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Do different governance actors approach the concept of network governance differently within a developing fragile society?

Karl O’Connor and Usamah Shahwan

Abstract

In recent years, the concept of network governance has become a central theme in public administration literature. Our study gauges the level of receptivity to the networking model among the three sectors: government, business and civil society, represented by 24 key individuals occupying leadership positions in their organizations. The West Bank is the focus of our analysis as it is formalizing its network governance model that arose out of necessity during the Covid-19 pandemic. We identify the attitudes of those networks tasked with implementing the programme, thereby highlighting where opportunities for successful implementation exist and where barriers can be overcome. Q methodology was chosen for collecting, processing and analyzing data as it is most adept at measuring individual perceptions. The article identifies three very closely aligned perspectives. All are supportive of the proposed change in governance arrangements. The research identifies subtly different expectations among stakeholders on network governance and raises questions about the suitability of network governance for the fragile society. It also suggests a parallel education program on the role of stakeholders in a different system of governance, if the reform is to be a success.

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Author's notes

We would like to thank Prof. James C Rhoads (Westminster College, Pennsylvania) for his advice on analyzing our very similar Q sorts. We would also like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their very detailed and constructive advice. The usual disclaimer applies.

Full text

Introduction

1In view of the dire economic conditions marked by high levels of unemployment in the Palestinian territories, compounded by the effects of Covid-19 and unstable fluctuations in the GDP, demands for the reform of the public administration and adoption of good governance principles have intensified in recent years. Further, any negotiated peace settlement between Palestine and Israel will require good governance practices on both sides, to ensure such a peace is sustained. Looking for better managerial techniques to improve the quality of public goods delivery poses a serious challenge to policy makers in the West Bank. The region faces formidable challenges in all walks of life, unparalleled in other developing countries, due to the military occupation that began in 1967. Challenges include the scarcity of water resources for human consumption and irrigation, environmental pollution, a high degree of unemployment, and a fragile economy that depends almost entirely on foreign aid and lacks a solid tax base. Public services, particularly health, energy supply, and transportation suffer from chronic malfunction and mismanagement. The number of families on welfare has increased significantly in the last few years reaching 35,000 families in 2023 according to official statistics in the Palestinian Ministry of Social Development. This number is expected to rise exponentially as a result of the ongoing war in Gaza. University graduates encounter great difficulties in finding suitable employment. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics in Ramallah, in the year 2022, 48% percent of university graduates in the West Bank and 74% in Gaza were unemployed.

2Network governance is not envisaged as panacea for the above-mentioned problems but rather as an innovative approach to finding realistic solutions in unstable and uncertain conditions. Institutional networking entails the pooling and sharing of resources among partners which prompts close cooperation in setting long strategic objectives and setting up multiple levels of monitoring and control, thereby reducing waste and enhancing accountability. The authors adopt a functional perspective in approaching the issue of network governance: ‘From a functional point of view, the aim of network governance is to create a synergy between different competencies and sources of knowledge in order to deal with complex and interlinked problems’ (Dedeurwaerdere (2005, p. 2). This paper tests the limits of such an approach within a unique development and security context. It identifies what potential members of such a network conceive as the possible advantages of the approach and identifies the potential pitfalls by studying the attitudes of government, business and third sector actors in the West Bank towards network governance.

3The traditional public administration model that has dominated the scene for more than a century has been unable to manage the innumerable challenges resulting from political instability, complex social and economic issues, and rising expectations. Since the successful implementation of the proposed model is based on the attitudes and collaboration of the three sectors (government, business and civil society), it is imperative that their responses to the model be understood, and that positive and negative reactions be recorded. By understanding the attitudes of the networks implementing the program, opportunities for successful implementation can be identified and barriers overcome. In essence, we are looking at stakeholder perceptions of the implementation of a process of policy creation rather than the implementation of a policy.

4A shift in how government functions transforms the policy making environment of a society. Following the moderate success of pockets of network governance in the West Bank over the past few years, the government has decided to mainstream the practice. The Covid 19 pandemic revealed the fragility of public administration systems in many parts of the world, most acutely in developing and war-torn countries. A major obstacle to the effective management of the pandemic in these societies was the inability of their governments to marshal adequate resources, including human, equipment, and financial resources. Had resources been pooled and skillfully managed through government networking with the private business sector and civil society organizations, such obstacles may have been more effectively overcome, as was reported to be the case in Odisha, India (Mishra, 2021).

5In a departure from much of the normative literature on governance and the literature identifying how governance models should work, our research presents the attitudes of those stakeholders tasked with implementing a new network governance model in Palestine (the West Bank): a developing fragile environment. We ask: Do different governance actors approach the concept of network governance differently within a developing fragile society? Unfortunately, recent events – the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7th that caused over 1,200 deaths and the subsequent Israeli response responsible for more than 50,000 deaths and the destruction of Gaza and parts of the West Bank – bring into sharp focus the type of governance system that will be tasked with managing the reconstruction of Palestinian society. While our fieldwork was conducted before the recent war, the study provides an understanding of the attitudes toward governance reform of those in civil society, the private sector and the bureaucracy, tasked with managing and operationalizing public expenditure. Following a brief introduction to the network governance literature, we present our case study and research methods. We then present our findings before applying these findings to the literature to identify some key research implications.

Literature Review

6Network governance entails the active participation of three major sectors: government, business, and civil society organizations. As acknowledged by Wang and Ran (2021) ‘…the concept of governance is now firmly embedded in our understanding of public administration, there is a continuing tendency to conflate and confuse different governance concepts.’ Their discussion considers how the terms ‘network governance’ and ‘collaborative governance’ are such examples. What practitioners mean by such terms is therefore important. While such a study would be interesting in the Western democratic context, we have situated our study within the fragile developing environment. We describe Palestine as fragile as it experiences regular economic and social crises, violent interstate and intrastate conflict, and has limited administrative capacity to carry out minimal governmental functions. Palestine is also widely recognized as a developing society by World Bank and IMF indices.

7Unlike much of the empirical governance literature, our study looks at stakeholder perspectives prior to the adoption of the model. This approach allows us to document perceived challenges to embedding a new way of managing the public sector in the developing fragile society. The purpose of this research is to draw on empirical data to identify stakeholder perceptions prior to adoption. The reasons for doing so are threefold: firstly, so as to ascertain how success is defined for each of our stakeholder groups; secondly, to ascertain potential implementation pitfalls and finally, from a theoretical perspective, the article seeks to identify any potential gaps in stakeholder knowledge. While our findings are most relevant for Palestinian network governance – an instrumental case study – the article highlights obstacles to implementing a governance agenda that would presumably be present in any developing/contested society.

8While network governance has a long pedigree (Mizruchi 1983), its adoption and implementation by public sectors in developing societies is a relatively new approach that has received growing attention from both academics and policy makers involved in public sector reform. The idea was spurred on by the increasing complexities facing both public and private organizations in the management of difficult problems and in making decisions or delivering services to the public (Klijin& Koppenjan, 2016). Coproduction has been a key tenet of both the academic and grey literature on network governance at the EU level (Bussu & Galanti, 2018, p. 349). The partnership principle was an integral policy instrument to encourage coproduction. It emphasizes close cooperation between public authorities and stakeholders to enhance ‘consultation, participation, and dialogues with partners for programming and implementing the European structural and investment funds…to strengthen bonds among [European] Member States and project partners to facilitate the sharing of information, experience, results, and good practice’1. Network governance in developing societies is heavily influenced by donor countries and agencies, countries in Europe, and the United States of America. The European Commission’s White Paper (2001) on European Governance identified the main principles of network governance as: openness, participation and effectiveness. Protagonists of the approach call for the joint involvement of government, the private sector, and civil society in tackling societal problems. The embodiment of the concept is realized through networking with local institutions to provide a service within a set of specific conditions. The model claims that in a world where many economies face budget deficits and recurrent economic crises, the networking strategy has the potential for cost savings, more accountability, and better quality of services provided to the public. It also generates conditions for the pooling of skilled resources and expertise.

9Horizontal networks are as important, if not more so, than vertical chains of command (Rhodes, 1996, 2007; Chhotray & Stoker, 2009; Sorensen & Torfing, 2005). According to this network narrative, ‘operative policies are, or should be, produced and implemented in horizontal and reciprocal patterns, where hierarchical relations are of limited relevance’ (Hertting & Vedung, 2012, p. 28). This in turn would give non-governmental bodies sufficient knowledge and power so as to become partners in the governing process. This means that bureaucracies would seek to control external bodies through the soft power of persuasion and nudge rather than command and control.

10The literature on network governance in developing countries is limited in number, scope, and substance. Yoon & Hyun (2010) identify the institutional basis for network governance in East Asia. Their research discusses ‘the effects of social and institutional mechanisms in allowing network governance embedded in non-contractual and social relations to emerge and persist’. Utas (2012) explores the crucial role that networks play in providing security in countries characterized as volatile and unstable with weak and corrupt government structures, using case studies from Africa and Latin America to support his arguments. Dedeurwaerdere (2005, p. 1) addressed the contribution of network governance to sustainable development, criticizing the concept in the European Commission’s White paper for its limitations in terms of its role in the implementation and facilitation of sustainable development in the context of infrastructural barriers. He suggests supplementing the network governance approach with initiatives to promote and encourage the adoption of “social learning” to overcome the infrastructural barriers, thereby promoting development. Therefore, in situations where the traditional economic governance mechanisms are inadequate and untrustworthy, we examine stakeholder perceptions of network governance as a solution.

11Network governance can help enhance efficiency and minimize problems in organizations that exist in highly volatile and unstable environments (Dedeurwaerdere, 2007). It is a form of alliance in which the government, the business sector, and civil society organizations collaborate in policy making. Representatives from each sector are involved in goal-setting and decision making. Bang and Esmark (2009) emphasize the importance of networks in coordinating activities across communities, regions, and partnerships. Coordination is critical to successful governance (Rhodes, 2007) and even more so in the developing society (O’Connor & Carmichael, 2020). Coordination can be enhanced if ‘the motivation of the players (the utility function), the complexity of the environment (measurement and enforcement)’ and the ability of the players to decipher and order the environment’ are known and considered (North, 1990, p. 34).

12The experiences and discussions reported in the above references were almost exclusively gleaned from Western industrial countries. There is very little available literature on the experiences of developing countries, especially those that have endured turmoil, occupation, and political instability, as in the case of Palestine. Being a relatively recent concept in developing countries, the volume of research on this topic in Palestine, as in other fragile societies, is scant. Suliman (2018, p. 30) conducted research to gauge the suitability of applying a network governance approach to profile migration in Palestine and found ‘a significant impact of network governance on the level of collaboration between the individual organizations to operate and achieve the common objectives’. Further, very few studies look at the perceptions of the stakeholders tasked with implementing new modes of governance. Herein lies the significance and uniqueness of this study. For the first time, we document policy actors’ perceptions of network governance at its inception within the developing fragile state. We expect that these insights will allow policy actors to better understand the policy landscape so that adoption and implementation of the model will be more successful.

13Laffin et al. (2014) critique the network governance model, arguing that despite the rhetoric of network governance dominating the landscape, vertical bureaucratic hierarchical structures remain dominant and ‘power remains highly centralized’ (2004, p. 763). They (ibid; 2004, p. 763) identify territorial and social distribution to be the causal factors for reform, rather than network governance. How public actors may apply a network perspective as a means to improve policy making has been discussed thoroughly by Klijn, and Koppenjan (2016). They argue that in Western democracies, the state is in possession of traditional legislative, pecuniary, and traditional dominance and therefore has considerable power to influence the networking process, but do stakeholders perceive potential dangers for adoption in more fragile states? The governance of network governance is not straightforward (Wegner & Verschoore, 2022, p. 480). We return to these debates in our discussion of the findings. Suffice to acknowledge that while there is widespread support for the idea of network governance, disagreement remains over the source of power in the relationship among governance actors. One body of literature argues that the era of governance has brought with it a corresponding interdependency, thereby reducing the power of the traditional bureaucracy. On the other hand, the traditional power structures are still in place, but work in collaboration with or via other policy actors.

14Helpfully, Wang and Ran (2021) differentiate the conceptual and thematic origins of collaborative governance and network governance. While they identify many overlaps, this distinction is helpful in identifying potential implementation pitfalls, which we return to in our discussion of the findings. Crucially, in this research, we are interested in both the attitude towards the concept of network governance and the willingness of stakeholders to champion its introduction. Reflecting on these debates in the literature, we have identified four theoretically-existent ideal types of respondent attitudes toward the new model of network governance: (i) positive-passive, (ii) positive-active, (iii) negative-passive, and (iv) negative-active. Positive-passive supports the networking idea but is not willing or capable of taking action in adopting and implementing the idea. Positive-active supports the idea and is ready to get involved in supporting adoption and implementing it. Negative-passive does not support the idea, but is unwilling or unable to prevent its adoption or implementation. Negative-active rejects the idea and will do whatever is necessary to abort its adoption and implementation.

The Ideal Types

15The authors derived the ideal types from the field of social psychology. These are positive, negative, neutral, and Sikken. (Sikken was deleted as it is not relevant to this case.) According to social psychology theory, attitudes and perceptions are strong predictors of behavior. Findings of experimental research have revealed that in general people are consistent in their attitudes and that there is consistency between attitudes and behavior (Fabrigar et al., 2006). The support of participating actors is crucial to sustain public organizations in a democratic system. The viability and effectiveness of a social system such as network governance depends, to a large extent, on the kind of response it receives from participating actors. The behavior of groups is largely influenced by group attitudes and perceptions toward the system. If network governance enjoys stakeholder support, it will be easier to implement and will undoubtedly be met with a high degree of commitment on the part of the participants.

The Case Study

16Fragile states have become a major feature of the contemporary developing world (Beall et al., 2013). According to Beall et al. (2010), a developmental state is: ‘one that ensures the integrity of its borders and the personal security of its citizens, pursues policies and enforces institutions that promote economic growth, and ensures that growth translates into broad-based improvements in social welfare’. Fragile states fall short on one or two of these measures (Beall et al., 2010, p. 1). For fragile states to avoid failure, Beall et al. (ibid.) argue that politics is not about consensus and technocratic solutions; rather, it is about ‘dissensus’ (Pieterse, 2008) and contentious processes of negotiating political settlements at the city level. Network governance is one mechanism for institutionalizing processes of negotiation and engagement – or in other words institutionalizing good governance. Indeed, former UN Secretary General Annan claimed that “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development” (United Nations, 1998). However, Bigdon (2006) points out that there is limited research on context-specific testing and redefining of good governance models in a developing country context.

17Palestine offers a unique case for study. The enormity and complexity of the challenges facing the country are staggering. The semi-autonomous Palestinian Authority, established in the wake of the 1993 Oslo Accords, has very limited sovereignty in the critical spheres of security, economy, foreign relations, and inland transportation, rendering the executive branch of government in Ramallah incapable of initiating or carrying out significant developmental projects in the area. A government under such conditions cannot freely exercise its responsibilities regarding the utilization of natural and economic resources, the development of policies to minimize unemployment, and the promotion of entrepreneurship in the territories. Urban planning becomes very difficult because the West Bank, according to the Oslo agreement, is divided into three jurisdictional areas: A, B, and C. Area C, which constitutes more than 60 percent of the total region, is under the full control of Israel. This fact has made it almost impossible for the Palestinian Authority to initiate or implement any comprehensive or strategic plans since each area has a different jurisdictional status.

18The Paris Protocol, an agreement signed in 1994 between Israel and the PLO, has imposed insurmountable restrictions on vital areas of the economy of the West Bank and Gaza, such as customs, taxes, labor, agriculture, industry, and tourism, which has resulted in the integration of the Palestinian economy into the Israeli economy, to the detriment of the Palestinians.

19The business sector in the Palestinian territories is weak and cannot provide job opportunities for the hundreds of thousands of workers, forcing a large proportion of the labor force to seek employment inside Israel. However, the employment of Palestinian workers in Israel is always precarious, depending on the security situation. For example, all Palestinian labourers, estimated to reach 193,000 according to the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2023), were banned from entering Israel proper after the 7th of October Hamas attacks. At present, because of the on-going hostilities, Palestinian workers are still prohibited from working inside Israel. In addition, 20,000 labourers from Gaza were arrested and deported back to the Gaza Strip following the breakout of the conflict.

20The NGO sector, comprising around a thousand registered international and local organizations, has been trying to provide vital services to the local population in the areas of health, education, human rights, and advocacy in addition to economic projects, especially irrigation and infrastructure, but its activities are also restricted by military orders and regulations. In this grim and complicated situation, network governance could be construed as an alternative to the weak and incompetent institutional structures existing in the territories and to overcome some of the challenges caused by the military occupation.

21Palestine experienced partial and informal networking during the Covid 19 epidemic when a number of NGOs and government hospitals networked to provide medical assistance to patients. This has left a positive impression of the benefits of networked service delivery. During an interview with a manager of a leading commercial bank in the West Bank, he disclosed that network governance between the Palestinian Monetary Authority and local banks has been underway for some time in the form of informing bank managers, beforehand, of any upcoming measures and policies that the Monetary Authority is planning to implement, in order to get the banks’ responses and to act to remove any steps which the banks consider not in their or the public interest. This has been seen as a positive first step in demonstrating collaboration between the three sectors.

Method: Q methodology

22We chose Q methodology to collect, process, and analyze data. Q methodology is ideally suited for identifying the viewpoints of individuals as it uses an inverted factor analysis to derive differences between discourses (van Exel & de Graaf, 2005). Q methodology involves four broad steps. First, the P-set (Person set) is identified. We are not so much concerned with the number of interviewees as with who these people are. It is therefore crucial that researchers have a deep understanding of their stakeholders. A sample of twenty-four participants was selected from the three sectors: civil service (both central and local), business, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs): eight from each sector. They were identified as key individuals with decision-making powers in their respective organizations. Selection of candidates was based on three criteria: rank or administrative position in the organization, willingness to participate in the interviews, and organization’s impact in society in terms of reputation, service, and influence. All participants held the position of director, chairman, or CEO in their respective organizations. Interviews lasted up to 90 minutes and took place in the offices of interviewees. Interviewees were asked to reflect on the placement of the cards and to tell stories and explain why they placed the cards in a particular order. The interviews were conducted between May 23, 2002, and August 19, 2022.

23As the West Bank society is small and homogeneous, it was not difficult to identify those organizations/departments in the three sectors that hold prominent positions in the country and exercise significant influence on the daily affairs of citizens. Regarding the business and government sectors, the researchers were keen to secure an equal distribution of participants across the sub-sectors. There were four representatives from local government and four from the central authorities. In the business sector, four representatives were chosen from the large corporate sector and four from the small business sector. The remaining interviewees were from the NGO sector. The organizations chosen are located in the four major governorates in the West Bank: Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, and Bethlehem. All interviews were conducted under strict condition of anonymity, and every precaution has been taken to ensure that they are not identifiable from the descriptions below.

24The next step was to identify the Q set (statements). In general, the statements were drawn from a review of the literature or focus groups and reflect all relevant discourses on the topic. Thirty-six statements were generated (from an initial concourse of over 80 statements) to describe the aforementioned ideal types. The statements originated from our review of the governance literature. Participants were asked to sort the statements from their individual perspectives, which constitutes the quantitative component of Q methodology. During the Q sort interviewees rank statements, in our case along a fixed distribution from agree to disagree, +3 to -3. While online versions of the Q-sort process are available and were effective during the pandemic, such processes often miss key qualitative information from the interviewee. The Q-sort process stimulates interviewee memories and stories, generating a wealth of empirical qualitative data. Face to face interviews in Arabic were conducted with the participants following their responses to the statements, in order to gain a deeper insight into their reactions. We have included some quotes from these interviews to support the quantitative data.

25Finally, the Q sorts were analyzed through an inverted factor analysis. We performed a varimax rotation and a principal component analysis using the software: PQ Method. Initially, we identified two factors. After deliberation, we felt it necessary to highlight the subtle difference of the third factor. In our two-factor solution, we found similar correlations between factors. Further, we examined a two-factor rotation, only highlighting the ‘pure loaders’, and this did not change the fundamental narratives underpinning each factor. We relied on the advice of Webler et al. (2009) to guide factor selection. The factors are illustrated in Table 2 in the annex. The three factors represent three groups of respondents who share a perspective on how stakeholders view network governance. We now refer to these factors as ‘empirical profiles’. As Q methodology is a mixed method, we rely not only on the z-scores, which reflect the quantitative placement of the statements, to differentiate the factors, but also on our interpretation of the qualitative narratives and who the individuals are, to determine how many factors to proceed with. For example, two (or three) factors may be quite similar statistically (as is the case in our study), but may differ in the placement of a small handful of statements and associated narratives. Further, who these people are is also incredibly important: for example, an interviewee who heads a large civil service department or an influential NGO who appears as an outlier, could be a typology on their own, or with one or two others, as their experience, influence, and knowledge will be different from others in the sample (See Brown, 1980). For this reason, it is very important that interviewees (P sample) are carefully selected.

The Findings

26Webler et al. (2009: 31) remind us that while lower correlations between factors are preferable, ‘it is not necessarily bad to have high correlations, as long as the factor is otherwise satisfactory. It may be that two factors agree on many issues, but their points of disagreement are particularly important’. This study is an example of how highly similar factor scores can still be very revealing about a topic. While our types are very similar (Table 1), important subtle differences warrant their differentiation. The three factors represent the three typologies of respondents who share a coherent set of beliefs or viewpoints on the adoption and implementation of network governance in Palestine. These empirical profiles are created from the placing of each of the statements by each of the interviewees. Each typology now has one collated Q sort card. If an individual contributed to the make-up of that typology, an ‘X’ is placed next to the number. However, just because an individual weighs significantly on one typology does not mean that they have nothing in common with the other typologies; hence, the other numbers in the row identify the relationship between the interviewee and the other typologies. A total of 21 interviewees weighed significantly on a typology (11 in factor one, three in factor two and seven in factor three), while three were confounded. In Q methodology, the number of interviewees contributing to the make-up of the factor/empirical profile is not a concern; rather, we are more interested in the nature of the factor or empirical profile (O’Connor, 2013). All three confounded interviewees were male, two were over the age of 40, two were from the business community, and one was from an NGO.

Table 1. Relationship between Factor Scores (note: highly similar)

                F1       F2       F3

    1     1.0000  0.7368  0.8515

    2     0.7368  1.0000  0.6837

    3     0.8515  0.6837  1.0000

Source: the Authors

Table 2. Factor Loadings

QSORT 1 2 3

1 1 0.3272 0.6058 0.6291 C

2 2 0.5463 0.0876 0.6973X

3 3 0.5089 0.3650 0.5060 C

4 4 0.2614 0.6321X 0.3875

5 5 0.7141X 0.3795 0.4128

6 6 0.3702 0.2600 0.7868X

7 8 0.7219X 0.1765 0.4466

8 7 0.4979 0.3006 0.6544X

9 9 0.6621X 0.3280 0.4287

10 10 0.3072 0.3640 0.6423X

11 11 0.6970X 0.4407 0.3369

12 12 0.4615 0.6376X 0.0458

13 13 0.3200 0.2732 0.7839X

14 14 0.3098 0.3145 0.7827X

15 15 0.6397X 0.4268 0.3854

16 16 0.6502X 0.2479 0.2633

17 17 0.5306 0.5139 0.5509 C

18 18 0.5320 0.2590 0.6601X

19 19 0.5896X 0.5291 0.2396

20 20 0.7211X 0.4506 0.3612

21 21 0.6351X 0.2020 0.5122

22 22 0.7182X 0.1976 0.4593

23 23 0.1798 0.8006X 0.3464

24 24 0.6999X 0.3316 0.4316

*C = confounded

Source: the Authors

27In the sections that follow, we make reference to the statements (numbers in brackets) that support our assertions supporting the typology boundaries.

Shared Perspectives on Network Governance

28We found that all three typologies were willing to work to build bridges across sectors. This was an absolute priority for Type two and a secondary priority for Types one and three (2; 6). All three typologies were willing to do whatever was needed to convince the political leadership and business owners to uphold the new network governance model (9). All typologies outright rejected mobilizing support against the implementation of the policy (15; 16; 17; 18; 21; 28). Type one believed very strongly that the model was the trend of the future, Type two was in favor, but less so and, reflecting its general pessimism, Type three placed this in the mildly agree category (12). Types one and two believed that the network governance model was feasible and could be implemented (19), however, Type three, reflecting interviewees’ pessimism, agreed but to a much lesser extent.

29All three typologies were willing to work to remove obstacles to the adoption and implementation of the new model (23). Type one supported the networking model because they believed that public service should be the joint responsibility of the three sectors that constitute the modern state (24). Types two and three agreed, but to a lesser extent. All agreed that a network governance model offers a better alternative to existing structures in terms of service delivery and the quality of public goods (27).

30Collectively, this demonstrates a commitment by all three perspectives to the concept of network governance. Such is the similarity between our typologies that traditional research methods might rightly conclude that the three sectors are similarly supportive of the reforms. Q methodology allows us to highlight these strong similarities between the perspectives, while emphasizing nuanced differences. Recall that a key strength of the in-person Q is that it provides interviewees with the stimulus to elaborate qualitatively on the statements presented. This, in turn, allows the researcher to triangulate the quantitative and interview data with the theoretical expectations to subjectively distinguish subtle differences between the typologies. The nature of the commitment to network governance varies, and our Q methodological approach can empirically differentiate between the theoretically existent ideal types. These nuanced differences between the typologies need to be emphasized so that potential weaknesses in the adoption and implementation of network governance can be addressed.

Factor One: Positive about the adoption of network governance and will actively support its implementation. Bureaucratic or political elite will inhibit implementation.

31This empirical perspective aligns closely with our theoretical perspective positive-active. Recall, the ideal type ‘positive-active’ support reforms and are ready to get involved in their implementation. They are the only typology that will approach the upper echelons of their organization as well as strategic stakeholders to explain the new model and enlist their support (10). They are the only typology that will strongly lobby for the adoption of the networking model before the decision makers in their organizations (30). They also see the new approach being implemented relatively quickly (3). Interviewee five, a central government official, typified the belief of this group:

‘I believe that when the three parties: business, government, and NGOs share in policy-making of public programs, their collective decisions will lead to better and more realistic solutions to societal and economic problems.’

32Interviewee nine was similarly enthusiastic, based on the opportunity provided by the pandemic crisis, his experience led him to conclude:

‘The Covid 19 pandemic showed how critical the collaboration was between the government health sector and the private and civil society sectors in dealing with the situation’.

33Interviewee 24 encapsulated the pro-active views of this typology, stating:

‘I will do all I can to make it work because it is in the interest of the public and the Palestinian community’.

34They supported the network model because they felt that the traditional public administration system had failed to deliver services to citizens in an efficient and equitable way (3). Interviewee 15, a business leader, claimed that:

‘a major cause behind [existing] failures is its [government] unwillingness to partner with the other two sectors and this was prompted by the bureaucrats who resist change’.

35Likewise, interviewee 16, also a leader from the business community, commented:

‘Everybody knows that public services are not being delivered satisfactorily here, and probably the collaboration among the three sectors will help to integrate more technology into the delivery system, making it more efficient and transparent…Disposing of the traditional rigid bureaucracy will eventually lead to better performance in the public management sector and contribute to good governance.’

36Interviewee 19, an NGO leader, was similarly enthusiastic about the potential of the new model, believing:

‘that the collaboration of the three sectors in sharing decision-making will create complementarity that will be in the interest of the public’.

37Interviewee 20, another NGO leader, believed that network governance was the solution to ensure that all actors in society work collectively to find solutions to common problems. They saw network governance as a forum where common solutions to policy problems can be efficiently identified and implemented:

‘At present, government goes in one direction and NGOs in another direction. Networking would be more cost-effective in programs that empower women economically…We need to have a more holistic approach that creates synergy. The networking model will be a step in the right direction’.

38However, interviewees in this typology were also realistic about the chances of success. This empirical type raised numerous concerns about the willingness of the bureaucracy to cede their traditional dominance. They felt that:

‘the bureaucrats in government will do their utmost to abort adoption and implementation of the suggested model if they feel it will contradict their personal interests. (Interview 8, Local Government)

39Interviewee 11, a local government leader, was equally supportive of the proposals, but believed that:

‘The central bureaucracy with its rigid rules and regulations will obstruct efforts at applying the suggested Networking Model…based on my long experience in local government here, the government, represented by the Ministry of Local Government, places many hurdles against attempts to build bridges with the private sector. It is very difficult to get permission to coordinate with other sectors, especially with regard to financial transactions, and employees who violate the rules are held accountable’.

40Interviewee 9, a central government leader, also shared these concerns:

‘we may be faced with stiff resistance from the political echelons against adopting the new model’.

41Concerns were expressed across the three sectors. This typology was actively in favor of the policy and was willing to do its utmost to drive this change in governance arrangements, but it also identified the potential blockages. For some it was the national civil servants, for others it was the political elite at the national level. In summary, there was a rationale for supporting the model in terms of effectiveness and quality of decision-making, which was complemented by the view that the model could increase the transparency and accountability of decision-making (Borzel & Panke, 2007):

‘A networking model that combines the other two sectors may create the right conditions to apply stronger transparency and accountability’. (Interview 21, business leader).

42In interviewee 22, a local government leader, summed up this typology nicely:

‘The suggested model helps community participation in the mission of planning, implementation and monitoring and therefore enhances local empowerment and also facilitates implementation and control. It definitely leads to good governance’.

43Type one was very much in favor of the revised governance model. They identified obstacles but were confident that these could be overcome and were willing to be actively involved in overcoming them. Six interviewees were from government, three from business, and two from the NGO sector. Four were under the age of 40 and seven were over 40. Four identified as female and seven as male.

Factor Two: A passive supporter of the adoption of network governance; serious concerns about the capacity of government and society to deliver;

44While all three typologies recognize the need for a new model, types one and three do so most strongly (11). When the collated Q sort of type two is read in combination with the interview data, we see that they would like to see more joined-up government, there are undertones of apathy towards the concept of network governance. Type two is the only type that believed that there are insurmountable complex political, economic, and social issues that will render the new model untenable (4). This is an important distinction. Type two alone placed statement 20 in the central category, as opposed to the disagree category: ‘The proposed model is not appropriate for the local context’ (20), suggesting some minor hesitation in supporting the model. Again, it is the only type that did not disagree with the statement: ‘I will do what is required at the personal level to block the adoption or implementation of the proposed model’ (5). The other two types did so more strongly.

45Their reasons for supporting the model differed from those of the other two typologies. Type two did not believe that the model was necessary because of the shortcomings of the traditional public administration system (31). Interviewee 23, a central government director, typifies the enthusiastic response of this category to the concept in general:

‘Networking and partnership, especially in the economic sphere, are vital’.

46However, while in favor of the model, this typology believed that the likelihood of successful implementation was not high, as intimated by Interview 4, a business leader:

‘I honestly believe that government services at present are plagued with many problems, some of which are unacceptable. They are administered in “primitive” outdated ways. Certain government agencies behave as if they have exclusive powers in decision-making regarding what and how a public service should be delivered. They are indifferent to the other sectors despite the fact that many services are being outsourced in many parts of the world now, including security.’ Emphasis added.

47They believed the central administration to be too powerful and willing to work to stymie any change. They were the only type that would refuse to try and galvanize public opinion to make people and policy entrepreneurs accept the new model (7). They were also the only typology to believe that it would take a very long time before the new system was accepted by both the political leadership and the general public, and that this would make it impractical in terms of providing the needed objectives(3). Type one and Type three would contact public administration professionals and academics, as well as officials in donor countries, to enlist their support for the proposed model (33). Type two were less inclined to actively support the model. They would not stand in the way, but they were not active supporters. They would love to see the model implemented, but they had seen numerous such initiatives and had been let down too many times to pursue the implementation of this initiative at personal cost.

48One respondent was from the business sector, one was from an NGO, and one was from central government, but all were involved in economics or business on a daily basis. All three loaders were over 40 years of age and were male.

Factor Three: Positive about the need for a new approach to public administration; bureaucracy will stand in the way of change. Don’t expect change.

49This typology believed that bureaucrats in the civil service would do whatever they could to abort any attempts to install the new model (14). This belief superseded their belief in the project. They supported the model because they felt that the traditional public administration system had failed to deliver services to the citizens in an efficient and equitable way (31). While very skeptical, they were the only type that strongly believed that this change in the existing system of governance, if it worked, could lead to a significant improvement in service delivery and performance (1). Type three was the most likely to believe that the network model was needed because the current system had failed (31).

50While they would not lobby for the networking model (30), they were the only type that would do their best to respond to criticism and negative attitudes toward the proposed model through social media and, if necessary, workshops and other face-to-face encounters with members of the body politic and citizens (26). Akin to type two, this perhaps demonstrated a lack of faith in reform initiatives based on previous experiences.

51Interviewee 2, an NGO leader, believed that the government’s record on policy design and implementation was poor and had little confidence that this initiative would succeed:

‘…27 years since the Palestinian authority assumed power in the territories, the public administration system has been riddled with inefficiency and poor performance and inability to face today’s challenges. The growing number of institutions in both the public and private sectors have grievances against the existing system, so are the majority of the people. Most citizens are dissatisfied with the way the system functions and they call for an alternative in view of the changes in the societal structure in Palestine.’

52Interviewee 6, a leader from the business community, embodied the skepticism of this typology. Akin to the other typologies there was a fear that the central bureaucracy would not cede power.

‘My long personal experience has not been encouraging in this respect. Governments are reluctant, and even antagonistic, to sharing decision-making power with business and civil society organizations and will place all kinds of bureaucratic obstacles to prevent this model from actualization’.

53Interview 14, an NGO Leader also identified the failings of the existing system:

‘The traditional top-down approach to problems in the society has failed to resolve issues so we chose to adopt a bottom-up approach…I support the new model because decisions should come from the grassroots in order to achieve the objectives of cleaning up the environment. This objective could not be actualized unless all concerned are allowed to participate in the mission’.

54Interviewee 7, a business leader, shared the belief in the model with his counterparts in this typology:

‘I firmly believe that the new model will be the trend for the future. The stakeholders always demand that decisions be congruent with the prevailing conditions, in order that decisions are realistic and reflect people’s demands and aspirations. In my view, this suggested model safeguards both the interests of the financial organizations and the general public’.

55However, while Type three were very much in favor of the model, interviewees had serious reservations about the ability of the various networks in Palestine to implement the model effectively. They were concerned that the central bureaucracy was either unwilling or unable to change.

‘Our experience with the existing system has been negative. Policies, regulations, and rules emanating from successive governments have been a failure, resulting in a state of confusion, problems, and mass complaints. The existing system does not fulfill the demands of the society, and the absence of a legislative council exacerbates the already dire situation in Palestine. Having said this, I feel that we need a more effective system that can link the three sectors together and achieve a better degree of cooperation and collaboration between them. We need change. Change is imperative since any failure at the governmental level will reflect negatively on the economic level.’ (Interview 10, NGO leader).

56This typology also had concerns with the capacity and ability of government to operationalize such an initiative, with interviewee 13, a central government director, outlining that while

‘the networking model may help in facilitating transactions between citizen and government agencies, there is much red-tape and the performance of many government employees is not up to standard’.

57There was skepticism in this typology that all were committed to the mission. Interviewee 18, an NGO leader, typified the response of this typology. He was very much in its favor, as it would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of decision-making, while at the same time increasing transparency and accountability. However, he was skeptical that the policy would succeed.

‘I believe that the level of services provided by government here is very low in terms of quality and speed. The situation could be drastically improved in view of the available resources if networking is adopted. The crucial issue is that transparency would be enhanced. Frankly speaking, transparency here is not enforced and almost non-existent. The citizens have little trust in government and what government officials declare. The collaboration of business and NGO with public agencies in decisions related to public service delivery could improve transparency and accountability. Another important benefit that could be gained by adopting a networking model is cost-effectiveness. It will help in eliminating wasteful duplication and overlapping in service provision. The underprivileged section of the population will enjoy more justice and equity in accessing service organizations.’

58Type three interviewees were in favor of the model and would champion it, and they also shared the concerns of Types one and two that bureaucracy would stymie implementation. However, while those in Type one were optimistic that these challenges would be overcome, Types two and three were less so. All seven interviewees were male and all were over 40 years of age. Only one was from the central government sector (and although he had more than 20 years experience in his current role, he had previously worked in the private sector), four interviewees were from the NGO sector and two were from the business sector.

Implications of the findings

Enthusiasm for the shift to the network governance model of public administration, but skepticism prevails

59Firstly, our methodology has allowed us to identify very subtle differences between the typologies: both Type one and Type three cite bureaucracy as an impediment to success – interviewees in Type one believe that this impediment can be overcome, but those in Type three are more pessimistic. Chaney (2017) notes that despite the network governance rhetoric in Middle Eastern states and a concurrent commitment to gender equality, there exists an application of an ‘expert bureaucratic’ model of [gender] mainstreaming across the region. Bureaucracies use their traditional power to control the agenda. According to Ziegler (2010, 2016, p. 555) ‘civil society group activity [in Central Asia] may be tolerated, but only if it is cooperative, aligned with regime norms and goals.’ Interdependence of actors in the networking model is a crucial issue. However, embarking on this approach is navigating uncharted territory for a fragile state with a high level of uncertainty. In their empirical study of Gaza, Elmasry and Bakri, (2019) explored the relationship between good governance and leadership in Gaza, concluding that the transformational type of leadership was perceived to be effective in promoting ‘good’ governance.

60However, in their governance symposium focusing on Latin America, Peters and Filgueiras (2022) find governance reforms to follow path-dependency rather than radical change. Transformational change envisaged by network governance can mean transformational in terms of the policy process, in that the process of policy making is changed or transformed. Our evidence suggests that there is a willingness to pursue this transformation, although there are differing perspectives on the likely success of the initiative. Transformational change can also relate to outcomes - there is little evidence to support the hypothesis of transformational outcomes that some of our interviewees espoused. Dispersing power among civil society groups in a developing, conflict society may indeed be transformational, but not always in the ways envisaged, or indeed at all. In our view, a network governance approach has the possibility to enhance good governance, however there is not always a correlation between network governance and good governance.

61The study has highlighted broad enthusiasm for such a network governance approach. However, well-founded skepticism exists as to its implementation, particularly in Type two. Governing collaborative frameworks is challenging (Smith 2020), and bureaucrats need to understand their new role in such a system: it is not business as usual. To succeed, therefore, the networking process must involve investment in public leadership education in the three participating sectors, as well as in the design of a coordination mechanism that can facilitate communication between them. Without such investment, we would not expect a change in the status quo. The subtle differences in rationales for support for the model identify where proponents of network governance need to focus their energies. There is a danger that skeptical and passive voices could be left out of the process, inadvertently weakening the model as adopted. There is a need for an education strategy from central government bureaucrats that will convince the skeptics (Type three) and motivate the passive supporters (Type two).

Disagreement on what successful network governance looks like. Formal network governance structures are required to ensure collaboration between the sectors.

62Secondly, there needs to be broad agreement on what successful implementation looks like. At present, the idea can be broadly interpreted and may mean all things to all people and organizations. Our empirically existent ‘Type one’ sees this as a forum to establish common solutions to wicked policy problems, but what will happen when disagreement arises around the policy solution? Laffin et al. (2014), in their case study research in the UK, see little evidence of bureaucracies ceding power. While governing has indeed become more inclusive, they claim that the power dynamics mean that power remains centralized in bureaucracies. In Palestine, have power dynamics organically shifted, or is the central civil service voluntarily ceding power? A cynic could argue that following the pandemic, a reduction in US foreign funding, and the increasing illegitimacy of the PA among ordinary Palestinians, the bureaucracy has no choice but to engage with civil society and the private sector if it is to remain relevant.

63Put differently, is the initiative about enhancing collaboration or collaborative governance, or is there to be a genuine transfer of power? Type one in particular are expecting a meaningful transfer of power, but is enhanced collaboration a more likely outcome? Forrest (2003), drawing on his research on network behavior in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Denmark finds it ‘clear that interorganizational cohesion, accessibility, trust generation, and framing issues’ are central to understanding network policy outcomes. We make no normative conclusion as to the merits of maintaining rather than dispersing power, but common sectoral expectations of the model need to be ascertained. Perhaps, Wegner and Verschoore’s (2022:490) recently designed framework for establishing a collaborative framework could be employed to identify common relational goals. Key features of their collaborative environment include ‘trust, learning, legitimacy, power symmetry, and fairness’. These features enable stakeholders ‘to marshal and focus the necessary actions to reach the instrumental goals for which the collaborative networks have been created’ (ibid). Greater attention to the structures that govern the governance process (meta-governance) is therefore required.

Goodness of fit for the fragile society

64The final implication comes from our analysis of the qualitative data and the extant governance literature. If a meaningful transfer of power to community organizations happens within a society with a weak judicial and political system, could the network governance system inadvertently support actors that would work against the state or indeed at the behest of another state. According to Carlsson and Sandström, (2008), policy networks are often ‘hierarchical due to the asymmetric state of resource dependency, but this power distribution does not necessarily reflect the formal hierarchy’. Different civil society and private sector actors possess significant resource differentials. In weak states, some CSOs, with little regulatory oversight, can have more financial clout than governments.

65Carlsson and Sandström, (2008, p. 49) point to network heterogeneity and centralized integration as key qualities of a well-performing system, conditions often absent in fragile states. Provan and Kenis (2007, p. 241) discuss the various forms that network governance can take and propose a number of conditions for network effectiveness that would lead us to question the appropriateness of network governance in a fragile society. This is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is noteworthy that no typology questioned the potential benefits of network governance (although Type two did emphasize capacity building).

66Academic proponents of the model assume a pluralist state in which power is divided among numerous actors: policy outcomes emanate from numerous interest groups, organizations, and state actors who compete to have their frames accepted. Their interactions are governed by the rules and norms of the state. In a developing and contested society, these norms can be fluid and rules are often unenforceable. It is noteworthy that no typology saw this as a potential risk to service delivery. Our typologies seem to look on network governance as a ‘silver bullet’. All types are in favor. All types believe that network governance could, should, or will bring about better public policy in Palestine.

67Success is defined as increased legitimacy and effectiveness (Borzel & Panke, 2007: Chapter 8). What happens if governance is installed in a regime lacking in accountability structures? Rather than enhancing transparency and increasing efficiency and effectiveness, will this lead to corrupt cabals? Will the hegemonic viewpoints of an elite group of actors become the dominant frame? Will authority and power be nominally located in various institutions, but with similar people with similar life experiences? Will previously independent NGOs and lobby groups become embedded in the regime rather than questioning it? Such questions lead us to pose serious questions about the viability of the model for Palestine. When CSOs and NGOs become part of the state or de facto arms-length bodies, a vibrant third sector can inadvertently be depleted.

68Piven and Clowards (1971), Laffin et al. (2014), and Du Gay (2005) all point to the importance of hierarchical institutions in securing the rights of deprived and dependent groups. Bureaucracy is all too often (incorrectly) portrayed as negatively affecting growth, innovation, and even citizen rights and democracy. None of our typologies saw any risks in this new network governance approach. To what extent does network governance lead civil society and NGOs to become agents of the state rather than holding the state to account? ‘The challenge for the state is how to adapt to this new role of being a partner that tries to find ways of influencing the existing governance structures or fostering the creation of new ones’. (Carlsson & Sandström, 2008) Are the three sectors governing the Palestinian state up to the challenge?

Conclusion

69For the first time we have set out the views and concerns of stakeholders in a governance system poised to change from traditional hierarchy to network governance. If network governance is to be a success in Palestine, it will need to be implemented in a highly volatile region, with threats to the legitimacy of state coming from within and outside. We make no normative claim on the merits of network governance. Rather, we have identified network governance as a new approach that those governing Palestinian society in the West Bank have, in theory, adopted and, to variant degrees, appear willing to embrace.

70Our study has a number of limitations: the study was conducted within a developing, fragile society, however the West Bank is not typical of such societies. Its complex internal divisions and external challenges set it apart from other developing fragile societies. This will have implications for the generalizability of our findings. Further, in an effort to focus interviewees on the concept of network governance, competing preferences were not explored. While we explore these in other papers (O’Connor & Shahwan, 2024a, 2024b) and in interviews conducted with different individuals, this approach is necessary within the conflict environment so that governance beliefs are identified and measured as opposed to measuring deep core beliefs. While such an approach is necessary, in times of crisis, deep core beliefs can indeed usurp governance beliefs.

71Q methodology is a mixed method. We draw on our own subjective expertise to make judgements regarding the number and scope of statements presented to interviewees and the number of factors to take forward. However, a key benefit to Q methodology is that interviewees set the nature and scope of the factor boxes/typologies themselves through the placement of cards. This is the opposite of traditional R research where interviewees are placed in predefined boxes by the researcher.

72Through Q methodological interviews with key stakeholders we have identified three perceptions of how the network governance agenda will progress. We have also identified a number of implications from these findings that Palestinian stakeholders will want to take on board, as they embark on this journey. Given recent developments in the region, future research needs to take stock of existing governance practices. Any future peace agreement will need effective governance structures to govern the peace. If such structures are to be created, an understanding of the status quo is necessary. To this end, this paper has set out the attitudes to network governance of those that will be tasked with implementing any peace agreement.

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Appendix

Annex One: Factor Scores

Statement

Category

F1 F2 F3

1 A change in the existing system of governance will not produce any significant improvement in either delivery or performance

Negative passive

-1 -1 -3

2 As a decision maker in my organization, I will start the necessary bridge building with the other sectors to pave the way for adopting the new model

Positive active

2 3 2

3 We will need a very long time before the new system is accepted by both the political leadership and the general public and this will make it impractical in terms of providing the needed objectives

Negative passive

-1 1 0

4 There are insurmountable complex political, economic, and social issues that will render the new model untenable

Negative passive

-1 1 -1

5 I will do what is required, at the personal level, to block the adoption or implementation of the proposed model

Negative active

-3 0 -3

6 The new model will create imbalance among the three sectors that may breed conflict and disharmony in society therefore I will mobilize all available channels to reject it

Negative active

-1 -2 -2

7 I will try to galvanize public opinion to make people and policy entrepreneurs accept the new model

Positive active

1 -2 0

8 In my opinion, a networking model is better suited to a democratic system of government

Possitive passive

1 3 3

9 I will do whatever is needed to persuade the political leadership and business owners to uphold the new model

Positive active

1 1 1

10 I will try to approach the upper echelons of my organization as well as the strategic stakeholders to explain the new model and enlist their support

Positive active

3 1 0

11 I feel there is no need for the new model. Things can be improved through the existing system

Negative passive

-2 -1 -2

12 I believe the networking model is the trend of the future and should be upheld in order not to waste time waiting for it to materialize

Positive passive

3 2 1

13 I believe the suggested model will be well-received by the general public and stakeholders

Positive passive

0 2 2

14 The bureaucrats in the civil service will do whatever they can to abort any attempts to install the new model

Negative passive

0 -1 3

15 I will organize informal activities and meetings through workshops and public lectures to de-legitimize the new model and render it unacceptable by the general public

Negative active

-2 -3 -3

16 I will strongly lobby all stakeholders against the adoption of the new model

Negative active

-3 -1 -2

17 I will resist any attempts that aim at imposing the new model even if it were sanctioned through legislation

Negative active

-2 -3 -1

18 I do not support the idea and will urge decision makers in my organization to reject it

Negative active

-2 -2 -3

19 I feel the networking model is feasible and can be implemented

Positive passive

2 3 1

20 The proposed model is not appropriate for the local context

Negative passive

-1 0 -1

21 I will use all legal means available to prevent my organization from adopting the new model

Negative active

-2 -3 -1

22 I will work to contact mobilize local media (including social media) in my country to support and publicize the benefits of the networking model

Positive active

2 0 0

23 I will work to remove obstacles that obstruct the adoption and implementation of the new model

Positive active

1 1 1

24 I support the networking model because I believe that public service should be the joint responsibility of the three sectors that constitute the modern state

Positive passive

3 2 2

25 The new model will create inter-societal conflicts and fighting among the three sectors with each one seeking hegemony over the other two

Negative passive

0 0 -1

26 I will do my best to answer to criticisms and negative attitudes towards the suggested model through social media and if necessary workshops and other face to face encounters with members of the body politic and common citizens

Positive active

0 0 1

27 I do support a networking governance model because it offers a better alternative to the existing one in terms of service delivery and quality of public goods

Positive passive

2 2 2

28 I do not support the new model because the three sectors should work independently to accomplish societal objectives

Negative passive

-3 -2 -2

29 In view of the recurring economic crises in the world and depletion of resources, the model offers a more dynamic and effective approach in facing macro-economic issues in the country

Positive passive

0 2 2

30 I will lobby for the adoption of the networking model before the decision makers in my organization

Positive active

3 1 0

31 I support the networking model because I feel the traditional public administration system has failed to deliver the services to the citizens in an efficient and equitable way

Positive passive

1 -1 3

32 I will not abide by any laws, rules or instructions from higher management that are aimed at facilitating the installment of the new model and will exert pressure on my colleagues in the organization to block its actualization even if it means my resignation

Negative active

-3 -3 -1

33 I will initiate contacts with professionals and academics in the field of public administration as well as officials in the donor countries to enlist their support for the proposed model

Positive active

1 0 1

34 People in Palestine are indifferent towards the development of new models as long as they can get the required services regularly so I do not expect that they will be excited about the new model

Negative passive

0 -1 0

35 It is my conviction that the application of the new model will negatively affect the interests of the general public, therefore, I will approach the international donor countries and institutions to put pressure on the Authority in order to prevent its implementation

Negative active

-1 -2 -2

36 I believe that the new model will bring more benefits to the general public in terms of quality and speed of service

Positive passive

2 2 3

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References

Electronic reference

Karl O’Connor and Usamah Shahwan, Do different governance actors approach the concept of network governance differently within a developing fragile society?International Review of Public Policy [Online], 7:1 | 2025, Online since 05 March 2025, connection on 21 June 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/4982; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/13zev

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About the authors

Karl O’Connor

Centre for Public Administration, Ulster University, UK

By this author

Usamah Shahwan

Associate Professor, Bethlehem University, Palestine

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Copyright

CC-BY-4.0

The text only may be used under licence CC BY 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

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