1The conflict in Northern Ireland, which lasted from 1969 to 1998, has been defined as protracted or intractable (Ruane and Todd 2012) and, over that period, scholars have been striving to find a suitable interpretation to explain it. Yet, its manifold interpretations led some academics to conclude that “there is a meta-conflict about what the conflict is about” (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 1) or that “there is no such single Northern Ireland problem, easily characterised and classified, as a set of interlocked and confused problems” (Dunn 1995: 7). In an essay published in 1995, John Darby claimed that the conflict was based on six interrelated issues among which the future constitutional position of Northern Ireland stood out (i.e. remaining within the UK, a united Ireland or independence). The other problems concerned social and economic inequalities between the so-called “Catholic-Nationalist-Republican” and “Protestant-Unionist-Loyalist” communities, as well as the question of their cultural identities and the relationships between each other. Finally the on-going violence and the problem of security was of importance. Concerning the constitutional issue, as early as 1974, the British government that had been administrating the statelet through Direct Rule since 1972, attempted to restore a devolved power which had been in place since 1921 when the six-county territory was created. By the early 1990s the seven attempts had all failed (Darby 1995). Reforms were also introduced in the fields of housing (Housing reading list), employment (Education reading list) and education (Smith 1999), which gave mixed results. A cross-community cooperation programme was launched under the terms of “community relations,” notably in the mid-1980s (Carmichael and Hughes 1998). At the same time, political parties and paramilitary groups were gradually changing their perspectives on the conflict. They also formed new alliances, often through secret talks that also took place with the British and Irish governments. In the early 1990s the protagonists in the conflict realised that violence would not resolve their disagreements on communal identity, politics and the future constitutional status of the province. In 1998, an agreement was reached to gradually put an end to violence and devise power-sharing institutions that would suit each party. The Belfast Agreement of 1998 was ratified by a majority of the population both in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. However, the devolved assembly and government collapsed after clashes between political parties and were only reestablished in 2008. This chaotic road to a “relative peace” is due to the work of both internal and external actors.

3However, many examples of external third parties’ experience have been drawn from the elite level according to John-Paul Lederach’s model of peace-building (Lederach 1997). The function of middle-ground people in peace processes is favoured in his model as they have the capacity to influence and link the elite and grassroots levels. Other theorists such as Joseph Montville (1986) have called this middle ground “Track-Two diplomacy” which involves professional, non-governmental practitioners and theorists usually drawn from NGOs and academia. Paul Arthur wrote about his experience in this type of diplomacy and defined it as follows:

Track-Two diplomacy comes […] in the interstices between “high politics” (strategy steered by politicians and officials) and “low politics” (the adaptation of civil society). It seeks to promote an environment in a political community, through the education of public opinion, that would make it safer for public opinion to take risks for peace. (Arthur 2009: 20)

4It is an unofficial process that has positive effects on the formal political negotiations, with meetings usually held outside the country with no media attention. And yet, the examples he gives tend to concentrate on meetings between representatives of political parties and his descriptions are mainly concerned with technical considerations. For instance, he explains the need to find “sufficient concerns” between the opposing groups, the significance of setting up special committees on highly politicized issues, or the methodology used to enable each side to tell their story and learn from different contexts. These unofficial talks tend to encourage trust among politicians while official negotiations are being scrutinized by the media putting much pressure on the actors to deliver a settlement.

5All these examples of mediations, either at the elite or the middle-ground level, tend to portray professionals from outside the country where the conflict is happening. This paper wishes to look at the itinerary and personal experience of Brandon Hamber, a South African-born academic who settled in Northern Ireland in the early 1990s and who has been involved in shaping the debate on dealing with the past. After working with several community groups and government bodies involved in the peace process he is now Director of the International Conflict Research Institute (INCORE) at the University of Ulster. His position as a middle-ground practitioner and both an outsider and insider in the Northern Irish context is an interesting example of how the process of shaping policies and of transferring models across various contexts can be facilitated or hindered.

Lesson Drawing and Policy Transfer

7The specific context of the research was that of two transitional societies in which the authors were considering whether lessons could be transferred cross-culturally and cross-contextually. They pointed out that the term “transitional societies” in itself posed a problem as it was not easily defined. According to them, it is a complex political and socially constructed term in contexts that are marked by uncertainty and social instability, in which research by academics could act as a stabilizing force and provide objective conceptual clarity and direction. In turn the context itself shaped the way research would be used and transferred, and the process depended on the complex relationship between researchers and policymakers.

Brandon Hamber’s Position

10Within the different layers of people’s involvement at cross-national level, Brandon Hamber describes himself as a man from the middle ground (Interview Hamber 2014). In South Africa he worked in and about the process of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission between 1995 and 2003. At that period he worked for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) in Johannesburg (1995–2001). He continued to do research and to work on the ground around the issue of dealing with the past in Northern Ireland and at the international level. His experience and training as a psychodynamic psychotherapist, using concepts borrowed from Melanie Klein and Donald Winnicott, have influenced his theory and practice. He qualifies his experience as being that of “an observer, a participant, a researcher, an activist and an action researcher” (Hamber 2009: 5). His attitude to knowledge is about “the importance of uncovering the process of knowledge generation in order to understand what is revealed through it […]. The construction of knowledge resides not in individuals but in the relations between individuals” (Hamber 2009: 3). Hence the importance of his intellectual and practical involvement in the settings where he lived and worked, and the people he was in contact with when he tried to influence policymaking.

A Favourable Context for Lesson Drawing

• 7 http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/about/ (accessed on 8 October 2014).

Combining research, education and comparative analysis, INCORE addresses the causes and consequences of conflict in Northern Ireland and internationally and promotes conflict resolution management strategies. It aims to influence policymakers and practitioners involved in peace, conflict and reconciliation issues while enhancing the nature of international conflict research.7

14Nowadays, the voluntary sector is still involved in exchanges with other countries and so are politicians (Mourlon 2012). The early aftermath of the Belfast Agreement seemed conducive to an open debate on how to move away from a divided violent society, which includes finding mechanisms to deal with the past.

Brandon Hamber and Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland

15With his experience with the South African transitional society, Brandon Hamber knew that the issue of how to deal with the past would come to the fore. But when he first raised the question in his publication Past Imperfect (Hamber 1999), he was met with very negative and hostile reactions: “people thought I was strange even to ask the question” (Interview Hamber 2014). In fact addressing this issue was difficult and potentially divisive as the negotiations on the peace process were still fragile. Politicians were more concerned about constitutional and institutional arrangements in the province and the problems around the release of political prisoners, the reform of the police force and the justice system.

16Brandon Hamber once again raised the issue when he joined Healing Through Remembering (HTR) in 2001 as a consultant. Together with Kate Turner, they facilitated early discussions within the organisation. He recalls that during the first meeting, participants from different communities did not want to stay in the same room and the atmosphere was tense and aggressive: “Why do you want to talk about dealing with the past. We’re not ready for that” was the typical reaction he got.

17His idea was to keep participants talking and debating through their commitment to a set number of meetings and to the idea that they did not need to agree. These initial meetings led HTR to conduct the first large-scale consultation on the topic, with the first HTR report published in 2002 analysing the pros and cons of devising and implementing mechanisms to address the violent past. They found out that views were divided on how to examine the past:

Many of the submissions endorsed the value of remembering and spoke of the importance of finding ways to move society forward. At the same time, others expressed their concerns about the potential pitfalls of remembering. Clearly, the idea of remembering also evoked an emotive response, suggesting that much hurt and unresolved pain is still present. (HTR 2002: v)

18They made six recommendations for the future, including putting in place a storytelling process, fixing a Day of Reflection, creating a living memorial museum, ensuring that the protagonists in the conflict acknowledged their responsibility.

There is no single treatment for the healing process. Processes of remembering, reflecting, informing and educating must be sustained for another generation at least. All have a part to play in dealing with the memories of the past. This will be a painful and difficult task, however it should not paralyse us and prevent us from moving on, but encourage us to avoid further damage, seek solutions and create a better future. (HTR 2002: introduction vii)

19In his everyday practice one way of going round contentious issues lay in the use of a particular method that Brandon Hamber coined as “talking about issues in a surrogate way”:

If you talk about policies developed elsewhere, people will gradually talk about their own country as the attention is initially diverted on something else and not on the bone of contention. (Interview Hamber 2014)

21Interestingly enough, another South African-born academic at Queen’s University, Professor Adrian Guelke, was wrongly suspected of having connections with the Republican movement in the 1990s. He has written both about Northern Ireland in a comparative perspective with South Africa and on the Apartheid regime and has always been opposed to republican violence during the Troubles. However, on 4 September 1991 he was the victim of an attempted murder carried out by a UDA gunman. The attack was organised by the South African Defence Forces’ intelligence branch which had used a doctored RUC intelligence report claiming that Guelke had links with the IRA and the ANC. The document had in fact been falsified by Leon Flores, a South African agent who wanted to set Guelke up (McDonald 2004).

22In this context, Hamber’s involvement in the debate on how to deal with the past was met with resistance and gave mixed results. Seven years ago, reluctance towards him was still tangible when he was interviewed by the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in 2008. At that time criticism was based on the fact that he was perceived as being part of an intellectual elite:

Dr Hamber: […] One of the biggest challenges within the process of dealing with the past is that you have a whole range of people with a whole range of different needs, so it is very difficult to do one thing that would meet all of those needs. […] When I talk about the issue of acknowledgment, I mean it as a wider, social and political process of people engaging in the past and saying, “Yes, there is something that we need to acknowledge in relation to the way that it happened,” whether that is acts of omission or commission. It is a much wider level I am talking about at a political level.
Q274 Kate Hoey: Are you sure it is not just academics and well meaning people thinking this is what people want when maybe it is not?
Q282 Chairman: You have come to Northern Ireland, you have set up this organisation and are acting as our tutor in these matters, surely you have a view.
Q288 Mr Hepburn: There are a lot of Sir Kenneths about and, with all respect, Dr Hamber, academics who are telling working class people in the Falls Road and Shankill Road what they need. Can you tell me why you think that your way out is what these people actually need? (House of Commons 2008)

This book does not prescribe a single method that should be used for dealing with the past. It is postulated that the debate should not be whether Northern Ireland should have a South African style truth commission or not, but rather, what strategy (or strategies) NI should be considering for dealing with the past. (Hamber 1998: 2)

One criticism I would have of the South African approach was an over-reliance on stressing that the South African TRC as the primary mechanism for dealing with the past, when clearly a range of mechanisms were going to be necessary over a long period of time. (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 2004–05)

24So being an outsider associated with the South-African model somewhat hindered his influence that took twelve years to be eventually seen as legitimate. Although re-examining the past is still a contentious issue that divides political parties in power, Brandon Hamber and the voluntary sector were influential in fostering debate at the elite level. Some mechanisms in spite of being piecemeal have been put in place. At least two official consultations were organised on the subject by the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee in the House of Commons in 2005 and by the Consultative Group on the Past in 2009 (CGP 2009). The British government set up Public Inquiries into past violence, the most mediatised of which being the Saville Inquiry into the events of Bloody Sunday. Within the new police service, two bodies were charged with re-examining unsolved deaths: the Historical Enquiry Team and the Office of the Police Ombudsman. The fate of the “Disappeared,” people from the Catholic/Nationalist community who had been murdered by the IRA or INLA, is being addressed by the Commission for the Location of Victims’ Remains. These investigative bodies are complemented by other judicial procedures such as Coroner’s Inquests and Civil cases (Mourlon 2012). The lack of agreement on how to proceed with an overarching and coordinated body that would deal with past violent event explains this multiplication of bodies and commissions.

25This issue is an integral part of the reconciliation process that has been on the agenda in government policy documents and in the successive European Peace Programmes.

Reconciliation

26The fact that reconciliation, as an outcome of the peace process, is an ill-defined concept and practical tool has been analysed. It has been seen as being imposed by official policy papers emanating from the government and the European Union. Among others, Brandon Hamber and Grainne Kelly revealed that the term used in the Belfast Agreement and given priority in the European Peace II programme was loosely defined (Kelly and Hamber 2005, Hamber and Kelly 2005, Harvey 2003). They proceeded with a consultation of stakeholders in Northern Ireland and came up with the following working definition of reconciliation:

Developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society
Acknowledging and dealing with the past
Building positive relationships
Significant cultural and attitudinal 
change
Substantial social, economic and political change. (Hamber and Kelly 2005: 36–40)

27This definition coincided with the period when Brandon Hamber had expressed criticism at the way Peace II was measuring “Peace and Reconciliation.” It provides an example of how researchers can influence policy.

29This involvement of researchers with the process of policy making illustrates how it can be shaped by “chance meeting” and how it is often modified to suit a particular agenda, without taking into account the genuine result of the researcher’s conceptual approach. Even if Brandon Hamber did not succeed in entirely modelling policy through his own definition, he was able to influence it and to have it accepted within the political discourse, either in policy documents or within political parties. For instance, Sinn Fein only adopted the term recently.

Conclusion

30The personal experience of Brandon Hamber reveals the difficulty of shaping policy in a divided post-conflict society, from the point of view of an insider-outsider. In societies coming out of violence and divisions, governments and the voluntary organisations tend to look at other possible models to resolve conflict. However well-established peacebuilding theories are, processes on the ground reveal resistance to the transfer of lessons from abroad and the need for adaptation. Brandon Hamber, having been involved in two transitional societies, provides a good example of the difficulties of cultural and policy transfer. However his very position at the heart of policymaking explains his achievements in influencing the debate on dealing with the past and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. As a member of an NGO he had worked for the South African TRC which in his own words had “sucked in most people from the voluntary sector.” He then realised the importance of this sector and his main achievement in Northern Ireland has been to “engage in processes and maintain a civil society presence in the debate about dealing with the past.” He realised that this issue was a long-term and chaotic process and that reconciliation was about living with unresolved issues, i.e. learning to live with paradoxes. Keeping momentum on these issues has been his main accomplishment in Northern Ireland.