1The term “academic advisors” may be used to refer to experts based primarily at universities who play advisory roles as student advisors, researchers, think tank members, consultants, and even technocrats when seconded to government ministries. Unlike academic advisors, bureaucrats cannot legally engage in other advisory roles during official government time. They therefore generate and often provide the necessary advice as internal policy advisors, as members of the government SAC or PAS, to which they may also belong as external advisors. Depending on the dynamics within each country, academic advisors and bureaucrats interact in various ways in the policy design as members of the government SAC/PAS. A PAS can be seen as a system ‘of interlocking actors, with a unique configuration in each sector and jurisdiction, who provide information, knowledge, and recommendations for action to policymakers (Craft & Howlett, 2012). Advice flows from multiple sources that are sometimes in intense competition with each other, and decision makers sit in the middle of a complex horizontal web of advisory actors (Brans & Timmermans, 2022). The extent and nature of interactions in terms of conceptualization and application only aggravate the existing controversies between bureaucrats and academics in policy areas and administration, ranging from how academic research can influence the public policy process (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1994) to whether or not policymakers actually use academic research (Newman et al., 2016) and how research is used (Head, 2013). These forms and functions of scientific expertise for policymaking differ between policy sectors and countries. PASs extend beyond the boundaries of internal government expertise and can include a broad range of actors, such as advisory committees, academic experts, think tanks, civil society organizations, or employer and employee associations (Blum & Brans, 2017). What counts as evidence is defined by institutional and discursive conventions that vary by country and policy, as well as by the general advisory systems and the specific styles of experts. For instance, in a neo-corporatist, institution-based system such as Germany, one will find more ‘expert rationality.’ This rationality often stems from institutional representatives who participate in advisory bodies such as representatives of employers’ and employees’ associations, for example (Howlett & Newman, 2010). Academics are engaged in numerous activities that may underpin policy advice, such as diagnosing policy problems, pre-evaluating different policy options, or studying the effects of reform efforts (Blum & Brans, 2017). Academic advisors from universities can also contribute to public policy making as experts providing expert-based information generated through professional, scientific, and technical methods of inquiry (Adams, 2004).
2As Talbot and Talbot (2015) argue, how policymakers engage with academics is both a ‘hot’ topic and a perennial problem. Policy initiatives such as the Research Excellence Framework’s (REF) so-called ‘impact agenda’ have ‘pushed’ academics towards seeking more engagement with policymakers. Other factors, such as ‘open policy-making’ ‘pull’ academics towards engagement (Talbot & Talbot, 2015). Other than through publications, policymakers can come to learn about or be influenced by scientific expertise through convocation activities through which scientific experts disseminate knowledge, such as workshops, conferences, or speeches. A third form consists of informal communications and personal contacts, such as background talks or personal briefings (Lindquist, 1990). A more recent medium consists of information carriers such as Twitter (Peters & Zittoun, 2016).
3In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic caused global disruptions in all aspects of life. As an intervention measure, different governments formulated and implemented a raft of policies in response to its effects. Kenya and South Africa are examples of countries that faced similar challenges, used similar approaches, and realized almost similar outcomes. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the governments, through their respective PAS, formulated policies to maintain economic, social, and health stability. In doing so, each government decided on what kind of advice it needed and which actors should comprise its policy advisory system. These policies ranged from socio-economic responses to health system preparedness. The governments of Kenya and South Africa used SACs/PASs to formulate, disseminate, implement, monitor, and evaluate a number of policies in response to the pandemic. Both countries declared COVID-19 a pandemic in March 2020 and lifted restrictions with regard to the pandemic in April 2022. In advising the government on the policy processes, PAS incorporated bureaucrats, public sector agencies, academia, stakeholder associations, think tanks, and political organizations to varying degrees and proportions. These organizations were included in coordination, response, research, vaccination, and lockdowns, and other efforts to manage the pandemic. Advisors participated in various capacities, including as members of ad hoc committees, researchers (especially at the Medical Research Centres), and policy analysts. Think tanks, such as the Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research Analysis (KIPPRA), provided evidence-informed critiques of government policies in particular sectors. Advisors also served as consultants, providing direct consultancy services to government agencies. They were commissioned to carry out impact studies, design interventions for respective government agencies, and conduct applied research through the National Research Fund (NRF). However, it is unclear how and to what extent the respective governments engaged academic advisors and bureaucrats in developing policies to counter the COVID-19 pandemic.
4Against this background, this paper has sought to establish the nature of interactions between academic advisors and bureaucrats based on policy analysis, research, consultancy, and secondment to the government in the management of policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic by the respective PASs in Kenya and South Africa. To what extent were the roles of academic advisors and bureaucrats complementary, contradictory, or independent in the policy process, and why?
5The article is anchored in the theory of governmental management of PAS as presented by Craft & Howlett (2013), Marciano & Craft (2023), and Howlett, Migone, & Tan (2014). According to Marciano and Craft (2023), governments use their discretion and capacity to determine the involvement of different actors in PASs, thereby shaping the accessibility of policy advice and the processes by which it is generated and consumed (Marciano & Craft, 2023). More often than not, PASs are dominated by bureaucrats because governments can invite advisors as and when needed. The ability of the government to define and assign roles in PASs gives bureaucrats a vantage position at the expense of academic advisors, who are relegated to supporting and complementary roles. The more roles bureaucrats have, the more dominant they become, and the fewer roles academic advisors have in PASs. In these cases, bureaucrats will typically head the PAS and the secretariat and only invite academic advisors as consultants or members of the committee as needed. Even when academic advisors head the PAS, they must operate within the terms of reference consistent with the prevailing desires of the government due to bureacrats’ inherent control over government functions. When deployed under crisis, PASs can expand to include staff across different ministries, consultants, policy planners, and civil society members who can advise on the procedural and substantive aspects of policymaking (Craft & Howlett, 2013), with the latitude of responsibilities that the government is willing to allow. The government can decide not only the composition of the PAS, but also the nature and extent of its role. More often than not, academics play different roles, including being part of the government-constituted PAS. According to Head (2015), academics can be categorized as follows: the ‘mainstream academic,’ who gives broad interpretations on policy and has limited direct engagement with practitioners; ’policy analysts,’ who specialize in providing evidence-informed critiques of government policies in a chosen policy sector; researchers who provide direct, applied consultancy services to practitioners; and those who take ‘secondments into advisory roles within public agencies or ministerial offices’(Head, 2015).
6The article argues that the form of PAS management adopted by a government influences the nature of involvement of academic advisors in PASs. Whereas the forms of PAS management could be authoritative, dependent, laissez-faire, or absent, the roles of academics could be in the form of, or a combination of, mainstream academic, policy analysis, consultancy, or secondment to government, as shown in Table 1.
Table1. Effects of Forms of Government Management on the Role of Academics in PASs
|
Form of PAS Management
|
Roles of Academics in PASs
|
|
Mainstream Academic
|
Policy Analysts
|
Consultancy
|
Secondment to Government
|
|
Authoritative
|
- Works on government assigned themes or issues
- Passive or no role in government-controlled PASs
|
- Appointed by the government
- Operates as either an internal or arm’s length PASs
|
- Targeted government consultants
- Relationship is based on the terms of reference.
- More are appointed/co-opted into PASs
|
- More people are appointed/co-opted into PASs
|
|
Dependent
|
- The government relies on them more
- Independent in their choice of what and when to research
- More people are appointed/co-opted into PASs
|
- Dominates government PASs
- Sets and acts on own agenda
- More people are appointed/co-opted into PASs
|
- Dominates government PASs
- Sets and acts on own agenda
- More people are appointed/co-opted into PASs
|
- More people are appointed/co-opted into PASs
|
|
Laissez-Faire
|
- No major interactions with the government.
- Self-regulated
- Independent in their choice of funding and research.
- Little or no collaboration in PASs
|
-Sets and acts on own agenda
- Independent in their choice of funding
- Little or no collaboration in PASs
|
- Independent in their choice of funding
- Little or no collaboration in PAS
- Faces competition with other PASs
|
- More competitive against others for space in PASs
|
|
Absent
|
- Independent in their choice of funding and research
- Little or no role in PASs
|
- Independent in their choice of funding.
- Little or no role in PASs
|
- Less participation in PASs
|
- Less participation in PASs
|
Source: Modified from Marciano & Craft, 2023
7Table 1 illustrates that under authoritative PAS management, the government actively employs its authority and resources to intervene within the advisory system. It establishes a central agency responsible for coordinating, validating, and uniformly enforcing policy positions. The government determines and controls the nature of the involvement of academics in PASs as needed in research, policy analysis, consultancy, and secondment. These academics could be nominated to positions and participate in government-funded research and commissioned consultancies.
8Under the dependent PAS management model, the government may be inclined to intervene in PAS operations, yet lack the resources or authority to do so. Thus, it could rely on other policy actors such as domestic and international ones, as well as private and third sector ones. The government has an indirect and sometimes informal allegiance to academic advisors.
9Under laissez-faire forms of PAS management, the government has discretion but chooses to maintain the status quo. Therefore, there are no significant efforts to manage advisory units or processes that diverge from their existing practices. This approach reflects a more “hands-off” stance, for example, favoring self-regulatory activities or public service management of its policy capacity and advisory practices. In these circumstances, academics have overarching responsibilities, citing their supposed epistemic or territorial hegemony. They are therefore free to collaborate with other actors but on a limited basis and under negotiated terms as needed. At the same time, the government is hesitant to curb private academic initiatives, either because it lacks the ability to definitively oppose them or because it wants the protagonists to cancel each other out, hoping for a natural selection outcome.
10Finally, in the absent form, governments have minimal to no discretion in influencing PASs as most systems are largely under private authority but have public policy implications. These policy areas depend heavily on external advisers because they are governed by international, supranational, or multi-level governance frameworks. This diminishes the government's ability to exert authority on advisory matters. As a result, academics, like other PASs, operate independently and can be engaged on a limited basis, as needed, by the government on negotiated terms.
11We do not consider full time employees in the public or private sectors, excluding university services, to be academic advisors, notwithstanding their academic qualifications. In this context, not all researchers, think tanks, or consultants are academic advisors. Experts in full-time employment, either as technocrats in ministries or government agencies or in think tanks or research institutes, are therefore considered bureaucrats. Academics may take up advisory positions, as in the Australian bureaucracy, move to top bureaucratic positions, as in the Netherlands, or serve as executive ministers in times of political and financial crisis, as in the governments of Italy and Greece, where their expertise is put to use at the apex of decision-making (Brans & Timmermans, 2022). PASs can act as an interface not only between the government and clients or beneficiaries but also create formal and informal networks between scholars and practitioners as two sides of the same coin. This is made possible by the fact that the government directly controls many aspects of the machinery, which allows it to set the policy agenda, and shape key policy sequencing and various procedural requirements or preferences. Some policy advisory systems are ad hoc, created in response to crises, and comprise experts and advisers. Others are more institutionalized and anticipatory in their function, addressing long-standing policy issues (Craft & Howlett, 2013). Governments can use their agencies and resources (or not) to prioritize or marginalize policy issues or actors; frame and create discourse around policy matters, policy instruments, or policy target groups; and persuade, communicate, and credit or discredit specific sources of policy advice. PASs are not necessarily permanent, but they often appear as ad hoc bodies, such as committees, task forces, and working groups. These are often deployed by governments on a temporary and short-term basis to respond to crisis conditions. In such cases, PASs can be used to bypass the typical challenges that prevent governments from acting quickly in a crisis (Nair & Garg, 2024). The extent to which PASs interact with other actors depends on government control through its agencies and discretion, hence the differences in country- and situation-specific applications of administrative and control management forms. Government-appointed experts are certified by virtue of their training, professional credentials, and positions as officials. Scientific experts, on the other hand, become crucial actors because they can distinguish good information from bad, signal from noise, and real findings from spurious associations (Baekkeskov, 2016). Each government therefore adopts a range of instruments and initiatives to manage PASs. Management can be triggered by governments seeking to proactively manage PASs or reactively, following developments that compel or invite governments to respond (Lieberson, 1991). Policymaking is a collective process in which decision-makers deal with a wide range of topics and issues, relying heavily on the advice they receive from other actors. These actors include academics, researchers, bureaucrats, and consultants/experts. The advice provided may be more technical or legal in nature, requiring specialized expertise and knowledge (Capano et al., 2023). Governments therefore establish PASs to access credible advice that can shape its decisions. This advice can come from different sources, including politicians, government special advisers, friends, lobbyists, backbenchers, media, private consultants, civil servants, and other ministries (Jarman et al., 2022). The government selects this advice as and when it is required, for immediate or future use. Experts may be invited either individually or as institutions. Different countries have different approaches to engaging academic advisors in the policy-making process. All governments face challenges beyond their control, which can take many forms, ranging from financial and political disruptions to health pandemics, natural disasters, and threats to national security (Aagaard et al., 2024). The governments of Kenya and South Africa, respectively, privileged or marginalized particular sets of advisors, including public servants, private sector consultants, and various specialized advisory bodies, by changing the structures and procedures of PASs. The roles of academics, namely mainstream academic/research, policy analysis, consultancy, and secondment to government office advisors, were influenced by the respective government’s form of PAS management during the COVID-19 pandemic. These governments sought expertise from public agencies, academia, stakeholder associations, think tanks, and political organizations to varying degrees as needed.
12This paper has adopted a multiple case study method (Flyvbjerg, 2011, Yin, 1981, Gerring, 2007, Obosi, 2025). According to Yin (1981), a case study involves: (a) a qualitative method with a limited number of cases, (b) a comprehensive and detailed investigation, (c) the use of specific types of evidence such as ethnographic, non-experimental, non-survey-based, participant observation, process tracing, historical, textual, or field research, (d) evidence collected in naturalistic, real-world settings, (e) a focus on broad topics where cases and contexts are difficult to distinguish, and (f) the application of triangulation (Yin, 1981). Flyvberg (2011), on the other hand, defines case study as an in-depth analysis of a specific unit, examining how events interact with contextual factors (Flyvbjerg, 2011). The case study approach was therefore preferred because it could address a series of decisions that occurred over an extended period, without clear beginning or end points and outcomes whose direct and indirect implications are too complex for single-factor theories (Obosi, 2025). Document analysis is a recognized form of collecting qualitative information from a primary or original source of written, printed, or recorded materials to answer research questions in interpretive case studies (Yin, 1981). The 'multiple case studies' approach was therefore appropriate for the study because it facilitated the analysis of phenomena that occurred across several contexts, leveraging similarities and differences between the cases.
13Using the multiple case study method, we gathered data from secondary sources on government deterministic control methods, such as regulation and the composition of PASs, as well as the coordination role, research, and health and socio-economic responses implemented for the management of COVID-19 in the two countries, respectively. Of interest was the comparison of interventions by academic advisors and bureaucrats in the respective policy processes in Kenya and South Africa. The analysis criteria were based on the expectation that different PAS management forms could lead to different PAS formations in different contexts. Both countries witnessed the involvement of academics in the policy process as consultants, researchers, members of think tanks, and/or advisors, albeit in different capacities and extents. The study aimed to demonstrate how PAS management forms employed by the Kenyan and South African governments influenced the roles and responses of academic advisors to the pandemic. Specifically, the study aimed to establish the involvement of academics in: a) research, b) policy analysis, c) consultancy, and d) secondment to government agencies during the management of the crisis. Where available, internal government documents were also used.
14The authors relied on secondary data sources, including print and online sources, tocapture the efforts of bureaucrats and academics. These sources included journals, books, data sets, government policy communications, and electronic sources. Archival records were also important sources for the case studies. These documents comprised policy briefs, memos, and updates from the President and the COVID-19 Response Coordinating Committees. They were obtained from the official websites of the Office of the President of Kenya and South Africa and from multisectoral agencies that played leading roles in addressing the pandemic. These agencies included the WHO, the World Bank, and other research institutions. The data captured from the documents were grouped thematically, qualitatively analyzed, and triangulated based on the four roles played by academics in the PAS in Kenya and South Africa.
15The first COVID-19 pandemic case in Kenya was detected on March 12, 2020. From that day forward, the government of Kenya implemented concomitant public health and socio-economic policies, or tightened existing ones, to curb the transmission of the virus. Some of these preventative measures included travel bans, curfews, and the closure of schools, workplaces, and places of worship (McDade et al., 2020). Kenya established a National Emergency Response Committee (NERC) comprising bureaucrats from national government ministries, the Council of Governors, and academics, to mobilize resources and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The NERC coordinated government responses to the pandemic through task forces comprising experts from all sectors, including internal bureaucracy, academic advisors, and international organizations. It was responsible for recommending and implementing whole-of-government policies related to the virus. The task force kept the residents abreast of the situation with daily press briefings coordinated by a team of academic advisors. As of April 27, 2020, there were 363 confirmed cases, 114 recoveries, and 14 deaths (12 males and 2 females). There was sustained local transmission, accounting for 58% of all cases, while 42% were imported. The Government of Kenya imposed a nationwide dawn to dusk curfew and restricted movement within urban areas with high COVID-19 transmission rates, as well as into and out of urban cities with high transmission rates to rural areas with lower rates1. Government bureaucrats teamed up with academic advisors to explain the socio-economic and health basis for lockdowns and restrictions on movement.
16Furthermore, the Kenyan government came up with ways to cushion Kenyans from the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic by establishing a National Coordination Committee to assess the socio-economic impacts of the virus. It also came up with recommendations across all sectors of the economy through Executive Order No. 2,2020. The multisectoral NERC task force comprised the health, security, education, transport, finance, and trade sectors and involved academics in various roles, including research, advisory, and consultancy, to formulate COVID-19 response policies.
17The Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI) and the Ministry of Health (MOH) Emergency Operation Center (EOC) coordinated the health policy responses according to the guidelines provided by the World Health Organizations (WHO). The NERC coordinated all the responses, including socio-economic interventions from the donor community. Daily updates were provided by the Cabinet Secretary for Health through nationally televised press briefings that were channeled via social media platforms, radio, and local dailies. Further risk communication was routinely conducted by the MOH through specific messaging on posters and vernacular radio stations at the national and subnational levels. Together with USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, WFP launched life-saving cash-based support in Mombasa for 24,000 families - totaling 96,000 people, with each family receiving 4,000 Kenyan shillings (US$40) (Centre for Policy Impact, 2020). Other social protection programs were run by the national and county governments, and the Royal Danish Embassy in Nairobi also provided support in the form of a DKK 20 million (KES 310 million) grant for cash transfers to 40,000 vulnerable Kenyans in Mombasa and Nairobi informal settlements (Centre for Policy Impact, 2020).
18The socio-economic policies were spearheaded by the central bank and the Treasury. policies included waiving banks' and mobile money operators' fees on transactions below KShs1,000 ($10) to encourage the use of cashless modes of payment, restructuring loans with longer repayment terms for individuals, SMEs, and corporates affected by the crisis, reducing Value Added Tax (VAT) by 2%, and enhancing support by Ksh10B (equivalent to $100M) for the elderly, orphans, and other vulnerable individuals through existing cash transfer mechanisms. Additionally, a 100% tax relief was planned and implemented for people earning less than Ksh.24, 000 (USD 240).
19In a nutshell, the policy responses focused on socio-economic factors, quarantine, social control, and the mobilization of the healthcare system to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. The steering committees at the national level were instrumental in bringing key ministries and organizations together to enable multi-sector action, especially through the creation of integrated public health response plans.
20South Africa declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 18, 2020, when the number of active cases surpassed 100. On March 26, a National State of Disaster was declared, and South Africa entered a five-week complete national lockdown.
21To deal with the pandemic, the government created the National Corona-virus Command Council (NCCC). This council, chaired by the President and his legal and economic advisors, served as the central decision-making body during the first months of the pandemic. The National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure (NatJoints) is the technical backbone of the NCCC and it met daily to process issues before submitting reports to the NCCC. The NatJoints was co-chaired by the defense and police services and included all directors general of all government departments. The NCCC was a 30-member panel led by Professor Salim Abdool Karim, with cabinet ministers ensuring an integrated response to the pandemic (News24, 2020).
22Subsequently, South Africa’s response to the pandemic was published in government gazettes and formalized under the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002. Government Gazette R.867 of 2020 delineated five alert levels by geographic area (nationally, provincially, or locally), each with specific restrictions (South Africa, 2020a). These levels were identified in collaboration with the Ministerial Advisory Committee, which was created under the Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002. Consideration was given to the disease burden, the health system’s capacity to respond to the disease, the levels of infection, hospitalization, and mortality. Current epidemiological trends based on the number of tests done, persons screened, positive cases, recoveries, and health care facility occupation were also considered (South Africa 2020b). After 750 days, the State of Disaster was lifted at midnight on April 5, 2022. Amended health regulations persisted, requiring people to continue wearing protective masks in public spaces, including on public transportation, and to practice social distancing. Restrictions on attending funerals and social gatherings continued, and proof of vaccination was required for travel to and from South Africa (South Africa, 2020b).
23Through its South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), the Department of Social Development administered grants to all citizens, asylum seekers, refugees, and special permit holders who were eligible for the respective grants, allowing them to access applications electronically. SASSA’s grants were increased to assist households, and the COVID-19 Social Relief of Distress grants were extended to March 2023 with additional allocations of R110.8 billion for 2022/23, R60 billion for 2023/24 and R67.6 billion for 2024/25. This funding was earmarked for the payment of grants, including those for students assisted through the National Student Finance Scheme (NSFAS) (National Treasury, 2022).
24At the national level, the NCCC was instrumental in uniting key ministries, academics, and organizations to enable multi-sector action, particularly through the creation of integrated public health response plans. Starting in April 2020, the economic sector made provisions for the support of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMMEs) through the debt relief finance scheme to help them stay afloat by lessening their loan repayment burden. Similar tax incentives were made available for agricultural and tourism employers through the National Treasury’s economic relief measures (South Africa, 2020a).
25In research, the J&J trial began in September 2020 at the Masiphumelele Research Site in Cape Town. Other population-based research infrastructures in South Africa, including the Africa Research Institute in KwaZulu-Natal and the MRC/ Wits Agincourt Research Unit in Mpumalanga, likewise drew on systems and structures for population data collection, community engagement, and data management systems developed over several decades to initiate epidemiological and other studies on COVID-19 (Manderson & Levine, 2023). At academic conferences and workshops, such as those held by the international network Future Earth prior to the Sustainability Research and Innovation Congress (SRI) online and in Pretoria, 20–24 June 2022, Uzma Alam (Africa Institute for Health Policy, Kenya) argued for the value of using COVID-19 as a case study of the flexibility and adaptability that characterize science on the continent.
26Although it is impossible to establish clear boundaries, it is possible to assess how the forms of PAS management influenced how bureaucrats and academics managed the COVID-19 pandemic in Kenya and South Africa. The analysis was guided by the hypothesis that the authoritative form of PAS management adopted by both governments relegated academics to supporting and complementary roles. The bases of the analysis are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary of Interactions between Academic Advisors and Bureaucrats in PASs in Kenya and South Africa during the COVID-19 Pandemic
|
Roles of Academic Advisors
|
Interactions with bureaucrats in PASs
|
|
Kenya
|
South Africa
|
|
The ‘mainstream academic’ who provides broad interpretations on policy
|
Limited direct engagement with practitioners
|
Limited direct engagement with practitioners
|
|
’Policy analysts,’ who provide evidence-informed critiques of government policies in a chosen policy sector
|
Academics validated the WHO and bureaucrats' advice on the use of mass vaccinations and proof of vaccination for travel, restricted mobility/lockdowns, and the use of face masks, as well as socio-economic, public health care, and social protection policies against the pandemic
|
Academics validated the WHO and bureaucrats' advice on the use of mass vaccinations and proof of vaccination for travel, restricted mobility/lockdowns, and the use of face masks, as well as socio-economic, public health care, and social protection policies against the pandemic.
|
|
Direct consultancy services to practitioners (e.g., policy evaluations and contract research commissioned by the government)
|
Participated directly by responding to government calls and indirectly as experts hired by Non-governmental organizations to design interventions
|
There was more independent research conducted by academics, which bureaucrats indirectly incorporated into government policies
|
|
‘Secondments’ into advisory roles within public agencies or ministerial offices
|
Academics were recruited into the bureaucrat-controlled National Emergency Response Committee (NERC), which was supported by Technical Task Forces comprising academics, development partners, line ministries, and county representatives who managed the pandemic response
|
Academics were recruited into the bureaucrat-controlled National Coronavirus Command Council (NCCC) comprising cabinet ministers and experts from all sectors, including academic institutions, to ensure an integrated response to the pandemic
|
- 2 Health Systems Strengthening Accelerator (2022). Coordinating the National Pandemic
27Table 2 shows that during the pandemic, the involvement of academics in PASs in both Kenya and South Africa was mainly as consultants, policy analysts, and staff on secondment to the government when specific policy considerations were needed. Some academics, however, continued to focus on their research interests independently of the government’s response. The most dominant role of academics in both governments was as ‘secondment’ staff in advisory roles within public agencies or ministerial offices. Various policy experts were seconded to respective national coordination committees and different government/policy task forces. In South Africa, the NCCC comprised a 30-member panel led by Professor Salim Abdool Karim. It had cabinet ministers and experts from all sectors, including academic institutions, to ensure an integrated response to the pandemic. In Kenya, the NERC engaged staff from the Department of Public Health at the University of Nairobi to communicate agreed-upon health protocols to mitigate the pandemic. More often than not, the multi-sectoral and disciplinary PAS intended to provide pandemic responses, so the urgency did not allow for a predetermined standard procurement of experts through conventional methods. Rather, ad hoc procedures such as availability and networking were preferred, implying that the experts selected were good, but not necessarily the best, for the task at hand. The NERC was supported by technical task forces that included academics, development partners, line ministries, and county representation. These technical task forces reviewed available evidence and provided the NERC with recommendations for appropriate responses to the pandemic2. The cherry-picking of academic advisors into these committees by bureaucrats was informed by the government’s authoritative form of PAS management. The NERC focused more on how academics could solve existing problems than on generating knowledge. In both Kenya and South Africa, the advice was conceptualized as more instrumental, involving the direct use of findings to shape policy, its implementation, or actual practices, than conceptual, involving less direct and detectable uses and possibly impacting policymakers’ understandings and ways of thinking.
28In terms of ‘policy analysis,’ which involves providing evidence-informed critiques of government policies, the academics validated the WHO’s and the bureaucrats' advice on the use of mass vaccinations, proof of vaccination for travel, restricted mobility/lockdowns, and the use of face masks. However, the bureaucrats, working under the aegis of the respective national coordination committees, managed the academic’s involvement, determining at what stage their input was required. This scenario led to a disjointed, ad-hoc, bureaucrat-dominated PAS comprising academic advisors and bureaucrats, which the government institutionalized to manage the COVID-19 pandemic, especially the health, socio-economic, and research responses. Both Kenya and South Africa implemented several measures, such as designating facilities for COVID-19 testing and treatment, securing Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs) for Health Care Workers (HCW), acquiring vaccines, and adopting the guidelines proposed by the WHO and health experts, courtesy of the policies formulated through the NERC and NCCC, respectively. Although academics in the PAS were at the forefront of media campaigns supporting the proposed measures for the local population, the information was prepared and shared by bureaucrats in the PAS, such as the government’s head of medical services and medical research. The government was concerned about the public perception of its basis for action, explaining its desire to work alongside academic advisors. For instance, the NCCC stated that the prohibition on the sale of alcohol and tobacco, based on health decisions derived from advice from leading academics and all available scientific evidence, sent shockwaves throughout the country (Bhorat et al., 2020). As members of the PAS, the academics had clear terms of reference and membership controlled by the government and could hardly deviate from the government’s direction. This further demonstrated an authoritative form of PAS management. In Kenya, think tanks also participated in the policymaking process during the pandemic, especially through symposia and workshops. For instance, on April 15, 2021, KIPPRA, in partnership with Kenya Think Tanks, held the 2nd Kenya Think Tanks Symposium, which included more than 50 Kenyan think tanks, government officials, and representatives from research and learning institutions.
29The consultancy docket demonstrated three forms of PAS management, namely, authoritative, in which the government made decisions and set terms of reference; laissez-faire, in which there was open field for engagement of the non-state actors on liberal terms; and dependent form, in which government relied on academics either directly or through proxies as non-governmental organizations, both local and international. In terms of socio-economic policy responses, academics validated bureaucrats’ socio-economic, public health care, and social protection policies against the pandemic. Both countries created multi-billion-dollar Emergency Response Units at the beginning of the crisis to address its economic and social impacts, such as unemployment and loss of wages and salaries due to shutdowns of schools, factories, and other essential economic activities. Kenya’s funding policy for the pandemic was intended to facilitate financing pandemic response. Although some academics were contracted individually to provide specific consultancy services, their roles were limited purely to servicing bureaucrats' ideas or monitoring and evaluating policies already implemented. With the respective heads of state assuming leadership positions in the NERC and the NCCC, respectively, the PAS received the highest level of political support. Hence, it proved useful not only domestically, but also in managing the pandemic beyond the respective borders. In South Africa, policy developments were driven by the Presidency, National Treasury, the South African Revenue Service, the Department of Employment and Labor, and the Department of Small Business Development. The Department of Social Development, through its South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), made the grants available to all citizens, asylum seekers, refugees, and special permit holders eligible for them. Applications could be accessed electronically. Unlike South Africa, Kenya received contributions from international donors, including the United States (US), Finland, Poland, and Sweden. Moreover, the World Food Program (WFP) provided cash transfers and nutrition support to 279,000 people in Nairobi’s informal settlements for three months.
- 3 Kenya News Agency, 11th February 2022
- 4 Kenya News Agency, 11th February 2022).
30The research, however, was mainly conducted by members of government task forces. While South Africa had more independent research that academics indirectly incorporated into government policies, Kenyan academics played a role as members of institutional research teams. It is noteworthy that during the development of the policies in response to the pandemic, academics in both countries were involved as advisors when specific policy considerations were needed, even though some continued to focus on their research interests independently of the government’s response. Whereas there was no direct and obvious linkage between academic advisors and bureaucrat-controlled research at the government research centers in Kenya, South African academics conducted more independent research, which bureaucrats indirectly incorporated into government policies. Kenyan researchers and experts collaborated with other international organizations under WHO leadership, conducting specific research on the virus to increase the relevance and utility of their work. For example, WHO-Kenya and Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI)Vaccine Research3 conducted research on vaccine uptake in 11 counties. During the pandemic, policy makers received significant input from medical and health-related research institutions such as KEMRI. The institute reported that researchers and experts coordinated the search for the most effective preventive measures, drugs, and vaccines against the virus (Kenya News Agency, 11, 2022). The British High Commission announced new funding in the fight against Covid-19 transitional genomics and vaccine evaluation in collaboration with WHO, Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), and other researchers who emphasized the need for genomics capacity to inform Covid-19 surveillance. KEMRI and the University of Nairobi regularly provided solutions for medical research in response to the pandemic4. Academic research was key to policy input and influenced policy outcomes. The Kenyan government made deliberate efforts to fund strategic research initiatives at multiple research institutions across the country through a consortium model approach, as seen in the calls for research grants in April and September of 2020. In September, the National Research Fund disbursed a total of Kes. 74,111,479 to four Covid-19 research consortia as part of the Kes. 131,037,479 research fund for the Coronavirus disease. Other studies supported by the National Research Fund included the gendered economic, social, and health effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and mitigation policies in Kenya, with a focus on informal settlements in Nairobi.
31Governments strive to create PASs that can help them develop policies not only in times of crisis but also during normal times. The nature of the relationships between academic advisors and bureaucrats within the PAS depends on the form of PAS management strategy chosen by the government. The discussion is based on the bureaucrats’ dominant role in the composition and assignment of roles to members of the respective PAS, which relegates the academic advisors to supportive and complementary roles. This largely authoritative form of PAS management elevates the secondment and consultancy roles of academics at the expense of research and evidence-informed policy analysis.
- 5 Human Rights Watch, 13 December 2021
32When a government lacks internal expertise and problem-solving skills, is under pressure to work on short timelines, and has cost concerns about deploying resources, a nucleus of bureaucrats emerges to steer the process. The advisors’ roles are therefore confined to stimulating or facilitating decision-making. In this case, the government exercises its control through its agencies to determine which experts to invite and for what purpose, projecting an image of basing decisions on science. However, there could be a preference for specific groups of advisors who align with the government’s current political preferences, underscoring the politics behind evidence-based policymaking (Cairney & Oliver, 2020). It was therefore common to find diverse policy actors at distinct levels of government performing different functions in managing the COVID-19 pandemic (Osei-Kojo et al., 2022). However, the composition of PASs is not necessarily a panacea for providing an acceptable solution to the problem. Sometimes, academic advice can be compromised by the government’s selection of experts who follow the government’s rules instead of the epistemic rules of science (Cairney and Toth 2023). In Kenya, academic advisors in the PAS were particularly instrumental in reassuring the public about the vaccine's effectiveness. They advocated for prioritizing vaccines for at-risk groups, public servants, and healthcare workers and promoted the slogan “No jab, no service”5 . These experts educated the community and mobilized support for the country’s response, including acceptance of the vaccine based on expert knowledge, government regulations, and WHO recommendations in a bid to protect the country (WHO 2021).
33Competition among experts was not confined to Kenya and South Africa. In the UK and Italy, for example, biomedical and epidemiological scientists, as well as government science advisers in the civil service, had a relatively prominent role (Cairney, 2021). Key scientific experts were highly influential during the initial COVID-19 response but became less influential as governments began to prioritize social and economic concerns. Competitions for influence could take place behind closed doors or in visible competitions to become the ‘adviser to the king’ in which experts could behave more like politicians by forming coalitions based on opposing ideas and interests, competing for positions, or quarrelling in collegiate bodies or on television. Some ‘insider’ experts may influence who is included or excluded, while others seek access to official advisory bodies or try to gain enough media popularity to draw attention to alternative approaches (Cairney & Toth, 2023).
34The fact that the PAS was the coordinating unit of the multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary responses to the COVID-19 pandemic (NERC in Kenya, and NCCC in South Africa) was a manifestation of the government's control over its routine bureaucratic systems and processes for dealing with the additional administrative burden imposed on governments during a crisis. According to Weiss (1986), this tends to influence “’low-level, narrow-gauge decisions’ due to the false assumption that researchers and policy makers agree on the goals and outcomes of research (Talbot & Talbot, 2015). From the PAS’s perspective, there was a consensus on the policy responses to the pandemic. However, while in PASs, academic experts merely pacify formal communication deferred to them by the government. They can hardly go against the government nor present a different expert opinion than what the government presents. When policy is made in expert venues due to deference from formal policy-makers and the practical absence of alternative deliberations, government-appointed specialists in the relevant science (i.e., certified experts) steer the policy-making process (Baekkeskov, 2016). In Singapore, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Hong Kong, information sharing and communication with various stakeholders during the health crisis. These groups were found to effectively reduce the routine load of health agencies for case reporting and monitoring, especially in Taiwan (Nair & Garg, 2024). Unfortunately, the ad hoc approach taken by some PASs made coordination difficult, resulting in advice prone to contradictions and challenges. An example is the manner in which the constitutionality of South Africa’s NCCC’s was questioned, yet it remained a Cabinet committee decision (News24, 2020). Some counties therefore opted for a full-time coordinating agency to consolidate the efforts of different actors. This was consistent with Canada’s development of the Emergency Response Board (CERB), which required a well-coordinated and experienced public service that was aware of its own capacity limits and strengths and capable of rapid and effective communication. The coordinating role of PASs brings together the internal administrative, technological capacity, and expertise within the government, upon which outsourced services and expertise from external experts are hinged. This internal capacity provides stability and insulates the PAS from an unnecessary trial and error approach. In Canada, for example, the Canadian Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) program was designed to be implemented by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the interlinked and international nature of the policy problems they faced, the CRA developed and implemented policies and solutions (Dinan, Béland, & Howlett, 2024). The bureaucrats in the PAS therefore ended up coordinating not only activities within the government, but also functions and responses from non-state actors, including international development partners and donor agencies, due to political support. This explains why the respective heads of state assumed leadership positions in the NERC and NCCC. This approach proved useful not only domestically, but also in managing the pandemic beyond their borders. Though similar to Italy’s PAS management, this approach differed from the UK’s, whose management of the outbreak of the pandemic relied on the well-established Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE). Italy had no such body until the government established an ad hoc scientific advisory committee for COVID-19 (Cairney & Toth, 2023).
35We wish to argue that the role of academics in the PAS was confined to either communicating or validating the dominant view of the government, as represented by the bureaucrats, rather than expressing their own views. While it is hardly practical for each academic to express their own views, the government, for political and practical reasons, sought to present a moderate position backed by science; hence, the invitation to academics to support this position. For instance, the NCCC stated that, based on health decisions derived from advice from leading academics and all available scientific evidence, prohibiting the sale of alcohol and tobacco sent shockwaves throughout the country (Bhorat et al., 2020). In public health emergencies, elected leaders often seek to legitimize difficult and controversial decisions by attributing them to expert advice (Jarman et al., 2022). The co-optation of academics into the PAS was intended to lend credence to the message communicated by the PAS, whether as consultants or seconded staff, so the public would see it as arising from scientific evidence and not just politicians’ rhetoric. Kenya and South Africa therefore used scientific evidence to justify their decisions, as did Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom during the early months of COVID-19, when politicians invoked science to first delay and then later justify decisions about regulations such as cancelling mass events, closing school, controlling borders, and requiring mask-wearing (MacAulay et al., 2023). However, given that academics are members of the PAS, which has clear terms of reference and membership controlled by the government, as well as the secretariat provided and chaired by the government's top bureaucrats, they could hardly deviate from the given direction.
36A similar situation applied to consultants and researchers studying socio-economic responses. In this case, bureaucrats determined when and to what extent academics would be engaged. For example, the Kenya Ministry of Health, the Kenya Medical Research Institute, and the African Institute for Development Policy (2020) prepared a funding policy brief based on an Assessment of Knowledge, Attitudes, Perception and Practice (KAPP) regarding the Kenyan population’s understanding of Covid-19. This assessment provided a basis for engagement between policymakers and relevant experts (Research Fund, 2022). In these contexts, the policy interventions were initiated and driven by bureaucrats, with targeted input from selected experts. Kenya’s private sector, financial institutions, non-state actors, and philanthropists also pooled resources to support government efforts to fight the virus. The donor community also augmented the country’s initiatives, which were largely centered on cash transfers and health support (Centre for Policy Impact, 2020). To enhance coordination of different initiatives from multiple stakeholders and ensure the effective management and accountability of resources, the government set up a COVID-19 emergency response fund board (Centre for Policy Impact, 2020). This is also an example of the government’s authoritative form of PAS management. Although some academics were contracted individually to provide specific consultancy services, their roles were limited purely to servicing the bureaucrats' ideas or monitoring and evaluating policies already implemented. In most cases, epistemic communities in the form of national, regional, and sometimes international health experts, were inducted into the ad hoc group to perform this role. Policy seems effective only when governments incorporate academic evidence as part of the policy process. Basic research within the health sector was the obvious priority. In public health emergencies, elected leaders often seek to legitimize difficult and controversial decisions by attributing them to expert advice (Jarman et al., 2022). To that extent, the government’s claim to be ‘following the science’ drove its policies, which were designed to support its desired policy positions rather than evidence-informed policymaking. More often than not, the positions supported by academics in favor of either COVID-19 vaccines or social control measures were not based on their own research, but rather on the positions advanced by the respective governments. The minimal role of academic experts in the PAS reflects the decline in the influence of university experts compared to bureaucrats and private consultants within their government PASs (Obosi, 2025).
37The paper concludes that, during times of crisis like the pandemic, governments predominantly use authoritative forms of PAS management and less frequently use laissez-faire and dependent forms. This is because there is hardly any defined role for academic advisors in PASs; more often than not, they are invited to ad hoc committees for specific roles and time periods based on the form of PAS management chosen by the government. Again, the role of academic advisors in policymaking is mainly indirect and is conditioned by bureaucrats. Whether in a consultancy role, advisory capacity, or as members of a think tank, bureaucrats largely shape the role of academics in the policymaking process. Generally, the roles of bureaucrats and academic advisors are complementary rather than contradictory. However, there is a disconnect between what bureaucrats want or need and what academics provide, despite the fact that their general expertise is as valuable to policymakers and bureaucrats as it is to individual advisors. There is a dire need for enhanced engagement and interaction between academics and policymakers to bridge the gap between academic work and policymaking processes. This could solve difficult social issues through an institutionalized, coordinated approach. This would diminish the temptation to view the academic and policy spheres as ‘two communities’ whose members play by unique sets of rules, speak different languages, operate along conflicting timelines, respond to different incentives, and generally have little communication or interaction across community boundaries, even if the policy target is the same.
38Finally, the role of academics only became apparent in the monitoring and evaluation phases of policymaking during the Covid-19 pandemic. The policymaking processes were not necessarily distinct, as some phases could overlap. At the height of the pandemic, the emphasis was on problem-solving models as opposed to knowledge-driven models; hence, the relegation of the roles of academic advisors below those of bureaucrats who steered prescribed government policies. In other words, advice utilization was conceptualized more instrumentally by bureaucrats, who directly used findings to shape policies, their implementation, and actual practices, than academically, where uses were less direct and detectable and perhaps impacted policymakers’ understandings and ways of thinking.
39Through its exploratory and descriptive analysis of how governments manage PASs by including or excluding particular members from assignments, this study has contributed to the ‘second wave’ approach to studying PASs (Craft & Wilder, 2017); Howlett, Migone, & Tan (2014) have called for an analysis of PAS grounded in the policy subsystem and focused on system-level analysis. The study has contributed to knowledge of not only the composition and structuring of PAS systems, but also how to condition interactions between internal and external actors for better outcomes. However, further research, especially on the effect of governmental control of PASs on the quality of advice, will be in tandem with the ‘third wave’ approach.