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Policy change and the persuasive potential of polysemic ideas: What explains coalition-building success?

Tamara Tubakovic and Marina Cino Pagliarello

Abstract

This article examines the persuasive potential of polysemic ideas in contexts where powerful actors are needed to generate new policy decisions or non-incremental changes to existing policies. Polysemic ideas are those characterised by ambiguity, allowing for multiple interpretations, and consequently adaptability to new environments (Cino Pagliarello, 2022a). However, we argue that there is a paucity of empirical cases, especially cases pointing to variation in the contexts in which polysemic ideas are successful in facilitating coalition-building and driving policy change. We address this gap by examining two cases of polysemic ideas from the European Union: the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ in education policy, which succeeded in forging a new policy consensus and shifting preferences about cooperation in education (Cino Pagliarello, 2022b), and ‘Solidarity’ in asylum policy, which failed to unite Member States around the need for major changes to the EU asylum distribution system (Tubakovic, 2019). We explain this variation by drawing on the policy learning literature. We argue that, when successful, polysemic ideas persuade policymakers to reassess their beliefs and recognise new shared possibilities to achieving their interests under the new policy framework. Trust and collaborative structures are nevertheless essential to this learning process.

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Introduction

1We explore coalition-building in complex institutional contexts with diverging policy interests and diffuse power among actors. These include international organisations, such as the European Union (EU), which often lack the power to impose decisions. The likelihood of policy change in these contexts often depends on a process of learning and soft coordination among key actors. Persuasion and argumentation through the exchange of ideas and the updating of beliefs, rather than the deployment of material power, are crucial to this learning process (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). The argument that ideas are critical to explaining public policy outcomes is now well established (Swinkels, 2020; Béland & Cox, 2016; Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 2002; Hall, 1993; Stone, 1989; Schmidt, 2008). Yet, we still lack a deeper understanding of how the nature of ideas might facilitate consensus-building for policy change.

2We focus on a particular type of idea – those that are polysemantic – and show how they facilitate consensus around new policy goals in arenas with conflicting preferences and unclear or contested authority. A fundamental and intrinsic quality of polysemic ideas is their ambiguity, which allows for multiple interpretations and consequently adaptability to new environments (Cino Pagliarello, 2022a). In particular, the focus has been on how polysemic ideas can act as ‘coalition magnets’ (Béland & Cox, 2016; Hannah & Baekkeskov, 2020). Due to their broad appeal, polysemic ideas can aggregate old and new actors with multiple and divergent preferences. Polysemic ideas have been conceptualised as discursive framing devices (Schmidt, 2008). Policy entrepreneurs draw on polysemic framing to connect their ideas to important values and interests held by the various policy actors. Understood from this perspective, polysemic ideas function as ‘boundary objects’ around which policy actors can each find points of agreement on the proposed policy changes (Cino Pagliarello, 2022a).

3Granted that polysemic ideas can work as coalition magnets (Béland & Cox, 2016; Jenson, 2020), there is a paucity of empirical cases, especially cases pointing to variation in the contexts in which polysemic ideas are successful in driving policy change. There is also a problem of vagueness in the language of ideational politics (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2022) unless we specify exactly the beliefs that make up an idea and what type of idea we are talking about.

4We address these gaps by examining polysemic ideas in two cases from the European Union: the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ in education policy, which succeeded in forging a new policy consensus and shifting preferences about cooperation in education (Cino Pagliarello, 2022b), and ‘Solidarity’ in asylum policy, which was intended to unite Member States around the need for major changes to the EU asylum distribution system but failed to do so (Tubakovic, 2019). Here, we ask why polysemic ideas succeed in facilitating positive change decisions in some cases but not in others. By exploring a positive (EU education policy) and a negative (EU asylum policy) case, we seek to identify the processes necessary for polysemic ideas to succeed in fostering robust coalition-building for policy change.

5We argue that, when successful, polysemic ideas, acting as boundary objects, contribute to the emergence of consensus by allowing actors with divergent interests to recognise the usefulness and desirability of the policy for achieving their (unique) interests. We contend that polysemic framing was successful in our first case because it persuaded Member States to reassess their beliefs and recognise new common opportunities for achieving their interests under the new policy framework. It prompted a cognitive shift in how actors perceived their preferences and interests in relation to the proposed policy change, informing subsequent coalition-building efforts. Conversely, in the second case, the use of a polysemic idea to frame the policy process in appealing terms failed to convince Member States that the proposed policy change would be mutually beneficial. Mistrust of the Commission’s use of solidarity and the adversarial nature of the negotiations hindered Member States’ receptivity to a change in beliefs.

6While existing studies have compared the persuasive potential of polysemic ideas with that of narrowly defined or more coherent ideas, our contribution lies in elucidating further what it is that polysemic ideas ‘do’ that make consensus-building possible. This article integrates insights from the ideational literature and policy learning frameworks to propose a nuanced approach that highlights the transformative potential of polysemic ideas in complex policy environments. Specifically, we show how polysemic ideas, as constructs with varied meanings, can facilitate consensus when they lead policy actors to reinterpret their policy interests and recognise the value of change. However, it is under precise scope conditions that polysemic ideas can generate agreement and change, which is key because the literature often conflates all ideas into a single category (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2022). By unpacking ideas into the beliefs they are made of, we can better understand their distinct roles and contributions to policy learning and change. Thus, in line with the spirit of this Special Issue, which is to contribute to ongoing efforts to move beyond traditional policy process theories and systematise policy learning as an autonomous theoretical field, our aim is to pinpoint the relationship between policy change, polysemic ideas, and policy learning.

7The structure of this article is therefore as follows. In the next section, we set out the problem we are addressing and our theoretical argument. We first discuss the literature on ideas and policy change, demonstrating the scholarly support that polysemic ideas can facilitate cooperation and consensus among actors in situations where there are conflicting preferences on highly salient and institutionally complex issues. We then highlight current limitations in our understanding of how polysemic ideas facilitate robust coalition-building, and what explains variation in cases. Here, we introduce policy learning as a useful lens for understanding why some polysemic ideas are more successful in leading to durable changes. While our work is conceptual in nature, we also contribute empirically by providing preliminary insights from two cases of EU policymaking. In these ‘illustrative’ cases, the empirical discussion is intended to give the reader ‘a feel for the theoretical argument’ (Levy, 2008, p. 7), rather than a rigorous test. We conclude with a discussion comparing the policymaking conditions in our two cases, highlighting the importance of certain factors, such as trust and collaborative structures, in explaining why cognitive shifts took place in the first case and not in the second.

The persuasive potential of polysemic ideas and their role in policy learning

8The argument that ideas are critical for explaining public policy outcomes is now well established (Swinkels, 2020; Béland & Cox, 2016; Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 2002; Hall, 1993; Stone, 1989; Schmidt, 2008). Scholars have examined the causal power of ideas, their relationship to institutions, and their independence from interest-based explanations (Blyth, 2002; Béland, 2019). Crucially, scholars have analysed the role played by ideas at different levels of generality and their influence on public policy content and outputs. Campbell (2002) distinguishes between ideas operating in the background, such as ‘policy paradigms’, normative ‘public sentiments’, and public philosophies, each of which are said to constrain the range of policies that policymakers are likely to consider useful or appropriate. They act as ‘guiding principles’ or ‘blueprints’ that shape decision-making in the ‘political foreground’ (Campbell, 2004; Hall, 1993). This latter space is occupied by more specific and actionable policy ideas, which are often seen as potential sources of change (Campbell, 2002; Mehta, 2010). Here, scholars have distinguished between ideas as problem definitions – which give meaning to the nature of the issue that policymakers are addressing –, and programmatic ideas, which tell policymakers how to solve particular policy problems (Campbell, 2004). These policy-relevant beliefs contain assumptions about cause and effect and provide constructed solutions to perceived policy problems which, when accepted by policymakers, form the content of public policy (Migone et al., 2024; Blyth, 2002). The argument here, then, is that changes in policy processes and outputs are closely linked to ideational changes.

9Central to understanding the influence of ideas on policy outcomes is the question of how they are collectively adopted by policy actors. Successful ideas are those that generate enough critical support to be adopted in policy or that otherwise lead to some form of political change (Béland & Cox, 2016, p. 430). As Hannah and Baekkeskov (2020, p. 439) have argued, ‘change rarely occurs without persuasive conceptualized alternatives to the policy status quo.’ Here, recent ideational analysis has explored the characteristics of ideas, and more specifically beliefs, to understand their persuasive potential (Campbell, 2002; Mehta, 2010; Swinkels, 2020; Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2022; Jabko, 2019). In doing so, these perspectives suggest that ideas are not monolithic constructs; rather, they are malleable and strategic assemblages of beliefs that can be deployed by actors in the policy change process (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2022; see also Jabko, 2019).

10The persuasive potential of polysemic ideas to influence policy processes has subsequently emerged as a key research agenda in policy studies (Béland & Cox, 2016; Cino Pagliarello, 2022a; Hannah & Baekkeskov, 2020; Radaelli, 2023). ‘Polysemic’ ideas are defined by their flexibility and openness to differing interpretations by policy stakeholders (McNeill, 2006, p. 347). Ideational scholarship has at times tended to emphasise the importance of consistency and logicality in the strength of an idea. Yet, terms in the literature such as ambiguity (McNeill 2006), seeming coherence (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016), multidimensionality (Skogstad & Wilder, 2019), multivocality, and ‘chameleonic’ (Smith, 2013) highlight the importance of ideational flexibility in shaping policy change, promoting consensus-building, and enabling institutional change (Eisl, 2020). This scholarship shows that shared ideas do not need to be ‘all-encompassing or systematic’ (Hannah & Baekkeskov, 2020). While coherence and coordination explain coalition-building within theories such as the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 1988), recent scholarship has argued that polysemic ideas provide analytical leverage for understanding how consensus can be constructed between diverse stakeholders with conflicting policy preferences (Cino Pagliarello, 2022a; 2022b).

11Polysemic ideas are particularly important where several powerful actors are needed to generate new policy decisions or non-incremental changes to existing policies. Béland and Cox (2016; 2024) have shown how polysemic ideas can play a crucial role in political coalition formation by acting as ‘coalition magnets.’ These ideas have the unique capacity to appeal to a variety of individuals and groups and are strategically used by policy entrepreneurs to ‘frame interests, mobilise supporters, and build coalitions’ (Béland & Cox, 2016, p. 249). Polysemic ideas are successful because they allow policy instruments that are potentially divisive on their own to be attached to broader ideas that garner support from diverse stakeholders (Hannah & Baekkeskov, 2020, p. 439). Polysemic ideas can be understood, then, as discursive strategies used by policy entrepreneurs to persuade others of (alternative) ideas for public policy. In this case, the positive role of ambiguity is related to the fact that ideas help actors ‘define their interests, and that broader – and vaguer – ideas are more likely to appeal to a greater number of policy actors that have heterogenous preferences’ (Béland & Cox, 2016, p. 432). Such ideas are attractive to policy entrepreneurs who will seek to use these polysemic ideas to create broad coalitions that transcend political divisions (Béland & Cox, 2016).

12This argument is also reflected in other work emphasising the virtues of more malleable ideas and frames. Skogstadt and Wilder (2019, p. 348) claim that multidimensional ideas not only help to create a bandwagon effect, they also ensure that opposition remains fragmented. Faling and Biesbroek (2019) similarly emphasise the importance of employing multiple frames in building cross-sectoral coalitions. Ambiguity in policy concepts can then be strategic in situations where clarity would provoke strong opposition (Jegen & Mérand, 2014). For example, in the EU context, ambiguity can be a strategy to promote integration when Member State policy preferences are heterogeneous (Jegen & Mérand, 2014). Jabko (2006) refers to this as ‘strategic constructivism,’ where social constructions are used instrumentally to build consensus among actors with divergent interests. He demonstrates this with the example of how the European Commission used the term ‘market’ to relaunch the EU in the 1980s, as ‘market’ could be a construction made up of quite different beliefs, each construction appealing to different constituencies. The success of polysemic ideas hence lies in their ability to resonate with multiple audiences.

13While all polysemic ideas can be ambiguous, not all ambiguous ideas are polysemic. Ambiguity generally refers to ideas that are vague or unclear, allowing for various interpretations. This lack of clarity can lead to potential misunderstandings and exacerbate conflicts. In contrast, polysemy refers to a single idea that has multiple related meanings, allowing different actors to find relevance based on their specific context. These related meanings can be strategically leveraged by actors to bridge gaps between divergent interests, facilitating cooperation and consensus in complex policy environments.

14While the existing literature has focused on demonstrating the coalition-building success of polysemic ideas compared to that of narrowly defined ideas (Béland & Cox, 2016; Jenson, 2020; Mohun Himmelweit & Lee, 2024), our contribution lies in advancing understanding of what it is that polysemic ideas ‘do’ that make consensus-building possible. Our query stems from the observation that not all polysemic ideas succeed in bridging divergent interests. There is a lack of research design strategies that include both positive and negative cases. Variation is key to understanding the contexts in which polysemic ideas are successful in building coalitions. This article explores two cases where polysemic ideas were deployed by the same policy entrepreneur – the European Commission – to foster agreement among the conflicting preferences of EU Member States on new policy developments. In one case, the idea of a ‘Europe of Knowledge’ succeeded in forging a new policy consensus and shifted member state preferences for cooperation in EU education policy, while in the other, ‘Solidarity’ succeeded in mobilising collective attention on the issue of asylum at the EU’s southern border but failed to maintain consensus on EU-level solutions. By exploring a positive (education) and a negative (asylum) case, we are able to trace how policymakers engaged with the European Commission’s polysemic framing, and why polysemy in the first case, but not in the second, succeeded in shifting policymakers’ preferences towards the proposed policy changes.

15Our argument is that the polysemic framing in the first case was successful because it persuaded Member States to reassess their beliefs and identify new common opportunities for achieving their interests under the new policy framework. Because polysemic ideas convey different meanings to different audiences, actors with diverging interests can recognise the usefulness and desirability of the policy for achieving their (unique) interests - and subsequently come to share the same policy preferences. This argument builds on Béland and Cox’s (2016, p. 429, our italics) claim that polysemic ideas ‘awaken a policy preference in the minds of actors.’ We show how in the first case, polysemic framing prompted a cognitive shift in how actors perceived their preferences and interests in relation to the proposed policy change, informing subsequent coalition-building efforts. In the second case, however, policy consensus was not attained because Member States continued to express distrust in the practical meaning of ‘solidarity’. To explain why this cognitive shift occurred in the first case and not in the second, we draw on the literature on policy learning and individual belief change.

16Policy learning has been recognised as a crucial mechanism for explaining how and why policies change or remain stable (Radaelli & Zaki, Introduction to SI, 2024). Major theories and frameworks of the policy process, such as the advocacy coalition framework (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014), theories of institutional or organisational change (Shaw, 2017), and theories of policy transfer and diffusion (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Rose, 1991), all employ ‘learning’ as a core construct. More recently, some scholars have argued that policy learning is a distinct theoretical lens on the policy process (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2018). There has been a proliferation of studies defining various learning types (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2017), learning modes (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013), and the conditions for policy learning (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013; Riche et al., 2021). Our analytical focus is on how polysemic framing facilitated a change in policymakers’ perceptions of their interests towards the policy changes proposed by the European Commission. Thus, we draw on studies examining ‘individual’ learning. Individual policy learning has been shown to have important corollary outcomes, such as ‘simplifying the emergence of shared interpretations of policy issues or facilitating agreement among policy actors’ (Moyson, 2018, p. 89; Leach et al., 2014). Changes in individual policy beliefs are thus an important first step in the process of consensus-building and policy change.

17Our argument is informed by Moyson’s (2018) work on policy learning and the role of interests. Policy learning often refers to the process that leads an individual to revise their policy beliefs and preferences (Riche et al., 2021; Moyson et al., 2017). Actors hold both predictive and evaluative policy beliefs. In the context of the policy process, predictive beliefs concern the expected outcomes of policy programmes. These are policy beliefs that relate to ‘cause-effect relationships’ – they constitute beliefs about the causes of problems, blame, and responsibility. They also constitute beliefs about what would be the most effective solutions to the defined problem. It is these beliefs that are often considered to be subject to change as a result of knowledge acquisition and social interactions. Moyson (2018, p. 92) nevertheless contends that policy learning is a broader concept that ‘equally denotes the cognitive and social processes that lead to changes in the evaluative beliefs of policy actors.’ Evaluative beliefs concern the desirability of the outcomes of the policy process, and thus the policies themselves. Moyson (2018) examines the case of the liberalisation of the Belgian rail industry. In his case, evaluative beliefs constitute an actor’s preference that ‘it would be desirable that new companies are allowed to operate trains’, leading to the view that ‘the liberalisation policy would be desirable.’ The theoretical argument is that actors may come to support policy changes – i.e., their preferences about the desirability of the policy may change – when they come to believe that the proposed policy is consistent with or realises their interests (Moyson, 2018).

18We argue that polysemic framing helps to persuade actors to see the value and benefits of the policy change for their unique interests. Despite having diverging interests, actors can still come to share the belief that the new policy is desirable. The ambiguity of polysemic ideas allows for multiple entry points into a policy discourse where actors make sense of their own interests, concerns, or beliefs. What polysemic ideas ‘do’ here then is to act as focal points or ‘boundary objects’ (Cino Pagliarello, 2022a) around which actors with different interests can find points of agreement with each other. Because polysemic ideas are structured enough to be recognised and malleable enough to be interpreted according to different worldviews, actors can maintain coherence, negotiate differences, and ultimately reach agreement. This subsequently informs consensus-building and, in turn, can facilitate the adoption of new policies (Leach et al., 2014, p. 594). Essentially, polysemic framing, in the language of Béland and Cox (2016), can ‘awaken’ or ‘shift’ the preferences of policy actors by persuading them to see the policy change as desirable. As actors with ‘vastly different interests come to embrace’ the polysemic framing (Béland & Cox, 2024, p. 242), a convergence in evaluative beliefs is made possible. Thus, for polysemic ideas to be ‘successful’ in consensus-building, they need to prompt a revising of policy beliefs.

19Our contribution then lies in elucidating further what makes some polysemic ideas successful in building and sustaining support for policy change. By contending that the transformative potential of polysemic ideas lies in their capacity to facilitate cognitive changes among actors, we advance the existing scholarship on polysemic ideas. Our paper integrates insights from ideational scholarship with the policy learning literature – polysemic ideas not only help to form alliances by accommodating diverse viewpoints, but they also encourage actors to rethink and update their own beliefs, leading in some cases to genuine policy learning. Understanding how polysemic ideas sustain political coalitions during policy formulation and decision-making is crucial in contemporary policymaking contexts, where the complexity and transboundary nature of many policy issues means that policymaking now involves multilevel governance processes at subnational, national, and transnational levels, with a diverse array of public and private policy actors. Policymakers navigate complex or ‘wicked problems’ and find ways to manage conflict (Hannah & Baekkeskov, 2020). How far polysemic ideas can drive learning and meaningful policy action on issues characterised by complexity or potential conflicts of interests and values is therefore an important area for analysis.

20Our conceptual argument is illustrated through two cases – the 'Europe of Knowledge' in EU education policy and 'Solidarity' in EU asylum policy. The two empirical cases are developed through ideational process tracing - their diffusion, construction, and reconstruction in political and policy discourse. Process tracing is valuable for observing and interpreting the sequence of events, including details on relevant actors, their beliefs, and how these beliefs are aggregated to produce the collective outcome (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 105). The empirical sections draw on documentary analysis and secondary sources to substantiate claims about cognitive changes and coalition dynamics. Data were collected from official EU documents – including European Commission communications, reports, Council of the EU decisions, European Council summit conclusions, European Parliament reports, and speeches by officials – and secondary literature to gather evidence on key policy developments in both cases.

21Our cases serve as plausibility probes within the comparative case study method, allowing us to explore the dynamics of belief and preference change and the role of polysemic ideas in shaping these processes. Plausibility probes are an intermediary step between hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing cases. They are intended to shed light on a broader theoretical argument by ‘illustrating’ it through the details of a particular case (Levy, 2008, p. 6). As illustrative cases, they are not intended to test theoretical propositions, but rather to give the reader ‘a feel for a theoretical argument’ (Levy, 2008, p. 7) by providing a concrete example of its application. Consequently, our cases are not exhaustive. What we have done instead is to draw on the most salient examples from our cases which substantiate our theoretical claim. Our first case illustrates how the European Commission’s ‘Europe of Knowledge’ frame convinced the EU Member States to reconsider their preferences for coordinating education policy, whereas the second case demonstrates that ‘solidarity’, while successful in mobilising attention to the issue of asylum, did little to shift member state interests. By identifying ‘at least one relevant case’ (Eckstein, 1975, p. 109), we demonstrate the relevance of our conceptual contribution. Moreover, by comparing a positive and negative case, we are able to identify potentially favourable conditions for the success of polysemic framing – thus paving the way for further theoretical refinement.

The polysemy of the ‘knowledge economy’ in European education policy

22The evolution of European education policies has been marked by a persistent tension between the European Commission’s aspiration to expand its influence in this policy domain and the entrenched reluctance of Member States to relinquish control over such a politically and culturally sensitive field (Cino Pagliarello, 2022b). However, the Lisbon Council of March 2000, under the Portuguese Presidency, introduced the Lisbon Strategy, which signalled a transformative shift in the governance of education within the European Union. This strategy represented a significant departure from Member States' traditional resistance to coordinated education policies, as the European Commission successfully navigated conflicting preferences to establish a framework for the coordination of national education systems without the need for formal treaty amendments (Walkenhorst, 2008). Framed within the discourse of the "Europe of Knowledge," the Lisbon Strategy underscored education's centrality to European economic and social policymaking, particularly its pivotal role in fostering the knowledge economy and enhancing employment prospects (European Council, 2000, p. 3; Ravinet, 2008, p. 28). Scholars widely regard the Lisbon Strategy as a paradigmatic 'turning point' in European education policy, positioning education as a foundational pillar of the European knowledge-based economic model (Novoa & deJong-Lambert, 2003, p. 55). For the first time, Member States collectively endorsed common objectives, benchmarks, and indicators to be pursued through the newly established Open Method of Coordination (OMC). This innovative governance mechanism relied on a non-legislative, consensus-driven approach, incorporating fixed guidelines, both quantitative and qualitative indicators, and iterative processes of monitoring, peer review, and benchmarking best practices to foster cooperation and alignment across divergent national systems (European Council, 2000). The OMC thus institutionalised a flexible yet structured mode of governance that preserved Member States’ autonomy while promoting a coherent European agenda for education.

23However, it would be an oversimplification to assume that the adoption of the OMC in education was a seamless process universally embraced by Member States. In fact, the late 1990s were marked by significant challenges and scepticism towards the initiatives in this domain. One notable controversy revolved around the management of mobility programmes, particularly the Leonardo programme, which faced widespread criticism from Member States. This criticism was further compounded by the resignation of Edith Cresson, the then Commissioner for Education, who was accused of fraud and corruption, which ultimately led to the resignation of the entire European Commission (Ertl, 2006, p. 12). While the OMC had already been employed in economic, monetary, and employment policies (Kröger, 2009), its application to education encountered resistance, despite repeated assurances that it would not undermine national sovereignty in this sensitive policy field. The President of the European Council, Guilherme de Oliveira Martins, emphasised the distinction between convergence and harmonisation, stating: “We are speaking of convergence and not harmonisation. We want to make a comparison to see what is being done elsewhere and under no circumstances do we want to impose any sort of model” (Agence Europe, 2000a). This principle of convergence over harmonisation was reiterated on multiple occasions to allay Member States’ concerns and to reassure them that the OMC would not result in a loss of sovereignty (Agence Europe, 2000b). For instance, Germany and the Netherlands viewed the OMC as a potential intrusion into their national education systems (Agence Europe, 2001). German policymakers repeatedly raised concerns about the use of benchmarks in education, fearing that these would lead to unwelcome external interference in their policies. These objections were eventually allayed by assurances that the European Union's involvement would remain strictly non-intrusive. As Commissioner for Education Viviane Reding clarified, “Germany, with its Länder for education policy, does not wish to be excluded from international comparisons. But the Länder believe there is a problem when comparison entails decisions. What Germany fears here is EU interference with regard to education” (Agence Europe, 2003). This delicate balancing act of addressing Member States' fears while promoting European cooperation illustrates the intricate negotiations that underpinned the adoption of the OMC in education, revealing a landscape of diverging and unstable preferences among Member States regarding the introduction of the OMC in education.

24Despite these initial challenges, the European Commission's strategic use of the polysemic 'Europe of Knowledge' framework, combined with reassurances and open dialogue, gradually shifted Member States’ evaluative beliefs and fostered a shared understanding of the benefits of coordinated education policies. With the launch of the Lisbon Strategy, the European Commission made the 'Europe of Knowledge' the primary goal of the EU, employing terms such as 'knowledge economy' and 'knowledge society' interchangeably to link knowledge to both economic and social objectives. Leaders such as Maria Joao Rodrigues and Antonio Guterres emphasised knowledge as the main source of wealth and envisioned a transformative shift towards knowledge-based economies and societies (Rodrigues, 2002, p. 3). Consequently, the Lisbon Strategy positioned education as a vital tool for economic and social progress, garnering support from diverse political leaders and intellectuals.

25The polysemic nature of the 'Europe of Knowledge' made it possible to reconcile these competing objectives, linking economic competitiveness to broader social goals. For instance, Jan Figel, the European Commissioner for Education (2004–2009), stressed that investing in the knowledge economy was essential for growth (Agence Europe, 2005). Similarly, President Manuel José Barroso underscored the role of the knowledge economy in safeguarding Europe’s global competitiveness, particularly in an environment where competitors relied on low-cost labour or natural resources (CEC, 2005). At the same time, the Commission framed growth as intrinsically linked to social objectives, arguing that economic prosperity should lead to improved standards of living. Viviane Reding emphasised that education should serve multiple objectives, including economic competitiveness, employability, citizenship, and social cohesion (CEC, 2000). The inherent polysemy of the 'Europe of Knowledge' discourse allowed the Commission to tailor its meaning, accommodating divergent interests through dialogue and adaptation.

26The concept of the 'Europe of Knowledge' was used in different ways by Member States. According to Dehmel (2006), 'knowledge' (related to economy or society) encompasses individual lifelong learning, educational credentials, experiential learning, and market interests. This polysemy was evident in the debates among Member States before and after the Lisbon Strategy. For Germany and France, it meant addressing youth unemployment and imparting skills; Finland emphasised job creation through information and communication technologies; Greece highlighted employability, social cohesion, citizenship, linguistic diversity, and e-learning; and Italy and Ireland stressed lifelong learning to meet the demands of the knowledge economy (Cino Pagliarello, 2022b). These examples illustrate how Member States interpreted the concept in ways that aligned with their national priorities, demonstrating the role of polysemy in accommodating diverse preferences within a shared framework.

27The knowledge economy was also ambiguously associated with principles of equity and quality, further demonstrating its polysemic utility. The Commission linked equity to individuals’ ability to benefit from education, framing it simultaneously as an educational outcome and an economic commodity (CEC, 2006). Quality, while left undefined, was tied to competitiveness, encompassing better jobs and work-life balance (CEC, 2000). This ambiguity gave Member States the flexibility to prioritise those aspects of the knowledge economy that were most relevant to their domestic contexts, while still aligning with the overarching EU agenda. Additionally, the knowledge economy was positioned as a foundation for knowledge-based policies, with investments in research and innovation aimed at boosting Europe’s growth. This vision aligned with broader initiatives such as the 'European Research Area' and the 'European Higher Education Area,' designed to enhance Europe’s scientific and technological capabilities (Chou & Gornitzka, 2014). Furthermore, the knowledge economy carried normative weight, serving as a benchmark for evaluation and a platform for the exchange of best practices (Dima et al., 2018; Grek & Lawn, 2016).

28This alignment, achieved through the flexibility of polysemic framing and iterative dialogue, paved the way for the concrete developments that followed the Lisbon Strategy, demonstrating how initial resistance transformed into active cooperation. Between 2001 and 2002, significant developments advanced the goals set by the Lisbon Strategy in concrete terms. In March 2001, the Education Council outlined ‘The concrete future objectives of education and training systems,’ signalling a willingness among Member States to cooperate while preserving their distinct education structures (CEC, 2000, § 37). Ministers agreed on three strategic objectives: improving education quality and effectiveness, broadening access, and opening up systems to the wider world. Despite resistance to harmonisation, this marked a recognition of the shared goals to “use education together.” The 2002 Barcelona European Council consolidated this momentum by adopting the ‘Education and Training 2010’ framework, which aimed to make European education systems a world-quality reference by 2010 (Council of the European Union, 2004, p.43). For the first time, substantial political cooperation in education took place, integrating national and EU initiatives into coherent strategies (European Commission, 2004, p.5). This framework was further extended with ‘Education and Training 2020,’ which emphasised lifelong learning, equity, quality, and innovation as cornerstones of the EU’s broader strategy for growth and employment (Council of the European Union, 2009).

29Concrete policy instruments also emerged. Tools such as the European Qualifications Framework (EQF), Europass, and the European Quality Assurance Framework for VET linked education to labour market outcomes by enhancing the comparability and transparency of skills and qualifications across Member States (European Commission, 2006). The OMC institutionalised comparability through benchmarks, indicators, and shared best practices, fostering alignment while respecting national autonomy (Corbett, 2012). Additionally, processes such as Bologna and Copenhagen established systems for the mutual recognition of degrees and vocational qualifications, ensuring transparency and cross-border mobility (Novoa & deJong-Lambert, 2003). The European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) further advanced mobility by standardising the accumulation and recognition of academic credits across national borders (European Parliament and Council, 2009). Programmes such as Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci, and Comenius expanded cooperation and mutual learning while making qualifications more portable and aligned with EU objectives (Gornitzka, 2010). Collectively, these initiatives concretely demonstrated how the Lisbon Strategy’s vision was translated into institutionalised mechanisms for education reform, enabling Member States to gradually align their policies with shared EU goals.

30Ultimately, the case of the Lisbon Strategy illustrates how the European Commission leveraged polysemic framing and open communication to align initially divergent Member State preferences, enabling the implementation of a coordinated education policy agenda, even within the constraints of a fragmented governance structure.

The ‘multioperability’ of solidarity in EU asylum policy

31The 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ revealed problems with the implementation and achievement of EU goals for a common asylum policy. In particular, EU policymakers recognised the flawed design of the EU’s asylum system, which contributed to an asymmetrical distribution of asylum ‘burdens’ between Member States (Mouzourakis, 2014). The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is grounded on a cooperative system of intra-EU allocation of responsibility for the examination of asylum claims. The Dublin regulation – the EU’s system of responsibility allocation – operates by determining, on the basis of a hierarchy of criteria, a single member state responsible for processing an asylum claim. However, in most cases, is the de facto responsibility lies with the country of first entry. This has resulted in certain countries, particularly those exposed to migratory routes at the EU’s external borders, shouldering the burden on behalf of other Member States.

  • 1 An often pejorative term used to imply an abuse of asylum procedures through the lodging of more th (...)

32However, reforming the asylum system to introduce an alternative policy for allocating responsibility has long been impeded by conflicting member state interests (Thielemann & Armstrong, 2013; Zaun, 2018, 2022). Member States do not agree on what would be a ‘fairer’ distribution of responsibility, nor whether this should be the purpose of an EU asylum system. Policy negotiations have been characterised by diverging interpretations of the issues at hand and how to solve them. For instance, Member States on the EU’s Southern border blame the structural inequality of the Dublin system and the pressure it places on them to receive and process all irregular arrivals. For them, a desirable policy change would be a revision of the first entry principle. For Northern Member States, any deviation from the basic principles of how responsibility is allocated would undermine the original purpose of the system, which was to solve the problem of secondary movements and ‘asylum shopping.’1 For them, the difficulties faced by border Member States stem from their poor implementation of the CEAS, and not from the Dublin system itself. Changes to the first entry principle would simply reward their free riding behaviour. More recently, following the 2015 crisis, Eastern Member States have also expressed clear preferences for reforming the asylum system. Unlike Northern and Southern Member States who despite their different interests still maintain that solutions should be decided at EU-level, Eastern Member States have taken on a more populist position, expressing the belief that asylum remains a matter of national sovereignty and should not be interfered with by the EU (Zaun & Ripoll Servent, 2023). We can see then why forging a consensus on an alternative policy that accommodates these diverging interests – while ensuring a fair and swift processing system – has been a major challenge for EU policymakers.

33The European Commission has attempted to use ‘solidarity’ as a central motif to engender political support for new policy tools and policy ‘corrections’ that would mitigate the distributive effects of the asylum system. Solidarity is a quintessentially polysemic idea. Broadly, it refers to the notion of mutual support within a group towards the achievement of common interests. In the EU, solidarity is treated as a cornerstone principle that binds each member state to the political community. Frequent references to a ‘spirit of solidarity’ are scattered throughout the foundational treaties, providing assurances that membership of the bloc entails reciprocity and mutual aid towards the achievement of core political, social, and economic goals and that each member state will offer assistance if another needs support. While some have criticised its flexible use as an ‘empty signifier’ in many moral and political discourses (Grimmel, 2017), others have noted that it is precisely this ambiguity that makes it appealing to a broad spectrum of individuals with different political and policy agendas (Béland & Cox, 2016). Its positive valence across the political spectrum has meant that it is an idea that is difficult to oppose. It can therefore be deployed effectively as ‘a political weapon in the hands of skilful policy entrepreneurs’ (Béland & Cox, 2016, p. 437) to foster EU cohesion and enable decision-making on divisive issues.

34As developed in our theoretical framework, polysemic ideas can be used as coordinative ‘boundary’ devices to bring different actors together. Their ‘constructive ambiguity’ allows actors with different interests to find points of agreement. The European Commission’s 2008 policy plan on asylum, ‘An Integrated Approach to Protection Across the EU,’ constitutes one of the first articulations of a common EU asylum policy in terms of ‘solidarity’ The European Commission stated as a key objective that the development of a common asylum system should ‘provide for genuine solidarity mechanisms both within the EU and within third countries.’ The European Commission proposed to ‘put at the disposal of Member States a series of mechanisms which will help them cope with the variety of challenges they are faced with.’ These mechanisms included the launch of a study to assess the possibilities for joint processing of specific cases in the EU; a Community mechanism to allow for the possibility of temporarily suspending the application of Dublin transfers in well-defined and exceptional circumstances; the creation of asylum expert teams coordinated by the European Asylum Support Office which could be called upon to assist overburdened Member States on a temporary basis in performing the initial profiling of asylum seekers; and the facilitation of the internal re-allocation of beneficiaries of international protection between Member States on a voluntary basis in cases of exceptional asylum pressure, including through the provision of specific EU funding under existing financial instruments. By offering a variety of mechanisms, the European Commission deployed an interpretation of solidarity as multi-dimensional and multi-operable, offering Member States an entry point into a new space for cooperation.

35The multi-operability of solidarity was developed further by the European Commission with its proclamation of a ‘toolbox approach.’ In a 2011 Communication on ‘enhanced intra-EU solidarity on migration,’ the European Commission (2011, p. 2) invoked solidarity as an obligation for Member States to assist those with ‘overburdened or malfunctioning’ asylum systems. This obligation, however, was to be deployed through a ‘range of instruments’ aimed at assisting countries receiving the highest number of asylum requests and frontline Member States vulnerable to mass inflows (Agence Europe, 2011). The Communication proposed a ‘flexible toolbox’ for Member States to pick and choose their solidarity instruments. These instruments included technical and operational support, financial support, the possibility of relocating refugees, and assisting Member States to better implement the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).

36This framing at first appeared successful in bringing Member States together. Member state governments reaffirmed their ‘desire to stand shoulder to shoulder with the countries of southern Europe’ (Agence Europe, 2012), which in 2012 were facing significant migration flows following instability and uprisings in North Africa. Following the lead of the European Commission, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted conclusions on 8 March 2012 which outlined ‘A Common Framework for genuine and practical solidarity towards Member States facing particular pressures on their asylum systems.’ The Member States affirmed in the document that the ‘framework for genuine and practical solidarity is a flexible and open “toolbox” compiled of both existing and possible new measures… All the measures and actions should underpin each other and create synergies and concrete results. Bilateral cooperation if well-coordinated with actions at Union level can complement and add value to those at EU level’ (Council of the European Union, 2012, p. 2). This document illustrates, at least rhetorically, the acceptance of the European Commission’s discourse on asylum reforms - with Member States supporting new policy instruments as a demonstration of mutual support.

37However, the migratory pressure facing EU Member States since 2015 has put this fragile consensus to the test. The entry of over one million people into the EU in 2015 constituted the largest influx of asylum seekers into Europe in any one year since the end of the Second World and constitutes a defining feature of what has been variously described as the EU’s ‘refugee crisis’, ‘migration crisis’, and ‘Mediterranean crisis.’ Since then, how to manage irregular arrivals, prevent deaths at sea, and ensure fair and orderly entry procedures that do not place undue burdens on bordering Member States have been constant and contentious issues on the EU’s policy agenda. While member state governments were quick to mobilise under the banner of solidarity, when it came to adopting and implementing specific solutions to tackle these issues, they were unable to agree on an appropriate approach to address the distributional issues in the asylum allocation system. The stuttering and often deadlocked negotiations on the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum showed that political divisions remained over what was meant by ‘Solidarity’ and how it should be expressed in EU asylum policy.

38The political debates showed that solidarity held different meanings for different coalitions of Member States in the Council: for the Southern frontline Member States, solidarity meant forced relocation, while for the Eastern, Višegrad, states, it meant mutual support in the prevention and swift return of unwanted migrants (Zaun, 2018; 2022). For the Northern states, solidarity is seen in a transactional manner - relocation is one possible instrument of support, but only if the frontline Member States implement EU laws appropriately and reinforce their border controls (Zaun, 2018). The European Commission’s initial association of solidarity with mandatory relocation also had an impact on the negotiations, as the idea then carried significant ‘baggage’ in subsequent debates, despite the policymaker’s withdrawal of this contentious instrument. Despite the move away from terms such ‘mandatory’ and ‘relocation’, towards terminology such as ‘flexibility’ and ‘practical’ solidarity, the use of the term solidarity, irrespective of its prefix, continued to provoke negative reactions from some Member States, who perceived it as an attempt by the European Commission to introduce mandatory relocation by stealth. Ultimately, solidarity worked as an agenda-setting device to draw attention to the policy issue, but when it came to policy design and implementation, member state interests in reforming the asylum allocation system remained largely the same.

Discussion

39The two empirical accounts presented in this article demonstrate how polysemic framing was deployed by a well-positioned policy entrepreneur – the European Commission – to appeal to the diverse interests of the Member States and persuade them of the mutual benefits of the proposed policy changes. Our theoretical argument was that polysemic framing can facilitate consensus-building by allowing each policy actor to identify and align their policy interests with the new policy proposals. This alignment reflects a cognitive shift in which actors recognise the desirability of the policy change and subsequently revise their preferences – in other words revise their evaluative beliefs.

40In European education policy, the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ demonstrates how polysemic ideas can act as boundary objects to promote alignment among Member States with initially conflicting preferences. By emphasizing knowledge as both an economic and social driver, the Lisbon Strategy provided a framework for voluntary coordination through the OMC. However, this alignment was not achieved without significant resistance. Member States such as Germany and the Netherlands expressed concerns about the use of benchmarks and feared that EU-level coordination would infringe on their national sovereignty in the field of education. These objections, rooted in deeply entrenched preferences for national control, highlight the political and institutional barriers to implementing a shared policy agenda in education. The European Commission’s approach to overcoming these barriers involved iterative dialogue, reassurances about preserving Member State autonomy, and framing the OMC as a mechanism of convergence rather than harmonisation. The discussion of resistance underscores the critical role of ideational flexibility in navigating opposition and reshaping evaluative beliefs. The polysemic nature of the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ allowed Member States to interpret the concept in ways that aligned with their national priorities, from addressing youth unemployment in Germany and France to fostering technological innovation in Finland. By accommodating different interpretations, the European Commission gradually transformed scepticism into cooperation, enabling the institutionalisation of tools such as the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) and the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS). This empirical case highlights how ideational framing, coupled with open communication and iterative processes, can shift policy preferences and enable voluntary coordination even in politically sensitive domains such as education. The experience of European education policy thus demonstrates the potential of polysemic ideas not only to bridge divergent interests but also to transform resistance into active engagement, facilitating ideational convergence within complex governance systems.

41Our analysis of EU asylum policy shows, however, that ‘polysemy’ does not always attract diverse interests. Unilateral actions by Member States and significant rifts over the European Commission's proposal to reallocate asylum seekers revealed that, beyond the rhetoric of ‘Solidarity,’ there was no revision or convergence of Member States’ beliefs regarding the desirability of the policy change to the asylum allocation system. In fact, attaching the idea of solidarity to a single solution – mandatory relocation – early in the policy process created a kind of ‘baggage’ for the idea, undermining its polysemantic potential. These findings support the argument that polysemic ideas alone are insufficient to generate effective action (Hannah & Baekkeskov, 2020) and that ‘polysemy’ does not always suspend or realign interests.

42From these empirical accounts, we show that polysemic ideas are more likely to foster consensus when their different meanings (e.g., ‘Europe of Knowledge’ as economy, society, cohesion, etc.) appeal to different actors' interests. Moreover, we also show that policymakers need to believe that the new policy will be mutually beneficial. The ambiguity of the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ framing created the conditions for open dialogue and communication, allowing Member States to share information about their preferences, and, in doing so, recognise that not only would the harmonisation of national education policies not undermine national approaches and traditions, but that policy coordination at the EU level would also add value across the Member States. This openness was underpinned by a trust in the European Commission as an honest broker, and a recognition that even if Member States did not share the same underlying interests, they still had the trust in each other to negotiate honestly.

43Trust – and the absence of trust – clearly played an important role in shaping how receptive policymakers were to polysemic framing. For new ideas to take hold, decision-makers ‘must be ready to learn’ (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2018, p. 259). This requires a certain psychological predisposition. When it comes to interest-based negotiations, ACF scholars have noted that policy actors need to overcome their bias towards loss aversion (Leach & Sabatier, 2005). Weible and Sabatier (2009) argue that policy learning is more likely to occur in collaborative than in adversarial policy subsystems because in the latter, individuals view each other with suspicion. The ACF assumes that in adversarial systems there is a tendency for individuals to exaggerate the power and maliciousness of their opponents and thus view the policy process as a struggle for dominance – of winners and losers –, which precludes the possibility of seeing each other as ‘joint’ winners (Weible & Nohrstedt, 2012). Specifically, in the asylum case, the politicised context and heated nature of asylum policy negotiations meant that Member States defended their positions and viewed any ‘win’ for another Member State with different interests as a loss for them. Framing the policy change as an illustration of ‘European solidarity’ – a value with significant valence in the EU context – did little to convince Member States that the outcome would be equally beneficial to all national interests.

44Additionally, the dynamics between power and learning are crucial for understanding the outcomes of polysemic ideas. While power politics often dominate contentious issues such as migration, learning processes are more suitable in contexts where there is a willingness to update beliefs and practices based on new information. The 'Europe of Knowledge' case illustrates how learning can facilitate consensus and policy alignment, while the asylum policy highlights the limitations of learning in the face of entrenched power struggles. We contend here that the presence of institutional structures that enable more flexible and voluntary policy coordination, rather than hierarchical structures with mandatory outcomes, can lower the perceived stakes of negotiations, diminishing the zero-sum thinking that leads to adversarial negotiations. In the 'Europe of Knowledge' case, negotiations within the OMC provided a structured environment for mutual learning and policy alignment. Conversely, the fragmented and politicised context of asylum policy negotiations hindered a coherent and shared understanding of 'Solidarity’.

45Finally, we demonstrate the empirical relevance of policy learning through ‘polysemy’ as a potentially novel mode of policymaking within the EU, highlighting the key role of the European Commission. Ultimately, our contribution shows important links between the literature on polysemic ideas and policy learning. For coalition-building to be genuine, policymakers must come to share the same evaluative beliefs. In the 'Europe of Knowledge' case, there was clear evidence of belief updating among Member States regarding the role of education in economic growth. However, in the asylum policy case, the absence of belief updating among key actors suggests that the concept of 'Solidarity' failed to shift the perceptions of policymakers and their interests, revealing the limitations of polysemic ideas in highly contentious policy areas.

Conclusion

46This article has explored the consensus-building potential of polysemic ideas in EU policymaking. By examining the cases of 'Europe of Knowledge' in education policy and 'Solidarity' in asylum policy, we have examined what polysemic ideas ‘do’ that contribute to consensus-building and policy change. Our argument was that for polysemic framing to be successful, it needs to persuade member states to reassess their beliefs and recognise new common possibilities for achieving their interests under the new policy framework. Because polysemic ideas convey different meanings to different audiences, actors with divergent interests can recognise the usefulness and desirability of the policy for achieving their (unique) interests - and subsequently come to share the same policy preferences.

47The 'Europe of Knowledge' case exemplifies how polysemic ideas can shift Member States' beliefs and preferences. The successful implementation of the OMC shows that strategic ambiguity allowed various stakeholders to find common ground and fostered cognitive convergence on the desirability of the new policy framework. The European Commission’s flexible use of terms such as 'knowledge economy' and 'knowledge society' linked economic growth and social cohesion, making the concept appealing to a broad spectrum of actors. Conversely, the 'Solidarity' in the asylum policy case reveals the limitations of polysemic ideas in contentious policy areas. The 2015 refugee crisis highlighted deep divisions among Member States over the distribution of asylum seekers. Attempts by the European Commission to persuade Member States to adopt mandatory relocation by linking it to solidarity failed to appeal to the different national interests. Viewing each other as policy adversaries, and approaching negotiations in zero-sum terms, Member States were unwilling to recognise that the new policy could result in ‘joint’ gains. Our analysis underscores that polysemic ideas work best when they offer solutions that appeal to various actors and are viewed as mutually beneficial.

48Our two illustrative cases show that there are certain conditions, the presence (and absence) of which may be necessary for polysemic framing to be a successful strategy for bringing about a convergence of beliefs among policy actors. As Dunlop and Radaelli (2018, p. 255) note, ‘policy learning does not just happen.’ Understanding why actors learn and the conditions that facilitate or prevent changes in individual beliefs in a collective context remain crucial questions (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013). Explanations from public policy, political science, and political psychology literature range from individuals' openness to new information, the bounded nature of reasoning, reliance on heuristics, and the resilience of pre-existing beliefs to new information. We further illustrate the role of knowledge brokers and policy entrepreneurs who mediate between diverse actors and foster learning by showcasing the value of new ideas (Howlett et al. 2017). Additionally, our cases speak to the importance of social dynamics, such as how the intensity of interactions, trust levels, and whether relationships are collaborative or adversarial, can influence actors' willingness to listen, learn from each other, and be receptive to new ideas (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2013; Riche et al., 2021 Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Further, these dynamics are influenced by structural conditions such as the institutional context, decision-making rules, and engagement norms (Eising, 2002).

49While our study provides valuable insights, it also has limitations. The findings from these illustrative cases are preliminary and require further validation through interviews and additional primary data. Future research should aim to gather more comprehensive data to corroborate and expand these findings. Additionally, examining other policy areas where polysemic ideas are employed could offer deeper insights into their role in policy learning and consensus-building.

50In conclusion, polysemic ideas hold significant potential for building coalitions, although their effectiveness is context-dependent. Understanding the conditions under which these ideas thrive will enhance their strategic use in policymaking, leading to more robust and responsive policies. Further research is needed to explore these dynamics in greater detail and across a broader range of policy areas.

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Notes

1 An often pejorative term used to imply an abuse of asylum procedures through the lodging of more than one application for international protection in different EU member states.

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References

Electronic reference

Tamara Tubakovic and Marina Cino Pagliarello, Policy change and the persuasive potential of polysemic ideas: What explains coalition-building success?International Review of Public Policy [Online], 6:2 | 2024, Online since 30 September 2024, connection on 16 March 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/4846; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/13dwc

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The text only may be used under licence CC BY 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

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