The author would like to thank Michael Bauer, Claudio Radaelli, Marylou Hamm, and Kenneth Stiller for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.

Introduction

1The global rise of the populist radical right (PRR) has sparked a wide-ranging debate about its causes and consequences. From the US to India (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013), from Israel to Italy (Lorimer, 2024; Rogenhofer & Panievsky, 2020), a vast body of literature has analyzed the origins and strategies of PRR parties. Additionally, an emerging body of literature has begun to examine the public policy goals and strategies of the PRR when in power (Askim et al., 2022; Bartha et al., 2020). This topic has become increasingly urgent as PRR parties have become more entrenched and PRR governments have become more frequent (Muno & Pfeiffer, 2022). This literature collectively attempts to identify the specific public policy goals and strategies of the PRR in a diverse range of countries and systems, from the local to the national level (Bačlija & Haček, 2012; Barbosa & Casarões, 2022; Bauer & Becker, 2020; Cianetti et al., 2018; Cianetti & Hanley, 2021; Fenger, 2018).

2For better or worse, scholars have had a wide range of cases from which to draw when seeking to understand PRR policymaking and policy goals. Anti-immigration rhetoric has translated into action in many countries, from Orban’s border fence to Trump’s ‘Muslim Ban’, border fence, and the more recent militarization of immigration policy (Banks & Nevitt, 2025; Sagas & Roman, 2020). One distinctive pattern of anti-immigrant rhetoric began in Australia and has led to a similar set of policies: deterrence, detention, and deportation (Rivas et al., 2025). This policy model has since spread to the United States (US) (Ardalan, 2025), the United Kingdom (UK) (Bonansinga & Forrest, 2025), and Italy, where there is a strong policy preference for the offshore processing of asylum applications (De Leo & Celoria, 2024). Anti-LGBTQ+ measures also feature heavily in PRR policies in Poland (Ploszka, 2023), while a mixture of restrictions on abortion and pro-natal policies is common in countries with low birth rates such as in Poland, Hungary, or the US (Cook et al., 2023; Sanders & Jenkins, 2022, 2023). Nationalism, or hyper-nationalism, is also common (Vachudova, 2020), often paired with authoritarianism and a general disdain for constitutional checks and balances, as seen in India, Turkey, or Israel (Rogenhofer & Panievsky, 2020).

3However, these similarities mask some significant differences. Regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Hungary is an outlier in the European Union (EU) (Madlovics & Magyar, 2023), while Poland and Italy fell into line (Barigazzi, 2023). The Law and Justice party in Poland is much closer to the Catholic church, while PRR parties in the US and Brazil are much more aligned with Protestant churches and organizations, particularly Evangelical ones (Barbosa & Casarões, 2022; Chrostowski, 2023; Cremer, 2021). The PRR in Europe tends toward more statist economic policy, while the PRR in Latin America tends toward neoliberal economic policy (Morales Martín et al., 2025; Oellerich & Bohle, 2025). The prevalence of anti-immigrant rhetoric, potential targets, and proposed policy solutions also varies by country (Cervi et al., 2020). While there is always some heterogeneity within any party family, the extent of the variation is surprising.

4Furthermore, PRR governance falls between existing fields in the literature. As PRR governments are not attempting to impose outright autocracies, although democratic backsliding may result (Krekó & Enyedi, 2018; Muno & Pfeiffer, 2022), they fall outside the existing literature on authoritarian diffusion. The literature on democratic backsliding provides ample case specific details and studies on authoritarian diffusion, (Buzogány, 2017; Lankina et al., 2016; Waller, 2023), but offers little insight into the conditions under which PRR parties are able to successfully share ‘best practice’ to fellow PRR governments abroad, or the conditions under which PRR governments can diffuse PRR public policy to non-PRR governments.

5To help elucidate the differences in PRR governance and policymaking, there has been a rise in scholarship addressing such variations from a case-study or comparative perspective (Fenger, 2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). These studies have helped to identify not only common policy platforms but also common policymaking strategies. Specifically, PRR governments have been shown to engage in selective forging, bending, and breaking of liberal norms to achieve their goals while remaining within the trappings of democratic systems (Pirro & Stanley, 2022). However, relatively less attention has directly addressed the issues of diffusion or attempted to answer ‘Galton’s Problem’ in relation to PRR public policy (Braun & Gilardi, 2006), i.e. to understand under what conditions the successes and failures of PRR governments influence policymaking abroad. This is odd, given the increasing scholarly attention paid to the emerging transnational connections between PRR parties and governments and the significant media and scholarly attention on the global trend of democratic backsliding (Bauer, 2024b; Holesch & Kyriazi, 2022; Ramos & Torres, 2020).

6Furthermore, the successes and failures of PRR governments in influencing policy beyond their own countries, as well as the differences in PRR public policy, highlight theoretical and methodological gaps in our understanding of diffusion. The existence of broad, transnational organizations such as the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) challenges our understanding of traditional epistemic communities due to their explicitly ideological character. New PRR international organizations like the Madrid Forum (Foro de Madrid), founded by Vox (a PRR party in Spain) and several Latin American PRR parties, show surprising levels of cooperation among otherwise nativist and authoritarian actors (Rodríguez & Perez, 2025). As such, despite the PRR’s ideological nativism, these parties appear adept at building transnational coalitions, and despite their authoritarianism, they appear increasingly able and willing to cooperate abroad. This creates a research gap around the question of under what conditions does PRR policy diffuse?

Cutting Through a Crowded Field

7Significant conceptual work has already been done to understand the politics and policy preferences of PRR parties and governments. Defining the PRR begins with Mudde’s classic definition of populism as a discursive strategy that divides the body politic into a ‘pure’ people and ‘corrupt’ elites (Mudde, 2004). However, the ‘radical right’ element adds significant ‘thickening’ elements to the ‘thin’ discursive practice approach. In doing so, this ‘thickening’ produces a clearer public policy program including concepts, strategies, and goals which can be diffused (Mikucka-Wójtowicz, 2019; Vranić, 2019). Bonded through their common populism, nativism, and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2013), PRR parties and governments possess an anti-pluralist and, in extreme cases, an almost organicist notion of the body politic (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013). This view is associated with forms of neo-traditionalism and a rejection of modernity (Dajč & Styczyńska, 2023), as well as a “cultural populism emphasizing religious traditionalism, law and order, sovereignty, and painting migrants as enemies” (Rockman, 2019, p. 1549).

8How does this ideology take shape? To begin with the ‘thicker’ elements of their platform, PRR parties will attempt to enact their authoritarian and nativist program once in power. They will do so through the centralization of power and the rejection of liberal principles of governance and administration (Schmidt, 2023). These tendencies have been categorized as an ‘illiberal playbook’ of forging, bending, and breaking, wherein PRR governments forge new norms, bend liberal norms where possible, and finally engage in the outright breaking of existing rules and norms if the other two strategies have not achieved the desired results (Pirro & Stanley, 2022). In their relation to the state, PRR governments centralize decision-making and reject expertise (Bauer & Becker, 2020). They attempt to shut down ministries or agencies, undercut the work of committees, restrict public consultation, and wield public remonstration against recalcitrant bureaucrats as a weapon to cow and shame particular actors or agencies (Bauer, 2024a; Bauer et al., 2021). Thus, PRR governments seek to reduce the role of administration to a tool rather than a participant in governance (Bauer & Becker, 2020).

9Furthermore, PRR nativism seeks to marginalize identified ‘others’, who are constructed as enemies of the culturally ‘authentic’ native population (Betz, 2019). This manifests as reduced rights for identified ‘out’ groups (Blokker, 2024; Schneiker, 2019) and restricted immigration (Prosser & Giorgadze, 2018). From ‘LGBT ideology free zones’ in Poland (Ploszka, 2023) to Trump’s ‘Muslim ban’ (Eroukhmanoff, 2018), PRR governments will attempt to reduce the scope of their identified ‘enemies’ who are constructed as ‘outside’ the authentic people. Who these identified ‘enemies’ are, and the reasons why they must be stopped, varies from case to case. For example, the PRR in the Netherlands and Germany frame anti-Muslim policies as necessary partially to protect the domestic LGBTQ+ community (Dietze & Roth, 2020; Fiers & Muis, 2021), while in other countries the LGBTQ+ community is framed as an ‘other’ which threatens the true ‘people’ (Edenborg, 2018).

10Economic policies follow in this trend, with varied impacts depending on the local or regional ideological opponents and domestic socio-economic conditions. This can result in more statist economic policy, such as government control over the economy, which is required to oppose the constructed ‘other’ and reduce the influence of non-native individuals. In Europe, the PRR often opposes further economic integration in the name of preserving national sovereignty (Oellerich & Bohle, 2025). In Latin America, however, the PRR prefers (neo-)liberalization of the economy, seeking to overturn the protectionism of prior left-wing governments (Morales Martín et al., 2025; Padoan, 2025). The common thread between these two otherwise opposed positions is the emphasis of PRR governments on traditional forms of individual and labor relations and opposition to their constructed ‘other’, whether that ‘other’ is external influences or internal ‘special interests’ (Pühringer & Ötsch, 2018; Tuğal, 2022). As such, while the specific policies may be different, they are all shaped by a combination of shared ideology and domestic socio-economic conditions (Rathgeb, 2024).

11Regarding diffusion, to date the literature on the PRR and diffusion has mostly focused on political diffusion, i.e., the diffusion of ideological or discursive elements from one country to another. Beginning with the seminal work of Rydgren (2005), this scholarship has focused on the creation and diffusion of a ‘master frame’ of the PRR as a key developmental stage in the creation of the PRR party family. Drawing on social movement studies, a ‘master frame’ is an interpretive structure that provides a powerful source of mobilization by ordering otherwise chaotic and difficult to interpret aspects of reality (Aslanidis, 2018; Rovira Kaltwasser & Sandoval, 2024). In the case of the PRR, this ‘frame’ combines “ethnonationalist, cultural racism, and anti-political establishment populism” into a potent connective and mobilizing force (Rydgren, 2005, p. 426). This political diffusion is supported by an extensive, transnational network of PRR epistemic and intellectual actors. These actors work to build a cohesive and unified social movement by driving ideological diffusion and socializing new actors into the norms and beliefs of the PRR (Caiani, 2018, 2025). Such political diffusion, though, is not automatic. Instead, it is a process mediated by repeated translation, as actors perform strategic bricolage when importing and adjusting different elements from abroad (Rydgren, 2005). Indeed, more recent work has highlighted a series of structural and socio-cultural features supporting the diffusion of populism, such as shared levels of economic development or culture (Wiesehomeier et al., 2026).

12To conclude, the literature on the PRR provides several useful insights into the PRR’s policy objectives and hints at ways in which policy diffusion may take place. First, the PRR seeks to confront the ‘corrupt’ elites and provide succour to the ‘good’ people by implementing neo-traditionalist reforms. This leads to a decline in the quality of democracy, if not its formal procedures, by centralizing power and authority in the hands of the leader. The leader will pursue these goals through a strategy of forging, bending, and breaking liberal norms. Second, the literature on PRR political diffusion highlights the contingent nature of diffusion, with PRR actors responding either rationally or socially to external triggers. Third, translation practices address some variation in policy, such as PRR economic policy. Finally, they highlight the importance of the highly networked transnational community. Together, these factors demonstrate that the PRR is open to diffusion and informs our understanding of how PRR policy diffusion may take place. Thus, we now turn to the literature on policy diffusion to identify the conditions under which it may occur.

Policy Diffusion

13At its core, policy diffusion can be understood as “a process in which policymaking and policy outcomes in one polity influence policymaking and policy outcomes in other polities” (Blatter et al., 2022, p. 806). This applies even to illiberal or outright autocratic or authoritarian states, as their policymaking impacts the choices of other states for a variety of reasons (Adams et al., 2022; Debre, 2022; Hall & Ambrosio, 2017; Schmotz & Tansey, 2018). Within this overarching process, there is less conceptual clarity on the exact mechanisms by which diffusion occurs. However, diffusion generally has been identified to work through four main mechanisms: coercion, competition, learning, and emulation (Simmons et al., 2006).

14Coercion occurs when more powerful states or polities exert pressure on weaker states to change or adopt a specific policy. Defined by a dyadic or multilateral asymmetry in relations (Simmons et al., 2006, pp. 790–791), it is a rationalistic mechanism of diffusion that relies on the capacity of both the coercive state and the target state to engage in a form of rational, if coerced, negotiation. Essentially, it requires that the coercing state possesses and employs tools to coerce the target state. Furthermore, while the exact rewards and sanctions can be heterogenous, the target must be capable of being influenced by some rewards or sanctions (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, pp. 309–310). Whether by hook or by crook, there must be some way for the coercive actor(s) to influence the target state to adjust its policies.

15Competition also emphasizes the rationality of actors but focuses instead on when policymakers adjust policies in response to changes in countries with which they are in economic competition. The proverbial ‘race to the bottom’ in taxation is often given as the classic example (Cao, 2010; Gilardi, 2016), in which actors adjust policies in line with neighbors or economic competitors to gain market advantages by rationally evaluating market signals (Marsh & Sharman, 2009; Meseguer, 2005). States compete with one another for advantage and read signals from the market through investment decisions or interest rates and adjust policies accordingly. This, again, requires rationality, as states read the signals of the market and rationally evaluate them as well as evaluating the potential policy changes necessary to compete successfully against their competitors (Dobbin et al., 2007). In this mechanism, the boundary condition of an economic competitor is important, as countries that cannot compete with one another, produce different goods, or do not seek the same types of investments are not expected to adjust their policies in response to competition.

16Learning as a mechanism of diffusion is a bit more complicated due to the extreme heterogeneity of studies on learning in the social sciences (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2013). However, it can be broken down into two sub-mechanisms: rationalistic and sociological. Insofar as learning is outcome oriented, it can be conceived as a rational process in which policymakers identify solutions to specific policy problems. In this mechanism, policy diffusion is linked inextricably with policy success or failure (Braun & Gilardi, 2006, pp. 306–308; Meseguer, 2005; Simmons et al., 2006, pp. 798–799) as policymakers will not adopt failed policies. Of course, how they identify and judge the ‘success’ of different policies varies as they operate under conditions of limited time and information. As such, they can be considered as boundedly rational actors who will sometimes adopt broad policy templates as they ‘satisfice’ rather than optimize their policy choices (Simon, 1956; Weyland, 2009).

17Alternatively, sociological learning operates on the logic of appropriateness rather than rational choice calculation. This assumes that, like rationalist approaches, policymakers attempt to understand the world, but their triggers and impulses are not solely rationalistic; they can also result from socialization and subsequent changes in beliefs and norms (Dunlop & Radaelli, 2018). In this sense, policymakers are open to persuasion, emotive arguments, and discourse. Through interaction with other policymakers, they change their assumptions about the appropriateness of a given policy.

18Finally, emulation occurs when states mimic the policies of others to better align with global norms. This is driven by purely sociological considerations: policies become more ‘normal’ as they diffuse and other actors adopt them (Wasserfallen, 2018, p. 624). Linked as it is with constructivist understandings of the social, emulation operates solely on the logic of appropriateness. Much research has focused on international interactions as drivers of emulation, with international organizations or transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as key norm entrepreneurs in fostering or promoting these policies. However, the exact underlying processes of emulation are poorly understood, and studies examining emulation are heterogeneous in their understanding of the causes and characteristics of emulation (Gilardi & Wasserfallen, 2019).

19Beyond these four mechanisms, a series of additional factors supporting or constraining diffusion have been identified. These factors are cross-cutting as most are considered enabling or constraining conditions for more than one mechanism of policy diffusion. Generally, they fall into two categories, internal and external, and have been found to strongly correlate with one or more of the mechanisms of diffusion (Maggetti & Gilardi, 2016). Internal factors are considered probability maximizers that support the likelihood of diffusion but are not sufficient conditions on their own. Examples include history, culture, informal practices, and constitutional and institutional design (Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; Kammerer & Namhata, 2018; Mesarovich, 2025). Each factor impacts the likelihood of diffusion in different ways, depending on the mechanism. Shared culture, for example, makes emulation more likely as beliefs about what is ‘appropriate’ are heavily impacted by existing cultural norms.

20Externally, geographical proximity or membership in a regional organization have also been found to influence diffusion. Such closeness allows for better sharing of information (in rationalist mechanisms) and increases the likelihood of contact for normative diffusion (in sociological mechanisms) (Gilardi, 2005, pp. 87–88; Mikucka-Wójtowicz & Wojnicki, 2021). For example, shared membership in a regional organization facilitates access to information on (un-)successful policy changes in other states and provides repeated contact between policymakers, fostering a shared understanding of the appropriateness of certain public policies.

The Populist Radical Right and Policy Diffusion

21While we have a good understanding of the policy goals and strategies of the PRR and ample literature on the four mechanisms of diffusion, the interaction between these two strands is less clear. Specifically, which mechanisms can be appropriate for the diffusion of PRR policy, and under what conditions can we expect such diffusion to occur? Furthermore, what gaps remain that require further theoretical refinement to understand the interaction between the PRR and policy diffusion?

Populist Radical Right Coercion

22Coercion in support of PRR diffusion is expected to operate under the same conditions as ‘normal’ policymaking. With the rise of PRR governments in more powerful states, there is already emerging evidence of PRR governments using their economic or military might to incentivize or enforce policy changes in target states. Trump’s ‘Remain in Mexico’ immigration policy during his first term and his decision to force Colombia to accept return flights of migrants, both of which were enforced under the threat of tariffs, highlight the willingness of PRR governments to use threats to force policy changes in selected states (Rueda et al., 2025; Sagas & Roman, 2020). The increasing willingness of the Trump administration to use the US relative economic heft, direct military threats, or the US pre-eminent security and military position within the liberal international order to advance various policy priorities highlights the continued relevance of coercion as a mechanism of policy diffusion (Brands, 2025; Keohane & Nye, 2025; Nelson, 2025). Indeed, although the ultimate goals of Trump’s Venezuela policy remain unclear, his willingness to use force to kidnap Nicolas Maduro and his insistence on determining the future of the Venezuelan oil industry provide a vivid example of the capacities of powerful PRR states to use coercion to enforce policy change (Yeung, 2026).

23What is less understood are the factors that would support or block such an attempt at coercive diffusion. Although the US has been somewhat successful in using coercive methods against neighbors and allies under Trump, it has been relatively unsuccessful in enforcing policy change in countries like China and India (Shukla & Kumar, 2025). Thus, while there are clearly some conditions under which strong PRR governments can use coercion as a mechanism, the tipping points that enable coercion remain unclear. How much leverage must a PRR state possess to enforce coercion? Does it depend on the specific policy in question? Which domestic and international factors enable or constrain coercion? As the liberal international order continues to weaken, understanding the types of policies pursued by coercion and the conditions under which states may opt for coercion is becoming increasingly necessary.

Populist Radical Right Competition

24Alternatively, when considering the PRR, it is expected that competition will not function. Of course, PRR politicians need some level of economic growth but their electoral platform is based less on delivering growth than on a continuous battle against the constructed ‘other’ (Sata, 2023). Indeed, the goal of PRR parties “is not economic, but social: to restore a broken sense of pride and social cohesion by retrieving a structure of meaning in peoples’ work biography, by narrating it as intact and worthy according to the moral parameters of market society” (Hilmar, 2023, p. 291). Thus, there is much less scope for competition between PRR governments and other states of similar economic development, which significantly hampers competition as a mechanism of diffusion. This is not to say that PRR governments do not have economic policies (Johnson & Barnes, 2015) as they obviously have them, nor that PRR experimentation has no boundaries. The UK, under Conservative Prime Minister Liz Truss, and Trump both experienced sharp economic shocks which caused them to severely restrict their economic policymaking and return to market orthodoxy (Bolden, 2022; Ramaswamy & Garrison, 2025). However, within these boundaries the PRR’s essential motivations are ideological and not technocratic, pursuing economic policies designed for their chosen domestic audience rather than listening to market signals (Rathgeb, 2024).

Populist Radical Right Learning

25Turning to learning, PRR actors have begun to develop networks similar to those of other political actors. These networks both support and constrain learning. The PRR's distrust of ‘experts’ as representatives of, if not members of, the liberal ‘elite’ the parties are fighting against reduces their links with the ‘traditional’ epistemic community (Crease, 2023; Meyer, 2024). However, as the PRR has become increasingly ‘mainstream’ there has been a proliferation of alternative networks that interact with and support PRR parties and regimes (Bešlin et al., 2020; Chiru & Wunsch, 2023). These networks create a transnational PRR epistemic community (De Graaff & Van Apeldoorn, 2021; Moffitt, 2017; Ramos & Torres, 2020). Thus, PRR regimes are expected to learn as a mechanism of policy diffusion, though with subtle differences due to their receptiveness (or not) to external knowledge.

26As stated above, rationalistic learning assumes that policymakers are goal- and outcome- oriented, a concept that would also apply to PRR regimes. PRR policymakers can learn from other successful attempts to implement their policies (Glasius et al., 2020), achieve ‘executive aggrandisement’ (Bermeo, 2016), subvert constitutional structures (Blokker, 2019, 2024), and implement them within their own states (Bauer & Becker, 2020). The successes of a sister party or the successful implementation of policies that may serve PRR policy goals provide useful lessons, regardless of the actual content of the success (Van Hauwaert, 2014).

27However, this may function but on subtly different lines from more traditional versions of rationalist policy learning as PRR conceptions of a ‘successful’ policy may differ from that assumed by the literature. As populists draw legitimacy from ‘the people’, the criteria for ‘success’ refer to the electoral success of such a policy or to the way in which it aligns with the political goals of the party (Muno & Pfeiffer, 2022). Attempts to centralize power in the executive, alter the structure of the domestic bureaucracy, or subvert democracy could be conceived of as ‘successful’ and, so, support learning (Bauer & Becker, 2020). While this does not necessarily change the applicability of the rationalistic learning mechanism, it does limit the relevance of traditional, materialistic policies which are usually identified as cases of rationalist policy diffusion (Kishishita & Yamagishi, 2021).

28For example, this rationalist learning process may help explain observed patterns in the evolution of PRR policy programs. While a core illiberal playbook of forging, bending, and breaking liberal norms of governance has been identified among PRR governments (Pirro & Stanley, 2022), this approach is based in part on the adoption of otherwise successful and perfectly liberal policies. PRR governments have become adept at combining such policies from other locales in new ways to pursue greater authoritarian control (Baldini, 2024), creating a policy mixture in which the whole is greater than the sum of its individual parts. Thus, PRR governments may also learn from the policy successes and failures of governments of diverse regime types.

29PRR policymakers are subject to the same cognitive constraints as other policymakers and, as such, are subject to the same heuristics. As Weyland (2009) identified, the heuristics of availability, representativeness, and anchoring may explain differentiated clustering patterns, as actors are more susceptible to adopting regional successes than importing distant models. Thus, local breakthroughs by, such as those of the Front National in France or Bolsonaro in Brazil, subsequently shape the policy mixes of nearby countries more than those in other regions. Just as the success of Brazil’s ‘developmental dictatorship’ in the 1960s created a useful template for adoption by other reactionary regional movements seeking to contain communism, the availability of local templates can create distinct clustering patterns in PRR policy learning. Indeed, local actors draw on regional success cases due to the availability of information and the importance of inferential heuristics, which lead them to over-prioritize such local information (Weyland, 2019). This does not preclude learning from more distant regions, but it may also explain the clustering patterns seen in some PRR policies, in addition to domestic socio-economic conditions (Rathgeb, 2024).

30Rationalist learning can also help explain the diffusion of ‘foreign agent laws’ and anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in the post-Soviet space. After Russia initially formulated two laws, one requiring all organizations receiving foreign funding to register as ‘foreign agents’ and another banning any challenge to ‘traditional sexual relations’, such laws slowly proliferated in nearby countries in subsequent years. While some countries already had far more extensive legislation in place, others used the Russian legislation as templates (Shyrokykh & Winzen, 2025). In Georgia, for example, the ruling Georgian Dream party adopted their own ‘foreign agents law’ to contain the risk of anti-government protests. However, they attempted to frame it in a way that would not conflict with the country’s stated pro-EU aspirations (Tabatadze, 2026). As in the cases examined by Weyland, this is an example of successful learning, as politicians drew on successful regional cases due to the availability heuristic while modifying them to fit local conditions.

31Whether or not these policy changes are representative of deeper sociological learning is a separate question. Such learning is indeed possible, albeit with slight differences from ‘normal’ sociological learning. As the PRR portrays itself as representing the ‘people’ against the ‘elites’, the usual factors of horizontal sociological learning, such as contact with epistemic communities, are subtly altered. Traditional performances of epistemic legitimacy and authority are rejected for not aligning with a populist epistemology (Ylä-Anttila, 2018), or because of the assertion that the people have “had enough of experts” (Clarke & Newman, 2017).

32That being said, there are still conditions under which sociological learning may take place. The growing PRR epistemic community serves an essential role in socializing PRR actors into the shared beliefs which make up the ‘master frame’ (Caiani, 2018; Rovira Kaltwasser & Sandoval, 2024). Although these networks differ widely from the traditional epistemic communities or communities of practice that drive socialization, they appear to effectively support socialization within specific ideological spaces. Events like CPAC (Sanders & Jenkins, 2023), although clearly ideological and lacking traditional forms of epistemic performance, have proven to be durable summits for the global PRR (Sanders & Jenkins, 2023; Stoeckl, 2020). Indeed, the broad reach of groups such as the Heritage Foundation in the US, the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Hungary (Mathias Corvinus Collegium, 2025), or the World Congress of Families (Stoeckl, 2020), helps drive socialization by engaging in shared rituals and developing personal connections.

33For example, US-Salvadorian relations have significantly improved since Nayib Bukele, the president of El Salvador, was invited to speak at CPAC 2024. While there, he received a standing ovation from attendees for his heavy-handed anti-gang policies (Del Real & Menjívar, 2024). Subsequently, the US began sending individuals to El Salvadorian prisons, often without trial or even formal arrest. This grimly mimics the very policies Bukele has implemented at home, providing significant legitimacy and support to the Bukele regime (Cuéllar, 2025).

34Across both sub-mechanisms, a variety of factors can enable learning that may operate similarly in other contexts. Most importantly, the existence of a robust epistemic community drives learning in both rationalist and sociological environments by providing policy advice and socializing policymakers into new norms. However, in the PRR context, the epistemic community must operate within an authoritarian and nativist policy environment which does not preclude its functioning, per se, but does create unique challenges. Under what conditions can it successfully translate policy to an inherently nativist policymaking audience? How does the community reproduce epistemic legitimacy within a community with a radical populist epistemology (Ylä-Anttila, 2018) hostile to traditional, elite forms of expertise? Under what conditions do community networks form that bridge the gap between competing authoritarian claims? Further research is needed to understand how factors such as shared culture or membership in regional or international organizations can support PRR learning. This research should also address more traditional boundary conditions for successful learning, such as state capacity and regime type (Börzel & Risse, 2022).

Populist Radical Right Emulation

35Emulation occurs under conditions of international socialization, which assumes that policymakers align their policies with norms based on the logic of appropriateness. When it comes to the PRR, this should remain unaffected, even concerning the structural conditions for successful diffusion. The emerging transnational PRR epistemic community can support PRR policy diffusion to other PRR governments by emulating ‘appropriate’ policies (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2019; Newth & Scopelliti, 2025). This produces alignment around normative conceptions and projects, such as ‘far-right civilizationism’ (Stewart, 2020). Repeated and continuous interaction through the developing network of PRR activists and NGOs provides significant scope for socialization to occur (Ramos & Torres, 2020). Thus, ideological affinity, one of the structural enabling conditions of emulation as a mechanism (Grossback et al., 2004), would continue to play an essential role in this regard.

36The list of factors supporting emulation are also unlikely to change for PRR emulation. Shared cultural affinity should enable PRR emulation, as a common language, history, or narrative eases diffusion. Likewise, shared participation in international organizations should facilitate emulation (Bashirov et al., 2026). However, even here there are interesting questions. Bounded by PRR nativism, shared culture may only support emulation to a certain extent depending on how culture is defined within a given context or policy. Some policies, such as migration or pro-natalist policy, may diffuse through emulation but others, such as abortion restrictions, may instead be bounded by differences in cultures and experiences. The European PRR, for example, shares significant cultural overlap due to their common Judeo-Christian heritage, yet differ greatly in their attitudes towards issues such as abortion or LGBTQ+ rights (Chrostowski, 2023; Spierings, 2021). Furthermore, shared histories may also be interpreted differently, as different PRR governments emphasize different periods in national history, which shapes the possibilities of emulation. Poland and Hungary, for example, took wildly different approaches toward Russia after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as PRR governments in both countries emphasized different elements of historical experience and cultural similarity (Holesch & Zagórski, 2023; Kopper et al., 2023; Özoflu & Arató, 2023).

37Although PRR emulation is most apparent in the political sphere rather than in policy alone (Van Hauwaert, 2019), the example of anti-gender policy is instructive here. While the historical roots are obviously quite deep, the contemporary anti-gender movement draws discursively from the development of the ‘gender ideology’ frame, which emerged in the 1990s. An extensive transnational network of actors, including religious groups and NGOs, has driven the adoption and diffusion of this frame to legitimize neo-traditional gender and family policy (Mos, 2025; Paternotte & Kuhar, 2018; Vaggione, 2020). Groups like Ordo Iuris in Poland play a key role in importing external policy frames and supporting anti-gender and anti-abortion groups regionally (Desperak, 2023; Kocemba & Stambulski, 2024). These changes have helped drive policy changes as PRR regimes draw on this alternative discourse to promote a return to ‘traditional’ family values. This is evident in changes ranging from tax codes designed to raise the birth rate to the establishment of ‘LGBT ideology free zones’ (Ploszka, 2023).

What is to be Done?

38The available literature provides a preliminary framework for analyzing PRR diffusion within the bounds of the literature on policy diffusion. However, further research is needed to understand the interactions between the PRR’s ideological disposition and existing policy diffusion literature. Essentially, scholarship is confronted with the question of why the PRR, despite its authoritarianism, nativism, and populism, has diffused.

39This occurred due to a combination of structural and ideational factors. First, PRR regimes remain bounded by the same structural constraints on policymaking. They participate in international society, in novel ways perhaps, but they still participate. PRR leaders are also subject to the same bounded rationality constraints as other actors, thus their processes of learning are as influenced by heuristics and issues of attention and information processing as other leaders. Intriguingly, PRR governments appear, at least in the case of Trump, to be more willing to use coercion as an instrument of policy diffusion, which may present scholars with many new examples to analyze in the coming years.

40Furthermore, the existence of a large and expanding transnational PRR epistemic community also supports PRR learning. Whether through rationalist models, by providing information on successful policies, or by driving socialization through interaction, this PRR epistemic community certainly exists and has an impact. As the number of PRR regimes increases, the exact variation and impact of this community will become more apparent. For now, studies on its political, if not yet policy, effects are substantial (Ramos & Torres, 2020; Rovira Kaltwasser & Sandoval, 2024; Van Hauwaert, 2014).

41To fully understand the ways in which the PRR intersects with policy diffusion, a new research program will be necessary. A good place to start would be to categorize PRR policy preferences. While existing databases on related topics, such as party manifestos, levels/quality of democracy, freedom of the press, and citizenship laws, provide a good starting point, bringing these insights together into a centralized database on PRR policy changes would be a very useful first step. Just as The PopuList identifies populist parties (Rooduijn et al., 2023), not just PRR but all varieties, a database on PRR policy changes would create a common reference point for codifying and classifying policy changes, bringing coherence to the field. Building on this database, a diverse range of approaches can be taken to test the applicability of existing diffusion mechanisms and supportive factors.

42Drawing from the existing literature, a number of classic studies could be repeated with PRR public policy to determine the operability of existing diffusion conditions in these novel conditions. For example, the work of Simmons and Elkins (2004) on the diffusion of liberalized economic policy could be repeated in reverse by tracing the diffusion of PRR policy in response to changing rational or social pressures from PRR governments. Similarly, Weyland’s (2009) work on the diffusion of pension and healthcare reform in Latin America offers ways forward in terms of incorporating a more diverse range of social policies with diffusion studies (Meseguer & Gilardi, 2009). This work could be adapted to analyze the diffusion of PRR pro-natalist policies or, could form the basis of a study on the relationship between the PRR and labor rights in different regional, national, or social contexts.

43An interesting avenue, though, is the emergent literature on the developing transnational PRR epistemic community. Although still in its early stages, this research has already identified significant transnational communities that assist in the creation and diffusion of PRR public policy (Buzogány & Varga, 2023; Ramos & Torres, 2020; Senninger et al., 2022). These networks are a good place to start understanding PRR learning from both rationalist and sociological perspectives, as well as PRR emulation. Building on classic approaches to networked diffusion and epistemic communities (Haas, 1992; Stone, 1999, 2004; Stone et al., 2020), multi-methods research approaches involving multiple types of data collection and analysis will be necessary to answer the range of research questions about the creation, operation, and impact of such PRR networks on learning and emulation..

44The first step will be to create a database of the PRR epistemic community to identify the bounds of such a network and map it onto either a novel or existing database of policy changes. Then, quantitative social network analyses can be performed to identify the factors that support PRR learning or emulation, as well as those that may be correlated with supporting or constraining distinct types of PRR policy. These analyses should be supported by in-depth qualitative research, such as interviews with policymakers and network participants, to understand the conditions under which PRR networks can successfully influence policymaking at the micro-level. Ethnographic fieldwork can be used to identify the practices that contribute to the overall performance of PRR epistemic legitimacy, enabling diffusion within the novel intellectual space of the radical populist epistemology (Bulli, 2022; Pied, 2019). Digital ethnography can also help us to understand how digital networks successfully repackage and translate policies for new contexts, enabling the rapid transmission of information to support learning in a diverse range of contexts (Heft et al., 2021; Lindquist, 2021).

45There is obviously scope for refining and advancing theories and methods of studying policy diffusion through the study of the PRR. For example, panel experiments could isolate the impact of factors such as ideology on policymakers’ receptiveness. This would help us understand how variation in ideology and messaging makes different types of policies more appealing (or better translatable) to different contexts (Butler et al., 2017). It will also be imperative to understand the conditions under which PRR regimes are receptive to diffusion from ideologically diverse actors, perhaps through avenues of authoritarian learning (Hall & Ambrosio, 2017). Understanding such unusual cases of policy ‘travel’ will help refine our understanding of policy diffusion as well as the PRR (Stark & van der Arend, 2024).

46Thus, while questions remain, I argue that the contours of a specific research agenda exist to address the questions posed here. By building on the disparate research conducted by these two divergent fields of research, significant scope exists to combine their insights and advance scholarship in both areas. As the PRR continues to institutionalize and experiment with policymaking, it is imperative that we continue to develop our scholarly understanding of the conditions under which such efforts can spread to new contexts.