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Learning from a comparison of policy responses to a century of Irish housing crisis

Paul Umfreville and Lorcan Sirr

Abstract

That the Irish housing system is perceived to be in crisis is not a recent phenomenon. Reports of inquiry have catalogued recurring housing crises and policy failings over the last century. It is the difference between historical and more contemporary public policy responses to housing crisis that both informs and forms the basis of this paper. Through historic document review, augmented by interviews with social historians and key decision-makers, the processes which led to policy responses to previous housing events are traced and compared to those of the current crisis. The research identifies the characteristics of policy change, highlighting similarities in policymaking processes that unfolded over time, from problem identification to the instigation of political action and policy design. This paper therefore offers a historical approach to contextualize contemporary policymaking. By learning from the past current policymakers are offered a means to overcome the permanent state of flux between housing being a problem and a crisis, though there are also salient lessons for policymakers in other fields of public policymaking.

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Author's notes

The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.

Full text

Introduction

1The Irish housing system is reportedly in crisis and has been for more than two decades (Hearne, 2020, 2022; Lewis, 2019; Norris et al., 2019), if not longer. Public policy responses have seemingly failed to tackle the causes, focusing instead on the symptoms (Norris and Shiels 2007; Dukelow 2011; Murphy 2018), but this is not a purely recent phenomenon as housing crisis has been a recurring facet of the Irish political landscape for over a century (Kitchin et al., 2015; Umfreville & Sirr, 2020). Whilst historic events resulted in policy change which sought to address failings in the housing system such as overcrowding, poor standards, supply and affordability, inertia now appears to be dampening the momentum for radical housing policy change (Lewis, 2019; Norris, 2014, 2016). It is the difference between responses to various crises over time that informs this innovative research.

2Public policy might be defined as “whatever governments choose to do or not to do” (Dye, 2017, p. 1), though a distinction must be made between policy as a strategy and political set of tactics, rather than policy that is enshrined in law, given that the obligation to enact is quite different. This paper concerns the political choice and reality of policymaking and government housing policy. It compares four cases of significant housing policymaking over two eras, exploring the realities of what happened, following the progression from problem recognition to political action and policy design. Insights to the impacts of housing crisis and insecurity have revealed the precarities of residential stability (Byrne, 2020; Finnerty & O’Connell, 2017; Lima, 2020; Waldron, 2021), the experiences of the concealed casualties of mortgage stress (Waldron & Redmond, 2017), and the impacts on vulnerable families of the marketization of social housing (Hearne & Murphy, 2018). Rather than focus on the outcomes of housing policy, this paper instead compares processes of policymaking which were responses to housing crisis and the influences on those processes. Historic document review, augmented by interviews with social historians and key decision-makers, allowed for the process to be traced for each case. This enables comparison between cases and of the timing of these influences within processes, giving credence to the assertion that “history matters” (Pierson, 2004, p. 2).

3This paper identifies similar characteristics in four examples of housing policy processes from the last century. These include the overcoming of financial constraints, the provision of external validation, the role of public opinion and political leadership, and the convergence towards political consensus. It also recognizes a progression of policymaking, from problem to politics to policy, and makes suggestions for current policymakers on how responses to housing crisis can be informed by historic housing policymaking processes. Although focused on the Irish housing crisis, these findings have implications for processes of policymaking as responses to crisis in other jurisdictions. Recognition of this progression and the importance of the characteristics could provide policymakers with the means to move beyond the permanent state of flux between housing being a problem and a crisis.

Tracing processes of public policymaking

4Policymaking does not occur at a single point in time but is the result of “processes that unfold over time and in time” (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003, p. 12). Pollitt (2008) identified that the practice and study of policymaking has neglected the fundamental dimension of time, whilst Grzymala-Busse (2011) and Strassheim (2017) suggested that temporal analysis can assist understanding of political processes and action. As such, Pierson (2004, p. 2) emphasized that “placing politics in time can greatly enrich our understanding of complex social dynamics”. But whilst “history is profoundly important” (Greener, 2002, p. 614), more important are “those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties [allowing for the examination of] path-dependent processes of change” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 507). The barrier to change is theorized as the effect of path dependence on the policy process, a recognition that previous decisions affect change or constrain potential future choices (Greener, 2002; Pierson, 1993, 2004; Rast, 2012; Sewell, 2005). For Greener (2002, p. 615), process durability and stability, evolution, or indeed revolution can be facilitated by “an endogenous and exogenous element to change”. The identification of path dependent sequencies “involves both tracing a given outcome back to a particular set of historical events and showing how these events are themselves contingent occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior historical conditions” (Mahoney, 2000, pp. 507–508).

5Pursuing more historical and comparative methods of analysis is for Jacobs and Manzi (2017, p. 17) “amongst the best ways to respond to the limitations of contemporary critiques of housing policy”, whilst Clapham (2018) identified a disconnect between housing research and policymaking and called for the study of housing policymaking processes in different contexts. The issue was how to connect these identified gaps in academic study, given that it is evident from the literature that there is little focus on the process of housing policymaking or the use of historical approaches to understand these processes. This therefore provided the opportunity to take a longitudinal perspective on housing policymaking to explain why policies to address the current Irish housing crisis are seemingly different to historic responses when there are grounds to expect that they would be similar.

6Drawing on the concepts of Mahoney (2000) and Pierson (1993, 2004) in relation to historic policy analysis and path dependence, this paper builds on the work of Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2011, 2017) which established the link between path dependence as a theoretical frame and comparative process tracing as the means for housing policy analysis. Process tracing provides the means for undertaking path dependence analysis to detect mechanisms between the critical juncture (“events or points in time where a certain historical path is chosen” which might be precipitated by a disaster, or the publication of a report or Census data) and the focal point (“typically an important political decision”, being the outcome of interest, either the Act of parliament or the policy response to the identified housing problem) (2011, pp. 400–401). In effect, this paper has the ambition to detect “a causal mechanism between the initial conditions A and the outcome of interest B” (2017, p. 45), where condition A might be a disaster, a report, or Census data, and condition B is the policy response.

7The research therefore traced, analyzed, and compared four historic and contemporary housing policymaking processes that were responses to a century of housing crisis (Figure 1).

Figure 1. A century of housing crises and policy responses.

Figure 1. A century of housing crises and policy responses.

Source: the Authors

8Table 1 sets out the significant number of policy responses since 2009.

Table 1. Detail of policy responses since 2009

Table 1. Detail of policy responses since 2009

Source: the Authors

9The identification of social mechanisms, the “regular patterns of actions and interactions [which] bring about outcomes” [author’s emphasis] (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2017, p. 53), provided a means for categorizing the influences on policymaking processes. To navigate the story behind each of the cases, the impact of efficiency, legitimacy, and power were identified and analyzed: efficiency (perceptions of the economic benefit or costs of different choices); legitimacy (the authority of existing institutions, and the acceptability of those institutions, over alternative institutional arrangements); and power (the inclusion and exclusion of actors in agenda setting and decision-making, or their influence on those processes) (ibid.).

10Four cases of the process of housing policymaking from across the last century were traced and compared, and in each the influences of efficiency, legitimacy, and power are recognizable and significant. The cases are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. The cases explored and traced in the research

Crisis

Critical Juncture

Focal Point

1930s Case

Overcrowding and slum dwellings continue to be the housing option for the poor. Civic surveys highlight the need for 70,000 houses nationwide (1924) as 21,000 families, or 90,000 people, live in one-room dwellings (1925). Census of 1926 is published in 1929 and highlights the depth of the crisis.

Whilst the Commission on the Relief of Unemployment report (1928) offered an alternative path to policymaking, the need for change was identified with the establishment of a sub-committee of the Executive Council in October 1931 (NAI - S.6193).

Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1932

1960s Case

9,000 people on Dublin housing waiting list (1962). Collapse of tenements, ensuing panic, and fear highlight the lack of supply of good quality dwellings (1963).

Local authority survey of unfit dwelling is published (1964), which identifies the depth of the crisis and provides legitimacy for policy action (Dáil Éireann, 1964).

Housing Act 1966

2004 Case

From the late 1990s, house price inflation was ‘highest in [the] world’ (anon., 2000) and promoted issues and concerns of affordability, whilst poor standards and limited regulation were symptomatic in the private renal sector (DELG, 2000).

The report of the Commission on the Private Rented Residential Sector (July 2000) offered a path to policy change.

Residential Tenancies Act 2004

2014 Case

Global Financial Crisis led to a collapse in the number of housing completions, with a lack of supply and increasing unaffordability and with issues of security of tenure and accessibility.

Imposition of efficiency and public finance restraints required by the Troika in response to the program for financial assistance (December 2010).

Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014

Source: the Authors

11Data was collected through historic document review of official public archived documents, proceedings from Irish Dáil (parliament) debates, and historical newspaper accounts, which enabled for the social mechanisms within policymaking processes to be identified and traced. This was augmented by undertaking 16 in-depth interviews with specialists in the history of Irish housing and wider aspects of Irish history for historic cases as well as with key decision-makers in the more recent cases.

12The literature highlights that the key decision-making actors in the public policy process are the triumvirate of proximate policymakers, the ministers, senior civil servants, and special advisors, who together have a significant role in contributing to and influencing policymaking (Chubb, 1992; Connaughton, 2012; Dye, 2017). We wanted to examine the experiences and perceptions of these key decision makers to provide context for each case. For the historic cases, given that none of the decision-making actors are still alive, renowned experts in social history augment and supplement the data from the document review. Whilst not directly comparable to the experiences and perceptions of the decision-makers, this does add to the historical narrative and context for both cases.

13Of the 20 interviewees identified, 16 interviews were undertaken, providing a strong spread of participants across the cases and by participant type, and the five former Ministers responsible for housing policy interviewed provided 17 years of continuity for the period from 1997 through to 2014. One ex-civil servant and one ex-advisor did not wish to participate in the research, whilst one ex-Minister was unable to participate due to a severe Covid infection that required long-term rehabilitation, and one social historian agreed to be interviewed but was subsequently unavailable. In total, 15 hours and 45 minutes of interviews and 76,800 words were transcribed, providing a rich source of primary data.

14This is a necessarily small sample size, but cumulatively it represents an effective group of very influential participants who gave their time freely for in-depth questioning, providing a unique and rich source of data. The interviewees are pseudo-anonymized and cited in the text as P (politicians), SH (social historians), CS (civil servants), SA (special advisors) and CiSo (civil society representatives) (Table 3).

Table 3. Interviews – participant type and number

Participant type

Detail

Number of interviewees

Politicians

(P)

Ex-Ministers for Local Government, Heritage, and Environment (or equivalent) and ex-Ministers of State for Housing (or equivalent)

5

Civil Servants

(CS)

Department of Local Government, Heritage, and Environment (or equivalent) at Principal and Assistant Secretary levels of seniority

2

Special Advisors

(SA)

Special ‘policy’ advisors appointed under the provisions of the Public Service Management Act 1997

2

Civil Society

(CiSo)

Commission or Board members of agencies involved in contemporary cases of policymaking

3

Social Historians

(SH)

Specialists on the history of Irish housing and wider aspects of Irish history

4

16

Source: the Authors

15The narrative for each of the cases is split into three stages: the emergence of the crisis, the recognition of the problem, and the proposal of a solution. Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 in the next section provide a visual outline of the pressures for change and the momentum for change (or no change) for each of the four policymaking processes. The research therefore analyzes and compares the processes of, and influences on, policy change as responses to housing crisis to explain why policies to address contemporary housing crisis are seemingly different to historic responses.

Comparing processes of Irish housing policymaking

16Two cases of historic housing crises were identified with which to compare cases of policymaking from the current housing crisis: the 1932 and the 1966 Housing Acts introduced significant support for the provision of public and private housing, with the government in both circumstances responding to concerns about the poor quality and quantity of housing. These cases are compared to two more recent ones, allowing an examination of the policymaking processes that led to the regulation of the private rental sector (from 2004) and the establishment of Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) from 2014. Both are relevant today, as they provide examples of policymaking which continue to have ongoing significant implementation and funding commitments.

  • 1 The left axis highlights the momentum for change: higher is for path-shaping change; lower is for p (...)

17Figure 21 outlines the momentum for policy change in the process leading to the 1932 Act. At the time, overcrowding and slum dwellings continued to be the main housing option for the working classes and the poor. The legislation introduced significant public provision of housing, and “brought slum clearance on a large scale” (McManus, 2011, p. 263) establishing a “golden age” of Irish social housing provision (Norris, 2018).

Figure 2. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on 1920s and early 1930s housing policy.

Figure 2. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on 1920s and early 1930s housing policy.

Source: the Authors

18Figure 3 outlines the momentum for policy change in the process leading to the 1966 Act. Despite suggestions by the Fianna Fáil (governing political party) Minister for Local Government, Neil Blaney, that “the housing needs on which the post-war housing program had been based were satisfied in full in [most] districts” (Dáil Éireann, 1958), with 9,000 households on the Dublin waiting list, the collapse of several tenement buildings in 1963, and a local authority survey identifying 60,000 occupied houses as being unfit for habitation, a change in policy direction was demanded. The parliamentary White Paper of 1964, Housing – Progress and Prospects, identified the need for 50,000 new houses, which marked the “end to the belief that housing demand had been met” (Daly, 1997, p. 453).

Figure 3. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on late 1950s and early 1960s housing policy.

Figure 3. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on late 1950s and early 1960s housing policy.

Source: the Authors

19The two more recent cases continue to impact on government resources and policymaking. The Celtic Tiger (1995-2007) saw a significant increase in house prices and issues of unaffordability which translated into rising rental prices. Figure 4 outlines the influences leading to the establishment of the Private Residential Tenancies Board. Subsequent legislation implemented the recommendations of a commission and established an independent statutory body to operate a national tenancy registration system. It introduced “new rights and protections for tenants” (O’Connor, 2014, p. 41) and provided significant “improvements to the legal protections for private renters” (Finnerty & O’Connell, 2014, p. 177).

Figure 4. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on late 1990s and early 2000s housing policy.

Figure 4. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on late 1990s and early 2000s housing policy.

Source: the Authors

20After the global financial crash (2008), significant issues of affordability, security of tenure, and accessibility arose. Figure 5 outlines the influences leading to the establishment of the Housing Assistance Program (HAP). The Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014 replaced previous reform mechanisms, such as the Rent Supplement and the Rental Accommodation Scheme, and provided direct placement into privately rented accommodation or financial support for eligible families to access the private rental sector. By 2021, over 119,000 tenancies were supported by mechanisms of state support to access the private rented sector (Finnerty & O’Connell, 2021, p. 182), at a cost of €525 million for the 64,000 recipients of Housing Assistance Payments in 2023 (DHLGH, 2023).

Figure 5. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on post-financial crisis housing policy.

Figure 5. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on post-financial crisis housing policy.

Source: the Authors

21The three social mechanisms of efficiency, legitimacy, and power are identifiable as significant influences on policymaking processes within each of the four cases (Table 4).

Table 4. Examples of the social mechanisms within the cases

Case

Examples of the social mechanisms within the cases

1932

Efficiency - precarious finances constrained and defined government policymaking.

Legitimacy - the State and its institutions were questioned; questions around the legitimacy of the political opposition were overcome.

Power - limited political opposition to the government transitioned into an emergence of a political opposition; political consensus on the policy solution to the problem.

1966

Efficiency - government policy focus on financial efficiency, and specifically on productive capital investment, constrained housing policymaking.

Legitimacy - existing institutional arrangements were questioned; the legitimacy for an alternative policy approach to the status quo emerged with the availability of the local authority survey data.

Power - the Capital Investment Advisory Committee had an important role in driving (or defining the limits to) housing policy; later political recognition for a need for change.

2004

Efficiency - there was an increasing role for the private sector to provide social housing outcomes, despite the economic boom of the Celtic Tiger.

Legitimacy - the regulatory regime of minimum standards and registration were undermined by non-compliance and limited enforcement; the Commission and its process of developing policy recommendations provided legitimacy to policy action.

Power - allegations of the wider abuse of power, bribery and corruption; the Commission provided the basis for political consensus on the solution to the problem; political leadership.

2014

Efficiency - the imposition of fiscal restraints restricted the availability of public finances and constrained policymaking.

Legitimacy - political legitimacy of the government’s handling of the financial crash was questioned with ceding of sovereignty to supra-national organizations.

Power - the loss of power of national government, with economic policies and fiscal constraint required by the Troika impacted on the availability of alternatives for policymaking.

Source: the Authors

22Mahoney (2000) asserted path dependence as relating to causal processes that are susceptible to temporal sequence. Here, Pierson noted that “earlier parts of a sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that happens ‘too late’ may have no effect, although it might have been of great consequence if the timing had been different” (Pierson, 2000, p. 263). Identifying the importance of temporality in the sequencing of political mechanisms (Grzymala-Busse, 2011), Thelen and Mahoney (2015, p. 20) further recognized that “early events in a path-dependent sequence exert a stronger causal impact on outcomes than later ones do”. This proposition is relevant to the comparison across cases, and Table 5 sets out the dominant social mechanisms within each stage for the cases.

Table 5. Dominant social mechanisms within the episodes of each of the cases

Stage

1932 Case

1966 Case

2004 Case

2014 Case

Emergence of crisis

Efficiency

(strong constraint to policymaking)

Efficiency

(strong constraint to policymaking)

Efficiency

(weak constraint to policymaking)

Efficiency

(strong constraint to policymaking)

Problem recognition

Legitimacy

(validity of policy action provided through external report)

Legitimacy / Power

(impact of public opinion; validity of policy action provided through external report)

Legitimacy

(validity of policy action provided through external report)

Efficiency

(strong constraint to policymaking – with diminished political legitimacy and power)

Proposal of a solution

Power

(political leadership and political consensus)

Power

(political leadership and political consensus)

Power

(political leadership and political consensus)

Efficiency

(strong constraint to policymaking – with policy solution within the efficiency constraints provided by the Troika)

Source: the Authors

  • 2 Interviewees are pseudo-anonymized and cited in the text as P (politicians), SH (social historians) (...)

23Perceptions of the efficiency of different policy choices and the economic costs or benefits of those choices dominate policymaking for each of the cases during the emergence of crisis, and this is linked to limited capital for housing investment in each of the cases. The impact of the civil war, the war of independence, and the great depression, together with political choices following independence, limited housing expenditure during the 1920s and into the 1930s (SH1; SH3; SH4)2. This was also within a wider context of the State’s economic stance of the 1920s and 1930s of “national self-sufficiency” (Aalen et al., 1997, p. 97), whilst the Cumann na nGaedheal government (1923-1932) was “very anxious to convey an impression to the international community of fiscal prudence” (SH3). Later, the balance of payments crisis during 1956 promoted the subsequent political focus on financial efficiencies and productive capital and a moratorium on social investments including housing (SH1; SH3). This approach to economic development was clarified by Taoiseach de Valera (Fianna Fáil) informing “local authorities that he was keen to increase employment in construction – but in projects other than housing” (Daly, 2016, p. 112), given that “only productive not redistributive capital investment will raise the level of real incomes, and that subsidies for new privately owned housing do not create wealth or productive enterprise” (Pfretzschner, 1965, p. 54). There was also a continuing need for public sector efficiency despite the boom-years of the Celtic Tiger from 1995-2007 (P2; CiSo2), whilst the global financial crash of 2008 had a significant impact on the Irish economy and subsequent policymaking (Dukelow, 2011; Murphy, 2018; P1; P3; P4; CS1; CS2; CiSo2; CiSo3; SA1; SA2).

24In each of the cases, efficiency defined policymaking during the emergence of crisis. In later stages, the legitimacy of existing institutions and then the relative power and influence of actors became important mechanisms within three of the cases, which provided the means to overcome the constraint of efficiency. It was the legitimacy of Fianna Fáil as an emerging political opposition that offered an alternative framing and solution to the housing problem (SH1; SH4) in the 1932 case. Following their split from the Sinn Féin political party in 1926 and attendance in the Dáil, their proposed policy response to the recommendations of the Committee on the Relief of Unemployment differed from that of the government and was given added weight by Fianna Fáil’s own increasing legitimacy as a political alternative (SH4).

25For the 1966 case, the severity of the crisis was revealed by the reporting of the local authority’s survey of unfit dwellings, first requested in 1960 but not published until 1964, which promoted the legitimacy of government action to develop an alternative policy approach (SH1). The need for policy action was driven by public outrage at the scale and immediacy of the crisis (SH1; SH3) following the collapse of several tenement buildings in Dublin and the subsequent public panic when a Dublin Corporation survey, undertaken during the summer of 1963, identified 367 dangerous buildings requiring evacuation, which had been home to 1,189 families (Daly, 2016, p. 112). Significantly, the Inquiry into unfit dwellings and dangerous structures, which involved the collapse of buildings, exonerated the Dublin Corporation from all blame (anon. Irish Independent, 1963, p. 10). The new Planning and Development Act of 1963 stressed the importance of local authorities in the operation of the nascent planning system by obliging each to prepare a development plan for their area, a role reinforced by the recognition from 1964 that local authorities ought to develop housing (SH1). Although the drive for efficiency was weaker during the boom years of the Celtic Tiger (1995-2007), the legitimacy of the Commission on the Private Rented Residential Sector, established in 1999 to examine the landlord and tenant relationship, provided the context for political consensus on the solution to the problem (CiSo1; CiSo2; CS1; CS2; P2).

26However, the 2014 case differed as efficiency through fiscal constraint and recalibration was intertwined with the loss of political legitimacy and power. The destruction of the hegemonic political system early in this process following the financial crisis ensured that national institutions became subservient to the legitimacy and power of supranational organizations (CS1; CS2; SA2; P1; P3; P4; CiSo2; CiSo3). Here, the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) exhibited significant influence on processes of policymaking, defining the limits of that policymaking as terms for the proposed bailout, with an overarching focus on efficiency, implemented by the newly established Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (CS1; CS2; P1; P3; P4; SA1). For one ex-Minister, the relative power of the Troika “was very significant, it dominated everything, the rug was pulled out from beneath, things were dictated from elsewhere, you’ve no choice really but to go along with that, so it dictate[d] the sort of policies [that could be implemented]” (P3), for another, “we were not in control of our own financial situation” (P4). Unlike the comparative cases, the constraint of efficiency on policymaking was not overcome and, instead, path dependence exacerbated the incremental evolution of revenue-based responses to housing need, through Rent Supplement to Rental Accommodation Scheme to Housing Assistance Payments (CS1).

27The 2008 financial crash, the loss of legitimacy, and the obligations for efficiency early in the 2014 case therefore influenced this process differently to the other cases. The imposition of demands for efficiency by the Troika disrupted normal policymaking responses to an identified problem, reinforcing the importance of efficiency concerns in defining policymaking. This was confirmed by a former Minister: “What I wanted to achieve was radically curtailed by the non-availability of the necessary finance” (P4). The acknowledgement of the role of social housing as an economic stimulus measure in the historic cases (SH1; SH3) is mirrored in the 2004 case, with the recognition that the private rental sector could facilitate economic expansion (CiSo1) and be used to stabilize house price increases (P2). However, a similar outcome was not observed in the 2014 case – indeed, the social housing budget was reduced in the wake of the financial crisis (CiSo3). The research therefore corroborates the assertion by Pierson (2000) that history matters and the timing of events is important, given the collapse of legitimacy and power early in the process (via the entry of the Troika). As a result, the response to the crisis from 2010 onwards differed from previous responses to the housing crisis.

28This provides an explanation as to why the 2014 policymaking process differed to previous policy responses to crisis, but equally important is how the responses differed. For each of the cases, efficiency had been the dominant social mechanism during the emergence of crisis, and the pressure for public sector efficiency had defined and constrained policymaking. The research has highlighted four characteristics that provided sufficient impetus to overcome this limitation: the provision of an external report which provided verification or validation for policy action; public opinion; political leadership and political consensus.

External validation

29Fitzgerald et al. (2019, p. 5) asserted that an implied element of public policy is that it is authoritative and legitimate. External reports provided validation for policy change in three of the cases set out in Table 6.

Table 6. External reports providing validation for policy change

Case

External reports providing validation for policy change

1932

The report of the Committee on the Relief of Unemployment recommended “a 10-year program of house building” and that the government establish a conference to develop a long-term housing program (NAI - TSCH/3/S5553C, 1928). This, together with the publication of the 1926 Census, in 1929, provided the impetus and validation for change in policy direction (SH1).

1966

The local authority survey of unfit buildings provided the data required to emphasize the true scale of the problem and the means for the Minister of Local Government, Neil Blaney, to overcome financial objections, and enabled the case for change to be argued (SH1).

2004

The Commission on the Private Rented Residential Sector provided legitimacy for policy action through its constitution, organization, management, and administration (P2; CiSo1; CiSo2). The recommendations were deemed to be legitimate, and policy action based on these valid (P2; CiSo1; CiSo2).

2014

The Troika provided significant influence on the constraints and limits of policymaking following the financial crash, but rather than external validation, this was recognized as an imposition (P1; P3; P4; CS1; CS2; SA2; CiSo2; Dáil Éireann, 2010a).

Source: the Authors

30The 2014 case, however, differed to previous cases. Whilst the Troika provided significant influence on the constraints and limits of policymaking, in the aftermath of the financial crash this was not recognized as external validation but rather as an imposition (P1; P3; P4; CS1; CS2; SA2; CiSo2; Dáil Éireann, 2010a). This was heralded as “the most expensive and bitter pill in our history” (Keenan, 2010), although one interviewee suggested that the policy adjustment was “in large part written by the Department of Finance and was their wish list of stuff they wish they could have gotten away with decades before!” (CiSo3). Dáil debates highlighted a failure of public policy and the loss of Ireland’s sovereignty (Finian McGrath - Independent), which had led to the imposition of “an extremely demanding austerity program” (Eamon Gilmore – Labour Party), the “harsh conditions” (Maureen O’Sullivan – Independent member of the Dáil) of which “are strangling the economy” (Pearse Doherty – Sinn Fein) (Dáil Éireann, 2010). This was corroborated by the interviews as “we were forced into that circumstance, looking for something other than capital and capital funding” (CS1) and “we had to negotiate on our knees more or less … there was no sense of an equal negotiation” (CS2). Whilst external validation is identified as an important part of policymaking, in this case external validation was replaced by an imposed regime of efficiency and financial constraint (P1, P3, CS1, CS2, SA2, CiSo2). Some attempt was made in 2011, through convening a housing practitioners conference, to “set out a framework for a sequence of legislative policy initiatives” but the focus was on the short to medium term, within the parameters of the Troika’s bailout terms (P4).

31Whilst the seeking of external validation can have a slowing impact on the process of policymaking – the Commission on the Private Rental Sector took five years from inception to legislation – it does provide the opportunity to take a more deliberative and longer-term view. This provides for a more proactive approach to housing policymaking and decision-making, rather than a focus on the fast or reactive policy responses that typify recent housing policymaking and decision-taking, and which have tended to concentrate on the symptoms of crisis rather than its causes.

Public opinion

32The research highlighted the importance of public opinion in shaping public policy. Chomsky (2007) emphasized that a democratic deficit can, and often does, exist between public opinion and public policy. Such a gap is well recognized in housing policy, exemplified by Wetzstein (2017) in relation to affordability discourses, strategies, and outcomes. Whilst True et al. (2007) identified the role of public opinion in the agenda setting process in promoting change or the status quo, Knill and Tosun (2008) identified public opinion as a constraint to policy change.

33Public opinion is, however, identified as a driver for policy change in three of the four cases: A general perception that “something had to be done” was recognized by interviewees relating to the 1932, 1966, and 2004 cases as political avoidance, denial of the problem, and dismissal of the issue became options that were increasingly untenable (P2; P5; SH1; SH2; CiSo1; CiSo2) (Table 7).

Table 7. The importance of public opinion in shaping public policy

Case

Public opinion shaping public policy

1932

Public opinion accounted for the outcome of the 1932 general election, with the electorate voting for “sweeping constitutional, economic and social changes” (Lee, 1989, p. 170) as Fianna Fáil, with the support of Labor, took the reins of power.

1966

The sense of panic in the Dublin tenements and the wider public opinion for policy action was reflected in The Irish Times editorial that “It should be a signal to abolish the slums forever” (anon. The Irish Times, 1963, p. 26). Public opinion demanded policy change.

2004

Public opinion was cited by interviewees as providing power and leverage for decision-makers to drive policy change (P2; P5; CiSo2) – in this case, for reforms to the private rental sector.

2014

The importance of public opinion shaping policy change was not evident.

Source: the Authors

34Although an ex-Minister speaking about the 2004 case highlighted that “housing is a sensitive subject in Ireland … so … one of the most positive things about the role of public opinion was that it gave me an enormous amount of power and leverage” (P2), and another recognized that this influence on decision-makers “can be huge” (P5), the importance of public opinion shaping policy change was not, however, evident in the 2014 case. Indeed, the crisis, the power of the Troika, and the dominance of efficiency as a constraint were such that public opinion had to be set-aside by decision-makers (P1; P3; P4), as politicians recognized that the actions required to meet the terms of the Troika’s “bailout” would lead to electoral defeat (P1; P4). This differs to wider perceptions of political action that results from a “need to survive an election means that the electorally unpopular decisions will not be made” (Fitzgerald et al., 2019, p. 16), such was the severity of the wider crisis.

Political leadership

35Whilst management is the overseeing of a response or action within a defined set of parameters, leadership defines the parameters within which the management of a response to crisis can be undertaken. Sabatier (2007, p. 203) recognized the role of skilful leadership in creating an alternative vision for policy change and acknowledged this role in bringing about actual change, whilst Béland and Howlett (2016) identified the influences of decision-makers through their leadership on policymaking processes and this relates to discussions around policy entrepreneurship (see for example Cairney, 2020; Herweg et al., 2018; Kingdon, 2014; Zahariadis, 2007). Each of the 1932, 1966, and 2004 cases exhibited attributes of political leadership, with Presidents Cosgrave and de Valera, and Ministers T. O’Kelly, Blaney, and Malloy attributed for occasionally or systematically driving housing policymaking (Table 8).

Table 8. Political leadership driving public policymaking

Case

Political leadership driving public policymaking

1932

President Cosgrave’s reticence to address housing crisis meant that his (reactive rather than proactive) conversion came too late to accrue political capital – his was a response to the democratic challenge rather than a drive to improve social conditions (SH4). President de Valera’s early recognition of the role that state support for housing construction formed part of a narrative of promoting social progress which had in part brought power (Daly, 1997; SH1; SH3). But, this position was led, driven, and implemented by Minister for Local Government, Seán T. O’Kelly (SH4), as he took his “fiery cross” (Connell, 2016) and zeal for implementing the housing program across the country (SH4).

1966

After some hesitation, Minister Blaney converted from a position of denial to one which promoted policy intervention, when external validation provided the legitimacy and public opinion demanded policy action. He eventually drove the policy agenda in the light of the scale of the housing crisis (SH1; SH3; SH4). Whilst recognizable as data informed decision-making, it also ties into Blaney’s leadership style, as he elucidated when he addressed a Fianna Fáil party meeting in County Sligo, “It is, after all, inherent in the basic philosophy of a democratic system that if people are fully informed of the choices that are open to them, they will come to the right decisions” (Sacks, 1976, p. 206).

2004

Minister Bobby Malloy provided political leadership (CiSo1; CiSo2; P2) by devolving power and responsibility to an assembly of “the great and the good” (P5) to recommend policy approaches to an increasing housing problem, establishing the Commission into the Private Rented Sector and progressing the recommendations towards the final legislation (P2; CiSo1; CiSo2).

2014

Representative of a process of political management, within defined boundaries or limits, rather than a process of political leadership which defined the boundaries for political action.

Source: the Authors

36The 2014 case, however, is representative of a process of political management, within defined boundaries or limits, rather than a process of political leadership that defined the boundaries of political action. For Murphy and Hearne (2019, p. 461), the Housing Assistance Payment is implemented with an “absence of leadership”. This research concurs, and instead of political leadership responding to the crisis and leading the policy response, political management followed the demands imposed by the Troika, which emphasized the strong influence that these international organizations had on Irish policymaking generally and housing policymaking specifically (P1; P4; CS1; CS2): “we had lost our independence, financial and otherwise, and were just left with the harp as an insignia of the country” (P4).

Political consensus

37Given the often-fractious nature of discourse around housing crisis, it is perhaps surprising to learn that political consensus is identified as a characteristic of housing policymaking in response to crisis. Whilst Knill and Tosun (2008) highlighted that the Westminster model of government is majoritarian rather than consensual, Sabatier and Weible (2007, p. 191) recognized the role of consensus, particularly in Westminster styles of governance, where a non-consensual approach might wreck any proposal. Schlager (2007, p. 307), in reviewing and comparing theories and frameworks, identified the role of institutional consensus needed for policy change. In this research, political consensus was an important element in the processes of policymaking and was a precursor for policy action in each of the cases (Table 9).

Table 9. Political consensus as a characteristic of housing policymaking in response to crisis

Case

Political consensus in response to crisis

1932

Convergence towards political consensus led to the development of the 1931 Act, as the Cumann na nGaedheal government recognized that their policy position had to change to mirror and counteract the approach of Fianna Fáil, their biggest electoral threat. Significant elements of this legislation formed the basis of the Fianna Fáil – Labor government’s 1932 Act.

1966

A change in government approach followed publication of an external report (the local authority survey of unfit dwellings), and increasing public concern, albeit sometime after the opposition parties had identified the need for this policy action. However, the final legislation was again in line with that which the opposition parties had advocated.

2004

The main political party election manifestos for the 2002 election confirmed that each had committed to implement the recommendations of the Commission on the Private Rented Residential Sector.

2014

Consensus was within a wider setting of constrained public sector finances required by the EU-ECB-IMF program of financial assistance.

Source: the Authors

38The consensus on the framing of the housing problem for the 2014 case was within a wider setting of constrained public sector finances required by the EU-ECB-IMF program of financial assistance, which “constrained public expenditure and set the parameters for policymaking (P3)”. The proposed policy solutions within the 2011 political party election manifestos suggest that there was limited political appetite for major policy change, with incremental adjustments to the status quo, and continued focus on private sector provision and limited capital expenditure (Fianna Fáil, 2011; Fine Gael, 2011; Labour, 2011).

39Whilst there was a convergence towards political consensus in each of the four cases, the 2014 case does not exhibit the same attributes in relation to validation through external reports or public opinion. Indeed, the interviews suggested that there was no need for external validation (CS1), nor did public opinion play a significant role in this policymaking process (SA2; P1; P3; P4). This develops the assertion by Umfreville (2021, p. 108) that consensus existed on problem definition following the financial crisis, a recognition that the housing system was in crisis, but that consensus related to the symptoms rather than the causes of that crisis (108).

40Rather than finding significant differences between eras, between 20th century and 21st century processes, the 2014 case appears to be an outlier. The policymaking characteristics of external validation, public opinion, and political leadership in the 2014 case differ from the other cases, outlining how policymaking differed: external imposition rather than verification or validation; public opinion as a negligible influence; and political management in place of political leadership. The result was reactive decision-taking which moved social housing provision from capital budgets, whilst the impacts continue to dominate political discussions (and housing budgets given the locked-in cost) a decade later.

Learning from a comparison of responses to housing crisis

41The research traced processes of policymaking responses to four cases of housing crisis. Two key interrelated issues arise from this research: the effectiveness of path dependence as a theoretical frame to analyze policy change, and the possibility of endogenous institutional change.

Path dependence as a theoretical frame to analyze policy change

42Tracing the process of policymaking enables us to analyze the emergence and evolution of crises, from when they are recognized as a problem, through political discussion and potential consensus, through to the proposed policy response. “Placing politics in time can greatly enrich our understanding of complex social dynamics” (Pierson, 2004, p. 2), and here public policymaking is identified as a process that appears to progress, over time, from problem to politics to policy. However, the dynamic nature of the changing context over time ensures that the once effective policy response as a solution to housing crisis becomes the status quo and therefore loses its own legitimacy for future crisis episodes, thus necessitating further policy intervention. Whilst history does matter (Mahoney, 2000), and can enhance knowledge of political processes (Rast, 2012), the future cannot be “imagined as a repetitive pattern of events known from the past” (Beckert, 2016). This explains Irish housing provision as being an ongoing and underlying problem characterized by intermittent crisis, despite some transformative policy interventions. A more static, “moment in time” theoretical frame would fail to recognize the evolution of crisis and the emergence of the policy response.

The possibility of endogenous institutional change

43The second issue arising from the research relates to the deterministic causality of event sequences. Mahoney (2000, p. 535) argued “that path dependence occurs when a contingent historical event triggers a subsequent sequence”. Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017, p. 50) interpreted this as a “strong definition” [author emphasis], relating only to those exogenous factors, “external shocks and changes in environment”, that might cause such change. However, in their own comparative process tracing research, Bengtsson and Ruonavaara diverge from this, instead recognizing a “weak definition” [author emphasis] that “leaves open the possibility of endogenous institutional change” (ibid.). For Cairney (2020, p. 127), the drivers to change behavior and outcomes are “endogenous (internal), when actors (1) follow and shape the rules of each institution and (2) learn when they ‘try out different strategies’; and exogenous (external), when… other levels of government change the resources of local actors”. The findings from exploration of Irish housing policymaking processes similarly diverges from the proposition of exogenous factors being the only catalyst for path-shaping policy change. Whilst exogenous factors had a role, or provided impetus, it was endogenous factors, those internal, in-party changes recognized in the 1932, 1966, and 2004 cases that eventually provided the catalyst for policy change. Although the 1932 is an external shock (i.e. beyond the sub-system), it corresponds to a “weak” definition as the “external actors” (i.e. the Fianna Fáil political party) joined the sub-system which thereafter led to internal change. The 1932, 1966, and 2004 policymaking processes correspond to Bengtsson and Ruonavaara’s “weak definition” with an emphasis on endogenous institutional change, whilst the 2014 process corresponds to a “strong definition” by reason of exogenous factors.

44Although each of the cases identify public policymaking as a response to immediate crisis, the 1932, 1966, and 2004 cases also include an element of a policy ambition that sought to shape the housing system for the future (SH1; CiSo1). The policy response in the 2014 case in contrast was purely a response to crisis. An ex-Minister highlighted that “things were extremely bad. So, the only [issue] was how do we look at every policy area and ensure that we can keep this ship afloat?” (P3). Similarly, “[efficiency] that was everything. The balance sheet issue was crucial to everything that we did. So… there is no question that efficiency was the overwhelming driver” (SA2).

45An objective of the research has been to explain why the policies to address contemporary Irish housing crisis are seemingly different to historic responses. This paper highlights policymaking as a process which can be traced over time, and that the same progression and processes of policymaking existed in each of the four cases, finding that efficiency, legitimacy, and power were significant influences. Given that this is so for each of the cases it would be reasonable to expect that the same process and social mechanisms would also be similarly significant for any new policymaking process.

46From it can be argued that characteristics of policymaking that have significant influence on policymaking processes can be identified. Of particular importance were validation, public opinion, political leadership, and political consensus. These were important to overcome path dependent sequences of paradigm-reinforcing (status quo confirming) policy constraint, whilst the ceding of political legitimacy and power was an important element which promoted a self-reinforcing (status quo confirming), path dependent sequence in the 2014 case. Recognition of the importance of these characteristics is key to understanding why policies to address contemporary Irish housing crisis might differ to historic responses, and to understanding how historic housing policymaking processes can inform contemporary policymaking. However, other influences had much less impact on the process of policymaking. Here, the interaction between the triumvirate of senior politicians, civil servants, and special advisors raised some interesting issues around power, but it cannot be asserted with any degree of confidence from this research that this relationship dynamic constrained or defined policymaking to any great extent.

47The role of a political leader in providing policy entrepreneurship to facilitate policy change is identifiable from three cases and supports the acknowledgement by Zohlnhöfer and Rub (2017) of the role of political entrepreneurs in the policymaking process. The research also identified consensus towards policymaking which addressed public concern and opinion. However the 2014 case exhibited external mechanisms of influence. Rather than the system being sufficiently resistant to dilute impetus for paradigm-changing policy transformation post-crash, the tracing of this process instead highlighted that the perturbation was so all encompassing that it destroyed the existing hegemonic legitimacy and power of the national political system, replacing it with external influences of the Troika, and a path which exacerbated the importance of efficiency. This significantly affected the subsequent process of policymaking.

48It is easy to castigate politicians with the popular refrain that they never learn. We can blame the system for inertia, which might be based on civil service intransigence and established ways of working, or ministers’ capriciousness and need to make an impact before the next election. Long-term goals versus short-term timelines, continuity or change, or a divisive polarization of the arguments continue to frame debate. However, each of the interviewees appeared genuinely concerned about the impacts of housing crisis and each had tried to make a difference within their respective roles to the best of their ability, this within the constraints of a seemingly broken system, with limited funding and with external pressures. No suggestions of undue lobbying or of pressure groups acting in coalition to influence policy to serve their own interests or ends were made. Nor was civil service intransigence or political capriciousness uncovered. Even “outsiders”, the civil society representatives, did not identify such coalitions or any collusion, though there was wariness within the relationship dynamics between triumvirate decision-makers. The system has been intermittent in its effectiveness for over a century, punctuated by more serious episodes of crisis, and therefore the refrain that “something must change”, was voiced and highlighted within each of the cases (P2; P5; SH1; SH2; CiSo1; CiSo2).

49There is much that can be learned from this study that has relevance beyond the Irish housing field. It has identified the importance of external validation, public opinion, political leadership, and political consensus for providing impetus to overcome policy constraint. The recognition of the importance of each of these characteristics could have wider implications for public policymaking.

Discussion and conclusions

50Given the recognition that the housing problem will not be “solved entirely in the political system” (P1), external validation and public opinion continue to be important influences on policymaking. Here, new opportunities have been “characterized by new parliamentary and public forms of policy making” (Murphy & O’Connor, 2021, p. 208) and importantly, these have included a focus on housing (O’Donnell, 2021, p. 185). Similarly, Irish innovations to facilitate public consultation, participation, and deliberation has made the country “a world leader in deliberative democracy”, placing “citizens at the heart of constitutional change and political reform” (Harris, 2021, p. 259). The effectiveness and impact that deliberative democracy had through processes such as national stakeholder forums, for example the citizens’ assemblies on Constitutional right to life and matters of wider governance (2016-2018) and on gender equality (from 2020), highlighted that progressive policy which encourages and facilitates public involvement and participation, and which incorporates public opinion, can be developed and can be successful. Whilst deliberative approaches can lead to a fuller engagement with individuals, and perhaps address issues with “who the public is” with regards to more structured sectoral group participation, public engagement needs to be structured and built into the design of policymaking processes (Ó Broin & Corrigan, 2021, pp. 3, 6).

51Each of these approaches offer opportunities for policymakers to provide external validation to accommodate public opinion within the policymaking process, through the examination of the housing system in its totality – the social housing sector, the private rental market, and the homeownership market (CS1, CiSo1, CiSo2) – to provide an opportunity to ensure the inclusion of public opinion in agreeing the focus and limits of the causes of the problem and any proposed policy solution. This, however, requires political leadership to encourage and work towards political consensus on the ways and means to secure external validation, and a commitment to contest a future general election on respective plans to implement the recommendations of any (yet to be drafted) forum or citizens’ assembly report. This would be consistent with previous episodes of policymaking as responses to housing crises, and requires bold political leadership which advocates a longer-term, proactive, and holistic approach to policymaking. This utilizes the process of policymaking identified in this study, and the following three principles provide a means for policymakers to learn from our history.

52Problem recognition – Policymakers ought to report on the three elements of the housing system – the social housing sector, the private rented market, and the home ownership market – to identify the problems and challenges facing each element. This focus on the three independent though interrelated elements of a housing system would provide a general and non-political understanding not only of the problems and challenges facing each element, but also of the potential opportunities, policy solutions, or options that exist for policymakers. There is, therefore, a need to step back and to reframe the question of “what is the problem?” to enable for the provision of a different answer. Perhaps the consensus on the problem is not as unanimous as it seems, and it is the lack of consensus that is partly the reason for the perceived lack of effective policy action highlighted in public discourse and housing literature.

53Political action – Politics is about making choices from a range of different available options. It is therefore an integral part of the policymaking process. This study has highlighted how effective policy can be developed when there is consensus on an approach for policy action, and when political parties recognize policymaking as a process of decision-making – from problem to politics to policy – rather than a moment-in-time action of decision-taking. A referendum on housing in Ireland would widen involvement in decision-taking, but the constraint of binary questioning could be overcome by a proactive and participative approach to decision-making. This might serve to take the rhetoric out of the housing debate. Political leadership here involves the widening of participation in that decision-making process, with the delegation to, and the encouragement of, the wider community to inform the debate, to provide the verification and validation required to support the difficult choices needed to be made for effective political action.

54Policymaking – This paper highlights that the housing problem is wider than the remit of the government department with responsibility for housing – in Ireland the Department of Housing, Local Government, and Heritage. Therefore, its solution will inevitably require the involvement of a wider cross-section of society. The polarization of the housing debate and focus on economic rather than social outcomes has constrained public policymaking in this area, which has tended to focus on the symptoms rather than the causes of crisis. New opportunities to widen participation now offer a fuller engagement with individuals to harness external knowledge and experience, to reflect on the challenges, potential opportunities, policy solutions, or options. A wider deliberative approach can enable for participative examination of the issues in public, providing the verification and validation required to support a proactive and longer-term approach to policy action.

55Umfreville (2021, p. 114) discusses public policy response to housing crisis, and the challenge for future policymakers to give importance to the means for facilitating policy innovation to ensure that the social impacts of housing crisis are addressed by discussing and agreeing “the underlying causes of the problem, not just the symptoms”. Together, these principles respond to the findings of this research and are based on the process of policymaking rather than the outcomes, recognizing the importance of characteristics including external validation, public opinion, political leadership, and political consensus as drivers or verification for effective policy change. This research addresses broad questions around why responses to contemporary Irish housing crisis differ to historic responses when there are grounds to expect that they would be similar, and how these policymaking processes differ.

56Taking a longitudinal perspective on Irish housing policymaking in response to crisis, this paper responds to calls to address identified gaps in academic study around historical comparison of housing policymaking (Clapham, 2018; Jacobs, 2001; Jacobs & Manzi, 2017; Stephens, 2020). It explores the processes which led to policy responses to previous housing events and compares those processes to two more recent cases, providing a historical approach to contextualize contemporary phenomena. This research finds similarities between four cases of housing policymaking, and it is the interaction between the influences of efficiency, legitimacy, and power that highlighted these similarities but also emphasized the differences. Whilst the drive for efficiency was the dominant influence or pressure in the early stages for each case, issues of legitimacy and power dominated the problem recognition and proposal of a solution stages in three cases. Identifying the characteristics of policymaking processes which overcame the path dependent constraint of efficiency, this research finds that policymaking processes progress from problem to politics to policy.

57The current crisis again appears to be gripped by inertia, with policymaking again seemingly constrained by concerns about finances and (economic) cost rather than the social cost of inaction. This paper recognizes that critical junctures are triggered by the amalgamation of crisis recognition and public opinion, the provision of an external report providing impetus for change, followed by political leadership and political consensus. Although the Irish housing crisis is recognized, and public opinion demands action, political leadership and political consensus are still lacking. Without exogenous change through voting at the ballot box, or endogenous change precipitated by an external report, the next critical juncture in Irish housing provision may be some way off.

58Although based on a comparison of Irish housing policymaking processes over the last century, the context of this paper and the findings of the research will have resonance for policymakers in other jurisdictions. The recognition of this progression, and the characteristics of policymaking, could offer policymakers a means for working towards overcoming the permanent state of flux between housing being a problem and a crisis. The findings also offer salient lessons for policymakers in other fields of public policymaking.

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Notes

1 The left axis highlights the momentum for change: higher is for path-shaping change; lower is for path-reinforcing change or the status quo. The downward pointing arrows highlight the pressures for the status quo, including pressure on public finances or no policy agenda, whilst the upward arrows represent pressure for change, including the publication of a report and the recognition of the scale of the problem or public opinion.

2 Interviewees are pseudo-anonymized and cited in the text as P (politicians), SH (social historians), CS (civil servants), SA (special advisors) and CiSo (civil society representatives).

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List of illustrations

Title Figure 1. A century of housing crises and policy responses.
Credits Source: the Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/5046/img-1.png
File image/png, 495k
Title Table 1. Detail of policy responses since 2009
Credits Source: the Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/5046/img-2.png
File image/png, 134k
Title Figure 2. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on 1920s and early 1930s housing policy.
Credits Source: the Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/5046/img-3.png
File image/png, 78k
Title Figure 3. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on late 1950s and early 1960s housing policy.
Credits Source: the Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/5046/img-4.png
File image/png, 158k
Title Figure 4. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on late 1990s and early 2000s housing policy.
Credits Source: the Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/5046/img-5.png
File image/png, 68k
Title Figure 5. Tracing the influences and momentum for change on post-financial crisis housing policy.
Credits Source: the Authors
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/5046/img-6.png
File image/png, 70k
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References

Electronic reference

Paul Umfreville and Lorcan Sirr, Learning from a comparison of policy responses to a century of Irish housing crisisInternational Review of Public Policy [Online], 7:1 | 2025, Online since 01 April 2025, connection on 21 June 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/5046; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/13zex

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About the authors

Paul Umfreville

School of Surveying and Construction Innovation, Technological University Dublin, Ireland
d19127225@mytudublin.ie
paul.umf@gmail.com
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5285-2799

Lorcan Sirr

School of Surveying and Construction Innovation, Technological University Dublin, Ireland

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Copyright

CC-BY-4.0

The text only may be used under licence CC BY 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

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