The Enemy, the Unwilling Guest and the Jaguar Host
An Amazonian Story

L'ennemi, l'invité indésirable et l'hôte Jaguar : une histoire amazonienne

Luiz Costa et Carlos Fausto
In an article that renews the anthropological study of hospitality, Matei Candea and Giovanni Da Col (2012) propose a thought experiment. They ask us to « imagine what anthropology might look like today if Marcel Mauss had chosen hospitality rather than the gift as the subject of his 1924 treatise » (2012 : S1). In the same volume, Andrew Shryock affirms that, « for ethnographers interested in cultural comparison, the telling feature of canonical research on hospitality is the ease with which its practitioners move from local to transregional frames of analysis » (2012 : S22). Accordingly, as Amazonianists, we must ask whether « hospitality » can serve as a heuristic device in the study of Amazonian indigenous peoples. Is it so easy to carry the concept across the Atlantic Ocean?

There are, no doubt, many events of hospitality and hosting in the region that could be fruitfully described and analysed. After all, as Shryock writes, hospitality is « a shared language of human interaction » (Ibid.). However, despite its possible universality, hospitality has a particularly low level of ethnographic and theoretical yield in Amazonia. It is neither a local idiom explored by indigenous people, nor an abstract sociocosmic operator crosslinking different scales and domains. We thus gain little in replacing other relational forms – such as exchange and predation – for hospitality,
unless we construe the latter in a more abstract form; in which case it could be analysed as « an alternating asymmetry » (Humphrey 2012: S73), combining asymmetry and reciprocity. The kernel of the issue, however, lies elsewhere: hospitality is too closely connected with the twin concepts of sovereignty and domestication. And this, as we intend to show, precludes its acclimatisation to Amazonia.

Hospitality as an anthropological concept was forged by Julian Pitt-Rivers (1968) in the Mediterranean area, and intimately associated with other concepts such as shame, honour and grace. These are native ideas with a strong moral binding character, typical of a vast region which includes the Near East, North Africa and Southern Europe. It is possible that they date back millennia, being present in Abrahamic traditions, Classical Antiquity, and, perhaps, in Ancient Mesopotamia. In other words, they are the ethical fabric of a world deeply marked by a specific package that includes kings, grains, and livestock (among other things), a world that in great part still defines our modes of thought today.

More recently, in the wake of its revival, the concept of hospitality has revealed a high degree of portability. In particular, it has continued to yield decisive insights in the anthropology of the steppes of Inner Asia, where it becomes inflected by local notions of masterhood and a hierarchical cosmopolitics. For our argument, what is conspicuous is its enduring definition as a form of sovereignty. Adam Chau (2017), for instance, argues that hosting in Imperial China was an expression of the host’s sovereignty over the space with which the hosting was exercised. In the same vein, David Sneath affirms that, for Mongolia during the Qing dynasty, hospitality served « as a mode of inclusion into the cosmopolitical and sociopolitical orders of the day », which consisted of a « nested sovereignty » with the Manchu Emperor at the top (this issue).

In Inner Asia, hospitality seems to provide a singular relational schema that is replicated along a sliding scale, from the micro-scale of the domestic domain to the macro-scale of the State (or vice-versa). Whereas David Sneath favours a top-down movement (the aristocracy defined what hospitality was about and how it should be performed in the domestic space),

1. As the reader most likely will have noticed, our own title is an Amazonized version of the title of Pitt-Rivers’ article.
2. Chau distinguishes hospitality from hosting (this issue), the latter referring to the act of receiving already known guests (invitees), the former referring to the act of receiving strangers. In our text, we use hospitality to denote an orientation toward any kind of guest, and hosting as the set of acts deployed in the enacting of hospitality. In Amazonia, guests are almost never unknown strangers; they are most often allied people invited to participate in a ritual event. Yet even these guests are necessarily marked by a degree of strangeness (otherness). Without a dose of alterity, they would be ritually worthless.
Caroline Humphrey seems to favour a bottom-up movement (hospitality in the domestic space is the simplest model, which is replicated in upper echelons). In both cases, however, there is always a domus where boundaries and «proprietary authority» (Sneath, this issue) are implemented in the name of a sovereign. Returning to the Near East, we find a similar characterisation of hospitality in Shryock’s work in Jordan: «Scaling up and down within this system is constant […]. At all points along these scales, sovereignty is manifest in the ability to act as host» (2012: S24-S25).

In order to approach this issue from an Amazonianist point of view, we must take a step back and focus on another fundamental element in the Asian landscape: the equation between the host-sovereign and the master. The Mongolian term ezen is commonly translated as «master» or «owner», and, according to Rebecca Empson, «is used to denote asymmetrical relations entailing hierarchy and obligation at several different scales or levels» (2019: 268). As in Amazonia, the ezen are multiple and scalable, and are by no means restricted to the domain of intra-human interaction. According to Humphrey «there is no other word for host than master of the household [geriin ejen]» (2012: S65), and according to Sneath (this issue), all the master’s relations in a certain historical period were contained within the «overarching sovereignty of the Qing emperor as ultimate ezen». Masterhood is thus the very foundation of both hospitality and sovereignty in Inner Asia.

Inner Asian masterhood recalls many aspects of Amazonian mastery, but for a few important differences. The first concerns the nested hierarchy in Inner Asia, and its convergence on an apical figure, which confer on the system the character of a pyramidal totality. Despite the multiplicity of masters in both regions, masterhood generates a whole in Inner Asia, whereas in Amazonia mastery generates an entangled and dispersive relational network with imprecise boundaries. Furthermore, whereas in Inner Asia the host-guest relational schema seems to serve as a gradable template for imagining mastery relations, in Amazonia a master is not conceived as host, but mostly as a predatory jaguar which simultaneously feeds, takes care of, and embodies its children. The absence of the «master = host» equation is accompanied by the relatively low productivity of the house as an image of containment and boundary when compared to Inner Asia. The topology of masters containing others is similar in both regions, but in Amazonia concerns primarily the body rather than the house. A final difference is that, in Amazonia, the act of incorporating others (strangers) is predominantly a form of adoption resulting from a predatory act, and is thus rarely an event of hospitality. Rather than receiving and providing,

we find preying and familiarising. In Amazonia, « reproductive vitality » (Da Col 2017) must be captured, extracted from others, in order to produce kinship rather than kingship.

While Amazonian mastery may not fit well into the schema of hospitality, it is similarly at odds with the ideas of sovereignty and domestication. It is in contrast to these two ideas that we will define the Amazonian master in this article. We will build our argument in close dialogue with two magisterial books that contain some of the most sophisticated anthropological theories of sovereignty and domestication: Graeber and Sahlin’s On Kings (2017) and Descola’s Beyond Nature and Culture (2013 [2005]). Finally, in the conclusion, we will return to our comparative endeavour.

One and the Many, One over the Many

« Upon earth there is not his like », we read in the frontispiece of the first edition of Hobbes’ Leviathan, published in 1651. This passage is taken from the Book of Job, and proceeds thus: « who is made without fear. He beholdeth all high things : he is a king over all the children of pride » (King James Bible). The monstrous aquatic being of the Bible, who is a sovereign (over his own kind), appears in the frontispiece as a giant, whose body, except the head, is composed of hundreds of mini-people, all of whom are turned toward him. This giant is not only human, but also a monarch: he wears a crown upon his head, the warrior’s sword in his right hand, the bishop’s staff in his left. He towers above an urban centre with well-tended fields at the back, conveying an image of what civilisation entails: fields, cities, churches, and kings.

The cover of On Kings reproduces many elements of Hobbes’ frontispiece. We find the same monarch with a composite body, holding the same artefacts, and wearing the same crown. However, the scene below him changes radically. Instead of a European village with a church and military fort, enclosed by a wall separating it from the surrounding cultivated fields that extend to the horizon, we find a frozen landscape dotted with igloos and scenes from the daily life of the peoples of the Arctic, in particular seal-hunting. Nothing is cultivated here, and the only relation that implies domestication is that between hunters and their dogs. The meaning of the book’s cover is clear: Hobbes’ anthropomorphic Leviathan also reigns over those to whom we could apply the triple absence that Pero de Magalhães Gandavo attributed to the Tupi of the Brazilian coast in the xvi th century: people « without faith, without law, without ruler » (2008 [1576] : 65). Even among the Inuit, who, unlike the Tupi, did not cultivate their fields, the colossus rises from Earth to the Heavens, as depicted in Hobbes’ frontispiece,
staking his domain. Or, more precisely, it is along this vertical axis, albeit from Heaven to Earth, that Graeber and Sahlins reencounter the Leviathan at the origin of each and every human society.

The cover synthetically conveys the main thesis of On Kings, which can be summarised in five propositions: a) human societies are part of a wider cosmic politeia that encompasses them, there being no boundary between the socius and the cosmos; b) there is always a power hierarchy between humans and non-humans, the latter governing the fate of the former; c) even in those societies that are not hierarchically ordered, there is always a hierarchy within the domain of the meta-humans, which assumes the form of a monarchy (a government of the One over the Many); d) there being no difference between the socius and the cosmos, the meta-human world is not simply imagined, but inscribed in practice and constitutive of real power; e) consequently, all human society is political society, the deep structure of which is the sovereignty of the king.

All societies, even those that have no centralised power, are described as projecting a pyramidal structure, at the top of which stands a sovereign. The government of the One over the Many was imagined before being implemented; or more precisely, since there is no ontological divide between the imaginary institution of society and an instituted society, all human societies are already defined by the notion of sovereignty, regardless of whether they are ruled by a human monarch.

Of all the world’s regions, Amazonia seems to have been the most refractory to this image of government. Despite the imprecision concerning its territorial limits, and the dizzying cultural variety of its indigenous populations, one element seems to have dominated the anthropological imagination, ensuring that Amazonia was kept separate from the Andean Highlands and the Pacific coast: the absence of government. This image of an ante-political society emerged in the context of the expansion of European monarchies into American lands, and proved particularly valuable for contractualist authors such as Thomas Hobbes, who famously wrote:

“...It may peradventure be thought there was never such time nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places where they live so now. For the savage peoples in many places of America, except the government of small families [...] have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before” (1952 [1651]: 85-86).

A century later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1755) returned to the savage peoples of America to provide a more benign view of the absence of government. In any case, whether as positive or negative models, Amerindians were set up as the ground zero of political society. Pierre Clastres’ brilliant
insight was to make this ground zero into a ground -1, which reflected not a lack, but an active refusal: Amerindian societies were to be defined by their rejection of the great divide, of the emergence of the One over the Many. The Clastrean twist (1974) founds a political society that is not anterior to Sovereignty, but against it: there is no state of nature, because Amerindian nature is against the State. It is anti- (rather than ante-) government.

When David Graeber and Marshall Sahlins claim that « the state of nature has the nature of the state » (2017: 3), they provide a further twist: both Hobbes and Clastres sought the State in the wrong place, because it is a meta-human institution, rather than a human one – it is the relation between the human and meta-human worlds that assumes the form of the State. If we are to « take seriously » indigenous cosmopolitics, if we admit that, in fact, human and non-human persons constitute a political collective (in Latourian terms), it follows that we do not need to find asymmetries in the human world for there to be asymmetries in the cosmos. In other words, not even where we find equality among humans is there equality between humans and other-than-human beings.

Our theory of Amazonian mastery has always adopted, as an analytical principle, the non-separation of sociology from cosmology, as first proposed by authors such as Joanna Overing (1983) and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1986). In the 1980s, Amazonianists already used the term « sociocosmology » (a sort of precursor to « cosmopolitics ») to indicate that relations with other-than-human beings was a constitutive part of the indigenous world – not only as it is imagined, but also lived and enacted. However, there were few authors who insisted on the asymmetries that often characterise these relations. As we have observed elsewhere (Fausto 2001, 2012a; Costa 2017a: 4-7; Brightman, Fausto & Grotti 2016), Amazonia was seen as the domain par excellence of symmetrical reciprocity, to the extent that few authors investigated vertical relations with an asymmetrical character.

Egalitarian Jaguar Masters

Our initial inspiration for an Amazonian theory of mastery emerged from the study of a Tupi-Guarani speaking people, the Western Parakaná, inhabitants of the terra firme of the tropical forest, highly specialised hunters of terrestrial mammals, who during the xxth century had abandoned manioc

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4. In the South American case, both Fernando Santos-Granero (1986, 1993) and Philippe Descola (1988) had already argued that Clastres had mistakenly looked for power in chiefs, whereas it is more readily found in shamans or through shamanic activity.

5. And when they did so – as in the works of Peter Rivière (1984) and Terence Turner (1979) – they limited themselves to intra-human relations, with little regard for the transspecific asymmetries.
horticulture and undergone a centrifugal movement veered toward warfare (Fausto 2001, 2012b). When they were submitted to state administration in the 1980s, the Western Parakanã were an extremely egalitarian people: without any chiefs or even headmen, no shamans or any other type of specialist, and no marked asymmetry based on age or gender.

However, at the heart of Parakanã life was an asymmetrical relation with oneiric enemies that defined ritual, onomastics, and the treatment of illnesses. While there were no shamans, there were people who dreamed. Dreams were conceived as an interaction with enemy-others: bestial humans, animals, artefacts, celestial bodies, and meteorological phenomena. These oneiric others did not, however, act as enemies – on the contrary, they gave songs and names, asking for nothing in return. These songs were generically called « jaguar », and dreamers were known as « jaguar-masters » (jawajara). The reciprocal for this designation was « pet » (te'omawa), so that dreamers appeared as the masters of familiarised jaguars. These jaguar-songs were transmitted to a third person to be executed during ritual. The dreamer could not kill his own pet, having to surrender it to a third party, who would become its executioner in the plaza. Once dead, the song lost its potency, meaning that for every new ritual new songs had to be dreamed, appropriated, transmitted, and executed (Fausto 1999, 2012b: 192-193).

In brief, at the heart of the ritual and onomastic life of one of the most egalitarian people in Amazonia, we found an asymmetrical relation modelled on the familiarisation of animals. Inspired by André Georges Haudricourt (1962) and Philippe Descola (1994), we proposed the existence of a close homology between ways of treating animals, plants, and humans in Amazonia, which allowed us to generalise the asymmetrical relation between master and pet beyond the practical activity of familiarising animals. In so doing, we showed that it also schematised other « domains », such as agriculture (Fausto & Neves 2018), kinship (Costa 2017a), warfare, shamanism and ritual (Fausto 2012b), chiefship (Costa 2010), and the historical relations with non-indigenous agents (Fausto 2008; Costa 2017b). We showed, in short, that the mastery relation is a basic cosmopolitical operator in Amazonia, appearing in different forms among most, if not all, the people of the region, and manifests in the most diverse domains of social life. Amazonia, thus, cannot continue to be defined as a province of symmetry.

But what does this mean exactly? Does Graeber and Sahlins’ observation that « There are kingly beings in heaven even where there are no chiefs on earth » also apply to Amazonia (2017: 2)? By forgetting to look upward, did we somehow miss the colossus rising behind the Cordillera? In order to answer these questions, we must first explain in greater detail what we mean by « mastery » in Amazonia.
Our idea of Amazonian mastery can be summarised in five propositions: a) mastery is an asymmetrical relational schema that converges in a native term that means «master», «owner» or «mother/father» and another that means «pet» or «son/daughter/child» (or else the schema is expressed by a genitive construction); b) this schema applies to relations between (human and/or non-human) persons, as well as those between persons and (tangible or intangible) things; c) this relational schema is dynamic and articulates with modes of capturing, generating a movement that we have called «familiarising predation»; d) mastery is a moment in this wider movement of generalised social reproduction, which results from the conversion of symmetrical relations between affines into asymmetrical relations between consanguines; e) it is thus a symmetrical-asymmetrical cosmic schema for producing kinship.

One of the points to be retained is that the relationship established through mastery is one of meta-filiation, in which adoption is a crucial element. The principle means of incorporating the stranger is not hospitality, but capture and familiarisation. The stranger is seized (dead or alive) and converted into the reciprocal term of a relation that produces the captor as a master, who comes to contain or embody his/her pet-child. If predation stands as the key symbol for Amazonia ethnology, it logically presupposes its dynamic consequence: familiarisation and the production of kinship.

The almost exclusive privileging of affinity in Amazonian ethnology (particularly of meta-affinity, an «affinity without affines», as proposed by Viveiros de Castro [1993]) results as much from its unquestionable ethnographic relevance as from a certain theoretical choice, dating back to Lévi-Strauss’ article (1943) on the brother-in-law relationship in South America (Coelho de Souza & Fausto 2004). In alliance theory, consanguinity is seen to be closer to nature, while affinity results from (or rather is the means for) culture proper, thereby occupying a special place in Lévi-Strauss’ kinship theory (Lévi-Strauss 1963 [1958]: 61). However, if we no longer posit a great divide between Nature and Culture, such distinctions

6. More specifically, it often applies to: a) the possession of certain material items and knowledge; b) the relation between parents and adoptive children (especially war captives); c) the relation between the killer and his victim after the killing; d) the relation between pets and their owners; e) the shaman’s relation to auxiliary spirits; f) the relation between chiefs and their followers; g) new relations emerging in the context of conquest and colonisation; h) relations between humans and non-humans; i) the relations internal to the non-human world (Fausto 2012a: 31).

7. In Amazonia there is a further way of moving from meta-affinity to meta-consanguinity, one which retains the symmetry of the former: through relations between formal friends or trade partners which transform a foreign-enemy into a foreign-brother (Viveiros de Castro 1992; Santos-Granero 2007; Fausto 2012d; Taylor 2015).
no longer make much sense. Why should consanguinity be relegated to Nature when even “biological” filiation can be a form of capture and adoption rather than a natural fact (Vilaça 2002; Costa 2017a: chap. III)?

In fact, as Lévi-Strauss reminds us:

« […] if the relationship between “brothers-in-law” is the necessary axis around which the kinship structure is built […] the child is indispensable in validating the dynamic and teleological character of the initial step, which establishes kinship on the basis of and through marriage. Kinship is not a static phenomenon; it exists only in self-perpetuation » (1963 [1958]: 47-48).

If we take kinship to be part of a total system for producing persons, it should be evident why we insist in describing a dynamic schema of capture and familiarisation that includes the conversion of symmetrical affinity into asymmetrical consanguinity. In a sense, this is a transformation of Lévi-Strauss’ atom of kinship, in which there is the passage from brother-in-lawhood to filiation by means of a woman. If same-sex symmetrical affinity is an instance of generalised meta-affinity, actual filiation is an instance of generalised asymmetric meta-consanguinity.

In the next section, we will argue that the schema of familiarising predation in Amazonia describes the movement of « making kin out of others » – to use Vilaça’s apt phrase (2002) – but not of « making kings out of others ». The « G factor » here does make a difference.

Let There Be Many Masters

The configuration of mastery in Amazonia cannot easily be apprehended by the arithmetic of the One over the Many, nor can it be accommodated in the pyramidal and nested model of the Absolute host. One of its prime characteristics is dispersal: there are always too many owners, and only rarely do we find among them a master who towers above all others. Where such figures seem to emerge, such as the Janejará (« our owner ») of the Wayãpi or the mythical hyper-jaguar of the Kanamari, these characters are submitted to a regime of multiplication and dispersal. Thus, in the Wayãpi case, Janejará does not occupy a unique or privileged place, but is merely one owner among many, just as humans are one among many types of existing people (Gallois 1988) 8. In the Kanamari case, the jaguar that contains all beings within itself at the origin of time shatters into diverse fragments that make the historical world possible (Costa 2007: 200-213).

8. According to Dominique Gallois, evangelical missionaries did not appropriate this « personnage » to translate the notion of God. In order to avoid any confusion, they created a new term: Janejaré’e (« our true owner ») (Gallois, personal communication, 2018).
Furthermore, in Amazonia the demiurges remain definitively in the past, not even existing as spirits in this current world, nor making themselves present whenever something uncommon happens. Among the Kuikuro of the Upper Xingu, for instance, the twins Sun and Moon – who, with their creative misunderstandings, produced much of the word as we know it – no longer relate to humans, nor to the myriad animal-spirits that constantly interact with the living, producing illness and, thereby, ritual (Fausto 2012c, 2018).

It is common for researchers in Amazonia to find out that everything has an owner – or, rather, that everything can have an owner: that mountain, that liana grove, that lake, that cultivar, that animal. The topography of owners varies between different indigenous peoples: for some, they pertain to an infra-specific and infra-categorical domain; for others, they are supra-specific and supra-categorical. But the relationship of dominion is always present, the other side of ownership is care. Everything that lacks an owner also lacks care and protection. Thus, for example, the owner of the peccaries is the father of its children-pets, which it releases to be hunted by humans (so long as certain conditions are met). This master is often thought of as the jaguar of the species, containing within itself (or within an enclosure) the anonymous multiplicity of prey-to-be (Gow 2001: 69; Fausto 2007: 509). This world of many masters is not conical, but rather, to use a geographical metaphor, a «sea of hills» with numerous outcrop formations, one rising beside another, reaching different heights without any one towering above the rest – a different topology from the hierarchical Andean landscape of the equally numerous Apu (Ødegaard 2011: 345); or of the sacred mountains and land owners in Mongolia (Empson 2019).

This dispersal of owners is not only limited to the extra-human world, but also inflects different mastery relations in the intra-human world. One of the most characteristic features of Amazonian indigenous warfare, for example, was to make many killers out of few killings. This multiplicative logic was evident in the socialisation of the homicidal act: if a Parakanã warrior fatally wounded an enemy, he called on his companions to pierce the corpse, so that all could later be submitted to the ritual seclusion that would make them «those who have killed humans» (moropiarera) (Fausto 2012b: 162-163). Among the Kayapó and the Wari’, all who took part in a warfare expedition should, indistinctly, be submitted to seclusion (Verswijver 1992: 179; Vilaça 1992: 98). In most cases, killers would familiarise the

10. The image of an enclosure or even a corral into which the master hoards its pets or followers is quite common in contemporary Amazonia (Daillant 1998; Kohn 2007). However, see note 13.
spirit of their victim during seclusion, thereby enabling them to enunciate many songs and names, in an always amplified way.

This logic of dispersal and multiplication applies even to those systems where we find a strong, consolidated chiefship and social hierarchy, as in the Upper Xingu. Among the contemporary Kuikuro there is, indeed, a main chief, who is the « owner of the central plaza » (bugogo oto). He must welcome the dignitaries from other villages or their messengers, proffering a ritual speech that is the prerogative of the executive chiefs. Nonetheless, there are many other owners in the same village – the owner of the men’s house, the owner of the village, the owner of the path that leads to the bathing stream, the owner of the flutes, and owners of all sorts of rituals. The organisation of a multitude of owners is necessary for the system to function, even if all these relations converge in the centre of the plaza, where the main chief is to be found. The plaza is also the centre for the ritual articulation of mastery relations with spirits, so that political and cosmic power coincides (Fausto in press). The chief, however, is hardly ever the actual owner of the central plaza of other Kuikuro villages, much less of those in other Xinguano villages. Even where we find compelling chiefship and hierarchy, there are still centrifugal forces of dispersal that offset Oneness.

**Spirits with Gaping Mouths**

The fact that the world has too many owners raises a number of problems for humans. After all, to produce children, to make food, to cure the ill, multiple powerful persons must be engaged with. These owners do not compose a fixed and definitive cartography, nor are they arranged in a clear-cut hierarchy, meaning that it is not possible to negotiate with one owner in the name of all others. Amerindian shamans know this only too well. Allow us here to repeat the words of a Chukchi specialist, registered by Waldemar Bogoras and reproduced by Sahlins (2017 : 34):

« We are surrounded by enemies. Spirits always walk about with gaping mouths. We are always cringing, and distributing gifts on all sides, asking protection of one, giving ransom to another, and unable to obtain anything whatever gratuitously » (Bogoras 1904-1909 : 298).

With some modifications, this passage would be corroborated by most, if not all, Amazonian shamans: we are indeed surrounded by enemies, and this is why we must weave relations with numerous owners. This similarity comes as no surprise. The Chukchi are a Siberian people whose traditional subsistence activity was reindeer-hunting. Like native Amazonians, they are better described as practicing a sort of « hunting » shamanism rather than a
«pastoral» one (Hamayon 1990). Pedersen’s distinction (2001) between the ontologies of northern North Asia and southern North Asia is apposite here. According to him, the former are predominantly animistic and associated with horizontal social formations, whereas the latter are predominantly totemistic and associated with vertical social formations. The further point we are making, however, is that even the horizontal systems are based on mastery relations, albeit ones that are dispersive and non-totalising in nature.

It is not only dispersion that typifies the world of Amazonian masters, but also the risk of the relations of dominion being inverted: the master always runs the risk of becoming a pet. This ambiguity seems to be inherent to mastery relations established with enemies, whether human or other-than-human. It is particularly salient in homicide seclusion (Fausto 1999, 2012b: 169-172): instead of familiarising his victim, the killer might be familiarised by it, thereby coming to see his own kinspeople as enemies. This is the misfortune of the savage master to which Pierre Clastres (1980) refers: by killing so much, familiarising so many, the warrior definitively becomes an other, attacking his own people, or offering himself up to his enemy (Sterpin 1993).

Much like warfare, illness also involves a process of capture and familiarisation by another collective (in this case non-human), which effects an undesired metamorphosis: as the patient dies, in the eyes of his kinspeople, he is being transformed and made into a kinsperson by the pathogenic agents. To reverse this process, shamans must intervene through their non-human sons and/or pets, who aid them in confronting, overcoming, or negotiating with the pathogenic agents: «distributing gifts on all sides, asking protection of one, giving ransom to another» (Bogoras 1904-1909: 298). Among the Kuikuro, the pathogenic relation is the constant source of the dispersal of the human person: with each disease, one’s double is captured by other-than-human beings. The shaman must recover this double, but, once the person has been unfolded, he or she will come to experience a multiple existence. A double will always live with the pathogenic agents, constituting another family there. This relation will be made visible through ritual that belongs to these other-than-human beings, but which the former patient will now own. Like any good owner, he or she must now feed their spirit-pets by sponsoring their feast, which also confers prestige in the eyes of his or her kinspeople (Fausto 2018; Barcelos Neto 2008).

Every sick person is in small part a shaman (and every shaman is necessarily someone who has been cured). Indeed, becoming a shaman may be more dangerous than becoming a warrior, since shamans need to establish mastery relations with beings who are more powerful than they are. As the Yanomami shaman and thinker Davi Kopenawa tells us:
“[…] a shaman’s spirits call him “father” because they live by his side and he feeds them with the yÃckoana powder […]. Having eaten their fill, they joyfully exclaim: “Our father treats us well! He knows how to answer our words!” But if they are starving and exasperated, they feel mistreated and eventually go back to where they came from, never to return” (Kopenawa & Albert 2013: 69).

The spirits place themselves in the dominion of the shaman – they choose their master, or respond positively to their master’s capacity to feed them. This adoption, always ambivalent, carries with it the seeds of its own inversion.

Such ambiguity is characteristic of all-powerful mastery relations, which always require the mastering of other masters (High 2018). It is also characteristic of the relationship between hosts and guests, both in the Mediterranean and in Inner Asia. In fact, one of the trending topics in the current literature on hospitality is the ambivalence, already noted by Pitt-Rivers (1968), of hosts and guests forever on “a knife-edge between suspicion and trust” (Candea & Da Col 2012: S5). From the host’s point of view, who would be the perfect guest? An entirely tamed other, a domesticated animal? Perhaps we go too far in our homologies, but if mastery in Amazonia is not a form of sovereignty, what can we say about its relation to domestication? If the master is not a host, is the pet a sort of domestic animal? What kind of relation is entailed between a master and its dependent? To answer these questions, we turn to the work of Philippe Descola, who interprets Amazonian mastery as an anti-domestication.

The Spectre of Domestication

Dispersed and multiple, mastery also has a high degree of portability, occupying the centre of creative processes throughout the region. Masters provide life, they enable growth, they protect and shelter, they become beautiful as they make others beautiful, and they achieve mastery by converting pervasive predation into precious kinship. Why, then, have they remained marginal to theories of Amazonian society? There are many possible explanations for the sidelining of mastery: its link with a purportedly “natural” consanguinity in structuralist theories of kinship; its vertical orientation in an ethnographic area where horizontal relations are prominent; its constitutive asymmetry in a world conceived as basically symmetrical. None of these, however, really justify why mastery should be deemed to have a low level of theoretical yield. At best, they make this relegation understandable. In order to tackle the problem we will now turn to Philippe Descola’s theory of animism, which is arguably the only synthetic theory to provide an explicit justification for why mastery is supposedly a minor relational schema in Amazonian ethnology.
The same fact that has made mastery so visible to ethnographers has also made it a theoretical hurdle for comparative-minded Amazonianists: its interspecific scope, as evident in its capacity to structure relations between animal masters and their progeny, humans and their pets, and shamans and their familiar spirits. For some reason, this recurrence of very similar relations of adoptive filiation that are «interspecific» (spirit/animals; humans/pets; humans/spirits) has had the rather odd effect of inspiring researchers to investigate pet-keeping against the spectre of domestication, our own Western prototype of what an asymmetrical interspecific relation looks like. This focus on domestication has made shamanic familiarisation seem less problematic than pet-keeping. The relation between shaman and familiar spirit blends mastery with elements of alliance or diplomacy, due mostly to the fact that the familiarised spirit is typically more powerful than the shaman (Costa 2017b: 49-52). Furthermore, shamanic familiarisation is an obviously more productive or creative relation, capable of causing death or healing. By contrast, pet-keeping does not seem to serve any purpose, thus lending itself to being conceived as a placeholder for a virtual relation of domestication (much like the chief serves as a placeholder for the State in Clastrean political anthropology, as we will see shortly).

The first author to adopt a different perspective was Philippe Erikson (1987), who posited that pet-keeping was an «intellectual counterweight» to hunting, a means to rectify the imbalance in relations between humans and non-humans created by predation. In other words, it appeared as a sort of human trick to offset a practical asymmetry. This explanation of pet-keeping was criticised by Philippe Descola (1994), who follows André Georges Haudricourt (1962) in correlating the treatment of nature and humans, an endeavour that resulted in the monumental treatise that is Beyond Nature and Culture (2013 [2005]). Although we follow Descola’s inspiration, it is noteworthy that his critique undid some of the gains of Erikson’s interpretation: while the latter offered a theory grounded in hunting, transversal to any notion of «domestication», and hence closer to Amazonian realities, Descola resitutates the problem of pet-keeping against the possibility of animal domestication.11

We know that no animal species has probably ever been fully domesticated in Amazonia, even though «throughout Amazonia, Amerindians cohabit in their homes in perfect harmony with many species of animals»

11. The theoretical inspiration for Descola’s critique may have played a role here. Haudricourt’s seminal article (1962) is about plant and animal domestication – the opening line itself situates the question in light of the Neolithic Revolution. What Haudricourt explores is how different types of domestication correlate with ways of governing people. For a discussion on the Neolithic in Amazonia, see Eduardo Neves (2016) and Carlos Fausto & Eduardo Neves (2018).
These pets are typically associated with a specific owner, usually a woman or a child, who feeds them. The process of taming involves making pets grow accustomed to the domestic environment, all the while making them dependent on the provisioning of their owner. In all cases, pets come to be associated with children, orphaned from their dead parents, and raised by their adoptive « mothers ». Their movement is indeed often restricted by fencing or ropes (at least during some stages of the taming process). They hardly ever reproduce in captivity, nor are they encouraged to do so. Moreover, pets are almost never eaten, certainly not by those that own them\(^\text{12}\).

This does not look like « the reduction to a state of domesticity of “a succession of individual animals produced one from another, under human control” », to take Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire’s definition of domestication as used by Descola (2013 [2005] : 380). Amerindians would have refused to cross the boundary « between the taming of game animals and their domestication » (Ibid. : 382). However, they have imagined it, envisaging domestication as a possibility contained in the world of the spirit masters and their animals, who demonstrate full-blown animal husbandry: control over the reproductive behaviour and movement of their « children », which are raised as livestock by and for their owners, who do not only care for their propagation but also feed off them (Ibid.)\(^\text{13}\).

For Philippe Descola (Ibid. : 385), one of the evidences for a conceptual limitation to domestication lies in the continued influence of the animal masters over the pets raised by humans. Since most captured animals are already domesticated by their masters, humans can only act as surrogates who pretend to manage what the animal masters never actually relinquished to them. By mimicking the behaviour of spirit masters, native Amazonians would « “play” at being livestock-raisers, possessing all the required zoological and ecological skills but without pushing such behaviour to its logical conclusion » (Ibid. : 383). Viewed as ghettos of pseudo- or truncated domestication, the vertical relations of protection and care that sustain animal masters and pet-owners are framed as doubly insignificant: from a dominant relational form in the ethnographically restricted domain of « animal masters », they shift to a curtailed relational form in a phenomenologically proximate domain of pet-keeping.

\(^\text{12}\). For discussions of Amazonian pet-keeping practices, see: Luiz Costa (2017a : 30-41); Philippe Erikson (1987); Anne-Christine Taylor (2000); Felipe Vander Velden (2012).

\(^\text{13}\). This « envisaging » should be read with care. Although the figures of the animal masters are certainly very ancient, as attested by their distribution throughout the Americas, the details of how these masters relate to their eponymous animal species vary significantly, and in many cases may incorporate observations of post-Columbian livestock-breeding. For a similar view on the masters of animals as « spiritual pastoralists », see Tim Ingold (2015 : 25).
Descola’s reasoning can be approximated to a wonderful passage in *Tristes Tropiques*, where Claude Lévi-Strauss posits that the graphic art of Kadiweu women is «like the phantasm of a society ardently and insatiably seeking a means of expressing symbolically the institutions it might have, if its interests and superstitions did not stand in the way» (1973 [1955]: 197). Amazonian people too would express, through the realm of animal masters, the institution (domestication) that they might have, were it not for the ontological constraints that inhibited its development. This line of reasoning finds a parallel with Clastres’ argument in *La Société contre l’État* (1974), where Amerindian social institutions are measured in terms of an idea that they struggle against, whether this be the State or, in Descola’s case, domestication.\(^{14}\)

We have adopted a different perspective in our work, taking familiarisation as an Amerindian institution in its own right, one with a number of consequences. Instead of taking pet-keeping as a practice to be read against animal-herding, we view it as an instance of positive interspecific relations that also schematises a number of other relations, such as that between shamans/spirits, chiefs/followers, warrior/victims, parents/children, as well as animal masters and their progeny.\(^{15}\) Here, we have to dwell on some of Descola’s claims about this latter relation. It is certainly true that in Amazonia most animal masters stimulate the reproduction of their herd and liberate them for human consumption. The earliest studies of animal masters in the Northwest Amazon focused precisely on how human shamans negotiated the release of game with animal masters in exchange for human souls, and how this process was framed in the idiom of cosmic reproduction (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1971: 80-86). However, in our experience, there are few instances in which animal masters actually feed on the individuals of their herd.\(^{16}\) On the contrary, animal masters normally feed their herd, and throughout Amazonia feeding is a key mechanism for producing asymmetrical relations of dependency.\(^{17}\)

\(^{14}\) The argument can also be approximated to Graeber and Sahlins’ meta-human kingship, with the difference that, for them, to imagine is equal to instituting.

\(^{15}\) We do not want to give the impression that pet-keeping is a model for these other mastery relations. Instead, it is a mastery relation in its own right, which magnifies the pet-keeper by creating a dependence of the pet for its owner. On how pet-keeping magnifies the owner as it restricts the development of the pet, see Luiz Costa (2017a: 30-41, 120-128).

\(^{16}\) Except for the Achuar (Descola 2013 [2005]: 258), and possibly other Jivaroan groups, all descriptions of animal masters that we know of affirm the absence of predation between animal masters and their progeny. Animal masters instead prey on humans when one of their wards is harmed without the kill having first been negotiated or otherwise addressed. See, among others: Robert Murphy (1958: 13-17); Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff (1971: 83); Gerald Weiss (1975: 263-264); Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1992: 346, n. 34); Dimitri Karadimas (1997: 555-556); Marco Antonio Gonçalves (2001: 321); Peter Gow (2001: 69-70); Suzanne Oakdale (2008).

\(^{17}\) See Holly High’s discussion (2018) on the Lao notion of *liang*, which has many parallels with feeding in Amazonia.
Similarly, it does not seem to us that animal masters retain much control over the pets that humans raise\textsuperscript{18}. For one, the relation between animal masters and individual specimens is often mediated by what Descola calls « prototype figures » (2013 [2005] : 18), including, for instance, the chief of a peccary herd or the largest caiman in a lake, which stand between the animal master and their underlings\textsuperscript{19}. Infant animals are, moreover, typically orphaned when they are captured by hunters – and hence lose their proximate feeders, allowing humans to act as surrogates. All of this generally estranges the pet from its species: the Pirahá, for example, say that a pet monkey loses its ability to communicate with animals of its (former) species, failing, for instance, to recognise or react to their calls (Gonçalves 2001 : 340-341); the Cofán have no problem feeding squirrel monkey meat to a pet squirrel monkey, because, as they say, it has become an \textit{a'i}, a Cofán, and squirrel monkeys are no longer its conspecifics (Cepek 2012 : 57).

In brief, the fact that pet-keeping is analysed in relation to animal mastery, and both are interpreted against theories of domestication, extirpates certain instantiations of mastery from the relational schema more generally. Why, after all, is pet-keeping interpreted in relation to the bond between animal masters and their progeny, rather than that between shamans and familiar spirits, parents and children, chiefs and followers, bosses and clients? Indeed, the isolation of pet-keeping and animal mastery from the wider field of meta-filial relations creates the illusion that these two exemplars of mastery are somehow self-contained and distinct from other relations of the same sort, thereby obscuring how other actualisations of mastery, such as that between shaman and familiar spirit, affect the owner/pet and animal master/progeny pair.

Whenever the Kanamari gut a white-lipped peccary and find a bezoar, they know that they have killed the chief of the herd. In fact, the bezoar itself is the master of the herd, and the animal which carried it was a vessel (they call it \textit{a-hai}, « its flesh »), or a prototype figure, since the Kanamari recognise that, by bearing the master within it, it must be the chief of the herd. The bezoar needs to be taken by a shaman, who will store it in a box or a pouch, and feed it tobacco snuff to prevent it from causing illness. The shaman thus comes to have control over an animal master (rather than having control over the master's progeny, as in pet-keeping), and he can use it as hunting magic. The shaman travels to a salt lick and places the master of the peccaries

\textsuperscript{18} This contrasts with the power that masters of cultivated plants – which are technically domesticated – continue to have over their plants in human gardens (Morim de Lima 2016; Oliveira 2006; Silva 2009). Here we have overlapping, or perhaps nested, relations of ownership, which are somewhat different from the more exclusive ownership created through pet-keeping practices although they may be conceptualised in similar ways (Fausto & Neves 2018).

\textsuperscript{19} See also Isabelle Daillant (2003 : 303).
(qua bezoar) in a secluded spot. At his bidding, the master then summons its herd to the salt lick, where hunters are waiting to ambush it. In contrast to the animal master under the shaman’s control, a pet peccary under the control of an owner cannot summon peccaries toward it, since it has no relation to its former conspecifics. Descola’s argument elides this complex topology, where animal masters who dwell within prototype figures own a herd, and then become the pets of shamans who trick them into summoning their former pets back to them, so that human hunters may kill their prey.

We do not suppose that mastery relations remain always identical across these domains. However, we feel that an appeal to domestication as a virtual horizon of mastery is misdirected, since it places the latter within the purview of a technique that was marginal in the region, and hence can only conclude that mastery is, *ipso facto*, also marginal. In this way, as we hinted above, Philippe Descola seems to follow Clastres’ lead, but in the key of interspecific relations. Where for Clastres the essence of Amazonian societies blocks the emergence of the State, for Descola it is animism as an ontology that blocks full-blown domestication (which, for Haudricourt, is homologous to a form of government) in the region. As a consequence, neither Amazonian forms of chiefship nor familiarisation are analysed in their own right, but rather measured against other institutions, which most native Amazonian peoples probably never knew existed; or are deemed to have imaginatively projected onto relations between non-humans; or only came to know through contact with non-Amerindians.

The two issues are part of the same political science: domestication and the State are seen as two sides of the same coin, or two stages in the same sweeping process of political centralisation, demographic growth, heightened sedentarism, and so forth (Bender 1989) – even if recent research has gone some way toward complicating this teleological narrative (Wengrow & Graeber 2018). We would argue that, just as Clastres’ (negative) fixation on the State hinders the expansion of our imagination as to what an Amazonian politics looks like (Santos-Granero 1986, 1993; Descola 1988), so domestication obstructs the emergence of a theory of Amazonian societies that ceases to take familiarisation and ensuing ownership as epiphenomena of «dominant» social processes, such as predation and exchange.

**Reversible and Irreversible Animism**

Although Descola’s take on mastery against the backdrop of domestication pre-dates *Beyond Nature and Culture*, it assumes a new meaning in light of it, since the book makes clear that the mastery relation does not fit comfortably within an animist ontology, deemed predominant in Amazonia.
(or more precisely, within the spectrum of relations with which animism is compatible). Most discussions of Beyond Nature and Culture have focused on the fourfold schema of « ontologies » or « modes of identification ». However, as Philippe Descola makes clear, his model also depends on the articulation of the ontologies with « relational schema » (2013 [2005], 2014 : 296). It is the different ways in which modes of identification integrate with the relational schema that generate patterns of commonalities and differences, establishing the contours that define and separate sociocultural forms – the « societies » or « cultures » that have traditionally interested anthropologists, sociologists and historians.

Philippe Descola partitions the relational schema into two sets that together account for all concrete sociocultural realisations (2013 [2005] : 113). On the one hand, there is the set made up of potentially reversible relations between terms that are of the same « ontological status ». On the other, there is the set made up of univocal relations that are founded upon connections between non-equivalent terms, relations that « presuppose a hierarchy between terms whose ontological disparity is rendered effective by the very action that one exerts upon the other in the relationship » (Ibid. : 393). Descola discusses six relations, three from each set, which are paradigmatic of the range of variability made possible within each group. He summarises this in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations of similarity between equivalent terms</th>
<th>Relations of connection between nonequivalent terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symmetry</td>
<td><strong>EXCHANGE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative asymmetry</td>
<td><strong>PREDATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive asymmetry</td>
<td><strong>GIFT</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of relationships according to the type of relations that exist between the terms involved (in Descola 2013 [2005] : 334)

In Amazonian animism, the only relational schemas that can become dominant are those in the first column, which require horizontal equivalence between the terms put into relation. Of course, the relations in the second column, those that connect nonequivalent terms, can occur in restricted
relational contexts within animism. They can even take centre stage in certain interactional contexts, but they remain subordinate to the horizon of the dominant relational schema, and are thus subject to the whims of « individual idiosyncrasy, the unpredictability of feelings, and the arbitrariness of conventions» (Descola 2013 [2005]: 335, 359-361). If we were to follow this schema, mastery would emerge as one of these relations of connection between non-equivalent terms that can, according to Descola’s theory, only be marginal, in the double sense of being restricted and relatively barren of social potentialities. It is worth quoting Descola at length as to why animism is incompatible with relations such as mastery as a central relational schema:

«In animist cosmologies, in which entities of equal status are defined by the position that they occupy vis-à-vis one another, the only structuring relations possible are those that operate with potentially reversible links between subjects, whether human or nonhuman, whose identities are not affected by the realization of the relations that bring them together: that is to say, the relations of predation, exchange, or gift giving. Conversely, intransitive relations of the production, transmission, or protective type are bound to remain marginal given that they presuppose a hierarchy between terms whose ontological disparity is rendered effective by the very action that one exerts upon another within the relationship. With gift giving, exchange, and predation one subject ratifies the other; with production, protection, and transmission, the subject establishes a dependent subject or subordinate object» (Ibid.: 393, our italics).

We feel, on the contrary, that Amazonian animism will always remain only partly understood unless we can account for how mastery relations are a moment in the process of producing the «animist subject». In other words, we are faced with an animism that is unworkable without a relation that registers, establishes, and/or maintains an asymmetry between terms. This relation indexes a directional bond between two persons, which are relatively defined through an asymmetry of agency: the master is the one who contains, feeds, and protects its pet. The master is magnified by this fact for it can align its pet’s actions to its own 20. It thus appears as the agent before a passive target, although the target may be the source of its action or the condition of his acting (Strathern 1988). And herein lies the main question, which has always been at the core of a number of misunderstandings: is mastery a reversible or irreversible relation? The plain answer is: it is a directional relation, which in the Amazonian case – especially when it refers to powerful others (such as warriors and spirits) – is ambivalent, since it contains the seeds of directional inversion, but not reversibility. Let us make this point clear: the standard symmetrical model implies a sort of

20. It is in this sense that mastery magnifies and accrues creative capacities: «in Amazonia the magnification of persons is anchored in the capacity to align the affective dispositions and intentions of other individuals to one’s own» (Taylor 2015: 144).
alternation, as in gift-giving: the one who gives will receive in the future, as if both actions finally cancel each other out, producing a balanced world of symmetrical reciprocity. In our model, directional events are not cancelled. The direction can be inverted, but two predatory acts are not equal to mutual exchange between equivalent subjects. This is the asymmetry in question\textsuperscript{21}.

The directional event redefines both terms of the relation. It is not simply an incorporation of alterity. In Amazonia, ownership is always an altership, since the master only magnifies itself by aligning the agency of alien subjects to its own (Fausto 2012a). Indeed, what we intend to posit is a more complex sociocosmic integration than the articulation of a mode of identification with a relational schema. To square our terminology with Descola’s, we might say that mastery is a means of converting predation, a negative asymmetry between equivalent terms, into metafilialation, a spatial connection between nonequivalent terms. It creates a bridge between the two sets of relational schema, but it does so by creating the conditions for a mode of identification (which is also a mode of alteration) between master and pet.

In short, mastery cannot easily be accommodated within Descola’s theory without being treated as a minor relation, contradicting the available ethnography, which amply attests to its centrality in Amazonia. Part of the problem is that, for Descola, relations are external to the modes of identification. But mastery, as we define it, has a different topology. It is not a relation external to the « animist subject », but rather a relation internal to the constitution of animism’s complex subjects: shaman and spirit, mother and child, spirit master and progeny, woman and pet, and so forth, all create each other through meta-filial relations. And these relations create very specific sorts of subjects: the first term of the relation is magnified; his, her, or its capacity to affect social processes is enhanced through the second term of each relational pair, which becomes dependent on the master and has its agency restricted in terms of the former’s capacities. Ultimately, mastery not only cuts through the opposition between Descola’s two sets of relational schema, but also through that between the « ontologies » and the relational schema themselves. In other words, our directional animism implies at the same time a mode of identification and a relational schema, or, more precisely, the production of a certain mode of asymmetrical identification by means of a relational schema.

\textsuperscript{21} Not all mastery relations can have their directionality inverted. For most native Amazonians, pet-keeping is a one-way relation. For the Kanamari, relations of filiation are also, strictly speaking, unidirectional (Costa 2017a: 120-135). For the Arawá-speaking Jarawara and Jamamadi, relations with cultivated plants can be inverted: the soul of the plants that one cultivates in life will care for the soul of their former master in the afterworld (Maizza 2014). This contrasts with relations with one’s human children, which, as with the Kanamari, cannot be inverted (Shiratori 2018: 305, n. 135).
A Brief Look Up at the Mountains

We began this article by discussing sovereignty and conclude it with a discussion of hierarchy, an element that plays a significant role in Descola’s distinction between animism and analogism, since the «connection between non-equivalent terms» often implies a hierarchical structure between ranked terms. When we move from an animistic environment to an analogistic one, as when we ascended the Andes from Amazonia, we began to encounter new social institutions, such as hierarchy, domestication, and sacrifice, which are only marginally present in the tropical forest.

Whereas this seems to be true for South America, Kaj Århem has recently argued that, in South-East Asia, animism seems to be compatible not only with egalitarian and horizontal systems, but also with social forms that are evidently hierarchical. According to him, animism is as much characteristic of the egalitarian Chewong as the centralised Toraja, passing through intermediate forms which are typical of village communities with sedentary farming: «the rice-growing and livestock-rearing community in which domestic animals have replaced wild game in terms of social, economic and ritual significance» (2015: 19). In Århem’s model, animal domestication is a central element in differentiating between two forms of animism: a venatic one characteristic of the Chewong; and a hierarchical one everywhere else.22 The predominance of livestock husbandry over hunting would thus express a sociological limit, but not an ontological one, since both can be accommodated within animism, which is here defined by reference to a universalised subjectivity (Ibid.: 16).

In Århem’s view, both domestication and sacrifice (as a ritual practice characteristic of a pastoral mentality) may also fall within the scope of animism. This takes up a discussion that harks back to the seminal contributions of Tim Ingold (1986, 2000) and Roberte Hamayon (1990) on the difference between how hunters and herders relate to animals. The current trend is to avoid yet another great divide, suggesting a gradation between hunting and herding, conceived as a continuum between the poles of «autonomy» and «domination»23. The first pole is inextricably linked to the subjectivising encounter of the hunt, while the second is linked to the objectivising control over animals, which would be typical of domestication in the Near East. The latter model is, in turn, associated with the sovereignty of ancient states and monotheism, where we finally encounter an Absolute Host and a Perfect Guest. With Christianity, this pair

22. Following Marshall Sahlins (2014), Kaj Århem refers to a «hierarchical animism», but, curiously, its counterpart is not an «egalitarian animism», but what he qualifies as «venatic» or «immanent».

merges. If, as Chau (this issue) argues, God the Father is the Absolute Host, we would add that God the Son is the perfect guest, who offers himself up in sacrifice, like a tamed lamb, to his human hosts.

In their inescapable predilection for pet-keeping and the multiple worlds of the masters, the indigenous peoples of Amazonia provide an important counterpoint to this literature. Amazonian animism is neither horizontal nor symmetrical, as held in the standard model or in that proposed by Kaj Århem; on the contrary, it necessarily implies asymmetrical relations of mastery which may (but need not) be associated with hierarchical social forms. Many of our colleagues have read our work in the key of hierarchy and domination, even though we have always referred to asymmetry and dominion. We do so not because there cannot be, nor because there have never been, relations of hierarchy and domination in indigenous Amazonia, but because our model applies even to those people among whom such relations are undoubtedly lacking. What we are describing is a relational cell, which is articulated to relations of a symmetrical character. This set is our sociocosmic atom, the atom of meta-kinship: the symmetrical relation of meta-affinity that is converted into an asymmetrical relation of meta-filiation.

In our effort to define a positive value for mastery, independently of the notions of sovereignty and domestication, we have put emphasis on interspecific relations of predation and familiarisation rather than on sociological relations of hospitality. In Amazonia, the relation between host and guest seems to be of limited productivity, though it can be glimpsed in another, more fundamental form: that between master and pet (or adoptive child).

Émile Benveniste offers an interesting etymology for the Indo-European protoform *poti, which lies behind the term « host ». In its original sense, it was associated with personal identity and to the « master who is eminently “himself” », that is, ipsissimius (2016 [1969]: 61). In Amazonia, the master condition also leads to the enhanced selfhood (Taylor 1996: 209) that we call « magnification ». However, the production of this enhanced selfhood depends on the incorporation of alterity, meaning that the Amazonian master is a magnified Self without being an « I » identical to itself. Here, there is no equation between ipse (self) and idem (same) (Ricœur 1990). In the world of classic hospitality, according to Derrida, power « is nothing other than ipseity itself, the same of the selfsame, to say nothing of the subject which is a stabilizing and despotic escalation of ipseity, the being oneself or the Selbst. The question of hospitality is also the question of ipseity » (2000: 15). The alter-ating configuration of Amazonian mastery may be one of the crucial elements for us to understand its constitutive ambivalence and decentring movement, which tends to promote dispersion rather than concentration.
All this is good. However, as in Hobbes’ frontispiece, every Amazonianist also glimpses the colossus that rises from behind the mountains. For us, these mountains can only be the Andes. If the savage peoples of the tropical forest seemed so odd to the eyes of their European conquerors, Andean sociopolitical systems appeared much more familiar. After all, they had sovereignty, divine kingship, temples, animal domestication, urban centres – everything, in brief, that defines the package of civilisation. Amazonian people were thus read against this package – or, to be more exact, against the European reading of this Andean package. Can we do the opposite: to ascend the Andes with Amazonian baggage? What if we started from mastery and sought to determine under what conditions its relational cell began to take on different attributes: to coagulate rather than disperse; to unify rather than multiply; to become over-rigid rather than vacillating; to become, in sum, a mechanism for the construction of the government of the One over the Many?

Universidade federal do Rio de Janeiro
Programa de pós-graduação em sociologia & antropologia (PGSAS), Rio de Janeiro (Brasil)
luizcosta10@gmail.com

Universidade federal do Rio de Janeiro
Museu nacional, Rio de Janeiro (Brasil)
cfausto63@gmail.com


24. For essays in this direction, see: Denise Arnold & Christine Hastorf (2008); George Lau (2012). See also Susan Ramírez (2005) and Verónica Lema (2014).
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Luiz Costa & Carlos Fausto, The Enemy, the Unwilling Guest and the Jaguar Host: An Amazonian Story. — Despite its purported universality, hospitality has little ethnographic and theoretical yield in Amazonia, being neither an important indigenous idiom, nor an abstract sociocosmic operator. Why is this the case? Why is hospitality so important in Eurasia, and not in Amazonia? In this article we argue that hospitality’s close connection to the twin concepts of sovereignty and domestication precludes its acclimatisation to the South American Lowlands. It further analyses the notion of mastery, present both in Eurasia and Amazonia, in order to show that, in the latter case, mastery and its attending relations must be conceptualized independently of both sovereignty and domestication.