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Slaying the Dragon of Corruption: Application of Multiple-Streams Framework in Anticorruption Policy Processes in Devolved Systems of Government in Kenya

Justa Mwangi and Wilson Muna

Abstract

Although John Kingdon’s multiple streams (MSF) framework is utilized to explain public policy processes in the US and western countries, little empirical evidence exists of its applicability in Africa. This paper addresses this gap by interrogating agenda setting processes that combat corruption in devolved systems of government in Kenya through the lens of this framework. The paper is the result of an empirical study that involved 126 interviews and two focus group discussions involving nine key stakeholders from the counties of Kiambu and Nairobi City, which are two devolved systems of government in Kenya. The paper examines how the state, business, and civil society are intertwined within the anticorruption agenda setting processes of these two counties. The results illuminate the complex relationships between these actors as they switch roles from being facilitators (enablers) of anticorruption agendas to accomplices of corruption (through convergence of mutual interests) and demonstrate the extent to which MSF theory may be considered appropriate in the analysis of such policymaking processes. The authors present several pathways that MSF’s problem, policy, and political streams may converge to create policy windows to combat corruption, and calls for further studies in this area.

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Background

1Public sector corruption is often defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (Alfano, Baraldi, & Cantabene, 2020). Scholars who support this definition argue that public office provides ideal breeding ground for certain types of corruption, such as embezzlement and bribery (Prasetyono, 2019). This paper focuses on embezzlement and bribery as they are of particular concern in Africa. It is estimated that Africa loses over U.S $ 50 billion annually to embezzlement, despite being the second fastest growing economic region in the world (World Bank, 2020). Africa is also home to some of the world’s most impoverished people who are forced to fork out bribes to access government services (Chalil, 2020). In Kenya, embezzlement and bribery have been identified as one of the greatest threats to public service delivery in the devolved governments (Opalo, 2020). A study carried out by Kenya’s Ethics and Anticorruption Commission found that 63% of Kenyans have to pay bribes to access county health facilities, 59% have to pay bribes to access water and sanitation, 58% have to pay bribes to access markets, and 57% have to pay bribes to access trade licenses within Kenya’s devolved governments (EACC, 2015).

2Although policy makers view devolution as an anticorruption strategy, there is growing evidence that corruption poses a significant threat to the delivery of public services in many devolved jurisdictions (Mulyaman, Ismail, & Raya, 2019). Evidence from various studies shows that corruption undermines the redistributive nature of public services, forcing the poor to shoulder a disproportionate burden, thus creating inequalities in society, exacerbating poverty, and causing an overall adverse effect on human development (Plotica, 2017). This problem is compounded by the absence of formal theoretical models within the anticorruption decision-making processes that would lead to successful outcomes within devolved governments (Chalil, 2020). Thus, scholars call for more empirical studies to delve into the complexities inherent in anticorruption policy processes within devolved governments and the state and non-state actors involved (Boone, et al., 2019).

3Current approaches to tackle anticorruption in the public sector have been influenced by scholarly views that look at corruption as a principal-agent problem, thus focusing policy efforts on integrity measures, strengthening institutions, training, and legislation (Brierley, 2019). The UN Convention against Corruption borrows from this tradition by emphasizing criminalization and law enforcement, which many countries currently use as a template for fighting corruption. Unfortunately, these approaches are based on interventionism (arresting the culprit after the corrupt act) and managerialism (tightening systems, procedures, and protocols to seal loopholes of corruption). They have been criticized for being based on western experiences and the exceptional case studies of Hong Kong and Singapore (Wickberg, 2018). They have also raised ideological concerns of the high moral ground taken by proponents of corruption policy agendas, especially those coming from the west and being pushed to third world countries (Arce & Hendricks, 2019). Critics argue that the corruption discourse and measures to fight it are highly western-centric and riddled with ideological interests of a capitalist and neoliberal economic agenda that promotes and legitimizes epistemological claims about corruption that are fundamentally western-centric (Andersen, Johannesen, & Rijkers, 2020). For example, the function of the global corruption perceptions index is seen as legitimizing the corruption combating measures that western countries have placed on developing countries with the aim of eliminating obstacles to the free flow of capital (Andersen, Johannesen, & Rijkers, 2020).

4Further, a growing body of literature is showing that anticorruption efforts are failing globally, in spite of high-level prosecutions that have targeted public officials, particularly in the third world. This has been blamed on current anticorruption policymaking approaches, which have been mainly informed by the principal-agent approach and tend to target the demand side of corruption (public officials) and mostly ignore the demand side (business/public) (Nguyen & Luong-Montenegrin, 2020). Other studies show that communities such as businesses and civil society, welcome corruption in certain contexts as the solution to easing the burden of bureaucratic bottlenecks, thus saving time and boosting their revenues (Nguyen & Luong-Montenegrin, 2020). This view is not surprising given that many corruption studies have been approached from a functionalist and rational theory viewpoint, which tends to view corruption as how things are done (jumping bureaucratic hurdles). This approach has however received criticism for being tautological, as it does not rend itself to explanations on when corruption is functional (or not) (Smartis, 2018). It also does not explain why some people are corrupt and others are not, and what kinds of problems might be more amenable to corrupt solutions (Smartis, 2018).

5In the absence of robust empirical evidence, Kenya’s attempts to deal with corruption have followed global trends by adopting a managerialism and interventionist approach. This has involved criminalizing corruption, tightening procedures, and arresting the culprits. At the national level, Kenya has attempted to increase public sector wages and privatize public services, but this has not yielded the desired results and has exacerbated corruption (Boone, et al., 2019). Evidence from the Kenyan counties (devolved governments) shows that efforts to combat corruption have not been rigorous, as current practices rely on faulty, anecdotal corruption indexes and politicized interventions (Opalo, 2020). For instance, when we look at county level policy instruments in Kenya, we find that they borrow from the rational theory approach and thus concentrate on managerialism and deterrent measures as anticorruption mechanisms (Mackey, 2019). Since different stakeholders such as the state, business and civil society have varying agendas with regard to the corruption situation, the resulting policy instruments at the county level will be the result of the actor(s) best able to lobby their case.

6Despite this state of affairs, there is hardly any scholarly work on anticorruption policymaking processes in Kenya. Analytical frameworks that have been used to explain anticorruption policymaking in Kenya have largely been informed by rational choice theory (Chege & Wang, 2020). This paper makes a departure from this by utilizing MSF to add analytical value as it allows us to explore policymaking under conditions of ambiguity (Hoefer, 2022). Since policymaking is the result of complex processes involving a myriad of actors and institutions who operate in varying social, political and economic contexts, this paper seeks to illuminate Kenya’s anticorruption policymaking complexities under such ambiguity. MSF is considered suitable as it overcomes problems raised in earlier rational actor models (Hoefer, 2021). As this paper is the result of a case study of two counties in Kenya, MSF was deemed appropriate as it has been particularly praised for being helpful in conducting case studies (Cairney & Jones, 2016).

7The study’s research strategy aims to provide comparative perspectives on the MSF model and contribute to comparative scholarship, taking into account key institutional differences between other countries and Kenya, and in so doing, potentially provide insightful theoretical and empirical contributions that may contribute to theory making in Africa. The paper makes a departure from existing anticorruption approaches by applying MSF to fluid and unpredictable environments that lack sequence. It also looks at MSF’s applicability to anticorruption agenda setting, drawing on previous implementation and evaluation to explain why hard-hitting anticorruption policies do not enter the agenda.

8Contextually, the paper focuses on Kiambu and Nairobi City counties, which are two devolved governments in Kenya. The multiple streams framework is relevant for devolved governments in Kenya as it was initially applied to the U.S which has a devolved system of government. In analyzing the framework’s transferability, the paper looks at the interplay between three critical actors: the state, business, and civil society, which have been identified from the literature on the multiple streams framework as playing varying roles within the problem, policy, and political streams (Cairney & Jones, 2016).

Multiple Streams Framework

9Although initially developed for agenda setting within the US policymaking process, MSF has emerged as an important tool for interrogating public policy processes and spans nearly four decades of scholarship. The theory seeks to explain why one policy is selected over another within the policymaking space and postulates that policymaking is a fluid process driven by many factors, including shifting positions of policy actors, that follow no particular order. These complex interactions and dynamics are likened to ‘streams’ that depend in part on the skilled framing of issues, the coupling of identified problems, available solutions, and unpredictable political situations (Kingdon, 1984). The foundational assumption is one of a chaotic policymaking process with parallel processes and solutions chasing problems.

10MSF has other key structural frameworks that are explored in this paper, including the problem stream, the policy stream, the political stream, the policy entrepreneur, and the policy window. Each of the three streams (problem, policy, political) has various actors depending on the role they play at any given time. Thus, in the problem stream, the state (bureaucrats) and academia, business, and civil society might engage in contestations about identifying problems (Herweg, 2023). This stream is said to ripen when an issue is identified as a problem that requires government intervention (Barkhorn, Huttner, & Blau, 2013). Scholars argue that the ripening is often triggered by ‘focusing events’ such as emergencies, scandals, and the general public mood that congregate around an issue, demanding government intervention (Knaggard, 2015). Actors in civil society (mainly representing the public interest), business, or the state (who have their pet projects) sometimes take advantage of such ‘focusing events’ to influence the agenda within the problem stream (Zohlnhofer, Herweg, & Rub, 2015). Thus, such actors act as problem brokers, who try to frame the issues in question as a problem requiring government intervention. Such problem brokers are a key mechanism through which the problem stream influences the policy agenda.

11The policy stream is also dominated by contestations, as defining problems is a complex process with different actors having varying views on the same situation, making rationalization difficult. Since government resources and time are limited, the prioritization process is riddled with lobbying and competition from these myriad actors (Aviram, Cohen, & Beeri, 2019). The stream has policy communities, such as policy experts from academia (who rely on research and empirical evidence), government (who represent the views of the state), and think tanks (mainly from civil society and business), each of whom propose several policy options and engage in contestations among themselves (Hutchinson, Balabanova, & McKee, 2019). The stream is affected by focusing events, such as when new information (maybe about the feasibility of an idea) comes into the stream and changes the situation and positions shift (Wals, Espinoza-Moya, & Beland, 2019). Thus, this stream is a fluid environment in which possibilities for action and inaction are considered equally, as policymakers in government incorporate the opinion of epistemic actors and various interest groups, such as business and civil society stakeholders, in a bid to engage in evidence-based policymaking (Herweg, 2023). It is important to note that not all ideas have an equal chance of acceptance in this stream, as an idea generally needs to compete for acceptability based on the contextual and cultural norms of the given society (Cohen, 2016). The stream is akin to a chaotic situation in which solutions chase problems.

12The political stream is concerned with factors that are political in nature. These could be matters of general public notoriety, critical legislative moments (such as budget reading), administrative changes, fluctuations in the general public mood, or regime changes (Ruvalcaba-Gomez, Criado, & Gil-Garcia, 2020). Thus, the government cannot ignore the tremendous public pressure brought on by the general public mood, as it risks losing power and control (Ridde, 2009). It is important to note that powerful interest groups such as those formed by business and civil society coalitions, are also capable of mounting advocacy campaigns and influencing the national mood (Ridde, 2009). This stream is also influenced by regime changes, where new leaders come with their own agendas and different political party priorities come into play with new pet projects (Ridde, 2009). The presence of political situations, such as elections and a change in administration, affect this stream, as different players who take office are likely to be amenable to different ideas, and leaders facing elections are likely to be reluctant to implement unpopular policies (Cohen, 2021). Socio-economic and political factors, such as budgetary allocations, also affect the stream, as lack of adequate resources would hinder the implementation of the preferred policy (Mackey, 2019). Conditions that may create political goodwill in this stream include election cycles (when elections are around the corner and politicians want to get re-elected) and budget deadlines (when money must be appropriated by a certain date) (Hoefer, 2022). Thus, contextual factors in this stream include institutional constraints that actors in this stream must be aware of and political calculations that they must make. Hence, this stream creates winners and losers as solutions and problems are dropped in a chaotic policymaking process.

13The policy window is an unpredictable opening in the policymaking process which allows for policymaking to take place and a policy outcome to be achieved. Such an opportunity serves to focus the attention of various actors from the three streams (problem, policy and political) on specific policy choices and policy outcomes, influencing their direction and support towards a specific policy outcome. According to MSF, the timing of this window is highly unpredictable and often limited to short durations, and sometimes policy windows close without any action being taken, and it can take years before a similar window opens up (Herweg, 2023). Such windows are also influenced by the coupling of the three streams (problem, policy, and political) at critical moments through external focusing events such as accidents, war, or national calamities (Hoefer, 2022). However, due to the difficulty of couplings, windows of opportunity do not always open up during the convergence of the three streams, further complicating this chaotic policymaking process.

14Policy entrepreneurs are actors within the policy stream who are willing to invest resources to push certain projects and bring these projects to the attention of key decision makers in the political stream (Ederfors, 2020). They are often skilled in framing issues, lobbying other players, making concessions, and exploiting focusing events, to open windows of opportunity. They help to create compelling stories about the severity and causes of the problem, and help focus attention on their preferred viewpoint and on the problem-solution package they support (Jones et al., 2016; Stone, 2012). They act to advance ideas and shape policy thinking within the policy stream by mobilizing support and setting policy agendas in a bid to influence policy outcomes. They are often responsible for coupling solutions to problems and for coupling problems and solutions to politics (Engler & Herweg, 2019). Hence, they play a critical role in shaping the course of the three streams.

15Thus, MSF conceptualizes policymaking as multistage cycles that overlap in fluid, cyclic processes that never end, beginning with problem identification, which takes place within the problem stream, then moving to agenda setting, where alternative solutions compete for space within the policymaking process (Knaggard, 2015). Although the theory has been lauded for its theoretical richness and usefulness in analyzing policymaking under such conditions of uncertainty, it has received criticism for failing to address the systematic exclusion of marginalized groups from policy processes (Zohlnhofer, Herweg, & Rub, 2015). There is a paucity of data on its application in third world countries, and scholars argue that its concepts and ideas need to be tested in diverse backgrounds for validity (Cairney, 2018). The framework has also faced criticism for the lack of contributions that test its applicability in medium to large scale qualitative sample sizes (Engler & Herweg, 2019). Thus, this study sought to overcome these weaknesses by collecting data from a large qualitative sample, including marginalized groups in the data as explained in the methodology section, and applying MSF within a third world context (Kenya).

Methodological approach

16The study adopted a qualitative approach in order to overcome current limitations where there is a preponderance of quantitative data in the corruption literature and a plethora of corruption indexes that are not very useful to policy makers (Alfano, Baraldi, & Cantabene, 2020). The research utilized interviews, focus groups, and observations. Interviews were deemed appropriate as they would capture rich data from informants. Focus groups were considered necessary as they would add a diversity of voices and views (Berthod, 2018). Observations were important for capturing the non-verbal cues and contextual information (Brierley, 2019).

17The sampling and interviewing process employed a multistage sampling method with three levels. The first level required the selection of counties for the research. Kiambu and Nairobi City counties were purposively sampled. This was informed by the literature review which showed that they had high levels of corruption (EACC, 2015).

18The second level required the selection of units of observation. Again, these were purposively sampled as informed by the literature, which revealed the strategic functions that were critical in the anticorruption policymaking processes of the two counties (EACC, 2015). These are listed in Table 1.1 below:

Table: 1.1 Selected strategic functions and their justification

Function

Justification

1.

Supply Chain

Public procurement and supply chain processes were vulnerable to corruption especially during tendering.

2.

Finance

Financial stewardship of public funds presented vulnerabilities to corruption especially when making payments.

3.

Revenue

Collection of public funds presented vulnerabilities to corruption especially during receipting and banking.

4.

Payroll

Managing the public payroll presented vulnerabilities to corruption especially the risk of ghost workers.

5.

Human resources

Managing the human resources function presented certain vulnerabilities to corruption especially during recruitment.

6.

Authority-to-incur expenditure (AIE)

Authorizing expenditure of public funds presented certain vulnerabilities to corruption especially when making payments.

7.

Communications

Organizational communications presented certain vulnerabilities to corruption especially when disseminating public information.

8.

Information Communications Technology (ICT)

Responsibility for information processing presented certain vulnerabilities to corruption especially when disseminating public information.

9.

Public participation

Responsibility for conducting civic education forums presented certain vulnerabilities to corruption especially when disseminating public information.

10.

Sub-county administration

Responsibility for decentralized services presented certain vulnerabilities to corruption especially when delivering essential services.

Source: the Authors.

19Thus, public officials working in these functions within the legislative and executive arms of both county governments were interviewed.

20The third level of the multistage sampling involved the selection of the people to be interviewed. Since there were many individuals working in each strategic function, the individuals to be interviewed were selected through convenience sampling. Lists of potential interviewees were obtained through informal referrals and lists provided by human resources staff within the two counties. According to MSF, these public officials play an active role in the policy stream and could therefore provide insight into the role of the state in the anticorruption policymaking process (Beland & Howlett, 2016).

21Further, the study interviewed members of the public at various service delivery points such as markets, hospitals, billing offices, and car parks within the two counties. This was informed by the need to collect public views on anticorruption processes in key service delivery areas. It was also important to capture the role of the public in anticorruption processes, as MSF views the public as critical players in ripening the problem stream by drawing public attention to a problem (Cohen, 2016). Public respondents were conveniently sampled from the service delivery points, depending on the number available when the researcher visited the facilities. The physical locations were identified by county officials and from informal referrals. The number to be interviewed was determined by the need to collect data until saturation was reached. Thus, 12 interviews were conducted. This approach was informed by empirical evidence on non-probabilistic sample sizes, which shows that such an approach is able to capture critical meta-themes as early as the 6th interview, and that saturation is reached within the first 12 interviews (Hoefer, 2021).

22A similar approach was applied to interview suppliers from each county. The reason for targeting suppliers was informed by data showing their vulnerability to corruption in obtaining tenders and payments for their services and goods (Kimemia, 2013). They also played an important role as businesses, with varying interests in the anticorruption policymaking process, and from MSF’s viewpoint, they played a critical role within the policy stream (Cairney & Jones, 2016). Thus, 24 suppliers (12 from the executive arm and 12 from the legislative arm) in each of the county governments were targeted. Lists of potential suppliers were obtained from the respective county websites and from informal referrals.

23Various stakeholders who were considered to be important voices within the anticorruption policymaking space were also targeted for this research. These included professionals, politicians, non government organizations (NGOs), persons living with disability, religious groups, business groups, youth, women, and minorities. These groups were an important source of information as they organized themselves into civil society coalition groups that engaged in policy entrepreneurship as envisaged in MSF’s policy stream (Mackey, 2019). A list of these groups and their contacts were obtained from each county and through informal referrals. One person representing each stakeholder group was invited to participate in the focus group discussions. There was one focus group discussion per county. The use of focus groups in this research served to incorporate diverse voices and to explore in depth the roles of the state, business, and civil society in anticorruption policymaking processes and to explain why anticorruption policies sometimes fail.

24A semi-structured interview guide, a focus group discussion guide, and an observation guide were utilized to collect data. The observation guide captured contextual details such as verbal-visual interactions and body language during the interviewing process. Semi-structured interview guides were utilized for key informant interviews with public officials, members of the public, and suppliers. This tool included general questions structured around specific key variables that covered the study’s objectives. The tool captured the interviewee’s opinions, attitudes, knowledge and perceptions on the role played by the state, business, and civil society within the anticorruption policymaking process. Thus, the tool enabled the researcher to gain access to the respondent’s level of understanding of the anticorruption policymaking process in great detail. The researcher utilized probing techniques where appropriate and paraphrased questions to capture rich information. The focus group discussion guide was utilized to obtain in-depth information on the same issue. These focus groups provided a space where stakeholders could discuss sensitive issues that could not be revealed in one-on-one interviews. Thus, respondents could discuss freely, without fearing that the information they provided would be personalized, and without fear of victimization. The observation guide helped the researcher gain deeper insights into the focus groups and respondents. Thus, hidden meanings and other contextual information gleaned from the respondents’ non-verbal clues were captured. In total, the researchers interviewed 126 respondents and held two focus group discussions with nine key stakeholders from Kiambu and Nairobi City counties, as shown in Table 1.2.

Table: 1.2 Units of analysis and observation

Units of Analysis

Units of Observation

Total

2 counties

10 public officers (executive)

20

2 counties

8 public officers (legislature)

16

2 counties

9 key stakeholder groups

18

2 counties

12 suppliers (executive)

24

2 counties

12 suppliers (legislature)

24

2 counties

12 members of the public

24

Total:

63 Units of Observation

126

Source: the Authors.

Data Analysis and Results

25The data gathered from the interviews and focus group discussions was anonymized and analyzed using MSF logic. Coding was done, with K representing Kiambu county and N representing Nairobi City county, and respondents were numerically assigned numbers from 1-63. The data captures the views of public officers in strategic roles in the anticorruption policy processes of Kiambu and Nairobi City counties and the views of members of the public, suppliers, and key stakeholders. The results are presented thematically as follows:

Organizational culture

26Results from this study show that the state, business, and civil society were all deeply involved in the anticorruption policy processes within Kiambu and Nairobi City counties and played varying roles at different stages of the process. Thus, with regard to agenda setting, respondent N13 had this to say:

Sasa ikiwa sisi wanabiashara ndio tunataka hii ufisadi, hatuwezi blame ma politicians eti hawataki kuweka sheria za kumaliza ufisadi.

(Now, if we the business people are the ones who want corruption, we cannot blame the politicians for refusing to put in place tough laws for eradicating corruption).

27Thus, the corruption problem was not in tune with the interests of the business comm­­­unity. The ripeness of the problem stream, in accordance with MSF, could therefore not be realized as corruption was not viewed as a problem by a key segment of the community. MSF posits that an issue must be recognized as a problem before it can be addressed (Hoefer, 2022). This situation also points to the presence of an organizational culture that looks at corruption in lucrative terms, as it serves business interests. Thus, any focusing efforts from other actors, such as civil society, are likely to be met with resistance. This would frustrate the efforts of policy entrepreneurs who would be keen to couple the corruption problem with a solution. Thus, policy windows would be difficult to open. This situation may explain why corruption has persisted in Kenyan counties despite being a campaign issue in every election cycle.

28Respondent K4 explained that civil society often acted to influence the identification of the problem by calling on the state to declare corruption a national disaster. By doing so, respondent K4 argued, the state would be obligated to allocate time and resources to fighting corruption. This was confirmed by respondent K45 who argued that the state was pro-corruption and hence would not actively participate in identifying corruption as a problem unless forced to do so by public pressure. Research shows that such focusing efforts within the problem stream are capable of ripening the problem stream through public pressure (Cairney, 2018).

29Within the problem stream, there were myriad actors ranging from academia, business, civil society, and business. Academia, according to respondent K13, was mainly involved in providing data to show that the corruption problem exists, while bureaucrats were busy lobbying to reframe corruption issues. Business was represented by coalitions that tried to thwart anticorruption policymaking, according to respondent K4. The respondent added that business had vested interests as they benefited from the organizational culture of corruption within government. The respondent further elaborated that the social norm within the organizational culture of the county governments was that the state and business would not actively participate in the problem stream as far as corruption was concerned as they had vested interests. This shows the contextual policy dynamics that blocked policy change in this area.

30The data also show that there was a normative expectation that civil society would champion problem identification, as reported by respondent N62. Respondent N49 further spoke of problem entrepreneurs who emerged from civil society and championed specific views of corruption within the problem stream. They were quite organized as they convened meetings, issued statements, and lobbied for state action. The respondent noted that most of them came from civil society backgrounds or lobbied as part of civil society coalitions. Thus, they acted to focus attention on their preferred view of the corruption problem. However, the presence of policy communities such as business and state, that countermanded these efforts, reveals a normalized organizational culture of corruption that is difficult to change.

31On anticorruption policy processes, K34 shared that:

Serikali ya mseto, wanatuchezea tu. Mara wanasema sio wao wanatakiwa kuangalia mambo ya ufisadi lakini kwa maoni yangu, wanatakiwa waangalie hii maneno.

(The devolved government keeps playing with us. They tell us it is not their mandate to look at anticorruption processes, but in my opinion, they should look into this).

32Thus, questions of jurisdiction arise within the state, where the reluctance of the devolved government to take an active role in the anticorruption policy processes interferes with the agenda setting process, leaving other players to push their agenda. This is particularly common among state actors because the players involved are mainly politicians and public officials, who are vulnerable to the prevailing political climate at any given time.

33Respondents N62, K34, K4, and N49 confirmed that civil society sometimes acted as a pressure group, especially during the agenda setting phase, as state actors who may be involved in corruption (such as politicians and public officials) tended to amend, refocus, block, or externalize the corruption problem. In such situations, civil society acted as the voice of the public, galvanizing support and ultimately affecting policy outcomes. There was a societal expectation that civil society would champion anticorruption policymaking. The normative organizational culture was that anticorruption efforts should be championed by this segment of society while other players such as the state and business, resisted. It is noteworthy that both the state and business acted within the problem stream, albeit in opposing roles. This was the position reported by many respondents, such as N6, K13, and K39 who said that the anticorruption agenda was thwarted by collusion between the state and business. They also added that anticorruption research was not particularly welcome within the devolved governments and the business sector. This meant that the policy stream as envisaged by MSF was starved of important data from research and academia.

34Within the policy stream, the state, business, and civil society were active, as reported by respondents K34, N12 and K45. There were also policy entrepreneurs and stakeholders such as academia, as reported by K4. There were debates around the acceptability of corruption within the Kenyan society, which many respondents felt was a societal and organizational culture. Thus, corruption policy entrepreneurs faced a hard task coming up against organizational and societal norms to set an anticorruption agenda. Further, respondent N12 felt that the policy entrepreneurs were rather disorganized, convening at ad hoc moments when the public mood was favorable or when a major scandal was mentioned in the press. According to K4, these entrepreneurs were not consistent, as they kept changing positions depending on who was funding them. The respondent argued that they were not self financed, or anchored on any specific ideology, and hence not independent. The respondent further shared that even though academia seemed more independent and pushed specific positions, they were also influenced by the state and business as they did not have independent funding for their roles. Thus, the respondent argued, there was an unhealthy competition in this stream, as political (state) and business interests prevailed most of the time. This lack of interest in pursuing anticorruption policymaking from these two critical members of the policy community shows that the organizational culture had normalized corruption and did not consider it a problem. Respondent K34 contended that if the corruption problem reached the policy stream, then it was likely to be abandoned and not proceed beyond the policy stream. The respondent argued that corruption solutions were expensive (for both the state and business) and were likely to be abandoned due to the contextual nature of Kenya’s politics, where elections are financed through corruption. This organizational culture of financing politics through corruption was an autopoietic system that sought to entrench power within state and business circles. This further explains research that shows the fluidity of policymaking processes and the balancing of interests that thwarts the coupling of the three streams of MSF (Boone, et al., 2019).

35As ideas competed against each other within the policy stream, the organizational culture of corruption made it difficult for ideas to pass through the filters. According to respondents N3 and N10, not many solutions looking for problems to solve were coupled to the corruption problem. The data showed that many of the corruption solutions were either deemed unfeasible or too expensive because critical actors (state and business) were unwilling to act. Respondent K35 reported that ‘big business’ and ‘political honchos’ would collude to ensure that only weak policies (based on weak empirical evidence) were enacted to protect their own interests in corruption. Interest dynamics appeared to be normalized occurrences within the organizational culture, and civil society appeared weak in stemming the tide of business and state interests, as reported by respondent N18. Contextually, the respondent felt that civil society knew about these dynamics but was weak in navigating these interests, mainly because it was poorly resourced and disorganized. This interest dynamic meant that pressure from civil society could not bring about policy change, and thus balancing interests was a critical factor in the ripening of this stream.

36Respondent K12 said that civil society was sometimes called upon to act as policy entrepreneurs by softening up the positions of stakeholders who might be opposed to anticorruption processes so as to allow for consensus within policy communities. Thus, we see civil society engaging in policy advocacy and organizing themselves into broad coalitions to push the corruption agenda. According to respondent K12, these coalitions pushed various ideas and solutions within the policy stream, and thus at times appeared disconnected, with each pushing its own perspective. This was one of the weaknesses of the policy stream, as different ideas from the same group competed for space. Respondent N48 lamented that some of these views were extreme as they advocated for mass lynching of corruption suspects (on sight). While public anger and frustration with the failure of the anticorruption processes could be felt around these policy ideas, these were unlikely to move into the political stream, mainly due to contextual factors that Kenya is a constitutional democracy with an organizational culture that is anchored in the rule of law (Kimemia, 2013). Thus, the organizational culture ended up benefitting pro-corruption actors due to the lack of viable solutions to corruption within the policy stream. This may point to a situation of state capture as a key factor affecting the structural elements of MSF (the three streams, the policy entrepreneur, and the policy window) in the context of Kenya.

37Respondent K34 decried the lack of viable ideas in the policy stream and blamed it on inadequate research in this area and the low participation of academia in this stream. The respondent explained that the flow of ideas was thwarted by political actors who voted for little funding of academic research, leading to a situation where corruption research had to compete for funding with more urgently needed data, such as health. Thus, this appeared to be a vicious circle, where lack of funding led to inadequate corruption research, and hence a lack of evidence-based policy options. Thus, Kenya’s contextual political setting impeded the dissemination of anticorruption policy options.

38Respondent K9, however, felt that events such as the legislative calendar played a key role in making it easier to lobby the political class to pass popular policies closer to the time they were up for re-election. The respondent further said that this was the accepted organizational culture, as many policy entrepreneurs were in the habit of waiting until just before elections to lobby the political class, as the chances of success were almost guaranteed. Thus, timing was a critical factor, as the legislative calendar could influence the ripening of the political stream and open the policy window. This data confirms that legislative calendars in Kenya were key focusing events that were critical to anticorruption policymaking as envisaged by MSF. The data also confirms that focusing events influenced how policies were prioritized and handled within the political stream.

Bureaucratic procedures

39Respondents K34, N45, and N57 reported that corruption was accepted as a means of greasing the bureaucratic wheels of government and was ‘the order of doing things’ within the bureaucratic procedures of both county governments. Corruption was viewed as facilitating bureaucratic procedures such as red tape, hierarchy, and specializations and was not viewed as a problem that could slow down the cogs of bureaucracy. The fact that it was not viewed as a problem meant that the ripeness of the problem stream could not materialize as envisaged by MSF. Further, respondent N10 shared that the anticorruption agenda was either ignored or given half-hearted attention by state and business because they were directly benefitting from corruption, which led to compromises within the anticorruption policy space. These compromises emanated from civil society which often acted as policy entrepreneurs within the policy stream, as explained by respondent K15. The respondent said that some of these policy entrepreneurs were skilled at exploiting high level political rallies to apply public pressure and shape the anticorruption agenda. Thus, the ripening of the political stream and the opening of the policy window could occur through such actions. These contextual factors interrogated through MSF explain why and how some issues remain in the limelight for a long time, while others work their way through layers of bureaucracy. It also helps us understand the agenda universe, the myriad of interested actors within it, and the options that policymakers are willing to consider.

40Respondents K4 and N34 further shared that during anticorruption policy agenda setting, public officials found ways of slowing down services through the bureaucratic procedures of red tape, hierarchy and specializations. Thus, the state played the role of resisting the anticorruption policy agenda and causing delayed services. This was rooted in the state’s disinterest in the anticorruption policy agenda, as captured by respondent N15 who said:

Sisi watu wa chini, lazima tunajipanga. Tunaachiwa kazi na hatuulizwi maoni yetu.

(We, the lower cadre staff, we have to plan ourselves. We are left with the work and we are not asked for our opinions).

41From this data we can see that those at the bottom of the bureaucracy are left to figure out how to come up with anticorruption agendas and their opinions are not factored into the decision-making processes. These street level bureaucrats were first line policy actors within MSF’s policy stream, and even though their ideas may not reach the top echelons of the devolved governments, they were capable of policy innovation during agenda setting. Thus, they morphed into policy entrepreneurs within the meaning of MSF and this may explain the failure of anticorruption policymaking in Kenya.

42Other respondents such as K24, N16, N9, and K2 said that anticorruption agendas of the devolved governments, such as the introduction of open plan office spaces in an effort to physically do away with closed spaces where corruption was thought to take place, had the opposite effect as corruption had gone underground and become more clandestine and no one wanted to bring it up as an agenda for policymaking. Thus, the actions of the state in the anticorruption agenda setting process have not been effective. Respondent N16 attributed this to the influence of politics within the devolved governments. Thus, we see failed anticorruption policymaking due to vested interests within the bureaucratic procedures of the county government.

43When this is analyzed within MSF’s politics stream, the key players of the state are politicians who exercise power by controlling the anticorruption agenda setting process. Thus, if the same bureaucrats (state) who are corrupt are charged with setting the agenda for policymaking aimed at its eradication, then anticorruption policymaking is bound to fail. Respondents N5, K25, and K11 gave the example of the public vetting of officials within both counties, where corrupt officials were cleared and appointed to public positions, thus continuing to perpetuate corruption in government. One can then argue that vested interests were a key factor in the Kenyan context and were capable of thwarting the agenda setting of anticorruption policies. However, the same vested interests were also capable of being utilized to aid anticorruption policymaking, as seen in the data from respondent K25, who shared the example of the impeachment of the governors of the counties sampled for this study for engaging in corruption. This was an example of a successful policy initiative by political leaders within the legislative arm of county governments. It also shows the evolution of interests from pro-corruption to anticorruption within the political leadership (state), leading to a successful anticorruption agenda (impeachment). This situation also reveals the intergroup dynamics between the hierarchies of the county governments, from the top hierarchies to the lower levels, and across the arms of government and the public, as interests shift and ideas are floated in the fight against corruption.

Information processing

44The data shows that anticorruption information has been kept from the public by the devolved governments (state) through the lack of proper information processing dissemination procedures and the inaccessibility of dissemination channels, a situation that has made it difficult to set the anticorruption agenda within the problem stream. Respondent K9 reported:

Mambo mingi ya ufisadi hutendeka hii county hatujui. Hatupati habari kamwe. Labda tuulize wajuaji wa biashara wale wanapatiangwa.

(Many things that happen in this country in terms of corruption, we do not know. We get no information at all. Maybe we ask those in the know from the business community who are usually well informed).

45When the state keeps information to itself by failing to disseminate information or by making dissemination channels inaccessible, the public remains disempowered to confront the problem of corruption because the public would not have the requisite knowledge to identify corruption as a problem, according to MSF. Studies show that due to such failures, the problem stream would not materialize.

46Respondents N7 and K4 were of the view that the anticorruption policymaking agenda within the information processing of their counties, was often thwarted by propaganda from politicians (state actors) and business. They felt that politicians and businesses involved in corruption preferred to keep it in the shadows. Hence, both state and business actors utilized diversionary tactics to prevent it from being identified as a problem, as this would hasten the ripeness of the MSF problem stream.

47Respondent K18 felt that civil society had an important role to play in combating corruption within information processing. The respondent shared that civil society could use high profile scandals to trigger public anger and demand for accountability from the state. When the public recognized the dangers of corruption, this would empower them to take action and elevate the corruption issue into the problem stream. This is also one of the focusing factors that affect the structural elements of MSF (the three streams, the policy entrepreneur, and the policy window). Thus, policy entrepreneurs within civil society use such focusing events to bring about policy change. Civil society then becomes a champion of anticorruption processes, able to skillfully navigate different stages of the policy process and make compromises when necessary, while the state and business, as sources of resistance, cause delays in the policymaking process. Focusing events then become critical in this stream, such as new information about a policy solution that would make a policy option feasible, and the coupling of the streams occurs, opening policy windows.

48Respondent N53 added that civil society was not the ultimate solution to anticorruption advocacy as many of them relied on foreign donors to stay afloat. Thus, their lobbying efforts and drumming of public pressure depended on foreign funding and this made the public to dismiss some of them as agents of foreign powers. The politicization of such efforts would make the actualization of MSF’s policy window problematic.

49Respondent N17, on the other hand, held the view that the state automation and introduction of e-government reduced one-on-one interaction with the public, and this reduced opportunities for corruption and was a commendable effort by the state. This was an example of a successful policy initiative, as changing priorities within the political leadership (state) led to successful anticorruption agendas. However, the role of business in anticorruption within information processing was adverse as respondent K45 reported that many businesses sought to beat these anticorruption policy agendas. The data also shows there was an interplay between the state (devolved governments), business, and civil society that affected information processing (dissemination procedures, dissemination channels, and their accessibility) due to changing priorities and vested interests. This situation created information asymmetries among the actors and affected anticorruption policymaking processes in this highly fluid and competitive environment.

Public awareness

50Respondents K39, N3, N35, and K18 were of the view that public awareness in the form of civic education is largely carried out by civil society and less by state and business actors. When the state and business actors do not participate in creating public awareness, it leaves the bulk of the work to poorly resourced and ad hoc players who do not have the technical resources of the state and business. This means that the corruption problem, as envisaged in MSF, would face tremendous difficulties as public awareness is critical in the ripening of this stream. The problem stream is crucial in applying pressure on the policy stream, which consists of policy communities such as academia and think tanks. When such policy communities adopt the positions of civil society and members of the public, the problem stream and the policy stream move towards coupling, as pressure is also built on the political class (the state) through public pressure. Public awareness is also capable of capturing the national mood and thus affecting the politics stream.

51In the Kenyan context, the MSF problem stream is fraught with difficulties when there is an information asymmetry between the public (represented by civil society activists), the state (represented by devolved governments), and the business community. Public awareness and civic education are therefore crucial to ensure that the public and civil society are well informed about anticorruption processes. If the public does not perceive corruption as a problem due to ignorance or incapacity to comprehend what is going on, it becomes very difficult to bring corruption into the problem stream as envisaged by MSF. Although informed members of civil society (activists/lobbyists) may emerge as policy entrepreneurs within the problem stream and rally support for anticorruption initiatives, the participation of the wider public is crucial and the importance of public awareness cannot be denied (Cohen, 2021).

52Further data from this study shows that devolution of services without conducting public awareness in the form of civic education does not solve the corruption problem. Respondent K37 shared:

Watu wanasema wenyeji ndio wanaweza kujua hali ya huduma kutoka kwa serikali ya mseto. Lakini tumeona wengi hawajui kile kinaendelea.

(People say local people are the ones who are able to know the level of service from the devolved government. But we have seen many people do not understand what is going on).

53Thus, although the available literature advances the view that devolution improves accountability, it is not always the case that local people are better informed or in a better position to evaluate the performance of devolved governments. Such views do not account for the fluid and autopoietic nature of corruption, where more accountability would lead to more people being co-opted into the gravy train, leading to increased corruption (Boone, et al., 2019). Further, scholars who argue that local people are capable of evaluating the local government’s performance do not take into account the role of local elites (such as powerful business groups) in blocking attempts to hold local governments to account (Chege & Wang, 2020). There is also an assumption that greater accountability will lead to greater citizen empowerment to reduce corruption, which is not always the case. Local communities may not always be informed of their rights, especially in low-income countries with high illiteracy levels (Mulyaman, Ismail, & Raya, 2019). This is mainly due to information asymmetry between those in leadership and citizens, as citizens do not always have the same information or the capacity to interpret and act on it (Mulyaman, Ismail, & Raya, 2019). Thus, public awareness is critical in ensuring that the problem stream and the policy stream are actively engaging in the anticorruption agenda setting space, in accordance with MSF.

54Data from respondents N46, K12, N3, K43, and K27 show that although there have been incidents, crises, and symbols associated with corruption in both Kiambu and Nairobi City county, these have not been accompanied by feedback mechanisms that would keep the issue in the public domain long enough to hasten the ripeness of the problem stream. MSF envisages that corruption would be identified as a problem when public interest congregates around it, and when significant public attention dramatically escalates the problem to dominate county level discourses. At the same time, public interest would need to exert pressure on the political class and technocrat policy makers at the county level to take decisive action against corruption. This pressure would need to be reinforced by stakeholders from civil society and the business community within the counties. Thus, massive campaigns, boycotts, media reports, and public actions by business and civil society could increase the pressure on the devolved governments (the state) to act on the corruption problem. However, such focusing events are unlikely to be structured, as data from respondent K43 shows that civil society involvement in highlighting the corruption problem has been ad hoc.

55Studies show that there are two ways in which public initiatives can succeed in bringing corruption issues into the problem stream. One is through the leadership of a few progressive voices that are powerful enough to amplify the voices of the silent majority (Hutchinson, Balabanova, & McKee, 2019). At the county level, these voices include statements by key civil society figures who are respected locally or even nationally and internationally. Such personalities calling for action against corruption can spark a movement for change by calling for action, and lead to the ripeness of the MSF problem stream by rallying public interest and calling attention to corruption. Data from respondents K22 and N55 confirmed this view, as public awareness was cited as a critical channel for discussing anticorruption issues and elevating the issue into the problem stream. The second way is through the presence of strong civil society advocates who can act as policy entrepreneurs. According to MSF, policy entrepreneurs are critical because they know how to negotiate and are listened to and recognized for their expertise and leadership as strategic decision makers who are ready to take action (Cohen, 2016). In both Kiambu and Nairobi City counties, such civil society policy entrepreneurs were mainly activists who did not necessarily have the skills, resources and clout to push for change, as reported by respondent N43. This may explain the high levels of corruption that still persist in both counties to date (Auditor General, 2019).

56The findings show that the interplay between the state, business, and civil society in conducting (and failing to conduct) civic education forums had a significant impact on the anticorruption process. This contributed to the failure of anticorruption policies, as business and state interests took precedence and civil society efforts were ineffective due to resource constraints. The gaps in the implementation of civic education meant that anticorruption processes were largely left to run on auto-pilot. While civil society was seen as the champion of the people’s interests within the anticorruption policy space, the state and, to a large extent, business actors were seen as saboteurs of the process.

County Level Policy Instruments

57The data shows that corruption was acknowledged as a major problem among the respondents of this research, as captured by respondents K52, N5, and K40. Surprisingly, this fact was not captured in the county policy level instruments, planning guides, evaluation tools, or county reporting mechanisms. Thus, the problem stream faced challenges of acknowledgement, as official documents had not captured corruption as a problem. According to respondent N5, this situation was compounded by the absence of corruption specific solutions such as risk assessments, governance tools, emerging technologies, and case studies with best practices in the policy stream, which are critical to supporting evidence-based policymaking.

58Data from this study shows that during election cycles, politicians in both counties tended to hijack the anticorruption policy agenda and utilize it to get into office. This was captured by respondents K54 and N34, who reported that the political class was reluctant to take action against corruption as they were beneficiaries of it. Past incidents show that even when there are active policy entrepreneurs, human rights groups, food protests, and lobbyists like the unga revolution team that attempted to slay the dragon of corruption in Kenya by mobilizing public pressure around corruption, the political class was able to thwart attempts to shift public mood and avoid the ripening of MSF’s problem stream (Opalo, 2020). This shows that policy instruments at the county level were misused by the state to gain and retain political power. Thus, the electoral calendar was one of the focusing events that affected the structural elements of MSF (the three streams, the policy entrepreneur and the policy window). Anticorruption policymaking also depended on Kenya’s electoral cycle. The data demonstrates MSF’s applicability and its usefulness in capturing the contextual details that are of interest and relevance to anticorruption policymaking, but that are often overlooked due to a lack of conceptual tools in frameworks that do not utilize MSF.

59Respondents N32 and N27 said that politicians were under pressure from the national government and international organizations such as the Bretton Wood institutions and this shaped the scope, pace, and agenda of anticorruption processes in the counties. This is confirmed by research that shows that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are part of the Bretton Wood institutions, continue to play a critical role in policy agenda setting in Africa and developing countries (Knaggard, 2015). External pressure from such institutions and donors, according to MSF, is one of the pathways that can accelerate the ripeness of the politics stream. Another pathway identified in the literature is the emergence of political entrepreneurs with the resources and clout to force the ripening of the politics stream (Aviram, Cohen, & Beeri, 2019). However, data from this study shows that this has not been feasible, as respondents K54 and N34 argued that politicians are seen as beneficiaries of corruption and are therefore reluctant to strengthen the anticorruption agenda in the absence of focusing events that would force them to engage in anticorruption policymaking.

60According to MSF, policy windows in such circumstances would open up if there were important agenda setting opportunities that presented themselves either predictably or unpredictably. This would depend on factors such as when the public mood on a particular issue changes, or when the public feels that the problem no longer exists, or when the public thinks that the policy is an exercise in futility, or when a crisis is over and the public wants to move on, or when administrative changes have been made in the politics stream so that no one really cares about the problem anymore, or when there is no available policy alternative within the policy stream that can address the problem (Aviram, Cohen, & Beeri, 2019). Policy entrepreneurs who have ready-made policies available on short notice stand a good chance of having their proposals adopted when these policy windows open. Additionally, the opening of a policy window in one stream may increase the probability of spillovers and the opening up of another window in a related area (Ridde, 2009).

61Respondent N51 shared the following on the issue of anticorruption agenda setting:

Watu wa chini ndio hu-implement hizo ma-corruption policies. Akitaka kukusaidia, anaweza.

(The low cadre staff are the ones who implement those anticorruption policies. If they want to help you, they can).

62The data shows the critical role that street level bureaucrats play in setting and implementing anticorruption agendas. When left to their own interpretation of anticorruption policies, they are able to innovate and work around situations, becoming policy entrepreneurs in their own right. Other respondents, such as K4, N13, and N56, said that such policy entrepreneurs can emerge from the state (as street level bureaucrats) or from the business community, depending on varying interests. From the data, it appears that such policy entrepreneurs have easier access to political decision makers, in times of crisis or during elections when the public mood is against corrupt leaders. Respondent N13 explained that such entrepreneurs needed to be skilled in understanding the deep-rooted interests of political leaders and align these interests with the public mood. This required the application of favorable strategies that would keep the political class happy and at the same time improve the public mood against corruption. Thus, balancing interests was key to successful policy entrepreneurship within county level policymaking processes.

63County level policy instruments were also strongly related to policy entrepreneurship and policy venue dynamics, with findings showing that the state, business, and civil society played different roles in an attempt to influence the anticorruption policy process. While the state mainly served political interests and business served business interests, civil society largely served public interest. Thus, civil society became a champion of the anticorruption agenda, while the state and business community were sources of resistance and reluctance. This led to the view that the state (politicians/devolved governments) and business were the main beneficiaries of corruption and did not want to change the status quo.

Conclusion

64The empirical data presented in this paper shows that the coupling of the problem and policy streams is rare, as policy solutions to corruption are imprecise and often contested. Further, corruption is not viewed as a problem by key stakeholders such as the state or business unless it is inconvenient for them. While civil society tries to play the role of policy entrepreneur, opportunities to couple the problem and policy streams are often missed because the public does not understand the dynamics of anticorruption policymaking and policy communities such as civil society are unable to come up with viable solutions due to a lack of technical capacity. Further, the policy stream lacks vocal policy entrepreneurs outside of civil society to champion and shape the anticorruption agenda. Also, when data from both counties was compared, the results were more or less similar, making a comparative discussion unseemly. Contextually, several factors that could be described as focusing events also emerged, such as balancing interests, state capture, and electoral calendars, and these affected the structural elements of the MSF (the three streams, the policy entrepreneur, and the policy windows). Thus, in Kiambu and Nairobi City counties, the problem stream may mature when there is increased media spotlight on corruption within the devolved governments, increased coverage of corruption scandals uncovered by the Auditor General’s reports, and the amplification of the content of the reports to various audiences and civil society actors, together with increased scholarly works identifying corruption as a significant threat to devolution in the counties (Hutchinson, Balabanova, & McKee, 2019). The inclusion of the business community in anticorruption agenda setting may be a game changer, as corruption increases the cost of doing business and it would be in the interests of big business to have corruption reigned in (outside of rent seeking).

65The political stream, on the other hand, will mature with the recognition of the problem stream by the political leadership within the counties (state) and may ripen due to public pressure, coupled with the pressure of judicial actions and pronouncements against corruption. When these coalesce, they could lead to the coupling of the problem, policy, and political streams and create a policy window for tackling corruption. The authors believe that changes in the public attitude at the county level and the encouragement of more corruption research, coupled with international support, could lead to the inclusion of corruption to the problem stream in Kenya’s devolved system of government.

66This paper has contributed to the literature on the multiple-streams framework and demonstrated the applicability of the framework to anticorruption policymaking in devolved systems of government in Kenya. It has been useful in explaining the three streams of the MSF (problem, policy, political) and its two key structural elements (the policy entrepreneur, the policy window), and the role and interplay of the state, business, and civil society, within the context of Kenya’s anticorruption agenda setting process. Although a few researchers have attempted to apply the framework in devolved contexts in Africa, this may be the first time, to the authors’ knowledge, that this framework has been applied to interrogate the anticorruption policymaking process in devolved governments in Kenya. The paper concludes with a call for more empirical research using the MSF and the conceptual tools of this research to advance scholarship in this area.

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Justa Mwangi and Wilson Muna, Slaying the Dragon of Corruption: Application of Multiple-Streams Framework in Anticorruption Policy Processes in Devolved Systems of Government in KenyaInternational Review of Public Policy [Online], 6:3 | 2024, Online since 30 December 2024, connection on 18 March 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/4488; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/13gfs

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About the authors

Justa Mwangi

Kenyatta University, Kenya

Wilson Muna

Kenyatta University, Kenya

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