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Nuclear Power in Britain: A series of successful failures

Keith Baker
p. 26-43

Abstract

Britain’s efforts to promote nuclear power represent successful failures. A successful failure is a policy program that achieves some progress or delivers short-term success but ultimately fails to deliver upon its original objectives. Britain’s various nuclear power programs did deliver some limited success but often fell short of key objectives overall and incurred massive cost overruns. It is shown that government interventions often prevented outright failure, but these interventions were made necessary due to the unintended consequences of prior decisions. It is concluded that government creates the conditions that increase the risk of policy failure but through intervention, government can forestall outright failure to create a successful failure.

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Errata

The article by Keith Baker, Nuclear Power in Britain: A series of successful failures published in 2023 contains an error on page 34. The figure quoted for the 2023 dollar value of the cost of Sizewell B should be around $6.2bn (2023). The author profoundly apologizes for this error but states that they stand by the arguments and conclusions of the manuscript, which remain unaffected. The author wishes to thank Nihal Menezes of the University of Sheffield, UK for noticing the mistake.

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Funding information: The initial research that informed this paper was funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (grant number EP/F001444/1). The views expressed in the article are those of the author alone.

Introduction

1Successive British governments have sought to develop and promote nuclear power. Britain’s nuclear power programs were technically problematic, prone to cost overruns, and uneconomical from the very beginning. However, political enthusiasm for nuclear power persisted across multiple decades and across governments of different ideological hues. Nuclear power still exercises a hold on British policy makers as the current British government continues to argue for the installation of up to 24,000 Megawatts (MWe) of new capacity (HM Government, 2022). In the language of historical institutionalism, support for nuclear power is ‘stickly.’

2Public policy has long been concerned with understanding failure as many policies often fall short of their intended goals and do so at considerable expense. Moreover, such failures are often dramatic and very public. An important theoretical concept in the study of failure is the notion of a successful failure; a policy that persists or is portrayed as a success despite a track record of underperformance or an unfavourable cost/benefit ratio (Seibel, 1996; Andrews, 2021). In public policy, government is not a passive bystander and often intervenes in policy implementation or mandates changes in policy direction. As such, government interventions may produce a successful failure by forestalling outright failure. To explore this, an in-depth account of Britain’s nuclear power programs since the 1950s is presented. Although a single example cannot claim the explanatory power of multi-case research, it can provide an explanation that pays attention to the details. This is opposed to recent multiple case research (such as Compton et al., 2019) where reductive statistical analysis is used.

3The persistence of nuclear power in Britain is also theoretically interesting because British politicians have historically shown themselves able to abandon large and prestigious projects when they perceived that there were alternatives. For example, the Blue Streak missile system was scrapped in 1960 in favour of developing manned bombers and the Anglo-US Skybolt system (Moore, 2013). Nuclear power is not the only way to generate electricity and is a matter of considerable public concern.

4Aside from this introduction, this article has five sections. The first will consider the notion of policy failure and the concept of successful failure. The second will introduce the idea of historical institutionalism to complement the discussion of successful failure. The third section will explain why nuclear power in Britain offers insights into how government may create successful failures and presents the methodology used for document collection and analysis. The fourth section will present an account of Britain’s nuclear power programs whilst the fifth and final section will offer a discussion on the case and a commentary on successful failure.

Policy Failure

5Failed policies attract considerable attention, but failure is an ill-defined and contested concept (Bovens & t’Hart, 2016) and definitions of failure often depend on ideological predispositions rather than on a rational consideration of a policy’s actual record (Butler et al., 2017). This is not dissimilar to McConnell’s (2010) understanding of success in which policy success is characterised by the absence of serious criticism in addition to achieving the stated goals. For McConnell, the ability to critically assess a policy depends heavily on how the evaluative criteria are defined. This inherent subjectivity led Mueller (2020, p. 312) to comment that “…it is hard to even define what is a policy failure.” Mueller goes on to observe “…in many cases, it is not so clear whether the policy has rightly failed. Many policies have different dimensions.” McConnell (2010) would agree and comments that success and failure in policy programs often falls into a ‘grey area…’. Building on these discussions, Compton et al. (2019) argue that policy success occurs when a policy that sustains performance over time, despite changes in circumstance and failure, would be characterised by the opposite. Following these arguments, a policy failure is simply a policy that does not achieve its stated goals or delivers little or no performance across multiple criteria, and is often contested.

6This distinction between successes and failures is compounded by polices that endure or are sustained by policy makers yet deliver very little or produce results at vast expense when cheaper alternatives exist. Seibel (1996) describes such policies as successful failures (see also Andrews, 2021). Andrews (2021) claims that successful failures are characterised by the delivery of short-term benefits, which explains their endurance but have limited impact over the longer term and fail to address the ‘focal problem’ that they were created to solve. Seibel also suggests that in a successful failure, political principals are concerned with symbolism rather than actual achievement and this symbolism can often limit criticism of the policy.

7The focus on short term benefits or gains at the expense of a wider analysis into the actual outcomes or performance has echoes of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) in that decision makers may become overly focused on sunk costs and on the possibility of loss. This encourages politicians to remain committed or to ‘double down’ on a project or agenda. Likewise, Staw (1981) suggests that politicians can become committed to a project if they fear that they will be held accountable for its failure (loss adverse). Commitment may also be maintained if a project appears to have delivered previous success as the possibility of future success is given disproportionate weight (Staw & Ross, 1978). However, sunk cost fallacies should not be given too much explanatory weight as Boehne and Paese (2000) indicate that sustained commitment is often due to a desire to see the project completed or an agenda ultimately realised. Some support for this comes from a meta-analysis by Sleeesman et al. (2012) who find that considerations of sunk costs play a minor role in the decision to escalate commitment. Interestingly, Sleesman and his colleagues also note that people are as likely to become committed to the agendas and decisions of others as they are to their own.

8In recent work, Luetjens (2022) argued that policies require upkeep or maintenance and it is this continued engagement by policy makers that allows a policy to endure or persist. Luetjens indicates that politicians are engaged policy actors and will intervene in response to circumstances. However, these interventions may not simply be the necessary ‘upkeep’ of a successful policy but may be ad-hoc interventions designed to arrest problems. To follow Luetjens analogy of housekeeping, politicians are not routinely replacing damaged pickets but are frantically nailing in new boards when the fence is in danger of collapse. Taken together, these arguments suggest that policy programs can persist if decision makers see a possibility of overall success or continue to derive benefits, and that policy makers will intervene in an attempt to forestall problems rather than abandon a failing program.

9To explain why policy is designed and implemented in a particular way, and how the possibility of policy failure is made more likely by the design of the policy itself, it is necessary to turn to the concept of historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism draws attention to the role of path dependency and the interaction of circumstances and socio-cultural context in explaining policy decisions.

Historical Institutionalism

10Historical institutionalism argues that policy-makers are strategic actors whose efforts to advance their policy preferences follow from the organisational and socio-cultural context in which they are embedded. Institutions are understood as the normative pressures that govern behaviour in social situations and the configuration of legislative or organisational rules, and distributions of resources that shape behaviour. Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 940) state that: “Historical institutionalists are eclectic; they use both of these approaches to specify the relationship between institutions and action.” Individuals are also subject to the limitations and possibilities imposed by resource allocations, technological and physical constraints, path dependency, and the consequences (both intended and unintended) of their actions and the actions of others (Streeck & Thelen, 2005).

11A key argument of historical institutionalism is that policies can become ‘sticky’ if they appear to be successful in the short term. Peters (2012, p. 71) notes that once a policy program “…has been shown to produce some positive results it will dominate other solutions…” regardless of the superiority of possible alternatives, which may have a greater chance of achieving the stated goals overall. This aspect of historical institutionalism is consistent with Andrews’ (2021) claim that successful failures are characterised by low level or limited success that promises longer term success overall, and Seibel’s (1996) observation about the persistence of policies and organisations. Critically, this also explains the persistence of low performing organisations or policies as it may take a significant event to disrupt path-dependent processes. Historical institutionalism, therefore, tends towards the stability of policies, but there may be change if a dramatic failure occurs when a particular ‘path’ is discredited and alternative options begin to be considered.

12It is now possible to state the central argument of this manuscript: Britain’s nuclear power programs persisted and became successful failures because they made enough progress to promote the belief that government intervention in the now would ultimately lead to an unqualified success. The next section of the paper discusses how Britain’s efforts to promote nuclear power can serve to examine successful failure.

Data Collection and Analysis

13The analysis focused on Command (White) Papers that detail the formal policy agenda, parliamentary debates and statements, evidence to select committees, and cabinet or departmental minutes and policy documents. White papers and parliamentary debates were located through the UK Parliamentary archive, Hansard, and the UK National Archives. The UK National Archives website, the UK Parliamentary archive, and Hansard were searched for documents containing the terms “nuclear” or “atomic” but with a focus on electricity generation. Documents were then reviewed. Recent policy documents were located on the websites of the relevant Department or government archives. Britain’s nuclear regulators were excluded from consideration as they deal with safety matters. In addition, the document search was supplemented by a review of secondary literature to identify additional documents, specific parliamentary debates or Committee hearings, external events, and to provide information on the institutional context.

14The list of documents was then examined to exclude technical and research documents, and documents on radiological safety, planning applications, and material relating to international agencies. A document or parliamentary debate was deemed to be policy relevant if it specified or helped to shape the objectives, modes of implementation, or the evaluative criteria of a nuclear power program. It must be noted, however, that decisions regarding Britain’s coal industry could be considered relevant as the two technologies complete with each other, as they are both designed to generate ‘baseload electricity.’. In order to simplify the analysis, a document had to address nuclear power as its primary subject.

15Document analysis was based on inductive process tracing, which is effective when there are complex sequences of events that are sensitive to institutional context and the aim of the study is to develop new explanations (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 7). To conduct the process trace, each policy decision regarding Britain’s nuclear power program(s) and the associated criteria for success was identified in the various white papers and policy memoranda. The institutional and path dependent factors that shaped this decision were then determined. The sequence of events over the policy’s lifecycle was then traced to establish the directionality of the policy – whether the policy was succeeding or failing. The various interventions made by British governments were then mapped onto the process to determine how they changed or failed to change overall performance and how they created the context in which the next set of decisions were taken. The results of this analysis are presented in the following section.

Nuclear power in Britain: A succession of successful failures

16British politicians had recognised as early as 1945 that nuclear technology had both civil and military applications but prioritised the weapons program. A Prime Ministerial memo notes that Britain was “…naturally interested in the development of atomic energy, both as a means of self-defence, and as a source of industrial power.” (Cabinet Office, 1945, p. 4.) [emphasis added]. The first civil nuclear reactors in Britain were gas-cooled, graphite moderated reactors, which were known as Magnox reactors after the Magnesium Oxide used to clad their fuel canisters. The reactors were a development of the reactors used to produce plutonium for the weapons program. Following the successful conclusion of the weapons program, Britain’s nuclear efforts were divided between civilian power technology and weapons production. In 1954, responsibility for reactor design, development, and fuel production was transferred to the newly created UK Atomic Energy Authority [UKAEA] under the UK Atomic Energy Authority Act 1954 c 32. The principal task of the UKAEA was to support an emergent power program.

A program of nuclear power

17The British government approved the construction of four civil power Magnox reactors at Calder Hall in 1952. The first reactor at Calder Hall was connected to the grid in 1956 and by 1959, Calder Hall operated four reactors with a total output of some 196 MWe. Calder Hall was understood as technical demonstration rather than as part of an integrated nuclear power program – a point acknowledged by Aubrey Jones, the then Minister of Fuel and Power: “[T]he scheme did not have to be fitted into an elaborate national plan of power stations.” (HCD 562, 1956). This allowed the cost over-runs and the unfavourable economics of the station to be ignored in the name of demonstrating that the technology could work (Scott, 1979).

18The first program of nuclear power was announced in 1955 with the publication of the White Paper ‘A Programme of Nuclear Power’ (Ministry of Fuel and Power [MoFP], 1955). The program had three key objectives: to provide a market for British designed nuclear reactors, to support an eventual nuclear export industry, and to ensure security of cost-effective energy supplies by reducing the demand for coal, which was in short supply. The shortfall of coal was due to underinvestment in the coal mining industry in the 1940s. The first and second objectives are interlinked, and the 1955 White Paper is clear that the building of nuclear power plants was to be carried out by “…private industry for the electricity authorities” (p. 5). This would serve to develop the expertise that would provide “….the necessary foundation for a big expansion in the later stages of the programme.” (p. 6) and to “…look forward also to the time when a valuable export trade can be built up”. Investment in nuclear technology and expertise would allow Britain to “…fulfil our traditional role as an exporter of skill, to the benefit both of ourselves and of the rest of the world” (p. 9). It was proposed to install some 16 reactor units in four tranches between 1956 and 1964 to add some 1,500 – 2,000 MWe of additional capacity (Ministry of Fuel and Power [MoFP], 1955, p. 6).

19However, if nuclear power was to deliver cost-effective energy supplies, its generating costs had to be below that of coal. A peculiarity of nuclear power is that the generating costs of a nuclear power plant are a function of its capital costs. Consequently, the viability of nuclear power is very sensitive to construction cost over-runs. The 1955 White Paper acknowledges that nuclear power was not cost competitive with coal. To address this, the first reactors would receive credit for the plutonium they produced to lower the “…net running cost for the early reactors…” This came at the cost of imposing a “…heavier capital charge on to the later ones”, which – it was speculated – would be overcome if the newer reactors had a much higher efficiency (p. 4) so as to lower their operating costs. It was demanded that the total output of the first eight reactors should be between 400 and 800 MWe. The remaining 1,100 – 1,200 MWe of capacity was to be delivered by the final eight reactors. This required continuous technological improvement. It is worth noting that the 1955 White Paper was highly speculative and was driven by futuristic visions.

20The nuclear power program was expanded to 5000 – 6000 MWe in 1957 (Ministry of Power [MoP], 1957). This expansion was consistent with the legislative demand made in the 1955 White paper for growth in the latter stage of the program (p. 6) but was also due to the fiscal and energy crisis that resulted from the economic fallout of British and French efforts to occupy the Suez Canal in 1956. Britain’s economic situation had deteriorated, and this made it expensive to import coal and oil. Following the completion of Calder Hall, the UKAEA was claiming that technological advances would allow nuclear power to become cost competitive with coal by 1965 (HCD 569, 1957). This claim relied on the speculative assertion that coal prices would remain stable, that construction costs of nuclear power plants would decline, and that the reactors themselves would become more powerful. In 1960, the Magnox program was extended to 1968 but the actual level of installed capacity was reduced to 5000MWe (MoP, 1960). This retrenchment was due to concerns over the viability of nuclear power in the face of falling coal prices and construction cost overruns and delays within the nuclear power program. Nuclear power had failed to live up to the optimism of its early advocates. The then Minister of Power explained: “…the point at which nuclear power generation breaks even with conventional power generation will be rather further in the future than was first expected.” (HCD 627, 1960). It should also be noted that in expanding and then extending the programme, the British government ensured that its domestic construction industry had sufficient work.

21The first program of nuclear power concluded in 1968 with some 3840 MWe of capacity installed. Although this was less than the anticipated 5000 MWe, the output of the Magnox design more than doubled between 1956 and 1964 (60 MWe increasing to 173 MWe) and by 1966, the latest Magnox reactors were producing around 245 MWe of power. In terms of power generation, the program did meet the goals of the 1955 White Paper but fell considerably short of the ambitious 1957 expansion. Britain did succeed in exporting two Magnox reactors to Italy and Japan in 1959. This represents some measure of success for the program as in 1961, Britain had secured two of the then five international orders for nuclear power reactors (House of Lords Debate [HLD] 291, 1968). However, neither Italy or Japan ultimately purchased Magnox reactors for their fleet. Britain did not successfully export another nuclear reactor.

22Whilst investment in nuclear power did succeed in reducing coal consumption, its generating cost was considerably greater than coal. The UKAEA’s own figures indicated that the capital costs of a Magnox station equated to some £120,000 per MWe compared to £37,000 per MWe for a coal-fired plant (Scott, 1979). In addition, by 1964, Britain’s national power generating company, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was treating plutonium as worthless (HCD 694, 1964) as plutonium had proven unusable as a nuclear fuel and the price of enriched uranium had fallen. In the absence of the plutonium credit, the generating costs of Magnox increased dramatically. Green (1995, p. 521) concludes that if a 5% discount rate is assumed and fuel costs are included, the entire Magnox program had cost £9.7bn more than an equivalent number of coal-fired plants.

23The first program of nuclear power proposed the installation of up to 1500 - 2000MWe by 1965, and this was then trebled in 1957 to between 5000-6000 MWe. These ambitions were largely driven by fanciful ideas of technological progress and were scaled back in 1960 as it became obvious that the Magnox reactors and Britain’s construction industry could not deliver on the demands for additional electricity. In terms of the original 1955 program, some 3840 MWe of nuclear capacity was installed and Magnox technology was successfully exported. However, exports were limited and the Magnox program fell well short of legislative demands. The expanded program was a reaction to the consequences of underinvestment in coal mining and imperial misadventure. Effectively, British decision makers saw nuclear power as a solution to problems that they themselves had created. Moreover, the Magnox program was uneconomic from the beginning and required the British government to manipulate costs through the plutonium credit to make the technology artificially attractive. Ironically, the decision to ignore the economic problems of Magnox and nuclear power more generally, complicated privatisation some thirty years later.

The second nuclear power program

24Britain’s second nuclear power program was announced in 1964, with the publication of The Second Nuclear Power Programme (MoP, 1964). The second program would involve the installation of some “….5000MW of nuclear generating capacity should be adopted in England and Wales for commissioning during the six years 1970-1975.” (p. 4). The timing of the second program was determined by the schedule outlined in the 1955 and 1960 White Papers (MoFP, 1955; Mop, 1960) rather than by an actual assessment of Britain’s energy needs or the maturing of new technologies, suggesting an element of path dependency in the legislative process.

25At the heart of the second program was a commitment to Britain’s indigenous Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor or AGR and the 1964 white paper states that the “…Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor developed by the Atomic Energy Authority from the same concept as the Magnox reactor is accepted as one of the most promising for the continuance of the British nuclear power programme.” (p. 3). However, in 1964, the AGR existed only in a 30 MWe prototype and all calculations regarding its safety and performance were based on overly optimistic assumptions (Burn, 1978, pp. 150 – 151).

26The development of the AGR coincided with advances in [light] water moderated reactors and increasingly aggressive marketing by their American manufacturers. Historically, the CEGB had shown little interest in light water technology (Williams, 1980, p. 90) but had always stressed that their decision would be based on economic calculations. In 1961, Christopher Hinton, the CEGB’s chairman commented that the CEGB may choose to import technology if “…at any point in time it is found that one of these [foreign-designed] reactors has advantages over the reactor that we [Britain] have developed at that point in time” (Hinton, 1961, p. 16). Shortly before the publication of the 1964 White paper, a Cabinet Office memo noted the consequences of any switch to light water technology: “…[the] Economic Policy Committee was troubled that an announcement that we were willing to contemplate reactors of American design would kill the prospects of our own nuclear power industry and involve us writing off very substantial sums of money.” (Cabinet Office, 1964, pp. 3 -4).

27Despite its flirtation with light-water technology, the CEGB selected the AGR for Britain’s second nuclear power program in 1965. This followed from what the then CEGB chairman, Jack Hawkins, recalled as “…somewhat pretty heavy persuasion…” (Hawkins, 1973) in favour of the AGR as the British government sought to aggressively defend Britain’s indigenous nuclear industry. The possibility of securing exports was a key factor in the first programme of nuclear power. However, advancing exports was not a formal goal of the second program although this objective likely carried over the first program. British politicians saw the AGR as having export potential and argued that “…home orders…” of British technology were essential in maintaining the capacity to export nuclear technologies (HCD 842, 1972).

28It proved difficult to translate the small-scale prototype AGR into full-sized commercial units and the actual plants had to be substantially redesigned during the construction process. This resulted in costly delays and the British government was forced to reorganise the various construction consortia twice over to prevent their financial collapse. In light of these construction difficulties, the CEGB began to argue that Britain should switch to the American-designed Pressurised Water Reactor [PWR], which was believed to be substantially cheaper to build and operate (HC 73, 1973, p. A4). Ironically, American-designed reactors also suffered from dramatic cost overruns (see Bupp et al., 1974) and the projected cost savings were based on the use of turnkey contracts. Mooz (p. 49) comments that the “…actual turnkey price had little relation to the cost.” Whilst speculating on the costs of hypothetical reactors is counterfactual history, it is reasonable to believe that a switch to imported light-water technology would also have proven expensive beyond the initial units.

29The second nuclear power program resulted in in the construction of 10 AGR units at five power plants. These reactors ultimately added some 6,525 MWe of power to the electricity gird and exceeded the stated goals of the program. However, Jeffery (1980, p. 92) compared the production costs of the AGR to coal-fired power stations and concluded that if inflation was considered “…the results show that in real terms coal-fired stations have in all cases produced the cheaper electricity.” The AGR program was intended to safeguard Britain’s nuclear manufacturing capacity but the reactor itself was an immature design and without government intervention, it is possible that the CRGB would have rejected the technology.

30The second program of nuclear power was largely determined by the path dependent effects of technological choice in the 1950s. Britain had developed gas-graphite technology and British decision-makers sought to preserve this expertise and the associated industrial capacity. Likewise, the timing of the second program was legislatively driven and this, combined with the preference for indigenous technology, saw an immature design in the form of the AGR advanced. This did preserve Britain’s nuclear manufacturing capacity, but it required the CEGB to be browbeaten and foisted an expensive and uneconomic technology on Britain’s electricity industry. The adoption of the AGR necessitated repeated interventions to promote the technology and forestall the financial failure of nuclear construction companies. Although the second program ultimately added some 6525 MWe to the grid, the first AGR units were not completed until 1976, meaning after the program was to have concluded.

The third nuclear power program

31The third program of nuclear power was announced in 1974 and would involve “…not more than 4,000 MW over the next four years.” (HCD 876, 1974; Ministry of Energy, 1974). The program would be based around the still experimental Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor or SGHWR (HCD 876, 1974) as the selection of this design would give “…a boost to British technology…” and help to preserve Britain’s nuclear manufacturing capabilities. The small size of the third program was due to the fact that Britain actually had a surplus of electricity in the early 1970s due to overbuilding in the 1960s. Evans (1983, p. 81) notes that in 1973, the excess generation capacity was about 46% greater than demand.

32Throughout 1974 and 1975, there was considerable debate over the merits of SGHWR compared to PWR technology (see Williams, 1980, chapter 10 for a summary). Despite arguments that Britain should protect its nuclear manufacturing industry, the SGHWR was cancelled in 1976 as it was deemed too expensive. As the CEGB had been instructed to procure additional nuclear capacity, an additional four AGRs were ordered in 1978. Although the AGR had proven problematic, it would have been impossible to secure planning permission for a PWR before 1980 and consequently, the CEGB had to purchase new AGRs in order to fulfil programmatic requirements. Moreover, a switch to PWR technology would leave the National Nuclear Corporation bereft of work (Williams, 1980) and undermine its financial viability.

33In January 1978, the British Government reiterated its commitment to completing the third program: “The completion of the remaining stations in the existing AGR programme and the successful construction of the next AGR orders will be the first priority in our thermal nuclear programme…” but it was accepted that “….in addition to the AGR we must develop the option of adopting the PWR system in the early 1980s.” (HCD 942, 1978). Critically, the adoption of PWR would be subject to a public inquiry.

34After the May 1979 General Election, the newly elected Conservative government determined to expand nuclear power provision on the basis of predicted demand: “The electricity supply industry has advised that even on cautious assumptions it would need to order at least one new nuclear power station a year in the decade from 1982, or a programme of the order of 15,000 megawatts over 10 years.” (HCD 976, 1979). This program would make use of imported PWR technology. The first PWR in Britain was ordered at Sizewell B and construction was to begin in 1984, but the public inquiry required before the granting of planning permission lasted from 1982 to 1987. Whilst government ministers had the ability to set the terms of the inquiry narrowly, it seems likely that they allowed a wide-ranging debate as part of an effort to shape future planning inquires. If PWR technology was declared safe, future inquiries would have to recognise this finding of fact and subsequent debate would have to focus on planning matters rather than on nuclear generation technologies per se. Sizewell B received planning permission in 1987 and construction began in 1988. The plant itself became operational in 1995 but cost some 35% more than planned, with a final cost of some £2bn1987 ($17.7bn2023).

35In 1990, the British electricity industry was privatised. Although the British government intended to transfer the assets of the CEGB entirely to the private sector, nuclear power was considered a problem as its loss-making stations could not be easily distributed between smaller private generators. Although the CEGB could manage the massive risks and effectively cross-subsidise nuclear power, smaller commercial companies could not. In fact, it was initially recommended that nuclear power not be privatised due to the immense financial risks private companies would face (HC 307, 1988).

36The aging Magnox plants were ultimately excluded from privatisation “…to enable the nuclear generating companies to focus their attention on the future…” (HCD 157in 1989, but it was intended that the AGRs would be privatised due to their improving operating performance. In addition, it was expected that Sizewell B would be completed and that the newly privatised National Power company would “…construct and operate three more PWRs.” (HCD 157, 1989). These new PWRs would follow a similar design to Sizewell B and would add over 3600MWe in capacity to advance towards the goal of 15,000 MWe. A planning application for the first of these units – Sizewell C – had been lodged by the CEGB in June 1989. The plan to construct an additional reactor at the Sizewell site was likely due to the fact that expanding existing facilities would likely prove straightforward. However, Sizewell C was ultimately abandoned after privatisation due to concerns over the construction cost. Despite the British government’s belief that nuclear power could be privatised, Britain’s nuclear power plants remained in state hands until 1996 and were extensively subsidised through a mechanism known as the Fossil Fuel Levy. This represented a surcharge on coal and gas generation to fund subsidises paid to non-fossil fuel generators, i.e., nuclear.

37Conservative support for nuclear power appears odd as the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher was known for its dislike of expensive state-run projects and market-distorting subsidies. One possible explanation is provided in the minutes of the 13th meeting of the Economic Strategic Committee in 1979 “…a nuclear program would have the advantage of removing a substantial portion of electricity production from the dangers of disruption by industrial action by coal miners or transport workers (Cabinet Office, 1979). The Conservative government may have disliked public sector inefficiency, but they disliked trade unions more. It is also worth noting that the British government’s continued support for nuclear power runs contrary to the notion of privatisation and market liberalisation. Despite, privatising the generation industry, the British government still expected to dictate technology choices. At one level, this may simply be a political reflex, but it may also reflect the hold that nuclear power continued to exercise on decision-makers. The progress made on Sizewell B encouraged further promotion of nuclear power.

The (unannounced) fourth program of nuclear power

38The seven AGR power plants and Sizewell B were privatised as British Energy in 1996 but British Energy experienced a de-facto bankruptcy in 2002 due to a fall in the wholesale price of electricity prices and the phasing out of the Fossil Fuel Levy in accordance within European law, which outlawed subsidies (Taylor, 2007). British Energy was effectively renationalised in 2002 in order to safeguard the management of nuclear waste and underwrite about 20% of Britain’s electricity supply. Between 2003 and 2007, the British government published a series of White papers (Department of Trade and Industry [DTI] 2003, 2006, 2007) spelling out a revised energy policy. All the White papers are clear that government does not direct industry but seeks to facilitate commercial decisions. The first White paper did not formally rule out nuclear power but stated that “…its current economics make it an unattractive option for new carbon free generation…” (DTI, 2006, p. 12) and indicated that no new nuclear build was proposed (p. 61). However, by 2006, the British government was arguing that “…nuclear has a role to play in the future UK generating mix alongside other low carbon generation options.” (DTI, 2006, p. 124). In keeping with the commitment to a liberalised energy market, the British government indicated that it would seek to facilitate investment by lowering regulatory barriers through pre-licencing of standard or reference designs and centralising the planning system. Indeed, the 2006 White Paper references the length of the Sizewell B inquiry, noting that the plant “…took 73 months to secure planning permission” (p. 134). Likewise, the 2007 White Paper complains that the Hinkley Point C planning inquiry (1988 – 1990) “…covered many of the same generic health and safety issues as the Sizewell B inquiry even though it was based on the same power station design” (p. 256).

39These proposals informed the creation of Generic Design Assessment procedures within Britain’s nuclear regulators and the passage of the 2008 Planning Act (c 29). The 2008 Planning Act allowed infrastructure projects – such as power plants – to be designated as ‘nationally significant infrastructure project[s]’ (S 14) through national policy statements. Planning consent for nationally significant projects would be overseen by the new created Infrastructure Planning Committee. The Planning Act was largely repeated in 2011 under the Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition government through the 2011 Localism Act (c. 20). The Localism Act actually transferred responsibility for considering nationally significant projects to the government (S 128 (3)). The notion of regulatory reform, and the centralisation of planning, was based on the belief that nuclear power had failed economically because regulatory delays had caused costs to escalate. This ignores the fact that historically, Britain’s nuclear power programs were based around immature designs that had to be reworked for the peculiarities of each proposed site. A focus on the peculiarities of each site is also inherent in Britain’s nuclear regulatory regime as British regulation requires that a nuclear plant be as safe as is reasonably practical given the specific local circumstances. As such, health and safety issues must be reconsidered at each site individually. This remains the fundamental principle of British regulation and although the Generic Design Assessment will determine if a design can be built at all, the final design is still considered against the proposed site. In addition, it should be noted that the Sizewell B inquiry was fundamentally concerned with determining whether or not PWR technology – which was controversial at the time – could meet Britain’s safety standards and was broad in scope because government allowed it to be.

40In the early 2000s, multiple developers expressed interest in new nuclear build as part of the so-called global nuclear renaissance. In fact, Électricité de France [EDF] went as far as to purchase British Energy, and this was interpreted as a vote of confidence in nuclear power (Baker & Stoker, 2013). However, EDF is a Société Anonyme or a public company, owned by the French state, and it serves as the primary purchaser of French nuclear technology. As such, it seems likely that EDF’s interest was simply to acquire sites to build new [French] nuclear reactors rather than a sign of commitment to nuclear energy. Over the last decade or so, virtually all would-be nuclear developers have left the British market due to concerns over financing the immense costs of nuclear power plants, which suggests that the British government’s efforts have proven ineffective. At the time of writing, only EDF is actually constructing a new nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point C. The construction of Hinkley Point C began in 2012 and the costs had risen to over £26bn in 2022 ($31.56bn2023) despite efforts at reforming the planning and regulatory system. Hinkley Point C will not start producing power until 2026 at the earliest (World Nuclear News [WNN] 2022a).

41Following the 2010 General Election, a Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition government took office and a new energy policy was published: The 2011 White Paper ‘Planning Our Electric Future’ (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011) and nuclear power was a preferred policy option. The coalition government would seek to support “…a new generation of nuclear stations…” (p. 3) although it is noticeable that – in deference to a commercial energy industry – no capacity target was set. As part of this commitment to nuclear power, the coalition government extended loan guarantees to EDF in 2013 (WNN, 2013) to help underwrite the rapidly escalating costs of Hinkley Point C.. Most significantly, the coalition government reformed the electricity market over the long term, and fixed price contracts to reduce the capital costs of low carbon technologies and nuclear power in particular (p. 42). It was believed that fixed-price contracts would lower the cost of capital for nuclear power by some 1.5%. As nuclear power plants are funded by complex loans, a 1.5% reduction in the borrowing costs significantly improves the ability of developers to fund the construction costs of nuclear power. This intervention was likely driven by the recognition that financing nuclear new build was extremely difficult and market interest had waned.

42Long term fixed-price contracts for generation were implemented through a scheme known as Contracts for Difference, which took effect in 2014 as the part of the Electricity Market Reform program (2013 Energy Act). Prior to the formal commencement of the scheme, EDF was able to secure a fixed price of £92.50 ($153.212013) per Megawatt hour (MWh) in 2013 and the current price is £113.83 ($137.642023). However, the average wholesale price for baseload electricity between January 2010 and April 2022 was £58.82 (Ofgem, 2022), and the contract for difference is simply subsiding an expensive power plant by allowing EDF to continue to borrow money.

43Despite the problems with Hinkley Point C, the appeal of nuclear power remains. The 2021 Comprehensive Spending Review (HC 822) allocated £1.7bn ($2.52bn 2023) for investment in a new nuclear plant at Sizewell C. Although this is approximately 8% of the current cost of Hinkley Point C and may be insufficient as the estimated cost of Sizewell C is some £20bn ($22.61bn2023) (Laville, 2022). Even if the cost of capital is reduced in line with the 2011 White Paper, it is hard to see how any private investor could manage over £20bn in credit. Following from the Comprehensive Spending Review, an energy policy strategy document proposes the installation of another eight reactors providing up to 24000 MWe (HM Government, 2022, p. 21) and commits £100m ($121m2023) to nuclear power. The setting of a capacity target represents a departure from deferring to private investors and is consistent with an increasing degree of state involvement that began under the coalition government. Direct state support and intervention has continued to increase as in August 2022, the British Government acquired a 50% stake in Sizewell C – an investment valued at some £679 ($817m). New nuclear power will now be supported by public money (WNN 2022b) and it appears that nuclear power has returned to its historical status as a ‘state’ technology.

Discussion and Conclusion

44A successful failure occurs when a policy program persists whilst delivering short-term success or progress but does not achieve its overall goals. This article suggests that government intervenes when a policy program faces a crisis because it believes – based on the appearance of short-term progress – that intervention will ultimately deliver overall successful. As such, government intervention is reactive in that it forestalls outright failure and contributes to the emergence of successful failure. The case study of Britain’s nuclear power programs offers some support for these arguments and historical institutionalism successfully describes the mechanisms at work. This case study highlights the importance for failure and successful failure to pay attention to institutional context and path dependency, and the active role of government.

45Britain’s nuclear endeavours can be broadly divided into two eras: pre-privatisation and post privatisation. The pre-privatisation era is largely state-centred and was characterised by the belief amongst policy makers that nuclear power was essential to support British industry and advance British industrial interests. The post-privatisation era is characterised by a deference to commercial decision making and a belief that government should not direct but should steer private companies by shaping the context. This is consistent with wider ideas of governance that came to dominate British politics (see Bevir & Rhodes, 2003 or Rhodes, 2007 for representative discussion on governance).

46In the 1940 and 1950s, Britain saw itself as a leading international player and policy decisions reflected these understandings. Initially, British efforts focused on weapons technology but once this project was completed, attention switched to the civil power program. The small scale of the first program was due to the uncertainties that surrounded the technology although British politicians appear to have been encouraged by success in [re]building a nuclear infrastructure and to see the technology as essential to Britain’s industrial and economic future. The second program of nuclear power also reflects a concern for maintaining Britain’s engineering and construction capacity. The AGR was selected in the second program precisely because it would protect British industry. Likewise, the actions of the British government in reorganising the various construction consortia in the 1970s are consistent with an attempt to preserve Britain’s industrial manufacturing capacity. The promotion and protection of British industry also seems to have informed the third program and the preference for the SGHWR, as it was hoped that the selection of this technology would ‘boost’ Britain’s industrial capacity.

47This preference for Britain’s own technology reflects the fact that nuclear power was not only a matter of energy policy, but also a matter of industrial policy and – to a certain extent – foreign policy. This complexity of the nuclear power program is consistent with Mueller’s (2020) observation that policies have multiple dimensions. However, this multi-faceted policy agenda actually increased the problems that the British government was forced to address as it created greater potential for failure. As Britain possessed a nationalised electricity industry, the private companies that constructed the actual power plants operated under a state-directed monopsony and were dependent on the decisions of their major customer. These companies could not seek international business as they were tied to a unique and problematic technology. Likewise, the existence of a national nuclear developer created a preference for indigenous technology and this saw immature designs advanced, which created difficulties for the construction companies. This issue of complexity within policy represents an interesting avenue for future research, given that a complex policy has multiple points of failure but also multiple dimensions that can be identified as successes. Further research could therefore usefully investigate the relationship between complexity and successful failure.

48As would be expected, the actions of the Conservative government of the 1980s and 1990s reflect the transition between a state-run industry and a commercial industry. The Conservatives opted to continue the third program through the use of PWR technology rather than abandon nuclear power. This is consistent with Sleesman et al. (2012) but presents a dilemma for a historical institutionalist as the Conservatives generally objected to loss-making stake industries. An explanation can be found when it is considered that the Conservatives saw nuclear power as offering an alternative to coal and as a means of undermining Britain’s trade union movement. The grandiose program of some 15000 MWe is suggestive of a view that nuclear energy should supersede coal as the primary means of power generation. This represents a considerable escalation in policy ambition compared to previous governments and represents a significant intervention on behalf of nuclear power. Consistent with these policy ambitions, there was some effort to create circumstances favourable to future nuclear investment but this intervention appears to have produced very little. Support for nuclear power may – in part – be explained by an ideological hostility to coal and its producers and by the fact that modern nuclear power plants were being constructed in Britain.

49In 1989, nuclear power had to be withdrawn from the privatisation effort. To ensure that privatisation could succeed, and to operate in the newly liberalised energy market, nuclear power required subsidy. Intervention through subsidies likely forestalled the financial collapse of nuclear power as British Energy failed when the subsidies were largely withdrawn. The intervention to nationalise British Energy under the Labour government was likely not motivated by a desire to protect nuclear energy but simply by a desire to avoid the loss of generating capacity and to ensure that nuclear waste was safe guarded. This intervention was forced upon the Labour government by the unintended consequences of market liberalisation.

50In the post-privatisation era, the British government lost the ability to direct energy policy in the manner required to support nuclear power. In addition, the absence of a domestic nuclear production capacity left the government subject to the whims of commercial calculation. This is compounded by the fact that nuclear power struggles commercially in a liberalised market. As such, government interventions have aimed to make nuclear power more attractive indirectly, but these indirect interventions have consistently failed to change private sector calculations and government has been forced to escalate its interventions. Although it does appear that the various policy interventions have successfully prevented abandonment of Hinkley Point C, the counterfactual claim is that EDF and French industry needs to complete Hinkley Point C to preserve their ability to build nuclear power plants.

51A historical institutionalist would observe that the problems that government faced in respect of the complexity of nuclear power were largely of its own making, and that the various interventions it made to forestall failure resulted from prior decisions. During the first and second programs. The British government was consistently forced to address the unintended consequences that resulted from supporting a domestic nuclear power industry in the context of nationalized electricity industry. However, this case study indicates that Britain did succeed in securing some limited nuclear exports, maintaining a nuclear construction industry until the late 1980s, and successfully developed multiple reactor technologies. Moreover, these reactors did add the required number of megawatts to the grid and can be considered successful failures. Post-privatisation, the situation is somewhat more complex as government ambitions for a significant revival of nuclear power have largely failed, but the British government has succeeded in preserving Hinkley Point C and it remains possible that Sizewell C may be constructed.

52Britain’s nuclear power programs have flirted with outright failure on several occasions due the country’s immense difficulty and unattractive economics. The failure of the construction consortia in the 1970s was not sufficient to discredit nuclear power as there were alternative technologies that could be adopted. The failure of the AGR did not undermine nuclear power, it simply discredited the AGR as the cross-party commitment to nuclear power remained largely intact. Although the collapse of British Energy and the subsequent downplaying of nuclear power in the 2003 Energy White Paper may have represented an abandonment of the technology due to a dramatic failure, this failure occurred at a time when Britain was not suffering an immediate energy crisis and there were no nuclear power stations under construction. As such, nuclear power could be safely ‘set aside’ and investment directed to other technologies.

53The case of Britain’s nuclear power programs suggests that studies of policy failure and successful failure should pay close attention to the institutional context and the various contingent or path dependent events that shape the context. Nuclear power long made some progress towards the policy goal and given it was feared that the failure of nuclear power would leave Britain potentially short of electricity, British decision makers across different governments and political parties may have been unwilling to risk outright failure. This would be consistent with Staw’s (1981) observations about accountability. The risk of been held accountable for a failure is magnified when dealing with a policy that is very high profile or of societal consequence. This is very different from projects such as the Blue Streak missile system which could be abandoned because it did not have wider societal implications. This suggests that the degree of risk inherent in policy failure is important in shaping how government engages with a policy. Policy programs that run the risk of consequential failure may be more likely to persist as government is unwilling to allow them to fail.

54It is useful to end on a note of caution: the idea of a successful failure is an analytical construction and it may be that decision makers themselves do not understand policy outcomes in terms of successful failure. Politicians naturally wish to describe their activities in terms of success. In this respect, McConnell’s (2010) concept of partial success may have greater face validity in the ‘practical’ world of policy rather than the academic world of policy analysis. Future research could usefully consider whether the terms academics use to describe policy failure are in use amongst decision makers and their advisors.

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References

Bibliographical reference

Keith Baker, Nuclear Power in Britain: A series of successful failuresInternational Review of Public Policy, 5:1 | 2023, 26-43.

Electronic reference

Keith Baker, Nuclear Power in Britain: A series of successful failuresInternational Review of Public Policy [Online], 5:1 | 2023, Online since 01 April 2023, connection on 20 June 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/3206; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.3206

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About the author

Keith Baker

The State University of New York, Brockport, USA

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