of Thyrea from the Argives around the middle of the sixth century. Moreover, the land available in Thyrea was relatively limited. It is estimated that Thyrea and Anthana, the two poleis in the Thyrean plain, had both a territory of no more than ca 25 km², thus ca 50 km² together.61 Even if as much as a half of this consisted of arable land which was divided among the Spartans (probably an overstatement),62 there could have been space for less than 170 plots of ca 15 ha. We can of course suppose that the Thyrean plots were smaller than in Lakonia or Messenia, but in any counting it is obvious that the conquest of this district could have increased the number of the Spartan landholders only marginally. The prerequisite and the approximate limits for the Spartan landholding system were thus created with the conquest of Lakonia and Messenia, confirmed by the war at Tyrtaios’ time, while no big enlargement of the land resource through conquest took place afterwards.

  • 63 Survey evidence from different parts of Greece demonstrates that the countryside was thinly settled (...)
  • 64 So recently Van Wees (2018b, 251–254). He dates the creation of the circle of ca 8,000 Spartiates t (...)

19If supposing that the classical land holding pattern was created, or developed, only a long time after these conquests, we should ask how the conquered land was managed before that, perhaps possessed by a narrow elite, and find an explanation for the subsequent change. The increase of the land lots and thereby the number of the hoplite landholders could be partially explained by the progressive cultivation of marginal lands during the archaic period.63 But this development could not have essentially changed the land regime on the Messenian and Lakonian plains where most of the plots of the Spartans in the classical period were probably situated. Consequently, the only way to posit an essential increase of the number of the Spartan landholders after the conquests would be to assume a radical land reform—that the lands possessed by a narrow elite were redistributed to the poor Spartans who thereby rose to the status of hoplites. We should in fact accept the historicity of the Lykourgan land reform, date it to the sixth century, perhaps viewing the story as a quasi-mythological retro-projection of a fundamental reorganisation of the power relations during the late archaic period.64 Without such an assumption we have to accept that the establishment, or emergence, of the broad circle of the Spartan citizen landholders was linked, both logically and chronologically, to the conquests of Lakonia and Messenia and dates back to the time of Tyrtaios at the latest.

  • 65 Arist. fr. 536 Rose ap. Plut., Lyk. 6.1. The structure of the text indicates the focus on the regul (...)
  • 66 Arist. fr. 536 Rose ap. Plut., Lyk. 6.4: Αἰ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δᾶμος ἔροιτο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενέας καὶ ἀρχαγέ (...)
  • 67 The Rhetra has been dated to the time of Tyrtaios (Wade-Gery, 1958, 67; Bringmann, 1975; Thommen, 1 (...)
  • 68 Tyrt. fr. 4 W, quoted by Plut., Lyk. 6 and Diod. 7.12, the last verses including the final line quo (...)
  • 69 Tyrt. fr. 12 West: ξυνὸν δ’ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόληΐ τε παντί τε δήμωι. See Vela-Tejada (2021, 399–400) f (...)

20This view is supported, at least indirectly, by the evidence implying a notable authority of the Spartan demos in the early archaic period. The Great Rhetra, ascribed to Lykourgos by the tradition, prescribed political initiative to gerousia, but clearly stated the regularity of the assemblies and the power (kratos) of the damos.65 The so‑called rider which could have been either the original part of the Rhetra or a later addition allowed the council to check this power, but such an explicit statement of the checks was necessary only if the assemblies manifested undesirable activeness from the elite point of view.66 The Rhetra cannot be dated more exactly than to the archaic age, and therefore cannot give any more or less exact terminus non post quem for the kratos of the damos.67 However, similar authority of the Spartan demos was assumed by Tyrtaios, who was explicit that “the multitude of the people (demou plethos) should have victory (nike) and power (kratos)”,68 and exhorted everybody to fight for “the common benefit of the polis and the whole of the people (panti te demoi)”.69 The verses point out the importance of the multitude for achieving victory, linked this with the people’s power arising from this, and emphasise every man’s responsibility for common welfare and success. We cannot be sure if all this demou plethos already fought as hoplites in Tyrtaios’ time, but the military capacity of all of them was crucial for the community. They all had to fight for “the common benefit of the polis and the whole of the people”, which granted them the “power”. We have every reason to suppose that this capacity and the consequent “power” were based on the soldiers’ status as landholders.

  • 70 Arist., Pol. 1306b36–1307a3; Paus. IV, 18.2–3. It has been suggested that Tyrtaios referred to an u (...)
  • 71 Link (1991, 80–81; 2000, 34–35), Bresson (2021, 78), Baltrusch (2024, 38).
  • 72 For the social inequalities in Sparta and in the Spartan landholding pattern, see e.g. Hodkinson (2 (...)

21Some lost verses from a poem called Eunomia had apparently mentioned internal conflicts among the Spartans and the demands for redistribution of lands at the time of the Messenian war—in every likelihood during the war at the time of Tyrtaios. Aristotle, who mentions this and surely knew the relevant verses, believed that a part of the Spartans was impoverished because of the war, while Pausanias, who also had access to Tyrtaios’ poetry, specified that the discontent resulted from an impossibility to cultivate the lands in Messenia.70 We can hardly expect that Tyrtaios had given a precise description of the situation, but both Aristotle’s and Pausanias’ interpretation implies that he mentioned a crisis caused by the temporary loss of the Messenian possessions. Since many Spartans apparently suffered from this, we can suppose that the circle of the previous possessors of the Messenian lands, who received share of the “half of the harvest”, was relatively broad. This suggests that the land on the Messenain plains was indeed divided among the mass of the conquerors soon after the initial conquest, granting their status as landholding warriors living on the work of the helots.71 This does not suggest an equal distribution, and does not deny the bigger share received by the elite families,72 but we have to accept that the landholders’ status for the Spartans was almost certainly granted before the time of Tyrtaios. When this status was shaken by the loss of the Messenian, the whole demou plethos was interested in the re‑conquest.

22We must therefore accept that in Sparta the demou plethos—i.e. the whole citizen body—fighting for nike was involved in warfare from early times, probably since the eighth century conquest of Lakonia. This demos, more or less equal to the “spearmen, the fathers of our fathers”, had conquered Messenia under the leadership of King Theopompos. Many of these “spearmen” had profited from the previous conquest of Lakonia, perhaps accomplished by their fathers, while others might have looked for reward beyond Taygetos. The evidence does not tell if they, or how many of them, fought as panoploi, setting “foot beside foot, resting shield against shield, crest beside crest, helm beside helm” as their descendants did in Tyrtaios’ time, but we can trust that since the late eighth century a large circle of Spartans participated in the conquests and profited from these. With the confirmation of the Messenian conquest in Tyrtaios’ time at the very latest thousands of them, perhaps the whole of the Spartan citizen body, became rentier landholders living on the work of helots.

23The conclusion that Sparta must thus have developed an effective mass army by the middle of the seventh century at the very latest has implications for the martial capacity of Argos and the Arkadian poleis, which were able to resist the Spartan forces. Their fighting against Sparta, probably as Messenian allies, witnessed by Tyrtaios might not have been successful, but they certainly were able to inflict defeats on the Spartans. The Argives probably defeated them in the seventh century at Hysiai, while the Tegeans in the early sixth century were able to beat and imprison the aggressors in the famous battle somewhere in the Tegean land. Both the Argives and the Tegeans were worthy opponents for the Spartan hoplites.

  • 73 Anth. Pal. XIV, 73: ᾿Αργεῖοι λινοθώρηκες, κέντρα πτολέμοιο·
  • 74 For the “panoply grave”, see Foley (1988, 95).
  • 75 Hippobotos Argos e.g. in Iliad, III, 76, 258; XV, 30; Odyssey, XV, 239, 274. For the drawings of ho (...)
  • 76 In the battle at Nemea in 394 they had 7,000 hoplites (Xen., Hell. IV, 2.17; see Piérart, 2004, 603 (...)
  • 77 See e.g. Brouwers (2013, 75–86).
  • 78 This “first” shield was, in the historical times, probably displayed in the processions from the to (...)
  • 79 Foley (1988, 95).
  • 80 Hdt. I, 82. For a discussion of the broader context of the story and the reliability of the account (...)
  • 81 See Lendon (2005, 39–41).

24Archaic Argos was indeed famous for its military strength. A probably archaic epigram preserved in the Palatine anthology praised the “linen-cuirassed Argives” as the best fighters,73 which can imply hoplite fighting even if does not clearly indicate this. A famous corselet and helmet from the late eighth century “Panoply Grave” at Argos shows that hoplite equipment was adopted by the elite, but cannot indicate the mass participation in the hoplite fighting.74 Since Argos was praised as hippobotos—fed by horses—in the heroic epic, and as horses were in the eighth century frequently depicted on Argive geometric pottery,75 we could suppose an importance of Argive cavalry in the early times. In the historical period, however, the Argives relied mainly on their hoplites.76 The hoplite shield was known as the “Argive shield”,77 and the tradition claimed that it was invented at Argos—reputedly in the legendary Heroic Age when the first shield was dedicated at the Argive Heraion.78 Archaeologically, the dedications of Argive shield bands in the local Heraion and in Olympia are recorded from the late seventh century onwards.79 All this suggests that the Argive military might was since a relatively early date based on an effective hoplite force. When the Argives fought against the Spartans over Thyrea, they allegedly agreed to let the case be decided by a combat between 300 picked fighters from both sides, which was however followed by a mass battle when the picked fighters failed to produce a conclusive result.80 There is hardly any doubt that the picked “champions” fought as hoplites,81 and a big likelihood that so fought most of the Spartans in the following battle. The Argives were defeated, but the very agreement for the regulated combat implies an equality between the opponents (why should the Spartans have agreed with this if otherwise their superiority would have been granted?) and therefore at least ostensibly equal quality of the forces. This suggests that the Argives confronted the Spartans mainly as hoplites.

  • 82 The battle and its consequences described in Hdt. VI, 78–83; the 6,000 fallen recorded in VII, 148. (...)
  • 83 See note 15.
  • 84 Supposing that half of the 6,000 were hoplites (the same proportion as in the armies at Plataia acc (...)

25For the early fifth century, some evidence for the numbers of Argive hoplites may be given by the tradition that 6,000 Argives were killed in connection with the Battle of Sepeia where they were defeated by the Spartan king Kleomenes invading the Argive plain. The number can hardly be relied on, and we cannot simply assume that either all or even the majority of these men were hoplites. However, the tradition certainly suggest heavy casualties, thus a big army.82 The number 6,000 conforms with the hoplite numbers of other poleis in the Battle of Plataia soon afterwards, where Corinth put into the field 5,000 and Sikyon 3,000 hoplites.83 Argos could hardly have been less capable for effective fighting than its neighbours, which suggests that it was able to put into the field a strong and numerous hoplite force in the late archaic period.84 The renown of the early military strength of Argos, and their reputation as the pioneers of hoplite fighting suggest that this ability dates back to a relatively early period, probably at least to the time of Hysiai when they defeated the Spartan hoplites who must have played a crucial role in the Spartan army by that time.

  • 85 For the land resource in Thyrea, see above, with note 61. The smaller land resource can suggest tha (...)
  • 86 If all the ca 275 km² (27,500 ha) of arable land on the Argive plain (Piérart, 2004, 602) would hav (...)

26Unfortunately, we have no information about how the Argives managed their conquered lands nor which social strata reaped the fruits of their conquests. The class of gymnesioi, perhaps enslaved people in the conquered districts, can suggest that the Argives were building up a social system comparable to the Spartan helotry. However, the conquered lands were limited compared to the Spartan possessions, could thus have afforded plots for a relatively narrow circle of hoplites,85 and the system must to a great extent have broken down around the middle of the sixth century when Thyrea was lost. Remarkably, the loss of Tyrea seems not to have decisively affected the number of the Argive hoplites, which was in every likelihood relatively big at the end of the archaic period. Two related conclusions follow from this. First, since after the loss of the conquests the available land was confined mainly to the Argive plain, this relatively limited land resource compared to the big number of hoplites shows that by the end of the archaic period most of the hoplites were smallholders, and a big part of the arable land in the district was divided among them.86 For assuming a more elitist distribution in an earlier period we must posit a redistribution during the seventh or sixth century, for which no evidence is available. Without this we have to accept that a big part of the land in the Argive plain was possessed by smallholders throughout the archaic period and these smallholders who were able to fight as hoplites since an early time. The second conclusion will be that those possessing the lands in the conquered territories and living on the work of the gymnesioi formed probably an elite minority compared to the average hoplites. Whether this status resulted from the conquests or were the conquered lands distributed among the pre-existing elite families cannot be established. In either case, this elite appears as the main profiter. However, as the early military successes—the conquests and the defeat of the Spartan hoplites at Hysiai—must have required a big and well‑ordered force including numerous hoplites, we must accept that the smallholders played a crucial part in the Argive wars since an early period. What exactly motivated them—booty, patriotism, vengeance, hatred of enemies—can only be guessed.

  • 87 See below, with note 105.
  • 88 Hermippos fr. 83 and Ephoros FGrHist 70 F 54 ap. Athen. IV, 154d (quoted below in note 113).
  • 89 For the economy of the Arkadian poleis, see Roy (1999); for the conditions in the nearby Mantinea, (...)
  • 90 The Tegean territory has been estimated as 385 km² (Nielsen, 2004, 531), thus ca 15,360 ha of arabl (...)

27For the Arkadians, we cannot confidently rely on the debatable evidence on Aristokrates and his hegemony. If reliable, this would imply the leadership of a considerable military force, but not necessarily the part played by hoplites. The Tegeans’ successful resistance to Sparta during the early sixth century, however, indicates a strong force able to stand up against heavily equipped aggressors. Tegea was a small polis compared to Sparta, which means that a big part of the male population must have been involved in the fighting. We still cannot simply assume that the Tegean fighters, or most of them, were hoplites. The stories of the later writers about the Tegean victories, partly certainly legendary,87 relate various stratagems, including exploits of women and ambush, which can suggest that the victories were achieved without a notable hoplite participation, perhaps accomplished by flexible bands of light-armed warriors. However, the Arkadians, particularly the Tegean neighbour and opponent Mantinea, were later reputed as the inventors of hoplite warfare.88 The Tegeans sent 1,500 hoplites to the Battle of Plataia against the Persians in 479, which was a big number for a polis of moderate size. The number, moreover, indicates the smallholder status of the Tegean hoplites (the polis could not have had even nearly so numerous elite leisure class). As Tegea was an inland polis, probably without a notable non‑agricultural sector,89 the hoplites must have been mostly farmers who, given the relative smallness of the territory, must have possessed a big part of the available arable land.90 The parcels owned by the elite families must have been limited and the leisure class elite therefore comparatively weak. Consequently, we can be certain that by the end of the archaic period the Tegeans relied mainly on hoplite smallholders for defence. This does not necessarily indicate a similar situation a century earlier. If supposing that a big part of the land was in an earlier period controlled by an elite, we are faced with the same problem as in the case of Argos and Sparta: for explaining the change from an elite to the egalitarian landholding pattern we need to posit a fundamental land redistribution—a Tegean “Lykourgos” to accomplish this. The complete absence of relevant evidence may not be a big problem given the scarcity of data for archaic Tegea. However, the Tegeans’ ability to defeat the Spartans in the early sixth century makes much more reasonable to assume that already then the Tegean hoplite force was numerous, and that the relatively egalitarian landholding pattern allowing this was inherited from an early though unspecifiable past.

  • 91 See note 73. The panoply (for which see Snodgrass, 1964 and 1965) was in practice rarely complete ( (...)
  • 92 For which see Lloyd (2021, 46–51).

28All this evidence suggests that at least since the time of Tyrtaios the Peloponnesian communities put into field relatively big armies including numerous hoplites. These armies were used for both conquests and for defensive wars. In Sparta the warrior status of the citizens was based on the possession of conquered lands. From the other states comparable systems are not evidenced, although the Argives might have tried to build up something similar, and big forces were recruited from the circle of smallholders. The Homeric evidence indicates that hoplite equipment was accessible to the sub‑elite soldiers, not only to the heroes representing the leisure elite class. The archaic epigram which praised the Argives as the best fighters described them as linothorakes (with linen corselets) thus protected with linen instead of expensive bronze.91 What a hoplite required was a shield, helmet and a pair of spears, which need not have been too expensive for a smallholder and could have been inherited within the family. From an early period, possibly the eighth century, a relatively broad circle of men could have been able to equip themselves in this way, like their descendants were able to do at the time of the Persian War. As these men hardly had resource for dedicating the equipment in the sanctuaries or to deposit it in the graves,92 they tend to remain invisible in the archeological record. The numbers of hoplite smallholders probably increased gradually during the archaic period, but there is no need to explain this by positing a notable change of power relations, which would have required a shift of the control of lands from a powerful elite to the emerging smallholder class. The evidence does not indicate a period when warfare was predominantly an elite affair, or when hoplites formed a narrow circle dominating the rest of the community. It suggests that broad circles of community members took part in wars throughout the archaic period, mass fighting was common and an increasing number of men were able to fight as hoplites.

4. Warfare and the polity formation

29The common interest and joint action were bound to promote the consolidation of political communities. Less clear, however, is to what extent was the impact of defence and of conquest different, and if different types of warfare shaped different kinds of social and political organisation. In some respect the difference is obvious. The Spartan landholding pattern which made the citizens rentier hoplites would have been impossible without the conquests, while in the other poleis, not able to build up comparable spheres of permanent domination, had to rely on smallholders. In other respects, particularly the political order, a different impact can be debatable.

30In Sparta the conquests led to the formation of a collectively governed broad citizen community of the conquerors. The Great Rhetra and the verses of Tyrtaios, proclaiming the nike and kratos for the damos—or demou plethos—and exhorting to fight for “the common benefit of the polis and the whole of the demos”, bear a clear testimony for this. At the end of the archaic period the membership in this political community amounted to ca 8,000 men, and although it had surely increased during the period it must have been fairly numerous long before, probably from the earliest conquests. Leaders surely emerged from a narrower and wealthier elite, but rightful participation was granted for of all the citizens.

31The impact of warfare on the Argive social and political order is more difficult to judge, because neither the relationship between conquest and defence nor the character of the internal order is clear for us. The domination over Thyrea and the valley of Hysiai must have been achieved through conquest, and the subjection of the gymnesioi could have been achieved in the same way. From at least the sixth century, however, the Argives were preoccupied mainly with the defence of their territories. When Thyrea was lost around the middle of the sixth century, the Argives could have hoped for reconquest, but in practice they could only defend their core land.

  • 93 Paus. II, 36.4–5 (Eratos); IV, 35.2 (Damokratidas).
  • 94 Three inscriptions from the first half of the 6th century, one from Heraion (Nomima, I, 100) and tw (...)
  • 95 Paus. II, 23.7 mentioned an Argive tyrannos Perilaos, possibly a previous winner of the Nemean Game (...)
  • 96 For the power base of the Argive monarchy, see Kõiv (2024, 359–366).

32When it comes to the political order, the tradition about the Temenid dynasty ruling Argos since early times, and about Pheidon as its most outstanding member, can suggest that the polis emerged under personal leadership. This is supported by the traditions about the kings (basileis) Eratos and Damokratidas conquering Asine and Nauplia,93 and by the story of the anonymous Argive basileus who was expelled and escaped to Tegea. However, inscriptional evidence from the early sixth century seems to suggest that the polis was ruled collectively at that time.94 Later sources relate about tyrants taking power in Argos, which can imply occasional resurrections of monarchy.95 The evidence can thus imply fluctuation of political order. The early leaders—Pheidon, Eratos and Damokratidas—could be viewed as conquering warlords whose authority and power was largely based on their military success, while the alleged expulsion of the anonymous king after his defeats and attempt to give land to the Arkadians instead of his own people, may show the fatal consequences that military disasters and loss of conquered lands could cause for the leaders. This may indicate that the conquests promoted personal leadership and elite power, especially if we accept that conquered lands were possessed mainly by the elite. The Argive basileis would appear as martial leaders, perhaps heading elite units, and promoting above all the elite’s positions by enlarging their possessions on the conquered lands. However, as the early Argive military successes and conquests could hardly have been achieved without numerous soldiers, including hoplites, there must have existed a broad circle of hoplite landholders in Argos. These men were crucial for the success, and could expel the leaders as happened with the anonymous Argive basileus. The conquests could indeed have promoted elite leadership and sole rule, but the leaders had to be able to reliably present themselves as the promoters of the common cause, and the rule must have been acceptable to a broad circle of soldiers, many of whom fought as hoplites.96

  • 97 Strab. VIII, 3.2 notes the synoikismoi of both Tegea and neighbour Mantinea, without indicating the (...)
  • 98 Evidenced by the recent survey of the Norwegian institute at Athens shows signs of urban developmen (...)
  • 99 See especially Østby (2014), who in 32–33 supposes the existence of still another temple erected in (...)
  • 100 Another sanctuary was established on the hilltop of Psili Korfi about 10 km south of Tegea, with a (...)
  • 101 See Kõiv (2013b, 168–171).

33In Arkadia, the history of Tegea can provide an example of the formative impact of defensive warfare. The importance of the fighting against the Spartan aggression is obvious in this case, but the process of polis formation can be only tentatively reconstructed. We know from a passage in Strabo that the Tegeans used to live in nine demoi (systema demon), from which the polis was synoikised at an unspecified time.97 Strabo probably referred to the formation of the urban centre, which can be dated to the later part of the sixth century according to the archaeological record.98 The glorious victory against the Spartans was achieved in the early sixth century, thus at the time when the Tegeans still dwelt in distinct demoi, without a central settlement. These demoi must have been capable of effective cooperation to achieve this victory. The permanency of the cooperation between them is demonstrated by the development of sanctuaries, particularly the building projects in the Tegean principal sanctuary dedicated to Athena Alea. As early as the late eighth century two small successive temples were built on the site, while in the late seventh century the earlier buildings were replaced by the first monumental temple.99 The construction must have required means and organisation, achieved jointly by the separate demoi.100 This took place at the time when the Arkadians had already fought against the Spartans, as the fragment of Tyrtaios testifies. The Battle of Hysiai probably required the Spartans crossing the Tegean land, and the note of Diodoros about the Argive king suffering defeats inflicted by the Spartans, still dividing lands among certain Arkadians and eventually escaping to Tegea can imply that Tegea was actually affected by these or related events. The Tegean demoi must, consequently, have responded to the Spartan aggression already in the seventh century, which is likely to have promoted their cooperation. The emergence of their common sanctuary and the investment in the temple building can be seen as the manifestation of the formation of the political community, the main impulse for which could have been the Spartan threat.101 The consequent rise of the defence capacity led to the magnificent victory about a generation later.

  • 102 Paus. VIII, 5. Hiller von Gaertringen (1927, 8–9, 12) and Zingg (2016, 182–185) have suggested a 4t (...)
  • 103 Deinias FGrH 306 F 4.
  • 104 Polyainos I, 8 (Elnes); I, 11 (Akoues, who liberated the town which had fallen by treachery into th (...)
  • 105 The legendary nature and ritual background are most obvious in the story about the Tegean women led (...)

34The political order of the archaic Arkadain poleis is debatable. The list of the kings ruling the whole of Arkadia since the end of the Heroic Age, presented by Pausanias, was certainly a relatively late construction,102 and the pan-Arkadian monarchy it suggests is surely unhistorical. However, this does not rule out the possibility of personal leadership in particular Arkadian poleis. The tradition about Aristokrates, perhaps an Orchomenian basileus ruling “over almost the whole of Arkadia”, can imply a sphere of domination temporarily established by an elite warlord. However, the tradition, if reliable, that Aristokrates was stoned to death by the army implies that a broad community was entitled to control his rule. For archaic Tegea the later sources note early rulers connected to the victories against Sparta. An Argive historian Deinias reported that the great victory over the Spartan invaders was achieved when a woman called Choira Perimede ruled (dynasteusa) Tegea.103 Polyainos ascribed the same victory to an Arkadian basileus Elnes, and an apparently distinct victory to a Tegean leader Akoues.104 The reliability of these accounts is highly debatable,105 but they may indicated memories about personal leadership during the successful fighting against the Spartans. The permanency or character of this leadership cannot be established.

  • 106 Arist., Pol. 1318a.
  • 107 Robinson (1997, 113–114).
  • 108 Strab. VIII, 3.2, see note 97. The Mantinean synoikismos has been dated to the earlier part of the (...)
  • 109 Hermippos fr. 82 (Pap. Oxy. 1367 = Herakleides Lembos epitomising Hermippos’ work about lawgivers: (...)
  • 110 Hdt. IV, 161.2: ἔδοσαν ἄνδρα τῶν ἀστῶν δοκιμώτατον; Diod. VIII, 30.2: νετο Δημῶναξ Μαντινεύς, συνέσ (...)
  • 111 Hdt. IV, 161.2–3.
  • 112 Amit (1973, 127–128).
  • 113 Hermippos fr. 83 and Ephoros FGrHist 70 F 54 ap. Athen. IV 154d: ῞Ερμιππος δ’ ἐν α′ περὶ νομοθετῶν (...)

35Some evidence is available for the neighbouring Mantinea. Aristotle quoted Mantinea as the example of the good ancient (archaiotate) type of democracy established where the demos (δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός) consists of farmers and herdsmen who took care of their work, did not often take part in the assembly and left the offices for the best people.106 An archaic date for this constitution is likely enough,107 perhaps going back to the period when the Mantineans lived in separate villages, thus before the synoikismos mentioned by Strabo along with the Tegean synoecism.108 It might have been established by the sixth century lawgiver Demonax, whom Hermippos in the Hellenistic period perhaps called basileus of the Mantineans,109 while Herodotos and Diodoros noted as simply a honorable citizen.110 Demonax was invited to legislate in Kyrene where he allegedly reduced the power of the Battiad kings, leaving them only priesthoods and specific plots of land (temena), but gave the power which had previously belonged to the king over to demos.111 He could have relied on the Mantinean experience, which would suggest that the power in Mantinea belonged to the demos, and even if there was a basileus as sole leader he was firmly subjected to a communal control.112 At Mantinea Demonax allegedly introduced duelling (monomachia) and/or hoplite fighting (hoplomachia), which was connected to the reputation of the Arkadians and particularly the Mantineans as the inventors of hoplite warfare.113 Since Demonax acted around the middle of the sixth century, he could not have invented either monomachia or hoplomachia, nor do these forms of fighting necessarily conform. However, the tradition shows that Demonax was remembered not only as an establisher of broadly based constitutions—in Kyrene and possibly in Mantinea—but also as a promoter of hoplite tactics. We can also suppose that Mantinea’s reputation for its “ancient” democracy and for its role in introducing hoplite fighting were connected, and the broad circle of the political participants consisted of smallholders many of whom fought as hoplites.

36For Tegea the comparable social structure and political order suggest that the leaders heading the fighting against Sparta, whichever was their exact position, must have been, like in Mantinea, subject to a firm communal control. Above all, given the big number of hoplites by the end of the archaic period it seems almost certain that the bulk of the population consisted of smallholders, a large number of whom fought as hoplites. The smallholders defending their land had for a long period formed the main bulwark against Sparta, and their responsibility for defence contributed to their right of political participation.

5. Conclusion

37The evidence indicates that from an early period, probably from the beginning of the Spartan conquests in the eighth century, big forces were used by the Peloponnesian communities both for conquests and for defence. Both defence and conquest were conducted on a community level, thereby consolidated the polities and contributed to the polis formation. This was the case both in Sparta, which conquered vast territories, and in Tegea, which was preoccupied mainly with defence, and we can safely assume a similar effect of the combination of both kinds of warfare in the case of Argos. The archaic Peloponnesian evidence does not suggest a considerably bigger impact of defensive warfare for the community’s consolidation compared to aggressions, as it has been suggested on the basis of anthropological record. What matters was the extent of the circle of men sharing the profits from the wars. The evidence does not suggest that in the Peloponnese the attacks against others were the business of particular elite groups, possibly running against the communal sentiment. Even if the initiative for attacking neighbours came from the leaders, which seems likely enough, and the initial attacks were made by elite groupings, which cannot be either proved or denied, whole communities were involved from the early stages of the conflicts, and broad circles of people hoped to profit from this. Only for Argos there could be constructed a scenario describing the early conquests, particularly the Pheidon’s venture against Olympia, as a predominantly elite enterprise from which the sub‑elite strata did not receive much reward. Such a scenario might be connected to the tradition about the early monarchy at Argos, which could suggest that the Argive polis emerged under the leadership of elite warlords promoting the interests of a narrow circle which consequently supported their power and profited from the conquests. However, even in Argos the power of the elite could have been only conditional. The rulers had to rely on big armies including numerous hoplites, and had to secure the loyalty of the broad circle of landholders forming the bulk of this force. Sparta and Tegea, however, clearly show that both the conquest (in Sparta) and the defence (in Tegea) could consolidate the communities on the basis of broad participation. For the archaic Tegea the exact character of the political order cannot be specified. In Sparta the conquests clearly produced a collective rule among the circle of the conquerors.

  • 114 Kucewicz, Lloyd & Konijnendijk (2021, 206–211).

38In no case does the evidence indicate a period when warfare was predominantly an elite business and the hoplites came mainly from a leisure class granting this elite an uncontested control. From at least the time of Tyrtaios, but probably even earlier, the armies included numerous hoplites who could not derive from only a narrow elite within the forming political communities. This conforms with the Homer’s description of common soldiers possessing hoplite equipment. In Sparta the conquests might already by Tyrtaios’ time have promoted all the citizens, as hoplites, into the status of rentier landholders. In the other poleis, at least in Arkadia, the hoplites were mainly smallholders personally working their plots. There is no reason to posit a hoplite revolution which undermined an early elite power and brought the smallholders into significance. The development of the hoplite warfare surely had impact on the societies, best seen in Sparta where the hoplite status was confirmed by the conquests. In most poleis the effects were probably gradual, and conservative rather than revolutionary. The adaption of hoplite tactics made the numbers of heavily equipped men vital for the community’s safety and survival, but these fighters could have been supplied only from a pre-existent stratum of independent smallholders motivated to fight, whose possessions enabled them to provide for the equipment. The adoption of hoplite warfare did not create this stratum, but helped to secure the position of these men. The social order allowing this was probably based on the relatively egalitarian landholding patterns in the participatory communities emerging from the Early Iron Age. In these communities all the men had surely responded for the defence, and all could have taken part in the attacks against neighbours. This did hardly require notable wealth as even the elite fighters fought mostly as javelin throwers and archers during the Early Iron Age, as suggested by the archaeological record.114 The joint fighting had already consolidated the communities at that time, and the significance in war had probably granted all free men some participation in making the common decisions. The subsequent development of the hoplite tactics making big numbers of hoplites indispensable enabled the smallholders to preserve their independence. Their continuous, perhaps growing, military significance helped to restrain the growth of the elite power and precluded an outright domination which would easily have resulted if martial superiority of the leaders would have allowed this. Hoplite tactics thus contributed to the bottom‑up formation of polis, but this was made possible by the traditionally strong position of the smallholders, and their the responsibility for community defence throughout the Early Iron Age.

Haut de page

Bibliographie

ADSHEAD Kate, Politics of the Archaic Peloponnese: The Transition from the Archaic to Classical Politics, Amersham, Avebury monograph, 1986.

AMIT Moshe, “Great and Small Poleis: A Study in Relations between Great Powers and the Small Cities in Ancient Greece”, Latomus, Revue d’études latines, 1973.

ANDREWES Anthony, “Sparta and Arcadia in the Early Fifth Century”, Phoenix, 6 (1), 1952, pp. 1–5.

ANDREWES Anthony, The Greek Tyrants, London, Hutchinson University Library, 1956.

BALTRUSCH Ernst, Sparta: Geschichte, Gesellschaft, Kultur, Munich, C. H. Beck, 2024 [1st ed. 1998].

BARCELÓ Pedro, Basileia, Monarchia, Tyrannis: Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung und Beurteilung von Alleinherrschaft im Vorhellenistischen Griechenland, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1993.

BAUMER Lorenz E., Kult im Kleinen. Ländliche Heiligtümer spätarchaischer bis hellenistischer Zeit: Attika – Arkadian – Argolis – Kynouria, Rahden, Verlag Marie Leidorf GmbH, 2004.

BERSHADSKY Natasha, “The Border of War and Peace. Myth and Rritual in Argive-Spartan Dispute over Thyreatis”, in J. Wilker (ed.), Maintaining Peace and Interstate Stability in Archaic and Classical Greece, Mainz, Verlag Antike, 2012, pp. 51–77.

BERVE Helmut, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen, 2 vol., München, H. C. Beck, 1967.

BOURKE Graeme, Elis: Internal Politics and External Policy in Ancient Greece, London / New York, Routledge, 2018.

BOWLES Samuel, “Did Warfare among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors?”, Science, 324 (5932), 2009, pp. 1293–1298.

BRAUN Thomas, “Chrestous poiein”, CQ, 44, 1994, pp. 40–45.

BRESSON Alain, “Closed Economy, Debt and the Spartan Crisis”, in S. Hodkinson & C. Gallou (eds), Luxury and Wealth in Sparta and the Peloponnese, Swansea, The Classical Press of Wales, 2021, pp. 77–96.

BRINGMANN Klaus, “Die Grosse Rhetra und die Entstehung des spartanischen Kosmos”, Historia, 24, 1975, pp. 513–538.

BROUWERS Josho, Henchmen of Ares: Warriors and Warfare in Early Greece, Rotterdam, Karwansaray Publishers, 2013.

CALLMER Christian, Studien zur Geschichte Arkadiens, Lund, A.‑B. Gleerupska Universitetsbolhandeln, 1943.

CARLIER Pierre, La Royauté en Grèce avant Alexandre, Strasbourg, AECR, 1984.

CARNEIRO Robert L., “A Theory of the Origin of the State”, Science, 169, 1970, pp. 733–738.

CARTLEDGE Paul A., Sparta and Lakonia, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.

CATLING Richard W. V., “The Survey Area from the Early Iron Age to the Classical Period”, in W. Cavanagh, J. Crouwel, R. Catling & G. Shipley (eds), Continuity and Change in a Greek Rural Landscape: The Laconia Survey, vol. I: Methodology and Interpretation, London, British School at Athens, 2002, pp. 115–256.

CAWKWELL George, “Sparta and Her Allies in the Sixth Century”, CQ, 43, 1993, pp. 364–376.

CHOI Jung-Kyoo & BOWLES Samuel, “The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War”, Science, 318 (5850), 2007, pp. 636–640.

CHRISTESEN Paul, Olympic Victor Lists and Ancient Greek History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

CLEMENTS Thomas, “Unfixed Boundaries: Regions, Evidence, and Models in Archaic Sparta”, in M. Rönnberg & V. Sossau (eds), Regions and Communities in Early Greece (1200 – 550 BCE), Rahden, Verlag Marie Leidorf GmbH, 2022, pp. 105–121.

DAYTON John C., The Athletes of War: An Evaluation of the Agonistic Elements in Greek Warfare, Toronto, Edgar Kent Inc. Publishers, 2006.

DE LIBERO Loretana, Die archaische Tyrannis, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996.

DEMAND Nancy H., Urban Relocations in Archaic and Classical Greece: Flight and Consolidation, Norman / London, University of Oklahoma Press, 1990.

DREWS Robert, Basileus: The Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece, New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 1983.

DUCAT Jean, Les hilotes, Paris, École française d’Athénes, 1990.

DUCAT Jean, “The Perioikoi”, in A. Powell (ed.), A Companion to Sparta, vol. II, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018, pp. 596–614.

EARLE Timothy, A Primer on Chiefs and Chiefdoms, New York, Elliot Werner Publications, 2021.

ECHEVERRÍA Fernando, “Hoplite and Phalanx in Archaic and Classical Greece: A Reassessment”, CP, 107, 2012, pp. 291–318.

ECHEVERRÍA Fernando, “The Nature of Hoplite Warfare”, in W. Heckel, F. S. Naiden, E. E. Garwin & J. Vanderspeol (eds), A Companion to Geek Warfare, Hoboken, Wiley-Blackwell, 2021 pp. 75–87.

FIGUEIRA Thomas, “The Demography of the Spartan Helots”, in N. Luraghi & S. E. Alcock (eds), Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, Structures, Cambridge, MA / London, Center for Hellenic Studies, 2003, pp. 193–239.

FIGUEIRA Thomas, “Helotage and Spartan Economy”, in A. Powell (ed.), A Companion to Sparta, vol. II, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018, pp. 565–595.

FOLEY Anne M., The Argolid 800–600 B.C.: An Archaeological Survey, Göteborg, Paul Åströms Förlag, 1988.

FORREST William George, “Themistokles and Argos”, CQ, 10, 1960, pp. 221–241.

FORREST William George, “The Date of the Lykourgan Reforms in Sparta”, Phoenix, 17 (3), 1963, pp. 157–179.

FOXHALL Lynn, “The Control of Attic Landscape”, in B. Wells (ed.), Agriculture in Ancient Greece (Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium at the Swedish Institute at Athens, 16–17 May), Stockholm, Paul Åströms Förlag, 1990, pp. 155–159.

FOXHALL Lynn, “A View from the Top: Evaluating the Solonian Property Classes”, in L. Mitchell & P. J. Rhodes (eds), The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece, London / New York, Routledge, 1997, pp. 113–136.

FOXHALL Lynn, “Can We See the ‘Hoplite Revolution’ on the Ground? Archaeological Landscapes, Material Culture, and Social Status in Early Greece”, in D. Kagan & G. F. Viggiano (eds), Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece, Princeton / Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2013, pp. 194–221.

FRÖDIN Otto & PERSSON Alex W., Asine: Results of the Swedish Excavations, 1922–1930, Stockholm, Generalstabens Litografiska Anstalts Förlag, 1938.

GAGARIN Michael, Early Greek Law, Berkeley / Los Angeles / London, University of California Press, 1986.

GEHRKE Hans-Joachim, “Herodot und die Tyrannenchronologie”, in W. Ax (ed.), Memoria rerum veterum. Neue Beiträge zur antiken Historiographie und alten Geschichte. Festschrift für Carl Joachim Classen zum 60. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990, pp. 33–49.

GEHRKE Hans-Joachim, “Sull’etnicità elea”, Geographia antica, 12, 2003, pp. 5–22.

HALE John R., “Not Patriots, Not Farmers, Not Amateurs: Greek Soldiers of Fortune and the Origins of Hoplite Warfare”, in D. Kagan & G. F. Viggiano (eds), Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece, Princeton / Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2013, pp. 176–193.

HALL Jonathan, A History of the Archaic Greek World, ca. 1200–749 BCE, Malden / Oxford / Carlton, Wiley-Blackwell, 2007.

HALL Jonathan, “Argos”, in P. Cartledge & P. Christesen (eds), The Oxford History of the Archaic Greek World, vol. I: Argos to Corcyra, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2023, pp. 1–94.

HANSEN Mogens H., “Introduction”, in M. H. Hansen & T. H. Nielsen (eds), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Greek Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation, Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, 2004a, pp. 1–153.

HANSEN Mogens H., “Attika”, dans M. H. Hansen & T. H. Nielsen (eds), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Greek Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation, Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, 2004b, pp. 624–642.

HANSON Victor Davis, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1989.

HART David M., CHARTIER Gary, KENYON Ross Miller & LONG Roderick T., “Herbert Spencer, ‘The Militant Type of Society’ (1882)”, in D. M. Hart, G. Chartier, R. M. Kenyon & R. T. Long (eds), Social Class and State Power: Exploring an Alternative Radical Tradition, Springer International Publishing AG, 2018, pp. 147–152.

HEJNIC Josef, Pausanias the Perieget and the Archaic History of Arcadia, Prague, Nakl. ČSAV, 1961.

HILLER VON GAERTRINGEN Friedrich, “Pausanias’ arkadische Königsliste”, Klio, 21, 1927, pp. 1–13.

HODKINSON Stephen, Property and Wealth in Classical Sparta, Swansea, The Classica Press of Wales, 2000.

HODKINSON Stephen & HODKINSON Hilary, “Mantineia and the Mantinike: Settlement and Society in a Greek Polis”, BSA, 76, 1981, pp. 239–296.

HUXLEY George L., “Argos et les derniers Téménides”, BCH, 82, 1958, pp. 588–601.

HUXLEY George L., Early Sparta, London, Faber and Faber, 1962.

INGLIS Alexander St. George, A History of Elis ca. 700–362 B.C., Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, 1998.

JACOBY Felix, “Chrestous poiein (Aristotle fr. 592)”, CQ, 38, 1944, pp. 15–16.

JAMESON Michael H., “Agricultural Labor in Ancient Greece”, in B. Wells (ed.), Agriculture in Ancient Greece (Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium at the Swedish Institute at Athens, 16–17 May), Stockholm, Paul Åströms Förlag, 1990, pp. 135–146.

JEFFERY Lilian H., Archaic Greece: The City-States c. 700–500 B.C., London, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1978.

JEFFERY Lilian H., The Local Scripts of the Archaic Greece, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990.

JOST Madeleine, Sanctuaires et cultes d’Arcadie, Paris, Libraire philosophique J. Vrin, 1985.

KAGAN Donald & VIGGIANO Gregory F. (eds), Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece, Princeton / Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2013.

KELLY Thomas, “Did the Argives Defeat the Spartans at Hysiae in 669 B.C.?”, AJP, 91 (1), 1970, pp. 31–42.

KELLY Thomas, A History of Argos to 500 B.C., Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1976.

KENNELL Nigel M., Spartans: A New History, Malden / Oxford / Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

KÕIV Mait, “The Dating of Pheidon in Antiquity”, Klio, 83, 2001, pp. 327–347.

KÕIV Mait, Ancient Tradition and Early Greek History: The Origins of States in Early-Archaic Sparta, Argos and Corinth, Tallinn, Avita, 2003.

KÕIV Mait, “Egalitarianism and Hierarchies: Early Greek Polis in the Context of the Ancient near Eastern and Mediterranean City-State Cultures”, in T. R. Kämmerer (ed.), Identities and Societies in the Ancient East-Mediterranean Regions: Comparative Approaches (AOAT 390/1), Münster, Ugarit Verlag, 2011, pp. 105–151.

KÕIV Mait, “Early History of Elis and Pisa: Invented or Evolving Traditions?”, Klio, 95, 2013a, pp. 15–68.

KÕIV Mait, “Urbanisation and Political Community in Early Greece”, in T. Kämmerer & S. Rogge (eds), Patterns of Urban Societies (AOAT 390/2), Münster, Ugarit Verlag, 2013b, pp. 149–208.

KÕIV Mait, “Basileus, Tyrannos and Polis: The Dynamics of Monarchy in Early Greece”, Klio, 98, 2016, pp. 1–89.

KÕIV Mait, “Politische Gemeinden und Staatsbildung im archaischen und klassischen Arkadien”, Gymnasium, 125, 2018, pp. 469–517.

KÕIV Mait, “Why Did the Greeks Hate the Tyrants? A Comparative View on Monarchy in Archaic Greece”, Historia, 70, 2021, pp. 134–184.

KÕIV Mait, “From Palatial Monarchy to Monarchic City-State in the Argive Plain (12th–6th Centuries BCE)”, in M. Kõiv & R. Kletter (eds), Responses to the 12th Century BC Collapse: Recovery and Restructuration in the Early Iron Age near East and Mediterranean, Münster, Zaphon, 2024, pp. 318–384.

KONIJNENDIJK Roel, Classical Greek Tactics: A Cultural History, Leiden, Brill, 2018.

KRENTZ Peter, “Warfare and Hoplites”, in H. A. Shapiro (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 61–84.

KUCEWICZ Cezary, LLOYD Matthew & KONIJNENDIJK Roel, “‘Not Many Bows’? Light-Armed Fighters of the Tenth through Fourth Centuries”, in R. Konijnendijk, C. Kucewicz & M. Lloyd (eds), Brill’s Companion to Greek Land Warfare beyond the Phalanx, Leiden / Boston, Brill, 2021, pp. 205–235.

LATACZ Joachim, Kampfparanäse, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwircklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios, Munich, C. H. Beck, 1977.

LEBLANC Steven A., “Warfare and the Development of Social Complexity: Some Demographic and Environmental Factors”, in E. N. Arkush & M. E. Allen (eds), The Archaeology of Warfare: Prehistories of Raiding and Conquest, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2006, pp. 437–468.

LENDON John E., Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity, New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 2005.

LINK Stefan, Landverteilung und soziale Frieden im archaischen Griechenland, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991.

LINK Stefan, Das frühe Sparta: Untersuchungen zur spartanischen Staatsbildung im 7. und 6. Jahrhundert v. Chr., St. Katharinen, Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, 2000.

LLOYD Mathew, “Unorthodox Warfare? Variety and Change in Archaic Greek Warfare (ca. 700–ca. 480 BCE)”, dans B. Hughes & F. Robson (eds), Unconventional Warfare from Antiquity to the Present Day, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 231–252.

LLOYD Mathew, “Men of Iron: Pre‑Archaic Greek Warfare in Context”, in R. Konijnendijk, C. Kucewicz & M. Lloyd (eds), Brill’s Companion to Greek Land Warfare beyond the Phalanx, Leiden / Boston, Brill, 2021, pp. 17–63.

LLOYD Mathew, KONIJNENDIJK Roel & KUCEWICZ Cesary, “Introduction: Beyond the Phalanx”, in R. Konijnendijk, C. Kucewicz & M. Lloyd (eds), Brill’s Companion to Greek Land Warfare beyond the Phalanx, Leiden / Boston, Brill, 2021, pp. 1–16.

LORIMER Hilda L., “The Hoplite Phalanx with Special Reference to the Poems of Archilochus and Tyrtaeus”, ABSA, 42, 1947, pp. 76–138.

LOTZE Detlef, Μεταξὺ ἐλευθέρων καὶ δούλων: Studien zur Rechtstellung unfreier Landbevölkerung in Griechenland bis zum 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1959.

LOTZE Detlef, “Zur Verfassung von Argos nach der Schlacht bei Sepeia”, Chiron, 1, 1971, pp. 95–109.

LURAGHI Nino, “The Imaginary Conquest of the Helots”, in N. Luraghi & S. E. Alcock (eds), Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, Structures, Cambridge, MA / London, Center for Hellenic Studies, 2003, pp. 109–141.

LURAGHI Nino, “Traders, Pirates, Warriors: The Proto-History of the Greek Mercenary Soldiers in the Eastern Mediterranean”, Phoenix, 60 (1–2), 2006, pp. 21–47.

LURAGHI Nino, The Ancient Messenians: Construction of Ethnicity and Memory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

LUPI Marcello, “Amompharetos, the Lochos of Pitane and the Spartan System of Villages”, in S. Hodkinson & A. Powell (eds), Sparta and War, Swansea, Classical Press of Wales, 2006, pp. 185–218.

LUPI Marcello, Sparta: storia e rappresentazioni di una città greca, Rome, Carocci editore, 2017.

LUTHER Andreas, Könige und Ephoren: Untersuchungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte, Frankfurt am Main, Verlag Antike, 2004.

MA John, Polis: A New History of the Ancient Greek City-State from the Early Iron Age to the End of Antiquity, Princeton / Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2024.

MARAN Joseph & PAPADIMITRIOU Alcestis, “Mycenae and the Argolid”, in I. S. Lemos & A. Kotsonas (eds), A Companion to the Archaeology of Early Greece and the Mediterranean, vol. 2, Bridgewater, NJ, Wiley-Blackwell, 2020, pp. 693–718.

MEIER Misha, Aristokraten und Damoden. Untersuchungen zur inneren Entwicklung Spartas im 7. Jahrhundert v. Chr. und zur politischen Funktion der Dichtung des Tyrtaios, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998.

MOGGI Mauro, I Sinecismi Interstatali Greci, Pisa, Edizioni Marlin, 1976.

MOGGI Mauro, “Marpessa detta Choira e Ares Gynaikothoinas”, in E. Østby (ed.), Ancient Arcadia (Papers from the Third International Seminar on Ancient Arcadia, Held at the Norvegian Institute at Athens, 7–10 May 2002), Athens, Norwegian Institute at Athens, 2005, pp. 139–150.

MÖLLER Astrid, “Elis, Olympia und das Jahr 580 v. Chr. Zur Frage der Eroberung der Pisatis”, in R. Rollinger & C. Ulf (eds), Griechische Archaik: Interne Entwicklungen – Externe Impulse, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2004, pp. 249–270.

MORRIS Ian, What Is It Good For? The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, from Primates to Robots, London, Profile Books, 2015.

MOSSHAMMER Alden A., The Chronicle of Eusebius and Greek Chronographic Tradition, Lewisburg / London, Bucknell University Press, 1979.

NAFISSI Massimo, La nascita del kosmos: studi sulla storia a la societa di Sparta, Perugia / Naples, Università degli Studi di Perugia, 1991.

NAFISSI Massimo, “Elei e Pisati. Geografia, storia e instituzioni politiche della regione di Olimpia”, Geographia antiqua, 12, 2003, pp. 23–55.

NAFISSI Massimo, “The Great Rhetra (Plut. Lyc. 6): A Retrospective and Intentional Construct?”, in L. Foxhall, H.‑J. Gehrke & N. Luraghi (eds), Intentional History: Spinning Time in Ancient Greece, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010, pp. 89–119.

NAFISSI Massimo, “Lykourgos the Spartan ‘Lawgiver’: Ancient Beliefs and Modern Scholarship”, in A. Powell (ed.), A Companion to Sparta, vol. II, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018, pp. 93–123.

NIELSEN Tomas Heine, Arkadia and Its Poleis in the Archaic and Classical Periods, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, coll. “Hypomnemata”, vol. 140, 2002.

NIELSEN Tomas Heine, “Arkadia”, in M. H. Hansen & T. H. Nielsen (eds), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Greek Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation, Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 505–539.

NILSSON Martin P., “Die Hoplitentaktik und das Staatswesen”, Klio, 22, 1929, pp. 240–249.

NORDQUIST Güllog C., “Evidence for Pre‑Classical Cult Activity beneath the Temple of Athena Alea at Tegea”, in R. Hägg (ed.), Peloponnesian Sanctuaries and Cults, Stockholm, Paul Åströms Förlag, 2002, pp. 149–158.

ØDEGÅRD Knut, “The Topography of Ancient Tegea: New Discoveries and Old Problems”, in E. Østby (ed.), Ancient Arcadia (Papers from the Third International Seminar on Ancient Arcadia, Held at the Norwegian Institute at Athens, 7–10 May 2002), Athens, Norwegian Institute at Athens, 2005, pp. 209–221.

ØDEGÅRD Knut & KLEMPE Harald, “The Sanctuary of Athena Alea and Its Setting”, in E. Østby (ed.), Tegea I–II: Investigations in the Temple of Athena Alea 1991–94, II, Athens, Norwegian Institute at Athens, 2014, pp. 27–36.

O’NEIL James L., “The Exile of Themistokles and Democracy in Peloponnese”, CQ, 31, 1981, pp. 335–346.

O’NEIL James L., The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy, Lanham, Md, Rowman & Littlefield, 1995.

OPPENHEIMER Franz, Der Staat, Frankfurt am Main, Rütten & Loening, 1909.

OSBORNE Robin, “‘Is It a Farm?’: The Definition of Agricultural Sites and Settlements in Ancient Greece”, in B. Wells (ed.), Agriculture in Ancient Greece (Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium at the Swedish Institute at Athens, 16–17 May), Stockholm, Paul Åströms Förlag, 1990, pp. 21–27.

ØSTBY Erik, The Archaic Temple of Athena Alea at Tegea”, OpAth, 16, 1986, pp. 75–102.

ØSTBY Erik, “Recent Excavations in the Sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea”, in R. Hägg (ed.), Peloponnesian Sanctuaries and Cults, Stockholm, Paul Åströms Förlag, 2002, pp. 139–147.

ØSTBY Erik, “The Sanctuary of Athena Alea in the Pre‑Classical Period”, in E. Østby (ed.), Tegea I–II: Investigations in the Temple of Athena Alea 1991–94, I, Athens, Norwegian Institute at Athens, 2014, pp. 11–56.

ØSTBY Erik, LUCE Jean‑Marc, NORDQUIST Güllog C., TARDITI Chiara & VOYATZIS Mary E., “The Sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea: First Preliminary Report (1990–1992)”, OpAth, 20, 1994, pp. 89–141.

PAPPI Evangelia, “Argive Geometric Figured Style: The Rule and the Exception”, in E. Rystedt & B. Wells (eds), Pictorial Pursuits: Figurative Painting on Mycenaean and Geometric Pottery (Papers from Two Seminars at the Swedish Institute at Athens in 1999 and 2001), Stockholm, Astrom Editions AB, 2006, pp. 229–237.

PAPPI Evangelia & TRIANTAPHYLLOU Sevasti, “Mortuary Practices and the Human Remains: A Preliminary Study of the Geometric Graves in Argos, Argolid”, in A. Mazarakis Ainian (ed.), The “Dark Ages” Revisited: Acts of an International Symposium in Memory of William D. E. Coulson (University of Thessaly, Volos, 14–17 June 2007), Volos, University of Thessaly Press, 2011, pp. 717–732.

PIÉRART Marcel, “Argolis”, in M. H. Hansen & T. H. Nielsen (eds), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Greek Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation, Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 599–619.

PRETZLER Maria, “Tegea and Its Neighbours in the Archaic Period”, in Y. A. Pikoulas (ed.), Iστοριες για την Aρκαδια: Proceedings of the International Symposium in Honour of James Roy, Stemnitsa, Panepistimio Thessalias, 2008, pp. 145–162.

PRIETO PRIETO María Luz, “Ares y las mujeres de Arcadia”, in Actas del VII Congreso Español de Estudios Clásikos, vol. 3: Historia, arqueología, religion, Madrid, Sociedad Española de Estudios Clásicos y Editorial de la Universidad Complutense, 1989, pp. 263–268.

RAAFLAUB Kurt A., “Soldiers, Citizens and the Evolution of the Early Greek Polis”, in L. Mitchell & P. J. Rhodes (eds), The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece, London / New York, Routledge, 1997, pp. 49–59.

RAAFLAUB Kurt A., “Homerische Krieger, Protohopliten und die Polis: Schritte zur Lösung alten Problemen”, in B. Meissner, O. Schmitt & M. Sommer (eds), Krieg, Gesellschaft, Institutionen: Beiträge zur eine vergleichende Kriegsgeschichte, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2005, pp. 229–266.

RAAFLAUB Kurt A., “Athenian and Spartan Eunomia, or: What to Do with Solon’s Timocracy?”, in J. H. Blok & A. P. M. H. Lardinois (eds), Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches, Leiden / Boston, Brill, 2006, pp. 390–428.

RAAFLAUB Kurt A., “The Emergence of Participatory Communities in Early Greece”, in M. Kõiv & R. Kletter (eds), Responses to the 12th Century BC Collapse: Recovery and Restructuration in the Early Iron Age near East and Mediterranean, Münster, Zaphon, 2024, pp. 285–318.

RAAFLAUB Kurt A. & WALLACE Robert W., “‘People’s Power’ and Egalitarian Trends in Archaic Greece”, in K. A. Raaflaub, J. Ober & R. W. Wallace, Origins of Democracy in Ancient Greece, Berkeley / Los Angeles / London, University of California Press, 2007, pp. 22–48.

RAGONE Giuseppe, “Riflessioni sulla documentazione storica su Fidone di Argo”, in C. Bearzot & F. Landucci (eds), Argo: una democrazia diversa, Milano, 2006, pp. 27–103.

RAHE Paul A., The Spartan Regime: Its Character, Origins, and Grand Strategy, New Haven / London, Yale University Press, 2016.

RATINAUD-LACHKAR Isabelle, “Insoumise Asine ? Pour une mise en perspective des sources littéraires et archéologiques relatives à la destruction d’Asiné par Argos en 715 avant notre ère”, OpAthen, 29, 2004, pp. 73–88.

ROBERTSON Noel, Festivals and Legends: The Formation of Greek Cities in the Light of Public Ritual, Toronto / Buffalo / London, University of Toronto Press, 1992.

ROBINSON Eric W., The First Democracies: Early Popular Government Outside Athens, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997.

ROSCOE Paul, “War, Collective Action, and the ‘Evolution’ of Human Polities”, in D. M. Carballo (ed.), Cooperation and Collective Action, Boulder, University Press of Colorado, 2013, pp. 57–82.

ROY James, “The Economies of Arkadia”, in T. H. Nielsen & J. Roy (eds), Defining Ancient Arkadia (Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre 6), Copenhagen, The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999, pp. 320–381.

ROY James, “Sparta and the Peloponnese from the Archaic Period to 362 BC”, in A. Powell (ed.), A Companion to Sparta, vol. II, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018, pp. 354–373.

SALMON John B., “Political Hoplites?”, JHS, 97, 1977, pp. 84–101.

SCHEIDEL Walter, The Great Leveller: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century, Princeton / Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2017.

SCHULZ Fabian, Die homerischen Räte und die spartanische Gerusie, Düsseldorf, Wellem Verlag, 2011.

SHIPLEY Graham, “Lakedaimon”, in M. H. Hansen & T. H. Nielsen (eds), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Greek Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by the Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish National Research Foundation, Oxford / New York, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 569–598.

SIEWERT Peter, “Eine archaische Rechtsauzeichnung aus der antiken Stadt Elis”, in G. Thür (éd.), Symposion 1993: Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Graz, 12–16 September 1993), Köln / Weimar / Wien, Böhlau, 1994, pp. 17–32.

SNODGRASS Anthony M., Early Greek Armour and Weapons from the End of the Bronze Age to 600 BC, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1964.

SNODGRASS Anthony M., “The Hoplite Reform and History”, JHS, 85, 1965, pp. 110–122.

TAITA Julia, Olimpia e il suo vicinato in epoca arcaica, Milano, Università degli Studi di Milano, Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, 2007.

TAUSEND Klaus, Amphiktyonie und Symmachie: Formen zwischenstaatlicher Beziehungen im archaischen Griechenland, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992.

THOMMEN Lukas, Lakedaimonion Politeia: Die Entstehung der spartanischen Vervassung, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996.

TIGERSTEDT Eugene N., The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity, vol. I, Stockholm / Göteborg / Uppsala, Almquist & Wiksell, 1965.

TUCI Paolo A., “Il regime politico di Argo e le sue instituzioni tra fine VI e fine V secolo a.C.: verso un instabile democrazia”, in C. Bearzot & F. Landucci (eds), Argo: una democrazia diversa, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2006, pp. 209–271.

TURCHIN Peter & GAVRILETS Sergei, “Evolution of Complex Hierarchical Societies”, Social Evolution and History, 8, 2009, pp. 167–198.

VAN WEES Hans, “Tyrtaeus’ Eunomia: Nothing to Do with the Great Rhetra”, in S. Hodkinson & A. Powell (eds), Sparta: New Perspectives, London, The Classical Press of Wales, 1999, pp. 1–41.

VAN WEES Hans, “Conquerors and Serfs: Wars and Forced Labour in Archaic Greece”, in N. Luraghi & S. E. Alcock (eds), Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia: Histories, Ideologies, Structures, Cambridge, MA / London, Center for Hellenic Studies, 2003, pp. 33–80.

VAN WEES Hans, “War and Society”, in P. Sabin, H. van Wees & M. Whitby (eds), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, vol. I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 273–299.

VAN WEES Hans, “Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development”, in D. Kagan & G. F. Viggiano (eds), Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece, Princeton / Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2013, pp. 222–255.

VAN WEES Hans, “Luxury, Austerity and Equality in Sparta”, in A. Powell (ed.), A Companion to Sparta, vol. I, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018a, pp. 202–235.

VAN WEES Hans, “The Common Messes”, in A. Powell (ed.), A Companion to Sparta, vol. I, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 2018b, pp. 236–268.

VAN WEES Hans, “The First Greek Soldiers in Egypt Myths and Realities”, dans R. Konijnendijk, C. Kucewicz & M. Lloyd (eds), Brill’s Companion to Greek Land Warfare beyond the Phalanx, Leiden / Boston, Brill, 2021, pp. 293–344.

VELA-TEJADA José, “War in Greek Poetry”, in W. Heckel, F. S. Naiden, E. E. Garwin & J. Vanderspeol (eds), A Companion to Geek Warfare, Hoboken, Wiley-Blackwell, 2021, pp. 394–405.

VIGGIANO Gregory F. & VAN WEES Hans, “The Arms, Armour, and Iconography of Early Greek Hoplite Warfare”, in D. Kagan & G. F. Viggiano (eds), Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece, Princeton / Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2013, pp. 57–73.

VOYATZIS Mary E., The Early Sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea, Göteborg, Paul Åströms Förlag, 1990.

VOYATZIS Mary E., “The Role of the Temple Building in Consolidating Arkadian Communities”, in T. H. Nielsen & J. Roy (eds), Defining Ancient Arkadia (Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre 6), Copenhagen, The Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1999, pp. 130–168.

WADE-GERY Henry Theodore, Essays in Greek History, Oxford, Blackwell, 1958.

WAISGLASS A. A. I., “Demonax βασιλεὺς Μαντινέων”, AJP, 77, 1956, pp. 167–176.

WEBSTER David L., “Warfare and the Evolution of the State: A Reconsideration”, American Antiquity, 40, 1975, pp. 464–470.

WELWEI Karl-Wilhelm, Sparta: Aufstieg und Niedergang einer antiken Großmacht, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 2004.

WELWEI Karl-Wilhelm, “Ursprung, Verbreitung und Formen der Unfreiheit abhängiger Landbewohner im antiken Griechenland”, in E. Hermann-Otto (ed.), Unfreie und abhängige Landbevölkerung, Hildesheim / Zurich / New York, Georg Olms Verlag, 2008, pp. 1–52.

WHEELER Everett L., “Battle. A. Land Battles”, in P. Sabin, H. van Wees & M. Whitby (eds), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, vol. I: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 186–223.

WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF Ulrich von, Textgeschichte der griechischen Lyriker, Berlin, Wiedmansche Buchhandlung, 1900.

WOLFF Christina, Sparta und die peloponnesische Staatenwelt in archaischer und klassischer Zeit, Munich, Herbert Utz Verlag GmbH, 2010.

WÖRRLE Michael, Untersuchungen zur Verfassungsgeschichte von Argos im 5. Jahrhundert vor Christus, Diss. Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1964.

YATES David C., “The Archaic Treaties between the Spartans and Their Allies”, CQ, 55, 2005, pp. 65–76.

ZINGG Emanuel, Die Scöpfung der pseudohistorischen west peloponnesischen Frühgeschichte. Ein Rekonstruktion, Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, coll. « Vestigia », vol. 70, 2016.

ZÖRNER Gerd, Kypselos und Pheidon von Argos: Untersuchungen zur frühen griechischen Tyrannis, Marburg, Lahn, 1971.

ZURBACH Julien, Les hommes, la terre et la dette en Grèce c. 1400–c. 500 a.C., Bordeaux, Ausonius Éditions, 2017.

Haut de page

Notes

1 For Spencer, see Hart et al. (2018), Oppenheimer (1909).

2 Carneiro (1970).

3 E.g. LeBlanc (2006), Turchin & Gavrilets (2009), Morris (2015, 64–111), Sheidel (2017, 44).

4 The role of warfare in promoting individuals and elite leadership is stressed e.g. by Carneiro (1970), Webster (1975), LeBlanc (2006), Choi & Bowles (2007), Bowles (2009); the consolidating role seems to have received less attention, but see Earle (2021, 89–109) emphasizing the role of defence and describing warfare as the central factor for the “corporate mode of production”.

5 Roscoe (2013, 62–64).

6 Nilsson (1929), Lorimer (1947), Andrewes (1956), Salmon (1977), Hanson (1989), Viggiano & Van Wees (2013). The rise of hoplite phalanx as a decisive turn in Greek warfare during the archaic period is pointed out by Lendon (2005, 39–57).

7 For an overview of the development of the concept and its criticism, see Echeverría (2021), Lloyd, Konijnendijk & Kucevicz (2021). See also Konijnendijk (2018, 6–38).

8 The meaning of phalanges in Homer is admittedly ambiguous and could signify simply the mass of fighters, without any reference to the exact battle order: see Wheeler (2008, 192–195), Echeverría (2012, 311–312).

9 Iliad, XVI, 212–217 clearly refers to close fighting of heavily armed soldiers (quote from 215: ἀσπὶς ἄρ’ ἀσπίδ’ ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυν, ἀνέρα δ’ ἀνήρι. almost verbatim the same description in XIII, 130–133). Compare to Tyrt. fr. 11.31–32 West discussed below.

10 See Latacz (1977), Raaflaub (1997 and 2005), Raaflaub & Wallace (2007, 25–27), Van Wees (2008, 278).

11 For the bowl and its implications, and for the Greek mercenaries in the east in general, see Luraghi (2006, especially 36–38 for the bowl).

12 Van Wees (2005, 47–60, 151–197), Krentz (2007), Echeverría (2012 and 2021), Lloyd (2017 and 2021). For the debate see the chapters in Kagan & Viggiano (2013).

13 For the Late Geometric and early archaic pictorial scenes, see e.g. Viggiano & Van Wees (2013), Lloyd (2021, 31–38).

14 Tyrt. fr. 11.31–38 West; quote from 31–32: καὶ πόδα πὰρ ποδὶ θεὶς καὶ ἐπ’ ἀσπίδος ἀσπίδ’ ἐρείσας, / ἐν δὲ λόφον τε λόφωι καὶ κυνέην κυνέηι, and 38: τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἱστάμενοι. See Welwei (2004, 72–74), Van Wees (2005, 172–174), Lloyd (2017, 420; 2021, 31).

15 Hdt. IX, 28 notes 5,000 hoplites from Corinth, 3,000 from Megara and from Sikyon, 1,500 from Tegea and 600 from Orchomenos. There is no possibility that these numbers came from a restricted elite.

16 Hdt. II, 163.1 states that there was 30,000 Karians and Ionians in the army that Apries led against Amasis; see also II, 152–154. This and the archaeological record from the fort of Daphne (modern Tell Defenneh) in the north-eastern Egypt (see Hale, 2013, 184) suggest that by the sixth century the Greek mercenaries in the Egyptian service amounted to perhaps tens of thousands. See also the discussion in Van Wees (2021) dating the permanent influx of the Greek mercenaries from ca 625 onwards. These men, most of whom probably fought as hoplites, could not have been mostly of elite status.

17 E.g. Foxhall (1997, 119): “[…] generally the poleis of Archaic Greece were little more than a stand‑off between the members of the elite who ran them.” Recently, connected to the role of warfare, Lloyd (2021, 46–54).

18 Raaflaub & Wallace (2007), Robinson (1997), Kõiv (2011), Raaflaub (2024), Ma (2024, 121–127, 189–190) who describes the formation of relatively democratic sixth century constitutions as a natural conclusion of the institutionalisation of the political order starting in the previous century.

19 Tyrt. fr. 5 West. The exact meaning or the extent of Messene is not specified, and Luraghi (2008, 73) suggests that Tyrtaios refers to a settlement within the region (quoted supportively by Clements, 2022, 111, n. 45). However, the reference to Messene as “spacious” (εὐρύχορον) and the lines stating that it was “good to plough and good to plant” (Μεσσήνην ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀροῦν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ φυτεύειν) clearly suggest that a spacious and fertile area is indicated.

20 Tyrtaios indicates firmly at least two wars: at the time of Theopompos and at the time of his own. There might have been a series of conflicts, as suggested by Clements (2022, 116). However, Tyrtaios makes clear that Messene was “conquered” (εἵλομεν) by Theopompos, thus possessed by the Spartans since then, and without supposing that the Messenians were victorious at Tyrtaios’ time we must accept that this war confirmed and perhaps enlarged the Spartan power. For the ancients’ dating of the Messenian Wars see Mosshammer (1979, 204–209).

21 Hdt. VIII, 131.2 and Paus. III, 7.7–9 place Theopompos 8 (Herodotos) or 7 (Pausanias) generations before Demaratos and Leotychides ruling successively at the time of the Persian War. This would place his rule about two centuries before ca 500.

22 The main accounts are Ephoros FGrH 70 F 117, 118 and Paus. III, 2.6–7, 20.6. For the complex set of traditions concerning the conquest, see Kõiv (2003, 69–72, 77–100).

23 Paus. IV, 14.4 quoting Tyrtaios (fr. 6 West) does not indicate if the conquered Messenians, presumably after the Theopompos’ war, were helots or not. This has led to the opinion that Messenian helotry was established only after the second war fought at the time of Tyrtaios. So Welwei (2004, 56–57, 70), Shipley (2004, 569). Ducat (1990, 60–61, 141–144) thinks that the the full helotisation of the Messenians took place as late as after the revolt in 460s. Note also Luraghi (2003; 2008, 104–105 and 137–139); where he plays down, in my view unnecessarily, the significance of the conquest in the development of the helot status. Link (2000, 45–58), Hodkinson (2000, 128–129), Zurbach (2017, 479–480), Figueira (2018, 570), Bresson (2021, 78), Baltrusch (2024, 38) date the establishment of the Messenian helotry after the first conquest. See also Van Wees (2003, 34–37). For the western Messenia, see Luraghi (2008, 147–172).

24 Tyrt. fr. 23a West: …]καδες ᾿Αργείωνυνελ[…, where the first word could be restored as ᾿Αρκάδες. See West ad. loc., Kennell (2010, 42, 50), Clements (2022, 111).

25 See e.g. Adshead (1986, 26–28), Zingg (2016), Bourke (2018, 76–77). Note Strab. VIII, 4.10 implying that the evidence concerning the Argive–Elean–Pisatan–Arkadian coalition derives from Tyrtaios.

26 Paus. II, 24.7 dates the battle to the fourth year of Ol. 27, thus to 669. His dates for the second Messenian War were 685–668 (Paus. IV, 15.1, 23.4). Kelly (1970) has denied the very reality of the battle. However, Pausanias apparently took his information from two sources: the accounts of the Argives concerning the alleged graves of those fallen in the battle and some chronicle where he found the date. This suggests that it was indeed a famous event, thus an important Argive victory.

27 Diod. VII, 13.2; the exact meaning of Diodoros and the context of the reputed event remains unclear: see Pretzler (2008, 155).

28 Hdt. I, 66, dating the battle to the time of the Spartan kings Leon and Hegesikles who ruled during the first half of the 6th century; Paus. VIII, 48.4–5; 5.9; III, 7.3 (dating the battle to the time of Spartan King Charilaos who could have ruled during the early 8th century); Deinias FGrH 306 F 4; Polyainos I, 8.

29 Hdt. I, 67–68, dating this to the time of Kroisos, about a generation after the previous Tegean victory. This may be the context of the treaty between the Tegeans and the Spartans mentioned by Aristotle (fr. 592, 593 Rose): see Jacoby (1944), Cartledge (1979, 138–139), Tausend (1992, 168), Yates (2005, 73, n. 37), Rahe (2016, 116), contra Cawkwell (1993, 368–370), Braun (1994, 42–45), Wolff (2010, 43–45) placing the treaty after the early 5th century Tegean defeats (Hdt. IX, 35); see also Roy (2018, 356). For the implications of the alternatives, see Nielsen (2002, 188–190).

30 Hdt. I, 82. Herodotos’ narrative, as well as the later elaborations of the story, surely contained legendary elements and cannot be accepted at face value (see Robertson, 1992, 181–188, 199–204; Bershadsky, 2012; Hall, 2023, 45–47), but the Spartan conquest of Thyrea around the middle of the 6th century cannot be doubted.

31 See the discussion in Cawkwell (1993), Wolff (2010), Roy (2018, 355–360).

32 Hdt. I, 82.2.

33 Ephoros FGrH 70 F 15; for the traditions concerning the Lot of Temenos, see Kõiv (2003, 216–217).

34 Hdt. VI, 92.2, noting that the Sikyonians paid a part of this fine, thus apparently recognized some Argive sovereignty.

35 Hdt. V, 67.1.

36 Ephoros FGrH 70 F 115, 176; Marm. Par. FGrH 239 ep. 30.

37 Hdt. VI, 127.3; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 115; Paus. VI, 22.2.

38 Herdotos VI, 127.3 implies dating to the late 7th or early 6th century (for the worth of this evidence, see Kõiv, 2003, 257–261; Ragone, 2006, 30–35; Hall, 2007, 150), while all the other sources place Pheidon in a much earlier past (Arist., Pol. 1310b, 17–27; Paus. VI, 22.2; Plut., Am. Narrat. 2; Schol. Ap. Rhod. IV, 1212). For the discussion of this evidence, see Kõiv (2001; 2003, 255–276), Ragone (2006, 35–45), Hall (2007, 147–153), Christesen (2007, 112–122). The moderns have dated Pheidon to the 8th century (Huxley, 1958; 1962, 28–30; Berve, 1967, 6; Foley, 1988, 167; 1997; Gehrke, 1990, 38–42; De Libero, 1996, 208; Kõiv, 2003, 255–276, 344–353; Maran & Papadimitriou, 2020, 708), to the first half of the 7th century (Andrewes, 1956, 40–41; Zörner, 1971, 66–67; Tomlinson, 1972, 82–83); or to the late 7th and/or early 6th century (Kelly, 1976, 94–111; Carlier, 1984, 387–388; Barceló, 1993, 114; Tuci, 2006, 210–211).

39 Paus. II, 36.4–5; III, 7.4 (Asine); IV, 35.2 (Nauplia, allegedly destroyed at the time of the second Messenian War). The destruction of Asine is testified by the archaeological record which dates this to the late 8th century (Fördin & Persson, 1938, 148; Foley, 1988, 142–143, contra Ratinaud-Lachkar, 2004); for Nauplia the archaeological evidence is lacking due to the limited archaeological investigation.

40 Pollux, Onom., III, 83 (gymnetes); Steph. Byz. s.v. Chios: (gymnesioi). See Willets (1959, 496–498), Wörrle (1964, 105–112), Lotze (1959, 53–54; 1971, 103–109), Van Wees (2003, 41–45) who accept the judgement of the sources that the “naked ones” were servile comparable to the Spartan helots. The point of view of Welwei (2008, 21–24) who denies their servile status, viewing them as poor citizens fighting as lightly armed soldiers contradicts Pollux III, 83.

41 Kallisthenes FGrH 124 F 23 (quoting the inscription); Strabo VIII, 4.10; Paus. VIII, 5.13; IV, 17.2–3 (mentioning his stoning by the Arkadians); Plut., De sera num. vind. 2 (548f). For an interpretation of the tradition, see e.g. Zingg (2016, 161–166), Kõiv (2018, 502–508).

42 Herakleides Pontikos ap. Diog. Laert. I, 94.

43 Trapezous in Paus. VIII, 5.13; IV, 17.2–3; Orchomenos in Strabo VIII, 4.10.

44 Paus. VIII, 5.11–12. Pausanias distinguished between two rulers called Aristokrates—grandfather and grandson—both stoned to death for their crimes. The first was executed because of the rape of a priestess (VIII, 5.11–12) and the second for his betrayal in the Messenian War (VIII, 5.13). In every likelihood these traditions relate about the same half-legendary figure.

45 The inscription quoted by Kallisthenes FGrH 124 F 23, which recorded the punishment of a treacherous Arkadian king, has been considered as a fourth century forgery—a part of the Messenian pseudo-history invented after the fourth century (e.g. Hiller von Gaertringen, 1895, 938; Tausend, 1992, 152). The tradition was almost certainly manipulated in the 360s, at the time of the foundation of independent Messenia and of the Arkadian confederation (see especially Luraghi, 2008, 78–80; Zingg, 2016, 160–166), but the extent to which this manipulation followed or changed the previous traditions cannot be established.

46 For this “Battle of Fetters”, see above with note 28 and below with note 105.

47 Besides the tradition concerning the “Battle of Fetters” there was a story about the imprisonment of the Spartan king Theopompos who escaped by changing clothes with his wife (Polyainos VIII, 34), about a defeat of the Spartans with the help of a great fire for keeping the Tegean fighters warm during a cold winter (Paus. VIII, 53.9–10), and about a Tegean leader Akoues liberating his town which had fallen by treachery into the hand of the Spartans (Polyainos I, 11). For the discussion of this evidence see Wolf (2010, 21–27).

48 The evidence in Nielsen (2002, 186–187), Kõiv (2018, 475).

49 Thuk. IV, 134 (the battle in Orestis between the Tegeans and the Mantineians in 423); V, 65.4 (alluvial water as a constant cause of the wars between Tegea and Mantineia); V, 67.1–2 (the Tegeans, the Heraians and the Mainalians fighting on the Spartan, and the Mantineans with their allies on the opposite side in the Battle of Mantineia in 418).

50 Thuk. IV, 134 (the battle in Orestis between the Tegeans and the Mantineians and the allies of both: οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἑκατέρων); V, 47.1 and 7 (Mantinean xymmachoi noted in the treaty between Athens, Mantinea, Argos and Elis in 421–420); V, 33 (the Spartans liberating Parrhasia from the Mantinean domination).

51 Euseb. I, 197–198 Schoene: a war between Dyme and Elis at 668; Paus. VII, 26.2–3, 13: early wars of the Hyperesians (Aigeira) against Sikyon; FGrHist 105 F 2 records stories about the leadership of Orthagoras, the future Sikyonian tyrant, in the wars against Pellene; Anaxandridas of Delphi FGrHist 404 F 1 and Aelianos VH VI, 1.22–25 note the conquest of Pellene at the time of the Sikyonian tyrant Kleisthenes; Paus. VII, 26.13 says that Donoussa between Pellene and Aigeira was destroyed by the Sikyonians.

52 A late sixth century decree from Olympia mentions the Eleans (Faleioi) and their symmachia (Siewert, 1994, 29). For the controversial ancient accounts concerning the origins of the Elean domination, see Inglis (1998, 64–69), Möller (2004), Nafissi (2003, 28–40), Gehrke (2003, 17–18), Taita (2007, 67–68, 140–141), Kõiv (2013a), Roy (2018, 359), Bourke (2018, 53–87).

53 Tyrt. fr. 6–7 West quoted by Paus. IV, 14.5.

54 The obligation of “wailing for the masters […] whenever the baneful doom of death came upon any” (fr. 7) recalls the later duty of the perioikoi to mourn the Spartan kings (Hdt. VI, 58.2), but in the present case the “masters” (despotai), if they are to be identified with the “masters” (desposynoi) whom the half of all the fruits had to be delivered that Pausanias quotes in preceding lines, could hardly have been the kings.

55 Tyrt. fr. 11.35–38 West—see note 14.

56 Hdt. IX, 28.2 reports that in the Battle of Plataia there was 10,000 Lakedaimonians of whom 5,000 were the Spartans (accompanied by 35,000 helots) which means that 5,000 of the Lakedaimonians were perioikoi. See Ducat (2018, 601–603).

57 The inclusion of the gymnetes among the Spartiates is suggested by Van Wees (2018b, 250); for the figurines of archers, see Kucewicz, Lloyd & Konijnendijk (2021, 216).

58 8,000 Spartans noted in Hdt. VII, 234.2, which corresponds to the 5,000 Spartans in the Battle of Plataia according to Hdt. IX, 10.1, 28.2 (Bresson, 2021, 77; pace Van Wees, 2018b, 252–254 supposing that these numbers represent different phases in the development of the Spartan citizen manpower). Aristotle (Pol. 1270a, 36) thought there were once 10,000 Spartans.

59 See the calculations in Jameson (1992, 136–138), Hodkinson (2000, 131–145), Figueira (2003, 199–203, 217–220). This does not suggest equality of the plots (see Hodkinson, 2000, 65–104; Van Wees, 2018a, 203–208), although Herodotos’ statement that each Spartan was in the battle of Plataia accompanied with seven helots (IX, 10.1, 28.1), if even nearly reliable, implies a fairly big estate possessed by an average Spartan.

60 Pace Van Wees (2018b, 251–254) who suggests that the number 8,000 was achieved with a late 6th century reform and started to decline immediately thereafter.

61 Shipley (2004, 578, 594) includes both Thyrea and Anthana among the poleis with territories of no more than 25 km² (type 1, for which see Hansen, 2004a, 71).

62 The comparative evidence suggests that usually no more than a third of the polis territories was arable: Attika with a territory of ca 2,500 km² (Hansen, 2004b, 72) is estimated to have possessed less than 90 km² of arable land see Jameson (1992, 144–145 with references); Mantinea with a territory of ca 295 km² possessed up to 100 km² of arable land (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 1981, 175).

63 Survey evidence from different parts of Greece demonstrates that the countryside was thinly settled during the early archaic era, while farmsteads emerged and peripheral areas were settled only from the late archaic period (Foxhall, 2013), it has been suggested that the large numbers of independent farmers was produced by a late archaic agricultural expansion (Van Wees, 2013, 235–242). The Lakonian survey (Catling, 2002) indicates the same tendency in the peripheral area which was investigated, but cannot illuminate the situation on the central plain (Lupi, 2006, 203).

64 So recently Van Wees (2018b, 251–254). He dates the creation of the circle of ca 8,000 Spartiates to the late 6th century, resulting from the acquisition of the conquered lands, but does not explain how the mostly much earlier conquests created such a number at such alate date. He does not notice that the reform would have required an almost revolutionary redistribution of the landed possessions.

65 Arist. fr. 536 Rose ap. Plut., Lyk. 6.1. The structure of the text indicates the focus on the regularity of assemblies (apellazein) and to the power of this institution, indicated by the last clause: γαμωδανγοριανημην καὶ κράτος. The γαμωδανγοριανημην is obviously corrupt, but Aristotle’s commentary (fr. 536 Rose ap. Plut., Lyk. 6.3) shows that it stated the power of the people. The power of demos expressed in the regular gatherings was thus the ultimate goal and logical conclusion of the Rhetra (Tigerstedt, 1965, 55, 353, n. 360; Kõiv, 2003, 196–197; Lupi, 2017, 62–63).

66 Arist. fr. 536 Rose ap. Plut., Lyk. 6.4: Αἰ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δᾶμος ἔροιτο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενέας καὶ ἀρχαγέτας ἀποστατῆρας ἦμεν. The rider has been seen both as the original part of the Rhetra (Forrest, 1963, 157–161, 165–166; Van Wees, 1999, 20–21; Welwei, 2004, 65–66; Nafissi, 1991, 51–71; 2011; Kennell, 2010, 45–49) and as a later addition (Tigerstedt, 1965, 55–56; Gagarin, 1986, 53, n. 9; O’Neill, 1995, 13; Schulz, 2011, 142–145), as was assumed by Aristotle. See the discussion in Kõiv (2003, 197–205).

67 The Rhetra has been dated to the time of Tyrtaios (Wade-Gery, 1958, 67; Bringmann, 1975; Thommen, 1996, 30–53; Meier, 1998, 186–324) or between the end of the 8th and the first half of the 7th century (Huxley, 1962, 42–49; Forrest, 1963; Jeffery, 1978, 117–118; Cartledge, 1979, 131–135; Nafissi, 1991, 71–81; Meier, 1998, 187; Raaflaub, 2006), or to the 6th century (Van Wees, 1999). It could have been a retrospective statement about a supposed act of foundation in the past (Kõiv, 2003, 186–198; Nafissi, 2011; 2018; Ma, 2024, 84). However, it shows how the archaic Spartans imagined their state order.

68 Tyrt. fr. 4 W, quoted by Plut., Lyk. 6 and Diod. 7.12, the last verses including the final line quoted here were given only by Diodoros: δήμου τε πλήθει νίκην καὶ κάρτος ἕπεσθαι. I will leave aside the debates about the exact meaning of the different expressions in the preceding verses (see the various interpretations in Wade-Gery, 1958; Forrest, 1963; Meier, 1998, 243–253; Van Wees, 1999; Luther, 2004; Schulz, 2011, 146–152). What matters, is that the last part quoted by Diodoros cannot be a forgery (demonstrated by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1900, 109, n. 3; Van Wees, 1999, 6–9; Schulz, 2011, 146–149, pace Wade Gery, 1958, 61; Nafissi, 1991, 56).

69 Tyrt. fr. 12 West: ξυνὸν δ’ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόληΐ τε παντί τε δήμωι. See Vela-Tejada (2021, 399–400) for the fighting ideology of Tyrtaios.

70 Arist., Pol. 1306b36–1307a3; Paus. IV, 18.2–3. It has been suggested that Tyrtaios referred to an unequal division of land in Lakonia (e.g. Hodkinson, 2000, 76; Van Wees, 2018a, 203), but this was not how Aristotle understood the case—he clearly saw the crisis as caused by the Messenian War (θλιβόμενοι γάρ τινες διὰ τὸν πόλεμον) which could hardly have affected the landholding pattern at home.

71 Link (1991, 80–81; 2000, 34–35), Bresson (2021, 78), Baltrusch (2024, 38).

72 For the social inequalities in Sparta and in the Spartan landholding pattern, see e.g. Hodkinson (2000, 65–104), Van Wees (2018a).

73 Anth. Pal. XIV, 73: ᾿Αργεῖοι λινοθώρηκες, κέντρα πτολέμοιο·

74 For the “panoply grave”, see Foley (1988, 95).

75 Hippobotos Argos e.g. in Iliad, III, 76, 258; XV, 30; Odyssey, XV, 239, 274. For the drawings of horses and horse leaders see Pappi (2006); Pappi & Triantaphyllou (2011, 718–720).

76 In the battle at Nemea in 394 they had 7,000 hoplites (Xen., Hell. IV, 2.17; see Piérart, 2004, 603).

77 See e.g. Brouwers (2013, 75–86).

78 This “first” shield was, in the historical times, probably displayed in the processions from the town to the sanctuary during the annual Heraia (or Hekatombaia) festivals where shields were awarded as prices for the winners in the athletic competitions known as en Argei Chalkos (Pind., Ol. VII, 83) or agon chalkeos (Nem. X, 22–23); the contest is noted also in Ol. IX, 88; XIII, 107 and by Bakchylides in Ep. X, 32; Hesych. Agon chalkeios. The shield was allegedly invented by the legendary Argive twin brothers Akrisios and Proitos rivalling for kingship (Apollod. II, 2.1; Paus. II, 25.7), or it was inherited from Danaos (the greatgrandfather of Akrisios and Proitos) by his son‑in‑law Lynkeus who gave it to his son Abas who dedicated it at Heraion (Hygin., Fab. 273, 170).

79 Foley (1988, 95).

80 Hdt. I, 82. For a discussion of the broader context of the story and the reliability of the account, see Dayton (2006, 33–51).

81 See Lendon (2005, 39–41).

82 The battle and its consequences described in Hdt. VI, 78–83; the 6,000 fallen recorded in VII, 148.2. See Kõiv (2024, 360–361), and note 84 below.

83 See note 15.

84 Supposing that half of the 6,000 were hoplites (the same proportion as in the armies at Plataia according to Hdt. IX, 29.2) and that the casualties consisted of 2/3 of the total force we would arrive at 4,500 hoplites, which conforms with the 5,000 and 3,000 hoplites of Corinth and Sikyon. The destruction of Mycenae (Diod. XI, 65; Strab. VIII, 6.19; Paus. VII, 25.5–6) and Tiryns (Ephoros FGrH 70 F 56; Strab. VIII, 6.11; Paus. II, 25.8) in 460s probably led to the distribution of their land among the Argives, which can explain the rise of the hoplite numbers to 7,000 put into the field in the battle of Nemea in 394 (Xen. Hell. IV, 17.2).

85 For the land resource in Thyrea, see above, with note 61. The smaller land resource can suggest that the plots were smaller than in the case of Sparta. If the up to 2,500 ha of arable land was distributed into the lots of ca 10 ha, only ca 250 Argives could have received land.

86 If all the ca 275 km² (27,500 ha) of arable land on the Argive plain (Piérart, 2004, 602) would have been divided among the 4,500 hoplites—an impossibility before the destruction of Mycenae and Tiryns—this would have allowed 6.11 ha per hoplite. This of course cannot exactly correspond to the reality (the elite families surely possessed bigger plots, a part of the hoplites could have been city dwellers without possessing land etc.). If assuming, for the sake of argument, that 3,000 of the 4,500 hoplites were sub‑elite landholders, and allowing 40% of the arable land, thus 11,000 ha, to the leisure class elite (a reasonable conclusion from what Osborne, 1992, 24 and Foxhall, 1992 calculated for classical Athens), the 3,000 hoplites could have possessed 5.5 ha in average, which is close to the possible minimum for a hoplite. However, as before the destruction of Mycenae and Tiryns the land possessed by the Argives was smaller, the possessions of the 3,000 hoplite smallholders must have consisted even larger share of the total arable land.

87 See below, with note 105.

88 Hermippos fr. 83 and Ephoros FGrHist 70 F 54 ap. Athen. IV, 154d (quoted below in note 113).

89 For the economy of the Arkadian poleis, see Roy (1999); for the conditions in the nearby Mantinea, see Hodkinson & Hodkinson (1981, 265–291).

90 The Tegean territory has been estimated as 385 km² (Nielsen, 2004, 531), thus ca 15,360 ha of arable land; the polis sent 1,500 hoplites to Plataia (Hdt. IX, 28.3), which, assuming that two thirds of the full hoplite force was mobilised, will imply 2,250 Tegean hoplites. Assuming that every household was able to produce a hoplite and that every household possessed 5 ha of land (the approximate minimum for a hoplite household), the hoplites would possess 11,250 ha of the available 15,360 ha.

91 See note 73. The panoply (for which see Snodgrass, 1964 and 1965) was in practice rarely complete (Echeverría, 2021, 77–78).

92 For which see Lloyd (2021, 46–51).

93 Paus. II, 36.4–5 (Eratos); IV, 35.2 (Damokratidas).

94 Three inscriptions from the first half of the 6th century, one from Heraion (Nomima, I, 100) and two from the acropolis of Lasissa (SEG, XI, 336 = IG, IV, 614 = Nomima, I, 87; SEG, 314 = Nomima, I, 88), indicate that Argos had a board of damiourgoi as the leading officials. The inscriptions are dated to ca 575–550 by Jeffery (1990, 157), Kelly (1976, 131), Carlier (1984, 394).

95 Paus. II, 23.7 mentioned an Argive tyrannos Perilaos, possibly a previous winner of the Nemean Games, who killed Othryades the Spartan hero of the battle for Thyrea (II, 20.7); another tyrannos Laphaes was allegedly expelled and defeated by the Argives (II, 21.8); a basileus or tyrannos called Archinos either established martial competitions and distributed arms in a festival (schol. Pind., Ol. VII, 152) or used the distribution of arms as a trick for establishing tyranny (Polyainos III, 8).

96 For the power base of the Argive monarchy, see Kõiv (2024, 359–366).

97 Strab. VIII, 3.2 notes the synoikismoi of both Tegea and neighbour Mantinea, without indicating the dates of these events: συστήματα δήμων […], ἐξ ὧν ὕστερον αἱ γνωριζόμεναι πόλεις συνῳκίσθησαν, οἷον τῆς ᾿Αρκαδίας Μαντίνεια μὲν ἐκ πέντε δήμων ὑπ’ ᾿Αργείων συνῳκίσθη, Τεγέα δ’ ἐξ ἐννέα, […]. The Tegean demoi are listed in Paus. VIII, 45.1.

98 Evidenced by the recent survey of the Norwegian institute at Athens shows signs of urban development in the Tegean centre from the late 6th century: see Ødegård (2005, 216–217), Ødegård & Klempe (2014, 33–35), Pretzler (2008, 145–147). The city walls and most of the public buildings probably date from the 4th century: see Nielsen (2004, 532).

99 See especially Østby (2014), who in 32–33 supposes the existence of still another temple erected in the 7th century after the destruction of the later one among Geometric temples and before the construction of the monumental temple late in the century. See also Jost (1985, 151–154), Voyatzis (1990; 1999, 131), Nielsen (2002, 167), Nordquist (2002). For the archaic temple, see especially Østby (1986; 2002; 2014, 35–50), Østby et al. (1994, 94).

100 Another sanctuary was established on the hilltop of Psili Korfi about 10 km south of Tegea, with a marble temple built in the sixth century (see Jost, 1985, 159–161; Voyatzis, 1990, 28–30, 84–87; 1999, 132–133; Baumer, 2004, 73–74; the similarity of the votives suggests that the sanctuaries at Psili Korfi and that of Athena Alea belonged to the same community, thus to the Tegeans). In the late Archaic period a third sanctuary was established at the hill of Ayos Sostis, probably the Tegean acropolis (Jost, 1985, 154–156).

101 See Kõiv (2013b, 168–171).

102 Paus. VIII, 5. Hiller von Gaertringen (1927, 8–9, 12) and Zingg (2016, 182–185) have suggested a 4th century date for the construction; Hejnic (1961, 79–91) suggested a 5th century date, which would not contradict the further 4th century elaboration. On the nature and reliability of such kings lists in general, see Drews (1983, 53–56, 65–71, 89–90).

103 Deinias FGrH 306 F 4.

104 Polyainos I, 8 (Elnes); I, 11 (Akoues, who liberated the town which had fallen by treachery into the hand of the Spartans).

105 The legendary nature and ritual background are most obvious in the story about the Tegean women led by female leader called Chora Marpessa or Perimede defeating the Spartans (Paus. VIII, 48.4–5; III, 7.3; Deinias FGrH 306 F 4). See Prieto (1989), Moggi (2006).

106 Arist., Pol. 1318a.

107 Robinson (1997, 113–114).

108 Strab. VIII, 3.2, see note 97. The Mantinean synoikismos has been dated to the earlier part of the 5th century (Andrews, 1952; Forrest, 1960; Moggi, 1976, 150–151; Demand, 1990, 65–66; cautiously Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 1981, 258–261) or to the 6th century (Callmer, 1943, 72; Amit, 1973, 121–128; O’Neil, 1981, 335–339).

109 Hermippos fr. 82 (Pap. Oxy. 1367 = Herakleides Lembos epitomising Hermippos’ work about lawgivers: βασιλεὺς Μαντινέων); Athen. IV, 154d who also quoted Hermippos (fr. 83—see note 113), however, noted Demonax only as “one of the citizens”. Demonax might have held the office of basileus, comparable to that in some other states including the 5th century Argos (see Waisglass, 1956; Hejnic, 1961, 69; Carlier, 1984, 404). For the meaning of basileus in the Archaic period, see Carlier (1984, 142–150), Kõiv (2016, 16–17, 24–25).

110 Hdt. IV, 161.2: ἔδοσαν ἄνδρα τῶν ἀστῶν δοκιμώτατον; Diod. VIII, 30.2: νετο Δημῶναξ Μαντινεύς, συνέσει καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ δοκῶν διαφέρειν.

111 Hdt. IV, 161.2–3.

112 Amit (1973, 127–128).

113 Hermippos fr. 83 and Ephoros FGrHist 70 F 54 ap. Athen. IV 154d: ῞Ερμιππος δ’ ἐν α′ περὶ νομοθετῶν τῶν μονομαχούντων εὑρετὰς ἀποφαίνει Μαντινεῖς Δημώνακτος ἑνὸς τῶν πολιτῶν συμβουλεύσαντος, καὶ ζηλωτὰς τούτων γενέσθαι Κυρηναίους. ῎Εφορος δ’ ἐν ἕκτῃ ἱστοριῶν ‘ἤσκουν, φησί, τὰ πολεμικὰ οἱ Μαντινεῖς καὶ ᾿Αρκάδες, τήν τε στολὴν τὴν πολεμικὴν καὶ τὴν ὅπλισιν τὴν ἀρχαίαν ὡς εὑρόντων ἐκείνων ἔτι καὶ νῦν Μαντινικὴν ἀποκαλοῦσι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὁπλομαχίας καθέσεις ἐν Μαντινείᾳ πρῶτον εὑρέθησαν Δημέου τὸ τέχνημα καταδείξαντος.’ Demeas in Ephoros almost certainly refers to Demonax (Waisglass, 1956).

114 Kucewicz, Lloyd & Konijnendijk (2021, 206–211).

Haut de page

Pour citer cet article

Référence électronique

Mait Kõiv, « Warfare and Polis Formation in the Archaic Peloponnese »Gaia [En ligne], 28 | 2025, mis en ligne le 10 juillet 2025, consulté le 16 février 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/gaia/5307 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/14bdf

Haut de page

Droits d’auteur

CC-BY-SA-4.0

Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY-SA 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont susceptibles d’être soumis à des autorisations d’usage spécifiques.

Haut de page
Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search