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Deux cents ans de doctrine Monroe

Theodore Roosevelt, the Panama Canal, and the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

Stephen G. Rabe

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1Theodore Roosevelt once declared that "by far the most important action I took in foreign affairs during the time I was president related to the Panama Canal" (Sánchez P., 2007: 50). President Roosevelt had accomplished in 1903-1904 a treaty with the new nation of Panama that gave the United States the right to build and fortify a canal that connected the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The Panama Canal opened in 1914. Over 1,000 merchant ships passed through the Canal during its first year of operation. Roosevelt took pride in being the leader who had realized the legendary dream of cutting through the landmass of North and South America.

2Beyond enhancing international commerce, President Roosevelt further believed that he had served the cause of international justice. His "most important action" included detaching the province of Panama from the South American nation of Colombia. In his view, "we gave to the people of Panama self-government and freed them from subjection to alien oppressors" (Ibid.). Historians do not accept the president’s claim that he had defended the principle of national self-determination. Instead, scholars see an imperialist who bolstered the power of the United States by trampling on the sovereign rights of Latin Americans. As exemplified by his pronouncement in 1904 of the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt defined Latin America as a preserve of the United States. The United States would exercise "international police power" in the region.

Before Roosevelt

3Spain, which built a mighty empire in the sixteenth century in present-day Mexico and Bolivia and Peru, long recognized that connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans with a canal would confer enormous strategic and commercial power on the nation able to accomplish the feat. In the pre-industrial era, an inter-oceanic canal remained, however, a dream. Powerful machines would be required to carry out the formidable tasks of excavation. Engineers would also have to solve the problem of equalizing the sea levels of the two oceans. The people of the Western Hemisphere would have to await the fruits of the nineteenth-century industrial revolution.

4The nineteenth century indeed proved momentous for the isthmus of Panama. The Spanish Empire broke apart. Panama ultimately became part of the South American nation of Colombia. It was not a happy union. Overland transportation between Panama and Colombia was impossible because of mountains and dense forests in southern Panama. Panamanians complained that Colombian leaders ignored Panamanian concerns. Panamanians further believed that their strategic location guaranteed them a bright future and were loath to share their potential bounty with distant Bogotá.

5Sensing political advantage and economic opportunity, the United States welcomed the breakup of the Spanish empire. In December 1823, Monroe and Adams pronounced their famous "Monroe Doctrine".

6Legions of historians have pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine had little practical effect in the nineteenth century. The Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral statement. It had no standing as international law. The United States had not consulted with Latin American leaders about its pledge to protect them. In any case, the United States focused on continental expansion, not hemispheric relations. The issue of slavery and then the Civil War consumed the United States. The United States further lacked the military power to keep the Europeans out of the hemisphere. The British, in particular, established their economic dominance in Latin America, and Great Britain routinely employed its naval forces against Latin Americans to ensure that they respected British commercial power.

7Despite their nineteenth-century dominance in Latin America, the British understood that they would have to come to terms with the developing power and prosperity of the United States. That growing strength of the United States became manifest in the post-Civil War period, as the industrial revolution took hold in the United States. In 1850, in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the British agreed that they and the United States would jointly build a canal in Central America. The two nations pledged that neither would seek exclusive control over a canal and that both would safeguard a canal’s neutrality. Whereas Clayton-Bulwer would hold for fifty years, the British understood that time and history favored the United States.

8The coming of age for the United States in the Western Hemisphere took place in 1895 over an obscure issue, the Venezuelan Boundary Crisis. For decades, London had been bickering with Venezuela over the proper boundary between Venezuela and its colony, British Guiana. To the shock of both the Venezuelans and the British, the United States entered the fray, demanding that the British submit the dispute to binding arbitration. The ultimatum contained the astonishing claim that "today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition" (Holden R. and E. Zolov, 2000). Although British leaders were initially taken back by the brashness of the United States, they decided to settle on U.S. terms. London calculated that it needed the friendship of the United States in order to balance the looming power of imperial Germany. In 1901, the British agreed to revoke Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and grant the United States the exclusive right to build and operate a canal and defend it with military force.

9One last international development set the stage for a U.S.-dominated canal. In 1898, the United States intervened militarily to free Cuba from Spain. The spoils of war brought new possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific – a protectorate over Cuba, the annexation of Puerto Rico, the incorporation of Hawaii, and the annexations of Guam, Wake Island, part of Samoa, and the Philippine Islands. Tying the new Pacific empire to the continental United States and the new Caribbean possessions had now become a foreign-policy imperative.

Roosevelt Wants a Panamanian Canal

10When Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1901, he inherited and embraced a historical process that would make the long-held dream of connecting the oceans a reality. President Roosevelt had two clear choices for where to build a canal. The United States had a treaty option to build a canal through Nicaragua. Roosevelt’s other choice was to negotiate a treaty with Colombia to build a canal through its province of Panama. In the 1880s, with the permission of Colombia, the French company that had once constructed the Suez Canal had started work in Panama, excavating about 40 percent of a future canal. The company went bankrupt, however, and offered to sell its assets. The company was represented in the early twentieth century by Philippe Bunau-Varilla, who was also a major stockholder in the canal company. Bunau-Varilla initially offered to sell the company’s assets for $109 million but dropped the price to $40 million to match the price of the Nicaraguan option.

11Presented with two viable options, Roosevelt made a scientific decision by heeding the advice of engineers who recommended the Panama option. Engineers believed that they had a technology to build a multi-tiered lock system to equalize the two oceans. A path across Panama would also allow for larger ships than one through Nicaragua. Congress subsequently authorized the president to negotiate with Colombia, leaving Nicaragua as a second option should negotiations fail with Colombia.

12The Panama drama began on 22 January 1903, when Secretary of State John Hay dictated terms to the Colombians. Hay called in the Colombian chargé d’affaires and told him that the United States would meet the French company’s price of $40 million, give Colombia a $10 million bonus, and pay an annual rent to Colombia of $250,000. In turn, the United States would build a canal and operate it for one hundred years and control a six-mile-wide zone along the canal route. The United States would also have the option to renew the canal lease, suggesting that the United States would operate the canal in perpetuity.

13The Colombian government and people favored permitting the United States to build a canal through Panama. But the terms dictated by Secretary Hay were unacceptable. The Colombians believed they deserved a share of the French assets and that they wanted the treaty to make explicit that United States was a tenant in the canal territory. The treaty could not suggest that the United States could operate a canal in perpetuity or exercise sovereignty in a canal zone. President Roosevelt exploded when he learned that Colombians objected to Hay’s treaty. He labeled the Colombians as "foolish and homicidal corruptionists", "jackrabbits" and "those contemptible little creatures". The Colombian Senate, which rejected the treaty, was standing in the way of internal progress and prosperity and the glory and power of the United States. Roosevelt wanted "the dirt to fly" (Rabe S., 1982: 10-11).

Roosevelt Sponsors a Revolution

14President Roosevelt had several policy options in the second half of 1903. He could have pursued a diplomatic solution, either continuing to negotiate with Colombia or opening negotiations with Nicaragua. He could have also sought the advice of Congress. Roosevelt disdained that option, predicting that legislators would debate grandly and endlessly, and the canal would be built fifty years later. Others suggested to him that he should ignore Colombia and build a canal. Roosevelt liked the idea of a land seizure, but he understood that the U.S. public would oppose the use of force. Nonetheless, Roosevelt believed that international peace and prosperity and the power of the United States hinged on the United States building and operating a canal in the isthmus of Panama.

15Philippe Bunau-Varilla was the central figure in the scheme to detach Panama from Colombia. In October 1903, Bunau-Varilla shuttled between New York and Washington. In New York, he met with Panamanian nationalists who wanted to be free of Bogotá. His main contact in Washington was Assistant Secretary of State Francis Loomis. On 10 October 1903, Loomis brought Bunau-Varilla in to see Roosevelt. Their conversation was guarded, but Loomis wanted to know how the United States would react, if Panama declared its independence. Roosevelt noted that he could not answer directly but added "all he could say was that Colombia by its action had forfeited any claim on the United States – and that he had no use for the Colombian government" (McCullough D., 1977: 351). Bunau-Varilla grasped the president’s meaning, thanked him, and immediately left the White House.

16After meeting with Bunau-Varilla, President Roosevelt ordered the dispatch of the USS Nashville, which had been stationed at Kingston, Jamaica, to sail toward Panama. Secretary Loomis apparently kept Bunau-Varilla apprised of the Nashville’s movements. The warship arrived off the coast of Panama on the evening of 2 November. Panamanian nationalists, who kept in contact with Bunau-Varilla, prematurely declared their independence. Colombians managed to land a contingent of 500 troops in Panama, before the Nashville arrived. The Panamanians nullified the military assault by bribing the Colombian commander and his troops. Colombia could not land additional troops, for nine U.S. warships eventually patrolled Panama’s two coasts. The United States granted de facto recognition to the new nation of Panama on 6 November 1903.

17Bunau-Varilla negotiated a new canal treaty for Panama. The original treaty that Secretary of State Hay dictated to Colombia served as the basis for the new treaty, with additional advantages for the United States. The canal zone was widened from six to ten miles, the United States would have the sole authority to fortify and defend the canal, and U.S. domination of the canal would be in perpetuity. In addition, the United States was granted the right to intervene in Panama to protect the canal. Secretary Hay would later observe that the new treaty was "vastly advantageous to the United States" and "not so advantageous to Panama" (Major J., 1993: 56). Hay insisted that the new Panamanian government immediately ratify Bunau-Varilla’s treaty. Panamanians had little choice, for U.S. warships continued to protect their new nation from the Colombians. The U.S. Senate then ratified the treaty on 23 February 1904. President Roosevelt assured suspicious senators that no member of his administration had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the Panamanian revolutionists. In fact, even Roosevelt’s closest advisors, like Secretary of War Elihu Root, believed the president had violated international law and norms. Roosevelt rejected allegations that he acted illegally. By securing the right to build a canal, he had fostered international commerce and enhanced the power of the United States. The United States had "received a mandate of civilization" to promote progress (Ibid., p. 60-63).

Roosevelt Exercises International Police Power

18On 6 December 1904, just months after detaching Panama from Colombia, Roosevelt pronounced what would be labeled the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. The United States would hereafter exercise "international police power" in the Western Hemisphere to address "flagrant cases" of "wrongdoing or impotence". As a "civilized nation,", the United States had a duty under the Monroe Doctrine to intervene in the affairs of unruly, unstable nations (Holden and Zolov, op.cit., p. 100-102). The construction and then opening of the Panama Canal gave added weight to the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine. As Elihu Root observed in 1905, "the inevitable effect of our building the Canal must be to require us to police the surrounding premises" (LaFeber W., 1989: 42).

19Over the next three decades, the United States, under the aegis of the Roosevelt Corollary, would repeatedly intervene and militarily occupy Caribbean nations like Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama.

20In detaching Panama from Colombia and securing a beneficial treaty, President Theodore Roosevelt had fulfilled the historic dream of connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. He had also established a U.S. sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. During World War II and the Cold War, Roosevelt’s successors intensified efforts to maintain U.S. domination of the region. As, however, newly independent nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East began to exercise their influence in the late twentieth century, Panama would find global friends who would back the small nation’s claim to sovereignty over its canal.

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Bibliographie

Holden, Robert H. and Zolov, Eric (eds.), Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000.

LaFeber, Walter, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989.

Major, John, Prize Possession: The United States and the Panama Canal, 1903-1979, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

McCullough, David G., The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1977.

Rabe, Stephen G., The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1982.

Sánchez, Paul M., Panama Lost? U.S. Hegemony, Democracy, and the Canal, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 2007.

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Référence électronique

Stephen G. Rabe, « Theodore Roosevelt, the Panama Canal, and the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine »IdeAs [En ligne], 22 | 2023, mis en ligne le 01 octobre 2023, consulté le 28 avril 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ideas/16670 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ideas.16670

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Auteur

Stephen G. Rabe

Stephen G. Rabe is the Ashbel Smith Chair in History (emeritus) at the University of Texas in Dallas, where he taught for forty years. Rabe has taught or lectured in twenty countries, including leading seminars in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. He has written thirteen scholarly books. His latest books are Kissinger and Latin America (2020) and The Lost Paratroopers of Normandy: A Story of Resistance, Courage, and Solidarity in a French Village (2022).
rabe[at]utdallas.edu

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