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Policy advisory committees in Kenya: interest group participation and effectiveness

David Irwin and Mercy Kyande
p. 5-25

Abstract

Governments create advisory committees and arm’s-length agencies and then delegate responsibilities and powers, sometimes merely to provide policy advice but sometimes to implement regulation. Interest groups, and especially groups representing private businesses, are often appointed to such committees. As a result, they proactively seek appointment to policy advisory committees and boards established by government, believing that this offers one route amongst several to promote their interests to government and to influence public policy. But little is known about whether they are then successful in influencing policy outcomes. This paper addresses that gap – specifically by reviewing interest groups’ perceptions of their effectiveness, given the challenges of assessing actual effectiveness, in policy advisory committees in Kenya. Whilst it is possible that the policy outcomes simply reflect the policy preferences of the interest groups, these groups believe that they exert some influence on the committees on which they sit – through the provision of research evidence, clearly articulated opinion, and reasoned argument – and they further believe that the committees exert some influence on government policy.

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We thank Patrycja Rozbicka, Jon Scott and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and constructive feedback.
The research for this paper was undertaken with the generous support of the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE).

Introduction

1Governments create committees, task forces and boards to undertake a range of activities but especially to proffer policy advice. They cannot employ staff with sufficient knowledge of everything on which they need to formulate policy. So they seek additional knowledge, evidence, and opinion from external sources, including political advisers, scientific advisers, research institutes, academia, and interest groups. Interest groups not only engage with advisory committees but also apparently see merit in securing membership of these bodies. In this article we use the term “advisory committee” to cover any board, task force, or committee that has a role in advising government on – or reviewing or implementing – policy and regulation.

2The European Union (EU) is especially active in setting up advisory committees and then engaging people with knowledge and expertise. In the Nordic countries, advisory committees and policy commissions are seen as playing a vital role in policy formulation (Christensen & Holst, 2017). In Taiwan, standing advisory committees are the second most used source of policy advice after staff and government research units (Wang & Chiou, 2015). Even China utilises advisory committees to strengthen technical expertise and to make policy making more plural and open to influence (Li, 2021). However, despite claims that advisory committees are “likely to be better placed to leverage support and policy traction on difficult issues” (Crowley & Head, 2017, p. 181), there has been little research on interest group participation in government advisory committees outside the OECD (Howlett, 2019; Hustedt, 2019).

3Kenya is amongst those countries with many government-appointed boards, advisory committees, and task forces. It also has active and moderately successful business interest groups. Many interest groups, and especially business interest groups, are represented on government advisory committees and government-mandated agencies (Irwin & Kyande, 2022). Moreover, interest groups lobby government to create advisory committees and then lobby hard to be appointed to such committees (Business Advocacy Fund (BAF), 2020). This suggests that interest groups see advisory groups as an effective route to influence public policy. Whether that is true is not the subject of this research. Rather, we aim to understand the perceptions of interest group representatives on government advisory committees: do they perceive that they get a fair hearing; do they perceive that they contribute; do they perceive that the committees are credible and effective; and, perhaps most importantly, do they perceive that they have made a difference? In particular, we aim to answer the question of why interest groups make so much effort to participate when they could more easily lobby government in other ways. Whilst relying on interest group perceptions will inevitably introduce a degree of optimism bias, an improved understanding of their views on the working practices and effectiveness of advisory committees contributes to explaining why interest groups make considerable efforts to secure membership.

4This paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly introduces government advisory committees. This is followed by a description of the range of boards and committees found in Kenya and the degree of participation by interest groups. The research design is explained, followed by an account of the key findings. The paper concludes with suggestions to improve the effectiveness of interest group participation in policy advisory groups.

Government advisory committees

5Brown (2008) reminds us that the key purpose of government advisory committees is to improve the quality of decisions, whilst Bressers et al. (2018) claim that governments that take on board good policy advice, especially from arrangements that bring together a diverse range of stakeholders, are more likely to deliver policy that is seen to be legitimate. These committees can thus provide a mix of knowledge, evidence, and advice (Li, 2021), thereby improving the quality (Jordan & Maloney, 2007) and legitimacy (Dür & Mateo, 2017) of decision-making. In its review of UK advisory bodies, the Cabinet Office (2017) noted several benefits: accelerating regulatory reform, contributing to more informed decision-making, and increasing accountability and trust in government. Metz sums up, claiming that the “involvement of experts in policy making is widely viewed as enhancing the effectiveness of public policies” (2014, p. 263).

6To be effective, advisory committees need to be transparent (Van Damme et al. 2011), independent (Krick, 2015; Wang & Chiou, 2015), representative, and credible (Veit et al., 2017), as well as being able to deliberate and to draw reasoned conclusions founded on varying and objective viewpoints (Krick & Holst, 2021). This should add value to the work of policymakers through offering sound policy proposals (Rasmussen & Gross, 2014). Krick observes two possible reasons for governments to create advisory committees, seeing them either as symbolic and legitimising or as instrumental and problem-solving (2015, p. 488). Smith goes further, warning that appointment to committees can be a form of patronage and that committees thus “perform a therapeutic political role” (1977, p. 153) rather than making a meaningful contribution. Krick (2015), however, suggests that members of committees often play dual roles, both as representatives of interests and also as specialists or experts. She sees no conflict between these roles, but rather sees the holding of both roles as a bonus. She concludes that “broadly composed advisory committees make these arrangements very powerful instruments of governance given that governments are confronted with complex and partly conflicting requirements” (2015, p. 489). The UK government concurs, stating “independent expert advice [from advisory bodies] plays a vital role in the business of government and in public life” (Cabinet Office, 2017, p. 6). It is not clear, however, how much impact these bodies deliver. The UK Cabinet Office, qualifying the previous comment, says that “the scale of value added by advisory bodies is hard to measure” (2017, p. 6).

7It seems, then, that there are persuasive arguments for governments to make use of advisory committees. And, because governments create them and give them a mandate to review or propose policy, legislation, and regulation, it will be no surprise that interest groups – especially business interest groups when business is the target of the regulation – not only want to influence the discussions and outcomes but also to seek to influence advisory committees from the inside (Rasmussen & Gross, 2015). Participation allows interest groups, at least to some extent, to share issues, opportunities, knowledge, and expertise with government policymakers. This approach is recognised by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development which, in listing a range of advocacy techniques, specifically includes “the influence of special interests through participation in established institutional arrangements such as government advisory and expert groups or parliamentary inter-groups” (OECD, 2021, p. 18). Membership of advisory committees, however, confers a privileged position on interest groups, not only offering extra opportunities to be heard but also giving much greater access to information and networks not available to other groups (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2015). This facilitates discussion and deliberation with third-party interests and is seen by many as corporatist (Christiansen et al., 2017; Christensen & Hesstvedt, 2019). Membership is generally in the gift of government – which may encourage those appointed to pull their punches, or policymakers and interest groups to compromise to protect their relationship. However, advisory committees generally offer advice rather than set policy, perhaps allowing them to be more outspoken.

Advisory committees and interest groups in Kenya

8In most countries, it is hard to identify all the committees created by government and, furthermore, they are generally hardly noticed (Brown, 2008). Kenya has a plethora of state-owned entities, including state corporations, state-owned enterprises, task forces, commissions, councils, and committees. State-owned entities are described in Kenya as ‘parastatal’ organisations. Officially, the government describes them as ‘state corporations’, though it, too, tends to refer to them as parastatals. They undertake activities on behalf of the state but outside direct Ministerial control. They are regulated by the State Corporations Act 1986, and oversight is provided by the State Corporations Advisory Committee (SCAC) and the Public Service Commission. Their responsibilities and specific powers were clarified in 2015 when the Government introduced a code of governance for state corporations known as Mwongozo, Swahili for guidelines (Government of Kenya, 2015).

9The Government classifies state corporations into eight groups: regulatory, financial, service, regional development authorities, public universities, other tertiary education, training and research, and state-owned enterprises. It is the first three that are of most interest in relation to regulation. Regulatory parastatals include the Anti-Counterfeit Authority, the Export Processing Zones Authority, the Tourism Regulatory Authority, the National Bureau of Standards, and the National Employment Authority.

10State corporations described as financial include the Kenya Revenue Authority and the National Hospitals Insurance Fund. Amongst those classified as service are the Kenya Medical Supplies Authority, the Kenya Rural Roads Authority, and the Kenya Urban Roads Authority. Whilst these may not have a direct role in reviewing or proposing regulation, they do implement regulation and are well placed to advise government on amending regulation. Other parastatals, such as the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, a research institute, can and do influence policy and regulation. Moreover, many parastatals set up their own sub-committees, specifically to offer policy advice.

11Tracking parastatals and advisory committees is not easy. Kenya has neither a national register of government committees nor a register of members. The High Court has identified 128 parastatals (Walter, 2021). The SCAC website lists 136 state corporations, covering not only parastatal corporations with regulatory responsibilities but also state-owned enterprises, universities, and training and research institutions, though it is not clear if it only lists those organisations for which they have oversight responsibility. The Public Service Performance Management and Monitoring Unit (2020) records 227 state corporations. It explicitly classifies 46 as having a regulatory function, but some of the others, especially those classified as financial or service, also advise on regulation. Altogether, there appear to be around 64 parastatals with a regulatory function (Irwin & Kyande, 2022). Some of these are created by legislation; others are simply created by administrative order.

12In addition to the parastatals, there is a myriad of committees created by government, all intended to offer policy advice. Whilst it is difficult to be precise about the number, it would seem to be well into the hundreds: Irwin & Kyande (2022) found interest groups with 101 representatives on government-appointed advisory committees related to business or the economy. The Kenya Gazette carries announcements of appointments to at least some government committees – a recent issue, for example, reported appointments to the National Council on the Administration of Justice Committee on Anti-Corruption of new members, including representatives of the Kenya Private Sector Association and the Law Society of Kenya (Kenya Gazette, 2022) – and, sometimes, announcements of new committees.

13Some committees are created for a short period and with a specific objective, such as the Competence Based Curriculum Taskforce and the Covid Taskforce; others have a much longer life expectancy. In Kenya, ‘long life’ advisory committees include the National Economics and Social Council, the National Trade Facilitation Committee, and the National Skills Development Policy Technical Committee, all of which can have private sector representatives, while there are also committees that are required to have private sector representation, such as the Labour Migration Advisory Committee and the Decent Work Committee.

14Business interest groups have been successful in securing reforms of public policy (BAF, 2020) and moderately successful in securing appointments to advisory committees and parastatal boards (Irwin & Kyande, 2022), with most boards of organisations with a regulatory function having at least one business association representative. Some (about a quarter) have a legal requirement for a business association to be represented (sometimes resulting from business association advocacy). For example, the Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE), as one of the social partners, participates in five regulatory parastatal boards, including the National Employment Authority and the National Industrial Training Authority. In other cases, business associations seek representation through competitive selection or simply through being appointed by the government. For example, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM), possibly Kenya’s most professional business association, has nominees on the Export Processing Zones Authority and the Scrap Metal Council, both of which have explicit regulatory functions. The Kenya Private Sector Association (KEPSA) sits on the Agriculture and Food Authority, the National Transport and Safety Authority, and the National Environment Council.

Research design

15If governments create advisory committees to focus knowledge, expertise, and opinion on particular policy questions, it is important that the committees work in way that is conducive to contribution, consideration, and deliberation. There may be a need for trade-offs and compromises; there will certainly be a need for reasoned argument in support of proposals. Scholars tend to assess the effectiveness of committees by reviewing outcomes, but there is limited research on the way that committees generate policy proposals and thus on the questions that it might be appropriate to ask. Since well-balanced committees provide a forum for dialogue, questions were based on principles recommended by the World Bank for the implementation of public-private dialogue mechanisms (Herzberg & Wright, 2006) and on the UK Cabinet Office’s (2017) principles of independence, purpose, governance, and transparency. This led to the preparation of a semi-structured questionnaire with 44 substantive questions, grouped into three broad categories of role and governance, credibility, and added value (see appendix).

16Advisory committees can deliver sound policy proposals (Rasmussen & Gross, 2014) but, to do so, they need to have a purpose that is clear and relevant to members and wider stakeholders (UK Cabinet Office 2017). They need to be balanced (Veit et al., 2017), transparent (Van Damme et al., 2011), and trustworthy (Lucassen & Schraagen, 2012). Members need to receive a fair hearing and, ideally, the committee needs to achieve consensus (Brown, 2008). This requires good governance, with clear ground rules and effective facilitation. These requirements have been categorised together as role and governance.

17For committees to make any significant difference, they need to be credible – in the eyes of all stakeholders – which, as Lucassen and Schraagen (2012) explain, requires the members to bring knowledge and expertise and the outputs to be perceived as trustworthy. Members need to be independent (Krick, 2015) and to be able to make a reasoned argument. Clearly, there is some overlap with governance – if a committee is not balanced and well-governed, it is unlikely to be credible – but the aim of these questions was to explore the work of the committee, whether members do in fact have (or are perceived to have) the necessary knowledge, whether members unite behind agreed positions, whether the committee communicates effectively (Crowley & Head, 2017; Van Damme et al., 2011) and whether the committee evaluates its own performance (Gregory & Lonti, 2008; Lucassen & Schraagen, 2012).

18Brown (2008) claims that advisory committees improve the quality of public policy but that policymakers will only take notice if they believe that the committee is credible (Lucassen & Schraagen, 2012) and its output is legitimate (Van Damme et al., 2011). It would be easy simply to explore impact – the extent of their influence on policy outcomes – but committee members may be seeking other benefits. From the perspective of an interest group, however, added value could come in two ways: being able to further their own regulatory reform agenda through influencing the policy proposals of the committee and being able to gather market intelligence to enable them to lobby through other channels.

19Interest group representatives were interviewed to assess their perceptions of the committees on which they sit. Internet searches and personal contact revealed board membership for 42 of the 64 parastatals with a regulatory function. Preliminary conversations with interest groups and their representatives revealed the existence of many of the advisory committees. Together, these enabled the preparation of a convenience sample, appropriate because the aim of this research was to identify representatives of interest groups on such committees and to explore their perceptions of effectiveness. We defined four groups: (a) regulatory bodies, that is parastatals that have, or appear to have, a function related to reviewing or reforming public policy or regulation; (b) non-regulatory bodies, that is parastatals where the primary role of the board is simply governance of the respective body; (c) policy advisory committees, which includes long-term committees appointed by government, short-term task forces, and other committees appointed by government and sub-committees of parastatals; and (d) other committees that do not appear to have any regulatory responsibility. Interviews were mostly undertaken by Zoom although some were face-to-face and generally lasted about an hour although some were much longer. Respondents were classified as representing a business association, a professional institution or a civil society organisation, or as independent members. A summary showing the type of interest group and the body on which they sit is provided in Table 1. Most respondents were representatives of business associations and most were members of regulatory parastatals or policy advisory committees.

Table 1. Profiles of respondents

Business association

Professional institution

Civil society organisation

Independent

Total

Regulatory

4

1

1

1

7

Governance

2

2

Advisory

14

1

2

17

Other

1

2

3

Total

18

3

5

3

29

Source: The authors

20Whilst the semi-structured nature of the interviews facilitated the gathering of considerable detail, answers have been treated as dichotomous – rather than asking respondents to score committees for performance – in order, as far as possible, to eliminate subjective assessments by respondents.

Interest group perceptions of policy advisory committees

21Respondents were appointed to their board or committee in different ways. In 13 cases (45%), the business association has an enshrined right to nominate a member to the committee (and, in one case, the business association has both its CEO and chair appointed to the committee); in eight cases (28%), the Cabinet Secretary made the appointment (though this might have followed a closed competition); in two cases, the parastatal invited nominations and then made the appointment; just four positions (14%) were subject to an open and competitive selection (typically with a press advertisement calling for nominations).

Role and governance

22Overall, some 93 per cent of respondents thought that the committee on which they sit had a clear purpose. In some cases, the purpose of the organisation was defined by law, as with the Micro and Small Enterprises Authority, the Seeds National Performance Trials Committee, and the Export Processing Zones Authority. For the rest, the purpose was generally defined by the parent Ministry. Almost every respondent (97%) thought that the purpose was relevant and adequate.

23Some four-fifths of respondents thought that their committee was transparent, open and fair, although it is possible that the answers to this question may be biased because respondents would not want to admit to a deficiency in transparency. This question, however, relates to the relationship of the board or committee to the members, rather than to the general public, since most committees are not known to the public and generally say little publicly about their work. A similar proportion thought that the rules or guidelines for the committee were clear. Many comments were very positive, such as “it is excellent; members are required to declare any interest” and “we are guided by clear requirements of SCAC and Mwongozo”. However, some respondents pointed to problems, including “there are many instances where members […] try to influence positions for various personal interests” and “sometimes management lobbies the members individually […] and this causes tension”.

24Whilst mutual trust amongst members is not a requirement, it certainly helps. Three-quarters of respondents perceived that committee members trusted each other. For example, KAM says of the Export Processing Zones Authority that “members all appear to trust each other with high levels of openness and transparency. There is a sense of teamwork as a result.” One committee, the Covid Taskforce, was perceived to be government-driven and to take a top-down approach, with one association asserting that “the voice of the healthcare professionals is not taken on board” and “political and business interests take priority”. Another respondent, on a different committee, observed that “there has been a lot of suspicion between the board and the management”. One respondent suggested that the board was not always transparent and commented that “there are instances where members (from both the private and public sectors) attempt to influence positions to serve their personal interests” and, perhaps as a result, “trust levels are low”. The Federation of Kenyan Employers (which, as one of the social partners, sits on committees with trades unions and government) explained encouragingly that “each party usually has its own position […] but we remain objective in our discussions so as to make the best decision for the country”.

25Four-fifths of respondents explained that any committee member could put an item on the agenda for discussion, as long as it fell within the committee’s remit, and indeed many had done so quite often.

26Some three-quarters of respondents thought that there was a balance between private and public representation, with comments such as “we have seven private sector representatives and five public sector representatives”, “the composition is aligned to the Mwongozo guidelines”, and “the private-public representation is well balanced; there is also a good mix of skills and expertise”. It seems, however, that no committee achieved a gender balance. The constitution says that “not more than two-thirds of the members of elective public bodies shall be of the same gender” (Republic of Kenya, 2010, p. 38). Whilst these boards and committees are not elected, and thus not in breach of the constitution, arguably they are in breach of the public policy principle. We recognise that the organisations nominating representatives will want to send the person they consider most suitable for the role. However, given that the government tends to have multiple representatives, it could be more proactive in seeking better gender balance.

27Encouragingly, some 86 per cent of respondents reported that they received a fair hearing. Typical responses of respondents on smaller committees included “discussions are open and everyone is allowed to give their input” and “all members are required to give their input on every agenda item under discussion”. Respondents on larger committees had a contrary perception: “it is difficult to receive a fair hearing due to the large number of members” and “the number of members is too large [60] to have a fruitful discussion”. One (female) respondent volunteered the view that women members were not given a fair hearing. Getting a fair hearing and being able to persuade other members of the committee are, of course, two different requirements, with one respondent lamenting that “we receive a fair hearing but our proposals go unimplemented”. There is a caveat here in that we cannot know whether this is because the government does not like the proposals or because the case for the proposals has not been made. However, reflecting the assertions of Dür and Mateo (2012), one respondent reported that “most of the committee members are from the public sector and they are not very well versed in matters relating to business development, so they rely on us for guidance”.

28One question reviewed the possible perception that government is seeking a pre-determined outcome. This did not seem to be the case, with 85 per cent of respondents claiming that the board or committee on which they sat was free to take decisions as they saw fit. KAM, for example, believed that the government did not generally seek to influence the policy outcomes of the committees on which it sat. One respondent, however, cited a recent tussle in which a Ministry was thought to be constraining the board of a parastatal and making it less effective.

29Brown argues that advisory committees should seek consensus and, if that is not possible, should articulate clearly the reasons for the opposing positions (2008, p. 548). It is no surprise, therefore, that 90 per cent of respondents said that decisions depended on debate and consensus. The chair of the Anti Counterfeit Authority (ACA) was perceived to be keen to achieve consensus on all decisions and “the rare contentious issues are generally resolved effectively and amicably”. If consensus cannot be reached, in a few cases committees vote but others set up sub-committees to deliberate further, or defer the discussion to allow for the gathering of further research evidence. The Inter-Agency Committee on National Wages, for example, does not vote: if they cannot reach consensus, then “the position of each of the social partners is recorded and is taken as a matter that requires further negotiation”. For one committee, decisions depend on the results of scientific trials so there is limited scope for debate.

30Some 86 per cent of respondents said that they were happy with the chair’s facilitation of meetings, with comments such as “the meetings are highly structured” and “leadership is by people with expertise in the field of the committees they chair”. One respondent was rather less positive, saying that the chair “lacks leadership and people skills”.

31Whilst there are clearly some challenges with some committees, most respondents were very positive about the role and governance of the committees and boards on which they sat, as demonstrated by the summary of results shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Making a difference

Figure 1. Making a difference

Source: The Authors

Credibility

32Three-quarters of respondents said that their committee met regularly, in most cases monthly, although meetings were disrupted by the Covid pandemic. About half of the respondents said that their committee occasionally invited expert witnesses, although most observed that the committee members were themselves supposed to be the experts. Indeed, some 90 per cent of respondents perceive that the committee members had sufficient knowledge and experience to be able to contribute meaningfully to committee deliberations, although one felt that “many members lack the requisite technical capacity, leading to irrelevant contributions”, whilst another lamented that 50 per cent of the committee members were not in touch with the market and therefore did not understand the challenges”. Some respondents, however, were extremely positive: one explained how board members were helped to broaden their knowledge so that the board had “a pool of diversified professionals”, whilst another stressed that they had “practitioners from the sector”. One respondent observed that good knowledge did not necessarily translate into meaningful contribution.

33Part of being credible is the ability of committee members to express themselves succinctly, logically, and persuasively. Some 83 per cent of respondents reported that committee members were able to do this. One respondent, reinforcing this need, reported that, with a large committee and limited time, members could only make brief comments – but then argued that the consequence was that they could not effectively express themselves. Overall, however, four-fifths of respondents thought that they were given enough time to communicate their issues and concerns.

34Three-quarters of the committees published reports of some sort, with 90 per cent of respondents perceiving these to be relevant and coherent. Some 86 per cent of respondents perceived that, after decisions were taken, committee members united behind the position although one did say “no, that is why we resort to lobbying”. Outputs vary from specific reports submitted to the Cabinet Secretary and specific proposals to amend regulation to annual reports. Some three-quarters of respondents perceived that these led to policy reform, although one respondent complained that “one of the core functions of the board is to develop, adopt and review policy, but none has been achieved so far”.

35Michalowitz (2007) claims that it is easier for interest groups to influence technical issues than political issues. Given that policy advisory committees are largely set up to review policy or regulation, rather than to debate the merits of the underlying policy, it is perhaps not surprising that there were no instances reported by respondents of major changes in policy. Rather, they focused on technical issues and, it seems, their proposals did often result in policy reform. The National Performance Trials Committee, for example, introduced a hybrid seed authorisation model which has reduced the lead time for the certification of new seed varieties. The Export Processing Zones Authority (EPZA) successfully advocated the reversal of a government policy causing disruption to the handling of cargo destined for Mombasa. At the Anti-Counterfeit Authority, KAM made proposals related to the protection of intellectual property rights. The agency took these up and developed regulations to combat counterfeits, now passed by parliament and implemented by the agency. The National Construction Authority influenced the local content requirements of the National Building Regulations. In some cases, the output of the committee is the policy. For example, standards prepared by Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) technical committees, once agreed by KEBS, become the new policy. The policy advisory committees that are not constituted as parastatals can only influence policy through the Cabinet Secretary or through public officials on the committee taking proposals back into the government’s policy formulation process. This does not stop them expecting their proposals to become policy: for example, the respondent describing the work of the committee on wages and remuneration policy explained that “the policy, once complete and adopted, will be in itself policy reform”.

36A closely related question addressed the issue of whether all committee members were regarded as credible by their own and other stakeholder groups. Some 90 per cent of respondents thought that all other committee members were credible. Two respondents suggested that representatives may be seen as credible by their nominating organisation but said that other stakeholders may not share this opinion or that their contributions were inadequate.

37Effective organisations periodically assess their own performance and seek ways to improve. Just over half the respondents perceived that the committee on which they sat made some attempt to evaluate its own performance. Those that do mainly rely on external assessment rather than self-assessment: the Ministry of Public Service evaluates the performance of state corporations annually (see, for example, Public Service Performance Management and Monitoring Unit, 2020) and the State Corporations Advisory Committee undertakes annual performance appraisals in which the performance of the board and of individual members is evaluated. Several respondents explained that their committee reported against its targets. Indeed, the respondents with a clear view equated hitting the agreed targets with effectiveness, although effectiveness covers a host of other aspects as well. The Kenya Industrial Property Institute requires its audit committee, inter alia, to assess organisational and board processes. The National Accelerated Agricultural Input Programme committee undertakes field visits to assess effectiveness. The EPZA perhaps offers a good model: it has an annual peer review where the board members and chairs of committees assess each other on effectiveness in service delivery and the implementation of action points. Some committees do not even monitor whether their proposals make any difference: responses included “no mechanism in place” and “we have no way of monitoring”. Most committees make some effort: “there is continuous monitoring and evaluation”, “the board receives reports from the management on the implementation”, “the board tracks its activities and gives a report every quarter”, and “we conduct quarterly reviews”.

38With the exception of self-evaluation, respondents generally felt that their committee and its work were credible, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Role & governance

Figure 2. Role & governance

Source: The Authors

Added value

39Interest groups claim that their participation enables them to gather intelligence about proposals for reform and to be in a position to influence committee outcomes. Some 93 per cent of respondents say that they are able to use knowledge gained from participation to provide feedback to their association on current issues and policy debates. It seems, however, that only the Agricultural Council of Kenya (ACK) and KAM have formal mechanisms to capture learning. ACK requires its representatives to complete ‘back to office’ reports, while KAM collates feedback, which it refers to the relevant internal committee, and the KAM board receives reports. Just one respondent felt unable to share information with their association – on the grounds of confidentiality – although another responded that “I do not present the interests of […] at the board. It is made clear during induction that non-state actors should not bring the interests of their nominating bodies to the board but rather serve the interests of the nation”.

40Some 97 per cent of respondents stated that they were able to provide feedback to their associations on issues likely to arise in the future. One respondent explained that “this helps us in shaping our policy agenda”. The approach of one respondent is to work through the committee: “our strategy is to contribute to the policy agenda and shape the policy debate at the board – we therefore utilise advance intelligence to help us prepare adequately”. Others expect to lobby outside the committee as well: “I advise the leadership […] on potential issues to enable them to prepare adequately to engage the relevant government authorities”. One explained that “this is one of the main reasons we sit on these boards”. Two-thirds of respondents said that their associations used the information gleaned from committee participation as a pretext for preparing a policy position, although often any advocacy was taken up outside the committee.

41It is easy for associations to go to meetings and be negative about proposals tabled by others without necessarily making alternative suggestions. Many of the associations interviewed clearly aim to make a positive contribution. Kenya Medical Association, for example, has set up standing committees to discuss and debate the themes and issues taken up by the Covid taskforce and to ensure that their representative feels properly briefed before he participates. KAM takes very seriously its membership of government committees. For example, EPZA is always on the KAM board agenda. KAM also reaches out to other stakeholders to seek their views on issues. KAM’s strategy is to contribute to the policy agenda and to aim to shape the policy debate. For ACA, KAM’s policy team reviews each agenda and supporting papers prior to ACA discussions. As with EPZA, it meets stakeholders to seek their views on important issues. KAM perceives that the ACA board takes notice of the representation of the private sector and appreciates KAM’s contribution. At least one of the independent members liaises closely with the association for which he works, discussing issues and advising them on which government agencies to engage. It is important that people are properly briefed before going to meetings, especially if they wish to look credible. Many of the representatives seek views and research evidence from their interest group: “it is always important to gather views of association members” was a typical response. Some associations go further than seeking members’ views or sharing research and prepare policy briefs. Overall, 90 per cent of respondents claimed that they were able to utilise objective and comprehensive evidence to support their positions.

42The ideal position, as promoted by the Council of Europe (undated), is for collaboration between government and interest groups to develop public policy. Appointing interest group representatives to government committees and task forces is clearly a step in that direction. However, it requires that all the members of the committees then collaborate as well. One respondent thought there was limited collaboration “due to the different agendas and conflicts of interest”, and another explained that there was a lack of collaboration due to members being “drawn from various institutions and busy”. Positively, however, four-fifths of respondents felt that there was effective collaboration amongst committee members, even though one tempered their response, saying “there is still a lot of room and scope for improvement”.

43KAM respondents, referring to the EPZA, observed that collaboration “is encouraged by the SCAC guidelines on objectivity and fairness”; referring to the Anti-Counterfeit Authority, one said that “we are players in the same sectors so we engage quite effectively”; and, with reference to the Anti-illicit Trade Multi Agency Committee, one explained that “there is a sense of teamwork between ourselves and the other members, including the public sector”. This last respondent continued by saying that they aimed to engage through boardroom discussion, rather than going to the media, through ensuring professional engagement and communication and being respectful of other points of view, through offering solutions, and through trying to build lasting relationships. Perhaps the key lesson here is that collaboration requires all parties to want to collaborate and that a positive approach by an association can go a long way to encouraging others to collaborate effectively.

44A key question covered the perception of whether the committee as a whole took any notice of interest group views. Here, somewhat at odds with perceptions of whether decisions depended on consensus, the response was decidedly mixed with just two-thirds believing this to be the case: “the public sector seems to carry the day most of the time; they do not fully appreciate the role of the private sector in public policy formulation” and “the private sector is recognised but our issues are not addressed […] making the committee ineffective in delivering its mandate”. Others, however, were very positive: “the board takes note of the representation of, and contributions by, the private sector”; “this committee was born out of the collaboration between the private and public sectors and it is a win for both”; “the committee recognises and appreciates the contribution of the private sector”; “our voice is always heard and respected”.

45The Kenya Medical Association perceives that it has influenced policy decisions on human resource issues for healthcare workers, on the quality and cost of PPE, on vaccines for healthcare workers, on providing vaccinations free of charge (the government had initially intended to charge a fee), and on isolation facilities. KAM claims that it influenced the EPZA board in relation to the policy that was disrupting the movement of cargo. It perceives that it has shaped “key policy directions […including] policy around competitiveness, incentives, taxation, offloading to local markets, and establishment of new zones”. They note that their “members operating within the EPZs have registered satisfaction with our presentation of the issues affecting them”.

46The Inter Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) claimed to have made an important difference to one committee in that they influenced the decision to have the junior secondary level domiciled at secondary schools instead of at primary schools, as had been previously suggested (although the new government has now reversed this decision and formed a new task force). Responses included “yes, we have made a difference to the extent that the PS requests our participation in key meetings”, “we have influenced policy reform regarding the branding of seeds […] and this has reduced the cases of counterfeit products”, “I have made a difference and that is most likely why I have recently been reappointed to the board”, and “the committee always seeks my opinion before any decision on a proposal is passed”.

47Interviews with both the business association and civil society organisation representatives on the KEBS Road Vehicles Technical Committee allow for some comparison in approach. Both the Kenya Motor Repairers’ Association (KEMRA) and the Consumer Downtown Association (CDA) believe that it has made it easier to campaign on issues of concern, but our perception is that the KEMRA representative, who also owns a garage and is thus effectively regulated by the committee, is better placed to advocate reform through the discussions in which the committee engages, whereas the CDA representative, who is very good at making technical contributions, is less effective at influencing his colleagues and instead relies on his CEO to lobby externally.

48The Architectural Association made two interesting observations: that associations should be strategic about the contributions they make in committees since their presence is supposed to add value; and that associations should have clear expectations on what they hope to achieve through their participation. They would then be in a better position to measure the effectiveness of this participation.

49Respondents were asked to reflect on whether membership of the committee made it harder or easier to campaign on issues of concern. Some 88 per cent felt that it was easier: “it makes it easier; although there are certain ground rules at the committee, they do not stop one from expressing what is best for both the private and the public sectors”; “the committee membership has made it easier to campaign on issues of concern to our organisation; a good number of committee members are from the private sector and we have common interests”. A minority of respondents felt that it was harder: “the board [requires] members not to bring issues of the private sector into meetings as it is perceived as a conflict of interest”. The balance is perhaps best summed up by the respondent who explained that, “although my main agenda at the board is to serve national interests and not the interests of my constituency, it is a bonus […] to have me there since I am able to keep them well informed of the policy issues that may affect them and this enables them to prepare adequately and engage the government in a timely manner”.

50IRCK explained that the experience and knowledge gained through participating in the Curriculum Taskforce, together with views gathered from Christian-based organisations and the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, has helped it to develop considered policy positions. Moreover, the experience gained by the IRCK representative has empowered him to engage with government on policy issues and he thinks that he can now do this more effectively.

51A pertinent question to consider is whether interest groups that participate in task forces and on boards become less likely to keep government accountable. In the case of IRCK, they believe that participation has made it easier to deliver their mandate to enhance societal values and parental responsibility in the lives of children.

“Rather than feeling hampered by being a member of the Council, […] perceives that it is now easier as he can influence dialogue between […] and […] members and have issues escalated for discussion at the Council”.

52The responses to these last questions are summarised in Figure 3. This demonstrates the apparent mismatch between members making persuasive contributions and the committee taking notice of those views.

Figure 3. Credibility

Figure 3. Credibility

Source: The Authors

Conclusions

53Kenya is neither unusual in making extensive use of policy advisory committees nor in inviting interest group representation. Interest groups appear to adopt similar strategies to those in more developed countries. The results should therefore be generalisable, at least to non-authoritarian regimes. There are some limitations, however, not least the fact that interest groups are effectively assessing their own performance. There are some instances where associations could be regarded as making limited use of their involvement, but this research demonstrates that interest group representatives are generally very positive about the committees on which they sit: they perceive that their participation contributes to the quality of the decision-making and provides intelligence for their work outside the committees. In turn, this explains why interest groups are so keen to secure representation.

54The clear sense from the responses is that most policy advisory committees in Kenya reflect the ideals of Krick and Holst (2021). There is some level of patronage in the appointment of members but most respondents perceived that the committees on which they sat made a difference. There was no perception that their raison d’être was simply to give the illusion of action; rather, they believed that the committees brought together experts and practitioners to deliberate on policy issues. Overall, respondents were positive about the role and governance of committees, about the credibility of the members, and about their perceived contributions to informed decision-making and better regulation. Committees provide an opportunity for interest groups to share evidence with public officials, in line with resource exchange expectations (Rasmussen & Gross, 2014). Committees are perceived by business associations to be able to take their own decisions rather than jump to the government tune. They perform valuable functions, not only through involving interest groups in contributing to policy formulation but also by providing interest groups with advance intelligence about current and future policy issues, allowing them time to gather evidence and views and to prepare responses. It is clear that interest groups see membership of committees as just one means of pursuing their advocacy, one that helps to ensure that they are well-informed. However, they also continue to use other means.

55There are perhaps three areas where government could do more to improve the effectiveness of policy advisory committees. First, whilst there is always a temptation to involve ‘every’ stakeholder on a committee, this may not be the most effective way. In the UK, the average membership of an advisory committee is 11 (Cabinet Office, 2017). Whilst we did not specifically gather data on the size of Kenyan policy advisory committees, there is evidence from the interviews that larger committees are less balanced and less deliberative and that smaller groups are more cohesive, more collaborative, and more likely to draw reasoned conclusions from their deliberation, leading to a greater likelihood of proposing well-considered public policy.

56Second, many respondents explained that the boards on which they sat were governed by Mwongozo which states, inter alia, that “board members nominated by stakeholders should recognise that they owe their duties to the organisation and not their nominating authority” (Government of Kenya 2015, p. 11). There is thus a perception amongst some representatives that this prevents them from engaging in proper debate or raising issues related to specific sectors. Not only does this not square with the President’s foreword to Mwongozo, but it is also the case that a member’s duty to a board is to raise difficult issues, to share contradictory evidence, to introduce alternative policy solutions, and to ensure that there is full and open debate. We argue that these are not mutually incompatible: indeed, it is precisely through representing broad-based interests that members bring the knowledge and experience required to ensure that the board considers all evidence and all viewpoints. Without such debate, there can be no certainty that the optimal solution, balancing the interests of all stakeholders, “making the best decision for the country” in the words of one respondent, has been attained. Once a solution has been agreed, it is then a collective duty of the members of the board to promote that solution and the reasons for it. If a member really feels that the solution is unacceptable, then that member can easily resign from the board and lobby for change from outside. The Mwongozo requirements are generally very good and most of the principles could be applied to any other task force or committee convened by the government. This would have the advantage that all government committees were then governed by the same principles and requirements.

57Third, government could be more open about the existence of its boards and policy advisory committees. There is no suggestion that these are deliberately hidden from view and in many cases their creation and the appointment of members is publicised in the Kenya Gazette. However, there is no single register or directory that would make it easier for interest groups and citizens to keep track. Government could also insist that every board and committee should publish an annual report, made available publicly, which focuses on impact and added value rather than on activity.

58One complaint of interest groups is reflected in their perception that their views are often ignored. This could, indeed, be because the public officials and policymakers simply reject their stance, or it could be because they have neither the evidence nor the argumentation to persuade the government otherwise. Interest groups could all approach participation as professionally and seriously as KAM and KMA and this would almost certainly improve the effectiveness of advisory committees.

59This initial research suggests several areas that would be worthy of further study: first, assessing whether policy advisory committees succeed in changing public policy; and, second, exploring public sector members’ perceptions of interest groups’ credibility, preparation, and contribution.

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Appendix

Interview questions

Role & governance

Role in interest group

On which committee(s) do you sit

Does the organisation or committee have a clear purpose?

Describe the purpose and the policy areas that are covered?

Is the purpose relevant and adequate?

Is the board or committee perceived to be transparent, open and fair?

Do participants appear to trust each other?

Can anyone put an item on the agenda for discussion?

How often have you been able to put policy issues on the committee agenda?

Do decisions depend on debate and consensus?

What happens where there is no consensus? Do you vote?

Are there rules or guidelines for participation?

How were you appointed to the committee?

Credibility

Do you perceive that membership is balanced (for example, public/ private, sectorally, geographically, by gender)?

Do you perceive that you receive a fair hearing?

Or does it appear that the government is seeking a pre-determined outcome?

Is there any form of ToR for the facilitator?

Are you satisfied with the approach and performance of the facilitator?

Does the committee meet regularly?

Does the committee invite expert witnesses?

Does the committee publish report and proposals?

If yes, do you perceive reports and proposals to be relevant and coherent

Do participants unite behind agreed positions of the committee?

Do outputs (ie, reports and proposals) lead to policy reforms?

Do you perceive that the timeliness of communications (including agendas, items for discussion, etc) to members is adequate (ie, do you have enough time to prepare for meetings?)

Do you perceive that communications to external stakeholders are adequate and of suitable quality

Does the committee seek to monitor its own effectiveness?

Does the committee publish reports on its activities?

How does the committee monitor the implementation of their reports and proposals?

Do committee members have sufficient knowledge and experience to be able to contribute meaningfully?

Are members regarded as credible by their own, and other, stakeholder groups?

Are members able to set clear objectives for meetings?

Added value

Do you use discussions and knowledge gained at the committee to feedback on current issues and policy debates

Do you use discussions and knowledge gained at the committee to feedback ‘advance intelligence’ about potential issues and policy debates

When you have advance notice of discussions, how do you prepare?

Do you seek to gather views of (a) your association, perhaps through its policy committee, (b) your association members, (c) other associations?

Do you gather or commission research evidence? How?

Does the association support you, for example, by preparing a policy position on the topic?

Are you able to utilise objective and comprehensive evidence to support your positions?

Do members of the committee engage effectively & collaborate with one another?

Does that engagement continue outside of committee meetings?

Are members able to express themselves succinctly, logically and persuasively at committee meetings?

Does the committee allow you enough time to communicate your issues and concerns?

Do you perceive that the committee takes notice of private sector representation? Or do you feel overawed by the public sector representatives?

Do you feel that you have made a difference to the performance of the committee. If so, how? Please describe examples where you have been successful in influencing a policy debate within the committee. And provide examples of where that has subsequently led to reform of public policy.

Do you feel that membership of the committee makes it harder or easier for you to campaign on issues of concern to your organisation? Please explain

Committees and interest group of respondents

Committee

Description

Respondent interest group

Anti-Counterfeit Authority

PS, board, reg

Kenya Association of Manufacturers

BA

Anti-Illicit Trade Multi-Agency Team

pac

Kenya Association of Manufacturers

BA

Bus Rapid Transit Project Implementation Team

TF, pac

Kenya Private Sector Association

BA

Export Processing Zones Authority

PS, board, reg

Kenya Association of Manufacturers

BA

Inter-Agency Committee on the Development of a National Wages and Remuneration Policy

pac

Federation of Kenya Employers

BA

Kenya Bureau of Standards: Food and Nutrition Technical Committee

PS, s/c, pac

Consumer Downtown Association

CSO

Kenya Bureau of Standards: Road Vehicles Technical Committee

PS, s/c, pac

Kenya Motor Repairers’ Association

BA

Kenya Bureau of Standards: Road Vehicles Technical Committee

PS, s/c, pac

Kenya Motor Repairers’ Association

BA

Kenya Bureau of Standards: Standards Development Technical Committee

PS, s/c, pac

Kenya Association of Manufacturers

BA

Kenya Industrial Property Institute

PS, board, reg

Kenya Association of Manufacturers

BA

Maseno University Council

PS, board, gov

Independent

Ind

Micro and Small Enterprises Authority

PS, board, reg

Kenya National Federation of Jua Kali Associations

BA

Ministry of Agriculture: Agricultural Sector Development Support Program

pac

Agriculture Council of Kenya

BA

Ministry of Agriculture: National Performance Trials Committee

pac

Seed Traders’ Association of Kenya

BA

Ministry of Agriculture: Seed Regulation Committee

pac

Seed Traders’ Association of Kenya

BA

Ministry of Education: Competence Based Curriculum Taskforce

TF, aoc

Inter-Religious Council of Kenya

CSO

Ministry of Health: Covid Taskforce

TF, pac

Kenya Medical Association

PI

Ministry of Health: Covid Prevention – Education sub-committee

aoc

Evangelical Alliance of Kenya

CSO

Ministry of Health: Family Planning Training Coordination Committee

aoc

Pharmaceutical Society of Kenya

PI

National Accelerated Agricultural Input Access Program Committee

pac

Agriculture Council of Kenya

BA

National Construction Research Agenda Committee

pac

Kenya Property Developers’ Association

BA

National Construction Authority

PS, board, reg

Architectural Association of Kenya

PI

National Hospital Insurance Fund

PS, board, reg

Kenya Faith-based Health Services Consortium

CSO

National Standards Council

PS, board, reg

East African Shippers’ Council

Ind*

National Tourism and Hospitality Protocols Taskforce

TF, pac

Retail Traders’ Association of Kenya

BA

National Trade Facilitation Committee

pac

East African Tea Trade Association

BA

Retail Trade Committee

pac

Association of Kenya Suppliers

BA

Retail Trade Dispute Settlement Committee

pac

Association of Kenya Suppliers

BA

Tourism Fund

PS board, gov

Kenya Tourism Fund

Ind*

Key: aoc: any other committee; TF: PS: Parastatal; s/c: sub committee; Task Force; pac: policy advisory committee; gov: governance; reg: regulatory; BA: business association; PI: professional institution; CSO: civil society organisation; Ind: Independent.

* Whilst these members have been appointed as independent members, they are also senior managers in business associations

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List of illustrations

Title Figure 1. Making a difference
Credits Source: The Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/3175/img-1.png
File image/png, 23k
Title Figure 2. Role & governance
Credits Source: The Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/3175/img-2.png
File image/png, 40k
Title Figure 3. Credibility
Credits Source: The Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/3175/img-3.png
File image/png, 22k
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References

Bibliographical reference

David Irwin and Mercy Kyande, Policy advisory committees in Kenya: interest group participation and effectivenessInternational Review of Public Policy, 5:1 | 2023, 5-25.

Electronic reference

David Irwin and Mercy Kyande, Policy advisory committees in Kenya: interest group participation and effectivenessInternational Review of Public Policy [Online], 5:1 | 2023, Online since 01 April 2023, connection on 21 June 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/3175; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.3175

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About the authors

David Irwin

Visiting Fellow, Newcastle University, United Kingdom

Mercy Kyande

Zubi Consulting, Nairobi, Kenya

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Copyright

CC-BY-4.0

The text only may be used under licence CC BY 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

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