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Do hybrid democratic innovations work in autocracies? Investigating the Cases of Participatory Budgeting in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

Bakhytzhan Kurmanov

Abstract

Hybrid democratic innovations, typically introduced in democratic contexts to enhance citizen engagement and address democratic “malaise,” combine deliberative “talking” among smaller groups with broader “voting” by the public. In recent years, authoritarian regimes have also begun adopting such democratic innovations, including participatory budgeting (PB). This paper investigates whether such mechanisms serve merely as tools to reinforce authoritarian rule or whether they can genuinely empower citizens and function as hybrid democratic innovations that foster inclusion, deliberation, and impact. Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews and secondary sources, the study identifies two key mechanisms in PB cases in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: wide programmatic scope and local-level incentives that can foster partial empowerment. These empirical cases are assessed against three dimensions of hybrid democratic innovation: inclusion, deliberation, and impact. While PB in both countries remains shaped by top-down control and limited deliberative engagement, the findings suggest that under specific conditions such reforms can generate modest forms of citizen empowerment rather than serve solely as instruments of regime legitimation. The paper contributes to the literature on deliberative practices and comparative public administration in authoritarian settings with broader implications for understanding citizen empowerment across the Global South.

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Author's notes

Disclosure statement:
Author has nothing to disclose.

This study was supported by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan [grant number BR24993173].

Full text

The author would like to express sincere gratitude to the Associate Editor of the International Review of Public Policy, Dr. Claudio Radaelli, and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive and insightful comments. The paper also benefited from discussions at the NISPACEE Conference in Tbilisi on 25 May 2024; the Digital Forum: From Vision to Voice in Bishkek on 15 November 2024; the Life in Kyrgyzstan pre-conference academic workshop in Bishkek on 9 October 2025; and the ASEEES Conference in Washington, DC, on 21 November 2025. The author is also grateful to Raushan Abylkassymova, Dr. Ilyas Yesdauletov, Dr. Ablay Dosmaganbetov, and other colleagues and scholars for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Any factual errors or controversial interpretations are the author’s own.

Introduction

1Public policy scholars have increasingly examined how participatory instruments reshape state–citizen relations. Meanwhile, innovative approaches to citizen participation, often associated with direct democracy and termed hybrid democratic innovations, have emerged in democratic contexts as responses to democratic “malaise” (Hendriks, 2019). These innovations typically combine deliberation among smaller groups with broader voting procedures, thereby linking “talking” with “counting” (Hendriks & Michels, 2024). While initially developed in democracies, such participatory mechanisms have increasingly been adopted by authoritarian regimes, including Russia (Owen, 2020), China (Li et al., 2023), and Central Asia (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022). In these contexts, citizen participation is often carefully managed, serving to reinforce performance legitimacy rather than to challenge regime authority (Dukalskis & Gerschewski, 2017).

2Participatory budgeting (PB), first institutionalized in Brazil in the 1990s, represents one of the most influential of these innovations. Designed to empower citizens to shape public spending priorities and promote community development (Cabannes, 2004), PB was initially celebrated for its potential to include marginalized groups and deepen democratic practices (Ganuza et al., 2013). Yet, when transplanted into authoritarian settings, PB often acquires a dual character: simultaneously functioning as a deliberative tool and as a mechanism of controlled participation and political legitimation (He, 2019; Frenkiel, 2021). This raises a broader theoretical puzzle: do hybrid democratic innovations meaningfully empower citizens in authoritarian regimes, or do they primarily serve to consolidate authoritarian rule?

3The authoritarian deliberation framework (He & Warren, 2011) suggests that even within repressive systems, participatory practices may create limited spaces for citizen voice and more inclusive decision-making. However, the effectiveness and purpose of such practices vary significantly across regimes. This paper takes up the question of whether hybrid democratic innovations can foster citizen empowerment under authoritarian conditions, focusing on PB as a test case.

4Central Asia offers a compelling setting for this inquiry. Authoritarian Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have recently embraced PB as part of broader modernization and public sector reforms (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022). Kazakhstan piloted participatory budgeting in 2019 under President Tokayev’s liberalization agenda, while Uzbekistan launched a nationwide initiative in 2020–2021 that drew millions of participants and was heralded domestically as a democratic breakthrough (Redjaboev, 2022). Despite this enthusiasm, the actual impact of these reforms on citizen empowerment remains uncertain. Hence, this article provides a comparative analysis of participatory budgeting in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to examine under what conditions government-imposed PB initiatives lead to citizen empowerment. Here, empowerment is defined as enabling marginalized and broader populations to articulate rights and meaningfully influence policymaking (Hossain et al., 2018). Three democratic values such as inclusion, deliberation, and impact are adopted as benchmarks for evaluating empowerment (Hendriks & Michels, 2024).

5Drawing on 36 in-depth interviews with state officials and civil society actors, complemented by secondary sources, the article argues that PB in authoritarian regimes can enable partial empowerment when two conditions are met: (1) a sufficiently broad programmatic focus that addresses essential services such as education and healthcare, and (2) institutional incentives for local authorities to actively support citizen engagement. At the same time, the findings reveal significant limitations, underscoring the risks of democratic mimicry and constrained participation.

6The article contributes to scholarship in two ways. First, it advances the literature on deliberative practices in authoritarian regimes by showing that hybrid democratic innovations can yield conditional and partial empowerment when program design and institutional incentives align (He, 2019; Owen, 2020). Second, by analyzing PB in Central Asia, the study highlights its dual role: as a tool for authoritarian legitimation and democratic mimicry of citizen consultation/participation and as an experimental mechanism for partial citizen engagement to enhance regime performance in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Kurmanov & Knox, 2024; Cassani, 2017). These findings advance the understanding of participatory practices in non-democratic settings, illustrating that the design of such initiatives matter.

7The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews existing research on PB and empowerment and outlines the methodology. The following sections present the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan cases, before discussing the implications for understanding hybrid democratic innovations in authoritarian regimes. The conclusion reflects on the broader relevance of these findings for the study of authoritarian governance and participatory practices.

Literature Review: Citizen Empowerment and PB as hybrid democratic innovation

8The literature review of this article is divided into two strands: the existing scholarship on citizen empowerment and participation in authoritarian countries, including the introduction of hybrid democratic innovations, and the extant research on introducing PB as an instrument of deliberative innovations in authoritarian settings.

Citizen Empowerment and Participation in Autocracies

9Citizen empowerment is a dynamic concept generally conceived as a process of “social transformation that allows marginalized groups to define and demand their rights” (Hajdarowicz, 2022, p. 25). Hence, empowerment is an interactive process between an individual and the state, where citizens develop their skills, abilities, and experiences to bring change. The citizen empowerment process in state-led participation initiatives refers to the meaningful involvement of citizens in the policymaking process through collaboration with government institutions (Hossain et al., 2018, p. 674). Genuine citizen empowerment implies inclusive participation across all segments of society and stands in contrast to the tokenistic mobilization often observed in autocratic regimes. As Harrison et al. (2012, p. 89) emphasize, “participation for the mere sake of participating is an empty and alienating exercise”; rather, citizens engage in participatory processes to influence government actions in ways that meaningfully reflect their input. Literature indicates that autocracies install “participatory authoritarianism” to channel citizen participation to increase performance in public service provision through participatory instruments (Owen, 2020) or to achieve imitation of accountability and openness (O’Connor et al., 2020).

10Recent studies on citizen engagement in Central Asia through state-led participatory practices suggest that such reforms, often framed as “participation” and “collaboration” primarily serve to legitimize authoritarian regimes by contributing to regime consolidation and improving economic performance (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022; Kurmanov & Knox, 2024). Knox and Sharipova (2024) further argue that these dynamics reflect the emergence of consultative authoritarianism, in which civil society actors and citizens engage with the non-democratic state but space for political dissent is limited. However, this form of engagement remains limited and does not result in a genuine partnership between state and society. At the same time, Moldogaziev and Witko (2023) show that citizen engagement in service-oriented civil society organizations can foster meaningful civic participation in Central Asia. Their findings suggest that even in restrictive authoritarian environments, citizens are willing to engage through alternative channels of voice. This, in turn, points to the potential, albeit limited, hybrid democratic innovations such as participatory budgeting to take root in the non-democratic region.

11PB as a hybrid democratic innovation in authoritarian settings: inclusion, deliberation, and impact

12In the second strand of literature, this article looks at participatory budgeting (PB) as a noteworthy reform for developing countries in the Global South to promote the empowerment of citizens (Cabannes, 2004). The PB initiative, which was first introduced in Brazil in the 1990s, became a critical tool for citizen empowerment, especially for low-income and marginalized groups. Since then, various forms of PB have proliferated across the globe, from China to Europe, serving as vehicles for democratic innovation and expanded civic engagement (Sintomer et al., 2012) and as new ways of doing politics by deliberative means (Ganuza et al. 2013).

13The PB initiative is considered an administrative instrument that provides citizens with a mechanism to express their preferences and opinions, matching the people's choices with the government plan to foster inclusion (He, 2019). The increased effectiveness of state bodies in state spending is a key priority in this logic that helps to improve performance in delivery of social services (Cassani, 2017). However, several works criticize the administrative efficiency argument, claiming PB's planning and development hearings are merely ceremonial while the government controls and directs budgetary planning (Felix Junior et al., 2020). Furthermore, the outcomes of PB have varied depending on political context. For example, Nylen (2014), examining PB in Maputo, Mozambique, found that it served primarily as a tool for political legitimization by mayors, rather than fulfilling normative ideals of participatory democracy. Liese and Verschuere (2025) highlight that the top-down citizen participation initiatives that do not stress the inclusion of civil society organizations tend not to have a fundamental impact on citizens’ trust and community building.

14PB as an administrative practice raises broader questions about bureaucratic incentives, policy capacity, and the role of state officials in implementing it across different political settings. The launch of PB initiatives typically involves negotiating functions and resources, coordinating between central and local authorities, and managing various contingencies and risks (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014). Bureaucrats therefore play a central role. In some cases, strong administrative units, such as the Project Management agencies created for Taiwan’s PB, exercised tight control over the budget and the process, with citizens’ proposals reviewed by bureaucrats while citizens themselves lacked access to the city’s overall budget plans (Fu, 2023). These dynamics have led scholars to focus on policy capacity as a key factor shaping the success or failure of PB. Policy capacity is defined as the skills, resources, and capabilities required to perform policy functions (Wu et al., 2015). A recent assessment of PB projects in China highlights elite commitment and local vision alignment as crucial elements of policy capacity (Yan et al., 2025).

15Hendriks and Michels (2024) identify the evolution of the PB from initial versions to a more complex type, also known as a hybrid democratic innovation that combines three key values leading to democratic citizen participation: inclusive participation (inclusion), deliberative quality (deliberation), and a political effect (impact). Inclusion refers to the state considering individuals' viewpoints, which can occur electronically, through voting on projects, for example. Deliberation involves engaging citizens in dialogue before initiating decisions or projects, allowing them to propose ideas and initiatives directly. Finally, impact signifies the effective implementation and integration of citizen inclusion and deliberation into the state's decision-making processes.

16In authoritarian regimes, PB is sometimes framed as a deliberative democratic mechanism designed to strengthen citizen and community empowerment (He, 2011). He and Warren (2011) argued that autocratic governments could benefit from engaging in controlled dialogue with citizens, particularly when addressing complex or ambiguous issues. For example, He (2019) found that China’s PB experiment in Zeguo fostered deliberative practices and enhanced the quality of discussions.

17Yet, other scholars have questioned whether PB genuinely promotes citizen empowerment. Li et al. (2023) argue that PB experiments in China often align with the political agenda of the ruling party, using citizen participation to legitimize the regime rather than empower individuals. Frenkiel (2021) revealed that the influence of overzealous experts and “super residents” could marginalize ordinary citizens, reducing broader engagement. Similarly, Saguin (2018) demonstrated that elite groups dominating PB processes could exclude poor and marginalized communities, thus defeating the initiative’s purpose. Furthermore, challenges such as corruption and a lack of transparency can significantly undermine these efforts. Such issues often lead to limited openness, where participation is superficial, rather than fostering genuine empowerment (O’Connor et al., 2019).

18This paper engages with the scholarly debate by treating PB in autocracies as a hybrid democratic innovation, an institutional form that blends participatory elements with authoritarian control. Though there have been several studies on PB as hybrid democratic innovations in China, Russia, and Latin America, little research has been produced on the countries from other regions of the global south such as Central Asia. Furthermore, the specific mechanisms of how and when the new hybrid democratic innovation forms of PB can achieve citizen empowerment have not been adequately explored in other regions of the developing world. Hence, there is a gap in studies in this direction, which this article aims to fill.

19Here, citizen empowerment in the context of hybrid democratic innovations refers to the capacity of ordinary citizens to influence state resource allocation and thereby shape state priorities or behavior (Hossain et al., 2018). This includes but is not limited to greater transparency, responsiveness, and inclusion in decision-making.

20This paper uses three criteria, drawn from Hendriks and Michels (2024), to assess empowerment in PB processes:

  • Inclusion: Are diverse citizens, especially from marginalized groups, able to participate meaningfully?

  • Deliberation: Do citizens have opportunities to propose, discuss, or shape budget priorities?

  • Impact: Do citizen preferences actually influence final outcomes, including project selection or resource distribution?

21This adapted framework helps distinguish between symbolic participation (i.e., legitimizing the regime), partial empowerment (controlled form of engagement with some impact on budget and policy priorities), and full empowerment (i.e., influencing public policy and policy outcomes). The next section presents the study's methodology then unpacks the cases.

Methodology

22To explore the research questions, this article focuses on the Central Asian region that comprises five countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, all five countries have pursued various paths of political and economic reforms. However, all Central Asian countries are considered “consolidated authoritarian regimes” and “not free” by Freedom House (2023), performing poorly in political rights and civil liberties (see Table 1).

Table 1. Freedom House Global Freedom Scores for Central Asia in 2023.

Total score (out of 100) / Status

Political Rights (out of 40)

Civil Liberties

(out of 60)

Kazakhstan

23 / Not Free

5

18

Uzbekistan

12 / Not Free

2

10

Kyrgyzstan

27 / Not Free

4

23

Tajikistan

7 / Not Free

0

7

Turkmenistan

2 / Not Free

0

2

Source: Freedom House (2023).

  • 1 In Uzbekistan, the sudden death of I. Karimov in 2016 led to S. Mirziyoyev coming to power with a l (...)

23The cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were purposefully selected based on variation in the explanatory variables, specifically their post-Soviet context, authoritarian governance, and recent political transitions1. This was done without full prior knowledge of how the outcome variables, namely PB initiatives and their impact on citizen empowerment, would compare. This approach departs from the traditional “most similar systems, different outcomes” design, as the case selection was driven by differences in the independent variables rather than outcomes (or dependent variables) (following the approach of Slade & Zeveleva, 2025). Nonetheless, it was essential for the analysis that both cases had implemented deliberative PB initiatives within a relatively similar timeframe, providing a coherent and comparable basis for examining their effects and doing proper paired comparison following the comparative case study logic (Tarrow, 2010). The selected countries introduced PB initiatives to promote citizen engagement in public spending at the local level. Kazakhstan introduced the public participation budget as a pilot project in 2019, expanding it to the whole country in 2020. Uzbekistan adopted the initiative budgeting in 2021 as a pilot project in cooperation with the UNDP, gradually enlarging the initiative to the whole country in 2022.

24This work excludes cases of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan from Central Asia for several reasons. In Tajikistan, apart from the online platform Mometavonem and initiatives such as open procurement, the country has not introduced PB or other hybrid democratic innovations (Kurmanov, 2024). The Kyrgyzstan case is not included for two reasons. First, PB stopped at the initial stage of including citizens in this country's public hearings on budget issues but did not proceed to allow them to initiate or participate in budget projects directly (Kasymova & Schachter, 2014). In other words, PB never materialized as a deliberative practice in Kyrgyzstan.

25Primary data gathering was based on two rounds of primary data collection in 2020 and 2023. The author conducted 36 in-depth interviews based on purposive sampling. The first round of fieldwork was conducted from 2019 to 2021, with 16 in-depth interviews of civil society activists and state officials across Central Asia, including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This round of research builds on the author’s dissertation on open government and state accountability, during which he visited Almaty and Tashkent to engage with digital activists and state officials involved in citizen participation and budgeting reforms.

  • 2 Though they are distinguishable, the author included these two groups in one category because inter (...)

26The second round of data collection took place during Summer–Fall 2023 and Spring 2024, yielding an additional 20 interviews (see Table 2 for the total number of interviews). The sampling strategy targeted two groups: 1) state officials and consultants from international organizations who were directly involved in the design and realization of PB initiatives2 and 2) civil society activists and citizens who were directly involved in PB projects To assess how PB functions in practice and its impact on citizen empowerment, interviews were conducted with civil society activists, active citizens, and experts involved in developing and implementing PB, including through project proposals. A detailed overview of the interviewee profiles is provided in Appendix #1.

27The field research was conducted in both major cities and smaller remote places in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The author conducted interviews with state officials and activists involved in PB in Pavlodar (Eastern Kazakhstan) and Aktobe (Western Kazakhstan), reflecting a variety of smaller and mid-sized towns across the country. In Uzbekistan, interviews were conducted in Tashkent and the smaller city of Andijon in Southern Uzbekistan. Officials and ordinary citizens who initiated PB projects were interviewed.

Table 2. Conducted interviews by country.

State Officials/ Consultants in International organizations

Civil Society Activists/ Citizens involved in PB

Total

Kazakhstan

8

9

17

Uzbekistan

9

10

19

Source: Author’s compilation based on fieldwork.

28Examining politically sensitive issues of citizen participation in authoritarian Central Asia poses risks for the researcher and interview subjects (Janenova, 2019). Hence, the author took several measures to counteract the challenges of doing such research. First, the author protected the confidentiality of the interviewed respondents. Second, all respondents provided explicit informed consent. On some occasions, the respondents refused to be audio-recorded, fearing the negative repercussions and potential repressions. Interviews lasted from 30 minutes to one hour and were conducted primarily in Russian. The interview questions are provided in Appendix #2. The author took extensive notes and prepared transcripts of all interviews. Data were coded and analyzed using both deductive and inductive thematic analysis, allowing themes to be informed by the literature as well as to emerge from the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Kurmanov & Knox, 2022). Following a six-step approach, the author manually created codes that were transformed into categories and incorporated into three main themes: inclusion, deliberation, and impact.

29In addition, secondary sources such as legislation, documents, and reports on PB and citizen empowerment were included in the analysis. The secondary data analysis informs the context of PB adaptation.

30We will now present the case studies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in detail.

Kazakhstan case study

Background: public sector reforms and citizen participation initiatives under Nazarbayev and Tokayev

31Kazakhstan has actively pursued new public management (NPM) reforms since its independence in 1991, and the country is considered one of the most active reformers in Central Asia (Knox, 2008). Omelicheva (2015) revealed that performance-based claims (such as modernization and public sector reforms) were a centerpiece of the Kazakh regime's legitimation discourse. For instance, the Kazakhstan government under Nazarbayev (1991-2019) invested resources in an E-Government portal that eventually included the Open Budget and Open Legislation sections and the creation of public councils and other instruments of citizen participation. However, the platforms have received significant criticism from users, and state bodies have proven reluctant to provide valuable information to the public (O’Connor et al., 2019). Similarly, the introduction of public councils failed to engage citizens in discussing policies and budgets (Knox & Janenova, 2018). Moreover, recent studies show that local authorities in Kazakhstan have imposed tight control over citizen participation in consultative institutions to protect the interests of the state and business elite (Makulbayeva and Sharipova, 2025).

32When Kassym-Jomart Tokayev came to power in 2019, he was faced with demands for political change and reform from the urban middle class and broader society. The second president introduced the agenda of partial liberalization and the “Listening State” [Slyshashcheye gosudarstvo] concept, with an increased focus on the digitalization of government. Recent studies on the “Listening State” concept reveal that the reforms failed to make state officials responsive to ordinary citizens (Kurmanov et al., 2024). Meanwhile, the National Council for Public Trust became a tool for legitimizing the regime (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022). The January 2022 events, also known as Qandy Qantar or “Bloody January”, were the most widespread and violent protests in Kazakhstan’s history, resulting in over 200 deaths according to official figures. The swift suppression of the unrest, driven by citizens' frustrations with the unfulfilled promises of development, highlighted the Kazakh state's continued tight control over society (Abishev et al., 2024). These events triggered a subsequent process of de-Nazarbayevification and regime consolidation under the country’s second president, Tokayev, who pledged to build “a Just Kazakhstan” (Abishev et al., 2024).

Public Participation Budget in Kazakhstan

  • 3 For a more detailed discussion of decentralization reforms in Kazakhstan, see Yesdauletov (2025).

33In 2020, President Tokayev announced the launch of PB [byudzhet narodnogo uchastiya in Russian, xalıq qatısatın byudjet in Kazakh], following a 2019 pilot in Almaty organized by the quasi-state Center for Development of Almaty. The pilot attracted 387 projects and was deemed successful, prompting nationwide expansion. Introduced as part of decentralization reforms3 alongside rural akim elections, PB aimed to strengthen local governance. A 2023 Ministry of Finance decree allocated 10% of utility expenditures to PB, allowing participation by republican- and oblast-level cities as well as towns with over 10,000 residents. Funding ceilings were set at 85 million KZT (USD 182,000) for major cities (Almaty, Astana, Shymkent), 50 million KZT (USD 107,000) for oblast-level cities, and five million KZT (USD 10,700) for district centers.

34Participatory budgeting focuses on nine areas, including neighborhood renovation, playgrounds for sports and children, renovation of communities (chastnye dvory), etc. Citizens assemble to initiate and prepare projects and upload the basic cost proposal (smeta) along with supporting documents to the official websites of local executive authorities (akimat). Only two cities (Petropavl and Almaty) created separate web portals for the projects. The other cities had a special section on their official websites. A commission of state officials and civil society activists (ekspertnyi sovet) , would then review and approve the projects. After that, citizens could vote on the projects using special electronic signatures (ECP) on the official websites.

35In 2023, citizens submitted 3,932 PB projects, of which 998 were approved, with 24.7 billion KZT (USD 54 million) allocated for their implementation (Decenta, 2024). While PB has been most successful in Almaty (2,764 submissions, 338 approved), Shymkent (284/191), and the Aktobe region (240/129), overall progress remains slow, with limited citizen engagement elsewhere. Smaller towns illustrate this weakness: Satpayev (70,000 residents) generated only four projects, Zhanaozen (152,000) three, Tekeli (32,000) none, and Stepnogorsk (68,000) seven (see Appendix #3). Figure 1 shows three projects in Zhanaozen city.

Figure 1. The information about projects is on the official website of Zhanaozen local executive authority (akimat). Fifty-two votes were given for three projects.

Figure 1. The information about projects is on the official website of Zhanaozen local executive authority (akimat). Fifty-two votes were given for three projects.

Source: Author’s screenshot from Zhanaozen Akimat (2023).

36By contrast, larger oblast centers show greater activity. In Pavlodar, with an allocation of four billion KZT (USD 8.6 million), 89 projects were implemented in 2023, primarily courtyard and playground improvements (Pavlodar Online, 2023). The number of applications grew from an initial 10–15 to several dozen. However, smaller towns in the same region, such as Aksu and Ekibastuz, saw only three approved projects each, highlighting persistent disparities in participation.

37The public participation budget flourished in Almaty city, where city authorities and the Open Almaty project (created by the Center for Development of Almaty) firmly supported it. Over 2019-2022, 4449 projects were registered by citizens, out of which 541 projects were realized for 14 billion KZT (USD 30 million) (Ranking.kz, 2023; Open Almaty, 2023). Almost 70% of the proposals are related to the improvement of children's and sports grounds, as well as the installation of gazebos, benches, and trash cans in public areas (Ranking.kz, 2023) (see Appendix #3).

Findings from interviews: PB in Kazakhstan

Inclusion: Attempting to galvanize citizen interest in PB and the narrow focus

38According to respondents, PB was launched to increase the local government's capacity to serve residents' needs and achieve citizens’ inclusive participation. The public participation budget was intended to incorporate citizens' preferences in the basic renovation of their communities. Several civil society activists noted that PB genuinely galvanized public interest in formulating proposals to improve the local infrastructure. They noted the absence of obstacles and the availability of information, allowing citizens to easily register their projects on government platforms.

The state aims to involve the public in budget allocation by introducing this tool. That is, the state wants to demonstrate that it is aligned with global practices where citizens determine where to allocate budget funds (Kazakh Activist #8, 13.10.2023).

39Interviewed state officials reported that the PB’s broad variety of goals aligned with the objectives of improved quality of life and social well-being.

The specific results of public participation in the budget are increased transparency and accountability, economic and social efficiency of budget expenditures, an improved quality of life for the population and social well-being, increased trust in the work of executive bodies, and shared responsibility among residents for the development of their district or city. (Kazakh State Official #6, 25.10.2023).

40One state official reported that the public participation budget signified the transformation of the state’s modus operandi in citizen engagement. This budget allowed the state to monitor and understand citizens’ preferences and grievances locally. PB initiatives also facilitated the resource allocation process to prioritize public spending.

We have moved away from “elitism,” where someone makes decisions based on certain interests. Now, government agencies react to the requests of the population. The state has serious digital tools for analyzing the population’s request in participatory budgeting (Kazakh State Official #3, 10.12.2019).

41However, the public participation budget only applied to limited community improvement areas, such as the installation of playgrounds, gazebos, and benches. Several activists and citizens expressed discontent with the mere imitation of citizen participation, as the public was not involved in deciding how larger amounts of money would be spent at the local level. Citizens did not receive accurate budget information and had no real voice in determining budget processes at the local level. Hence, activists argue that the public participation budget process does not lead to citizen empowerment but rather serves the political goal of legitimizing Tokayev and supporting the everyday work of local executive authorities (akimat).

42The lack of accurate budget Information regarding PB is also confirmed in secondary sources and reports. Shibutov (2020), in his evaluation of PB in Almaty, noted that the scope of PB is very narrow and that citizens should be involved in discussions of budgets related to public services, including healthcare. His report also emphasized that citizens could neither access financial reports nor assess the quality of projects. Similarly, the PB evaluation report produced by Decenta (2024, p. 84) stressed that the “lack of transparent and effective information from expert commissions and officials regarding PB” could negatively affect citizens’ willingness to participate in such initiatives.

Citizens decide to spend only a small percentage of local budgets. This public participation budget is done for imitation’s sake. The public cannot discuss or participate in budget projects related to healthcare, education, etc. (Kazakh Activist #6, 21.07.2023).

43State officials also noted that the narrow focus of PB on community renovations and cumbersome formulaic procedures in Kazakhstan led to slower activity among citizens. Citizens did not initiate or vote on PB projects in many cities across Kazakhstan, and state officials attempted to rectify the situation. When there were not enough votes, akimat called residents and asked them to vote. They would also mobilize residents in other ways. Interestingly, one akimat official in a middle-sized town in Northern Kazakhstan admitted that they monitored the voting process and pushed people to vote if necessary.

If there are not enough votes, we induce [terebim] citizens to vote… If the collected votes are not enough, we go to schools and we ask kids to remind their parents about the projects (Kazakh state official #7, 24.02.2024).

44Thus, state officials still rely on top-down forms of citizen mobilization for PB.

Deliberation: Lack of incentives and the role of activists (“super residents”)

45Many local state bodies implement PB without adequate resources, financial incentives, or expertise from the central government. Currently, spending is capped at 10% of the city utilities' budget, with no provision for additional funding. Consequently, engaging citizens in PB does not result in tangible performance improvements for local state bodies, leaving akimats with little incentive to promote PB widely. Typically, PB is managed by local housing and public utility departments (ZhKH, an abbreviation of the Russian term ‘Zhilishchno-kommunal'noye khozyaystvo’, meaning “Housing and Public Utilities”) within local executive bodies (akimats); however, limited training is provided on effectively involving citizens in deliberations or project proposals.

46A key issue is that akimats independently determine how to disseminate information and promote citizen deliberation. This has resulted in widespread fragmentation of PB practices. While some akimats utilize social media platforms such as Instagram and WhatsApp, others rely on in-person visits to neighborhoods. As a result, the level of citizen engagement in initiating projects varies significantly across regions. Cities like Aktobe and Almaty have achieved notable success, while the majority of other cities continue to lag behind.

47For example, in one city in western Kazakhstan, Aktobe, authorities chose not to rely solely on the ZhKH department due to concerns about its lack of capacity and autonomy.

48A Kazakh state official explained:

I consulted the Ministry of National Economy, and they organized training for the akimat and maslikhat (local representative council) to properly implement participatory budgeting (Kazakh State Official #8, 24.02.2024).

49In this case, maslikhat members also actively mobilized citizens, using platforms like Instagram to encourage the initiation of projects in Aktobe. However, the Aktobe case is an exception. In most other cities, PB efforts remain primarily the responsibility of ZhKH departments, which often do little to engage citizens or actively promote project initiation.

50Several PB activists noted that the public participation budget was less widespread across the country since it depended on local executive units' enthusiasm and the existence of local activists. The realization of the public participation budget ultimately relied on local civil society organizations and activists organizing citizens to initiate projects. The success of public participation budgets in the regions outside of Almaty depended on the activism of “super residents” and activists. Interviews revealed that the massive enthusiasm in Almaty city was due to its developed civil society sectors and the active intervention of the local executive authorities and quasi-state bodies operating through government-organized non-governmental organizations.

Activists get involved differently in various regions of Kazakhstan. In some remote regions such as Temirtau, activists and residents are not interested in participating. This depends on how local executive authorities disseminate information about PB and the availability of civil society in a given area (Kazakh Activist #5, 12.06.2023).

51Several interviewed state officials reported that economic analysis departments within akimats, rather than expert councils, were primarily responsible for making key decisions regarding the selection and modification of projects (Kazakh State Official #8, 24.02.2024; Kazakh Activist #8, 20.03.2024). This arrangement effectively curtailed the scope and quality of citizen discussions about the projects, thereby restricting the deliberative aspect of PB.

Limited impact: lack of monitoring, digital divide, and exclusion

52Ultimately, the question of impact is central to PB, ensuring that it moves beyond mere imitation, a practice commonly observed in Central Asia and other autocracies with citizen participation initiatives (O'Connor et al., 2019). Genuine impact means that citizens are not only aware that their proposed projects are being implemented but also that government officials properly consider their views. The public participation budget faced numerous implementation problems across the country. Activists in Pavlodar City reported that only half of the projects were implemented for various reasons.

Spending and project implementation are not transparent. Initially, they ask for an estimate [smeta], but the local executive authority [akimat] does not take it into account but installs a standard playground. Citizens are frustrated when they receive something they did not want (Kazakh Activist #7, 01.09.2023).

53Another issue reported in several interviews was the government's control over the PB’s implementation and bureaucratic procedures. The local executive body (akimat) is responsible for initiating state procurement (goszakupki) to find a contractor (podryadchik). However, state procurement procedures determine the selection of low-quality contractors who are not obliged to meet project requirements. Contractors are not required to meet with the citizens who initiated the projects. Sometimes contractors from very remote regions of Kazakhstan win tenders, which becomes an acute problem. Though the term corruption was not mentioned in interviews, irregularities were reported, such as a lack of information on contractors delivering projects.

54The exclusion problem significantly impedes PB. Many citizens, especially the elderly and poor, do not have electronic signatures. This digital divide limits the ability of marginalized citizens to initiate projects. Some citizens are discouraged from voting on projects because they are afraid of scammers and privacy issues. Local civil society organizations occasionally help citizens register for electronic signatures to vote. However, these piecemeal efforts do not ensure massive citizen participation in PB in regions. State officials cited inadequate technological capacity to administer PB through the designated sections on government websites. For instance, several state officials have raised concerns about the lack of technical support for the website.

Technical support is not accountable [ne podchinyaetsya] to the akimat. When voting begins in the evening, the system sometimes shuts down,” one official noted. “In such cases, the akimat’s press service steps in to assist residents, explaining the problems with the voting process (Kazakh State Official #7, 24.02.2024)

Uzbekistan case study

Background: The political trajectory of Uzbekistan and public sector reforms from Karimov to Mirziyoyev

55Islam Karimov, who became the President of Uzbekistan after the country gained its independence in 1991, set the direction for a gradual transition regarding the state's political and economic reforms. The Karimov regime’s legitimacy was based on the narrative of the “Uzbek way” model of democracy and a post-Soviet Uzbek foundational myth (Omelicheva, 2015). The state’s responsiveness to its citizens was viewed through a traditional, non-Western cultural context. Karimov managed to strengthen his rule and justify his oppression of opposition figures as a “necessity” required to achieve the “Uzbek Way” mission. The Karimov regime established a large sector of pro-state non-governmental organizations and mahalla institutions at the local level to maintain control over society. However, centralized control over society led to severe inefficiencies in social spending and rampant corruption (Ruziev et al., 2007).

56The transfer of power from Karimov to Mirziyoyev in 2016 brought notable political changes. After securing victory in the late 2016 elections, Mirziyoyev sought to appeal to citizens by promising reforms, particularly in public services and state responsiveness. Early initiatives included the creation of a “virtual reception” for citizen complaints and open data platforms on legislation and budgets. While these reforms enhanced opportunities for citizen empowerment, they also served to legitimize the new regime (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022).

57Furthermore, Mirziyoyev actively promoted the liberalization of the Internet and social media spaces (Kurmanov & Knox, 2024). Various digital activist groups on Facebook and Telegram pages began to criticize the actions of government officials and state policies. Nevertheless, the recent crackdown on digital activists exposed the limits of liberalization in Uzbekistan (Babajanov, 2023) and highlighted the state’s ability to co-opt and control wider civil society (Kurmanov & Knox, 2024).

Initiative Budgeting in Uzbekistan

  • 4 “Surplus revenue” is calculated as the local budget revenues exceeding forecasts for the previous y (...)

58The President's decree ordered state bodies to follow best practices when cooperating with international organizations, such as World Bank and UNDP, to ensure the transparency of budget documents and develop specific mechanisms for the involvement of citizens in the budget process (Uzbekistan President’s Decree, 2018). The initiative budget (Tashabbusli budjet) was initiated by the Uzbek Ministry of Finance in collaboration with the UNDP as a pilot project in 2021 originally targeting 14 districts. During the pilot stage, 10% of all surplus revenues 4of district unit (rayon khokimiyat) budgets were allocated for the initiative budget (Uzbekistan President's Decree, 2021). However, since not all districts had surplus revenues, 5% of all district (rayon) budget expenses were reserved for the initiative budget from the central republican budget. The state organization “Fund for Civil Initiatives” was responsible for collecting and disbursing the funds. The pilot project was deemed successful since citizens initiated 1,500 projects.

  • 5 Since 2019, Uzbek authorities have actively pursued fiscal decentralization by transferring various (...)

59The pilot was scaled up nationwide in 2022 with significantly increased funding. Initially set at 5% of local expenditures in 2021, allocations for initiative budgeting have since expanded markedly (see Table 3). Local authorities now retain 30% of additional revenues from asset sales and local taxes, while the central budget provides supplementary funds when deemed necessary by the Ministry of Finance5. According to interviewed officials, around half of initiative budgeting expenditures are covered by the republican budget, with the remainder financed from local revenues. This arrangement highlights a notable shift in financing, combining stronger central support with greater fiscal responsibility at the local level.

Table 3. Allocated funding for Initiative budgeting in Uzbekistan

2019-2020

2021-2022

Since 2023

Additional revenues of local authorities (khokimiyats)

10%

30% of district/city

30% of district/city/region

Budget of district/city

No

5%

5%

Republican budget

No

Yes (additional amount)

Yes (additional amount)

Source: Author’s compilation based on Uzbekistan President's Decree (2021), Avezom (2022), Sorochkin (2023) and fieldwork

60The initiative budget began taking place twice a year (in spring and summer) in 2022. The allocated funding grew from USD 31.7 million for a pilot project in 2021 to USD 108.9 million in 2022 (see Appendix #4). The latest figures show that 4,193 projects were funded in both waves in 2023 for a total sum of 4.2 trillion UZS (USD 345 million). The initiative budget initially targeted improving neighborhoods, fixing utilities, and sanitation. However, with time, multiple projects shifted toward purchasing equipment and repairing education and healthcare facilities such as hospitals and schools (see Appendix #4).

61The initiative budgeting procedure consists of four main stages. First, all citizens and mahallas are encouraged to develop proposals related to a wide variety of areas, including road repairs, neighborhood renovations, and equipment purchases for hospitals and schools. During the second stage, the working commission, which consists of members of local executive authorities (khokimiyat), legislative councils (kengesh), and civil society, assesses and validates the projects. During the third stage, voting takes place. The maximum budget for one project should not exceed(116 thousand US Dollars (Avezom, 2022). Projects from all regions are uploaded to a government website with information on their realization (see Figure 2). The number of citizens voting on initiative budgeting projects skyrocketed from 1.1 million in 2021 to 14.1 million in 2023, accounting for nearly 30% of Uzbekistan's population. This remarkable growth underscores the widespread adoption of initiative budgeting nationwide, with 9,447 mahallas (95% of all mahallas) participating and 5,726 projects winning support between 2021 and 2024. Notably, all regions of Uzbekistan actively initiated projects, with Surxondaryo in the southeast leading (9,595 submitted projects, 213 awarded), followed by Qashqadaryo in the south (6,166/261), and Khorazm in the west (5,128/172) during the first season of 2023 (see Appendix #4 for more details).

Figure 2. The website indicates the top three budget initiative projects that received the highest number of votes in the first season of the 2022 year in Uzbekistan. The first project: 'Medical Equipment'; the second project: 'Equipment for Secondary School No. 2 in Yanykurgon District'; and the third project: '1. Modern Interactive Board, 2. Pair of Speakers for the School'

Figure 2. The website indicates the top three budget initiative projects that received the highest number of votes in the first season of the 2022 year in Uzbekistan. The first project: 'Medical Equipment'; the second project: 'Equipment for Secondary School No. 2 in Yanykurgon District'; and the third project: '1. Modern Interactive Board, 2. Pair of Speakers for the School'

Source: Author’s screenshot from Open Budget Uzbekistan (2023b)

62Based on the apparent success of initiative budgeting, President Mirziyoyev expanded the PB principles to include the repair of internal roads through the project My Life (Mening Uilym) in 2022. In 2023, the Uzbek president announced a separate initiative that would encourage mahallas to apply for budget initiatives (Sorochkin, 2023). Overall, the Uzbek government announced that it would allocate 10 trillion UZS (USD 813 million) for all budget initiative projects in 2024 (Sorochkin, 2023).

Findings from interviews: PB in Uzbekistan

Inclusion: Political liberalization, social state, and citizen activism

63Uzbek state officials emphasized that the primary goal of initiative budgeting is to engage citizens in addressing the most pressing local issues within a reasonable budget (Uzbek State Official #8, 23.03.2024). According to the officials interviewed, focus groups with citizens and digital activists (bloggers) were conducted to develop the most effective design for implementing initiative budgeting. Several activists highlighted that the political transfer initiated in 2017 from Karimov to Mirziyoyev empowered citizens to be vocal about their complaints. The announced measures of liberalization and openness affected broad groups in society, which started becoming active.

As technology develops and society becomes more open, people are losing their fear. They are beginning to complain and actively participate in the decision-making process. (Uzbek Activist #1, 05.02.2020).

64Interviewed state officials argued that PB was among the Mirziyoyev reforms aimed at reducing corruption and promoting the responsiveness of state bodies to ordinary citizens. As the Uzbek president relied on the popular legitimacy of citizens and civil society, PB legitimized his regime.

These reforms in Uzbekistan are aimed at reducing corruption and increasing the efficiency of government agencies. Officials are becoming more open and involved. (Uzbek State Official #2, 05.02.2020).

65The Mirziyoyev-led political liberalization caused citizens to file mass complaints regarding local infrastructure, utilities etc., through the virtual reception of the President (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022). However, local executive authorities (khokimiyats) needed additional resources to address these grievances. Hence, the state decided to create initiative budgeting to prioritize limited projects based on citizen input and widened its scope (Uzbek State Official #7, 20.10.2023). This shift aligned with the Uzbek state’s policy of devolving additional responsibilities to local authorities. This policy enabled khokimiyats to generate “additional income” by raising taxes and selling local property to address citizens’ priorities. The creative initiative budget also allowed the state to shift responsibility for underdeveloped local infrastructure to citizens in the context of limited funding.

The budgetary fund is not enough to solve all the problems, and thus the state wants to indicate that citizens will choose the most necessary project… hence, the state places responsibility on citizens. (Uzbek Activist #8, 10.10.2023).

66Authorities used the expansion of the budget to bolster their claims of building a social state. This process involved mahallas and local community groups. Several state officials noted that PB created a social state by allocating funds for the needy more effectively. This initiative facilitated Mirziyoyev’s agenda of creating a “New Uzbekistan,” where citizens collaborate with the state to improve development outcomes.

Deliberation: Channeling citizen participation into a revenue source for local khokimiyat

67The initiative budget has also become an instrument for the state to channel citizen participation in a non-threatening way. Such channeling fosters citizen participation by encouraging citizens to compete for resources in a “game” driven by local authorities who are motivated to launch more PB initiatives. Nevertheless, this hybrid innovation has prompted local authorities to collaborate more closely with mahallas and pro-state activists. Together they engage in deliberative processes to address local issues such as healthcare, education, and neighborhood renovations. However, the initiative budgeting has shifted the attention of citizens from investigating budget issues to a “race for votes” for projects that local authorities should ordinarily solve.

The budget initiative projects are aimed, for example, at fixing the transformer and improving the road, but this is not the purpose of the initiative budget. This is not an issue that the initiative budget should resolve. State corporations or local authorities should resolve these issues in the planned work. (Uzbek Activist #8, 10.10.2023)

68State officials highlighted that one key advantage of deliberation through initiative budgeting is the ability to address local issues more quickly compared to the slower, more bureaucratic process of traditional budgeting:

Since addressing the local issues identified by citizens through the traditional budget takes a significant amount of time, at least one year, it can be resolved much faster through initiative budgeting, typically within three to nine months. (Uzbek State Official #8, 23.03.2024).

69Furthermore, several activists highlighted that as the initiative budgeting progressed, the enthusiasm of citizens waned while local executive authorities (khokimiyat) became more active. Local executive authorities, state-controlled Mahallas, and government-controlled civil society organizations used administrative power to promote their projects (Uzbek Activist #7, 15.09.2023). The khokimiyats rushed to initiate as many projects as possible in order to secure funds and loyalty with the central authorities (Uzbek State Official #8, 23.03.2024). Vote “buying” has become common practice and respondents said it takes only one bottle of Coca-Cola or 20000 UZS (USD 1.6) to acquire the necessary votes. Voting can be done via SMS and does not require a proper electronic signature document.

The initiative budgeting has become an additional source of income for khokimiyats [local executive body]. Now, they use administrative verticals to acquire votes. For instance, a school renovation project was announced in Karakalpakstan, and the next day, nearly 1600 people voted for this project... (Uzbek Activist #9, 22.10.2023).

Impact: Issues of realization of projects and corruption

70Uzbek state officials have reported that once citizens or mahallas win projects, they receive funding through a designated account, enabling them to address issues directly. In Andijon, local khokimiyat officials collaborated closely with citizens to prepare initiatives and support their implementation (Uzbek state official #9, 20.04.2024). This approach was supposed to encourage citizens to take an active role in holding local authorities accountable for the entire budget in the future.

71Another significant impact is that local authorities can monitor citizen-led initiatives and allocate funding to areas prioritized by the public. Thus, PB, as a hybrid democratic innovation, helps bridge the information gap between citizens and authorities:

If local authorities want to develop a more open, transparent, and fair program for the district development to allocate funds, the Hakim [local governor] can use the initiative budgeting platform as a guide. When deciding where to direct the remaining 70% of the funds, the Hakim can simply visit the initiative budgeting website for their region, see which proposals won and lost, and start funding the ones that narrowly lost. (Uzbek State Official #9, 20.04.2024)

72However, several interviews with civil society activists involved in PB reported that citizens do not monitor the implementation of budget initiative projects. Reports of corruption and misuse of funds are common in the budget initiative. One activist reported that although citizens voted to renovate his district's school, the contractor did not repair the school according to their expectations (Uzbek Activist #9, 22.10.2023).

73The digital realization of the program resulted in unequal distribution of funds for local communities. Activists noted that citizens can vote for any budget initiative project numerous times, even if they do not reside in the locality in question. As a result, the budget initiative projects of communities with strong local executive authority (khokimiyat) and considerable support from government-organized NGOs can constantly win, potentially leaving the projects of ordinary and marginalized people uninitiated. The lack of proper procedure and transparency in the voting process is a significant concern for empowering the goal of the budget initiative:

There is no transparency; people should not be able to send their projects and ask someone from Andijan to vote for a project in Bukhara. Many people personally sent me these invitations, and many of my acquaintances asked me to support their initiatives. I didn't support any of them. I only supported one initiative that I know is related to the school where I work. (Uzbek Activist #6, 11.07.2023).

Discussion

74This paper set out to investigate the conditions under which hybrid democratic innovations, particularly PB, are effective in authoritarian regimes. Drawing on empirical cases from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the paper finds that PB can lead to partial forms of citizen empowerment when two conditions are present: (1) a broad programmatic scope and (2) incentives for local authorities to actively promote participation. However, the findings also reveal significant limitations, contradictions, and vulnerabilities in both cases that complicate any claims of success. Themes are compared in Table 4. Below we provide a comparative discussion along three values of the framework: inclusion, deliberation, and impact (Hendriks & Michels, 2024).

Inclusion: Broad Participation, Uneven Reach

75The analysis finds that a broader programmatic scope of PB that includes healthcare, education, and infrastructure can facilitate wider citizen involvement, as seen in Uzbekistan. In contrast, Kazakhstan’s narrow focus on community amenities and neighborhood park renovations (e.g., benches, playgrounds) has made PB less relevant to citizens' everyday needs for high-quality public services. This has resulted in tokenistic and symbolic participation (Felix Junior et al., 2020; Kurmanov & Knox, 2022). However, a wider reach does not automatically translate into full empowerment. In Uzbekistan, higher levels of participation were often driven by administrative mobilization (though mahallas), vote buying, and competitive “races” between districts rather than by grassroots enthusiasm or the political agency of ordinary citizens. These practices may distort participatory intent and exacerbate inequities between more and less resourceful communities. Thus, while a broader scope can increase numerical participation, it may also incentivize strategic behavior by state actors, creating new avenues for clientelist relations. This echoes findings from other authoritarian contexts where participation becomes performative or transactional rather than transformative (Li et al., 2023).

76The scope of inclusion was also shaped by funding allocation. In Kazakhstan, funds for PB were reallocated from the existing local utilities budget (10%) and remained fixed, reflecting a logic of earmarking a predetermined amount for community-based projects. In Uzbekistan, initial allocations were modest and local, but subsequent increases in funding, partly through greater central transfers to local authorities via enhanced revenue allocation, created incentives for local authorities to use PB to align service delivery with citizens’ preferences. The increased availability of central resources supported the policy capacity of Uzbek local authorities to promote citizen participation and implement PB (Wu et al., 2015).

Table 4. Comparison of PB in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

 

Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan

Inclusion

-

“Narrow focus” (community playgrounds, gazebos etc.)

Limited citizen interest in PB (except for the Almaty case)

 + -

“Wide focus" of PB (healthcare, education etc.)

Administrative mobilization of citizens, “vote buying” etc.

Deliberation

+ -

Lack of incentives for local authorities (akimats) to mobilize citizens for PB deliberation

Variegated dissemination by local authorities

“Super residents”

+ -

Local authorities (khokimiyats) have incentives to actively intervene and mobilize citizens for deliberation/initiation of projects

Assistance from authorities to formulate projects/collaboration

Mahallas and active citizens

Impact

-

Limited transparency on the implementation of projects

Use of “standard” projects

Digital Divide/Finding contractors/Corruption

+ -

Ease of Use of ICT for wider dissemination/voting. Partial monitoring information is available on the website

Corruption

Source: Author’s compilation. “+” reflects positive assessments, whereas “–“ indicates areas of negative progress or challenges.

Deliberation: Between Dialogue and Directive

77The deliberative dimension of PB with citizens proposing and shaping priorities was limited in both cases but to differing degrees. In Kazakhstan, weak incentives and fragmented institutional support meant local governments often treated PB as a bureaucratic task, delegating responsibility to under-resourced departments. Furthermore, in Kazakhstan, the PB initiatives in some cities were captured by local state institutions and “super residents” (Frenkiel, 2021), limiting the deliberation aspect of citizen empowerment. In Uzbekistan, by contrast, the central government provided stronger incentives and coordination for local authorities to enhance citizen participation. This encouraged khokimiyats to collaborate more actively with citizens and mahallas, leading to more structured participation. Promoting deliberative practices and effectively disseminating information at a centralized website further enhanced citizen engagement in PB in Uzbekistan. Ultimately, Uzbekistan’s initiative budgeting highlights the importance of incentivizing bureaucrats through central support and a shared vision, which can strengthen policy capacity and lead to better PB outcomes (Yan et al. 2025).

78However, PB in Uzbekistan also revealed its fragilities. Interviews highlighted a shift from citizen-led discussions to administrative competition, with local authorities using PB to secure funds or demonstrate loyalty to the center. This instrumentalization of participation resembles what Owen (2020) coins as participatory authoritarianism, where participation is encouraged but also tightly managed. Deliberation thus risks becoming a legitimizing performance rather than a space for genuine citizen input.

Impact: Implementation Gaps and Accountability Deficits

79The question of impact – whether citizens’ voices materially shape outcomes – is perhaps the most critical when it comes to PB and both countries fall short here. In Kazakhstan, limited transparency, poor monitoring, and a reliance on standardized project templates led to significant frustration with PB and limited participation in its programs. As interviews showed, citizens saw little connection between their proposals and what was eventually delivered, while the state engaged in the mere imitation of citizen participation reform (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022). In Uzbekistan, while some projects were successfully implemented, the unequal distribution of funds, lack of residency restrictions for voting, and opaque procurement practices undermined confidence in the process.

80Moreover, in neither country did PB evolve into a mechanism for systemic accountability. Citizens were generally unable to challenge project failures, monitor budgets, or sanction local authorities. Instead, PB remained confined to micro-level improvements (though on a wider scale in Uzbekistan), with limited institutional learning. These shortcomings point to the persistence of authoritarian command-and-control and the absence of accountability mechanisms that would allow participatory processes to mature into genuine empowerment (Hajdarowicz, 2022; Hossain et al., 2018).

Conclusions

81This study revisits the two research questions posed in the introduction:

Do hybrid democratic innovations work in authoritarian regimes?

Under what conditions do government-imposed PB initiatives, as hybrid democratic innovations, lead to citizen empowerment?

82First, this research contributes to the broader literature on deliberative practices in authoritarian settings (He, 2011; Owen, 2020) by demonstrating that hybrid democratic innovation can function – albeit partially and with limitations – in authoritarian contexts. For these innovations to be moderately successful, they must be supported by sufficient resources (the wider focus of the program) and offer clear incentives for local bureaucrats to implement them. Thus, this work builds on prior studies of citizen participation and deliberative practices in autocracies (O’Connor et al., 2019; He, 2019).

83Second, this study reveals serious caveats related to hybrid democratic innovations in autocracies. It finds that, in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, PB initiatives failed to serve as genuine instruments of citizen empowerment, falling short on key dimensions such as inclusion, deliberation, and impact (Hendriks & Michels, 2024). In the case of Uzbekistan, PB led to only partial empowerment, constrained by significant structural and political obstacles. While Uzbek authorities were more successful in increasing numerical citizen participation in PB compared to Kazakhstan, they fell short of achieving full citizen empowerment, i.e., meaningful and substantive participation by citizens. More broadly, these findings highlight the inherent limitations of implementing hybrid democratic innovations within authoritarian regimes. In response to the second research question, this paper argues that while programmatic scope and local incentives are necessary conditions for fostering more inclusive and deliberative PB processes, they are not sufficient. Without effective mechanisms to prevent state capture, ensure transparency, and guard against manipulation, even well-designed PB schemes risk becoming tools for regime legitimation or co-optation (Dukalskis & Gerschewski, 2017) that serve the interests of certain groups and state institutions rather than promote participatory democracy (Frenkiel, 2021; Sintomer et al., 2012).

84Hence, three crucial caveats related to the functioning of PB as hybrid democratic innovations in autocracies in the Global South are uncovered. First, expanding the scope of participatory initiatives must be accompanied by safeguards to prevent the strategic reallocation of resources away from marginalized communities. Second, incentives for local authorities should go beyond performance-based rewards or political pressure and include robust accountability mechanisms for citizens and civil society. Third, citizen empowerment should be understood as a continuum in which symbolic inclusion may coexist with partial empowerment but must not be mistaken for genuine democratic participation. These caveats are consistent with existing studies that caution against equating participation with empowerment, particularly in authoritarian contexts where participatory practices are often curated and instrumentalized (He & Warren, 2011).

85Finally, using empirical cases from Central Asia, this paper concludes that PB is an inherently political project (Ganuza et al., 2013) and its effects are shaped by design, political context, and underlying power dynamics. In both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, PB operated less as a genuine hybrid democratic innovation and more as an instrument of regime consolidation that offered a semblance of inclusion to signal responsiveness while maintaining top-down control (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022; Cassani, 2017). This finding also aligns with recent works that emphasize the shallowness of citizen participation and the limits of consultative bodies in Central Asia (Kurmanov & Knox, 2022; Knox & Sharipova, 2024; Makulbayeva & Sharipova, 2025). Nonetheless, even limited participation can sow the seeds of new expectations, build civic capacities, and generate forms of contestation over time even in authoritarian settings. Whether these dynamics evolve into more empowered and deliberative forms of citizen–state engagement and lead to greater trust in government depends on factors such as political openness, institutional reform, and sustained public pressure. These hybrid democratic innovations have the potential to gradually reshape practices of citizen participation in decision-making and contribute to higher levels of democratic engagement. However, this assumption should be examined in future research.

86These insights extend beyond Central Asia. For scholars and practitioners of public policy, the cases underline that the transfer of top-down citizen participatory tools across regime types requires attention to institutional design, incentive structures, and accountability safeguards. Hybrid democratic innovations can create openings for citizen engagement even under authoritarian conditions, but without robust monitoring and protection against manipulation, they risk becoming instruments of legitimation rather than empowerment.

87The author acknowledges the limitations of this paper in assessing PB in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Given the scope of the study, not all PB locations in both countries could be covered, which may have led to a partial perspective. It is essential to acknowledge the potential diversity of PB experiences across municipalities in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as well as the impact of demographic and other social characteristics on PB outcomes. This topic was beyond the scope of the current study. For instance, in Kazakhstan, this study focused on PB experiences in Pavlodar, Almaty, and Aktobe, which are relatively large and multiethnic cities. While it did not examine the impact of PB across linguistic or ethnic lines, future research could systematically explore whether heterogeneous communities engage differently with PB processes compared to more homogeneous locations, and whether city size plays a significant role. Similarly, in Uzbekistan, future research could investigate the specific localities where PB has been more successful and identify the demographic and other contextual factors that have shaped these outcomes. Furthermore, additional research is needed to gain a deeper understanding of ordinary citizens’ engagement in these practices. Rather than asking whether PB, as a hybrid democratic innovation, “works” in autocratic settings, future research should explore who participates, how, and to what end. Does PB deepen civic and democratic engagement, or merely diffuse discontent? Which citizens benefit, and whose voices remain excluded? These are important questions that warrant further scholarly investigation.

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Notes

1 In Uzbekistan, the sudden death of I. Karimov in 2016 led to S. Mirziyoyev coming to power with a liberal reform agenda (see Kurmanov & Knox, 2024, for more details). In Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev stepped down in 2019, paving the way for K-J. Tokayev, who introduced the "Listening State" reform agenda (see Kurmanov et al., 2024, for more details).

2 Though they are distinguishable, the author included these two groups in one category because interviewed consultants worked closely with the government in launching these reforms, and their positions were closely intertwined.

3 For a more detailed discussion of decentralization reforms in Kazakhstan, see Yesdauletov (2025).

4 “Surplus revenue” is calculated as the local budget revenues exceeding forecasts for the previous year.

5 Since 2019, Uzbek authorities have actively pursued fiscal decentralization by transferring various taxes, including excise taxes on alcohol sales and a substantial portion of income taxes, to local governments

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List of illustrations

Title Figure 1. The information about projects is on the official website of Zhanaozen local executive authority (akimat). Fifty-two votes were given for three projects.
Credits Source: Author’s screenshot from Zhanaozen Akimat (2023).
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/5793/img-1.png
File image/png, 373k
Title Figure 2. The website indicates the top three budget initiative projects that received the highest number of votes in the first season of the 2022 year in Uzbekistan. The first project: 'Medical Equipment'; the second project: 'Equipment for Secondary School No. 2 in Yanykurgon District'; and the third project: '1. Modern Interactive Board, 2. Pair of Speakers for the School'
Credits Source: Author’s screenshot from Open Budget Uzbekistan (2023b)
URL http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/docannexe/image/5793/img-2.png
File image/png, 147k
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References

Electronic reference

Bakhytzhan Kurmanov, Do hybrid democratic innovations work in autocracies? Investigating the Cases of Participatory Budgeting in Kazakhstan and UzbekistanInternational Review of Public Policy [Online], 8:1 | 2026, Online since 01 February 2026, connection on 10 April 2026. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/irpp/5793; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/15t8p

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About the author

Bakhytzhan Kurmanov

Institute of Public Policy and Administration, University of Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0276-2837
bakhytzhan.kurmanov@ucentralasia.org

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Copyright

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